&EPA
United States
Environmental Protection
Agency
RESEARCH REPORT
Decontamination, Cleanup, and Associated
Issues for Sites Contaminated with Chemical,
Biological, or Radiological Materials
Office of Research and Development
National Homeland Security
Research Center
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EPA/600/R-05/083
October 2005
Workshop on
Decontamination, Cleanup, and
Associated Issues for Sites
Contaminated With Chemical, Biological,
or Radiological Materials
by
Sarah Dun
Eastern Research Group, Inc.
Lexington, MA 02421
Joseph Wood
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
Office of Research and Development
National Homeland Security Research Center
Decontamination and Consequence Management Division
Research Triangle Park, NC 27511
Blair Martin
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
Office of Research and Development
National Risk Management Research Laboratory
Research Triangle Park, NC 27511
Contract No. EP-C-04-056
Office of Research and Development
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
Cincinnati, OH 45268
Recycled/Recyclable
Printed with vegetable-based ink on
paper that contains a minimum of
50% post-consumer fiber content
processed chlorine free
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ii NHSRC
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Note
The majority of this report was prepared by Sarah Dun of Eastern Research
Group, Inc. (ERG), an EPA contractor, as a general record of discussion for
the "Workshop on Decontamination, Cleanup, and Associated Issues for
Sites Contaminated With Chemical, Biological, or Radiological Agents."
Joseph Wood was coauthor and editor of technical content. This report
captures the main points of scheduled presentations and summarizes
discussions among the workshop panelists, but it does not contain a
verbatim transcript of all issues discussed.
The production of this document has been funded wholly by the
United States Environmental Protection Agency under Contract No. EP-
C-04-056 to ERG.
Decontamination Workshop iii
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Table of Contents
List of Abbreviations and Acronyms vi
Executive Summary viii
Introduction xvii
1. Opening Remarks 1
2. Presentations and Associated Question and Answer Periods 3
DHS S&T Biological and Chemical Restoration Programs 3
Crime Scene Management and WMD Terrorism 5
CDC/NIOSH and Health Response to Biothreat Agents:
Environmental Monitoring 6
Ranking Threats for Decontamination Research 7
OPP Sterilant Registration Project: Improving the
Association of Official Analytical Chemists (AOAC)
Sporicidal Activity Test and the Evaluation of
Quantitative Methods 9
Crisis Exemptions for Products Intended to Inactivate Bacillus
anthracis 10
Sampling and Clearance Lessons Learned 12
The Use of the Trace Atmospheric Gas Analyzer (TAGA) to
Qualitatively and Quantitatively Monitor Ambient
Air for Chemical Warfare Agents (CWAs) and
Decontamination Agents in Real Time at Parts per
Trillion by Volume Levels or Below 14
Insurance and Indemnity Issues 15
The Role of the On-Scene Coordinator in the Process 16
Introduction to the Government Decontamination Services 17
Laboratory Capacity Issues 18
Chlorine Dioxide Fumigation and Liquid Chlorine Dioxide 20
STERIS Chem-Bio Decontamination 22
Vaporous Hydrogen Peroxide (VHP) for Room/Building
Decontamination Following Chemical or Biological
Agent Attack: Overview of Efficacy and
Practical Issues 23
Whole-Structure Decontamination of Bacterial Spores by
Methyl Bromide Fumigation 24
DF-200 Decontamination of CBW Agents, Other Biological
Pathogens, and Toxic Industrial Chemicals 25
Capitol Hill Ricin Incident: Decontamination Dilemmas 26
Restoration from Decontamination: USPS Experience 28
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Another Look at Chlorine Dioxide Fumigation:
Concentration-Times, Efficacy Tests, and Biological
Indicators 30
Innovative and Emerging Decontamination Technologies 31
Systematic Decontamination Project: Homeland Security
Verification of Chemical and Biological
Decontamination Technologies 33
Use of HVAC Systems in Building Decontamination 33
Building Disinfection Byproducts: Experimental Evaluation
and Decision Tool 35
Evaluation of Two Biological Decontamination Methods in
a Room-Sized Test Chamber 36
Verification of Commercial Decontamination Technologies
in Bench-Scale Studies Using B. anthracis Spores 37
Technical Support Working Group Decontamination
Research and Development Activities 39
"Dirty Bombs" (Radiological Dispersion Devices [RDDs])
and Cleanup 41
Radiological and Nuclear Terror: Technical Aspects and
Implications for Decontamination and Site
Cleanup 42
UK Approach to ROD Cleanup 44
3- Panel Discussion—Lessons Learned 47
Information Sharing and Agency Coordination 47
Preparedness 48
Sampling and Analytical Issues 49
Decontamination Process 49
4. Panel Discussion—Research and Development Needs 51
5. Appendices 55
Appendix A: Agenda 55
Appendix B: List of Participants 58
Appendix C: Presentation Slides 62
Decontamination Workshop v
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List of Abbreviations and Acronyms
ANL
ARL
ASTM
ATSDR
BASIS
o/^1
C
CARC
Ci
CDC
cm2
CWA
DCMD
DDAP
DEFRA
DHS
DIMP
DoD
DoE
ECBC
eLRN
EPA
ETV
°F
FBI
FIFRA
ft2
ft3
g
GC
CDS
HVAC
JPL
kg
L
LANL
LBNL
LLNL
LRN
m3
min
mg
mrem
mVHP
Argonne National Laboratory
Army Research Laboratory
American Society for Testing and Materials
Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry
Biological Aerosol Sentry and Information System
degrees Celsius
chemical agent resistant coatings
curie
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
square centimeter
chemical warfare agent
Decontamination and Consequence Management Division
Domestic Demonstration and Application Program
Department for Environment, Food, and Rural Affairs
Department of Homeland Security
diisopropyl methylphosphonate
Department of Defense
Department of Energy
Edgewood Chemical Biological Center
Environmental Laboratory Response Network
Environmental Protection Agency
Environmental Technology Verification
degrees Fahrenheit
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act
square foot
cubic foot
gram
gas chromatograph
Government Decontamination Service
heating, ventilation, and air conditioning
Jet Propulsion Laboratory
kilogram
liter
Los Alamos National Laboratory
Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
Laboratory Response Network
cubic meter
minute
milligram
millirem
modified vaporous hydrogen peroxide
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NAS National Academy of Science
NHSRC National Homeland Security Research Center
NIOSH National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health
NMRC Naval Medical Research Center
NRT National Response Team
OPCW Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons
OPP Office of Pesticide Programs
ORD Office of Research and Development
OSHA Occupational Safety and Health Administration
OSC on-scene coordinator
PCR polymerase chain reaction
PNNL Pacific Northwest National Laboratory
ppb parts per billion
ppm parts per million
PROTECT Program for Response Options and Technology
Enhancements for Chemical/Biological Terrorism
PVC polyvinyl chloride
RDD radiological dispersion device
RIMNET Radiation Incident Monitoring Network
RVTP Rapid viability test protocol
Sabre Sabre Technical Services
SAFTEY Act Support Anti-terrorism by Fostering Effective Technologies
Act of 2002
SNL Sandia National Laboratory
STERIS STERIS Corporation
TAGA Trace Atmospheric Gas Analyzer
TSM Three-Step Method
TSWG Technical Support Working Group
UK United Kingdom
USAMRIID U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious
Diseases
USAR Urban Search and Rescue
USCG U.S. Coast Guard
USPS U.S. Postal Service
UV ultraviolet
VERIFIN Finnish Institute for Verification of the Chemical Weapons
Convention
VHP vaporous hydrogen peroxide
Decontamination Workshop vii
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Executive Summary
The Decontamination and Consequence Management
Division (DCMD) of EPA's National Homeland Security
Research Center (NHSRC) held its first "Workshop
on Decontamination, Cleanup, and Associated Issues
for Sites Contaminated With Chemical, Biological,
or Radiological Materials" at the International Trade
Center Building in Washington, D.C., February
23—25, 2005- The workshop opened with a plenary
session. The subsequent 31 presentations addressed 5
topics: the decontamination process, decontamination
technologies, research and development, lessons
learned, and radiological contamination. The speakers
represented national laboratories and federal agencies
such as EPA, the Department of Homeland Security,
the Postal Service, the Department of Defense, the
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, and the
FBI; academia; and key companies conducting research
or providing decontamination technologies and services.
Representatives from Great Britain provided the United
Kingdom perspective on decontamination issues.
Plenary Session
Blair Martin, of EPA's National Risk Management
Research Laboratory, moderated the workshop and gave
the opening remarks. Martin participated in most of the
decontamination activities for the buildings that were
contaminated with B. anthracis spores sent through the
mail in the fall of 2001. These bioterrorist events were
the primary impetus for forming EPA's NHSRC, and
the majority of discussion at the workshop was related to
building decontamination. All of the affected buildings
have now been successfully decontaminated. Martin
discussed the elements of a decontamination event and
noted that the actual destruction of spores (accomplished
mostly via fumigation) represents only a small portion
of the overall time and cost of a decontamination event.
The elements of building decontamination also include
establishing a decision-making process; characterization,
sampling, and monitoring of contaminants and
decontamination chemical levels; building preparation;
the decontamination; materials disposal plan; and overall
communications
Lance Brooks discussed the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS), Science and Technology Directorate's
biological and chemical restoration programs (referred to
as DDAP, i.e., Domestic Demonstration and Applications
Programs). He discussed some of the projects under way
or being planned, most of which focus on transportation
systems and wide urban areas. These projects involve
(or will involve) technology demonstrations, tabletop
exercises, and the development of template response plans
and protocols for particular scenarios, all designed to
reduce the time to get critical facilities or areas restored
and operational. One completed project discussed was
the Biological Aerosol Sentry and Information System
(BASIS), a precursor to the Biowatch program, which is a
network of monitors (with subsequent laboratory analysis)
set up in major urban areas as an early warning system to
detect aerosolized biological agents.
The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) faces
many challenges with forensics sampling and crime
scene management following an incident involving
chemical, biological, or radiological weapons, according
to Benjamin Garrett of the FBI. These challenges include
determining that a deliberate release (as opposed to a
natural event) has occurred, knowing where to sample,
and conducting analyses of evidence without harming
the investigator or damaging the evidence. The primary
purpose of sampling by the FBI is to gather evidence.
By contrast, EPA conducts sampling to characterize the
extent of contamination and determine the effectiveness of
decontamination. The FBI should share its data with other
agencies such as EPA and the Centers for Desease Control
and Prevention (CDC), but the involved parties need to
devise a process for doing so without harming the FBI's
investigation.
Session 1: The Decontamination Process
Nancy Adams, Director of the DCMD/NHSRC,
noted that her division conducts research and develops
technologies related to incidents involving biological,
chemical, and radiological agents. Efforts focus on
decontamination science and technology, sampling
methods, contaminant containment, tracking
contaminant movement, and disposal. Adams's
presentation detailed the methods used by NHSRC to
rank threats. These involve the identification and ranking
of high-priority agents, identification and ranking of likely
terrorist targets, and identification of terrorist goals (e.g.,
loss of life, economic damage, and inducing fear). These
viii NHSRC
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components are combined to couple threat agents with
target facilities and to develop likely terrorist scenarios. She
compared the DCMD threat-ranking approach to those
developed by other agencies and noted that NHSRC uses
the ranking results primarily to guide decontamination
research efforts.
The CDC's Kenneth Martinez explained that
although the primary purpose for environmental
sampling is to address public health concerns, sample
collection and analytical methods are similar regardless of
whether the data will be used for public health decisions,
scene characterization, or crime scene investigation.
Environmental sampling may identify agent sources,
assess the nature and extent of contamination, support
risk assessment and public health decisions, identify
people needing medical treatment, and guide reoccupancy
decisions. The three sampling phases in a response are
screening, characterization, and restoration. The CDC
has developed a sampling protocol for B. anthrads spores
and is investigating and validating sampling and analytical
methods for bio-contaminants, focusing in particular
on surface sample collection efficiencies, air sampling,
methods comparison, and variability issues.
Steve Tomasino described EPA's Office of Pesticide
Programs (OPP) research and development of biological
agent analysis methods, in particular OPP's evaluation
of laboratory sporicidal efficacy test methods. EPA
regulations require the Association of Official Analytical
Chemists (AOAC) sporicidal activity test to register
and approve the use of a chemical to be used as a
decontaminant for a particular microorganism such as
B. anthracis. This test has a number of limitations, for
example, the results are qualitative, the test requires 21
days for incubation, and the test lacks standardization.
OPP has identified potential modifications to the existing
AOAC method and two new promising methods that they
are currently testing with surrogates: one developed by
the American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM)
and one referred to as the three-step method (TSM). OPP
submitted the study results to an expert panel, which
selected TSM as the preferred method. As part of ongoing
efforts, OPP will conduct additional surrogate studies with
TSM beginning in April 2005- The TSM will undergo a
multi-laboratory validation study in September 2005, and
a summary report of findings is due in December 2005-
Registration of bio-decontamination chemicals
requires test data regarding product chemistry, product
toxicity, and product efficacy using the AOAC test,
according to Jeffrey Kempter of EPA's OPP When the
anthrax attacks occurred in September and October 2001,
no products were registered for use against B. anthracis.
Accordingly, crisis exemptions had to be issued for each
decontamination chemical for use at each contaminated
site. Crisis exemption requests had to include remediation
action plans, sampling and analysis plans, and ambient
air monitoring plans. OPP granted crisis exemptions
for four liquid B. anthracis sporicides for use on hard,
nonporous surfaces only: aqueous chlorine dioxide,
hydrogen peroxide/peracetic acid, sodium hypochlorite,
and hydrogen peroxide/quarternary ammonium foam.
Five gases have received crisis exemptions: gaseous chlorine
dioxide (for buildings), vaporized hydrogen peroxide
(for buildings), paraformaldehyde (for equipment in
tented enclosures), methyl bromide (for laboratory and
field study), and ethylene oxide (for specialized off-site
treatment of specific items). Although no chemicals have
yet been registered for B. anthracis decontamination, OPP
is moving toward that goal.
Mark Durno and Tony Intrepido gave a joint
presentation on building sampling and clearance issues. A
technical assistance document prepared by EPA's National
Response Team details a sampling approach for any
biological incident. Other agencies are conducting studies
related to sampling approaches and analytical techniques.
For collecting field data, there are several methods,
including hand-held assays, infrared sensors, and rapid
polymerase chain reaction (PCR) testing. Verification
sampling (following decontamination, to determine
efficacy and to allow for reoccupation of the building)
typically has been exhaustive, but as research advances
and laboratory techniques become more relevant to field
applications, this process will become more efficient.
Dave Mickunas, of EPAs Environmental Response
Team, discussed the Trace Atmospheric Gas Analyzer
(TAGA) for real-time monitoring of chemical warfare
agents (CWAs) and fumigants (such as chlorine dioxide)
in ambient air. EPA's TAGA consists of an Atmospheric
Pressure Chemical lonization (APCI) source coupled
to a three-quadrupole mass spectrometer. Mickunas is
developing CWA spectra and calibration curves and
conducting other analyses, such as verifying detection
limits, determining the dynamic linear range, establishing
surrogates, and identifying interferences. The TAGA is
situated in a mobile unit (a van) and has been successfully
used at B. anthracis decontamination events to detect
fumigant leaks.
Decontamination Workshop ix
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In the decontamination of postal facilities, the
United States Postal Service (USPS) accepted full liability
and assigned broad indemnity to the decontamination
contractors, according to Jerry Robinson, an attorney for
the USPS. To minimize their risk, the USPS then obtained
a $100 million insurance policy, which cost $4 million.
However, in a future incident, most government agencies
will not be able to indemnify decontamination vendors
because these agencies are not allowed to enter into the
open-ended contracts required for indemnification.
Decontamination contractors should obtain a SAFETY
Act designation and certification for their technologies,
which would allow them to be immediately available
to perform decontamination services. To be certified,
however, vendors must purchase insurance.
Marty Powell explained that an EPA on-scene
coordinator (OSC) has two primary responsibilities:
to determine whether the contaminant poses a threat
to the public or environment and to ensure that the
threat is mitigated. Oddly enough, "on-scene" indicates
involvement in an event without requiring a physical
presence. The OSCs are coordinators, not commanders;
they direct federal response assets. OSCs draw from a large
tool box of resources (e.g., contractor support, scientific
support, special units, and public relations support teams)
and provide these resources to local and state agencies.
The OSCs ensure that the remediation work at a site
is completed properly. They have the ability to make
decisions at a site without obtaining a permit.
Robert Bettley-Smith, of the UK Department
for Environment, Food, and Rural Affairs (DEFRA),
described his country's Government Decontamination
Service (CDS). The CDS will be a DEFRA agency and
will be formally established in summer 2005- The GDS
will provide guidance and identify resources, such as
information about vendors, their capabilities, and their
technologies. In the UK, authorities at the county level are
responsible for hazardous events and have experience with
chemical transport and releases, but they lack experience
with biological events. Therefore, GDS will focus its
efforts on such events and develop a response plan. The
agency is considering establishing a centralized data system
to facilitate the sharing of knowledge across nations and to
prevent research overlap.
Rob Rothman, of EPA/NHSRC, addressed the
development of standard analytical methods and
laboratory capacity issues. EPA has identified 109
priority agents and specific analytical methods for various
matrices. Revisions to these standard analytical methods
are scheduled for June 2005- They will include updates to
existing methods and will add new methods for analysis
of drinking water, CWA degradation products, and four
radiological agents. Laboratories must have the capacity
to handle thousands of samples collected over the course
of a response, from initial identification of the threat
agent to cleanup, clearance, and surveillance. Most of
the samples will be taken in the first few months, but
some sampling will be conducted years after the event.
To address capacity concerns, EPA is working with the
CDC to develop a three-tiered Environmental Laboratory
Reference Network (eLRN), similar to CDC's existing
LRN. The network would include screening or sentinel
labs, confirmatory labs, and reference labs.
Session 2: Decontamination Technologies
John Mason gave an overview of his company's
technology. Sabre Technical Services (Sabre) has experience
with B. anthracis decontamination, using chlorine dioxide
fumigation at the AMI building in Boca Raton, Florida;
on contaminated containers in Newark Harbor; and at
a facility in Utica, New York, where tenting was used to
seal the building. With the Sabre technology, sodium
hypochlorite is reacted with HC1 to produce chlorine
gas; the chlorine gas is then reacted with sodium chlorite
solution to produce aqueous C1O2, which is then stripped
to the air. At AMI, Sabre used the building's HVAC
system to distribute the fumigant in order to achieve a
concentration of 750 parts per million (ppm) for a 12-
hour period. Approximately 200 biological indicator
test strips were placed throughout the building, and in
post-treatment sampling, all strips indicated no growth.
Tracking sample locations and communicating results
were two concerns when dealing with hundreds of
samples. Sabre has developed software that produces
a three-dimensional sampling map to address these
concerns.
Most of STERIS Corporation's decontamination
experience involves using vaporous hydrogen peroxide
(VHP) for bio-decontamination in pharmaceutical and
clean room applications, according to Iain McVey Because
of this, his company was selected to fumigate two B.
anthracis-contuminated government buildings. STERIS
is currently collaborating with the DoD to demonstrate
decontamination of chemical agents, using "modified
VHP," and to develop a mobile VHP generating system. A
x NHSRC
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benefit of VHP is that it decomposes to water and oxygen
so residual contamination is not a concern. However, the
rapid decay of VHP also means that repeated injections
are needed to ensure that the proper concentration is
reached. Multiple injection points may be the best option
for optimal distribution.
Mike Herd, of BIOQUELL, Inc., discussed his
company's hydrogen peroxide vapor technology for room
and building decontamination. The technology works
by flash evaporating a 30 percent to 35 percent aqueous
hydrogen peroxide solution until a micro-condensate
forms on surfaces within the treatment area. Data showed
that the micro-condensate greatly improves the kinetics
of decontamination. The system is designed to apply
to buildings of any size and consists of self-sufficient
units that can be chained together. Hydrogen peroxide
vapor tends to form strong hydrogen bonds between
the molecules, which limits its movement in air, so
the BIOQUELL system uses a rotating nozzle system
that distributes the vapor dynamically. BIOQUELL
participated in tests by EPA's Environmental Technology
Verification (ETV) program to determine its technology's
effectiveness in destroying B. anthracis spores on seven
different building materials. Herd discussed several case
studies to illustrate the application and effectiveness of the
technology.
Methyl bromide is commonly used for termite control
and for fumigation of imported produce, according
to Rudolf Scheffrahn of the University of Florida. In
conjunction with EPA, he has conducted laboratory and
field studies to assess methyl bromide as a fumigant for B.
anthracis. In the 2004 field study, a 30,000-ft3 home was
first sealed using tenting, as is commonly done for termite
treatments in Florida. Gaseous methyl bromide was
generated by passing the liquid through a heat exchanger.
Better destruction efficiency with methyl bromide is
achieved with higher temperatures, so fans and heaters
maintained a target temperature of about 35° C within
the house. After fumigation for two days, essentially all
50 spore strips placed throughout the house indicated no
growth. No damage to electronic equipment was observed.
Schaffrahn opined that the advantages to methyl bromide
are that it diffuses readily; is very stable, easily detected,
and low in cost; can be used with any humidity level; has
already been approved to treat some bacteria; and treats
porous and other types of materials with minimal damage.
A disadvantage is that it depletes stratospheric ozone.
Rita Betty of Sandia National Laboratory (SNL)
presented a report on the testing of a decontamination
formulation (DF-200) for CWAs, toxic industrial
chemicals, and biological agents and for combating
aerosolized chemical and biological agent clouds. DF-
200 is an aqueous-phase formula that has been used
successfully by the military. The commercial product
is a mixture of surfactant, hydrogen peroxide solution,
and a novel activator. After mixing on site, the final
hydrogen peroxide concentration is about 3-5 percent.
DF-200 is less corrosive than bleach and other available
decontamination materials. SNL tested DF-200 with
GD (soman), HD (mustard gas), and the nerve agent
VX in stirred reactor studies and achieved 100 percent
decontamination of live agents after a 60-minute exposure
period. In other studies, DF-200 rapidly (within a
15-minute exposure period) neutralized nerve agents,
sodium cyanide, phosgene, and carbon disulfide, as well
as biologicals (B. anthracis and Y. pestis). Mustard agents
required more time (a 30-minute exposure period) because
of mustard's low solubility. The DF-200 residue in indoor
areas can be removed using a wet-dry vacuum.
According to Jack Kelly, of EPA, ricin is a white
powder that can be made fairly easily from the proteins
of castor plant beans. Ricin is considered extremely toxic
by any exposure route, and no vaccines or antidotes are
available. On February 2, 2004, ricin was found in the
mail room attached to a United States senator's office.
EPA et al. had collected at least 670 samples from three
affected rooms and identified 19 positive results, all from
one room. EPA removed and stored personal and office
items from the affected room. Large hard-surface items
were left in place and decontaminated with a sodium
hypochlorite solution. Post-treatment testing found no
ricin activity. Clothing and office materials, along with
indicator vials of crude and pure ricin, underwent heat
treatment, which resulted in 100 percent deactivation of
13 of the 14 purified ricin vials and 94.4 percent to 99-7
percent deactivation for 14 of the 28 crude ricin vials.
Another set of office materials underwent a single heat
treatment and/or ethylene oxide treatment. Results from
test vials undergoing ethylene oxide treatment alone or
heat followed by ethylene oxide treatment indicated that
the combined treatment was most effective.
Richard Orlusky highlighted the USPS's experiences
in restoring the Trenton mail facility after completing
decontamination. Although B. anthracis contamination
of the Trenton facility occurred in 2001, the building
was not reopened until March 2005- Fumigation with
Decontamination Workshop xi
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chlorine dioxide gas did not occur until October 2003,
and restoration activities began in February 2004. The
USPS kept the HVAC systems running after closing
the building, but over time, components of the system
failed, resulting in interior temperatures reaching 100°E
Restoring environmental controls is key to creating a
comfortable work environment (repairs were conducted
by workers wearing personal protective equipment) and
to minimizing equipment and building degradation. If
fumigation is the selected decontamination method, then
surface cleaning with a bleach agent should be conducted
sparingly, since it is highly damaging to many materials.
Additional chlorine dioxide research may show effective
decontamination at lower concentrations and reduced
contact times, which may reduce damage caused by the
fumigant itself.
Paula Krauter, of Lawrence Livermore National
Laboratory (LLNL), presented research on developing a
rapid viability test protocol (RVTP), which is a 15-hour
method for processing biological indicator strips using
real-time PCR. They compared the RVTP against the
standard culture method, which requires 7 days for results.
Testing involved exposing more than 1,000 biological
indicator strips to 750 ppm of chlorine dioxide for up to
12 hours (a number of these strips were exposed for less
than 12 hours). Half of the strips were analyzed by RVTP
and half by the standard culture technique. In general,
no significant difference in results provided by the two
methods was identified. The standard culture method
reported a 1.5 percent false positive rate. No false negatives
or positives were observed for RVTP Tests to compare
stainless steel and paper strip biological indicators were
also conducted. At non-lethal doses of chlorine dioxide,
LLNL found a significantly higher number of positive
results for the paper strips, i.e., better kill was indicated
with the stainless steel disks.
Session 3: Decontamination Research and
Development
Mark Brickhouse, of the U.S. Army's Edgewood Chemical
and Biological Center (ECBC), described the work
with public- and private-sector researchers to evaluate
a number of emerging decontamination technologies.
These include modified VHP, which contains ammonia
as an activator for both chemical and biological
decontamination. "Forced hot air" acts to accelerate
weathering and increases off-gassing for chemical agents
but is insufficient for treating biological agents. Decon-
Green is an environmentally friendly decontaminant based
on commercial chemicals and is designed to replace DS2
and DF-200 in military use. Studies have proven Decon-
Green to be effective against chemical and biological
agents, but it is disruptive to surfaces. Surface coatings are
being developed to either resist or react with and destroy
chemical or biological agents. Enzymes to decontaminate
nerve agents, sulfur mustard, and biological agents and
toxins are being investigated. Supercritical carbon dioxide
is an effective cleaning and sterilizing agent and is being
investigated as a decontamination technology.
Phil Koga, of ECBC, discussed a systematic
decontamination study funded by EPA. This study will
assess the impact of fumigant (chlorine dioxide and
hydrogen peroxide vapor) concentration, exposure time,
building material (porous and nonporous), temperature,
and relative humidity on destruction of different
microorganisms (e.g., avirulent and virulent B. anthracis
spores and surrogates). In addition, testing seeks to provide
information about the effects of six different building
materials on the decay of fumigant concentration in test
chambers (e.g., velocity deposition will be quantified) and
the effects of the fumigants on the integrity of the building
materials.
Tina Carlsen, of LLNL, discussed research on
examining both decontamination of HVAC systems using
hydrogen peroxide vapor and the use of HVAC systems in
the fumigation process. Tests with VHP in a medium-scale
HVAC system indicated that galvanized steel reduced the
hydrogen peroxide concentration, whereas PVC had less
of an effect. In another test, using 90 feet of galvanized
steel ductwork with sensors located throughout, the
hydrogen peroxide concentration decreased as a function
of distance traveled along the ductwork, and VHP
decreased with increasing temperature and decreasing flow
rate. Ongoing research will include biological indicator
tests within the ductwork to characterize kill rates and
optimize VHP efficacy as well as characterization tests
with alternate ductwork materials.
Research at the University of Texas is focusing on
building material impacts on fumigant levels and gaseous
byproduct production, in a project lead by Rich Corsi.
Corsi stated that the research includes an evaluation of
the chemical interactions of ozone, chlorine dioxide,
methyl bromide, and hydrogen peroxide vapor with 24
common building materials; quantification of deposition
velocities; identification of building decontamination
xii NHSRC
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byproducts; and incorporation of the results into a novel
software application. Results show significant differences
among disinfectants. Byproduct persistence was also likely,
as indicated by 5-day and 1-year tests of off-gassing. For
most materials, with the exception of ceiling tiles and
HVAC system components, ozone was more reactive than
chlorine dioxide.
Mark Buttner discussed the research at the University
of Nevada Las Vegas (UNLV) to test the efficacy of
two decontamination products (DF-100 and chlorine
dioxide gas); compare surface sampling methods (swipe,
heavy wipe, and swab sample processing kit); and
compare analytical techniques for biological agents,
using cultures, quantitative polymerase chain reactions
(PCRs), and hand-held assays. Other experimental
parameters included the effects of building material
and environmental background (e.g., dust) on the
decontamination method. Each of the three sampling
methods demonstrated comparable spore collection
efficiencies. After decontamination with DF-100, post-
decontamination samples found no culturable spores
although the quantitative PCR analysis indicated that
spore DNA remained. Similarly, after decontamination
with chlorine dioxide, post-decontamination samples
found no culturable spores in 24 of 27 samples, but
quantitative PCR analysis indicated that spore DNA
remained. The hand-held assay results were positive for all
samples. Neither decontamination method was affected
by environmental background, although the quantitative
PCR analysis method was inhibited by the dust.
An overview of EPAs Environmental Technology
Verification (ETV) program for decontamination
technologies was presented by Mike Taylor of Battelle
Memorial Institute. Three decontamination technologies
(all fumigants) have been verified so far: BIOQUELL,
Inc.'s hydrogen peroxide gas; Certek, Inc.'s formaldehyde
gas, and CDG Research, Inc.'s chlorine dioxide gas.
The verification procedure consisted of connecting
the decontamination technology to the test chamber,
inoculating test material coupons (representing seven
different materials) with 108 spores of B. anthracis or
surrogates, placing the coupons in the test chamber,
implementing the decontamination technology, removing
the test material coupons, and analyzing the coupons.
Decontamination efficacy was quantified by calculating
the log reduction in viable spores on the test materials and
by identifying positive or negative bacterial growth on the
biological indicators and spore strips. It was noted that
homeland security related technologies would no longer
be verified under ETV but would be tested under a new
EPANHSRC program called the Technology Testing and
Evaluation Program (TTEP).
According to Rebecca Blackmon, the Technical
Support Working Group (TSWG) is an independent
federal agency, with oversight from DoD and the
Department of State, that does rapid R&D and
prototyping to support federal agency requirements. The
Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN)
subgroup focuses on agent detection, decontamination,
protection, and information collection, with ongoing
projects. The biological background in critical facilities is
being investigated, since it may interfere with detection
of actual bio-agents. A statistical design tool for sampling
contaminated buildings is under development. In
conjunction with others, TSWG is developing a real-
time, portable sensor system to monitor CWAs and
toxic industrial chemicals. Another sensor web is being
developed to monitor and control building temperature,
humidity, light intensity, and decontaminant agent
concentrations for a facility undergoing decontamination.
Decontamination technologies using plasma and
electrostatics are being developed. Other technologies are
being developed to mitigate the spread of radiological
releases and remove radiological contaminants from
building materials.
Session 4: Lessons Learned and Research and
Development Needs
Panelists and other participants at the workshop
provided numerous examples of lessons learned from the
decontamination activities that took place following the B.
anthracis incidents in 2001. These are summarized below
in four main categories. During this discussion, several
participants also noted research that is needed; a summary
of these items follows.
Intetagency coordination and information/data
sharing Workshop participants emphasized the
importance of information/data sharing and coordination
not only during a response action, but also during
ongoing research. They provided examples of information
sharing and coordination efforts, suggested tools to
improve these efforts, highlighted the benefits of sharing
information while addressing research needs, and
noted security concerns to consider. Several workshop
participants (primarily OSCs) emphasized the need for
Decontamination Workshop xiii
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information (e.g., on decontamination methods) when
responding to an event. Several participants suggested the
development of databases or repositories of information
on technologies, agents, available laboratories, test
methods, technical experts, etc. Others noted that this
workshop was a great way for information exchange and
that this type of workshop should be continued.
Preparedness Workshop participants all agreed that
planning and preparing for the aftermath of a terrorist
event is critical to responding quickly and appropriately.
They suggested a number of ways facilities and agencies
could prepare. Workshop participants repeatedly suggested
exercises (especially tabletop) as a means of identifying
possible threat scenarios, developing response plans, and
pinpointing data gaps. They suggested interagency panels
and peer reviews for these exercises. The focus of such
exercises typically becomes the technical aspect of the
response plan, but in a real-world situation, the technical
side of a response may be easy compared with regulatory
or communication issues. Examples of materials that
would help prepare agencies and facilities include a matrix
to link threat agents with appropriate decontamination
methods and site conditions, template response plans, and
standards/protocols (e.g., for sampling).
Sampling issues Workshop participants expressed
diverse views regarding sampling issues. Some suggested
minimizing sampling requirements to streamline a
decontamination event because it consumes much of the
overall response time. Others believed that eliminating
one or more of the sampling phases (characterization,
verification, or clearance) would be detrimental to the
process. Participants also voiced differences of opinion
over the utility of biological indicators in assessing
environmental contamination. Decontamination events
rely on biological indicators (e.g., spore strips), but results
from these tests may not correlate well with environmental
conditions (i.e., actual levels of spores). One participant
noted that no positive environmental samples were
found in the B. anthrads decontamination when the
biological indicators were negative and desired fumigant
concentration had been achieved.
The decontamination process A number of buildings
have now been bio-decontaminated, and participants
noted many specific lessons learned. When fumigation
is the selected decontamination method, the fumigation
itself is only a small portion of the overall decontamination
timeline. Sealing a building can be costly and time-
consuming, but tenting is an effective technique.
Preserving sensitive and valuable materials should be
considered when one is selecting a decontamination
technology. Leave as much material as possible inside a
building for fumigation to alleviate disposal concerns.
Agencies working with an OSC need to understand the
command structure at a decontamination event. An
environmental clearance committee supports local agency
decisions about when it is safe to reoccupy a building
by providing information and credibility. The clearance
committee itself does not make decisions. To support an
OSC, however, technical working groups should consist
of people who are authorized to make decisions for their
agencies.
The following is a compilation of suggested research
and development needs, as discussed during the R&D
panel discussion, as well as during the Lessons Learned
discussion. Nancy Adams noted that some of the
suggested research items are currently being investigated or
are already planned for future investigation.
Decontamination
• Real-time monitoring of fumigants
• Tenting as a means of sealing a building
• Cost analysis of an overall decontamination event,
including the disposal and restoration
• The chemical interactions and reaction products
between decontaminants, threat agents, background
(e.g., dust, organic material), and materials
(common building materials but also sensitive/
valuable equipment)
• Risk and exposure assessment of biological agents to
establish safe levels for reoccupation
Sampling and Analysis
• Correlating environmental samples to biological
indicators; understanding the basic science of
biological indicators (Bis); developing new Bis
using more common materials such as carpet, or
worse-case materials, in lieu of typical BI materials
such as paper or steel
• Real-time monitoring technology (e.g., developing
faster, cheaper, and better technologies) for all types
of agents
• Background levels of live bio-agents
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• Comparison of surface sampling methods for bio-
agents
• Using statistics for sampling design and standards
• New analytical techniques, such as rapid testing
protocols
• Methods for sampling irreplaceable items (e.g.,
paintings or historical documents)
• Identification of better surrogates
Other threat agents
• Interactions of chemical and radiological agents
with various materials
• Applicability of chelaters, HEPA filters, and other
decontamination technologies to radiological agents
Most of the information presented during the
workshop applied to B. anthracis. A number of workshop
participants mentioned the need to expand research
related to the decontamination of other chemical,
biological, and radiological threat agents. Agents
specifically mentioned included ricin.
Containment
• Aerosolization, dispersion, and resuspension of
biological and radiological agents
• Surface coatings and building materials that serve as
biocides or limit chemical infiltration
• Smart building systems, e.g., specially designed
HVAC systems to limit agent spread
General
• Research is needed to address decontamination of
wide, outdoor areas, including agricultural product
decontamination and disposal, and multiple agent
attack events.
• Identifying dual-use technologies would help us
prepare by allowing us to develop technologies
and manufacture equipment before the next event
occurs.
• Biotechnology-based decontamination approaches
(bacteria, enzymes) are needed.
• A panel of experts distant from ongoing
decontamination discussions and research should
be convened to independently review the collective
research efforts ongoing at various agencies and
facilities.
Session 5: Radiological Dispersion Device
Cleanup
Fred Holbrook and John MacKinney, from EPA's
NHSRC, each presented information related to
radiological dispersal devices (RDDs). RDDs use
conventional explosives to disperse radioactive materials.
It is expected that these devices would cause low-level
radiological contamination and cause psychological and
economic harm but that fatalities would be low. Among
the radiological agents that are potential components of
RDDs, cesium fluoride is of particular concern because it
is a fine, talclike powder, which is easily dispersed over a
broad area.
Worldwide control of radiological materials is a
problem, as evidenced by the large amounts of missing
and unaccounted-for radioactive material. Because of this,
most experts believe an RDD event is the most probable
homeland security threat. Tests are being conducted to
examine whether a radiological agent will aerosolize and
how the shape of the charge may affect dispersion; models
are being developed to predict possible dispersion patterns.
Studies of particle dispersion have shown that indoor
particulate concentrations following an event may be high.
Using threat scenarios, we can create standard response
and mitigation procedures, plan possible cleanup actions,
and evaluate existing technologies. DHS is assessing
possible optimized approaches to decontamination
and restoration after an RDD release and considering
cleanup criteria based on societal needs, expected land
uses, and decontamination technologies. Radiological
decontamination techniques are based on mechanical,
chemical, or biological removal; some chemical methods
include the use of acids, chelants, foams, gels, oxidizers,
and polymers.
According to Malcolm Wakerley, after the Chernobyl
nuclear incident, the UK created the Radiation Incident
Monitoring Network (RIMNET). This system consists of
92 gamma detectors (located approximately 30 kilometers
apart) that supply data to a group of laboratories.
Information from these sensors helped the UK identify
areas of contamination after the Chernobyl accident. The
RIMNET system includes a modeling component that
can assess short-, medium-,and long-range impacts and
is linked with meteorological data to backtrack from an
alarmed detector to a radiation source. Additionally, the
UK has created a handbook in response to a review of
decontamination and remediation technologies conducted
Decontamination Workshop xv
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following a series of other radioactive accidents.
The handbook includes a simple logic diagram and
22 tables on decontamination technologies and
considerations.
The UK plans to maintain the handbook over the
next three years and add lessons learned from exercises
and case studies.
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Introduction
This report summarizes presentations and discussions
from the "Workshop on Decontamination, Cleanup, and
Associated Issues for Sites Contaminated With Chemical,
Biological, or Radiological Materials," which was held
February 23-25, 2005, in Washington, D.C. The
workshop objectives were to:
• Allow agencies, organizations, and individuals
to share information about the decontamination
of chemical, biological, and radiological releases.
Specific topics addressed included elements of a
decontamination event and ways to reduce the
response time and cost; decontamination
technologies used in real-world situations
(e.g., anthrax events in the United States, hospital
decontamination projects worldwide); and
research and development projects underway or
planned by various organizations and agencies.
• Discuss some of the lessons learned about the
decontamination process and suggest steps to
improve that process.
• Identify research needs to fill data gaps and
articulate opportunities for improving the current
understanding of the decontamination process.
Workshop participants included representatives
from federal agencies and laboratories (e.g., the
Environmental Protection Agency, the Department of
Homeland Security, the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Lawrence
Livermore National Laboratory, and Edgewood Chemical
Biological Center), academia, and decontamination
technology companies. During the workshop, speakers
gave presentations on specific topics, including
decontamination event experiences, decontamination
technologies, current and planned research projects, and
radiological agent concerns. Following each presentation,
speakers held a brief question and answer period. On the
third day of the workshop, participants engaged in two
free-flowing discussion sessions. During the first session,
participants were asked to share the lessons learned during
research projects and real-world decontamination events.
The second session focused on areas and topics in need
of further research. Both discussion sessions allowed
participants to elaborate upon the questions and issues
raised during the presentations.
This report summarizes the information provided
and issues raised during the workshop presentations and
associated question and answer periods. It also summarizes
the content of the discussion sessions. The technical
content of this report is based entirely on discussions at the
workshop.
Although workshop presentations and discussions
addressed a number of individual topics, workshop
participants raised several key issues to consider during
ongoing research and future decontamination efforts:
• Information sharing and interagency
coordination Workshop participants repeatedly
emphasized the importance of information sharing
and coordination during a response action, as well
as ongoing information sharing among researchers.
During presentations, speakers provided examples
of both effective and ineffective information
sharing. They consistently indicated that better
information sharing leads to faster, cheaper,
and easier decontamination efforts. During the
discussion sessions, workshop participants suggested
tools for improving the sharing of information,
highlighted the benefits of sharing information
while addressing research needs, and noted security
concerns to consider.
• Preparedness Workshop participants agreed that
planning and preparing for threat events is critical
to responding quickly and appropriately to these
events. Presentations highlighted a number of
research projects that focus on preparing facilities,
specifically airports and transportation centers,
for future terrorist events and identifying possible
response actions. During the discussion sessions,
workshop participants suggested a number of ways
facilities and agencies could prepare for a terrorist
event.
• Sample methodology and design Workshop
participants discussed sampling concerns related
to research projects and decontamination events.
When discussing research projects, workshop
participants voiced concerns about developing
standardized sampling methods so that results were
comparable across projects, as well as concerns
about identifying appropriate surrogates. When
discussing decontamination events, workshop
Decontamination Workshop xvii
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participants emphasized the need for clear sampling
objectives, the utility of different sampling methods,
and the need to streamline the sampling process.
Some conflicting views were raised. For example,
some suggested minimizing sampling requirements
to streamline a decontamination event, whereas
others believed that eliminating sampling phases
would be detrimental to the process. Participants
also voiced differences of opinion about the utility
of biological indicators and spore strips in assessing
environmental contamination.
Research needs Workshop participants identified
a number of research needs from basic research in
fumigation chemistry and effectiveness to advanced
research on sampling methods (e.g., developing
cost-effective, real-time sampling methods). See the
"Panel Discussion—Research and Development
Needs" section of this report for further details.
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Opening Remarks
Blair Martin, U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency, National Homeland Security Research
Center
The Decontamination and Consequence Management
Division (DCMD) of the U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) National Homeland Security Research
Center (NHSRC) organized this workshop so that
agencies, organizations, and individuals could share
information about the decontamination of chemical,
biological, and radiological releases. Specific topics
included:
• Elements of a decontamination event and ways
to reduce the response time and cost
• Decontamination technologies used in real-world
situations (e.g., anthrax events in the United States,
hospital decontamination projects worldwide)
• Research and development projects under way or
planned by various organizations and agencies
• Lessons learned during real-world situations and
research projects
• Additional research and development needs.
In fall 2001, Bacillus anthrads spores sent through
the mail contaminated several United States Postal Service
(USPS) buildings. Using a variety of methods, the USPS
decontaminated these buildings. The removal and off-site
decontamination of building contents, surface cleaning,
and fumigation provided the backdrop to this workshop.
Drawing on his personal experience, Martin explained
the elements of the decontamination process:
• Selecting a decontamination technology
When selecting a decontamination method,
considerations include building security, interagency
relationships, incident command structure,
preparation and review of technical documents,
contractor selection, and crisis exemption
applications and approvals. The last three items are
pacing items that affect the project schedule.
• Building characterization and monitoring
Characterization and monitoring, which can occur
simultaneously, are conducted for several reasons.
Forensic sampling, which tracks the movement
of an agent from the release point, addresses the
criminal aspects of an event. Characterization
sampling identifies the nature and extent of
contamination. Biological indicators, fumigation
sampling, and environmental conditions sampling
(i.e., temperature, humidity, and pressure)
are used to ensure a successful fumigation.
Outdoor monitoring of the fumigant ensures
safety. Clearance sampling confirms successful
decontamination and allows reuse of the building.
Decontamination The decontamination
event includes procuring, installing, testing,
operating, disassembling, and finally removing
the decontamination equipment. Procurement
and testing are pacing items that affect the
project schedule. Considerations during the
decontamination event are system safety; the
heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC)
systems; and possible fumigant leak areas. The EPA
trace atmospheric gas analyzer (TAGA), which
is discussed in detail in a later presentation, is a
mobile testing unit that was useful for identifying
leaks during actual decontamination events. Over
the course of a 2- to 3-year process, the actual
decontamination or fumigation is a 1-day event.
The fumigation may increase to 2 to 3 days if a
no-growth endpoint is selected as the building
clearance requirement. The cost of the fumigation
itself is also only a fraction of the overall cost of the
entire decontamination process.
Materials disposal Materials may be removed
from a building before or after decontamination.
The decision whether to remove materials depends
on their value, the ease of decontaminating them,
their impact on the decontamination agent, and
the impact of the decontamination agent on them.
Final disposal options must also be considered.
What special handling is needed to dispose
of material removed from a building prior to
decontamination? Can materials that are removed
after decontamination be sent to nonhazardous
waste landfills or incinerators? Waste disposal
Decontamination Workshop 1
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also includes any wastes generated from the
decontamination or fumigation effort itself.
Communication systems A successful
decontamination event relies on successful
communication. Communication plans should
include law enforcement agencies, health agencies,
environmental regulatory agencies, advisory groups,
contractors, on-scene coordinators (OSCs), building
workers and occupants, as well as residents and
businesses in the surrounding communities.
Martin also listed a number of building-related activities
that need to be considered: orderly building closure;
contamination containment, especially within the HVAC
system; documentation to guide decontamination; and
equipment storage needs. A building content assessment
is needed to identify items that might be affected by
treatment.
Finally, Martin indicated that workshop participants
have a broad range of experiences with and perspectives
about decontamination events. He hoped that they could
openly share their knowledge over the course of the
meeting.
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Presentations and Associated
Question and Answer Periods
DHS S&T Biological and
Chemical Restoration
Programs
Lance Brooks, Department of Homeland Security
This presentation provided a brief overview of restoration
programs under way at the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS).
Decontamination is being researched and evaluated
by a number of agencies, such as EPA's Office of Research
and Development (ORD), DHS's Homeland Security
Advanced Research Projects Agency (HSARP), and the
Systems Engineering and Development Office. DHS's role
in researching, testing, and evaluating decontamination
processes is outlined in the National Response Plan, which
is scheduled for release on April 14, 2005- DHS hopes to
coordinate efforts with EPA More information is available
at www.HSARPAbaa.com.
At the beginning of a project, DHS works with
the decontamination-user community to identify and
address their needs. The stated program goal is to provide
"integrated field demonstrations of the next-generation
solutions, which bring together the user, technology,
and ConOps in a real-wo rid test of a particular
solution." In other words, DHS personnel are looking
to answer the question of how biological or chemical
agent decontamination will be conducted in the future.
They work with off-the-shelf or government-owned
technologies. Although DHS does not intend to
develop technologies, it will, if necessary, work to
further develop technologies near completion.
Projects conducted by DHS include:
• Biological Aerosol Sentry and Information
System (BASIS) BASIS is geared toward providing
enhanced biological security at special events and
determining whether a biological release event has
occurred. The system is easy to set up and deploy
but has a limited operational period and covers a
fixed location. It served as a platform for a newer
program called BioWatch. Results reported from
BASIS and BioWatch initiate treatment and
response. BioWatch was used successfully during
the Salt Lake City Winter Olympics and is now in
place in about 30 metropolitan areas.
Program for Response Options and Technology
Enhancements for Chemical/Biological
Terrorism (PROTECT) Developed in partnership
with transit facilities, the project provides
response plans and solutions for events in such
facilities, for example, the sarin release in the
Tokyo subway. DHS found that implementing
the technology component of a response is often
easier than addressing the response's regulatory,
communications, and other aspects. In a
demonstration project, PROTECT placed agent
detectors and televisions in strategic positions
in a transit facility. The system includes a laptop
from which an incident commander could log
into the system, control cameras, access software,
and examine alarmed detectors to coordinate a
response. The program also includes a formalized
plan for operating the system and creates incident
commander transparency. Using the system reduced
response time from as much as 40 minutes down to
5 minutes.
Restoration of Large Airport Facilities This
program is in progress and focuses on the
coordination and understanding of the restoration
process for a large airport. San Francisco
International Airport, for example, loses $80
million a day if closed. This is not a technology-
driven project but focuses on condensing the
decontamination timeline. The goal of the
project is to reduce the time and money needed
to restore a critical transportation facility after an
attack. Under this project, DHS brought together
stakeholders to conduct tabletop exercises, including
a large-scale demonstration exercise to identify
and address critical aspects of the response (e.g.,
Decontamination Workshop 3
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development and approval of a decontamination
plan, fumigation verification, facility clearance,
and overall coordination and communication).
Project products include templates that provide
guidelines for developing response plans and
protocols that are then pre-approved by EPA
and other regulatory agencies. The project has
specifically examined improving the verification
step (i.e., rapid verification mechanisms), assessing
sample placement to improve sampling clearance,
using rapid bioviability sampling technologies, and
developing decision support software. A project
report is scheduled for release in late spring 2005-
The following projects are in the planning phase, and
DHS is looking for a partner agency or organization:
• Restoration of a Transit System This project
focuses on transit facilities, such as subways, that
have open platforms, tunnels, and transport from
below to above ground. These facilities present
many different challenges. The overall project
goal is to reduce time between the event and
restoration. Revenue loss and street traffic impacts
are problems when these systems shut down. This
project will draw from the large airport facilities
project and create templates for response plans and
protocols (e.g., restoration plans, contamination
characterization methods, decontamination and
verification sampling for surface, clearance methods,
decision tools) that apply to urban transit systems. A
large-scale demonstration project is planned.
• Restoration of a Wide Area (Urban) This
project focuses on open areas but will likely include
indoor areas as well. In these areas, contamination
migration to enclosed and semi-enclosed areas
is a concern. The project goal is to reduce the
overall time to restore a large outdoor urban area
following a biological attack. As for other projects,
DHS will develop strategies, templates, response
plans, and protocols for addressing an event. Two
smaller ongoing programs lead into this project.
One focuses on technologies and protocols; the
other examines overall policies. A large-scale
demonstration project is planned.
• Facilities Chemical Restoration Demonstration
The goal of this project is to reduce the overall time
to restore a critical facility following a chemical
attack. DHS will develop strategies, templates,
response plans, and protocols for addressing a
chemical release event. A large-scale demonstration
project is planned.
Questions, Answers, and Comments
• How will DHS reduce the time required to
complete a decontamination event? DHS projects
are geared toward understanding what aspects
contribute to the time and personnel needed to
complete decontamination and how these aspects
can be adjusted to reduce the time frame. DHS is
also exploring sampling software that can speed up
the decontamination process.
• Has DHS partnered with contractors or is
DHS working to identify technologies to be
used in place? Demonstration projects are run
through DHS and NHSRC. These agencies will
partner with industries, as identified in the pre-
demonstration phase.
• What performance measures were used to
declare BioWatch a success? BioWatch has
been implemented in partnership with EPA and
the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
(CDC). The agencies determined Bio Watch's
success by reviewing a matrix of criteria. They
concluded that the system was operational, reported
no false positives, and had minimal downtime.
BioWatch strives to provide biological security for as
large an area as possible.
• When detection systems are installed, when
and how do you respond to a positive alarm?
How does this procedure apply to BioWatch?
DHS works with EPA, CDC, and the FBI to
confirm positive responses. When an alarm sounds,
several layers of testing begin. In the first layer, the
alarm is reported and agencies provide guidance
to local organizations. Secondary testing occurs
in areas around the positive sampler. Organisms,
if detected, are checked for viability. Agencies
then determine whether they can confirm that an
event has occurred. Once an incident is identified,
investigations move to the FBI and CDC.
Participants should note that BioWatch is only one
tool for determining whether an event truly has
occurred.
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Crime Scene Management
and WMD Terrorism
Ben Garrett, Federal Bureau of Investigation
When the FBI becomes involved in a decontamination
event, its goal is to manage the crime scene and handle
weapons of mass destruction. It is concerned about the
criminal aspects of the event. As such, the FBI focuses on
forensics, which is the collecting and gathering of evidence
for the identification, prosecution, and conviction of the
perpetrators.
Garrett identified four phases to an incident response:
• Tactical The tactical phase includes entering the
affected building or area and removing the threat.
A plan to enter the area without harm must be in
place.
• Operational This phase involves protecting the
public and mitigating hazards. The FBI involves
local emergency response agencies in these efforts.
• Crime scene Evidence collecting, packaging, and
transporting make up this phase.
• Remediation The FBI is not responsible for the
cleanup or decontamination of a building or scene.
EPA and other partners address that phase of a
response.
Some considerations associated with the forensic
aspects of an event include:
• Detection To prove that a crime occurred, the FBI
must be able to detect the crime. For example, when
anthrax is detected, the FBI must separate natural
occurrences of anthrax from an intentional release.
• Sampling The FBI's focus is on gathering evidence
in a manner that will withstand legal challenge.
In the case of a biological release, the evidence is
microscopic. How do you find the crime scene?
How do you collect microscopic evidence? How do
you preserve the evidence's integrity?
• Traditional exams Fingerprints, fibers, genetics,
and toolmarks are examples of traditional forensic
evidence. The FBI must consider collecting and
evaluating this evidence while protecting people
from the biological or chemical threat. The
traditional exams are key to linking the evidence
to the perpetrator. Therefore, the FBI prefers to
use decontamination methods that preserve the
integrity of the evidence. They must consider
questions such as "Will the decontamination agent
remove fingerprints?"
Biological and chemical agents pose unique challenges
for detecting, sampling, and evaluating evidence. These
challenges arise before the FBI arrives at a scene, and
responses to these challenges may compromise evidence.
Similar problems arise when addressing radiologicals.
Garrett provided two examples that illustrate FBI
concerns and considerations.
• The FBI responded to an incident involving three
family members who had a history of dealing with
ricin and blaming each other for the crime. While
evidence was being collected, miscommunication
led to improper evidence handling, which destroyed
traditional evidence along with the toxin threat.
• A local public health agency investigated a number
of cases of salmonella poisoning in Oregon. Rumors
speculated that the illness had been intentionally
spread in order to influence election results. The
public health agency determined that the event was
a natural occurrence, the result of poor hygiene.
Later, several people confessed to intentionally
spreading the illness.
Questions, Answers, and Comments
• During a weapon of mass destruction event and
FBI investigation, does the FBI help address the
public health ramifications? Historically, the FBI
has been reluctant to share evidence about ongoing
cases, even when evidence or data may be useful
for addressing public health concerns. The Bureau,
however, has made strides to improve information
sharing. It has a public health agent at CDC to
serve as a conduit for information and includes
local, state, and federal public health agencies in
conference calls discussing investigation results. For
example, in August 2002, a New Jersey post office
box tested positive for anthrax. The FBI provided
information about this event to the New Jersey
CDC and other public health officials. Although
the FBI has working relationships with CDC and
local and state public health agencies, a concern
that information sharing will compromise an
investigation will always exist.
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• What are your thoughts about sharing
evidence data with EPA and others assessing
the extent of contamination and planning the
decontamination? Garrett believes that the FBI
should share data, but the involved parties need to
devise a process for sharing information without
harming the FBI's investigation. From experience,
the FBI has learned that it must strike a balance
between sharing information and maintaining
the integrity of the investigation to successfully
prosecute.
CDC/NIOSH and Health
Response to Biothreat
Agents: Environmental
Monitoring
Capt. Kenneth F. Martinez, Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention, National Institute for
Occupational Safety and Health
Agencies involved in a bioterrorism event hold many
different perspectives about sampling needs. For CDC,
sampling addresses public health concerns. Sample
collection methods and analysis results, however,
are similar regardless of the data's end use for public
health decisions, scene characterization, or crime scene
investigation, so information sharing between agencies is
important.
When the first events occurred, communication
between agencies was strained. Agencies now understand
the value of working together and are moving toward
sharing information more freely. They must, however,
remember that each has to address its unique mission.
Environmental sampling may identify exposure
locations, determine agent sources and exposure pathways,
characterize pathogens and agents, assess the nature and
extent of contamination, support risk assessment and
public health decisions, identify people needing medical
treatment, and guide reoccupancy decisions. Public health
sampling may examine the paths for agent spread in
order to limit that spread. For example, CDC considered
whether postal employees exposed to anthrax transported
spores home on their clothing.
The National Institute for Occupational Safety
and Health (NIOSH) has also been involved with
sampling at bioterrorism events. NIOSH has focused on
understanding ventilation systems, transport of agents by
people, and safety and health issues. Over the course of
the anthrax outbreaks, agencies collected approximately
10,000 samples. In conducting sampling and obtaining
results, agencies must remember that no numeric criteria
exist to interpret biological sampling data. Sample results
cannot be extrapolated to predict exposure. Developing
standards, however, is currently under way.
Martinez highlighted the importance of planning
environmental sampling at biological or chemical events.
Environmental sampling can be the driving force behind
public health decisions. CDC's existing sampling plans are
clinically based. When planning sampling, agencies must
consider the need for continuity of operations at a facility
during a response.
CDC has identified three sampling phases:
• Screening Screening occurs in the first few
days following the incident. For the anthrax
events, agencies needed assurance that an event
had occurred (i.e., an agent had been released).
Sampling plans should optimize finding sources and
assessing their concentrations as soon as possible.
• Characterization Sampling for contaminant
characterization is conducted to prepare for
remediation. False positives and negatives are not as
much of a concern during characterization.
• Remediation/restoration Agencies must have a
high level of confidence in sampling results. Results
are used to confirm that the agent was removed.
CDC responded to anthrax releases in Florida, New
Jersey, New York, Connecticut, and Washington, D.C.
In all but two cases, CDC identified the sources of the
anthrax release. (CDC never found the source of anthrax
affecting a health care worker in New York City or an
elderly woman in Connecticut.) To identify sources, CDC
followed a consistent sampling strategy. They followed the
trail of the source and considered dissemination methods
(e.g., air, personnel). For anthrax delivered through the
mail, CDC sampled the mail-sorting machines and
electrostatic collection points (e.g., computer monitors).
At Capitol Hill, CDC collected samples from elevators,
furniture, floors, ventilation systems, vehicles, and
clothing. CDC personnel collected primarily bulk samples
or surface samples. They rarely collected air samples. At
the time no method to validate spore sampling results
existed. Confidence in sampling results comes from
experience with industrial hygiene sampling and past
disease sampling.
6 NHSRC
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After the 2001 events, CDC developed a sampling
protocol (which will be updated) and conducted
validation studies. CDC also evaluated validation studies
by Sanderson et al. (collection efficiencies), McCleery et
al. (air sampling), Dugway Proving Ground (biological
agent simulants), and Sandia National Laboratory
(anthrax simulants). The Dugway Proving Ground study,
conducted with EPA, involved releasing an agent in an
air chamber, letting the agent settle, and then collecting
and sending the sample to a laboratory for analysis. This
study allowed method comparison and evaluation of inter-
laboratory variability.
CDC applied the lessons learned during the anthrax
events to a ricin event in South Carolina (October 2003),
the BioWatch program agent identification in Texas
(October 2003), and the SARS outbreaks (spring 2003).
CDC coordinated with other agencies to share data, based
sampling strategies on potential agent transport pathways,
and applied updated sampling methodologies.
Questions, Answers, and Comments
• When CDC conducted subway sampling, what
weie some of the sampling challenges? To assess
the incident of the health care worker in New York
City who contracted anthrax, CDC was asked to
sample as many potential sources as possible. CDC
could not identify a clear contamination pathway
but did know the exact subway line that the worker
rode. Using police department personnel trained
in sampling techniques, CDC sampled the subway
line. Each sampling person was accompanied by
a strategist to help identify appropriate sampling
locations. None of the samples collected in the
subway were positive for B. anthracis. Because
B. anthracis out-competes other organisms,
interferences were not a concern.
• Has CDC considered the impacts of
noncultutable but viable organisms? CDC
researchers are currently examining this concern.
They have completed some research with B.
anthracis; the information gathered for this
organism, particularly validation studies, is
applicable to other organisms. CDC has methods
for identifying organisms. Bioviability and its
impact on infectivity are critical issues.
• What validation methods do you plan to use
in the future? Agencies are currently debating
validation methods and techniques. At the same
time, a number of novel technologies are also
becoming available. CDC research focuses on
methods that are cost-effective and easily accessible
to first responders. CDC is also concerned about
collection and recovery systems. Some specific
research has examined sampling methods such as
swabs, wipes, and vacuuming.
Ranking Threats for
Decontamination Research
Nancy Adams, U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency, National Homeland Security Research
Center
NHSRC/DCMD provides research to support
decontaminating and restoring facilities by working with
decontamination teams, emergency response teams, and
on-scene coordinators. One aspect of NHSRC's research
is to identify agents of greatest interest and to examine
ongoing research to address these agents.
This presentation focused on the methods used by
NHSRC to identify and rank threat agents. In addition to
ranking agents, NHSRC/DCMD conducts research on
sampling methods, contaminant containment, tracking
contaminant movement, and decontamination and
disposal issues. NHSRC does not focus on collecting
evidence.
Adams discussed four different methods used to rank
threat agents. Specific results of the ranking processes
were excluded from the presentation because of security
concerns. NHSRC is continually updating ranking results
to ensure that its research has the proper focus.
• DCMD approach This ranking approach
identifies and ranks high-priority threat
agents, identifies and ranks likely terrorist
targets, and identifies terrorist goals (e.g., loss
of life, economic damage, and inducing fear).
To identify and rank threat agents, NHSRC
examined the ranking schemes and results of other
agencies and organizations, including CDC, DoD, EPA,
the State Department, and the intelligence community.
NHSRC then developed a list of ranking factors:
infective dose, persistence, availability (e.g., small pox
is well guarded), prior use, ease of detection, severity
Decontamination Workshop 7
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of effects, transmission, preventives/treatments, ease of
decontamination (e.g., fumigation, latent desiccation),
latency, and ease of airborne dispersion. NHSRC is
more concerned with airborne dispersion, but they are
beginning to address water distribution. Each ranking
factor is given a weight (1 to 5) for relevance. The weights
are somewhat arbitrary and can be changed. Each agent is
assigned a value (0 to 4) for each ranking factor. NHSRC
has clearly defined the agent-specific values (e.g., for
the ranking factor "severity of effects," 0 is mild and 4 is
death). The overall threat agent rank is the sum of the
products of the ranking weight and the agent-specific
value.
NHSRC identified a number of target buildings (e.g.,
shopping centers, convention centers, airports, hospitals,
museums, and federal agencies). The building ranking
factors are building access, HVAC access, potential for
infiltration outdoors, room size, and people traffic. Each
of these factors is then weighted (1 to 5). Infiltration has
a low weight because buildings are typically either entirely
open or closed. Each building is assigned a value (1 to
5) for each ranking factor. The overall building rank is
the sum of the products of the ranking weight and the
building value.
NHSRC combines the agent rank, building rank, and
terrorist goals to link agents to events and develop threat
scenarios. NHSRC calculated a threat value by summing
individual ranking factors (e.g., agent availability, agent
hazard index, ease of agent use, people traffic, and non-
health impacts). Agent availability refers to the ease of
obtaining an agent and prior use of an agent. The agent
hazard index involves the infectious dose, lethality,
severity of effects, contagiousness, latency, and treatment
availability. Ease of use refers to dispersion options and the
potential for infiltration, and people traffic refers to the
number of people who use an area. Non-health impacts
include economic, symbolic, political, and psychological
impacts. NHSRC then ranked different threat scenarios
according to visual patterns and statistical cluster analyses
to help focus work on a small number of persistent agents
with severe potential effects.
• Science Applications International Corporation
(SAIC) ranking approach SAIC researchers
completed a similar but independent ranking
process for NHSRC. They considered threats
(physical contaminants and "cyber" threats),
targets (buildings, water systems, and wastewater
systems), and impacts (health, economic, and
environmental). SAIC developed a ranking
algorithm that calculated a risk number based on
the probability and consequences of an event. The
risk index was the product of agent availability,
event feasibility, and the sum of possible health
impacts, economic impacts, and environmental
impacts. Values for each of these variables were
identified using a series of decision trees. SAIC
calculated risk indices ranging from 0 to 300,000.
At the conclusion of the project, SAIC found results
similar to those of the DCMD approach.
• Expert systems approach This approach
considered the open literature, classified reports,
NHSRC reports, and EPA lists of contaminants and
threats. Experts then gathered in a threat scenario
meeting and developed a list of priority agents. This
list was similar to those developed by NHSRC and
SAIC.
• Battelle systematic decontamination effort This
effort employed a method similar to the DCMD
approach and achieved similar results.
NHSRC received input from a number of agencies to
ensure that the final threat list would be all-encompassing.
NHSRC (including DCMD and the Threat and
Consequence Assessment Division), DHS, DoD, EPA
Office of Water, EPA Office of Solid Waste, and EPA
Emergency Response Team members all provided input.
Questions, Answers, and Comments
• How does the NHSRC ranking scheme compare
with the rankings and categorizations developed
by other agencies? NHSRC uses the ranking results
primarily to focus research efforts. Ranking schemes
and categorizations are based on agency-specific
missions. For example, CDC is concerned with
health effects, so it may rank small pox as a threat
agent because of its drastic health consequences.
NHSRC is concerned with decontamination; since
small pox is fragile in the environment, NHSRC
would rank it as a low priority.
• NHSRC should add a category for technical
surprises (e.g., non-cultural but viable
organisms). NHSRC is researching methods
for determining organism viability as well as
bioengineered organisms and newer chemical
threats.
8 NHSRC
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OPP Sterilant Registration
Project: Improving the
Association of Official
Analytical Chemists (AOAC)
Sporicidal Activity Test
and the Evaluation of
Quantitative Methods
Stephen Tomasino, U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency, Office of Pesticide Programs
EPA's Office of Pesticide Programs (OPP) is researching
and developing biological analysis methods. This
presentation updated workshop participants about the
method development project status and OPP's evaluation
of laboratory sporicidal efficacy methods. OPP operates
a microbiological laboratory, which is the home of this
OPP project, at Fort Meade, Maryland. This laboratory
is registered with CDC's select agent program and may
become part of CDC's Laboratory Response Network
(LRN).
As part of the method development project, OPP is
developing methods that allow laboratories to simulate
real-world conditions. The methods consider the threat
agent or surrogate, types of materials, application methods,
and carrier systems. Goals of the project include advancing
the science of efficacy testing, standardizing methods,
creating comparable efficacy testing results, identifying
a surrogate for B. anthmcis, and building a platform for
testing additional biological agents.
OPP's ultimate goal, however, is to design comparable
efficacy data to help develop regulatory guidance. The
AOAC sporicidal activity test is the standard test currently
employed. A single carrier contains 105—106 spores, and
a full study uses 720 carriers. This test has a number of
limitations: results are qualitative, the test requires 21
days for incubation, and the test lacks standardization. A
passing result means that none of the carriers was positive.
OPP is following a four-tiered approach to developing a
method that is easier to run and understand:
• Tier 1 OPP evaluated methods, including
modified AOAC tests, with the agent B. subtilis.
• Tier 2 Activities under tier 2 will be launched
soon and will include evaluating surrogates for B.
anthracis.
• Tier 3 Collaborative and validation testing will
occur under tier 3-
• Tier 4 This step involves identifying, developing,
and conducting comparative evaluations of field-test
methods. OPP is currently focusing on laboratory
assays and is not pursuing field-testing.
Ensuring that performance standards are maintained
is critical when developing new methods or making
changes to an established method. OPP has identified
modifications to the existing AOAC method and two
new promising methods, which they are testing with
surrogates.
Modified AOAC Method The current AOAC tests
use a liquid extract from raw garden soil (soil extraction
nutrient broth) as the test medium. To standardize the
test, OPP recommends replacing the extract with a
synthetic broth manufactured to standard specifications.
OPP also recommended replacing porcelain carriers with
stainless steel carriers, adding a carrier count procedure
with a minimum of five to six logs per carrier, adding a
neutralization confirmation procedure, and replacing the
egg-meat medium.
OPP tested the current AOAC method against the
modified AOAC to examine whether changes in the
test medium and the carrier material affected the text
performance. Tomasino presented a number of slides
detailing these test results. Overall results were comparable.
As part of ongoing efforts, OPP completed a final study
protocol for the modified AOAC method in March
2005 and will begin validation testing in April 2005- The
validation report is due in July 2005, and approval of the
report is expected in August 2005-
The two new methods under evaluation are
quantitative methods with inoculated vials serving as
the carriers. When identifying new test methods, OPP
considered a number of attributes, such as available
protocol, validation, previous use for testing sporicides,
readily available equipment, expertise, flexible contact
times and temperatures, enumeration approaches, percent
recovery results, deactivation of the agent, reproducibility,
turnaround time, suitability for various product forms,
and adequate controls. Two methods met these criteria:
• ASTME 2111-00 Standard Quantitative Carrier
Test Method The ASTM method uses a glass vial
as a carrier. Following exposure, the vial's contents
are syphoned through a filter to capture spores. The
filter is then plated to assess spore growth, which
indicates that spores remain.
Decontamination Workshop 9
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• Three-Step Method (TSM) (Sagripanti et al.,
1996) TSM employs a glass coupon as the carrier.
To determine whether spores remain, the coupon
undergoes a three-step process: centrifuge, sonicare,
and incubation.
OPP focused tests on liquids and hard surfaces. Each
test method required a different amount of sporicide. To
assess the variability and repeatability of each method,
three separate laboratories completed three replicates of
tests following each method.
Repeatability studies highlight inconsistencies
within a laboratory. Reproducibility studies highlight
inconsistencies between laboratories. Repeatability and
reproducibility standard deviations were acceptably small
for all test methods. Tomasino presented slides detailing
the test methods and conditions (e.g., pH, sporicide
concentration, and exposure period) and the results
achieved for each method (expressed as the control carrier
log density or the log reduction). OPP's study results
did not show any method to be clearly superior. OPP
submitted the study results to an expert panel, which
selected TSM as the preferred method. As part of ongoing
efforts, OPP will conduct additional surrogate studies with
TSM beginning in April 2005- TSM and two to three
surrogates will undergo a multi-laboratory validation study
in September 2005, and a summary report of findings is
due in December 2005-
Questions, Answers, and Comments
• What fumigants are you testing? To date, OPP
has tested only liquid fumigants. However, OPP
believes that TSM can be modified to test other
fumigants and other surfaces.
• What are the surrogate selection criteria? OPP
began testing with virulent anthrax. The surrogate
selection criteria will be straightforward and may be
used by other researchers.
Crisis Exemptions for
Products Intended to
Inactivate Bacillus anthracis
Jeff Kempter, U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency, Office of Pesticide Programs
Crisis exemption is the process of receiving approval to
use an unregistered chemical as a decontaminant for
a particular microorganism, such as B. anthracis. This
presentation provided background information about the
crisis exemption process, considerations for evaluating and
selecting sporicides, issues that demand attention, and the
current state of the registration process.
A number of groups (e.g., researchers, regulators,
chemical producers, first responders) and the public are
involved in deciding what chemicals should be used to
decontaminate an anthrax event. First responders want
chemicals that are safe and act quickly. The public looks
for chemicals that are safe to use but provide adequate
decontamination.
In the United States, decontamination agents
fall under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and
Rodenticide Act (FIFRA). FIFRA applies to chemicals
sold for inactivating biological agents. These chemicals
are considered pesticides and must be registered. When
anthrax attacks occurred in 2001, no chemical had been
registered for decontaminating B. anthracis. As such, the
government created the crisis exemption process to allow
chemical decontamination. A crisis exemption was needed
for each decontamination event. Of the 63 requests, OPP
approved 28 and rejected 35. Both federal agencies and
private companies submitted requests and each request
included remediation action plans, sampling and analysis
plans, and ambient air monitoring plans.
When evaluating and selecting sporicides,
OPP considers both safety and efficacy issues.
• Safety Concerns regarding safety include
containment of the contamination area and
fumigant, fumigant toxicity and potential human
exposure, fumigant generation method, ability
to achieve negative pressure in a building, post-
treatment aeration and scrubbing needs, system
backups, and ambient air monitoring needs. A key
concern is that the fumigation be successful after the
first treatment. Air treatment systems are also a key
concern when considering containment and post-
treatment cleanup.
10 NHSRC
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• Efficacy Issues associated with treatment efficacy
include fumigation processes (e.g., treating the
building as a whole or in sections), fumigant
distribution (e.g., using fans), reaching and holding
decontamination process parameters, monitoring
process parameters (e.g., concentration, time, and
relative humidity), biological indicator sampling,
and clearance sampling. Sealing a building to
prevent or minimize leaks is a time-consuming part
of ensuring the fumigation efficacy.
Liquids OPP has granted crisis exemptions for four
liquid B. anthrads sporicides: aqueous chlorine dioxide,
hydrogen peroxide/peracetic acid, sodium hypochlorite,
and hydrogen peroxide/quarternary ammonium foam.
These liquids were approved for use on hard, nonporous
surfaces only. The exemption for DF-100 was withdrawn
because the fumigant failed tests with the AOAC method.
DF-200, which is the improved version of DF-100, has
reportedly passed testing.
GasesAkpors Five gases and vapors have
received crisis exemptions: gaseous chlorine dioxide
(buildings), vaporized hydrogen peroxide (buildings),
paraformaldehyde (equipment in tented enclosures),
methyl bromide (laboratory and field study), and
ethylene oxide (specialized off-site treatment of specific
items). Several vendors offer hydrogen peroxide as a
decontamination agent.
OPP is moving toward registering chemicals for
B. anthracis decontamination, but several regulatory
issues must be addressed first. EPA needs to establish
standard efficacy test methods. The registration data
requirements need to be rigorous but reasonable. EPA
must also consider the question of how clean is clean. A
National Academy of Sciences (NAS) study focusing on
anthrax, plague, and small pox is pending. This study will
likely include several recommendations for regulatory
requirements, such as a site-by-site risk assessment. The
study will also address natural versus residual exposures,
past decontamination efforts, and enclosed versus semi-
enclosed facilities.
Registration requires test data regarding product
chemistry, toxicity, and efficacy. These tests are
straightforward and are guided by the concept that a
product registered for use against an agent must be tested
against that agent. OPP may accept surrogate data if the
surrogate is proven to be equally susceptible to a product.
Product labeling includes details regarding the product use
and safety precautions. For registration, a product may be
labeled for restricted use and require a substantial technical
use manual.
To address efficacy testing, EPA is leveraging
interagency cooperation. EPA and others participate
in an expert panel to share information and prevent
redundancies. They are trying to identify one set of tests
that is acceptable to all the agencies. These tests could
then be used for regulatory and/or registration purposes.
Kempter highlighted the OPP method testing discussed in
Tomasino's presentation.
Kempter discussed "Lemon Drop" as an example of a
crisis exemption situation. The United States Coast Guard
(USCG) identified a shipment of lemons with a viable
threat for biological contamination. USCG needed, and
OPP provided, a crisis exemption within 24 hours.
OPP and others have been successful at completing
decontamination. Certain decontamination methods are
safe and effective, some personnel and equipment can
be mobilized quickly, and OPP can quickly issue crisis
exemptions for known decontamination methods.
Questions, Answers, and Comments
• For sporicidal testing, is there a standard for
material compatibility? Material compatibility
standards have not been required. If OPP identifies
a chemical that passes toxicity and efficacy tests
but has known compatibility problems, OPP will
require the manufacturer to label the product
accordingly. OPP is unlikely to fail a chemical
based on compatibility. A workshop participant
noted that many concerns are associated with
material compatibility and fumigation. Material
compatibility involves more than just damage to a
material; it also involves the impact of a fumigant
on materials, the impact of a material on a
fumigant, and the ability of a fumigant to penetrate
a material.
• Have all the chemicals that were used to
decontaminate B. anthracis been registered?
No chemicals have been registered for use against
anthrax. Decontamination is still conducted under
crisis exemptions and each situation is reviewed on
a case-by-case basis. Some of the chemicals used in
anthrax decontamination, however, are registered
for other uses. OPP is working with laboratories
and others to prepare for crisis exemption
submissions, if needed.
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Sampling and Clearance
Lessons Learned
Mark Durno, U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency
Tony Intrepido, U.S. Army Center for Health
Promotion and Prevention Medicine
Durno is an OSC and end-user of decontamination
technologies. He was involved in the Capitol Hill anthrax
incident and has participated in technical working groups.
This presentation discussed many of the approaches
presented earlier but provided an end-user's perspective.
The basic sampling approach is the same for
chemical, biological, and radiological agents. The anthrax
technical assistance document prepared by the National
Response Team (NRT) (available at urww.nrt.org) provides
immediate response actions for first responders at a scene.
The approach outlined in that document is consistent with
other terrorism response or hazardous release situations.
The specifics of a sampling plan, however, change from
site to site. Parameters to formalize before sampling begins
include objectives, approaches, sampling and analytical
methods, transportation concerns, coordination efforts,
and data interpretation.
Considerations when developing sampling objectives
include:
• Defining goals Sampling goals may
include assessing risk, characterizing contamination,
supporting decisions, or verifying decontamination.
• Establishing data quality objectives Even if
expressed as notes in a log book, data quality
objectives are critical to a successful sampling event.
• Identifying standards No decontamination
standards are currently available.
In addition, professionals (e.g., from the medical,
environmental, laboratory, and public health
communities) involved in the decontamination process
should be consulted. Sampling event objectives for first
responders may include real-time monitoring, screening,
bulk material sampling, or unknown material sampling.
As the sampling effort moves toward assessing the extent
of contamination or decontamination, the objectives may
shift to forensics or the effectiveness of decontamination.
Transitional sampling, an Occupational Safety and Health
Administration (OSHA) approach, clears a building for
safe reoccupation.
Regardless of the objectives, Durno emphasized, the
sampling approach must be logical. An approach devised
in the heat of the moment is destined to have problems.
A carefully designed approach is more likely to lead to
a smooth sampling event. Two examples of sampling
approaches are:
• Known source When B. anthmcis was
transported in the mail, the contaminated letters
were the known sources. For each room where
a contaminated letter may have been, sampling
occurred at the areas through which it most likely
passed. If a positive result occurred, sampling in the
affected area was expanded.
• Known contamination with an unknown source
In this instance, statistical analysis of an area can
improve the probability of finding a positive
detection and identifying a source. A negative result,
however, does not necessarily indicate that the agent
is absent from an area.
Intrepido continued the presentation with a
discussion of lessons learned from the sampling efforts.
In April 2004, Intrepido participated in a workshop
to discuss sampling and detection issues. During that
workshop, discussions included topics such as hazard
identification, field detection, sampling efficacy, analytical
capabilities, and post-decontamination sampling. The first
topic applied to first responders and the last three topics
applied to characterization and remediation activities.
• Hazard identification Hazard identification is
critcal for first responders because their actions may
spread contamination. Like hazardous materials,
biological agents must be contained. Assessing and
establishing the credibility of the threat is key.
• Field detections Several methods for collecting
field data are available (e.g., hand-held assays,
infrared sensors, and rapid polymerase chain
reaction testing). Misuse of these tools, however, can
lead to poor decisions. Intrepido discouraged using
these methods without proper training. Other field
detection technologies are under development and
testing.
• Sampling efficacy Intrepido listed a number of
available guidance materials and references, as well
as several studies by NIOSH, USPS, and others,
that address sampling efficacy concerns. Further
efficacy studies, however, are needed to identify
acceptable detection limits.
12 NHSRC
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• Analytical capabilities Laboratories are working
to improve analytical capabilities and analytical
support for decontamination projects. CDC has
established the Laboratory Response Network
(LRN) and is working to standardize analytical
methods used throughout the LRN. DoD is
establishing a similar environmental LRN (eLRN)
to harmonize sampling.
• Post-decontamination sampling To date,
verification sampling has been exhaustive. As
research advances and laboratory applications
become more relevant to field applications,
clearance will become more efficient.
To provide better guidance, the NRT technical
assistance document should consider first responder
needs, include a matrix of appropriate sampling strategies
and methods (including statistical tools), encourage the
use of relevant professionals, and develop consistent
nomenclature.
Two examples illustrate different factors that affect a
sampling strategy.
• Hart building A clear understanding of
contamination avenues was present. Sampling was
planned using this knowledge.
• USPS buildings People were working for days and
weeks after the initial release. A dynamic sampling
plan considered movement of the agent and objects
in the building, and so sampling included lifting
some objects and sampling underneath them.
Appeasement sampling became part of the approach
to assuage people's fear. Additional sampling also
became necessary when one laboratory provided
quantitative sampling results and other laboratories
reported only qualitative results (i.e., positive or
negative). The quantitative and qualitative results
were not comparable.
Questions, Answers, and Comments
• A workshop participant expressed concern about
false negatives. Statistical design, if correct, can
consider data risk. In research at the Edgewood
Chemical Biological Center (ECBC), differences in
kill efficacy were based on differences in surfaces.
Most tests use a stainless steel surface, which does
not account for surface variability in real-world
situations.
Did you conduct any high-volume air sampling?
NIOSH and the Agency for Toxic Substances and
Disease Registry (ATSDR) helped EPA develop
an aggressive high-volume air sampling protocol,
which was similar to asbestos sampling protocols.
They sealed several rooms and passed one to two
room volumes of air through a dry filter unit.
Although the data were insufficient for statistical
verification, the results improved EPAs confidence
in other data, such as surface sampling data. EPA
also augmented sampling data using other sampling
methods (e.g., gelatin filters) that can detect low
concentrations. Overall, the dry filters from the
high-volume sampling reported positive results
but not with the same frequency as other sampling
methods. EPA hopes that more research in this area
will be conducted.
When designing a statistical sampling approach
for B. anthracis, the agents specific aerosol
properties are considered. When designing a
statistical sampling approach for two or three
different agents, how do you consider agents'
different aerosol properties? When searching for
unknowns, targeting specific areas for sampling is
difficult. As more information becomes available
and you begin to understand the nature of
contamination, you can target areas and change
sampling approaches.
When identifying the logic behind a sampling
sequence, should you consider clearance
sampling needs? At the Hart Building, vertical
and horizontal grid-style sampling with air
sampling was conducted. Clearance sampling at
this building was more involved than clearance
sampling at other buildings because an extended
period had lapsed between exposure and
decontamination. Sampling included redundancy,
extensive horizontal (i.e., surface) sampling, and
consideration of airborne movement. Intrepido
noted that the decontamination process at the
Hart Building helped to develop a new sampling
nomenclature. The technical language regarding
the decontamination process is also continuing to
evolve.
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The Use of the Trace
Atmospheric Gas Analyzer
(TAGA) to Qualitatively
and Quantitatively Monitor
Ambient Air for Chemical
Warfare Agents (CWAs) and
Decontamination Agents in
Real Time at Parts per Trillion
by Volume Levels or Below
Dave Mickunas, U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency, Environmental Response Team
The presenter and others are developing and testing
methods for real-time, low-level monitoring for chemical
warfare agents (CWAs) and decontamination agents in
ambient air. EPA's TAGA consists of an Atmospheric
Pressure Chemical lonization (APCI) source linked
to a three-quadrupole mass spectrometer. This project
included developing CWA spectra and calibration
curves, developing chemical ionization capabilities to
detect CWAs, verifying detection limits, determining the
dynamic linear range, establishing surrogates, identifying
interferences, and demonstrating methods. Mickunas
presented a series of slides detailing the test methods, test
conditions, test materials, chemicals of interest, and some
unique test conditions.
Chemical agents of interest throughout the task
included GA (Tabun), GB, GD, GF (cyclosarin),
VX, HD, and the nitrogen mustard agents HNj,
HN2, and HN3. Chlorine dioxide and chlorine were
the decontamination agents of interest. Initial testing
occurred in a laboratory chamber. EPA used diisopropyl
methylphosphonate (DIMP) as a surrogate for G and B
agents and half mustard as a surrogate for mustard.
One aspect of the testing was to assess how well agents
would transfer through a glass sampling tube without
being adsorbed or reacting with the tubing. Because
laboratory testing must be conducted under a hood,
researchers could test only a limited tubing length. Results
showed that the glass tubing was not entirely inert. EPA
is considering additional test conditions, such as adding
heat, to assess reactions with the glass tubing.
After testing the systems in a fixed laboratory,
EPA moved the system to a mobile laboratory, which
consisted of a TAGA mounted in a bus. The APCI uses
electrons and protons to ionize a chemical. Ambient air
enters the instrument; molecules are ionized and then
passed through the three-quadrupole mass spectrometer.
TAGA measures charges and creates a unique spectral
"fingerprint" as the result for each chemical. Information
gathered in the mobile laboratory can then be sent to an
incident command location via satellite.
Mickunas presented the TAGA fingerprints for
a number of the agents of interest. The technology
considered the molecular weights of the parent and
daughter ions. TAGA can even detect low concentrations
of chemicals with low vapor pressures, such as VX. Ion
counting is key to the success of this method. For the
tested agents, EPA recorded between 200 and 7,000 ion
counts per part per billion (ppb), which indicates a good
response.
Overall, TAGA is a good testing method for the
agents of interest. The mobile unit can identify an
evacuation area, but it is not currently configured for
sampling high concentrations. At a decontamination
event, TAGA can be used to detect fumigant leaks and
identify concentrations exceeding shutdown levels (e.g.,
chlorine dioxide concentrations of 25 ppb for three 15-
minute periods, or 100 ppb for one 15-minute period).
Questions, Answers, and Comments
• Workshop participants commented that TAGA and
the mobile laboratory can serve as a leak-detection
technology. The detection limits for hand-held
sensors are too high to detect leaks. Mickunas
agreed and noted that the TAGA technology is
about six times more sensitive than hand-held
instruments.
• Is the method applicable to high-molecular-
weight compounds (e.g., ricin)? The
pharmaceutical industry, which deals with high-
molecular-weight compounds, uses this technology.
Air monitoring was not the original end use of
the technology. The method works with these
compounds because it examines charges on
molecules.
• Are there concerns about using this technology
at fumigations in high rises? Downwash is a
concern. Overall, many opportunities exist to
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research the logistical implementation of TAGA
and the mobile laboratory.
• Does vehicle exhaust interfere with the lesults?
Vehicle exhaust interference is minimal, less than
30 percent.
• Are fixed monitoring stations in a community
required with TAGA and mobile laboratories?
From experience, this workshop participant
has found that fixed stations are costly and
time-consuming to use. Mickunas agreed that
fixed monitoring stations have limited value. A
contamination plume from a leak can be very
narrow and can pass between fixed stations without
detection. The mobile monitoring unit provides
more information and more ways to identify and
resolve leaks.
Insurance and Indemnity
Issues
Jerry Robinson, U.S. Postal Service
This presentation examined insurance and indemnity
issues at decontamination sites. The USPS is concerned
not with industrial accidents but with terrorist actions.
Therefore, some of the insurance and indemnity options
mentioned in the presentation apply only to terrorist
attacks. An act of terror can be broadly defined as anything
unlawful that causes harm or attempts to use weapons of
mass destruction. A terrorist group does not need to be
identified and the act may be conducted by a domestic or
foreign group.
In October 2001, anthrax releases contaminated
the USPS Brentwood and Trenton facilities. The attacks
caused illness in 22 people and the death of 5 people. The
attacks also rendered the facilities unusable, damaged mail-
sorting equipment, and instilled fear in postal workers and
the public. The USPS contracted with vendors to fumigate
and restore the facilities.
As the property owner, the USPS needed to protect
contractors from undesirable outcomes occurring as a
result of the decontamination process (e.g., explosion,
unsuccessful fumigation, and harm to postal or vendor
workers). Obtaining this protection comes at great cost
and great delay.
Addressing liability for harm to people is the most
difficult aspect of protecting the vendors and the USPS.
Involved parties may try to distribute the liability to
minimize each party's risk. For the decontamination
events, the USPS reluctantly accepted full liability and
assigned broad indemnity with few exceptions (e.g.,
outcomes occurring as a result of gross vendor error).
Many months, however, passed before the USPS reached
the decision to accept liability. To minimize their risk, the
USPS then obtained some insurance coverage—a $100
million policy costing $4 million. Decontamination of
one facility, however, cost more than $ 100 million, so this
policy did not cover the USPS completely.
The USPS course of action has two problems.
First, most government agencies cannot indemnify
decontamination vendors because these agencies are not
allowed to enter into the open-ended contracts required
for indemnification. DoD has exceptions to this restriction
for issues related to weapons. The current administration
is also very reluctant to grant terrorism exceptions; the
USPS has an indefinite income stream and, for this
reason, was able to accept indefinite liability. Second,
insurance is not an available standby solution and much
time is needed to negotiate an insurance policy after an
event occurs. Most insurance companies will not hold
an open insurance policy without payment, but opening
an unnecessary insurance policy is not a smart business
practice. Nonetheless, the USPS is looking for an available
standby solution.
Robinson suggested that contractors obtain a
SAFETY Act designation and certification for their
technologies. This would allow contractors to be
immediately available to perform decontamination
services. The SAFETY Act—that is, the Support Anti-
Terrorism by Fostering Effective Technologies Act of
2002—is part of the Homeland Security Act. The
SAFETY Act covers decontamination technologies
because these technologies are a response to a terror act.
As well as fostering the deployment of more anti-terrorism
technologies, the Act creates a system of litigation and
risk management for those technologies. Litigation
management restricts punitive and non-economic
damages to government contractors; risk management
restricts liability to the extent that insurance allows.
The SAFETY Act, however, requires a vendor to
purchase insurance, determined by DHS, in order to
be certified. The insurance level is supposed to be the
maximum amount that can be purchased without unduly
raising product price. This is a vague standard for DHS
to follow. The SAFETY Act also includes a government
contractor liability exemption. This exemption absolves
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contractors from responsibility for undesirable outcomes
of the decontamination (e.g., damage to property or
personal injury). Some attorneys are concerned that the
government contractor liability exemption will not stand
up in court. For example, a judge faced with a person
harmed during a decontamination event and responsible
for overwhelming medical bills may deem the contractor
liable because no other responsible party is available.
Questions, Answers, and Comments
• Does the SAFETY Act cover decontamination
at private companies? Private companies are
covered as long as a terror act, and not an industrial
accident, caused the damage.
• Is federal insurance an option? The atomic power
industry has used a federal insurer model, but the
federal government is the insurer of last resort.
The current Congress has not adopted a federal
insurance policy for terror acts.
• Do you see companies investing in insurance
because they want decontamination and response
business? Robinson stated that there is a limited
market for decontamination services and suggested
that more insurance options might be available if
more contractors entered this market.
• Is the contractor liability exemption rebuttable?
This exemption is only rebuttable if there is proof of
fraud in the application to DHS.
The Role of the On-Scene
Coordinator in the Process
Marty Powell, U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency
Powell has worked for EPA for 20 years and served as
an OSC for about 10 of these years. This presentation
provided an overview of an OSC's two responsibilities:
1. To determine whether there has been a release of an
oil, hazardous substance, pollutant, or contaminant
and whether the release poses a threat to the public
or environment.
2. To ensure that the threat is mitigated. These
responsibilities remain the same on all projects,
although project specifics change.
An OSC's role in a project is defined by the title "on-
scene coordinator" itself. "On-scene" implies a different
role from "on-site." "On-site" implies a federal presence at
a specific threat location; "on-scene" indicates involvement
in an event without requiring a physical presence. OSCs
are coordinators, not commanders. Commanders control
site actions, whereas coordinators play a number of roles to
provide information and support remediation efforts. The
command structure at a site may seem complex, so the
OSC can act as a liaison within this structure.
OSCs direct federal response assets. They draw from
a large tool box of resources (e.g., contractor support,
scientific support, special units, and public relations
support teams) and provide these resources to local
and state agencies to ensure that these agencies are not
overwhelmed by the remediation process. They also ensure
that remediation work at a site is completed properly. For
example, the USPS commanded decontamination efforts
at the postal facilities contaminated with anthrax. The
OSC simply supported the USPS's efforts.
Many workshop participants may be contacted by an
OSC. Researchers may act as information resources for
an OSC, or technology vendors may work with OSCs
to identify resources for testing their technology. OSCs
may also evaluate the remediation equipment used for
decontamination.
Questions, Answers, and Comments
• One workshop participant has worked with OSCs
over the past three years. The OSCs understood
available federal information and assets and
obtained them as necessary and worked behind
the scene of the decontamination to ensure
success. Another participant agreed that the OSC
is a valuable source of information, which can be
used to support decisions. Powell emphasized that
OSCs can access many EPA resources and facilitate
obtaining these resources. They provide a link
between scientific research and implementation of
technologies.
• Another participant noted that an OSC has a broad
range of authority and power. For one site, the OSC
determined the chlorine concentration needed for
decontamination. Powell responded that an OSC
has the ability to make decisions for a site without
obtaining a permit. Regulations requiring permits
often do not consider emergency response needs.
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In addition, OSCs have no liability and cannot
be sued for their decisions. The role of the OSC is
complicated by the needs of different agencies, such
as other offices within EPA, the United States Coast
Guard (USCG), and the Department of Energy
(DoE). Regardless of agency, though, an OSC's
roles and responsibilities remain unchanged: they
work toward an end goal of threat identification and
mitigation.
One participant, who works as an OSC, noted that
a shortcoming in many responses is coordinating
government and academic research to solve
problems. An OSC may seek more information
about a compound, but the literature may provide
scattered and conflicting information. The OSC
is then charged with making decisions based on
this information. This participant emphasized the
need for more research, planning, and preparedness
information.
What triggers the appointment of an OSC? A
notification of some kind of release, for example,
a call to EPA or the National Response Center,
triggers the appointment. (An industry call to
EPA about a spill is a notification.) An OSC may
respond by granting responsibility to state or
local agencies but is still responsible for ensuring
mitigation. Sometimes the response includes a full-
scale investigation.
In the remediation phase, does the OSC act
as the incident commander under the Federal
Response Plan? In Florida, when the FBI
completed investigations and released the
building for decontamination, did EPA establish
a command structure? An OSC is unlikely
to become the incident commander. The OSC
considers site operations, such as what vendor is
providing what services. The command structure,
however, can vary. The USCG strike team is one
resource available to an OSC. Typically, this team
serves as the incident commander at coastal sites.
Agencies involved in a decontamination event may
work together to formalize the incident command
structure. EPA is currently working toward
developing a more uniform approach.
Introduction to
the Government
Decontamination Services
Robert Bettley-Smith, Department for
Environment, Food, and Rural Affairs,
Government Decontamination Service
Bettley-Smith presented the United Kingdom
(UK) approach to threat events and subsequent
decontamination and provided a history of events that
have occurred. The UK is examining possible future
threats and building its arsenal of technologies to address
them. These efforts consider global uncertainty and draw
on a cross-government effort to ensure preparedness.
In April 2003, the UK commissioned a study to assess
the need for an agency to address chemical, biological, and
radiological threats. The study recommended actions to
improve the UK's ability to respond to threat events. In
January 2005, the government announced its intention
to establish the Government Decontamination Service
(GDS). Currently, the government is balancing efforts
to improve the UK's capability to address an event and
establish the organization to implement this capability.
GDS must consider current government structure
and authority. In the UK, authorities at the county
level are responsible for hazardous events. They are well
prepared for chemical events because of their experience
with chemical transport and releases. They also have
experience with radiological events (e.g., the Chernobyl
event). They lack, however, experience with biological
events, so GDS will focus its efforts on these threats. GDS
considers biological event decontamination as a specialized
field with expertise available from the private sector. There
is a concern that local authorities could be overwhelmed
by the exigencies of decontamination following an attack
and could respond inappropriately.
The UK hopes to learn from the U.S. anthrax
events and other countries' responses to biological
threats. The Australian response plan was evaluated
in November 2003- This plan is grounded in military
actions, a precondition that is not applicable to the
UK. Also reviewed was the French plan, which includes
public notification as required by French laws. Again,
this plan is not wholly applicable to the UK. Bettley-
Smith emphasized the importance of understanding
the background for a response plan model, including
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constitutional restrictions and responsible parties. The UK
has also considered establishing a centralized data system
for facilitating and sharing knowledge across nations and
preventing research overlap.
In addition to developing a response plan, GDS may
provide information about vendors and technologies
capable of biological decontamination. This information
may be presented in the form of a catalog of available
goods and services, including long-term, durable responses
and proven technologies. GDS may also enter agreements
requiring that vendors offering these services be available
to the government when necessary.
Overall, GDS will serve three primary functions:
• Provide advice and guidance GDS will guide
responsible authorities as they plan for emergencies
and test these plans. It will prepare a strategic
national guidance document; provide ad hoc advice;
review case studies; and participate in exercises that
test command and coordination abilities, identify
solutions, and highlight response plan weaknesses.
Individuals have already evaluated three case study
events (a cesium release and two bombings) to assess
responses and suggest actions to improve responses.
• Identify resources GDS will provide information
about vendors, their capabilities, and their
technologies and facilitate interactions between
local authorities and vendors. Some interim
arrangements, modeled on the response to the U.S.
anthrax events, are in place, but the public demands
more confidence in vendor relationships and
technology success. The lack of technology field-
testing is a concern because a technology must work
when needed.
• Advise the central government GDS will track the
UK's decontamination capabilities and report to the
central government.
GDS will not assume responsibility for
decontamination, fund decontamination, or handle
humans, animals, or their remains. If an event occurs
in the UK today, GDS will likely provide advice and
guidance and help secure contracts. It may also be able to
provide an OSC.
Questions, Answers, and Comments
• Is there a perception of urgency to address
decontamination capabilities and preparedness
in other European communities? Bettley-Smith
was most familiar with activities in the UK and
was unable to provide an overview of actions
occurring throughout Europe. Concern has been
high in Australia since before the Sydney Olympics.
France is also working to address decontamination
concerns. Some of the UK actions have been driven
by threat assessments, and the UK is working to
ensure that event responses are proportional to the
risk.
• Does the UK face the same insurance and
indemnity issue as the U.S.? In the UK, the
government serves as the insurance underwriter,
with certain reinsurance provisions. The
government is working with the insurance industry
to quantify risks. Once insurance providers can
quantify the risk, they can underwrite it. Key
contractors will likely carry insurance for a variety
of situations. After a terror event has occurred, the
risks during the remediation phase of the event are
the same as the risks during the remediation phase
of a hazardous materials release. These are insurable
risks. Insurance may be difficult, but not impossible,
to obtain.
Laboratory Capacity Issues
Rob Rothman, U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency, National Homeland Security Research
Center
This presentation addressed laboratory capacity issues as
they relate to homeland security. A homeland security
presidential directive requires that "federal agencies
be prepared to respond to chemical, biological, and
radiological attacks."
Laboratories face several issues with regard to meeting
this directive:
• "Validation Validated sampling methods provide
a level of confidence in reported sampling results
and in answering the question "How clean is
clean?" These methods are lacking for some priority
chemical, biological, and radiological agents.
• Expertise Laboratories must have expertise in
handling CWAs, which may degrade quickly.
• Capacity A laboratory may be called to analyze
thousands of samples quickly, especially if an attack
affects city operations.
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Creating standardized analytical methods is one way
to address these issues. Standardized methods would
ensure consistent and proficient sample analysis across
laboratories. In September 2004, EPA identified 109
priority agents and specific analytical methods for gas,
solid, oily solid, and aqueous samples.
Revisions to the standard analytical methods are
scheduled for June 2005- This revision will include
updates to existing methods and will add new methods for
analyzing drinking water, CWA degradation products, and
four radiological agents (strontium-90, cesium, iridium,
and cobalt-60).
Research with CWAs must occur under high-security
conditions and within laboratories under the rigorous
personnel-reliability program. Only a finite number of
laboratories meet these conditions. Rothman listed some
of the available analytical methods for CWAs, which
include a joint U.S. and Finnish method, Organization for
the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) methods,
Finnish Institute for Verification of the Chemical Weapons
Convention (VERIFIN) Blue Books, and the Wiley
Encyclopedia of Analytical Methods. EPA not only needs
to package this existing information in the standardized
analytical methods document but also needs to develop
new methods. Some chemical-specific concerns in the
development of methods are that GS degrades quickly
(within 24 hours) and VX, mustard, and lewisite are
relatively persistent. Methods, therefore, must be able to
detect either the primary agent or degradation products.
In addition to developing analytical methods,
laboratories must have the capacity to handle samples
collected during a response. Samples to identify the threat
agent and assess the nature and extent of contamination
are collected at the greatest rate within days of the event.
Thousands of samples, collected within days or weeks
of the initial event may need to be analyzed. Cleanup,
clearance, and surveillance samples taken weeks, months,
and possibly years after the event may be collected in
greater numbers, but likely at slower rates, than initial
sampling.
To address capacity concerns, EPA is working with
CDC to develop the environmental Laboratory Response
Network (eLRN). CDC's existing LRN serves as a
model for the three-tiered eLRN. Screening or sentinel
laboratories will provide analyses and participate in
sampling surges. Confirmatory laboratories will coordinate
with the sentinel laboratories and first responders. These
laboratories will also provide method validation. Reference
laboratories will provide definitive agent identification
for an event, develop methods and guidance, and
provide quality assurance. Tentatively identified reference
laboratories include the EPA ORD laboratories in Las
Vegas (chemical focus) and Cincinnati (biological focus).
These two laboratories are currently working toward
identifying preferred analytical methods for all priority
agents in all media, developing validated methods for
CWAs, and preparing a nationwide quality assurance
program.
Optimally, these laboratories will operate under the
same system to provide as much consistency as possible.
The network would also be able to address all hazards,
provide rapid sentinel screening, employ high-confidence
methods, and offer surge capacity. Laboratories will add
real-time technologies to their capabilities when these
methods are validated and supported by research. Through
the eLRN, EPA hopes to eliminate problems of analytical
inconsistencies and lack of sample comparability.
Questions, Answers, and Comments
• One workshop participant provided additional
details about CDC's LRN. CDC developed the
LRN to support medical responses. Sentinel
laboratories are given cleared status to conduct
analyses; they include hospitals and others with
access to biological analysis methods. Confirmatory
laboratories are part of a secure system addressing
public health concerns (i.e., state and federal public
health laboratories). Confirmatory laboratories
undergo proficiency testing and follow a quality
assurance/quality control program. Reference
laboratories include the CDC laboratories. The
impetus for creating the LRN was the need for
high-quality, interpretable results that support
public health decisions. Security at these laboratories
is critical. Rothman agreed with the participant
about security: it is critical, especially when
laboratories are handling CWAs. EPA is currently
discussing security issues and will likely limit
security clearance to a small number of laboratories
that will develop protocols and then distribute these
protocols throughout the network. Use of surrogates
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and degradation products may also facilitate
material handling and address security concerns.
• Is EPA considering geographic distribution
of the laboratories for the eLRN? Geographic
distribution is one of the many factors under
consideration. For example, EPA is considering
using the 10 EPA regional laboratories as part of the
eLRN.
• How did EPA select the four radiological
agents for inclusion in the revised standardized
analytical methods document? These four
radiological agents represent a starting point. They
are high-energy gamma emitters that are readily
available.
• Will the eLRN include private laboratories?
Private laboratories may be included in the eLRN as
sentinel laboratories.
Chlorine Dioxide Fumigation
and Liquid Chlorine Dioxide
John Mason, Sabre Technical Services
Sabre Technology Services (Sabre) fumigated the AMI
building in Boca Raton and containers involved in
"Lemon Drop." (USCG identified a shipment of lemons
with a viable threat for biological contamination.) USCG
needed, and OPP was able to provide, a crisis exemption
within 24 hours. Mason presented information about
the chlorine dioxide fumigation technology used at these
locations and the lessons learned from conducting these
fumigations.
At these events, Sabre sought options to accelerate
the decontamination and clearance process. Options
included minimizing wastes generated, minimizing liquid
pre-treatments, applying mobile fumigation technologies,
streamlining the clearance process, ensuring proper sample
tracking and quality control, and communicating clearly
with the affected community. At both events, Sabre
demonstrated its mobile fumigation technology. At the
AMI building, streamlining the clearance process would
have been the best option to reduce time. A tremendous
effort was also exerted to describe and discuss the
fumigation process to the public and regulatory agencies.
To illustrate the process, Mason described the
fumigation at the AMI building in detail. The fumigation
itself lasted 7 days from equipment setup to complete
fumigation. However, 30 days of planning preceded the
actual fumigation. Before fumigation could start, Sabre
considered whether B. onthntcis contamination remained
after 2.5 years of vacancy. Contamination followed the
mail route and affected the HVAC system above the mail
areas. Sampling protocols developed for the Capitol Hill
anthrax event were applied to the AMI building.
Having confirmed the presence of B. anthracis, Sabre
demonstrated the technology to ensure that the fumigant
would reach all areas requiring decontamination. Sabre
used the building's HVAC system to distribute the
fumigant. For the demonstration, about 1,500 biological
indicators and 15 test strips were placed throughout
the building. Sabre released the fumigant to achieve a
concentration of 750 parts per million (ppm) for a 12-
hour period. The building remained at a minimum of
75° F and 50 percent relative humidity. The indicators and
test strips confirmed that the fumigant would reach all
targets.
The Sabre technology involves transforming liquid
chlorine to gas. The technology passes the liquid through
packing material to achieve the phase change. They
controlled for the necessary temperature and humidity
level using the building's HVAC system. In Boca Raton,
dehumidifying the air was necessary.
During the full-scale AMI fumigation, Sabre placed
approximately 200 log-8 test strips throughout the
building. In post-treatment sampling, all strips showed
a no-growth response. Tracking sample locations and
communicating results were concerns, so Sabre developed
a three-dimensional sampling map of the AMI building.
The software enabled people to visualize the sampling
locations and track the sample chain of custody.
As Sabre completed the AMI building fumigation,
the company was called to apply the same technology to
the contaminated containers identified in Newark Harbor.
Sabre used this event to test its mobile equipment. The
total transit time from Boca Raton to Newark was about
20 hours. Within 48 hours of leaving Boca Raton, Sabre
was ready to begin fumigation. Insurance and a crisis
exemption were both obtained within 24 hours because
the agencies involved in Newark had worked with Sabre at
the Boca Raton building and were familiar with the Sabre
technology. The fumigation in Newark was completed
within 10 days.
These two projects illustrate the need for pre-
planning. The planning phase can be streamlined when
agencies and organizations are familiar with a technology.
Data tracking is also critical. Demonstrations of the
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decontamination technology at the AMI building were
needed partially to ensure that the fumigant was contained
within the building. Sabre has since conducted tests of
tenting with negative pressure to contain fumigants at
a facility in Utica, New York. Obtaining insurance also
contributed significantly to project delays. The AMI
building fumigation was delayed from November to May
because of insurance issues.
Questions, Answers, and Comments
• When decontaminating the containers in Newark
Harbor, were you told what the target agent
was? Can you discuss project considerations for
conducting decontamination for an unknown?
Sabre received minimal information about the
target agent in this situation. They were told to treat
the containers for an unknown biological agent.
This situation highlights the need for better testing
and method development. The containers had been
tested for only three elements, but treatment was
needed quickly because of the critical location of
the containers. Agencies involved did not know
whether the biological threat was real or a hoax. The
containers had tested positive for narcotics. For the
safety of all involved, they assumed that the threat
was real. Before a bomb squad or customs officials
could enter the containers, decontamination for the
biological threat had to occur.
• Can you elaborate on your sampling, specifically
the different sampling at the AMI building
points used to track fumigant levels? Sabre
placed thousands of fumigant indicators to confirm
that the fumigant reached desired areas. The
indicators change color once they reach a certain
concentration.
• How did you gain community support for
fumigation of the AMI building? Sabre included
the community early in the decontamination
process. A public relations firm provided
community relations support. In addition, the
project had the mayor's support. Sabre was open
about their activities and made themselves available
to community groups and media outlets. Sabre held
process demonstrations and arranged a round-table
discussion for the community the day before the
scheduled fumigation. More than 100 people from
the community attended this event.
Because the original contamination occurred
long before building closure, how did you
ensure treatment of surfaces that had since
been covered? For surface-to-surface mates, Sabre
inserted a geoplate between the two surfaces to
allow fumigant penetration. They considered items
such as coffee cups on a surface, dictionaries on
tables, and surfaces within chair cushions.
How was electronic equipment handled? The
equipment that could run was kept running during
fumigation. About 60 percent of the equipment
was nonfunctional by the time of fumigation. Since
fumigation, Sabre has not observed soft metal
corrosion. In high-humidity areas, rust films are
forming, but this would occur in any facility left
vacant for a long period.
What was your approach to insurance? Sabre
combined insurance with a no-growth standard
for two reasons: 1) a no-growth standard decreases
the number of possible questions in the clearance
process, and 2) it combines clearance with a
standard. As a private company, Sabre must have
insurance. Immediately following the events
of 9/11, insurance was unavailable because
insurance companies had mold and biological
exclusions to protect themselves from costly mold
situations. Suppliers and vendors on a biological
decontamination project would have lost their
base insurance because of the mold and biological
exclusions. Companies are working to remove this
exclusion for bio-weapons, and standby insurance is
now available.
At the AMI building, Sabre used tubing to
check fumigant concentrations inside. Have you
considered telemetry systems? Sabre selected the
tubing approach—a simple technology—to keep
the overall process simple. Telemetry tied to titration
results is desireable but cost-prohibitive at this
point.
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STERIS Chem-Bio
Decontamination
lain McVey, STERIS Corporation
STERIS Corporation (STERIS) provides technologies to
prevent infection and contamination. Their technologies
are used in the pharmaceutical industry but also apply to
decontamination following biological terror events.
Vaporous hydrogen peroxide (VHP) decontamination
methods have widespread use in pharmaceutical
companies and clean rooms. A pharmaceutical company
may house manufacturing equipment in a chain of glove
boxes. Decontamination, which may occur monthly or
even daily, consists of simply injecting VHP into the boxes
in this chain.
After the events of 9/11 and the anthrax attacks,
STERIS began modifying its technologies to apply to
anthrax. STERIS used its proprietary VHP to fumigate
two buildings contaminated with anthrax:
• GSA Building 410 This 1.4 million-ft3 building
was an office supply storage area and a mail-sorting
facility for the White House. STERIS conducted
fumigation with the building contents in place. The
building was separated into 200,000-ft3 fumigation
zones because no data for fumigation of a whole
building were available. The HVAC systems were
treated as separate zones. The decontamination took
3 weeks.
• Building SA-32 STERIS simplified the
decontamination system based on information
gathered during the GSA Building 410
decontamination. This 1.5 million-ft3 building
was also separated into 200,000-ft3 zones. All of its
contents were removed for easier decontamination.
Decontamination at this building took 2 weeks.
At both of these buildings, STERIS successfully
employed its VHP technology. McVey stated that a benefit
of hydrogen peroxide is that it decomposes to water
and oxygen so residual contamination is not a concern.
However, the rapid decay of VHP also means that
repeated injections are needed to ensure that the proper
concentrations are reached. Multiple injection points,
not a single point, may be the best option for optimal
distribution.
In collaboration with the ECBC, STERIS continues
to study the VHP technology. ECBC operates an
abandoned building as a large-scale test site. The building
houses former office and lab areas, which provide a variety
of surfaces and materials for testing. When conducting
efficacy tests, STERIS places the VHP units in a sealed
room. Sensors on the unit track the vapor concentrations.
Because the whole unit is within the room, the unit is self-
decontaminating. Bench- and chamber-scale tests have
shown modified vaporous hydrogen peroxide (mVHP™)
(patent pending) to be effective against chemical agents as
well as biological agents.
Because contamination of the cargo air fleet is a
concern, STERIS also completed a demonstration project
to test mVHP for decontaminating a C-141 cargo aircraft.
STERIS set up the hydrogen peroxide system in a cargo
plane slated to be scrapped. Project setup took 2 days.
STERIS tested different fumigation time periods and
concentrations and conducted chemical and biological
sampling in on-site mobile units. STERIS also exposed
aircraft materials to 100 hours of hydrogen peroxide
to investigate concerns about structural integrity. Tests
showed that VHP did affect structural components but
that there were no ill effects on avionics.
STERIS is working to reduce the system size so
that the system will fit on a cargo plane. STERIS is also
working to develop a mobile/modular system, spacecraft
decontamination systems (with NASA), and an integrated
mVHP/HVAC system.
Questions, Answers, and Comments
• Has STERIS tested the different effects of
VHP on fabrics, materials, paintings, wood,
and irreplaceable historical artifacts? The GSA
Building 410 storage area contained personal items
of the President and Vice President, including
several paintings. No problems with the paintings
have been reported to STERIS. Fumigating carpet
is a concern. The deeper the carpet, the longer the
exposure period needs to be. Most chemical agents
make very good plasticizers, so they will soak into
materials such as paint. When hydrogen peroxide is
introduced as a gas, it works in a similar fashion.
• Is relative humidity control required? STERIS
personnel use a 35 percent hydrogen peroxide
aqueous solution for bioefficacy, so they introduce
water with the hydrogen peroxide. If humidity is
too high, the hydrogen peroxide gas just condenses.
STERIS uses a system to keep humidity below the
condensation level.
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• At the NBC offices in New York City, was a crisis
exemption needed for VHP? STERIS obtained
a crisis exemption for the NBC decontamination.
There was a concern about releasing VHP in an
occupied building. Affected rooms, therefore, were
treated by liquid decontamination. At this site, the
effect of hydrogen peroxide on personal items was
also a great concern. STERIS removed personal
items and fumigated them with VHP off-site.
• What was involved in emptying Building SA-32?
STERIS removed the old mail-sorting machine,
which was autoclaved for decontamination and
incinerated for disposal. STERIS personnel also
removed the wallboard down to the studs, so they
really fumigated an empty shell of a building.
Hydrogen Peroxide
Vapor for Room/Building
Decontamination Following a
Chemical or Biological Agent
Attack: Overview of Efficacy
and Practical Issues
Mike Herd, BIOQUELL, Inc.
BIOQUELL, Inc., is a company with experience using
hydrogen peroxide vapor for decontamination applications
in the healthcare, bio-defense, pharmaceutical, and
environmental industries.
Hydrogen peroxide vapor forms a condensate at
a submicron level. By nature, it is residue-free because
it degrades to oxygen and water. A treated area can be
reoccupied when the concentration there reaches a
time-weighted average of 1 ppm. Users must remember,
however, that decontamination using any type of fumigant
does not replace actual cleaning and is not appropriate for
use on spills that must be physically removed.
The BIOQUELL system was designed to apply to any
size room or location. The system consists of self-sufficient
units that can be chained together to form an infinitely
scalable system, although Herd noted that practical
application would limit the number of connected units.
The units operate independently of a building's HVAC
system. They are self-sanitizing because they are sealed in
the treatment area.
The technology works by flash evaporating a
30 percent to 35 percent hydrogen peroxide solution into
the environment. The hydrogen peroxide then creates a
micro-condensate on surfaces within the treatment area.
The micro-condensate greatly improves the kinetics of
decontamination; the D-value is less than 2 minutes when
the micro-condensate occurs and 2 hours without the
micro-condensate. BIOQUELL uses an optic condensation
monitor to detect the onset of the micro-condensation.
Relative humidity has not been a factor in the use of this
technology; success has been achieved in environments
ranging from 5 percent to 85 percent humidity. Modeling
is necessary for planning decontamination events and
ensuring success. In 2002, BIOQUELL published a paper
detailing the physical chemistry behind the process.
Hydrogen peroxide tends to form strong hydrogen
bonds between the molecules, which limits its movement.
To ensure proper distribution, BIOQUELL releases
hydrogen peroxide vapor from a self-contained unit
with a rotating nozzle system that distributes the vapor
dynamically.
BIOQUELL is currently examining material
compatibility issues associated with using hydrogen
peroxide vapor on different substrates. Initial efficacy tests
under EPAs Environmental Technology Verification (ETV)
program for decontamination and destruction of anthrax
have been conducted on seven materials (carpet, bare
wood, glass, laminate, galvanized metal ductwork, painted
wallboard, and painted cement). The first four of these
materials are nonporous; the last three are porous. Some
spore reduction occurred on each of these materials, which
was unexpected—no reduction was expected on porous
materials, such as the carpet. A report summarizing the
results of this study is available at www.epa.gov/etv. Further
efficacy testing with other pathogens is planned. Herd
indicated that BIOQUELL hopes to conduct research
with CWAs and would like to identify a partner for this
research.
Herd discussed several case studies to illustrate
technology applications. The presentation slides provided
specific details regarding these case studies. In one incident,
BIOQUELL personnel responded to the SARS incident
in Singapore. Within 3 days they arrived on-site and began
decontamination. In this instance, they treated 88 rooms
without having to modify the building. Medical equipment
was included in the treatment. No material compatibility
issues arose after treatments at these or other hospitals.
Decontamination Workshop 23
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Questions, Answers, and Comments
• Using the workshop meeting room as an
example, would you recommend removing
the contents before fumigating with hydrogen
peroxide vapor? Vfbuld you recommend pre-
cleaning? Herd estimated that three of the
BIOQUELL model R machines would suffice
to fumigate the meeting room. Decisions about
material removal or pre-cleaning are made on a
case-by-case basis and depend on the end use of the
room (e.g., reuse or replacement of the contents).
• How do you seal a hospital room, how long does
it take, and do you train hospital people to apply
the technology? Hydrogen peroxide is a "lazy"
gas and does not move readily. BIOQUELL tapes
a room and then conducts sentinel monitoring to
identify possible leaks. BIOQUELL manufactures a
small decontamination unit for hospitals. Hospital
staff could be trained to use the technology, but
they would likely need assistance for room-level
decontamination.
• Does concrete or the concrete surface coating
interact with hydrogen peroxide vapor? Have
you seen any interaction with smooth, hard
surfaces in hospital applications? Vfere your
material compatibility tests representative of
real-life conditions? To Herd's knowledge, tests
found no interaction with concrete. He thought
that researchers had identified the surface geometry
of concrete as a key factor in concrete interactions.
A workshop participant noted that the later
presentation describing research conducted under
the EPA ETV program would discuss material
compatibility findings with regard to concrete.
• Has BIOQUELL hung spore strips in the air to
test whether decontamination of airborne (vs.
surface) spores also occurs? Some testing of air kill
has been conducted to assess how HVAC systems
may affect decontamination. Herd volunteered to
share the data upon request.
Whole-Structure
Decontamination of Bacterial
Spores by Methyl Bromide
Fumigation
Rudolf Scheffrahn, University of Florida
Scheffrahn is an entomologist with the University
of Florida. His expertise with termite fumigants and
fumigation events research is relevant to decontamination.
He discussed a laboratory and field study of methyl
bromide fumigation and tenting techniques as they apply
to decontamination following a terror event.
Every day in Ft. Lauderdale, fumigants are used to
clear quarantined fruit and vegetables. Ship containers,
each holding $50,0000 to $60,000 worth of product, are
sealed and fumigated for 2 to 4 hours. Methyl bromide,
which has served as an agricultural chemical for more than
60 years, is one fumigant used. Methyl bromide diffuses
readily and is very stable, which means that clearing a
treated building is necessary. Methyl bromide can be used
with any humidity level and has already been approved
to treat some bacteria. However, methyl bromide is a
stratospheric ozone depleter.
In partnership with EPA, Scheffrahn conducted
laboratory and field studies to assess methyl bromide as
a fumigant for anthrax. In laboratory trials, spore strips
were placed in desiccation chambers and exposed to
methyl bromide. The spore strips were then incubated to
assess the kill rate. After 48 hours at 37° C, complete kill
was observed for B. anthmcis and G. stearothermophilus.
However, B. atrophaeus and B. thuringiensis experienced
only partial kills.
Research continued with a 2004 field study at
a 30,000-ft3 home in the Florida Keys. The house
represented a typical residential environment with the
addition of computers and electronic equipment to assess
collateral damage. Researchers placed spore strips (G.
stearothermophilus on paper, B. thuringiensis on paper, B.
atrophaeus on paper, and B. atrophaeus on stainless steel)
throughout the structure (e.g., on walls and carpeting,
inside a computer CD drive, in chair fabric, wall plates,
light fixtures, hanging files, and a sealed refrigerator).
They also established eight real-time monitoring locations
within the house. The house was then sealed, using
tenting—as is commonly done for termite treatments in
Florida.
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The fumigation involved passing liquid methyl
bromide through a heat exchanger to create the gas.
At EPA's request, the researchers tested a higher gas
concentration than truly necessary (More than 600
pounds of methyl bromide were used to reach the
mean concentration of 312 milligrams per liter [mg/L].
Scheffrahn estimated that 150 pounds of methyl bromide
would have sufficed.) Reactions with methyl bromide
are temperature dependent; higher temperatures result in
better kill efficacy. As such, fans and heaters maintained
a target temperature of 35° C within the house. The fans
moved the heat through the house but were not necessary
to diffuse the methyl bromide. After a 48-hour exposure
period, the researchers aerated the structure to remove the
methyl bromide, and after 4 days, methyl bromide was
not detected around the house. At 48 of 50 spore strip
locations, no growth was observed. Growth occurred on
all controls. The two failure locations were the refrigerator
and at an improperly mounted spore strip location. No
damage to electronic equipment was observed.
Advantages to the methyl bromide and tenting
system included the low cost (approximately $150 per
1,000 ft3); rapid turnover to completion (approximately
200 hours); treatment of all porous material, voids, and
HVAC systems; application at any humidity; and absence
of collateral damage. To demonstrate how quickly a home
can be sealed with a tent, Scheffrahn showed an example
of a four-man crew in Ft. Lauderdale installing a tent
around a 3,000-ft2 home in about 40 minutes.
Scheffrahn also suggested some future research
avenues: real-time infrared methyl bromide detectors; air
displacement with materials (e.g., nylon 66) to reduce the
total treatment volume; silicone ground seals, and methyl
bromide scrubbing. At quarantine locations, scrubbers are
used to treat methyl bromide.
Questions, Answers, and Comments
• What was the temperature inside the refrigerator?
[Room temperature.] The refrigerator was off to
prevent recirculation, and the door was closed
tightly during the fumigation.
• If sulfuro fluoride is a substitute for methyl
bromide, why not use that against anthrax?
Sulfuro fluoride treats only insects and has limited
use against insect eggs. Methyl bromide, however,
can treat bacteria.
• Does methyl bromide present an explosion
hazard? No, methyl bromide was once used as an
ingredient in fire extinguishers.
• What are the long-term availability and costs of
methyl bromide? Methyl bromide will remain a
quarantine fumigant until a suitable replacement
can be found. Researchers have been searching
for a replacement for 10 years or so. Suitable
replacements are already available for other methyl
bromide uses.
• How would scrubber waste be disposed of?
Scheffrahn thought that the scrubber waste would
be treated as a hazardous waste and incinerated.
• Can methyl bromide be used on wet surfaces?
There have been some studies with damp (free
water vs. high-humidity) wood treatment. Methyl
bromide has low solubility—about 1.5 grams per
100 milliliters of water.
• Was there an attempt to have methyl bromide
approved for treatment of the anthrax releases?
Scheffrahn understood that Great Lakes, the
company that manufactures methyl bromide for
fumigation, was contacted. Research found during
a literature review indicated that methyl bromide
could kill anthrax, but the data were unclear. The
primary study examined anthrax kill in woolens and
tested only pure methyl bromide. The uncertainties
of the data eliminated methyl bromide from
consideration. More recent research has found that
a 2 percent methyl bromide by volume is sufficient
for efficacy.
DF-200 Decontamination
of CBW Agents, Other
Biological Pathogens, and
Toxic Industrial Chemicals
Rita Betty, Sand/a National Laboratory
Sandia National Laboratory (SNL) is testing a
decontamination formulation (DF-200) for neutralizing
CWAs and toxic industrial chemicals, killing biological
agents, and combating aerosolized chemical and biological
agent clouds.
DF-200 is an aqueous-phase formula that has
been used successfully by the military. The commercial
product is mixed on-site as a tertiary system of surfactant,
Decontamination Workshop 25
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a 7-9 percent hydrogen peroxide solution, and a novel
activator. The hydrogen peroxide solution is below 8
percent to allow for easy shipping. After mixing, the final
hydrogen peroxide concentration is about 3-5 percent.
DF-200 is less corrosive than bleach and other available
decontamination materials.
SNL tested DF-200 and DS2 (a corrosive
decontaminant used by the military in the past) as
decontaminants for GD, VX, and HD in stirred reactor
studies. Results were similar, with DS2 performing only
slightly better at the 1-minute exposure period. Both
chemicals achieved 100 percent decontamination of live
agents after a 60-minute exposure period. In other studies,
DF-200 rapidly (within a 15-minute exposure period)
neutralized nerve agents, sodium cyanide, phosgene, and
carbon disulfide, as well as biologicals (B. anthrads and Y.
pestis). Mustard agents required more time (a 30-minute
exposure period) because of mustard's low solubility.
A benefit of using DF-200 to neutralize VX is that it
cleaves the phosphorous-sulfur bonds to create less-toxic
byproducts. Overall, SNL has completed a number of tests
of DF-200. Specific results are classified, but generally the
results demonstrate a high efficacy. Betty provided contact
information for those seeking to learn more.
Laboratories at Kansas State University have tested
DF-200 and biofilms. Samples consisted of six- to seven-
log biofilms that underwent a 1-minute exposure to DF-
200. The biofilms were allowed to grow for 1, 3, 7, and
14 days prior to treatment. The 1-minute exposure to
DF-200 successfully decontaminated the sample biofilms.
DF-200 was also completely successful in eliminating
infectivity and viral RNA integrity in influenza tests.
Toxic industrial chemicals, which are an increasing
threat, provide unique challenges for decontamination
because of the variety in their chemical and physical
properties. They also attack by differing mechanisms:
nucleophilic attack, oxidation, reduction, or buffering.
Foam is a highly effective treatment method, except
against toxic metals or strong acids and bases that may
react violently.
SNL is also conducting a feasibility study of using
foam (e.g., DF-200) for knocking down an aerosol agent
cloud intended to drift to target areas. The study explores
methods for cloud knockdown and neutralization. SNL
does not intend to design a system for implementing
treatment.
DoD considers DF-200 to be the best available
decontamination technology. SNL developed DF-200 to
enable rapid and safe neutralization of agents. Currently,
DF-200 is available in a variety of sizes and dispersal
techniques (e.g., 5-gallon backpack size) to meet multiple
needs. DF-200 is available to first responders addressing
a terror event. In 2004, EPA registered DF-200 for
disinfecting hard, nonporous materials. Applications
beyond decontaminating threat events may also exist.
Questions, Answers, and Comments
• What remains after decontamination with
DF-200, and how is it treated? The residue and
cleanup depend on the release scenario. After the
foam collapses, a wet-dry vacuum will remove it
from indoor areas. After an outdoor release, the
foam dries to a light, silky residue, which may
weather in a short period of time.
• What is created in air when the foam mixes
with the agent? Is the air still dangerous after
the kill? When is it safe to reoccupy an area? To
be effective as knockdown, the foam is deployed
as small droplets that eventually fall to the ground.
The droplets maximize the capture efficiency of
the agent. No gas is involved. Overall, the process
creates a neutral cloud.
• In the subway example, what is the active spray
duration? The foam spray is not necessarily
continuous. In chamber tests, 1-minute spray
durations were used. For the 8-cubic-foot chamber,
about 2 liters of DF-200 are deployed in this time.
Capitol Hill Ricin Incident:
Decontamination Dilemmas
Jack Kelly, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency,
Emergency Response Team
The ricin incident at Capitol Hill provides a real-world
example of issues faced at a decontamination event. The
Capitol Police responding to the ricin event had little
information about ricin, so they called in OSCs, whose
primary purpose at this event was to gather information.
This presentation reviews OSC actions. In the end, the
OSCs themselves were forced to make decisions about
ricin based on limited information.
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Ricin was first developed as a weapon during World
War I. It is a white powder that can be made fairly easily
from the protein toxins of castor plant beans. Worldwide,
more than a million tons of castor beans are processed for
castor oil annually. Castor oil production in the United
States, however, ceased in the 1970s. Ricin is composed of
two toxins that act together to cause toxicity by inhibiting
protein synthesis in cells. Ricin is considered extremely
toxic by any exposure route (inhalation, ingestion, or
injection). No vaccines or antidotes are available.
On February 2, 2004, ricin was found in the
mail room attached to a senator's office in the Dirksen
Building. The Capitol Police contacted an OSC that day
and requested assistance. Field sampling and follow-up
laboratory analysis confirmed the presence of ricin. EPA
was asked to receive, inventory, and store mail from the
building; conduct additional characterization; perform
decontamination of the affected areas and their contents;
and conduct clearance sampling. A February 9, 2004,
deadline for decontamination was established.
By February 8, 2004, EPA had containerized
approximately 80 drums of unopened mail and stored
clothing from 32 potentially exposed individuals. EPA, the
FBI, and Capitol Police had collected at least 670 samples
from three affected rooms and identified 19 positive
results—all from one room. From the affected room, EPA
removed and stored personal and office items. Large hard-
surface items were left in place.
The mail room was clearly contaminated. Bordering
rooms on either side were considered buffer rooms and
potentially contaminated. EPA looked toward existing
research and data to devise a decontamination plan.
The U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious
Diseases (USAMRIID) Blue Book served as the primary
resource. Technologies considered were chlorine dioxide
fumigation, heat treatment, and sodium hypochlorite
solution cleaning.
EPA chose to decontaminate with a sodium
hypochlorite solution. This decision was based on the
small size of the decontamination area, the extent of
ricin contamination, knowledge of ricin properties, a
literature review, and input from an advisory group.
Decontamination occurred in the mail room that was
known to be contaminated; the two buffer rooms; the
room that held evacuees; and the common hallways,
elevators, and mail drops. EPA covered the mail room
with the solution and effectively cleaned the room. Post-
treatment testing found no ricin activity. The building was
reopened on February 9, 2004, with the mail room and
buffer rooms remaining closed for renovations.
EPA considered several options for decontaminating
the clothing, office items, mail, and mail equipment that
had been removed from the building. A decontamination
team researched the options and suggested heat treatment.
If the heat treatment were unsuccessful, ethylene oxide
fumigation would follow. Chlorine dioxide fumigation
was the third option.
The decontamination team considered packaging
items for decontamination, setting sterilization
specifications, and establishing efficacy measurements. The
team also considered ricin concentrations, ricin locations
on materials, and ricin toxicity values. Because of the
unknowns surrounding ricin, EPA decided that near 100
percent denaturation of ricin was needed.
In cooperation with ECBC and the Naval Medical
Research Center (NMRC), EPA obtained crude and
purified ricin to test treatment efficacy. Clothing and office
materials, along with indicator vials of crude and pure
ricin, underwent heat treatment. Temperature probes in
the treatment bags tracked the temperature (82—88 °C).
Treatment resulted in 100 percent deactivation of 13 of
the 14 purified ricin vials. For the crude ricin, 14 of the 28
vials reported 94.4 percent to 99-7 percent deactivation.
EPA was unable to determine why crude ricin was more
difficult to denature than purified ricin. The vials that did
not achieve 100 percent deactivation underwent a second
heat treatment. Some of the vials were reanalyzed within
4 days of treatment and others 3 weeks after treatment.
The crude ricin reported 99-8 percent to 99-99 percent
deactivation after 4 days and greater than 99-99 percent
deactivation after 3 weeks. The purified ricin reported 100
percent deactivation after 4 days and only 99-92 percent
to 99-99 percent deactivation after 3 weeks. EPA believed
this reactivation may have been due to protein refolding.
The decontamination team documented their findings in
a brief memorandum. Recommendations for the fate of
the clothing and office materials that underwent the single
heat treatment were left to the OSC.
EPA received a second set of materials, including
paper items, mail, and vacuum cleaner contents, for
decontamination at the end of March 2004. These
materials underwent a single heat treatment. In addition,
EPA conducted ethylene oxide pilot tests to assess efficacy.
The pilot test resulted in deactivation up to 99-9 percent,
so EPA decided to expose the heat-treated materials to
ethylene oxide. Results from test vials undergoing ethylene
Decontamination Workshop 27
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oxide treatment alone or heat followed by ethylene oxide
treatment indicated that the combined treatment was
most effective. In the combined treatment, 9 of the 11
crude ricin vials experienced 100 percent deactivation,
with the other 2 samples reporting 99-995 percent and
99-997 percent deactivation. All 11 purified ricin vials
were 100 percent deactivated. Again, the decontamination
team documented findings in a memorandum and the
OSC provided recommendations for reuse.
Kelly noted several lessons learned from this
decontamination event:
• Documentation EPA correctly assumed that
they would receive requests to retrieve information
for the criminal investigation. Documenting the
materials held in each container was critical.
• Communication The decontamination team first
considered simply disposing of replaceable personal
items (e.g., clothing) and reimbursing the owners.
However, the owners were emphatic about having
items returned. An effective communications
program might have persuaded owners to accept
reimbursement as a solution.
• Coordination Interagency groups and the
decontamination groups worked well together
and may have a place in a response. Large groups,
however, may suffer delays simply because of the
group size. Collaboration with other agencies, such
as ECBC and NMRC, was critical for the research
projects conducted as part of decontamination. This
collaboration allowed the involved OSCs to focus
on managing the response and avoid becoming
bogged down by the technology.
Questions, Answers, and Comments
• How do the percentages reported for deactivation
relate to kill? The mammalian cell assays assess
reduction in activity and provide results as the
percent of toxicity inactivity. Crude and purified
ricin were used as surrogates for the ricin actually
found during the event.
• What was the ricin particle size? This information
was never made public.
• Ricin is a considerable concern for the
USPS. Have fumigation vendors looked at
decontaminating ricin? Some studies of ricin
fumigation have been conducted. Vendors,
however, are unable to obtain ricin for testing
their decontamination technologies. They have
conducted some studies of protein degradation that
may be applicable to ricin. Vendors also hypothesize
that if a fumigant can destroy a prion, it should
be able to destroy ricin. Overall, ricin should be a
priority agent for further research.
Restoration From
Decontamination: USPS
Experience
Richard Orlusky, U.S. Postal Service
In October 2001, the USPS Trenton facility closed as the
result of an anthrax event. This presentation highlighted
the USPS's experiences in restoring this building after
decontamination.
Although contamination occurred in 2001, the
Trenton facility was closed until offices in Washington,
D.C., had been decontaminated. Construction of the
fumigation system in Trenton began in April 2003, and
fumigation with chlorine dioxide gas occurred in October
of that year. An environmental clearance committee
recommended reoccupancy in February 2004. At that
time, the USPS and the vendor began removing the
fumigation equipment, conducting limited building
restoration (e.g., cleaning the HVAC system), and meeting
with restoration contractors to plan restoration activities.
The USPS began restoring the mail machinery in March
2004 and restoration contractors mobilized at the site in
May 2004. The building reopened in March 2005-
Critical factors that impacted the restoration included:
• The building's age and the type and condition of the
equipment
• The effects of the decontamination effort (e.g.,
surface cleaning with bleach damages equipment
and flooring)
• Building degradation from inoperable control
systems (e.g., shutting down the HVAC system led
to high temperatures and high humidity)
• Equipment degradation from a lack of preventive
maintenance (e.g., mail-sorting equipment requires
extensive preventive maintenance and performs
poorly after sitting idle)
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Orlusky noted that if the USPS had known the
extent of damage caused by fumigation with chlorine
dioxide, they would have used a different, less damaging
material. They would have reserved bleach for surface
decontamination only Orlusky also noted that the longer
a building and its equipment are left idle, the longer it
takes to restore the equipment. At the Trenton facility,
the interior temperature reached 90 to 100 °F, which
resulted in a harsh working environment. Restoring
environmental controls is key to creating a comfortable
work environment and minimizing equipment and
building degradation.
Restoration considerations included:
• The cost of inspecting and servicing components
versus replacing components
• The service life of existing building equipment
• Necessary building upgrades
• Building aesthetics
Inspecting and servicing equipment are hidden costs
of decontamination and restoration. These costs should be
weighed against the cost of simply replacing equipment.
Aesthetics also carry hidden costs, but the importance
of aesthetics, which impact worker relations and public
relations, should not be underestimated. The USPS
spent considerable money replacing bathroom fixtures,
renovating the lobby, and replacing locking devices (e.g.,
employee lockers and EO. boxes).
At the Trenton facility, restoration included rebuilding
the mail machinery; inspecting electrical wiring, circuit
breakers, motor controls, and transformers to identify
replacement versus repair points; laying new flooring
over workroom floor tiles and replacing carpet in office
areas; replacing components of the HVAC systems; and
addressing building aesthetics.
Orlusky discussed the following lessons learned from
the USPS's experiences:
• Prepare up-to-date as-built plans. Many delays
experienced by the USPS stemmed from the lack
of accurate as-built plans and drawings. These plans
are critical to ensuring successful decontamination
and restoration.
• Consider the facility. The age of the building,
maintenance status, and type of equipment are
major determinants of cost, time, and scope. These
factors should be considered when planning the
decontamination and restoration.
• Plan restoration actions early. Including the
restoration contractor in discussions with the
fumigation contractor can help with planning a
comprehensive scope of work.
• Select the decontamination technology wisely.
If fumigation is the selected decontamination
method, then surface cleaning with a bleach
agent should be conducted sparingly. Additional
chloride dioxide research may show effective
decontamination at lower concentrations and
reduced contact times, which may reduce damage
caused by the fumigant itself.
• Maintain the facility. Restoring environmental
controls as quickly as possible, maintaining
equipment, and reducing the downtime before and
after fumigation reduce the overall time needed to
restore a facility.
• Estimate hidden costs. Costs beyond the
decontamination and fumigation event themselves
can be substantial. In addition to aesthetic and
equipment-servicing costs, industrial hygiene
activities, such as health and safety training,
emergency response and evacuation planning, as
well as site security, add to the overall cost.
Questions, Answers, and Comments
• A workshop participant stated that bleach
alternatives have been approved under crisis
exemptions. In instances of heavy contamination,
however, some pre-cleaning is necessary to reduce
biocontaminants to levels that will respond to
additional treatment. Orlusky agreed that bleach
cleaning is necessary in some instances. After several
attempts, the decontamination crew developed a
successful bleaching technique. Bleach cleaning,
however, was a labor-intensive practice.
• How were the HVAC systems addressed? The
USPS kept the HVAC systems running after closing
the building, but over time components of the
system failed. Workers wore personal protective
equipment while conducting repairs.
• Did the USPS conduct OSHA restoration
sampling? OSHA has posted a guidance document
for restoration sampling on its Internet site, and
the USPS submitted a restoration sampling plan
to OSHA. The agencies worked closely together to
conduct restoration sampling, which was a major
effort. The facility employees appreciated this
relationship with OSHA.
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Another Look at Chlorine
Dioxide Fumigation:
Concentration-Times,
Efficacy Tests, and Biological
Indicators
Paula Krauter, Lawrence Livermore National
Laboratory
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL)
and SNL, in partnership with the San Francisco
International Airport, have been collaborating in a
Domestic Demonstration and Application Program
(DDAP) to develop and demonstrate procedures,
plans, and techniques for the rapid restoration of a
major transportation facility. DDAP consists of many
components. This presentation focused on research,
development, and evaluation of rapid efficacy tests
to improve the verification and clearance phases of
decontamination. LLNL specifically studied fumigation
with chlorine dioxide.
Researchers developed a rapid viability test protocol
(RVTP), which is an overnight method for processing
biological indicator strips using real-time polymerase chain
reaction (PCR). LLNL's research sought to demonstrate
this method's ability to test thousands of samples and
demonstrate a tracking and data analysis tool. The
research compared the RVTP against the standard culture
method, which requires 7 days for results, to assess the
accuracy of the RVTP The research included a rigorous
quality assurance program to evaluate potential cross-
contamination, to determine the RVTP's ability to detect
blind positives, and establish assay sensitivity. In testing
the RVTP, LLNL included a number of blind positives,
degradation products that would interfere with the
methods, and positive and negative controls.
LLNL conducted testing over the course of 2 days.
Testing involved exposing more than 1,000 biological
indicator strips to 750 ppm of chlorine dioxide for up
to 12 hours. A number of strips were also exposed to
nonlethal concentrations of chlorine dioxide by varying
the contact times. (LLNL used a test chamber and
technology provided by Sabre.) Researches were able
to tightly control the chlorine dioxide concentration,
temperature, and humidity within the test chamber. The
chlorine dioxide was generated by combining sodium
hypochlorite and hydrochloric acid to produce chlorine.
The chlorine was then combined with sodium chlorite.
Half of the strips were analyzed by RVTP and half by the
standard culture technique. LLRN barcoded each to track
sample locations in the test chamber and test results. The
barcode maintained the sample chain-of-custody.
Krauter presented details of the RVTP and standard
culture test conditions. Results of the standard culture
are determined by visual turbidity, which is a subjective
endpoint. RVTP results are less subjective; positive results
are based on a specific number of DNA detections. At
a dose of 750 ppm of chlorine dioxide for 6 or more
hours, no viable growth was identified by either RVTP
or standard cultures. No significant difference in results
provided by the two methods was identified. The standard
culture method reported a 1.5 percent false positive rate.
No false negatives or positives were observed for RVTP
Both stainless steel and paper strip biological
indicators were tested. At nonlethal doses of chlorine
dioxide, LLNL found a significant difference in number
of positive results identified for the stainless steel versus
paper strips. These biological indicators differ in several
qualities: porosity, spore viability, purity, and spore piling.
These results highlight considerations for selecting a
decontamination method (gas or liquid) applicable to
conditions (porous versus hard surfaces).
Overall, LLNL's research met the objective of
developing an analytical method that can provide accurate
results in 15 hours. Continuing research includes testing
RVTP with a high-throughput automation mode and
applying RVTP to a variety of environmental samples
(e.g., wipes and filters).
Questions, Answers, and Comments
• LLNLs results found better kill on the stainless steel
disks versus paper strips. These results conflict with
other research with glass and paper. Krauter noted
this inconsistency. LLNL used a different fumigant
generation process and a different technology
to apply spores to the stainless steel disks. These
differences may have affected the results.
• What kind of variability was there in the
replicates? For each test concentration and
time period, LLNL tested 50 individuals and
identified positives within the test group. They then
conducted the standard student T-test on results.
• How were nonlethal doses achieved? The study
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consistently exposed test strips to 750 ppm of
chlorine dioxide, but the exposure period varied to
achieve a nonlethal dose. The test results indicated
a need for more information on the 3- to 5-hour
exposure periods and for log-8 versus log-6 test
strips.
• What is the cost of RVTP? Krauter did not
have specific information about analysis costs, but
another workshop participant indicated that RVTP
costs about 5 cents per sample.
Innovative and Emerging
Decontamination
Technologies
Mark Brie/chouse, Edgewood Chemical and
Biological Center
This presentation provided an overview of ECBC
activities. Public- and private-sector researchers are
evaluating a number of decontamination technologies,
such as mVHP, forced hot air, Decon Green, chlorine
dioxide, enzymes, solvent suspensions and wipes, ionic
liquids, and supercritical carbon dioxide. ECBC and DoD
are seeking replacements for liquid decontaminants, such
as bleach because of problems with corrosivity.
Congress funds most ECBC projects, which have
focused on field-testing technologies. The following
summarizes ongoing efforts.
• Modified vaporous hydrogen peroxide
(mVHP) ECBC and STERIS co-developed this
decontamination technology, which includes
ammonia as an activator. They have conducted
field-testing at an abandoned building and in
a C-141 cargo plane, as described during the
presentation by McVey of STERIS. Field-testing
proved efficacious against biological and chemical
agents. The C-141 cargo plane served as a
demonstration of the mobile technology. For bare
metal coupons, greater than 99-9 percent kill rates
were found for biologicals and a mustard simulant
was reduced to less than the 8-hour time-weighted
average in 5-, 10-, and 24-hour test runs. On
more absorptive surfaces, however, longer exposure
periods and higher concentrations were required for
success.
These tests also examined methods for distributing the
VHP and provided data for modeling efforts. Ongoing
research with mVHP includes reducing the equipment
size to a system transportable on military vehicles; assessing
material compatibility and equipment sensitivities;
expanding aircraft studies; and assessing applications for
ambulances, hospitals, or hotel suites.
• Forced hot air Injecting an area with forced
hot air acts as accelerated weathering. Past tests
were unsuccessful because of uneven heating;
even heating prevents recondensation. ECBC has
conducted more recent testing in aircraft using
airflow strategies that achieve consistent target
surface temperatures. Results indicated that forced
hot air increases off-gassing for chemical agents
but is insufficient for treating biological agents.
Studies consistently found that longer cycle
times are needed for more absorptive materials.
Considerations for forced hot air systems include
material compatibility, treatment volume, and air
distribution. ECBC believes the system could be
modified to treat other vehicles.
• Combined VHP and forced hot air A combined
system takes advantage of the benefits of both
technologies. The forced hot air enhances hydrogen
peroxide vaporization, controls heat and relative
humidity, and enhances the diffusion of VHP The
forced hot air also improves desorption of chemical
agents. The effluent from treating an aircraft can
be routed through a carbon-based filtration system,
catalytic oxidation, or thermal oxidation treatment
system. ECBC may conduct further research on the
combined technology in fiscal year 2007-
• Decon Green ECBC is also developing Decon
Green, an environmentally friendly decontaminant
formulated using commercial chemicals. Decon
Green is designed to replace DS2 and DF-200 in
military use. Studies have proven Decon Green
to be effective against chemical and biological
agents, but the chemical is disruptive to surfaces. To
improve material compatibility, reformulations have
slightly reduced kill efficacies. Decon Green has a
number of benefits: it is ready for use 15 minutes
after mixing, applicable in a variety of weather
conditions, effective for 12 hours after mixing,
compatible with protective clothing, and disposable
as a nonhazardous material after hydrogen peroxide
degradation.
Decontamination Workshop 31
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• Resistant coatings Traditional chemical agent
resistant coatings (CARCs) are nonreactive, durable
and nonmarring, weather resistant, and flexible.
Research for next-generation CARCs has been
funded.
• Reactive coatings These materials actively destroy
surface chemical agent contamination either by
hydrolysis or oxidation. Research information
on reactive coatings is readily available, and
reactive materials such as these are widely used
in industrial processes. Identifying and studying
materials resistant to biological and chemical
agents will likely be a strategic research area in
the next few years. Potential agents for reactive
coatings include metal oxides, activated carbon,
zeolites, microporous membranes, novel polymers,
dendrimers, and microencapsulation materials.
Current research with reactive coatings aims to
identify a coating that could achieve 99-999 percent
decontamination when partnered with other
standard decontamination technologies. ECBC
is partnering with the Army Research Laboratory
(ARL) to study hyperbranched polymers and
polyoxometalates. ECBC will perform the efficacy
and material compatibility tests.
• Other research materials ECBC and others are
conducting research on several other materials. In a
joint venture with NATICK, ECBC is evaluating
active moieties in uniforms for personal protection.
Catalysts, such as metal oxides, activated carbon,
and polyoxometalates would be included in
uniform fabrics to improve personnel protection
from chemical agent vapors. ECBC is also
investigating self-decontaminating coatings (e.g.,
polyoxometalates and other inorganic catalysts)
for water infrastructure protection and zeolite-
based systems that would apply to a wide variety of
situations.
In addition to researching specific decontamination
agents, ECBC is conducting several other research
projects:
• Comparative decontamination The object
of this study is to compare the efficacy of three
different commercial fumigation products and
study the effects of parameters such as temperature
and relative humidity.
• Enzyme decontamination ECBC and
Genencor International have partnered to
investigate the use of enzymes to decontaminate
nerve agents, sulfur mustard, and biological agents
and toxins. They have signed an exclusive patent
license agreement to begin commercial production
of viable enzyme products. These products are
available to first responders.
• Sensitive equipment decontamination ECBC
is also researching small-scale decontamination
systems that are capable of treating a wide range of
chemical and agent materials. Two research areas
are sorbent/reactive suspensions and solvent wipes.
Ongoing tests of these technologies are planned.
Nonreactive wipes also play a role in reducing gross
contamination.
• Ionic liquid-based decontamination Ionic
liquid has been a productive research area for the
past 5 to 10 years. Researchers have identified a
broad class of ionic liquids for decontamination
of CWAs. Ionic liquids would replace traditional
solvents by combining solvent, surfactant, buffer,
and oxidizing agent functionalities. Further tests are
planned.
• Supercritical carbon dioxide decontamination
ECBC developed a bench-scale supercritical
carbon dioxide reactor to test this decontamination
technology. This material seems to be an effective
cleaning and sterilizing agent. Supercritical carbon
dioxide is also environmentally friendly and recycles
carbon dioxide, thus preventing the release of
greenhouse gases. The technology is readily available
for garment cleaning, hard-surface cleaning, and
sterilization.
Questions, Answers, and Comments
• What technologies apply to wide-area
decontamination, such as large cities? Foam and
base-activated technologies can both be developed
for wide areas. GL1800 is modified airport de-icing
equipment that can be used for deploying a liquid
over a large area.
• Is the forced hot air technology effective
against virus contamination? ECBC has tested
decontamination technologies against virus
contamination, but a decontaminant must be
able to kill a spore to be considered a biological
32 NHSRC
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decontaminant. A first responder will not
necessarily know the differences among viruses,
biological agents, and spores.
When conducting aircraft research, why was
the HVAC system excluded from study? ECBC
researchers excluded the HVAC system because
they were considering contamination scenarios that
may not involve the HVAC system. Contamination
of the main cargo area was seen as the more likely
scenario.
Systematic Decontamination
Project: Homeland Security
Verification of Chemical and
Biological Decontamination
Technologies
Phil Koga, Edgewood Chemical and Biological
Center
When decontaminating an anthrax-contaminated
building, one must consider treatment options (e.g.,
surface treatment versus fumigation), efficacy data, and
material impacts. ECBC, in conjunction with NHSRC,
is conducting systematic studies on the performance of
chlorine dioxide and VHP for decontamination.
As part of its research, ECBC is conducting a
bioefficacy study to assess concentration and exposure
time, evaluate six types of materials (porous and
nonporous), and test avirulent and virulent B. onthmcis.
The study also examines sub-optimal temperatures and
relative humidities as well as B. anthrocis surrogates. The
test design included three fumigants (STERIS's VHP,
ClorDiSys, Inc.'s chlorine dioxide, and Sabre's chlorine
dioxide), six microorganisms, and test coupons made of
six different materials. The two chlorine dioxide fumigants
differed in that ClorDiSys, Inc., uses a dry generation
process and Sabre uses a wet process.
ECBC conducted range-finding tests to assess optimal
fumigant concentrations and exposure periods and
examine the effects of temperature and humidity. Koga
presented specific test details. Testing seeks also to provide
information about the effects of six different building
materials on the fumigant concentrations and the effects
of the fumigants on the integrity of the building materials.
This testing is linked with the bioefficacy studies. ECBC is
looking to use American Society for Testing and Materials
(ASTM) standards for strength and other characteristics.
Deposition velocity testing has begun, and material
compatibility testing is slated for April 2005-
Questions, Answers, and Comments
• When generating chlorine dioxide, determining
whether chlorine gas is present is critical. Other
researchers used ammonia-based analytical tests to
identify chlorine dioxide.
• One workshop participant suggested that
ECBC use corrosivity tests developed in the
telecommunications industry when conducting
material compatibility tests with circuits. This test
includes exposing a copper plate to an agent and
counting the holes that form. Koga indicated that
ECBC considered testing the circuit function, as
well as material compatibility.
• Has ECBC considered pore symmetry tests or
other methods to assess surface degradation?
ECBC has considered a number of methods but is
open to other recommendations.
• Is there a need for a secondary scrubber for
chlorine gas when fumigating with chlorine
dioxide? ECBC is testing for the presence of
chlorine gas in the chlorine dioxide gas stream and
addressing this concern.
• What was the spore recovery material for the
coupons? ECBC used a water-based material.
Use of HVAC Systems in
Building Decontamination
Tina Car/sen, Lawrence Livermore National
Laboratory
LLNL and Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory
(LBNL) became involved in decontamination
research after the sarin release in the Tokyo subway.
This presentation describes their HVAC system
decontamination studies.
After the Tokyo subway incident, three potential
attack scenarios were identified: open air (e.g., a stadium),
semi-enclosed (e.g., a subway), and enclosed (e.g., a
building or an airplane). In two of these scenarios, HVAC
systems are involved, so LLNL's research focuses on HVAC
systems and gaseous fumigants used in decontamination.
Decontamination Workshop 33
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Specifically, the research examines both decontamination
of HVAC systems and use of HVAC systems in
decontamination. The research includes a medium-scale,
well-instrumented demonstration with hydrogen peroxide
(generated using the STERIS technology).
The LLNL test facility consists of an office trailer split
into two rooms: a test room and a control room. The test
room contains an HVAC system created with 6-inch-
round galvanized steel ductwork, aged to remove organics.
Preliminary experiments involved injecting the test room
with hydrogen peroxide through the ductwork. The
decontamination cycle consisted of four steps: dehumidify
to reach 30 percent relative humidity, condition by
injection with hydrogen peroxide at 7-3 grams per
minute (g/min) for 12 minutes, sterilize by injection with
hydrogen peroxide at 4.2 g/min for 3 hours, and aerate for
4 hours.
LLNL expected a hydrogen peroxide concentration of
1 mg/L during the sterilization phase. In testing, however,
the hydrogen peroxide concentrations were significantly
lower. Concentrations dropped near one corner of the
room. A test with biological indicators supported this
finding; some positive indicators were found. LLNL
hypothesized that the galvanized steel was affecting the
hydrogen peroxide concentrations. A subsequent study
using polyvinyl chloride (PVC) ductwork supported this
hypothesis. The bulk hydrogen peroxide concentration
was much greater when introduced with PVC than with
galvanized steel.
LLNL created a new circular ductwork configuration
that included 90 feet of galvanized steel with sensors
located throughout. After injecting this system with
hydrogen peroxide, LLRN found that the hydrogen
peroxide concentration decreases as a function of flow rate,
temperature, and distance traveled along the ductwork.
These results indicate a need for increased injection rates
or multiple injection points. Condensation is a concern
when increasing the injection rate.
In conjunction with LBNL, LLNL is creating a
computational fluid dynamic model to characterize
decomposition in the ductwork. Available test data
indicate that the VHP degradation process is third order.
Once this model is created and validated, it can be used to
assess longer systems and larger configurations.
LLNL is also conducting surveys of buildings with
HVAC systems. The surveys identify the features that
have the greatest impact on hydrogen peroxide. LLNL
collects real-world data about these features. Information
collected includes square footage, interior materials,
layout, HVAC system operation modes, injection point
locations, humidity controls, HVAC system returns,
and areas not serviced by the HVAC system. An HVAC
engineer can help to address architectural concerns. LLNL
has collected HVAC system information from three
federal buildings (a two-story, modern office building; an
older, multistory office building; and an indoor arena).
Collected information is classified because these are federal
facilities. The surveys identified architectural features
that would be difficult to decontaminate. LLNL also
concluded that an HVAC engineer should be involved in
the building surveys. The results may support a database of
information needed for developing remediation strategies
and individual building assessments.
Ongoing research will include biological indicator
tests within the ductwork to characterize kill rates and
optimize VHP efficacy, characterization tests with
alternate ductwork materials, and completion of the
modeling program. Ongoing room-scale studies include
characterization of VHP distribution and development of
predictive models. During characterization tests, LLNL
researchers will evaluate different modes of fumigant
introduction and dispersal. They will also increase the
sensor density in the test room to provide additional data.
Questions, Answers, and Comments
Workshop participants commented on the application
of the research to real-wo rid situations. Several participants
commented that larger office buildings often use
fiberglass-lined ductwork and that returns may be lined
with papier-mache or fiberglass. Another participant noted
that the presence of slime and dirt in HVAC systems
would affect study results. And yet another participant
noted that the iron content of the ductwork would also
affect results. Carlsen agreed that any lining, material, or
dirt in the ductwork would affect results. An initial project
goal was to provide information for airports, which usually
have HVAC systems made of unlined galvanized steel.
LLNL obtained their galvanized steel ductwork from a
commercial business and did not test for iron content.
LLNL researchers have not yet studied lined ducts, but
they would welcome additional research to add to the
body of knowledge. LLNL started its research with a basic,
clean system. Subsequent efforts could involve expanding
the system or testing a dirty system. Because of funding
limitations, LLNL researchers selected room scaling as a
34 NHSRC
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next phase. They hope to conduct dirty system testing in
the future.
Building Disinfection
Byproducts: Experimental
Evaluation and Decision Tool
Richard Corsi, University of Texas
Corsi's research focuses on the effects of building materials
on fumigants and the production of gaseous byproducts.
The research investigates how materials affect the amount
of fumigant needed for decontamination and provides
anecdotal evidence regarding material compatibility.
In conducting building decontamination, a
disinfectant must reach a specific dose to ensure efficacy.
The dose is based on the disinfectant concentration, as well
as on exposure time, and can be expressed as ppm-hours.
Disinfectant consumption by materials in the treatment
space (e.g., a room) affect the dose. Consumption may
reduce the disinfectant air concentration, increase the
time to the threshold concentration, suppress doses, and
require greater mass injection rates and increased injection
times. Another concern of fumigation is the production
and persistence of disinfectant byproducts. Byproducts
themselves may be toxic, persist in a building, compromise
worker safety, and increase the time to reoccupation.
Researchers have evidence that a fumigant can enter
and react with porous materials. The term deposition
velocity describes the mass transport of a disinfectant in or
out of material and chemical reactions. Corsi presented an
equation describing disinfectant concentration in a room
over time, which is a function of injection rate, gas-phase
decay, and velocity deposition. The deposition velocity is a
function of time and materials.
Issues regarding byproduct formation and release
include byproduct identification, formation factors, and
persistence. Factors affecting byproduct formation include
the disinfectant, disinfectant concentration, material,
relative humidity, and exposure time.
Corsi's research evaluated 4 disinfectants and 24
materials, quantified deposition velocities, and identified
byproducts and release rates. Some byproducts are
volatile while others are more persistent. This research
tried to identify and quantify byproduct formation.
Data from this research feed several tools: a software
application that will support decisions regarding fumigant
applications (DADS); a database of experimental results
(e.g., deposition velocities, byproducts); and screening
calculations that facilitate fumigation system design,
consider fumigant consumption, and rank byproducts.
The test included 96 combinations of materials
and disinfectants that served as standard conditions.
Relative humidity and dose remained consistent. Relative
humidities, disinfectant doses, and disinfectant and
material combinations were then adjusted, yielding 36
variations. Tests were replicated 14 times. The research
generated more than 3,000 samples. The four disinfectants
tested included ozone, chlorine dioxide, hydrogen
peroxide, and methyl bromide. The 24 test materials
included commonly purchased construction materials
(e.g., concrete, carpet, wallboard, ductwork).
The experiment system consisted of four closed
chambers that were simultaneously injected with a single
disinfectant. The system included controls to maintain
specific disinfectant concentrations, temperatures, and
relative humidities. The four chambers vented to a single
monitored exhaust point and then passed through a
potassium iodide scrubber. In the tests, one of the four
chambers remained empty as a control and the other three
chambers contained test materials. Each test run of the
system consisted of a 9-hour background phase, a 4- to
16-hour disinfection phase, and a persistence phase of at
least 20 hours. During the background phase to identify
chemical emitters from the test materials, test temperature
and relative humidity were reached, but no disinfectant
entered the system. The disinfectant was injected into the
system during the disinfection phase.
Overall, tests conducted so far have identified
significant materials effects for ozone and chlorine dioxide,
significant disinfectant effects, significant concentration
effects, rapid decay in consumption rates (for ozone
and chlorine dioxide), and non-zero endpoints. Corsi
provided specific test data to illustrate the findings. Ceiling
tiles and office partitions continued to be consumers of
chlorine dioxide and ozone throughout the disinfection
phase. Concrete was almost completely passivated. Most
materials had low deposition velocities after 16 hours, but
all materials had non-zero endpoints.
Byproduct formation is highly dynamic and produces
unique material/disinfectant fingerprints. There were
significant differences among disinfectants. Byproduct
persistence (off-gassing) was also likely; 5-day and 1-
year tests showed persistence in some byproducts. For
most materials, with the exception of ceiling tiles and
Decontamination Workshop 35
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HVAC system components, ozone was more reactive
than chlorine dioxide. Ozone byproducts included 16
saturated carbonyls and about 50 additional, unquantified
chemicals. Chlorine dioxide byproducts also included 16
saturated carbonyls, 6 unknown chlorine compounds,
and a number of additional unquantified compounds.
The chlorine dioxide reaction with latex paint created
significant quantities of an unknown chlorine compound.
The reaction behind this byproduct formation remains
unknown. VHP created only a small amount of volatile
byproducts. Methyl bromide itself was a greater concern
for building reoccupation than byproduct formation.
Reports summarizing research findings are slated
for release in July 2005- Completion of the software
supporting decisions regarding fumigant applications
(DADS) is scheduled for June 2005-
Questions, Answers, and Comments
• How were materials placed in the test chambers?
For carpet or flooring, the bottom of the test
chamber was completely covered. Other materials
with edges that would not be exposed in a real-
world situation were sealed with sodium silicate
along the edges. Paper, however, was simply stacked
in the chamber as it would be stacked on a desk.
• Was the presence of hexanol due to residual levels
or continual emissions? Hexanol may have been
residual. Compared with the amount involved
in the persistence phase of the test, the amount
emitted in the background phase was small.
• How were blanks considered? The beginning
of each experiment was considered a blank. The
9-hour background phase was used to identify
background chemical concentrations.
• Were the chambers sealed from light? Chambers
were sealed from light.
• How were air concentrations considered? Flow
rates and air concentrations were used to find mass
per volume. The results are reported as relative
emissions. Had the tests lasted longer, higher masses
would have been reported. A workshop participant
also commented that the test identified only volatile
byproducts.
• What efforts were made to establish that no
chlorine gas was formed? The chamber exhaust
was tested to prove that chlorine gas was not
formed.
Evaluation of Two Biological
Decontamination Methods in
a Room-Sized Test Chamber
Mark Buttner, University of Nevada, Las Vegas
Researchers at the University of Nevada, Las Vegas,
conducted research to test the efficacy of two
decontamination products (DF-100 and chlorine dioxide
gas) and compare surface sampling methods and analytical
techniques for detecting biological agents, using cultures,
quantitative PCR, and hand-held assays.
DF-100 is a Modec, Inc., decontamination foam
with two liquid components. Product ingredients include
cationic detergents, fatty alcohols, stabilized hydrogen
peroxide, water, and inert materials. DF-100 has since
been replaced by DF-200. The Gas:Solid technology
by CDG Research Corporation produced the chlorine
dioxide for testing. Spores of B. dtrophaeus served as the
test organism and TSAC cultures, hand-held assays,
PCR primer/probe sequences, and TaqMan assay (7700
Sequence Detection System) served as the analysis
methods. The 7700 Sequence has since been replaced by a
7900 Sequence system.
Researchers conducted tests in a controlled chamber.
They placed the test surface materials in the chamber, ran
the chamber HVAC system, introduced dry spores (using
a Pitt-3 dry aerosol generator), stopped the HVAC system,
and allowed the spores to settle overnight. They conducted
sampling the next day. Test surface materials included
wood laminate (desk material), vinyl tile (flooring), and
painted metal (a metal file cabinet). Predecontamination
samples were collected using readily available methods:
swipe, heavy wipe (damp cloth), and swab sample
processing kit (foam swab). After initial sampling,
researchers injected the decontaminants and collected
post-decontamination samples. Samples were analyzed
using the three test methods (culture, quantitative PCR,
and hand-held assay).
During spore injection, the average airborne
concentration was 1.5 x 106 spores per cubic meter. The
culture and quantitative PCR methods reported 105 to 106
spore per square foot in the predecontamination samples.
Each of the three sampling methods demonstrated
comparable spore collection efficiencies. Similar levels
of spores were found on each of the three test surface
materials as well. The results from the predecontamination
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served as the control for the post-decontamination
sampling.
After decontamination with DF-100, post-
decontamination samples found no culturable spores
although the quantitative PCR analysis indicated that
spore DNA remained. Earlier studies of DF-100 with viral
agents identified no viral RNA after treatment, however, a
virus is more fragile than a spore.
After decontamination with chlorine dioxide, post-
decontamination samples found no culturable spores
in 24 of 27 samples. Of the three positive samples, each
supported only one colony. The quantitative PCR analysis
indicated that spore DNA remained. The hand-held assay
results were positive for all samples.
Researchers also conducted one environmental
background trial for each decontamination method to
determine the impact of dust on the effectiveness of the
decontamination method and the analytical method.
They collected dust from the outdoor air filters of several
commercial buildings and then aerosolized 10 grams of
this dust in the test chamber. They found an approximate
soiling level of 2 milligrams of soil per 100 square
centimeters. Researchers then injected spores into the
chamber and conducted decontamination. Spore culture
data were comparable between the predecontamination
samples with and without environmental background.
The dust, however, did inhibit the quantitative PCR
results. Culture data for post-decontamination samples
were similar with or without environmental background.
Quantitative PCR results indicated that spore DNA
remained in post-decontamination samples.
Buttner listed some practical considerations for
each of the decontaminants tested. DF-100 is fast
and easy to use, but it is limited to use on nonporous,
washable surfaces. It also resulted in material damage
(e.g., it dissolved floor polish, stripped paint, and caused
bubbling of wood laminate). Chlorine dioxide gas can
decontaminate an entire space with contents in place.
This method, however, requires specialized equipment,
training, and personnel. It also causes material damage
(e.g., it yellowed wall paint and corroded aluminum).
In conclusion, both decontamination methods were
effective in reducing the number of culturable spores
and neither method was affected by environmental
background. Spore DNA remained after treatment with
both decontaminants. The quantitative PCR analysis
method, however, was inhibited by environmental
background. This study did not assess the infection
potential of nonculturable pathogens.
Buttner provided the following references for this
research:
• Buttner, M.P, P Cruz, L.D. Stetzenbach, A.K.
Klima-Comba, V.L. Stevens, andT.D. Cronin.
2004. "Determination of the efficacy of two
building decontamination strategies by surface
sampling with culture and quantitative PCR
analysis." Appl Environ. Microbiol. 70:4740-4747-
• Buttner, M.P, P Cruz, L.D. Stetzenbach, A.K.
Klima-Comba, V.L. Stevens, and PA. Emanuel.
2004. "Evaluation of the Biological Sampling Kit
(BiSKit) for large-area surface sampling." Appl.
Environ. Microbiol. 70:7040-7045-
Questions, Answers, and Comments
• Would you expect similar material compatibility
concerns with DF-200? Buttner indicated that
speculating about results for DF-200 would be
inappropriate. Nonetheless, a workshop participant
speculated that material compatibility issues would
be fewer for DF-200 than for DF-100 because DF-
200 has a lower solvent content.
• Did you have a biocide neutralization step post-
sampling? No biocide neutralization step was
conducted.
Verification of Commercial
Decontamination
Technologies in Bench-Scale
Studies Using B. anthracis
Spores
Mike Taylor, Battelle Memorial Institute
EPAs ETV program verifies environmental technology
performance and objectively reports results to end-users
such as permitters and buyers. The program performs
tests as outlined in quality assurance plans developed in
conjunction with technical experts, stakeholders, and
vendors. ETV does not purposely try to fail technologies.
Battelle works as a contractor to ETV. This presentation
provided results from testing three decontamination
technologies: BIOQUELL Inc.'s hydrogen peroxide gas;
CERTEK Inc.'s formaldehyde gas, and CDG Research
Inc.'s chlorine dioxide gas.
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The testing apparatus consisted of the technology
under evaluation and a test chamber. The test chamber is
a compact glove box with a decontaminant injection port,
sensors, and an exhaust port. In this system, Battelle used
spore strips to assess biological efficacy and construction
material coupons to assess material compatibility.
Researchers tested seven material coupons (carpet, bare
wood, glass, laminate, galvanized metal ductwork,
painted wallboard, and painted concrete). The painted
concrete coupons consisted of sawed and painted cinder
block. Each coupon measured 0.75 by 5 inches. Battelle
evaluated biological efficacy by assessing the log reduction
in viable spores on the test materials and identifying
positive or negative bacterial growth on the biological
indicators and spore strips. The biological indicators and
spore strips provided a link to real-world events, which
rely on these indicators for decontamination sampling.
Changes in coupon appearance, color, texture, and
other parameters indicated coupon damage and material
compatibility concerns.
The general test procedure consisted of connecting
the decontamination technology to the test chamber,
inoculating test material coupons and placing them in
the test chamber, implementing the decontamination
technology, and removing and analyzing the coupons.
Before inoculating the coupons, Battelle wiped each one
with isopropyl alcohol. Coupons were not autoclaved, so
some microbes remained and Battelle observed microbe
growth. Each coupon was inoculated with 108 of the
biological test agents. B. anthrads analyses were conducted
with a 15-minute extraction followed by 1- and 7-day
growth assessments. The supernatant from the extraction
process underwent a 1-hour heat shock and dilution
plating for enumeration. Efficacy data (log reductions)
were calculated as the log of the viable spores recovered
from control samples minus the log of the remaining
spores on the decontaminated samples. Battelle also
conducted several statistical analyses to assess results
variability.
Taylor presented the specific study conditions for
each of the three technologies tested, as well as the specific
study results, including mean efficacy for spore reduction
on each test material, statistical analyses for each test
material, and growth on the biological indicators and
spore strips. Results for the efficacy tests and statistical
analyses are expressed as log reductions from 1 to 8, with
8 indicating 100 percent kill. Battelle found that surrogate
results did not compare to B. anthracis results. Results for
the biological indicators are qualitative; positive results
indicate growth and negative results indicate an absence of
growth. Some of the biological indicators and spore strips
were positive after decontamination with the CERTEK
Inc. formaldehyde. The indicators and strips were placed
in a pouch and the positives were likely the result of
uneven gas penetration into the pouch. Testing with the
CDG Research Inc. chlorine dioxide gas is undergoing
repeat testing and verification.
Questions, Answers, and Comments
• One workshop participant commented that ETV
originally intended to test technologies volunteered
by vendors, with vendors sharing the costs. For
homeland security related technologies, this format
changed to a new program called Technology
Testing and Evaluation Program (TTEP) and is
fully funded by EPA, which allows flexibility in
testing.
• A number of research projects with chlorine dioxide
gas are ongoing. Additional areas of research
may examine chlorine gas and reactions in gas
chromatograph (GC) columns and study flow rates
through the test chamber. Chlorine dioxide can be
as much as 50 times more soluble in organics than
in water. This is a trait that should be considered.
• A workshop participant noted that studies need to
consider air exchange rates. The laboratory studies
should mimic the air exchange rates found in real-
world situations.
• Why was methyl bromide excluded from testing?
Battelle discussed including methyl bromide, but
EPA funding and approval, which was not received,
is necessary. Battelle, however, is willing to discuss
various technology options with vendors interested
in the testing program.
• What were the replicates for each
decontaminant? Because tests began after the
anthrax incidents following 9/11, Battelle was
pushed for results. The tests examined a single dose
(concentration X time) with three replicates.
• Are you anticipating any major changes in
protocol as new projects start? Some minor
changes may occur, but the overall study design
should remain the same. Battelle may add monitors
to examine the rate of volatilization and to identify
degradation products. It will likely change the
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protocol for cleaning the test material coupons and
move away from the isopropyl solution wipes.
Technical Support Working
Group Decontamination
Research and Development
Activities
Rebecca Blackmon, Technical Support Working
Group
The presentation provided an overview of projects
underway by the Technical Support Working Group
(TSWG). These projects, which can last from 7
months to 2 years, focus on methods that speed up the
decontamination process. The presentation was organized
by projects that affect activities before, during, and after
decontamination.
Under TSWG, the Chemical, Biological,
Radiological, and Nuclear subgroup identifies user needs
related to these materials and conducts rapid research,
development, and prototyping. Their focus areas are agent
detection, decontamination, protection, and information
collection. TSWG and the subgroup projects include:
• Biological backgrounds in critical facilities
The intent of this two-phase project is to determine
seasonal and diurnal variations in existing
background bacterial and viral aerosol load with
a focus on threat agents (e.g., B. anthmtis). The
project will provide information about the bacterial
background at critical locations, which will help
responders identify possible interferences if a
bio terrorist event occurs. As part of the project,
researchers collect integrated and time-resolved
samples at multiple locations and link these samples
with HVAC systems and environmental data.
Samples undergo analysis with classic microbiology
and microassay methods. The University of
Minnesota and Los Alamos National Laboratory
(LANL) are partners in this project.
Phase I of the project serves as a demonstration for
Phase II. Under Phase I, the research partners completed
a 1-month sampling program at local airports to assess
sampling protocols. Phase I also included developing
extraction protocols and developing and evaluating low-
cost microassay methods. Phase II is in the planning
phase. Over the course of 1 year, researchers will conduct
quarterly sampling and analyze the samples using the
microassays identified or developed during Phase I. The
data from Phase II will provide an understanding of the
variability and prevalence of biological background as
affected by season, weather, activity level, and geographic
location.
• Statistical design tool for sampling contaminated
buildings Under this project, TSWG, in
partnership with Pacific Northwest National
Laboratory (PNNL), will develop a user-friendly
software tool that will design statistically valid
surface sampling protocols for determining the
extent of contamination following a chemical or
biological terrorist attack. Users will input specific
statistical requirements and tailor the program's
generic floor plan to meet specifics of the facility
and HVAC system under investigation. The
program includes decision criteria that affect
sampling protocols (e.g., providing the user the
confidence intervals that the sampling protocol
will identify hot spots and maximum agent
concentrations). Users, however, should discuss
statistical sampling needs (e.g., level of confidence)
before an event occurs. The software will also help
users estimate costs associated with sampling. The
project is slated for completion in June 2005-
• Wireless multisensor environmental monitors
In conjunction with Esensor, Inc., and SUNY
Buffalo, TSWG is developing a real-time sensor
system that is lightweight, portable, inexpensive,
and battery-operated. The system contains eight
interchangeable sensors that monitor CWAs and
toxic industrial chemicals. The sensors use wireless
or Internet/Ethernet connections compatible
with other wireless systems to communicate
results. This type of system is especially relevant
to decontamination events. A bomb squad could
also use the system to assess suspicious packages.
TSWG is targeting a cost of $3,000 to $5,000 for
the system. A prototype has been designed, and
production of a system for testing is under way.
• Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) sensor web
Although similar to the wireless multisensor
monitors, the JPL sensor web has unique
applications. This project responds to an EPA
requirement for monitoring chlorine dioxide during
decontamination. The system may also apply to
urban search-and-rescue operations (e.g., searching
Decontamination Workshop 39
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collapsed buildings) when inserting a sensor is safer
than inserting a person to assess environmental
conditions. This wireless network monitors and
controls temperature, humidity, light intensity, and
decontaminant agent concentrations in a facility
undergoing decontamination. The system is self-
networking and has proven reliability from field-
testing (e.g., monitoring for explosives along the
Alaska pipeline). JPL has built a 40-pod network
and demonstrated this network for sensing chlorine
dioxide. The pod sensors consist of a single pass
sample cell with no mirrors or reference beams.
The sensors are easy to calibrate and have a wide
detection range (80 to 1,000 ppm for chlorine
dioxide). The sensors are also inexpensive to
produce and require little power to run. As a next
step, JPL aims to miniaturize the chlorine dioxide
sensor and develop an Urban Search and Rescue
(USAR) gas sensor.
• Electrostatic decontamination system This
is an effective, safe, and logistically efficient
decontamination system now in its fifth generation.
Clean Earth Technologies demonstrated chemical
and biological agent decontamination without
damaging surfaces. The technology is within the
EPA regulatory processes, with the biological aspect
undergoing verification testing.
The decontamination unit for this technology
has a rugged, compact, modular design. A single
operator can easily use the system. Without brushing,
scrubbing, mopping, or scraping, the decontaminant
provides a greater than log-6 kill for B. anthracis spores
within seconds. Compared with foam technologies,
approximately six times less of this decontaminant is
needed to achieve success. The decontaminant also has
high material compatibility; a paper document can be
submersed in the decontaminant for 24 hours without
harming the print. The system can be employed with or
without ultraviolet (UV) light. UV light increases the kill
rate when used with the biological decontaminant. Testing
has shown that the system is effective against biological
agents, chemical agents, and viruses (e.g., flu, polio). The
decontamination process does not destroy DNA and
therefore does not compromise DNA evidence.
• Atmospheric plasma decontamination This
decontamination method provides effective and
efficient neutralization of biological agents but
minimizes damage to high-value items (e.g.,
items of historical interest). The technology has
been demonstrated with oil paintings, tapestries,
black and white photographs, and ink on paper.
AOAC sporicidal testing has also been successfully
completed. TSWG completed this project in July
2004. A report summarizing results is available on
request.
Expedient mitigation of radiological releases
The project examines methods to minimize the
spread of radioactive particles from a radiological
dispersion device (RDD). Astrippable polymer
coating would be applied to surfaces after rescue
operations and during the decontamination
planning phase. The polymer coating developed
by TSWG requires 24 hours for curing.
Demonstrations have shown that it is durable
yet easy to strip. The coating can also be applied
using equipment familiar to first responders (e.g.,
hoses and backpack systems). Ongoing efforts
under this project include testing the coating with
radiologicals and investigating a dual use with dust
re-entrainment mitigation.
Radiological decontamination technologies
In conjunction with Argonne National Laboratory
(ANL), TSWG is examining a chemical process to
nondestructively remove cesium-137 from porous
building materials. The process applies an ionic
wash followed by a superabsorbent gel that captures
the cesium-137- The gel is then vacuum-removed
from the surface. The process is particularly
applicable to concrete decontamination. ANL has
completed laboratory testing and may conduct
field-testing in 2005- ANL is also modifying the
gel formation for other materials and examining
application technologies. Commercialization
negotiations are in progress.
Mass personnel decontamination protocol
TSWG has completed the guidance document
"Best Practices and Guidelines for Mass Personnel
Decontamination." This document, which is
available for order on the Internet (www.cbiac.
aprea.army.mil), includes information for
decontamination of chemical, biological, and
radiological agents on people. A first edition was
completed in 2003, and a second edition was
released in September 2004.
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Questions, Answers, and Comments
• What is the minimum detection levels on the
monitors and sensors (ppm/ppb/ppt)? TSWG
is involved with two sensor projects—one uses
existing sensors placed in pods, the other requires
developing a new technology. Blackmon believes
these sensors detect contamination to the ppm level.
• For the electrostatic decontamination system,
what was the test substrate and how was the
biological solution applied? Blackmon did not
have immediate access to the project details but said
she would obtain the information for the workshop
participant. Blackmon provided her contact
information to workshop participants.
ii
Dirty Bombs" (Radiological
Dispersion Devices [RDDs])
and Cleanup
Fred Holbrook, U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency
RDDs, or "dirty bombs," use conventional explosives
(e.g., TNT, RDX) to disperse radioactive materials. These
bombs would cause low-level radiological contamination
and cause psychological and economic damage. Fatalities
from RDD events, however, would be expected to be
low. Holbrook listed several radiological agents that are
potential components of RDDs and specified the half-life
of each. (The more radioactive materials have shorter half-
lives.) To cause the worst health effects, the radiological
agent must enter a person's lungs. Cesium fluoride is of
particular concern because it is a fine, talclike powder, i.e.,
it is easily dispersed.
An improvised nuclear device is a crude nuclear
weapon that can cause vast destruction (e.g., destroy
buildings, start fires, and cause tremendous loss of life).
Enriched uranium can be a fuel source for a nuclear
device; approximately 1,300 to 2,100 metric tons of
enriched uranium throughout the world have questionable
controls. The two bombs dropped on Japan to end World
War II are examples of nuclear devices. Little Boy, which
was dropped on Hiroshima, used 60 kilograms (kg) of
enriched uranium as a fuel source. Fat Man, which was
dropped on Nagasaki, used 6 kg of plutonium as a fuel
source.
About 90 percent of specialized radiological
materials, such as weaponized radionuclides (e.g.,
uranium, plutonium), are under government control.
Academic, industrial, agricultural, and medical settings
use radiological materials for many different applications.
Medical treatments, specifically, require thousands of
curies. Of the 2 million sources of radiological agents,
about 5,000 are susceptible to becoming orphaned (lost,
stolen, etc.) each day. Worldwide control is a problem
(e.g., the former Soviet Union contains many "orphans").
Radiation is described in terms of alpha and beta
particles and gamma rays. Alpha particles move short
distances and can be blocked by paper or skin. Beta
particles are higher energy but can be shielded by
aluminum foil or skin. These particles can travel several
feet and exposures can result in deep, serious burns.
Gamma rays consist of high-energy, short wavelength
protons. These particles are pure energy and can travel
many feet. They are very penetrating and can cause severe
health effects. Radiation is measured as the number of
nuclei decay per second. One curie (Ci) is considered
a large radiation source; 100 Ci is considered very
dangerous.
Radiation doses are reported as rems. Holbrook listed
several radiation doses and associated health effects. At 25
to 50 rems, a person may have decreased numbers of white
blood cells. An RDD event is unlikely to produce a dose
above 25 rem.
A 1987 event in Brazil provides an example of a
nonterror event that nonetheless resulted in a terrible
endpoint. Scavengers found cesium in an abandoned
radiotherapy clinic. The scavengers took the material
home to their village. As a result, 20 people received a
high radiation dose, 129 people were contaminated, and
thousands more were monitored for radiation sickness.
In another event, a young girl found cesium (a glowing
blue powder), painted her body with it, and then ate food
without washing her hands. She died within 30 days. This
event occurred in a tourist and agricultural area and caused
economic disaster in that area. The cleanup cost about $20
million.
High cleanup costs are a consideration for addressing
radiological agent events. An obvious first step would
be to reduce the possibility of an event. Holbrook
suggested programs that would encourage users to return
radioactive materials to the manufacturer to minimize the
number of orphan sources. A public health campaign to
educate people about radiation and radioactive releases
Decontamination Workshop 41
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may reduce the extent of cleanup required by political
pressures. Holbrook illustrated impact areas from the
release of a 2-Ci source of cesium-137- A large number
of people would receive a dose of 150 millirems (mrems),
which is equivalent to the difference in background
radiation between Washington, D.C., and Denver,
Colorado. However, that small increase in risk may seem
unacceptable if not properly communicated.
Decontamination options include acid dissolution
of a radiological agent from the contaminated substrate,
chelant bonding for excretion from organisms (including
humans), and blasting with abrasive materials for removal
of the contaminated material. Holbrook highlighted
several specific decontamination technologies in his
presentation. He noted that one strain of bacteria can
consume as much as 0.5 inches of concrete per year when
a sulfur gel is applied to the concrete. He also noted that
DoD and power plant authorities have successfully used
foams on a variety of surfaces.
Questions, Answers, and Comments
• What is the difference between a low-level and
high-level radioactive waste facility? These two
types of facilities are vastly different. Only about
three facilities in the United States currently
accept low-level radiological wastes, so disposal
of radiological wastes after decontamination is a
substantial problem.
• Will radioactive waste facilities accept mixed
wastes? Will some of the decontamination
technologies mentioned produce mixed
waste? Wastes that contain both radioactive and
hazardous chemical materials are a huge problem.
Radioactive waste facilities do not accept mixed
wastes. When reviewing available technologies,
many characteristics and factors must be considered,
including cost, feasibility, life cycle, performance,
maintenance, and safety. Strong acid technologies
can be hazardous to the people deploying the
technology and may create a mixed waste.
Radiological and Nuclear
Terror: Technical Aspects
and Implications for
Decontamination and Site
Cleanup
John MacKinney, U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency, National Homeland Security Research
Center
RDDs and nuclear weapons are vastly different. An RDD
(i.e., a "dirty bomb") may consist of radiological agents
injected into an HVAC or water system, dispersed from
a crop duster, or disseminated covertly. A nuclear weapon
may include smuggled weapons or improvised devices
produced with smuggled weapons-grade materials. This
presentation not only discussed issues associated with
RDDs but also identified a nuclear weapon event as a
worst-case scenario.
The United States and other countries have experience
with radiological agents from activities with uranium
and plutonium in commercial and defense facilities;
remediation at hazardous waste sites; running waste
management facilities; and operating commercial, test,
and research reactors and laboratories. These facilities
are in fixed locations where accident prevention and
response programs are in place. Facilities may also provide
a long warning period before releases occur. Conversely,
terror events are unpredictable. They can occur anywhere
without warning. As such, RDDs present new challenges
for local and federal responders. Most people, however,
believe an RDD event is the most likely threat, especially
considering the abundance of missing and unaccounted-
for radioactive material.
The question becomes how do we prepare for an
RDD event. One solution is to develop many different
release scenarios and plan accordingly. The radiation
released from a device is unlikely to result in fatalities,
although the actual explosion may cause harm. A principal
effect of RDDs is to deny access to places. An RDD may
consist of an explosive device or any means of dispersing
radiological agents (e.g., spraying from an automobile
or aircraft, injecting into a building or water system). A
device may distribute radiation in a small area (e.g., the
size of the meeting room) or a much larger area (e.g., tens
of city blocks).
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Chernobyl was the worst nuclear disaster in
history. This event released more than 100 million Ci
of contamination. For contrast, MacKinney presented a
realistic radiological release example. Within 24 hours,
a small radiological device (10 Ci of cesium-137) would
disperse about a 1-rem dose of radiation to an area several
tens of city blocks, based on a simple gaussian dispersion
model.
Currently, researchers at SNL are examining explosives
and radiological devices. The tests are being conducted in
igloos (50 m3 in size) formerly used to examine explosions
at plutonium pits. Current tests are small and use 0.5
pound of explosive with solid metal bars or ceramic disks
of radiological materials. The research examines whether a
radiological agent will aerosolize and how the shape of the
charge may affect dispersal. Aerosolized or in vapor form,
a radiological agent can enter a persons body and cause
harm. Researchers tested a number of materials to examine
how the material properties affected aerosolization (e.g.,
form or shape, thermal properties, shock physics, vapor
pressure). Entrainment is not inherent to the radioactive
materials but is another complication because the
explosion will entrain dirt and particles of concrete.
Stress levels induce different material reactions
and different particle sizes. In a worst-case scenario,
an explosion will impart enough stress to change a
radiological element to a vapor form. (The vapor then
condenses as sub-micron particles, which are readily
dispersed.) For most of the metal bars tested, the
explosion dispersed large chunks of metals. Tests found
that bismuth, however, aerosolizes very well: 80 percent is
aerosolized into the respirable range because the bismuth
passes to the vapor stage during the tests. A carefully
configured charge can also aerosolize cobalt. Ceramics,
including strontium 90, used in the former Soviet Union
shipping beacons, also tended to create large chunks. (A
large chunk is 12 to 15 microns in diameter and a very
large chunk is 1 inch in diameter.) Cesium chloride poses
another threat because it passes through the liquid to the
vapor phase during an explosion.
Several factors influence the dispersion pattern of
an RDD. Larger chunks remain local to the impact
area. Smaller particles disperse more widely depending
on particle dynamics (e.g., phase changes, size, shape,
and aerodynamics). Buoyant rise—the lift from the heat
of the explosion—and meteorology also play roles in
dispersion. Smaller particles can be caught on air currents.
Models can predict possible dispersion patterns, however,
further research is needed. MacKinney showed examples
of dispersion patterns with and without buildings.
With the buildings, materials disperse in patterns that
are not necessarily intuitive. In addition, studies of
particle dispersion have shown that indoor particulate
concentrations following an event may be high.
Returning to the topic of preparing for an RDD
event, MacKinney provided several suggestions.
Organizations should develop threat scenarios—much
has been done and is ongoing in this area. Using these
scenarios, we can create standard response and mitigation
procedures, plan possible cleanup actions, and evaluate
existing technologies. Additional research is needed to
adapt existing technologies to threat scenarios and to
develop and test new technologies. When developing
decontamination technologies, research organizations
should avoid rushing to invest in solutions that address
a single problem and should invest only in technologies
with sound scientific support and real-world experience.
Research should target technologies that fill gaps.
The decontamination and restoration periods after
an event follow a similar pattern, regardless of the threat
agent (e.g., chemical, biological, or radiological). The
first step is the safe shutdown of the affected building or
area. A shutdown has huge implications when involving
city blocks and private properties. Through work groups,
DHS is assessing possible optimized approaches to
decontamination and restoration after an RDD release.
This approach would be flexible in selecting cleanup
criteria based on societal needs, expected land uses, and
decontamination technologies.
Nuclear devices present another radiological threat.
They include improvised devices, as well as weapons
bought or stolen from a nuclear state. A nuclear device
has a likely yield of 0 (failure) to 50 kilotons. The most
likely event would involve a device with a 5- to 20-kiloton
capacity. A 10-kiloton device, which is considered small,
has the explosion capacity of nineteen 100-ton coal cars.
The bomb exploded at Hiroshima was 13 kilotons; the
bomb exploded at Nagasaki was 22 kilotons.
After detonation, temperatures soar within a fraction
of a second with the fireball reaching millions of degrees.
The extreme rise in heat is followed immediately by
incredible winds (measured near 700 miles per hours
during historic testing events). Most deaths after
detonation are caused by burns. In addition to proximity
to the detonation point, an individual's specific injuries
depend on location within a building and building
Decontamination Workshop 43
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materials. DHS modeling estimated that a nuclear
detonation in Washington, D.C., would result in 50,000
deaths from the initial blast and another 50,000 to
100,000 deaths due to radiation. Radioactive fallout could
extend hundreds of miles.
In conclusion, an RDD detonation is a likely threat.
Organizations must understand possible threat scenarios
and can use models to help simulate urban impacts.
Decontamination technologies must mesh with larger
remediation and renovation goals. Although a large
nuclear device attack is unlikely, this threat cannot be
ignored because of the severity of the impact.
Questions, Answers, and Comments
• When creating an RDD, why not grind the
radiological material? Because of the radiation
dose, grinding may be fatal. If the proper safety
precautions are used, grinding may work to further
distribute the ceramic-form radiological materials,
but grinding metal-form radiological materials
might prevent the shock wave that creates the phase
change. A number of technical issues are involved in
creating successful RDDs.
UK Approach to RDD
Cleanup
Malcolm Wakerley, Department for Environment,
Food, and Rural Affairs
The UK learned lessons about radiological contamination
as the result of past nonterrorist, nuclear incidents (e.g.,
the U.S. B-52 bomber accident in Spain, Chernobyl
reactor fallout, and Brazil's cancer therapy unit wastes).
These incidents provided information about contaminant
movement resulting from an RDD detonation. The
Chernobyl incident and the events of 9/11 in the United
States prompted the creation and upgrade of a radiation
monitoring network and radiation response handbook.
This presentation focused on these two items.
After the Chernobyl incident, the UK created the
Radiation Incident Monitoring Network (RIMNET).
This system consists of 92 gamma detectors, located
approximately 30 kilometers apart, that supply data
to a group of laboratories. The sensors are very simple
and cannot detect alpha-emitting materials. Many of
the sensors have been in service for more than 20 years.
Information from these sensors helped the UK identify
areas of contamination after the Chernobyl incident. For
example, contamination was patchy because of heavy rains
within the fallout area. The UK identified some areas that
were no longer safe for grazing sheep.
RIMNET provides a vast amount of data regarding
local background levels of radiation, which can be used
to identify irregular events. The system is linked to
government departments, and all departments can access
the data simultaneously. Agencies can use RIMNET as a
tool for communicating with politicians, communities,
and international partners. For example, an incident
occurring in the UK will also impact nations on mainland
Europe. In an exercise with sensors in Scotland, the
RIMNET database was able to upload years' worth of
sampling data within 30 minutes.
Updates to the RIMNET system include a
modeling component that can assess short-, medium-,
and long-range impacts. The system is also linked with
meteorological data. With these components, the system
can backtrack from an alarmed detector to a radiation
source. If a release occurs anywhere in world, the system
can also calculate when radiation will reach the UK. If the
release occurs in the UK, the system can calculate when
radiation will reach other countries. The UK also has the
ability to run models that, within 10 minutes of a release,
can identify areas to shut down to prevent contaminant
movement.
A model output in the presentation illustrated
releases associated with a 6,000-Ci cobalt bomb that
aerosolized. The map shows the inhalation dose from
the passing cloud. The predominant dose, however,
results from deposition. The area closest to the release
presents the greatest concern. Doses are lower farther from
the release point, but a public relations concern exists
regarding communicating dose impacts to communities.
Commonly, communities want doses to return to levels
present before an event. Determining how and to what
level decontamination occurs becomes a political question.
As such, releases become instruments of economic as well
as health destruction.
In 1996, the UK created a radiological handbook in
response to a review of decontamination and remediation
technologies conducted after a series of additional
radioactive accidents. The review identified trees, soil,
and grass as contributing substantially to exposure
doses. Vertical surfaces were only minor contributors to
overall dose. The existing response system is predicated
44 NHSRC
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on equipment available to local authorities, but
specialized military equipment would be available for
decontamination. The radiological handbook includes a
simple logic diagram and 22 tables on decontamination
technologies and considerations. It also includes an
example release incident and discusses the UK inventory
of decontamination equipment.
After the events of 9/11 in the United States, the
UK expressed increased interest in the 1996 review and
handbook. The handbook has grown since 1996 and now
includes radiological agents that terrorists might use. (The
radiological threat agents addressed by the UK are similar
to the priority radiological threat agents selected by the
United States) The handbook provides reliable, consistent,
and comprehensive information to help decision makers
select the most practical decontamination methods and
to guide them through the decontamination process.
The UK is currently working to expand the handbook to
address various climates and crops so that it is relevant to
all of Europe and potentially to the United States.
Emergency planners use the handbook during
threat event exercises so its use will be intuitive during
a real event. The handbook follows a 10-step decision
process outlined in detail in the presentation. Generally,
these steps involve considering the nature and extent of
the contamination, the availability and applicability of
decontamination methods, and the land uses of affected
areas. Each land use area is then considered and evaluated
individually. Land use areas in an inhabited area, for
example, may include residential, commercial, and
recreational areas.
The UK plans to maintain the handbook over
the next 3 years and add lessons as they are learned. In
exercises, the UK has examined case studies of accidents
using the handbook as a resource and considering
advances in technologies to reassess what actions
should have been taken. The UK is willing to share the
information it has gained, as well as the radiological
handbook, with the United States.
Wakerly concluded with his thoughts on a potential
RDD attack. The attack will likely occur in an urban
setting. Ground surfaces, such as soil and grass around
homes and work areas, will provide the predominant
radiation routes of exposure after the initial attack.
Removing radiation from those areas will provide the best
reduction in dose.
Questions, Answers, and Comments
After his presentation, Wakerly commented that the UK
is examining the practical side of using the handbook
and decision trees. The handbook has worked well for
tabletop exercises. In real-world situations, however,
many additional concerns exist (e.g., seals for vehicles
conducting decontamination). Wakerly asked how the
United States was addressing the many radiological issues.
A workshop participant responded that RDDs are a new
research area for the United States Some investigations,
however, are under way. For example, aTSWG project
examines the next generation of materials for personal
protective equipment. These materials will be lightweight
and breathable because heat is a substantial issue when
using personal protective equipment.
Decontamination Workshop 45
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46 NHSRC
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Panel Discussion—Lessons
Learned
Several bio-decontamination events are now
complete. Workshop participants shared their experiences
at these events with others in order to discuss lessons
learned about the decontamination process and to suggest
steps that would improve that process.
Information Sharing and
Agency Coordination
Workshop participants uniformly agreed that improving
coordination and information sharing efforts among
federal, state, and local agencies, as well as private
companies and communities, would improve responses to
chemical, biological, and radiological threat events. They
agreed that sharing information early when a threat event
occurs would result in responses that are faster and better.
• Examples of existing efforts Although
information sharing and coordination efforts can be
much improved, workshop participants provided
examples of current efforts among agencies.
> EPA ORD recently published two reports
as a means of sharing information with
others. The first summarizes EPA data from
decontamination events. The second compiles
building decontamination data and reviews
decontamination options beyond crisis
exemption options. EPA has not been proactive
in distributing these reports, but they are
available to workshop participants upon their
request.
> DoD requires annual internal agency research
updates and coordinates efforts with EPA.
> Participants from the UK noted that they
publish information on the Internet. They also
encouraged ongoing coordination between the
United States and UK.
• Security concerns When sharing information,
agencies must be cautious that information is not
used against us. Data security must be considered
when sharing information. One participant
suggested that CDC and EPA detail employees
to the FBI to facilitate information sharing for
decontamination and public health concerns
without compromising the criminal investigation
aspect of an event. For example, a whole report
may be classified, but only a small portion contains
classified information. Security and classification
issues will likely continue to be a problem.
Suggestions for information sharing methods
One workshop participant suggested that DHS
spearhead efforts toward better information sharing.
Another recognized the benefit of this workshop
and suggested that NHSRC and others regularly
host workshops of its type for government, private,
civilian, and military groups. Others also provided
suggestions for data repositories. One workshop
participant suggested creating virtual repositories
containing electronic documents and paper-
copy documents converted to electronic forms to
maximize information sharing. These repositories
would serve as centralized information centers and
might include:
> Research and priority agent repositories
that list completed, ongoing, or planned
research efforts and priority agents for
research If agencies and researchers had a clear
understanding of efforts underway by others,
they could reduce potential redundancies,
address priority issues quickly, and appropriate
funds properly. EPA has launched an internal
campaign to track research projects. This effort
will not only prevent research redundancies but
also feed into budgeting decisions.
> Decontamination portfolios that link threat
agents with decontamination technologies
The repository should list technologies that are
validated as well as those under development. A
workshop participant noted that the National
Decontamination Team may be creating this
type of repository.
Decontamination Workshop 47
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> Agent repositories that list threat agents linked
with laboratories able to analyze these agents
This repository could also include acceptable
surrogates for research projects and methods
for preparing these surrogates to provide
consistency across research studies.
> Databases that list people with expertise in
areas pertaining to decontamination Such
a database could list training and work
experience. One workshop participant noted
that this database exists and is available
through EPA.
Several workshop participants who work as OSCs
emphasized the need for information when responding to
an event. They need information about decontamination
methods that work or do not work and why. They also
need information in order to address the specific concerns
of agencies from multiple levels of government (e.g., local
boards of health, mayors' offices).
Preparedness
Organizations can prepare for a chemical, biological, or
radiological agent event in a number of ways. Workshop
participants repeatedly suggested tabletop exercises
as a way to identify possible threat scenarios, develop
response plans, and pinpoint data gaps. They suggested
interagency panels and peer reviews for these exercises.
The exercises should illustrate the pressures of the event
and the complexity of decontamination planning (e.g.,
addressing HVAC systems). Workshop participants
suggested focusing these exercises on airports and
transportation facilities. One workshop participant noted
that exercises can become complex and attempt to address
worst-case scenarios. In these exercises, the focus becomes
the technical aspect of the response plan. In a real-wo rid
situation, the technical side of a response may be easy
compared with regulatory or communication issues.
Materials that would help prepare agencies and
facilities include:
• Matrix of responses Similar to a decontamination
database, this matrix would link threat agents with
appropriate decontamination methods and site
conditions (e.g., a contained building contaminated
with anthrax). All known decontamination
agents and material compatibility issues should
be included. Some of this information may be
subjective or anecdotal. Nonetheless, having this
information readily available would likely streamline
the response.
• Response plans Workshop participants agreed
that exercises should encourage organizations to
prepare plans. For example, plans could identify
methods to treat irreplaceable objects (e.g.,
paintings, historical documents) or process large
volumes of personal items. FEMA has published
a radiological response plan that addresses
communication and preparedness concerns. All
response plans should include communication
strategies (e.g., protocol for notifying the President
and other government officials).
• Standards Research and planning for pieces of the
response is under way or complete, but a means for
looking at the overall response process is lacking.
A protocol that outlines a systematic way to assess
an event would be useful. This protocol should
cover both simple indoor and complex indoor/
outdoor situations and should include standards.
A workshop participant noted that the process
of writing and preparing standards may identify
potential problems and force decisions before an
event.
• Up-to-date drawings In one participant's
experience, the lack of accurate building plans led
to delays and increased expense in decontaminating
an impacted building. Having accurate plans readily
available is critical for rapid response.
One workshop participant noted that prepositioning
decontamination equipment may be appropriate. Others
thought that this action was not economically viable. If
the government buys the infrastructure for a technology
now, the technology may be obsolete when needed.
Having the equipment in the right place at the right
time and ensuring that it would operate after years on
standby are also concerns. A participant suggested that
technology vendors research dual uses of decontamination
technologies, such as applications in agricultural
decontamination for insects and mold, responses to
hazardous material releases, or uses in hospital settings.
Dual-use technologies would provide a sustainable
business model and provide technologies for addressing
agents if needed. Another workshop participant noted
that the military often develops technologies and then
turns them over to the commercial market. They are then
available commercially when needed.
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Sampling and Analytical
Issues
Workshop participants discussed several topics regarding
sampling utility and sampling methods. These topics
included:
• Streamlining the sampling process Several
workshop participants noted that sampling (for
characterization, verification, and clearance) took
up much of the response timeline. They suggested
streamlined sampling (e.g., minimize or eliminate
characterization sampling when fumigation is
the planned response; only screen samples to
determine viability). When characterization
sampling is minimized, verification and clearance
sampling become more important. Individual
workshop participants noted that the clearance
samples were most important when reoccupying a
building and that good communication with the
affected community (e.g., workers in a building) is
necessary to minimize clearance sampling.
Other workshop participants strongly believed
that no sampling phase should be eliminated. One
participant believed that characterization sampling
took up only a small segment of the response
timeline and should not be compromised.
• Using biological indicators Decontamination
events rely on biological indicators (e.g., spore
strips), but results from these tests may not
correlate to environmental conditions (i.e., actual
levels of spores). Several workshop participants
identified correlating these tests as a research need.
Having participated in five or six decontamination
events, one participant noted that no positive
environmental samples were found when the
biological indicators were negative and desired
fumigant concentration had been achieved.
Another noted that establishing a link between
indicators (e.g., paper or stainless steel strips)
and environmental samples may help speed
reoccupation of sensitive areas. Several other
participants noted that pharmaceutical companies
already use biological indicators to confirm
sterilization. Decontamination research may be
able to draw from this experience. In termite
fumigation, vendors also rely on indicators to
confirm complete fumigation.
Other workshop participants were more
hesitant about linking different types of indicators
to environmental samples. One noted that
spores on steel coupons or paper strips will not
respond the same as spores on desks, fabric, or
other materials in a building. As such, hospital
and pharmaceutical practices may be of limited
usefulness. Currently, biological indicators and
spore strips confirm that a decontamination agent
was present, but indicators and strips do not
directly confirm that decontamination of agents in
the environment has occurred.
Improving sampling methods Workshop
participants noted lessons learned and identified
concerns regarding sampling methods.
Lessons learned:
> Calibrating sampling instruments and
ensuring proper operation before
sampling is critical.
> Fixed sampling points are costly and difficult
to site, and they provide a limited amount of
information. A mobile unit (e.g., TAGA) can
be more useful.
> Remotely monitoring a building with a
titration system can be difficult. In one
participant's experience, the system required
5,000 feet of tubing and months for setup
and operation.
Concerns raised:
> Many questions arose from a lack of
understanding. For example, additional
environmental sampling was required at
one facility to address workers' concern
about the safety of their workstations.
> Rapid screening and sampling may overlook
multiple-agent attacks. For example, a
terrorist may use a single event to drive people
toward a common area and a second event.
> Any sampling protocol should address multi-
agent attacks. Once an agent is identified
at an event, agencies may race toward
decontamination. Other agents may be
overlooked.
Decontamination Workshop 49
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Decontamination Process
Workshop participants provided comments based on their
experience at decontamination events.
• When fumigation is the selected decontamination
method, the fumigation itself takes up only a small
segment of the decontamination timeline.
For example, a 1-week fumigation requires 6
weeks of preparation and several months of post-
fumigation activities.
• Knowing the target agent is critical for properly
planning a response. One workshop participant
noted that time and money could have been saved
at one site if the decision makers knew that the
target agent was a weaponized biological agent.
They would have selected fumigation immediately
instead of spending time considering alternative
decontamination technologies.
• Sealing a building can be costly and time-
consuming. In addition to the cost of sealing the
building, budgets must also include inspection
costs. A project in Utica, New York, found tenting
to be an effective means of sealing a building.
• Preserving sensitive and valuable materials is a
concern when one is selecting a decontamination
technology. One workshop participant suggested
innovative research grants to businesses or
academics as a way to address concerns about
preserving materials.
• One workshop participant suggested leaving as
much material as possible inside a building for
fumigation to alleviate disposal concerns.
• CDC is concerned about the public health side
of an event and facility safety for reoccupation.
However, decisions about reoccupation are made
by the local health agencies, so CDC responses
to an incident must be carefully crafted and must
respect the command structure. CDC only supports
the local agencies and must be careful not to say
anything that could be construed as policy.
A representative from CDC indicated that
historically a clear understanding of the different
phases of a response was lacking. Participants in
a decontamination event should recognize that
the response phases are not separate and distinct;
however, activities are becoming clearer as agencies
gain more decontamination experience.
An OSC provides information to agencies involved
in a decontamination event. Agencies use this
information to support their decisions. (One
OSC at the workshop indicated that many of the
technical experts present could be called upon to
provide information to support a decontamination
event.) Agencies working with an OSC need
to understand the command structure at a
decontamination event.
An environmental clearance committee supports
local agency decisions about when it is safe to
reoccupy a building by providing information
and credibility. The more the local agencies know,
the better able they are to make decisions. The
committee itself does not make decisions.
One workshop participant served on several
environmental clearance committees. This
participant noted that the facility operator at one
site supported the committee as an independent
group assessing clearance for reoccupation.
An OSC attending the workshop voiced support of
environmental clearance committees and technical
working groups. To support an OSC, however,
technical working groups should consist of people
who are authorized to make decisions for their
agencies. Environmental clearance committees
should recognize that they serve as advisory bodies,
recommending cleanup values to the local agencies
that make the decisions.
50 NHSRC
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Panel Discussion—Research and
Development Needs
Over the course of the 3-day workshop, presenters
described a number of ongoing research projects. During
the second panel discussion, workshop participants
suggested many additional research needs. Again, workshop
participants emphasized the need for agency coordination
to maximize research efforts. The following is a list of
suggestions provided during the second panel discussion, as
well as research needs identified during the lessons learned
panel discussion.
• Both basic and applied research are needed.
Researchers must ensure that their efforts translate to
real-world situations. Small-chamber studies provide
a systematic approach, but these studies do not assess
real-life concerns. Studies should simulate responses
in real buildings. Issues of scale and engineering
may be a concern when moving from laboratory
to field-testing. For example, real-world situations
often include greater surface areas and volumes for
decontamination. Workshop participants provided
several specific suggestions for applied research topics:
> Real-time monitoring technology (e.g.,
developing faster, cheaper, and better
technologies) for agents and fumigants
> Appropriate sampling methods (e.g.,
determining whether cotton wipes or rayon
wipes are better for surface sampling) for bio-
agents (e.g., spores)
> Validation of decontamination technologies
> Tenting as a means of sealing a facility for
fumigation
• Most of the information presented during the
workshop applied to B. anthrads. A number of
workshop participants mentioned the need to
expand research related to other chemical, biological,
and radiological threat agents. Most agreed that
additional basic research on radiological agents is
needed. Specifically, participants suggested research
topics including:
> Interactions of chemical and radiological agents
with building and environmental materials
> Movement of fine radiological particles
> Aerosolization and re-aerosolization of biological
and radiological agents
> Effects of heat and humidity on the deactivation
of ricin
*• Applicability of chelaters, HEPA filters,
and other decontamination technologies to
radiological agents
> Activated reagents and their use on CWAs
> Decontamination of infectious agents in an
environment with a heavy organic load
In addition to expanding research on specific threat
agents, workshop participants thought research
should expand to consider more threat scenarios,
such as a large, outdoor contamination event.
Events that may cause agricultural contamination or
economic damage are also of concern.
Research efforts should assess the whole cost of
a decontamination event, including the disposal
and restoration components. These efforts should
identify potential savings areas that would reduce
the expense and time required for decontamination
and restoration. Gathering information and
conducting decontaminations quickly could cut
costs. A workshop participant noted that removing
building contents before decontamination requires
consideration of the restraints of working in a
contaminated environment as well as packaging
and transporting waste materials pulled from
the building. If materials are removed after
decontamination, perhaps they could be handled
as relatively innocuous materials. Waste products
from the decontamination process itself must also be
considered.
Dual-use technologies should be identified or
developed before the next threat event occurs.
Technologies for decontaminating biological
agents, specifically, could have many uses (e.g.,
decontaminating mold-infested buildings, hospitals,
and manufacturing facilities). As an added benefit,
research on dual-use technologies can also foster
collaboration between public and private sectors.
Decontamination Workshop 51
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Workshop participants also encouraged research into
biotechnology-based decontamination approaches
(e.g., bacteria-eating anthrax). One workshop
participant mentioned an existing project studying
viruses that attack anthrax. Another discussed a
personal experience with a past project researching
a bacterial virus for remediating a pathogen threat.
This research was difficult to pursue because of
concern that this project could be construed as
biological warfare. Rather than using a bacterial virus,
an enzyme extracted from the virus could destroy
B. anthracis and other pathogens very quickly. (This
technique also has a hospital application.) Current
research is pursuing enzymes as a means of addressing
chemical and biological agents.
Several workshop participants mentioned the
need for better surrogates. One participant noted
that identifying surrogates is more complex than
identifying a single surrogate for a single threat
agent. Surrogates can change based on the threat
agent, decontamination methods, and material
characteristics. Researchers should consult
microbiologists to consider whether biological
indicators, spore strips, glass disks, and other media
truly simulate B. anthracis releases. Identifying
successful surrogates would enable academic
institutions and others without clearance to work
with threat agents to advance decontamination
technologies.
Workshop participants repeatedly mentioned
biological indicators and spore strips as an area of
uncertainty. For example, the test coupons need
to better represent real-world situations (e.g.,
carpet coupons versus steel disks). The participants
suggested additional research to improve available
indicator and strip technologies and to develop
new methods for ensuring that agent deactivation
occurred. One workshop participant specifically
mentioned the need for understanding the biology
behind these technologies. Decontamination events
rely heavily on biological indicators and spore strips,
but information from these tests is not directly
comparable to environmental samples. As during
the lessons learned panel discussion, workshop
participants held conflicting opinions about
whether relating biological indicators and strips
to environmental conditions (actual spores) was
appropriate.
During the lessons learned panel discussion,
workshop participants mentioned specific research
needs regarding existing sampling methods. One
participant identified the need for research to address
several questions: How much sampling is enough?
What samples are truly necessary? How clean is
clean? Other research topics specifically mentioned
were rapid testing protocols, methods for sampling
irreplaceable items (e.g., paintings or historical
documents), accurate and inexpensive real-time
monitors, and sampling standards (e.g.,
1 spore strip per 100 ft2).
Several workshop participants suggested additional
research to develop surfaces and coatings that are
easy to clean, serve as biocides, or limit chemical
infiltration. Specifically, studies could develop a
way to seal porous materials, which can be difficult
to decontaminate. Some research of surfaces and
coatings is under way.
Architects and engineers are notably absent from
this meeting. These experts can provide information
about designing buildings with smart systems—using
building materials to combat contamination. A
workshop participant mentioned that comprehensive
planning at a State Department building resulted in
a structure that minimizes the potential impact of a
contamination event. For example, the mail room
has a self-contained HVAC system with HEPA
filters. Mail is processed through holding areas that
can be tested for threat agents before the mail enters
the building.
Many of the presentations given during the
workshop discussed material compatibility issues.
Workshop participants agreed that additional
research to understand interactions between
decontaminants (e.g., fumigants), threat agents,
and building materials is needed. Much remains
unknown about chemical off-gassing, for example,
or decontaminant impacts on sensitive equipment
(e.g., computer components, aircraft systems). A
workshop participant noted that the IBM facility
in Rochester, New York, has a laboratory for testing
sensitive equipment. IBM is open to having others
use this laboratory for research. One presenter found
that a number of carbonyls formed during chlorine
dioxide fumigation tests. Very little of the reacted
chlorine from those tests was recovered. The fate of
the remaining chlorine remains unknown. More
52 NHSRC
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information is needed to understand chemical
reactions during fumigation and the formation of
fumigation byproducts.
Workshop participants suggested research
to characterize background (e.g., dust, filth,
grime) to understand how these materials may
impact decontamination, especially fumigation
technologies. LLNL plans to test and characterize
grime in subways, and DoE seeks to characterize
background characteristics of airborne materials that
could be threat agents. For example, live anthrax
spores can be found everywhere. Understanding
these background levels should prevent unnecessary
fumigation.
Several workshop participants suggested additional
research to address the question "How clean is
clean?" They suggested conducting risk-based
modeling to understand the aggregate risk before,
during, and after a decontamination event. For
example, if no growth is reported for 106 spore
strips, is a building safe for reoccupation? From
a risk-based perspective, how should we address
intact, nonviable spores?
Nonculturable but viable organisms have not been
addressed. Citing personal observations, a workshop
participant noted that biological indicators report
positive results on different days (i.e., some are
positive on day 1, some on day 4, and occasionally
some on day 6). The reason for this is unknown.
Perhaps results vary based on different culture
media.
One workshop participant suggested convening
a panel of experts distant from ongoing
decontamination discussions and research to
independently review the collective research efforts
ongoing at various agencies and facilities. This
panel may be able to identify topics that have been
overlooked or projects that are redundant. They
may also be able to determine whether current
research is focusing on too few decontamination
technologies or identify other areas of interest. The
panel would meet periodically (e.g., to observe the
presentations and discussions at this workshop).
Their input may prevent us from being blindsided
by an unexpected terrorist attack.
Decontamination Workshop 53
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54 NHSRC
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Appendices
Appendix A: Agenda
WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 23, 2005
8:00am Registtation/Check-in
PLENARY SESSION
9:00am Opening remarks; decontamination timeline;
summary of all events thus far Blair Martin
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA),
National Homeland Security Research Center (NHSRC)
9:30am DDAP program Lance Brooks
Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
10:00am BREAK
10:15am FBI/Forensics sampling Ben Garrett
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
SESSION 1: The Decontamination Process
10:45am CDC approach to sampling Ken Martinez
Centers for Disease Control (CDC)
ll:15pm Agents of interest Nancy Adams, EPA/NHSRC
ll:45am LUNCH
12:45pm AOAC sterilant registration method Steve Tomasino, EPA
l:15pm Crisis exemptions JeffKempter, EPA
l:45pm Sampling issues Mark Durno, EPA Region 5
2:15pm BREAK
2:30pm Ambient monitoring for fumigants/CWagents-TAGA van Dave Mickunas, EPA
3:00pm Insurance and indemnity issues Jerry Robinson
United States Postal Service (USPS)
Decontamination Workshop 55
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WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 23, 2005 (continued)
SESSION 1: The Decontamination Process (continued)
3:30pm The role of on-site coordinators in the process Marty Powell, EPA
4:00pm The UK perspective on decontamination approaches Robert Bettley-Smith
(GDRS)
4:30pm Lab capacity issues Rob Rothman, EPA/NHSRC
5:00pm ADJOURN
THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 24, 2005
SESSION 2: Decontamination Technologies
8:30am C1O2 fumigation, liquid ClO2/bleach John Mason
Sabre Technical Services
9:00am C1O2 system test Aniston Tom McWhorter
CDG Technology
9:30am VHP fumigation, liquid HP, and sporeclenz Iain McVey
STERIS Corporation
10:00am BREAK
10:15am VHP fumigation Mike Herd
Bioquell, Inc.
10:45am Methyl bromide fumigation Rudi Scheffiahn
University of Florida
ll:15am Foam decontamination technologies Rita Betty
Sandia National Laboratory
ll:45pm LUNCH
2:30pm Ricin Jack Kelly, EPA/ERT
l:00pm Restoration from decontamination Rich Orlusky, USPS
l:30pm Evaluating C1O2 fumigation efficacy Paula Krauter
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
2:00pm Innovative/emerging decontamination technologies Mark Brickhouse
Edgewood Chemical Biological Center (ECBC)
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THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 24, 2005 (continued)
SESSION 3: Decontamination R&D
2:30pm Systematic decontamination studies PhilKoga (ECBC)
3:00pm Use of HVAC systems in building decontamination Tina Carlsen
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
3:30pm BREAK
3:45pm Impact of materials on disinfection and byproduct formation Rich Corsi
University of Texas
4:15pm Chamber studies MarkButtner
University of Nevada, Las Vegas
4:45pm Decontamination ETV program Mike Taylor
Battelle Memorial Institute
5:15pm TSWG R&D activities Rebecca Blackmon
Technical Support Working Group
5:45pm ADJOURN
FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 25, 2005
SESSION 4: Lessons Learned
8:30am PANEL DISCUSSIONS
• Lessons learned from building decontamination work
10:30am BREAK
10:45am • Research and technology development needs
12:00pm LUNCH
SESSION 5: Radiological Dispersion Device Cleanup
l:00pm Scenarios FredHolbrook
(DOE) EPA/NHSRC
l:30pm Dirty Bombs John MacKinney, EPA
2:00pm Radiological cleanup Malcolm Wakerley
DEFRA/Radio Active Substances
2:30pm Wrap-up Blair Martin, EPA
Decontamination Workshop 57
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Appendix B: List of Participants
The following pages list workshop participants. The list does not include those who were invited to participate but
could not attend the workshop. Asterisks denote presenters.
Nancy Adams
Director, Decontamination and
Consequence Management
National Homeland Security
Research Center
U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency
MC E-343-06
Research Triangle Park, NC 27711
Nick Adams
President
BioQuell, Inc.
101 Witmer Road - Suite 500
Horsham, PA 19044
* Robert Bettley-Smith
Department for Environment,
Food & Rural Affairs
4/E4 Ashdown House
123 Victoria Street
London, SW1E6DE
United Kingdom
*Rita Betty
Member Technical Staff
Chemical and Biological
Technologies
Sandia National Laboratory
P.O. Box 5800 (0734)
Albuquerque, NM 87185
* Rebecca Blackmon
Subject Matter Expert
Chemical, Biological, Radiological,
& Nuclear Countermeasures
Technical Support Working Group
12821 Old Fort Road, Suite 302
Fort Washington, MD 20744
Nicolas Brescia
On-Scene Coordinator
Removal Branch
Hazardous Site Cleanup Division
U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency
1650 Arch Street (3HS31)
Philadelphia, PA 19103
"Mark Brickhouse
Team Leader
Decontamination Sciences
Physical and Chemical Scientist
Research Development
Engineering Command
Edgewood Chemical
Biological Center
5183 Black Hawk Road
(AMSRD-ECB-RT-PD)
Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD
21010-5424
•Lance Brooks
Scientist
Programs, Plans, Budget
Science & Technology Directorate
Department of Homeland Security
Room 10-D47
Washington, DC 20528
Karen Burgan
Senior Policy Advisor
Office of Emergency Management
Office of Solid Waste and
Emergency Response
National Planning and
Preparedness Division
U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency
1200 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
(5202A)
Washington, DC 20460
* Mark Buttner
Microbiplogist
University of Nevada, Las Vegas
4505 South Maryland Parkway
Box 454009
Las Vegas, NV 89154-4009
"Tina Carlsen
Senior Environmental Scientist
Environmental Chemistry
and Biology
Environmental Restoration
Lawrence Livermore National
Laboratory
P.O. Box 808 (L-528)
Livermore, CA 94550
Karen Cavanagh
General Counsefand Chief
Operating Officer
Sabre Technical Services, LLC
17 Computer Drive, E
Albany, NY 12205
John Chang
Chemical Engineer
IEMB
Air Pollution Prevention
& Control Division
National Risk Management
Research Laboratory
U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency
109 TW Alexander Drive (E305-03)
Research Triangle Park, NC 27711
"Richard Corsi
Professor
Department of Civil Engineering
Center for Energy &
Environmental Research
University of Texas at Austin
10100 Bumet Road (R7100)
Austin, TX 78757
John Drake
Project Manager
Decontamination and Consequence
Management Division
National Homeland Security
Research Center
U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency
10282 Rock Springs Road
(OH/WVDP)
West Valley, NY 10282
"Mark Durno
On-Scene Coordinator
Emergency Response
Superfuna Division
U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency - Region 5
25089 Center Ridge Road (ME-W)
Westlake, OH 44145
Haroona Franklin
Head of Contracts and Resources
CDS Project
2 Little Smith Street
London SW1P 3DH
United Kingdom
Scott Fredericks
Environmental Reponse Team
Office of Superfund
Remediation & Technology
Innovation
U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency
"Benjamin Garrett
Senior Scientist for WMD
Hazardous Materials Response Unit
Federal Bureau of Investigation
2501 Investigation Parkway
Quantico,VA 22135
Perry Gaughan
On-Scene Coordinator - Region 3
Removal and Response Branch
Hazardous Site Clean Up
U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency
1650 Arch Street (3HS31)
Philadelphia, PA 19103
Harold Heaton
Principal Staff Physicist
Special Applications Branch
National Security
Technology Department
Johns Hopkins Applied
Physics Laboratory
11100 Johns Hopkins Road
(17N-686)
Laurel, MD 20723
58 NHSRC
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Craig Heimbach
Physicist
Neutron Interactions and Dosimetry
Ionizing Radiation
National Institute of Standards
and Technology
100 Bureau Drive (8461)
Gaithersburg, MD 20899
* Michael Herd
Vice President
Bioquell, Inc.
101 Witmer Road - Suite 500
Horsham, PA 19044
*Fred Holbrook
Senior Engineer
Decontamination and
Consequence Management
National Homeland Security
Research Center
U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency
26 West Martin Luther King
Drive (163)
Cincinnati, OH 45268
Anthony Intrepido
Program Manager
Industrial Hygiene Field Services
Directorate of Occupational Health
U.S. Army Center for Health
Promotion and Protective Mediums
5158BlackhawkRoad
ATTN: MCHB-TS-OFS
Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD
21010
Jenna Jambeck
Post-Doc
Atmospheric Protection Branch
Air Pollution Prevention
& Control Division
U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency
109 TW Alexander Drive (E305-02)
Research Triangle Park, NC 27711
Peter Jutro
Deputy Director
National Homeland Security
Research Center
U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency
1200 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
(8801R)
Washington, DC 20460
"Jack Kelly
On Scene Coordinator
Removal Response Branch
Hazardous Site Cleanup Diyision
U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency - Region 3
1650 Arch Street (3HS31)
Philadelphia, PA 19103
*Jeff Kempter
Senior Advisor
Office of Pesticide Programs
Antimicrobials Division
U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency
1200 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
(75IOC)
Washington, DC 20460
Max Kiefer
Assistant Director Emergency
Preparednness and Response
Office of Director
National Institute fo Occupational
Safety and Health
Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention
1600 Clifton Road (MS E-20)
Atlanta, GA 30333
* Philip Koga
Associate Director for
Special Programs
Edgewood Chemical &
Biological Center
Research & Technology Directorate
U.S. Army Research
Development & Engineering
Command
RDECOM-ECBC /AMSRD-ECB-RT
Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD
21010-5424
* Paula Krauter
Environmental Microbiplogist
Environmental Protection
Department
Environmental Restoration
Lawrence Livermore
National Laboratory
7000 East Avenue (L-528)
Livermore, CA 94550
Terrance Leighton
Senior Scientist
aVD/CHORI
5700 Martin Luther King Parkway
Oakland, CA 94609
Paul Lemieux
Chemical Engineer
Decontamination &
Consequences Management
National Homeland Security
Research Center
U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency
109 TW. Alexander Drive
Research Triangle Park, NC 27709
*John MacKinney
Senior Scientist
Center For Radiological
Emergency Response/ORIA
U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency
1200 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
(6608J)
Washington, DC 20460
* Blair Martin
Associate Division Director
National Risk Management
Research Laboratory
Air Pollutipn Prevention and
Control Division
U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency
109 TW Alexander Drive
(E343-04)
Research Triangle Park, NC 27511
* Kenneth Martinez
Regional Operations Director
Coordinating Office of Emergency
Preparedness and Response
Office of the Director
Centers for Disease Control/NIOSH
4676 Columbia Parkway (R-ll)
Cincinnati, OH 45226
*John Mason
Chief Executive Officer
Sabre Technical Services, LLC
17 Computer Drive, E
Albany, NY 12205
Michael McLoughlin
Program Manager
Department of Homeland Security,
Science and Technology
HSARPA
Washington, DC 20528
*Iain McVey
Project Manager
Defense and Industrial
STERIS Corporation
5960 Heisley Road
Mentor, OH 44060
* David Mickunas
Chemist
Environmental Response Team
Office of Superfund
Remediation Technology Innovation
U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency
Building 18 - 2890
Woodbridge Avenue
Edison, NJ 08837
Mark Minier
Vice President
Sabre Technical Services
17 Computer Drive, E
Albany, NY 12205
Robert Murtha
President
MURTECH
820 Cromwell Park Drive
Glen Burnie, MD 21061
Laurel O'Connor
Senior Research Scientist
Battelle
1204 Research Drive
Aberdeen, MD 21001-1228
Decontamination Workshop 59
-------
* Richard Orlusky
Environmental Grardinator
Environmental Policy Management
United States Postal Service
21 Kilmer Road
Edison, NJ 08899
Cayce Parrish
Principal Technical Advisor
Office of the Administrator
Office of Homeland Security
U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency
1200 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
(1109A)
Washington, DC 20460
* Marty Powell
U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency
303 Methodist Building
11th and Chapline Streets (3HS33)
Wheeling, WV 26003
Vipin Rastogi
Senior Research Biologist
Research & Technology Directorate
U.S. Army - Edgewood Chemical &
Biological Center
E-3150 Kingscreek Street, N
Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD
21010
"Gerald Robinson
Attorney, Purchasing &
Commercial Protection Law
United States Postal Service -
Law Department
475 L'Enfant Plaza, SW
Washington, DC 20260-1136
Richard Rossman
Principal Research Scientist
SA&E
Battelle Memorial Institute
1204 Technology Drive
Aberdeen, MD 21001
*Rob Rothman
Physical Scientist
Office of Research & Development
National Homeland Security
Research Center
U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency
26 West Martin Luther King
Drive (163)
Cincinnati, OH 45268
Shawn Ryan
Chemical Engineer
Decontamination & Consequence
Management Division
National Homeland Security
Research Center
U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency
109 TW Alexander Drive
(MD-H-137-03)
Research Triangle Park, NC
* Rudolf Scheffrahn
Professpr of Entomology
University of Florida
3205 College Avenue
Ft. Lauderdale, FL 33314
Lewis Schwartz
Vice President, Operations &
Opportunity Development
Defense and Industrial
STERIS Corporation
5960 Heisley Road
Mentor, OH 44060
Les Sparks
Senior Chemical Engineer
Decontamination and
Consequence Management Division
National Homeland Security
Research Center
U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency
(ND 305-03)
Research Triangle Park, NC 27711
Harry Stone
Program Manager
Battelle
10300 Alliance Road - Suite 155
Cincinnati, OH 45242
Michael Takacs
Health Physicist
Nuclear & Chemical Hazards
DHS/FEMA
Department of Homeland Security
500 C Street, SW - Room 200
Washington, DC 20472-0001
•Michael Taylor
Program Manager
Measurement and Data
Analysis Sciences
Energy and Environment Division
Battelle Memorial Institute
10300 Alliance Road - Suite 155
Cincinnati, OH 45242
Rodney Taylor
Managing Director
Breitstpne & Company, Ltd.
534 Willow Avenue
Cedarhurst, NY 11516
* Stephen Tomasino
Senior Scientist
Microbiology Laboratory Branch
Biological and Economic
Analysis Division
Office of Pesticide Programs
U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency
Environmental Science Center
701 Mapes Road (7503C)
Ft. Meade, MD 20755
Abe Turetsky
Edgewood Chemical &
Biological Center
U.S. Army
E-3150 Kingscreek Street, N
Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD
21010
John Vitko
Director, Biological
Countermeasurers
Science and Technology Directorate
Department of Homeland Security
Washington, DC 29528
Chris Wagner
On-Scene Coordinator
EPA National
Decontamination Team
26 West Martin Luther King Drive
(MS 271)
Cincinnati, OH 45268
* Malcolm Wakerley
CBRN Specialist
Radioactive Substances
Department for Environment,
Food & Rural Affairs
4/E4 Ashdown House
123 Victoria Street
London SW1E 6DE
United Kingdom
Phan Winter
Associate, SETA for DHS
Booz Allen Hamilton
4001 Fairfax Drive - Suite 750
Arlington, VA 22203
Joseph Wood
Decontamination and
Consequence Management Division
National Homeland Security
Research Center
U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency
E343-06
Research Triangle Park, NC 27711
Rosemary Workman
Environmental Scientist
Office of Homeland Security
U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency
1200 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
(1109)
Washington, DC 20460
60 NHSRC
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Appendix C: Presentation Slides
Decontamination Workshop
Overview
Presented by:
G. Blair Martin
USEPA, ORD, MRMRL, APPCD
Presented at:
NHSRC Workshop on Decontamination, Cleanups, and
Associated Issues for Sites Contaminated with CBNR Materials
Washington, DC
February 23 to 25, 2005
WELCOME
The Decontamination and Consequence
Management Division of National
Homeland Security Research Center
welcomes you to our first workshop on
decontamination
PURPOSE OF WORKSHOP
The purpose of the workshop is to share information on
a variety of subjects related to decontamination of
CBNR releases in buildings, including:
/ The elements of a decontamination event
/ Technologies that have been used in actual
decontaminations
/ Research and development to understand and improve
technologies for additional CBNR agents
/ Discussion of "lessons learned" that might reduce the
time and/or cost of any future decontaminations
/ Identification of research needs to fill gaps in the
knowledge base and extend the range of applicability of
technologies
BACKGROUND
In the fall of 2001 a number of buildings were contaminated with
B.anthracis from letters mailed through the U.S. Postal Service
All of the these buildings have been decontaminated using a
variety of methods
/ Removal and disposal of contaminated materials
/ Surface cleaning with bleach, liquid chlorine dioxide or various
hydrogen peroxide products
/ Fumigation with chlorine dioxide, hydrogen peroxide, or
paraform aldehyde
/ The volumes fumigated at one time ranged from about 40,000 to over
14,000,000 cubic feet
ELEMENTS OF A DECON EVENT
The decision process leading to the fumigation and final
clearance of the building
Characterization of the extent of contamination and
monitoring of the fumigation
Building related activities including, preparation and
maintenance and surroundings for security, safety of the
neighborhood, and the ultimate decontamination
Selection, design and performance of the decontamination
process
Disposal of contaminated materials and/or wastes from the
decontamination and building reconstruction
Communication with affected individuals and the
community at large
BUILDING RELATED ACTIVITIES
-------
DECISION PROCESS
Site and structure security
Interaction with Federal State and Local Agencies
Incident command structure
Regulatory and technical document review processes
Selection of contractors
Decision on approaches to decontamination
Documentation for crisis exemption
Issuance of crisis exemption
Final documentation for clearance
CHARACTERIZA TION AND
MONITORING
Forensic sampling
Characterization sampling
Biological indicators
Ambient monitoring
Fumigant Concentration monitoring
Temperature, Relative humidity, and delta pressure monitoring
Clearance sampling
DECONTAMINATION PROCESSES
J Design interface with building
s Design decontamination system
s Design interface with heating, ventilation and air conditioning
systems
s Procurement and fabrication of equipment
s Installation of system and support equipment
J Testing
s Fumigation
s Disassembly and removal
DISPOSAL
Materials may be removed prior to fumigation
> High value materials that must be preserved
> Materials that may be hard to decontaminate
> Materials that may accelerate decomposition of fumigant
> Machines or electronics that the fumigant may damage
> Equipment that may be replaced before building is returned to
service
Additional material may be removed after fumigation
Wastes from the fumigation system also may require disposal
COMMUNICATION
Law Enforcement Agencies
Workers and Occupants of the Building
Residents of Surrounding Community
Commercial Establishments
Federal, State and Local Health agencies
Environmental and Regulatory Agencies
Advisory Groups
Contractors
OCSs
62 NHSRC
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DHS S&T Biological & Chemical
Restoration Programs
February 23, 2005
Lance Brooks
Dr John Vitko,
Biological Countermeasures Portfolio Manager
Dr. Randolph Long,
Chemical Countermeasures Portfolio Manager
Homeland
Security
R<
;search, Development, Testing and Evaluation
Operational End Users
Office of Research
And Development:
-Federal Stewardship
Homeland Security
Advanced Research
Projects Agency
-Engage Private Sector
Systems
Engineering &
Development:
-Systems Testing and
Acquisition
<• > Ca
,-J
;
0?
\
lability Push/ft/
Office of Programs, Plans
and Budgets (PPB)
-Define Needs
-Identify Gaps
-Prioritize Programs
CBRNE Countermeasures
Critical Infrastructure Protection
Standards
USC i::,USSS,BTS,EP&R
_ _
Operational End Users
Homeland
Security
Domestic Demonstration & Application Programs
* Homeland
" Security
Program Goals
Integrated field demonstrations
of next generation solutions
which bring together the user,
technology, and ConOps in a
real world test of a particular
solution.
ogical Aerosol Sentry and Information
em (BASIS)
need biological security at
events
deployment and setup
ed operational period
rage for fixed sites-point
essfully deployed at Winter
c Games in Salt Lake City
Homeland
Security
Program for Response Options and Technology
Enhancements for Chem/Bio Terrorism (PROTECT)
Closed Circuit Television
Camera (CCTV)
£-:..:
f Security
ration of Large Airport Facilities
To be Completed FY05
o reduce the overall time to
a critical transportation facility
ng a biological attack.
hed
tnerships (federal, state, & local)
O
n Critical Path
elopment and approval step
igation verification step
arance sampling step
rail coordination and understanding
toration "templates" that provide guidelines
rge airports
Homeland
Security
Conduct Tabletop exerci
scale demonstration
Decontamination Workshop 63
-------
Restoration of Large Airport Facilities
«• Improve the development and approval step by pre-planning the restoration process
•/ Improve the fumigation verification step
> use of statistical sampling methods and a sampling database
«• Improve the clearance sampling step
> use of statistical sampling methods and a sampling database
«• Improve the overall coordination and understanding of the restoration process
> development of decision support software (BROOM)
• Homeland
• Security
Note that the program is not addressing the fumigation step
Pre-Demonstrations
Goal: To plan, coordinate and establish
partnerships for Transit Facility and
Wide Area Restoration Demonstrations
• Establish
- Partnerships (federal, state, & local)
• Focus
- Concept of Operation/Protocols
- overall coordination and understanding
- Utilize HSI Study, TSWG Protocols, FTA Study
-Collaboration
- EPA for Pre-review of sampling & decon plans
- FTA for Transit systems Tech Transfer
Develop
- Restoration "templates/guidelines" for
Transit Systems & Urban Areas
DHS S&T will utilize resources and
experience for conducting a coordinated
system demonstration.
^ Homeland
W Security
Restoration of a Transit System
Goal: To reduce the overall time to
restore a critical transportation
facility following a biological attack.
To be Initiated FY06
1 Partnerships
- facility, federal, state, & local
- FTA (Restoration Analysis, CBRN)
- WMATA (Restoration Plan)
1 Leverage Airport Restoration DDAP
- existing clean-up guidelines
- existing / emerging sampling methods
- existing / emerging decontamination technologies
• Develop
- Pre-planning/rapid approval of restoration
process (Template)
- Methods for contamination characterization
- Decontamination and verification for surfaces
- Clearance Methods and decision tools
* Homeland
' Security
Conduct Tabletop exercises and Larc
scale demonstration
Restoration of a Wide Area (Urban)
To be Initiated FY06
Goal: To reduce the overall time to
restore a large outdoor urban area
following a biological attack.
.
• Partnerships
-Urban area, federal, state, & local
• Identify & Survey
- existing clean-up guidelines
- existing / emerging sampling methods
- existing / emerging decontamination technologies
Develop
- Pre-planning/Approval of restoration process
- Methods for contamination characterization
- Decontamination and verification for surfaces
-Clearance Methods and decision tools
Clean Earth Tech. Workshop - Protocols/Technology |
HSI Workshop - Analysis/Policy j
* Homeland
' Security
Conduct Tabletop exercises and Large
scale demonstration
Wide Area Restoration
Large-Scale Restoration of Biologically
Contaminated Areas - Technology/Protocols
Develop science- and consensus-based protocols to
restore large-scale urban areas to safe levels for
unrestricted reoccupation following a bioterrorism
Large-Scale Restoration of Biologically
Contaminated Areas - Analysis/Policv
Transition from crisis response to consequence
management
Community involvement and societal values
Interagency cooperation
Regulatory and technical issues
The psycho-social and econom ic im pacts of a wide-
biological incident
i Homeland
' Security
Study results and developed
protocols will be incorporated into
the Wide Area DDAP .
Facilities Chemical Restoration Demonstration
Initiated FY05
Goal: To reduce the overall time to
restore a critical facility following a
chemical attack.
Establish
- Partnerships (facility, federal, state, & local)
- Threat scenarios
Survey and identify
- existing clean-up guidelines
- existing / emerging sampling methods
- existing / emerging decontamination technologies
1 Develop
- Pre-planning/rapid approval of restoration
process
- Methods for contamination characterization
- Decontamination and verification for surfaces
- Clearance Methods and decision tools
i Homeland
' Security
Conduct Tabletop exercises and Large
scale demonstration
64 NHSRC
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Crime Scene Management &
WMD Terrorism
Presented to
EPA Workshop on Decontaminatio
Cleanup & Associated Issues
February 2005
Presentation Contents
Overview of Crime Scene Management
Forensic Challenges
- Detection
- Attribution
- Traditional Exams
<- FBI crime scene, Seattle,
Washington, April 2004
Items include (1) bag of castor seeds;
(2) hydrogen-filled rockets; (3) 9-mm
handgun; (4) spilled mercury; & (5)
loose cash.
Crime Scene Management & WMD Terrorist*
Response to WMD Terrorism
9 Tactical Phase
- Removal of the hostile threat
(FBI & other SWAT, FBI HRT)
Operational Phase
- Provide Rescue / Control
(protect the public; identify &
mitigate hazards)
Crime Scene Phase
- Evidence Collection, Packaging
& Transport
Remediation Phase
Crime Scene Management & WMD Terrorisn
Detection
In this context, Detection means
"determining that a crime has
occurred"
-A crime must be detected in order
to be investigated
WMD Terrorism Challenge:
Differentiating natural event from
a deliberate release or other
criminal event
Crime Scene Management & WMD Terrorisn
Detection
Consider: Victim found with
gunshot wound determined to be
fatal
- Not necessarily apparent that foul
play occurred
Consider: Victim found dead with
bacterial illness determined to be
cause
- Not necessarily apparent that foul
play occurred
,e Management & WMD Terrorism
Sampling
In this context,
Sampling is the
term the public
uses for what Law
Enforcement
considers
"gathering
evidence"
- Knowing when,
where, what & how
to sample | What Do You Collect as Evidence? |
Crime Scene Management & WMD Terrorism
Decontamination Workshop 65
-------
Sampling
Challenge: Pathogens are microscopic, limiting visual
clues to assist in knowing:
- Where to collect evidence
- What items to collect
- Whether an item or area is connected to the crime scene
- How best to collect the evidence
<- It is amatter of size:
Magnified area (lower right)
shows a clump of bacteria that
might be hidden within a single
line of a human fingerprint
Crime Scene Management & WMD Ter
Sampling
Consider the gunshot victim
- We can see the gunshot wound
-We can see a gun
-We can see a bullet
Consider the pathogen victim
- We cannot see the disease
- We cannot see the pathogen
- If we cannot see the disease or the pathogen,
then we might fail to find the scene altogether
Crime Scene Management & WMD Ter
Traditional Exams
In this context,
Traditional forensic
examinations refers to
the conduct of fingerprint,
toolmark, question
document, trace
evidence, and related
exams that are the
classical tools of forensic
sciences
Crime Scene Management & WMD Ter
Traditional Exams
Challenge: Conducting traditional
examinations on evidence contaminated with
biological pathogens without
- harming the examiner
-losing evidence
Factors to consider:
- Methods for rendering the pathogen harmless
are destructive
- Examining contaminated evidence is hazardous
Crime Scene Management & WMD Ter
Summary- 1
Crime of "Bioterrorism" presents
unique challenges with regard to
- Detection
• versus natural outbreaks
- Sampling
• Finding microscopic organisms
- Traditional Forensics
• Protecting examiners and exhibits
Similar challenges exist for crimes
related to toxic chemicals and
radiological materials
Crime Scene Management & WMD Terrorism
Summary- 2
Traditional Forensic Examinations are likely
to yield the most useful clues
- Fingerprints
- Handwriting
-Toolmarks
- Trace evidence
- Questioned documents
Crime Scene Management & WMD Ter
66 NHSRC
-------
Summary- 3
Despite the novel nature of WMD terrorism,
classical police work is still the most likely
means of solving the case
Crime Scene Management & WMD Terrorism
Questions or Comments?
Contact information:
Benjamin C. Garrett, Ph.D.
Senior Scientist for Weapons of Mass Destruction
FBI Laboratory
2501 Investigation Parkway-Room 3102
Quantico, Virginia 22135 USA
+ 1-703-632-7929
Benjamin.Garrett@ic.fbi.gov
Decontamination Workshop 67
-------
CDC/NIOSH Response to
Biothreat Agents:
Environmental Monitoring
CAPT Kenneth F. Martinez, MSEE, CIH
National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health
Purpose of Environmental Sampling
• Determine agent sources, characteristics, and
exposure pathways
• Determine the extent and degree of
contamination
• Contribute to risk assessment and data-driven
recommendations
• Support medical treatment and clean-up
decisions
• Provide guidance on re-occupancy
Initial Public Health Goals
Characterize contaminant
• Physical properties (size, morphology)
• Ability to aerosolize (moisture, additives)
• Purity
Limit Spread of Contamination (after dispersal)
• Fomite transport
• Personnel transport
• Air movement (HVAC)
Determine who may have been exposed and
what remedial actions are taken
Some Questions...
Is preventive personal decontamination needed
after an exposure event?
Could clothing act as a vehicle to carry spores
offsite and to worker home environments?
If so what precautions should be recommended?
68 NHSRC
-------
Partnerships
Multiple Agency Involvement
• FBI, EPA, OSHA, CDC, Coast Guard, ACOE, USPS,
Unions, State Agencies
Defining Roles/Expertise
Strong Views and Personalities
Public Scrutiny, Agency Pressure
Agency Conflicts
• Technical and programmatic
gjjg
NIOSH Role
Emergency Response
• Assist Epidemiological Team
• Environmental Assessment, Safety and Health
Consequence Management
• Technical Resource
• Advise re: Sampling, PPE, Risk Communication
Approximately 10,000 environmental Samples
• Between 4°/o-50°/o from a given site were positive
Some Underestimations
Importance of environmental sampling
• Driving force behind public health decisions
Existing plans clinically based
Need for maintaining continuity of operations
during a response
Phase of a Response
S creening
• Law enforcement and public health partnersl-
• Analysis confined to validated methods
• Targeted sampling approach
Characterization
• Federal (with state and local) and industry pai
• Analysis more flexible
• Probabilistic (with some targeted) sampling a]
Remediation/ Re s to ration
• Federal (with state and local) and industry pai
• Analysis confined to validated methods
• Probabilistic (with some targeted) sampling a]
CDC Responses
Anthrax 2001
Florida - AMI
NJ - Hamilton PD&C
NYC - multiple sites
Washington, DC —
Capital Hill and
Brentwood PD&C
Outliers
• NYC healthcare worker
• CT elderly woman
--:
Investigative Sampling Strategy
Anthrax Outbreak Investigation
Follow the mail
High traffic areas
Ventilation system
Areas that collect dust
Decontamination Workshop 69
-------
Consider.
Dissemination
• Air
• Fomites
• Personnel
Surfaces
• Porous versus non-porous
Validated sampling protocols
Methods of analysis
What Was Sampled?
Anthrax Outbreak Investigation
Furniture (equipment)
Floors
Ventilation system
• Filters
• Return air grills
Vehicles
Clothing
Environmental Sample Types
rBulk
L Surface
Air
Environmental Sampling Protocols
Validation Studies
In the field
• Sanderson, et al., Curseen/Morns (Brentwood)
P&DC
• McCleery, et al., Hamilton (Trenton) P&DC
In the lab
• Dugway Proving Grounds
• CDC (NIOSH and NCID), EPA partnership
• Sandia National Laboratory
• CDC, EPA partnership
Distribution of Samples by
Geographical Location
Area Investigated
Number of Samples
Collected
Florida 1224
Hartford area 891
Kansas City 72
Trenton area 1353
New York City 449
Washington, D.C. (Capitol) 4112
Washington, D.C. (other) 1360
Total 9461
70 NHSRC
-------
Distribution of Samples
by Type of Facility
Type of Facility
Number of Samples
Collected
Office Building 4611
Postal Processing and Distribution 3299
Post Office 492
Subway 215
Other Business 217
gjjg
Some Applications of Lessons Learned
i Ricin — Greenville, SC
• October, 2003
i Bio Watch - Houston, TX
• October, 2003
• Tularemia
i SARS — Toronto, Canada
• Spring of 2003
Ricin Event
October 2003
Greenville, SC
Threat letter with ricin found
FBI/local health department/
CDC Investigation
Coordinate with CDC
RRAT lab
Determine sampling and analytical methodology
Sampling Strategy based on...
Interviews with:
• Postal Manager, Union official and employees
• Postal Inspectors, FBI, and Law Enforcement
• Medical Officers regarding health issues, absenteeism
A detailed walkthrough of the facility to identify all
points where package was delivered, moved, stored,
etc., until discovered by alert postal employee
Conveyor and Controls
Results
70 Surface swab and 5 vacuum samples collected
overnight
Samples air shipped to CDC after collection for
immediate processing via TRFI and PCR
Results available by 3 pm — all negative
Results significant in decision to reoccupy the facility
Decontamination Workshop 71
-------
Houston, Texas - BioWatch
October, 2003
Tularemia detected (and confirmed) on BW
monitors
Investigation launched —
• Syndromic surveillance
• Laboratory review
• Environmental
• Rodent trapping
• Surface sampling
NIOSH Investigation
Inspected all sites where positives were
detected (reviewed construction, excavation,
lawn mowing, etc.)
Reviewed laboratory procedures, sample
handling, sample transport, opportunities
for cross contamination
Collected 68 environmental samples (swabs, filters, etc) from
multiple co-located sampling devices and other potential sources
Provided additional air sampling equipment for increased density
of sample locations
Findings
All environmental samples were negative
Heavy rainfall impeded ability to collect
additional air samples
Opportunities for cross-contamination possible
but an unlikely explanation
Environmental activities adjacent monitors were
unremarkable and unlikely to explain results
SARS
Spring of 2003
Toronto, Canada
• First outbreak
• Community
• Vanous hospitals
• Second outbreak
• North York General Hospital
NIOSH Investigation
Focus on occupational safety and health issues
• PPE
• Controls
• Environmental assessment
Exposure characterization
• Wipe samples
• Swabs
• Wipes
• Air samples
72 NHSRC
-------
Ranking Threats
for
Decontamination
Research
Nancy H. Adams, PhD, Director
Decontamination and Consequence Management Division
National Homeland Security Research Center
Office of Research and Development
US Environmental Protection Agency
Research Triangle Park, NC
Multiple Approaches
DCMD ranking methods
SAIC rankings
Expert Panel
Battelle rankings for decon
methods studies
Constant updates
DCMD Approach
Identification and ranking of high-
priority threat agents
Identification and ranking of
buildings as terrorist targets
Identification of terrorist goals
Coupling threat agents and
buildings
Scenario development
Chemical and Biological
Threat Agents - Sources
CDC Category A list
• Chemical warfare agents
• Toxic IndustrialChemicals
Department of State
Department of Defense
EPA
Intelligence community
Ranking Factors for Threat Agents
- Infective dose (biologicals)
• Persistence
• Availability
• Prior use
• Ease of detection
• Severity of effects
• Transmission between persons (biol)
• Preventives/treatments
• Ease of decontamination
• Latency
• Ease of airborne dispersion
Ranking Method
1 - Each factor given a rating (1-5) for
relevance
2 - Each threat agent ranked for each
factor(0-4)
• 0 = not applicable
• 4 = highest effect
3 - (Factor rank) x (Threat rank for factor)
= Product
4 - Summed products = Ranking for
threat agent
Decontamination Workshop 73
-------
Factor
Infective dose (biologicals)
Persistence
Availability
Prior use
Ease of detection
Severity of effects
Transmission (biologicals)
Preventives/treatments
Ease of decontamination
Latency
Ease of airborne dispersion
Lethality (chemicals)
Weight
5
2
4
2
3
5
4
3
2
3
3
5
Definitions of Factor
Rankings
Each factor's numerical ranking defined.
For example, for Severity of Effects:
0 = mild, temporary impairment
1 = More severe effects in susceptible
group(s)
2 = Serious illness of med-long duration
3 = Permanent impairment
4 = Death
Example Ranking
• Factor = Severity of Effect
• Factor ranking = 4
• Anthrax ranking = 4
• 4x4 = 16
This product added to the other
product values for anthrax to
obtain a ranking value
Building Types
Shopping centers
Convention centers
Subways
Airports
Domed stadiums
Hotels
Theaters
Residences
Aircraft
Schools
Hospitals
Office buildings
Apartments
Presidential offices
Congress
Military bases
Embassies
CDC
Museums
Building Ranking
Factors
Building access
HVAC access
Potential for infiltration for
outdoors
Small rooms
Large rooms
People traffic
Factor
Building access
HVAC access
Potential for infiltration
for outdoors
Small rooms
Large rooms
People traffic
Weight
5
4
2
3
3
4
74 NHSRC
-------
Ranking Method
Factor Weights (1-5)
Building ranks (1-5)
Sum of products (Weight x rank)
Terrorist Goals
Health impacts
Economic
Symbolic
Political
Psychological
Coupling Threats with
Buildings
Method of introduction
• In-room
• In-duct
• Outside/proximal
Coupling Threats with
Buildings - cont'd
• Threat Value = 1+2+3+4+5
1 = Amounts available
2 = Hazard index
3 = Ease of use
4 = People traffic
5 = Non-health impacts
Coupling Threats with
Buildings - cont'd
Term 1- Amount available
• Availability
• Prior use
Term 2 - Hazard index
• Infectious dose
• Lethality
• Severity of effects
• Contagious
• Latency
• Availability of treatments
Coupling Threats with
Buildings - cont'd
Term 3 - Ease of use
• Ease of dispersion
• Potential for infiltration
Term 4 - People traffic
Term 5 - Non-health impacts
• Economic
• Symbolic
• Political
• Psychological
Decontamination Workshop 75
-------
Scenario Development
Methods of Introduction (3)
Terrorist goals (5)
Rankings for each
• agent,
• building type,
• method of introduction,
• terrorist goal
Rankings analyzed by
• Visual patterns
• Cluster analysis
SAIC Approach
Quantitative Ranking of
Threat Scenarios
Risk = Probability * Consequence
Probability depends on:
Availability of agent
Capability of terrorists
Past terrorist action
Ease of dissemination
Latency
Persistence
Existing security
Consequence depends on:
Toxicity of agent
Amount of agent
Contagiousness
Impact on infrastructure
Availability of treatment
Ease of detection
Ease of decontamination
Requires an artful blend of quantitative and qualitative information.
Selected Algorithm
Risk Index = A x F x (HI + El + NI)
A = Availability
F = Feasibility
ffl = Health Impacts
El = Economic Impacts
NI = Environmental Impacts
Risk Index varies from 0 to 300,000.
Health Impacts: Biological
Fatality Rate
ow
2%
Medium
2-30%
Hi
>3
High Med Low High Med Low High Med Low
Hl=0 Hl=0.1 Hl=1 Hl=1 Hl=10 Hl=10 Hl=100 Hl=100
Feasibility Decision Tree
76 NHSRC
-------
Expert System Approach
Open Literature Sources
(CDC, DHS)
For Official Use Only
Sources (DOT), DoS, DOE)
Y Inputs to the Threat y^
V Scenarios Meeting j~
NHSRC Threat Scenario
Reports
EPA lists of Contaminants,
threats, and threat scenarios
(OSWER, OPPTS, OW)
Battelle Systematic
Decontamination Effort
Approach similar to DCMD
Includes updated information
Provided rankings for study of
decontamination methods
EPA-Wide Rankings
Includes input from:
• EPA Office of Homeland Security
• Department of Homeland Security
• Department of Defense
• EPA Office of Water
• DCMD
• Threat and Consequence Assessment
Div.
• Office of Solid Waste
• EPA Emergency Response Team
• On-scene coordinators
• Decontamination Team
Summary
Constantly updated listings
Inputs from multiple sources
Commonality among rankings
Path Forward
• Threat Scenario Simulations
1 Detailed Risk Assessments
• Development of Play Books
Decontamination Workshop 77
-------
ORD Workshop on Decontamination
OPP Sterilant Registration Project
(Task SB 3.2 - ORD Safe Buildings Program)
|~| Improving the AOAC Sporicidal Activity Test and the
~Evaluation of Quantitative Methods
Stephen F. Tomasino, Ph.D.
EPA Office of Pesticide Programs
Microbiology Laboratory
R. Meade, Maryland
OPP Microbiology Laboratory
EPA Environmental Science Center, R. Meade, MD
Renewed Interest in the Evaluation, Research and
Development of Efficacy Test Methods for Sporicidal Agents
Project Goals
OVERARCHING GOALS
• Advance the science of efficacy testing and replace the
AOAC method with a quantitative carrier-based
procedure
• Perform collaborative, standardized testing to develop
and validate test methods acceptable across federal
agencies
• Design studies to generate comparative efficacy data
to aid in the development of future regulatory
guidance
• Identify a suitable surrogate for B, anthracis
• Set the stage for the evaluation of other biological
agents
OPP's Role - Regulatory
performance Standard for Sporicidal Claim = AOAC
Sporicidal Activity Test
M Test Challenge = Bacillus subt/7/sand Clostridium
sporogenes(VP - 106 Spores/Carrier)
. Hard Surface (Porcelain Carriers); Porous Surface (Suture
Loops) - 60 Carriers Each
. Full Study = 720 carriers
. Partial Study (B. suittfeonly) = Range Finding (30
carriers/surface/contact time) and Confirmation (60
carriers/surface)
• Passing Result = zero carriers positive
A Tiered Approach
Tier 1: Evaluate selected methods using Bacillus
subtilis (includes modifications to the AOAC method)
Tier 2: Evaluate surrogates for Bacillus anthracis
Tier 3: Conduct collaborative validation testing of
selected test method/surrogate combination
Tier 4: Identify, develop, and conduct comparative
testing of field test methods
78 NHSRC
-------
Two Approaches
( TEST METHOD RESEARCH
AOAC Sporicidal Test
(966.04)
-qualitative
f' "\
Improvements
and
Modifications
1
Quantitative Test
Methods
-log reduction I
f ~\
Comparative Testing
-ASTM
-TSM
1, ,
Mofficial Method Change ] L Surrogate Studies
Publication in J. AOAC 1 }
(
, |f
Publication in 3. AOAC
AOAC Sporicidal Activity Test
A qualitative, carrier-based assay
Spore-forming bacteria (Bacillus subtilis, Clostridium
sporogenes)
Simulates hard (porcelain carriers) and porous (suture
loops) surfaces
Each test is composed of 60 carriers (EPA requirement)
HCL resistance test
Passing result = no carriers with surviving spores
Requires 21 days of incubation
Lacks standardization in several key steps
Qualitative Assessment
AOAC Sporicidal Activity Test
Qualitative Data
Efficacy of Bleach (~5250 ppm) Against Bacillus subtilis Spores on
Porcelain Carriers using the AOAC Method
Recommended Modifications
Chemically defined medium for B. subtilis spore
production to replace the soil extract nutrient
broth
Replace porcelain carriers with stainless steel
carriers
Addition of a carrier count procedure for
enumeration of spore inoculum
Establishment of a minimum (average) spore titer
per carrier
Addition of a neutralization confirmation
procedure
Replacement for the Egg Meat Medium for
Clostridium sporogenes
SENB & Carrier Inoculation
Decontamination Workshop 79
-------
Preparing Carriers
Parameters used to Measure the
Impact of the Modifications*
Spore Production Medium
Current: AOAC SENB
Modified: Amended Nutrient
Agar
Carrier Type
Current: Porcelain Modified: Stainless Steel
Spore Counts
HCL Resistance
Efficacy Results
Spore Counts
HCL Resistance
Efficacy Results
Not Applicable
Spore Counts
HCL Resistance
Efficacy Results
^Differences in spores counts can be measured statistically; pass/fail criteria are established for
the HCL resistance and efficacy tests and will be used to assess differences.
1-
AOAC Method Modifications
Extramural Contributors
U.S. Air Force Research Laboratory, Aberdeen,
MD
FDA - Winchester Engineering and Analytical
Center
FDA - Denver District Laboratory
Dr. Martin Hamilton, Professor of Statistics,
Montana State University
Pre-collaborative Data
Bleach @ 3000 ppm -unadjusted pH/10 mins
Medium/Carrier
NA/SS
NA/P
SENB/SS
SENB/P
Primary +
28/30
24/30
6/30
8/30
Secondary +
30/30
29/30
3/30
11/30
Total +
30/30
30/30
7/30
16/30
NA = Nutrient Agar amended with 5 ug manganese sulfate
SENB = AOAC Soil Extract Nutrient Broth
SS = Stainless Steel Carriers
P = Porcelain Carriers
Spore Load: NA/SS (1.1 x 106); NA/P (6.2 x 106); SENB/SS = 4.0 x 106); SENB/P = 1.1
xlO6)
HCL Resistance
Medium/ Carrier 2m
NA/SS +/
NA/P +/
SENB/SS +/
SENB/P +/
ins 5 mins
+ +/+
+ +/+
+ 0/0
+ 0/0
10 mins
0/0
0/0
0/0
0/0
20 mins
0/0
0/0
0/0
0/0
Spore Load: NA/SS = 6.8 x 10=
NA/P = 1.9X106
SENB/SS = 3.1x10=
SENB/P = 2.2x10=
1-
Timeline for the Modifications Project
Contract with AOAC signed in Sept. 2004
AOAC Expert Review Panel formed in Dec. 2004
Study protocol submitted in Jan. 2005
AOAC ERP completed review in Feb.
Final study protocol will be submitted to AOAC by
March 11
Conduct validation study in late April/early May
Complete and submit validation report and analysis-
July 1
AOAC review and approve validation report-August
26
80 NHSRC
-------
A Replacement for the AOAC Method
Test Method Selection - Attributes
Available Protocol
Validation
Previous use for testing
sporicides
Readily available
equipment
Expertise
Flexible contact times
and temperatures
Enumeration method
Percent recovery
Deactivation of product
Reproducibility
Turnaround time
Suitability for various
product forms
Adequate controls
4-
Test Methods Selected for Evaluation
AOAC Sporicidal Activity Test
Standard Quantitative Carrier Test Method-
ASTM E 2111-00
A quantitative micro-method as reported by
Sagripanti et al., 1996. (Sagripanti, J.L. &
Bonifacino, A. 1996. Am. J. Infect. Control'24,
364-371) - referred to as the Three Step
Method (TSM)
Carriers used in Sporicidal Efficacy Testing
Glass vial carrier
used for ASTM E
Porcelain
penicylinder used
for AOAC SAT
ASTM 2111-00
Three Step Method (TSM)
Decontamination Workshop 81
-------
TSM - fractions
Formulations and Materials
Liquids
Gases & Vapors
Sprays, Foams
and Gels
Devices and
Other
Technologies
Hard (metal,
plastics, glass)
Porous
Other
(specialized)
(Water)
4-
Volume of Sporicide per Test Method
10 ml
sporicide for i 7
AOAC SAT, I <•
w/5 carriers
1 ml sporicide
for ASTM E
2111-00
4-
Important Components of the Test
Method Collaborative
Limited to glass surface x liquid
sporicides x spores of B. subtilis
Three labs/three replications
Identify/implement quality control
activities
Training and readiness review
Test Method Comparison
Chemicals & Test Conditions
pH-adjusted bleach; 3000 ppm/10 minutes @
20C
Commercial product (0.8% hydrogen
peroxide, 0.06% peracetic acid); undiluted/10
minutes @ 20C
pH-unadjusted bleach; 3000 ppm/10 minutes
@20C
pH-adjusted bleach; 6000 ppm/30 minutes @
20C for the AOAC test
Test Method Comparison
Extramural Contributors and Responsibilities
U.S. Army Edgewood Chemical and Biological
Center, Aberdeen, MD, and FDA (Denver District
Office Laboratory) will provide expertise and
technical support in the collaborative testing of
sporicidal chemicals using efficacy methods
selected by OPP.
Dr. Martin Hamilton, Professor of Statistics,
Montana State University, is the statistician
assisting on this project. Dr. Hamilton is
currently under contract with the OPP
Antimicrobials Division.
82 NHSRC
-------
Quantitative Results
D control:
recoverable, viable spores per control
carrier; specifically, Iog10(cfu/control carrier)
o log reduction (LR):
LR = Iog10(cfu/control carrier)
- Iog10(cfu/treated carrier)
Statistical Goals for the LR Data and
Control Data
a within-laboratory variance
(independent repeats of the same test)
a between-laboratory variance
(measures the variability between labs}
o total variance
= within-laboratory variance
+ between-laboratory variance
1
'in
o
Control carrie
t*. >ji m
Day
LAB
I/IETHOD
Recoverable, viable spores per control carrier (loglO
scale); red line is the mean
0 KB1*10'?0- -r,
1 fc S^*"01 *bE p*s> ^
uu e "°
Q^ (1.5 X106)
(°)
123 123 123
AOAC ASTM TSM
| AOAC Method
I
Treatment
Bleach SOOOppm pH adj
Peracetic acid/hyd.per.
Bleach SOOOppm unadj
Bleach SOOOppm pH adj
- Collaborative Highlights
Comments
No. positive ranged from 16 to 56
No. positive ranged from 5 to 60
60 out of 60 positives in 4 of 6 tests
0 out of 20 positives in 4 of 6 tests
Bleach 3000 ppm, pH adjusted (each point is a
test; red line indicates the mean)
8
1 6>
|
1 4l
ro
° 2
0-
Lab
Method
0
LR = 6.5
-
123 123 123
AOAC ASTM TSM
Peracetic acid/hydrogen peroxide (each point is
a test; red line indicates the mean)
8
.1 6'
2 2>
0-
Lab
Method
0
LR = 6.8 O LR = 6'7
123 123 123
AOAC ASTM TSM
Decontamination Workshop 83
-------
Bleach 3000 ppm, pH unadjusted (each point is
a test; red line indicates the mean)
O 6
|
| 4
2 2-
0
Lab 123
Method AOAC
1 2 3
ASTM
1 2 3
TSM
Repeatability SD is acceptably small (less than 0.9)
for all test methods
Repeatability SD
0 0 0 0 -*
r? '" '° ? §
J3. /
"""' /"--
S*ff / ""*"*""* 13
,/
/
MettTpeK
— 0— AMC
Bleach adj Bleach unadj Per. acid-hyd. per
Reproducibility SD is acceptably small (less than 1.3) for
all testing methods
CO
.Q
I
1.00-
0.75
0.25
o.oo
Bleach adj Bleach unadj per. acid-hyd. per.
4-
Selecting a Method
Additional Attributes
Questionnaire Submitted to Analysts
• The Protocols - their use and clarity
• Test Set-up - preparing for the test
• Testing - performing the method, resources
• Results - recording, compiling, and interpretation
TSM selected for surrogate studies and
validation testing
Timeline for Surrogate Studies and
Validation of a Quantitative Test
Submit manuscript to AOAC on the 2004 test method
collaborative - May, 2005
Initiate surrogate studies with TSM - April 18th
Complete surrogate studies - May 27th
Surrogate analysis and report - July 1st
TSM and 2-3 surrogates will be subjected to an AOAC
multi-lab validation study in September
Prepare summary report on TSM validation -
December
1-
Acknowledgements
Dr. Marty Hamilton for Statistical Support and
Guidance on Test Design
FDA and ECBC Staff
EPA OPP Lab Staff
EPA's ORD - Safe Buildings Program
84 NHSRC
-------
Crisis Exemptions for
Products Intended to
Inactivate
Bacillus anthracis
Workshop on Decontamination, Cleanup, and Associated Issues for Sites
Contaminated with Chemical, Biological, or Radiological Materials
Sponsored by EPA's Office of Research and Development
Jeff Kempter, Senior Advisor
Office of Pesticide Programs
Environmental Protection Agency
February 23, 2005
OUTLINE
Background to
Crisis Exemptions
Evaluating and
Selecting Sporicides.
Issues That Demand
Attention
Are We There Yet?
INTRODUCTION
Evaluation, selection and use of chemicals
to inactivate 6. anthracis and other
biological agents involves several groups:
RESEARCHERS
REGULATORS
PRODUCERS
FIRST
RESPONDERS
BACKGROUND
• In the U.S., decontamination chemicals are
required to be registered or exempted by
EPA prior to sale or distribution
•When anthrax attacks occurred in October,
2001, no products were approved specifically
for use against B. anthracis
•Accordingly, crisis exemptions had to be
issued for each decon chemical at each
contaminated site
CRISIS EXEMPTIONS
Of 63 requests for
crisis exemptions,
EPA approved 28 and
rejected 35.
Federal agencies and
private companies
could make requests
Fumigation requests
had to include
o Remediation Action
Plans
o Sampling & Analysis
Plans
o Ambient Air Monitoring
Plans
EVALUATING AND SELECTING
SPORICIDES FOR B. anthracis
Safety Issues
Efficacy Issues
Liquids
Gases /Vapors
Decontamination Workshop 85
-------
SAFETY ISSUES
i Containment of
" contaminated area
1 i Fumigant toxicity &
human exposure
I • Fumigant generation
method
Negative air systems
Post-treatment
aeration & scrubbing
System backups/tests
Ambient air
monitoring
EFFICACY ISSUES
Gas containment
Fumigate all at once
or in sections
Distribution of gas;
absorbers of gas
Reaching/holding
efficacy parameters
Monitoring of
parameters
Biological indicators
Clearance sampling
LIQUID SPORICIDES*
i Aqueous chlorine dioxide
i Hydrogen peroxide/peracetic acid
i Sodium hypochlorite
i Hydrogen peroxide/quaternary
ammonium foam**
"Hard, non-porous surfaces only
**Exemptions withdrawn for DF-100
LIQUID SPORICIDES
CHEMICAL EFFECTIVE CONC. S
CONTACT TIME
Aqueous chlorine 500 ppm X 30 min.
5,000-6,000 ppm X 60 m
(PH = 7)
MATERIALS
COMPATIBILITY
No known problems
based on pesticide usi
OTHER USES
Hydrogen per
and quaternar
xide DF-100 ineffective after
hour; DF-200 is effectiv
jssanitizerand disinfection
for many uses
EPA registered as
tssanitizer, disinfectant,
EPA registered as a
sanitizerand disinfectant
DF-200 successfully
tested by DOD against
GASES/VAPORS
Gaseous chlorine
dioxide (buildings)
Vaporized hydrogen
peroxide (buildings)
Paraformaldehyde
(equipment in tented
enclosures)
Methyl bromide
(lab/field studies)
Ethylene oxide (off-site
sterilization of items)
GASES/VAPORS
CHEMICAL
Formaldehyde
Gas
Chlorine
Dioxide Gas
Hydrogen
Peroxide Vapor
Methyl Bromide
Gas
Ethyl ene Oxide
Gas
GENERATION
METHOD
On-site heating of
paraform aldehyde
prills (flakes)
On-site reaction of
precursor
materials (sodium
chlorite)
On-site
vaporization of
liquid hydrogen
peroxide
On-site
vaporization of
liquid methyl
bromide from
cylinder
Release of gas
into sterilization
chamber
TOXICITY
Acutelytoxic, animal
carcinogen,
genotoxin
Acutelytoxic,
respiratory and eye
irritant, no cancer data
Acutelytoxic,
respiratory irritant, no
cancer data
Acutelytoxic,
neurological effects,
insufficient cancer
data
Acutelytoxic,
reproductive toxin,
genotoxin, animal
carcinogen
EXPOSURE LIMITS
0.75 ppm PEL
2 ppm STEL
20 ppm IDLH
0.1 ppm PEL
0.3 ppm STEL
5.0 ppm IDLH
1.0 ppm PEL
No STEL
75 ppm IDLH
4.0 ppm TLV
20 ppm PEL
250 ppm IDLH
1.0 ppm PEL
5 ppm 15 min.
"Excursion"
800 ppm IDLH
86 NHSRC
-------
GASES/VAPORS
CHEMICAL MATERIALS
COMPATIBILITY
Formaldehyde Relatively
Gas unreactive
Chlorine
Dioxide Gas
Hydrogen
Peroxide
Vapor
Methyl
Bromide Gas
Ethylene
Oxide Gas
May affect metals
(Al, Cu, brass),
computer parts,
carpets and low
grade paper at high
CT values
Relatively
unreactive
May affect animal
fur, leather, natural
latex, and sulfur-
containing articles
Relatively
unreactive
PENETRATION SPORICIDAL USES
Medium Biosafety cabinets, clean
rooms, mail bags, mail
equipment, buildings
Medium Medical equipment,
buildings
High
High
Clean rooms, medical
equipment, buildings
Experimental (efficacy
studies on B. anthracis &
spore strips)
Medical equipment, critical
items
DECONTAMATION REQUIRES
EXTENSIVE COLLABORATION
^ Interagency technical
working group (TWG)
directly supports
Incident Commander
-------
SPORICIDE DATA AND
LABELING REQUIREMENTS
Test Data
- Product Chemistry, Acute Toxicity-standard
- Efficacy Data
• AOAC Sporicidal Activity Test (B. subtilis & C. sporogenes)
I Test against virulent agent or surrogate acceptable to EPA
I Simulated use test for gases & vapors
Labeling
- EPA may classify these products for Restricted Use
Only or somehow limit sale/use to trained personnel
- Label must bear safety precautions and complete use
directions (i.e., technical manual)
- Products that pass efficacy tests are called "sterilants"
and may list specific microorganisms tested
"HOW CLEAN IS SAFE?"
The National Research Council
of the National Academies of
Science is conducting a
study due out this Spring
that will address:
i Anthrax spores and maybe
plague, smallpox
Infectious dose
Risk assessment methods
Natural vs. residual
exposure
Past cleanup efforts
Enclosed and semi-enclosed
facilities
RESEARCH ISSUES
^Improved and harmonized efficacy
test methods
^Materials compatibility
^Parameters for optimal fumigant
effectiveness
^Real-time monitoring methods
RESEARCH ISSUES (cont'd.)
^Scrubbing/removal technology
^Field-testing and test bed(s)
^Develop effective decon methods
for outdoor or semi-open sites
^Coordinate research across
agencies
PREPAREDNESS ISSUES
a Develop faster, safer, more cost-effective decon
methods
rj Have equipment and resources available and on
stand-by
rj Provide more guidance private industry on
preparedness planning for bio-terrorism
rj Increase interagency coordination, sharing &
leveraging
ARE WE THERE YET?
YES:
- Certain decon methods are
safe and effective for use on
structures & objects
- Some personnel and
equipment can likely be
initially mobilized quickly in
emergencies
- Crisis exemptions can be
issued quickly for known
decon methods
NO:
- Decon methods are still
expensive and slow
- Equipment and trained
personnel are very limited
- Many areas need research
- Research and regulation
need to be coordinated
- Preparedness plans are
needed for critical sites
88 NHSRC
-------
Sampling & Clearance
Lessons Learned
MarkDumo, U.S. EPA
Tony Intrepido, U.S. Army CHPPM
February 23, 2005
Discussion Topics
Introductions
Sampling Basics
• U.S. Capitol, USPS, Boca Building
Sampling Issues
• TAD Workshop Findings
• Verification Needs
• Sampling Efficacy
• Sampling / Spore Strip Approach
• Aggressive Air Sampling (Large Building)
Anthrax Technical Assistance
Document
National Response Team
• National Coordination Council
Chapter 6 lays out sampling approach for
any biological contamination event.
www.nrt.org
• Click on "NRT publications"
• Scroll until you find it
Pre Remediation Samnlin
Considerations
Objectives
Approach
Methods
Analytical
Transportation
Coordination
Interpretation
Sampling Considerations
Goal
• Risk, characterize, extent, support, verify
Data objectives
• Develop your hypothesis
No current standards
• Lessons learned
Plan development
Sampling Objectives
Develop in consultation with professionals:
• Medical
• Environmental
• Public health
• Industrial hygiene
• Laboratory
• Building experts
• Local, state, federal agencies
Decontamination Workshop 89
-------
Sampling Objectives
Real-time monitoring • Effectiveness of
Screening
Bulk material
Questionable article
Extent of
contamination
decontamination
Clearance for re-
occupancy
Transitional
Crime scene / forensic
Sampling Approach
Logical and systematic
Scheduled
Risk-based
Targeted
Statistical
Targeted Sampling Approach
Known sources
Logical tracking
• Air movement
• Cross contamination
Work toward or away from source
Statistical Sampling Approach
Need
• Source not identified
• Highly dispersed
Considerations
• Maximize the probability of a positive result
• Assurance that a negative means absence
Currently, no conclusive approach
• Lab and sampling inefficiencies
90 NHSRC
-------
^
Detection / Sampling Breakout
Session
NRT Civilian / Military Anthrax
Workshop
Washington D.C.
April 14, 2004
Open Discussion
Subjects:
• (1) General issues related to NRT / TAD.
• (2) Hazard Identification
• (3) Field Detection
• (4) Sampling Guidance / Efficacy
• (5) Analytical Capabilities
• (6) PostDecon
Hazard Identification
Threat Assessment
• Evaluate credibility of event
• Determine hazard and physical characteristics
of questionable substances.
• If Biological contamination cannot be
conclusively "ruled-out", and the situation is
considered credible, confirmation sampling
should be conducted.
• For public health response — use culture plate.
Field Detection
What's out there and widely used?
• Hand-held assays.
• Infrared / Hazmat ID (rule-out).
• Haz-tech system w/microscope & camera.
• Rapid PCR.
Technologies are "acceptable science" but
need validated for field applications:
• Some studies planned
Sampling Guidance / Efficacy
References available:
• NRT TAD*
• CDC sampling guidance for anthrax*
• CDC BioWatch technical guidelines (sensitive)
• OSHA e-tool for anthrax response
• OSHA DFU and HEPA sampling methods
• GSA guidelines for anthrax response
• www.bt.cdc.gov
Decontamination Workshop 91
-------
Sampling Guidance / Efficacy
Studies:
• NIOSH: Sampling effectiveness (Sanderson)
• NIOSH: Validation for air sampling method
• USPS: Bert-Price statistical study
• NCID: USPS DCBS 17 re-aerosolization (Dull)
• Weis/Intrepido: Daschle re-aerosolization.
• Canadian / DOJ ??
Sampling Guidance / Efficacy
Needs:
• Further studies of sampling efficacy to answer
the question: What is the detection limit of
accepted sampling methods?
• Dugway Proving Grounds (surface / air efficacy)
• NIOSH / Sandia (surface efficacy)
• RDECOM (Leahy letter)
• CDC (Arduino - swab sampling)
Analytical Capabilities
LRN / DOD could become overwhelmed with
multiple large scale events (limited reagents).
CDC is attempting to standardize analytical
methods through the LRN for environmental
samples (wipe / sock being worked on currently).
DOD is attempting to "harmonize" environmental
analytical methods with LRN.
Using non-LRN, non-DOD labs (ag labs, private
labs) may raise consistency issues if used on a
response.
Post Decon / Verification
Verification sampling has been exhaustive
on past responses.
The "ECC" concept is the best approach to
insure adequate protection of public health
through highly qualified professional
debate.
NRT / TAD Needs
Better guidance for First Responders.
Develop a matrix for acceptable sampling type in
given situations.
Encourage the use of Occupation Health
Professionals at the local level.
National Academy of Sciences: "How Clean is
clean" study.
Update links to all recent specific guidance and
studies.
Crossing the nomenclature barrier (ASM
standards)
NRT / TAD Needs
Chapter 6:
• Update to include more specifics in certain
sections:
• Use of statistical analysis
• Sampling methods (add / remove)
• Emphasis on total discipline coordination
• More efficient verification approach
92 NHSRC
-------
National Homeland Security Research Center Decontamination
Workshop 23-25 February 2005
The Use of the Trace Atmospheric Gas Analyzer
(TAGA) to Qualitatively and Quantitatively
Monitor Ambient Air For Chemical Warfare
Agents and Decontamination Agents in Real Time
at Parts Per Trillion by Volume Levels or Below
David B. Mickunas, US EPA/ERT
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Nancy H. Adams, Ph.D.
Safe Buildings Program Director
National Homeland Security Research Center
Mr. Eric N. Koglin
Contracting Officer Representative
National Homeland Security Research Center
Raj Mangaraj
Donald Kenny
Anne Gregg
Battelle Memorial Institute
AMBIENT AIR MOBILE MONITORING FOR
CHEMICAL WARFARE AGENTS
TASKS •/&
Develop Spectra and Calibration Curves for the CWAS
Develop Chemical lonization Capabilities to Maximize
Sensitivity for the CWAs
Determine and Verify Detection and Quantitation
Limits for Each CWA
Determine Dynamic Linear Range for CWAs
s. Establish Surrogate Relative Response Factors
Determine if Other Materials Interfere with CWA
Response
Establish/ Demonstrate Sample Air Flow Operating
System and Conditions to Ensure that No Less Than
85% of Material at the CWAs Quantitation Limit
Task 1. Develop Spectra and Calibration Curves for M
the CWAs
•All experiments performed with the Perkin Elmer-SCIEX (PE-
SCIEX) API-365.
•The CWAs to be used are GA, GB, GD, GF, VX, HD, HN-1,
HN-2, and HN-3.
Task 2. Develop Chemical lonization Capabilities to
Maximize Sensitivity for the CWAs
'The proton affinity of the G- and V-series CWAs are sufficiently
higher than that of water to allow proton transfer from the H30+
and H30(H20)n+ reagent ions generated in the APCI source of the
API-365. Therefore, ambient air APCI conditions in the positive ion
mode will be used for ionization of all G- and V-series of agents
for this study.
'The protonated water and associated water clusters under
ambient air APCI conditions are not efficient for the ionization of
sulfur mustard (HD). The sensitivity for HD is enhanced by the
addition of a small amount (approx 0.03%) of benzene to the
APCI inlet.
Decontamination Workshop 93
-------
Task 3. Determine and Verify Detection and
Quantitation Limits for Each CWA
The detection limit for each agent will be determined as three
times the standard deviation of the ion pair's signal in the
background (either room air or room air spiked with blank
hexane) divided by the ion pair's response factor.
•The quantitation limit for a compound will be determined as ten
times the standard deviation of the ion pair's signal in the
background divided by the ion pair's response factor.
•In order to verify the accuracy of the gas phase agent
concentrations, the concentration of the standard solutions used
to generate the agents in the gas phase will be verified via a gas
chromatographic method.
Task 4. Determine Dynamic Linear Range for CWAs
•The dynamic range of calibration for each agent will be
determined by observing the signals obtained from the detection
limit to the ion current at which the signal is no longer linear (i.e.,
saturation of the reagent ions).
•The dynamic range will be explored by varying the solution
concentration and/or the rate of introduction via the syringe drive
during the generation of calibration curves.
Task 5. Establish Surrogate Relative Response fj^\
Factors
•Spectra and calibration curves for the surrogate compounds will
be obtained using the same procedures described above.
•Both native diisopropyl methyl phosphonate (DIMP) and
deuterated diisopropyl methylphosphonate (d14-DIMP) will be
used as surrogates for all of the G- and V-series agents.
•Chloroethylethylsulfide (CEES, halfmustard) will be used as the
surrogate for the mustard agents.
•The relative response factors will be established by comparison
of the response of the surrogate compound(s) to the response of
the chemical warfare agents.
Task 6. Determine if Other Materials Interfere with
CWA Response
•Evaluate the effect of two potential interferences (vehicle
exhaust and bleach) at two interferent concentrations to be
determined during testing.
Room temperature and humidity will not be controlled beyond
the normal operation of the HVAC system.
•Interferent test concentrations will be obtained by diluting a
concentrated feed with air. Depending on the interferent, the
concentrated feed will be provided by one of two methods.
•This procedure will test two agent concentrations at two
interferent concentrations. A false positive test will also be
performed in the same manner without the introduction of the
CWA.
Task 7. Establish/Demonstrate Sample Air Flow /£\
Operating System and Conditions to Ensure that No
Less Than 85% of Material at the CWAs Quantitation
Limit Passes Through the System
•A double-walled glass tube will extend out of the hood and into
the ion source of the API-365. This tube is approximately three
feet in length. In order to demonstrate an 85% transmission of
the CWAs through the sampling line, initially a three-foot section
will be used to obtain the baseline transmission and then add an
additional three foot length to the sampling line (within the hood).
The agents will be vaporized into the glass tubing as in previous
tests at a known concentration and the percent transmission
through the three- versus six-foot sampling lines will be
compared.
n
Experimental Chamber
94 NHSRC
-------
Vaporizer Unit
Calibration Unit
Trace Atmospheric Gas Analyzer Mobile Laboratory
Trace Atmospheric Gas Analyzer (TAGA)
Atmospheric Pressure Chemical lonization (APCI) Source
TAGA Schematics
Decontamination Workshop 95
-------
TAGA Operational Process
Chemical Agents Investigated
GA- Ethyl /V-dimethylphosphoramidocyanidate
GB - Isopropyl methylphosphonofluoridate
GD — Pinacolyl methylphosphonofluoridate
GF — Cyclohexyl methylphosphonofluoridate
VX — 0-Ethyl-S-[2-(diisopropylamino)ethyl] methyl phosphonothioate
HD - 2,2'-Di(chloroethyl)sulfide
HN1 - N-Ethyl-2,2'-di(chloroethyl)amine
HN2 - N-Methyl-2,2'-di(chloroethyl)amine
HNS - 2,2',2"-Tri(chloroethyl)amine
GB - Isopropyl methylphosphonofluoridate
Molecular Weight- 140
Parent Ion - 141
Daughter Ions - 117, 99, 97, 81, 79, 43
o
,CH
\\
H3C'
\
CH-,
ffl
ifdiHIniiUlii
96 NHSRC
-------
XGB CAL CURVE
•<=•-
50 60
VX - 0-Ethyl-S-[2-(diisopropylamino)ethyl] methyl
phosphonothioate
Molecular Weight- 267
Parent Ion - 268
Daughter Ions - 128, 97, 86, 44
H3C CH2
O - P - S
CH2-CH2 CH3
N— HC
/ \
H3C— HC CH3
CH3
)-Ethyl-S-[2-(ciisopropylamino)ettiyl]methyl pi
)-Etliyl-S-[2-(ciisopropylamino)etliyl]methyl phosphonothic
Decontamination Workshop 97
-------
HD - 2,2'-Di(chloroethyl)sulfide
Molecular Weight-158
Parent Ion - 158
Daughter Ions - 63, 109
CH2CI
H2C
S—CH2
CH2CI
D-2,2'Di(chloraettiyl)sull
98 NHSRC
-------
NH1 - N-Ethyl-2,2'-di(chloroethyl)amine
Molecular Weight - 169
Parent Ion - 170
Daughter Ions - 63, 106, 142
CIH,C
CH,
H,C
CH2CI
•<=•-
z
Diisopropropyl methyl phosphonate
Molecular Weight- 180
Parent Ion - 181
Daughter Ions - 79, 97, 115
.CH
>
-------
-*
DIIUP INFUSION
jr y = 67804x + 16
jX^ R' = 0 9994
•^AV
D-14 Diisopropropyl methyl phosphonate £2
Molecular Weight- 194
Parent Ion - 195
Daughter Ions - 79, 80, 99, 117
D3C CD3
CD3 o \
CD PX
3 CH3
D'\ /CD,
"- P \°l
" ' D C/C\/P\
e fti -
1 *' "
.,-
18° 18i m ah ,
,
A\
D
100 NHSRC
-------
DIMP-dH INFUSION
I
R!=099£S^
CEES - 2-Chloroethyl ethyl sulfide
Molecular Weight- 124
Parent Ion - 124
Daughter Ions - 47, 75
ChU
H2C
S - CH2
CH2CI
Decontamination Workshop 101
-------
2-Chloraettiyl ethyl sulfide
Source Concentration (ppbv)
i>
Acronym
GA
GB
G
G
V
H 1
H 2
H 3
DIMP
d,4-DIMP
HD
GEES
Primary
Ion
63>117
41>97
B3>43
81>97
6B=B6
70>106
58=65
04=63
81=79
95=79
58=109
24=75
Method
Detection
Limit
(pptv)
0 52
0 85
14 19
0 36
007
044
031
0 97
083
0 76
1704
126
Method
Quantitation
Limit
(ppvt)
1 7
28
47 3
1
02
148
1 04
324
278
253
5681
419
Limits of
Linearity
(ppbv)
20 76
12 01
2728
19 5
nd
34 1
977
7 13
81
225
9254
nd
Analyte
Response
Factor
(icps/pptv)
145
106
8
94
156
8
14
24
68
261
1
0 2
Surrogate
DIMP
DIMP
DIMP
DIMP
DIMP
DIMP
DIMP
DIMP
DIMP
DIMP
GEES
GEES
Surrogate
Response
Factor
(icps/pptv)
68
68
68
68
68
68
68
68
68
68
02
0 2
#k
Relative
Response
Factor
047
0 64
8 50
0 72
044
850
86
83
00
61
020
1 00
Immediately
Health |pptv|
s than Acute Exposure Guideline Limit (pptv)
AMBIENT AIR MOBILE MONITORING FOR
DECONTAMINATION AGENTS
102 NHSRC
-------
TARGET COMPOUNDS
Chlorine Dioxide
Chlorine
Compounds
Chlorine Dioxide
Chlorine Dioxide
Chlorine
Chlorine
Chlorine
Parent/Daughter Masses
67/51
69/53
70/35
72/37
72/35
Chlorine Dioxide Generator for TAGA Calibration
ii
Configuration for Calibration of Chlorine Dioxide Generation
Wind from NW at 2.3 mph
Wind from NW sis ': 7 mph
Decontamination Workshop 103
-------
Win
-------
INSURANCE
AND
INDEMNITY ISSUES
Presented by Gerald J. Robinson
Insurance and Indemnity Issues
Overview
• Postal Service Anthrax experience
• Indemnity language adopted and
insurance purchased
• Problems with approach used
• Starting point for resolution
' Insurance and Indemnity Issues
Postal Service Anthrax Experience
• October 2001 - Brentwood and Trenton
contaminated by letter mail filled with
anthrax
• Need to decontaminate facilities to remove
hazard and return facilities to service
• Contractors fumigate with chlorine dioxide
gas
Insurance and Indemnity Issues
i Contractors refuse to provide service
without protection from risks inherent in
decontamination service
i Risks
- Harm to workers
- Harm to community
- Damage to facility
- Possibility that process fails to work
-Regulatory Risks
Insurance and Indemnity Issues
i Solution to extraordinary risk
problem
i Postal Service indemnifies
contractors and assumes risks
i Postal Service purchases insurance
to mitigate risk assumed
Insurance and Indemnity Issues
• Broad indemnity granted
• Postal Service indemnified
contractors for all claims caused
by, arising out of, or in any way
related to the decontamination
project
Decontamination Workshop 105
-------
Insurance and Indemnity Issues
i Exceptions
-Claims caused by actions
unrelated to the decontamination
project
-Claims caused by a violation of
law unrelated to the project
-Claims caused by willful
misconduct or gross negligence
Insurance and Indemnity Issues
• Project Insurance Purchased
-General Liability Insurance
-Environmental Liability
-Professional Errors and
Omissions Liability
-Aggregate Limit of $100 million
Insurance and Indemnity Issues
i Problems with this approach
-Cost
- Many Agencies may lack authority to
indemnify
-Time involved negotiating
indemnification and obtaining
insurance
-Doesn't provide a standby solution
7 Insurance and Indemnity Issues
•Suggested approach
•Contractors obtain
SAFETY act designation
and certification for their
technologies
Insurance and Indemnity Issues
i Support anti-terrorism by Fostering
Effective Technologies Act of 2002
(commonly called the SAFETY Act)
i Creates a system of Litigation
Management and Risk Management
for qualified anti-terrorism
technologies
7 Insurance and Indemnity Issues
Litigation Management
• No punitive damages
• Non-economic damages only available
when plaintiff suffers physical damage
• Actions only in federal court and only
against sellers
• Government contractor defense (no
liability)
106 NHSRC
-------
Insurance and Indemnity Issues
Risk Management
•Liability is limited to the
extent of liability limits of
insurance policy
•Insurance must be
purchased
Insurance and Indemnity Issues
•Decontamination
technologies are within the
class of technologies
covered by the SAFETY
act
' Insurance and Indemnity Issues
i Technologies that "would be effective in
facilitating the defense against acts of
terrorism, including technologies that
prevent, defeat or respond to such acts"
Section 863, (b) (7)
-Decontamination services responds to a
terrorist act by removing the possibility of
further infection or harm to the public
-Also, services may be anti-terrorism
technologies - Section 865 (1)
Insurance and Indemnity Issues
How SAFETY Act Helps
• Agencies that cannot indemnify
contractors may use decontamination
service
• Contractors have no liability or
liability limited to the extent of
insurance purchased
• Contractors immediately available to
perform decontamination service
' Insurance and Indemnity Issues
SAFETY Act Problems
• Contractor may be unwilling to spend
money to obtain insurance before event
and contract
• Contractor must spend money and time to
obtain SAFETY Act certification and
designation
• SAFETY Act benefits may not be enforced
Decontamination Workshop 107
-------
Introduction to the Government
Decontamination Service
Robert Bettley-Smith, FRICS
CDS Project Director
Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Defra)
defra
The Context
Uncertainty surrounding global security
Cross-Government effort to ensure UK is
prepared for a range of emergencies
CBRN Resilience Programme led by Home Office
defr<
The History
• April 2003 - study commissioned to assess the UK's
ability to deal with CBRN clean up
• December 2003 - powerful case for improving the
arrangements for decontamination
• 25 March 2004 - Government "actively considering"
setting up a decontamination service
• 25 January 2005 - Government announces "intention to
establish" a decontamination service
dcfrei
CDS Concept (1)
• Responsible authorities already obliged to
prepare for CBRN events, including clean up
• Decontamination is a specialist area
• Expertise available in private sector
• Government recognises a central brigading of
expertise would be more efficient than RAs each
carrying out the same work
dcfr<
CDS Concept (2)
• GDS will determine which companies could
successfully decontaminate buildings and the
open environment, and
• Make sure that responsible authorities can call on
their services when necessary
GDS Functions
• Provide advice and guidance to responsible
authorities when planning for emergencies, and
help test their arrangements
• Identify and assess specialist contractors' ability
to decontaminate, and ensure responsible
authorities have access to them when needed
• Advise central government on national
decontamination capability
defr<
108 NHSRC
-------
CDS Services - advice & guidance
• Strategic National Guidance
• Ad hoc advice
• Case studies
• Participation in exercises
defrcf
CDS Services - reacting in an emergency
Depending on the seriousness of the event and
need, GDS may provide:
• advice and guidance
• advice, guidance and help securing contracts
• advice, guidance, help securing contracts and
managing them
GDS will not...
• Assume responsibility for decontamination
• Fund decontamination
• Deal with humans, animals or their remains
data
GDS Administrative matters
Creation in summer 2005
A Defra agency, but a Government service
At a site in the Midlands
About 20 staff
Chief Executive being recruited
defra
•
gds@defra.gsi.gov.uk
Decontamination Workshop 109
-------
Laboratory Capacity Issues
DECON-WORKSHOP
Rob Rothman
February 23, 2005
Homeland Security
Presidential Directives
Federal agencies be prepared
to respond to chemical,
biological, and radiological
(CBR) attacks.
TICs vs. CBR Agents
CAPABILITY/CAPACITY ISSUES
• Validated sample methods for
priority agents
• Expertise related to CWAs
• Laboratory capacity to
process potential sample demand
Standardized Analytical
Methods (SAM) Rev 1
September 2004
GOAL: To assure consistant/proficient
sample analyses when called upon to
respond to a national emergency:
Identifies -109 Priority agents
Identifies specific methods for
analysis in four environmental media:
* gas
* solid
* oily solid
* aqueous
SAM Rev 2
Update methods
Add CWA degradation products
Methods for drinking water
Add 4 radionuclides:
* Strontium 90
* Cesium
* Iridium
* Cobalt 60
Chemical Warfare Agents
Nerve (sarin), Blister (lewisite), Blood
(cyanogans), choking (phosgene)
Chemical Weapons Convention
Chemical Surety
• Army Regulations 50-6
• Personnel Reliability Program (PRP)
• Dilute Agents vs. Neat
110 NHSRC
-------
CWA DILUTE LIMITS
AGENT
GA.GB
GD.GF
VX
H,HD
L, HL
MAXIMUM
QUANTITY
2O mg
10 mg
100 mg
50 mg
MAXIMUM
CONCENTRATION
2.0 mg/ml
1.0 mg/ml
10 mg/ml
5.0 mg/ml
CWA Methods
Joint Method(US/Finland
• Nerve, Blister, and Degradation
• All environmental media
OPCW Methods
VERIFIN Blue Books
Wiley Encyclopedia of Analytical
Chemistry
Neat Labs
' Alion Science and Technology
Chicago, IL
• Calspan UB Research Center
Buffalo, NY
• Geomet Technologies
Gaithersburg, MD
• Southwest Research Institute
San Antonio, TX
• Battelle
Columbus, OH
• Midwest Research Institute
Kansas City, MO
• Edgewood Chemical and Biological
Center (ECBC)
Aberdeen Proving Grounds, MD
I
Dilute Labs
• Argonne National Lab
Argonne, IL
• Quicksilver Analytics, Inc.
Abingdon, MD
• O.I. Analytical
Pelham, AL
• Oak Ridge National Lab
Oak Ridge, TN
• Lawrence Livermore National Lab
Livermore, CA
Anatomy of Response
Months Weeks
Forensics
-Clinical (Reference)
Environmental (Field Analytics)
• Clinical (Sentinel)
Environmental (Real Time)
Environmental (Fixed Laboratory)
Environmental Laboratory Response
Network (eLRN)
EPA, WITH CDC, DEVELOPED A JOINT
PROPOSAL TO EXPAND THE LRN TO
ADDRESS ENVIRONMENTAL SAMPLE LAB
CAPACITY/RESPONSE ISSUES
• CDCs ROLE WILL REMAIN FOCUSED ON
CLINICAL SAMPLES, WHILE EPA WILL
ESTABLISH AN ENVIRONMENTAL SAMPLE
COMPONENT
• EPA WILL MODEL THE ENVIRONMENTAL
NETWORK COMPONENT AFTER THE
EXISTING CDC CLINICAL LAB NETWORK
Decontamination Workshop 111
-------
LRN: Roles and
Responsibilities
Definitive Reference Labs
-Role: Network Support & Attribution
-Responsibilities:
1) Definitive identification, 2) Methods
development & sampling guidance,
3) QA and sampling procedures
Confirmatory Labs
-Role: Confirmatory Analysis
-Responsibilities:
1) Coordination with sentinels &
first responders, 2) Method
validation
Screening/Sentinel Labs
-Role: Screening & Surge Analysis
-Responsibilities: Routine monitoring
to identify potential incidents
eLRN
Optimal Characteristics
"All-Hazards
Threat based, focused on specific agents and
locations
Rapid sentinel screening
High confidence in methods and staff
- "Gold Standard" confirmatory methods
- Ongoing training and audits
Sufficient surge capacity to address alerts and
response
Add "real-time" technology when supported
by research
Near-Term EPA Reference Labs
Activities
EPA ORD Labs in Las Vegas and Cincinnati
* Las Vegas focus on Chemical
* Cincinnati focus on Biological
SAM- ID analytical methods for priority agents of
concern
* Identify validated preferred methods for
analysis - all environmental media
Develop CWA Capacity
* Establish validated methods for primary
agents and degradation products
Expand Cincinnati lab BSL-3 capability
Develop QA/PT Program for eLRN
Implement a National TRIAGE Program
THANK YOU
Rob Rothman
Rothman.rob@epa.gov
513-569-7187
112 NHSRC
-------
BIOQUELL
Hydrogen peroxide vapor ("HPV")
for room / building decontamination
following chemical or biological agent attack
Overview of efficacy and practical issues
Mike Herd
Vice President
BIOQUELL Inc.
February 2005
©BDS
Overview of science
Hydrogen peroxide vapour - an overview
2H202(g)
Hydrogen peroxide
vapour
Excellent biocide
2H2O + O2
Water Oxygen
"residue-free"
RBDS - Room Bio-Decontamination Service
• using hydrogen peroxide vapor technology, BIOQUELL provide an
"infinitely scalable" room / building bio-decon service
• Tyvek pouched Slog Gee-bacillus stearothermophilus spores used as
biological indicators to verify bio-decontamination
> Applications in the healthcare, bio-defence, pharmaceutical
and environmental sectors
BIOQUELL
Condensation monitor
How it works:
f—<"~"Tr~\ Light
A Gassing 1 * Escapes
-Environment, j
Condensation
Use of optics to detect onset of micro-condensation
Micro-condensation and water chemistry
1.00E+06^
Gassing Time M inutes
D value before condensation = 120 minutes
D value after condensation = 1.2 minutes
> Micro-condensation critical for fast kill - D values go from 2 hours (pi
dewpoint) to <2 minutes (post dewpoint)
H\ WB micro-condensation - often not visible; condensate layer
^ <1 micron r
BIOQUtLL
BIOQUELL's dewpoint model
Detailed analysis of the physical chemistry
• results published in the PDA Journal of Science & Technology (November
2002)
• won the 2002 Fredrick D. Simon Award for best paper published in the PDA
journal
volume of room
adjustment for
equipment (eg: chairs)
starting temperature
starting RH
concentration of
peroxide liquid
airflow rates
point micro-condensation
starts
1 gas concentration trend line
1 relative humidity trend line
1 max. gas rate injection
1 mass of condensate
1 cycle parameter prediction
Good correlation between theoretical (model) and practical
(experimental) results HIT)] BIOQUEL
Decontamination Workshop 113
-------
Gas distribution is key
Celling
\
Vapour exits generator
ate. 100fs-'
, A, /
Gas effectively "bounces" off hard surfaces in room ensuring good gas
distribution - and hence good kill,
even in challenge sites RP7J11IOQUELL
Hydrogen bonding - between H2O2 and H2O
a*
8- (hydrogen peroxide)
8" c~
i
JF
'*WV
(hydrogen peroxide)
y
" Hydrogen
bonding
H-
f
"gl_«vS*
I (water)
d£> Strong hydrogen bonding between molecules
H^> Hence high kinetic energy is needed to disperse the gas...
t^> ...but this can help practically, making BIOQUELL's technolc
safe with (eg) rooms with a common false ceiling
Material Compatibility
Industrial-grade carpet (1C)
Bare wood (pine lumber) (BWD)
Glass (GS)
Decorative laminate (DL)
Galvanized metal ductwork (GM)
Painted (latex, flat) wallboard paper (PW)
Painted (latex, semi-gloss) concrete cind
block (PC).
Anthrax bio-deactivation work with US EPA/ ETV
Glass 7.92 log kill (complete bio-deactivation)
Decorative laminate 7.85 log kill (complete bio-deactivation)
Painted wallboard 6.92 log kill (complete bio-deactivation)
7.54 log kill (complete bio-deactivation)
Galvanised metal
ductwork
Painted concrete
Bare wood
Carpet
6.36 log kill
3.70 log kill
3.01 log kill
> Note short cycle: 20 minutes gassing; 20 minutes dwell (plus
issues with limits of detection)
> Bacillus anthracis Ames bio-deactivation data - report available
on EPA website (ETV program) |:f
-------
Case study: Acinetobacter in Hopital Henri-Mondor
MDR-Acinetobacter in adult ICU
crisis situation (following outbreak in
Northern France)
total of 7 mortalities (3 patients
colonized when BIOQUELL arrived)
5-bed ICU comprising a 800m3
(2,625ft3) suite of rooms
extensive bio-burden present before
RBDS (including Acinetobacter) - and
none after RBDS
EEffil Bioquai
Case study: Acinetobacter in Hopital Henri-Mondor
adjacent ward and public areas monitorec
for HPV-no leakage
no further patient acquisition following
RBDS
RBDS has been re-deployed twice by the
same hospital to combat a similar problert
in other ICUs
hospital intends to publish their
experience and associated data
Case study: MRSAat Lewisham Hospital, London
10 patients were infected / colonised
with MRSA - it appeared cross
transmission had occurred
20-bed surgical ward, "Nightingale"
design
35.7% of 28 surfaces and 27.7% of 18
air samples were found to be
contaminated with MRSA
ward emptied and cleaned manually for
4 days using bleach
re-sampled and MRSA recovered from
16% of 65 surfaces
•S7JI BIOQUELL
Case study: MRSA at Lewisham Hospital, London
BIOQUELL asked to bio-decontaminate
the ward using RBDS
adjacent ward and public areas
monitored for HPV - no leakage
RBDS completed in 12 hours
ward available for re-occupation
immediately after RBDS
no new acquisition of MRSA following
RBDS
Bioqua
Decontamination Workshop 115
-------
Case study: Serratia - Royal Hallamshire, Sheffield
Serratia is a problematic nosocomial
pathogen, which can persist in the
environment during outbreaks (Sarvikivi,
2004, ICHE)
BIOQUELL was contacted by a special
care baby unit with an outbreak of
Serratia (marcescens)
• cleaning had failed to remove the
organism from the environment
• infection acquisition was continuing
(including mortality)
[igfi] BIOQUELL
Case study: Serratia - Royal Hallamshire, Sheffield
BIOQUELL's RBDS technology was
deployed
Serratia and S. aureus cultured before
RBDS and no environmental
contamination detected after RBDS
infection acquisition ceased -the 'acid
test' of a successful bio-
decontamination
Solution: Clarus R
weight: 20kg (44lbs)
500m3 (Euro) / 250m3 (US) bio-
decontamination volume (17,700 / 9,000
cubic ft capability)
high kinetic energy of vapour (exit velocity
100fs-')
2 axis vapour distribution system
own H2O2 container
infinitely scalable ("daisy chain" together)
easily fits in back of vehicle
easy to transport upstairs...
...and into awkward places
self-sanitising
Egflfl BIOQUELL
Solution: Clarus R2
• weight of top: 8kg (181 bs)
• weight of filter / catalytic converter: 21
(441 bs)
• dual use re. bio-agent and chem age
building remediation - effectively an P
filter
• filter disposable - can be bagged ree
incineration
• airflow: 450m3/h (16,000ft3/hr)
• top self-sanitising
^> Rapid catalytic conversion
CJ) HEP A filtration will filter out any
remaining bacteria - activated ca
will filter chemical agents
Instrumentation module
Measures:
• temperature
• gas concentration
• relative humidity
> Monitor key environmental conditions in room which
effect when dewpoint reached
Software controls
jj||: — —
U— .
H~
B-W-N
llQtJl "'^
116 NHSRC
-------
"Scalable"
Clams R and R2 units
networked together
BIQQUELL
RBDS - material compatibility
Excellent material compatibility results - eg:
• computers
• electronics
• furniture
RBDS site survey designed to identify potential problems,
including for example:
• soft, absorbent materials which will absorb hydrogen peroxide
vapour - and typically desorb (out-gas) slowly
BIOQUELL able to give detailed responses on material
compatibility and/or carry out a trial on specific materials at
BIOQUELL's facilities
^\ BIOQUELL has bio-decontaminated >10 hospital intensive
care units (ICU) with no adverse effects - hence "real world"
comfort of excellent material compatibility
Other practical issues encountered
HVAC
• largest problem area by far
• HVAC drawings almost always wrong / lost
• HVAC zones often problematic but BIOQUELL has developed a
range of techniques
• HVAC can be dirty / have high levels of organic matter
Clients
• tend to create further issues
Lesser issues (all manageable but watch out for them)
• alarm systems
• absorption of soft materials - hence longer gassing cycles
• availability of power
H\ Do not underestimate the advantages of experience -
BIOQUELL has bio-decontaminated >1,000 rooms / buildings
BIQQUELL
• u
HTJ] BIOQUEL
Singapore hospital - SARS case study
3 Hospitals
• 8 partially occupied wards
• 88 rooms -total volume 6, 700m3
Client's requirements
The SARS epidemic in Singapore was worsening; 87% of new
infections were hospital acquired
Rapid, residue-free, bio-decontamination was sought - with no holes
to be drilled in the facilities, no patients to be disturbed or placed at
risk
A large volume of equipment (including delicate ICU Equipment)
needed bio-decontamination
> Urgent requirement to deploy equipment in Singapore.
And fast.
BIOQUELL
The RBDS
Results
Using RBDS, BIOQUELL was able to safely bio-decontaminate the
required 88 rooms in 16 days, remaining flexible and sensitive to
patients needs throughout
Decontamination Workshop 117
-------
An example: East Shore Hospital ICU
Ability to deploy around hospital staff/patients was critical
EEfil BIOqUELL
Singapore ICU RBDS 4 hours from vacation to
occupation
RBDS - Hospital Equipment Compatibility
Gambro Dialysis Siemens Servo Tyco Puritan Siemens Servo
Machines 300C Ventilator Bennett 800 900C Ventilator
Ventilator
Dinamap NIBP
Philips Defibrillators
Siemens Patient
Monitor Systems
> Excellent material compatibility
characteristics of BlOQUELL's technology rWV,jl BIQQIIELL
W& BIOQUELL
rapji BIOQUELL
BHI^^^^3 BlAdMMVUffllnllhMI MfcrtjflA*
Hydrogen peroxide vapor ("HPV")
for room / building decontamination
following chemical or biological agent attack
Overview of efficacy and practical issues
Mike Herd
Vice President
BIOQUELL Inc.
February 2005
118 NHSRC
-------
Whole-Structure Decontamination of
Bacterial Spores by Methyl Bromide
Fumigation
Rudolf H. Scheffrahn
What is needed for B. anthracis
spore cleanup?
• Rapid decontamination
• No sensitive equip, damage
• Portability
+ Cost effectiveness
+ Safety
UF
Structural remediation alternatives:
• Foam/liquid disinfection
+ HEPA vacuum/vaccine
• Fumigation
UF
(CHjBr)
COWMOOTY FUMOAWT
<=q» QUWIANT1NBBEGU,ATO«lf USE ONLY
SUPERVISION BY REGULATORY AGENT SEQUREO
ACTIVE INGREDIENTS W«hf I trnndg 100W
lh» product wgh» 11 d poundm par giilan
DANGER • PELJGRO • POISON
KEEP OUT OF REACH Of CHILDREN
* Registered foodfelructural tumigani
• Stable up to SOO'F
• Paefcaged in cylindeis
* Non-corrosive alkylalmg agent
* TLV = 5 ppm
• Analysis by simple detection equip.
• Deep diffusion of porous materials
* Part of existing fumigation industry
• No volume or humidity limitations
Decontamination Workshop 119
-------
Label: Meth-O-Gas® Commodity Fumigant-Great Lakes Chemical Co.
EPA Registration No. 5785-41
TABLE III METH-0-GASQ
APPLICATION SUMMARY FOR STRUCTURES OR VEHICLES ASSOCIATED WJItLBAW
OR PROCESSED COMMODITIESQ)
TREATM ENT SITE
PESTS
Warehouse, Shipboard, Railroad
Car, Truck, Air and Sea
Containers, Grain Elevator,
Poultry Houses, Food Processing
Plant, Restaurants, Feed Room,
Grain Bin
EXPOSURE
RATE TIM E
(Ib/1000ft3l (hrsl
cockroaches, confused flour beetle, rice[
weevil, granary weevil, saw toothed grair
Deetle, rusty grain beetle, lesser grain
Dorer, cadelle, khapra beetle, drugstore
Deetle, larder beetle, carpet beetle,
copra beetle, coffee bean weevil, etc.
rats, mice and brown tree snakes
(Boiga irregularis)
fungi and some bacteria
(e.g., Solmonella spp.)
3-4
24-36
;i)At temperatures below 60°F, increase the dosage by 1/2 Ib per 1,000 cu. ft. for every 10°F drop in
:emperature or use an approved procedure to heat the fumigant. No additional fumigant is required for
•ats and mice. Do not fumigate fungi and some bacteria when inside temperatures are less than 70° F.
DF
Lab Trials
Methyl bromide
introduced into
chambers using
-as-tight syringe
120 NHSRC
-------
<
c
Spore count vs. methyl bromide
:onc. at 37°C for 48-hour fumigation
0) fi
D
^^ \
1
\ \
\ \
-*— B. anthracis
-•— G. stearo .
B. atroph.
B.thuring.
0 16 32 48 64 80 96 112
mg/L. MB
UF
UF
CPU/slide of B anthracis spores after 48-hour exposure to
methyl bromide at 0 or 120 mg/L and 27°C
S a strain
AT." •••
ATCC 937
ATCC 4728
ATCC 9660
ATCC 11966
ATCC 14187
AMES-1-RIID
AMES-RIID
ANR-1
"i.-i.'ME
0 mg MB/L
2 17E+04
3 82E+05
1 02E+06
0 OOE+00
4 34E+02
345E+07
5.56E+07
8 53E+07
506E+08
2 70E+07
120 mg MB/L
0 OOE+00
6 60E+01
0 OOE+00
0 OOE+00
0 OOE+00
240E+04
270E+05
2 19E+05
650E+03
8 OOE+02
UF
2004 Field Trial, Big Pine Key, Florida
•
N
V"~~
UF
Decontamination Workshop 121
-------
Non-pathogenic B. anthracis surrogates:
6. stearothermophiius (paper)
6. thuringiensis {paper)
B. atrophaeus (on paper)
B. atrophaeus (stainless steel disc)
122 NHSRC
-------
Field site conditions:
312 mg MB/L mean cone.
48-hour exposure time
35°C mean temperature
Decontamination Workshop 123
-------
Results of 2004 Field Trial:
• 48 Spore strip locations: no growth of
any spore species (Gs, Bt, Ba (paper),
or Ba (stainless steel), from both
contract laboratories [IITRI quantitative
Bt and Ba (paper) or Raven labs (Gs and
Ba stainless]
• Growth on all controls (n=10/species)
UF
Advantages of methyl bromide for
B. anthracis decontamination:
«• Low cost: $150/1,000 ft3
• Rapid turnover: ± 200 hours
• All porous materials, voids, HVAC,
etc. decontaminated - no secondary
procedures needed
• No collateral damage
• No modification of ambient humidity
UF
124 NHSRC
-------
Technology for future MB
fumigations:
Real-time IR MB detectors
Air displacement balloons
Multilayer or laminated tarpaulins
Silicone ground seal
MB Scrubbing
Portable- Methyl Bromide Monitor
MB 3000 Methyl Bromkde FumtgUHHi
Aaan accurate, sdf-cantairaid iron-tc^,
the Mi-JOOOTM mediums She levels Of
melhyl bte«Uc rrt furnqation ftKiiitiej.
Decontamination Workshop 125
-------
Commercial fumigation
structures:
• Single-family houses
• Multi-unit complexes
• Large commercial structures
• Government facilities
• Boats & ships
• Trucks and containers
• Military hardware
UF
126 NHSRC
-------
Decontamination Workshop 127
-------
10.3 11
128 NHSRC
-------
DF-200 Decontamination of CBW Agents, other Biological
Pathogens and Toxic Industrial Chemicals
Presented at
EPA Workshop on Decontamination, Cleanup, and Associated Issues for
Sites Contaminated with Chemical, Biological, or Radiological Materials
Washington D.C.
February 24, 2005
Dr. MarkD. Tucker
mdtuckeO.sandia.gov
505-844-7264
RitaG. Betty
rbettvO.sandia.gov
505-284-4160
DF-200
Presentation Outline
^Introduction
^Sandia Decon Formulation (DF-200) Test Results
Neutralization of Chemical Warfare Agents
Kill of Biological Agents
Kill of Other Biological Pathogens
Neutralization of Toxic Industrial Chemicals
Aerosolized CBW Cloud Knockdown
^Summary
Sandia CBW Decon Formulations
http://www.sandia.gov/SandiaDecon/
Neutralization of CW Agents
E
"
Rapid and complete coverage
:eived Sandia Foam
Contact Time: 1 Hour
Complete kill of anthrax spores
Sandia Decon Foam
Corrosion Comparisons
Deionized Water -
24 Hour Exposure
Sandia Decon Foam -
24 Hour Exposure
Bleach-24 Hour
Exposure
Sandia DF-200
How Does it Work?
Final concentration of hydrogen peroxide in standard
DF-200 formulation is -3.5%
Decontamination of
CW Agents
Decon-
taminant
DS2
DF-200
1
Min.
100
100
GD
30
Min.
-
100
60
Min.
100
100
vx
100
99 100
60
Min.
100
100
1
Min.
100
97
HD
30
Min.
-
100
Percent decontamination of live agents in reactor studies at the Edgewood
Chemical and Biological Center (ECBC). Challenge ratio was 50:1.
60
Min.
100
100
mm.
Decontamination Workshop 129
-------
"^^ ^^^
dPo^ DF-200 Performance
Neutralization of CW Agents and TICs
Agent
Nerve Agents (G)
Nerve Agents (V)
Vesicants (HD)
Sodium Cyanide
Phosgene
Carton Bisulfide
Contact Time
(Minutes)
1-10
10-15
15-30
1-15
1-15
1-15
Byproducts
Nucleophilic Attack
Nucleophilic Attack
Oxidation
Oxidation
Hydrolysis
Oxidation
Rapid neutralization of CW agents and TICs
®£.
Sandia Decon Foam
Kill of BW Agents in DF-200
Control
15 Minute
Contact
30 Minute
Contact
60 Minute
Contact
B. Anthracis -
Ames-RIID
Average
CFU/ml
1.21 x10'
No Growth
No Growth
No Growth
Log
Reduction
0
7
7
7
B. anf/jrac/s-ANR-1
Average
CFU/ml
6.42x10'
No Growth
No Growth
No Growth
Log
Reduction
0
7
7
7
Y.pesf/s-(ATCC
11953)
Average
CFU/ml
6.42x10'
No Growth
No Growth
No Growth
Log
Reduction
0
7
7
7
Results of kill tests conducted against BW agents in DF200 solution.
Decontamination of CW and BW Agents
Additional Testing
CW Testing
•Commercial DF200 foam deployed on CARC surfaces
using Intelegard's Merlin system. Challenge ratio of 120:1
BW Testing
•Three strains of anthrax, anthrax surrogate and Ricin toxin
tested on CARC and in suspension
•Commercial DF200, High Test Hypochlorite, and Super
Tropical Bleach
All results demonstrate high efficacy of DF200
Contact: Mr. Vic Murphy, murphvvaiSimcsc.usmc.mil,
(703)432-3193
Effectiveness of DF-200 vs. Biofilms
Control Samples: Prior to
treatment with DF-200.
Average adhesion = 6-7 log
CFU/cm2
Treated Samples: After 1
min treatment with DF-
200. Average reduction
= 6-7 log CFU/cm2
Work performed by Jill Bieker-Hawkinson, KSU
Influenza A (H1N1) Inactivation Studies
Results: RT-PCR conducted with forward and reverse N1 primers:
All treatments with Sandia DF-200D resulted in complete
loss of infectivity and complete loss of viral RNA integrity.
Work performed by Jill Bieker-Hawkinson, KSU
FBI WMD Threat List
130 NHSRC
-------
Challenges & Mechanisms of TIC
Decontamination Chemistry
Water lnsoluble4-L-tWater Soluble
Attack Mechanisms
Oxidation Reduction Bufferini
Limitations: toxic metals, strong acids/bases
10^ DF200 Neutralization of TICs
Solution and Headspace Gas Analysis
TIC
Hydrogen Cyanide
(gas)
Hydrogen Cyanide
(gas)
Sodium Cyanide
(solid)
Phosgene (gas)
Carbon Bisulfide
(liquid)
Malathion (liquid)
Capsaicin
(liquid)
Challenge
Ratio,
Solution:TIC
250:1
1:1
200:1
200:1
200:1
200:1
200:1
% Decontaminated in solution/
% Decontaminated in headspace
1 minute
59
96
93
98
>99
89
>99
1 5 minutes
83
95
98
>99
>99
95
Below
detection
60 minutes
>99/>99
48/96
>99/>99
>99
>99
Below
detection
Below
detection
9
CBW Cloud Knockdown & Neutralization
Problem
One mechanism of the dispersal of CBW agents
would be to create a "cloud" of active material
that would drift and affect the intended target
areas.
The objectives of this project are
> to explore methods of CBW cloud knockdown
and neutralization.
> If feasible, recommend conceptual deployment
design
Success will result in
> protecting lives, minimizing impact to
infrastructure and post-event decontamination
efforts, and
> facilitating timely restoration of operations.
The focus is on determining the feasibility of knocking down
and neutralizing an aerosol cloud - not systems development
CBW Cloud Knockdown & Neutralization
Large Aerosol Chamber Design
Large Chamber
- 8 foot high by 8 foot wide by 8 foot
deep
- Static Free PVC
- Inflow from aerosol source with
filtered exhaust
- Multiple Aerosol sampling ports
- Mixing Fans
- Internal Decon Spray System
>New Larger Chamber, Spring 2005
CBW Cloud Knockdown & Neutralization
Modeling and Transport Physics of CBW Cloud
Conditions
• Use CBW cloud scenarios defined by DoD Guardian program
- Determined peak plume concentrations, duration, and
exposure
NOTE: Atadecon:agentratioof-800:1, DARPA Immune
Building Program demonstrated an effective interior knockdown
and decon
- 8-log knockdown and decon of anthrax simulant
- HD simulant concentration reduced by two orders of
magnitude
Recent Data
DF200 Knockdown & Neutralization Spray
• "Optimized" spray system
• 3.2 g/m3 G-agent simulant
• 138 g/m3 DF200 Spray density
• Immediate decrease of nearly
4 orders of magnitude
•-90,000 gallons of DF200
required for 50m x 50m x 1000m
spray curtain
•Knockdown/neutralization
proof of concept
•Various simulant and spray
densities are being evaluated
Decontamination Workshop 131
-------
CBW Cloud Knockdown & Neutralization
Comments
>Many applications for fundamental capability;
Technologies developed are also applicable to
hazmat and civilian incident responses
-Chemical plants *'•'*«
-„*"'•'•
-Chemical D-mil
- Subways
- Nuclear plants
-High-profile buildings
CBW Cloud Knockdown and Neutralization
Conceptual Design
\ Region of safety ^
Incoming
CBW Agent
Cloud
-At.
CBW Cloud Knockdown & Neutralization
Subway Tunnel
Spray Array
Subway Tunnel
CBW Cloud Knockdown & Neutralization
Subway Station
Sandia Decontamination Technologies
Sandia has developed unique decontamination formulations
and application/delivery concepts to
enable rapid and safe
neutralization CBW agents, biological toxins and toxic industrial
chemicals.
Hazmat Response
Intentional/Accidental
Liquid, Solid, Gaseous
Indoor/Outdoor
^
DF-200 Summary
• DF-200 is available for use by the U.S.
Military and the nation's first responders in
the event of a chemical or biological
incident
• EPA registration for use as a disinfectant
granted in November 2004
• Many opportunities exist to utilize the
fundamental DF-200 chemistry for other
applications
Effective against chemical and biological
agents, other biological pathogens and TICs
132 NHSRC
-------
Sandia Decon Foam (DF-200)
r
DF-200 is considered to be the best
available decontamination technology
by the US Military
Sandia Decon Formulation (DF-200)
Project Team
Mark Tucker
Rita Betty
Gary Brown
Wayne Einfeld
Pauline Ho
Caroline Souza
Mollye Wilson
Kristine Muroya
Jonathan Leonard
Linda Johnson
Jill Bieker-Hawkinson
Bruce Kelley
Website
http://www.sandia.gov/SandiaDecon
Sandia Decon Foam Demonstration for
President George W. Bush; July 22, 2002
Decontamination Workshop 133
-------
Capitol Hill Ricin Incident:
Decontamination Dilemmas
(or... "Can't we just throw it away?")
Steve Jarvela and Jack Kelly
EPA Decontamination Technology Workshop
Washington D.C.
February 23-25, 2005
Special thanks to Dr. Robert Butt and his staff at
NMRC whose assistance during this incident went well
beyond what could be expected
Capitol Hill Ricin Incident -
Presentation Outline
Incident Occurrence and EPA's Arrival
EPA Activities in Incident Command
Some Ricin Facts
Decontamination of Affected Building
Areas/Post-Decontamination Sampling
The "Decon Team"
Decontaminating Clothing, Mail and
Miscellaneous Items Offsite
Dirksen Senate Office Building
,
mum i
,1 •
OFFK
BUILD!
Incident Occurrence and EPA's Activities
February 2, 2004 - suspicious powder found on the mail
slitter in mail room (Room 464) attached to Senator
Frist's office in Dirksen Building
Preliminary field samples and follow-up laboratory
analyses by FBI/USCP confirm ricin
Several Region III OSCs arrive at Capitol Hill per
assistance request from House Sergeant at Arms
EPA instilled into Incident Command Structure
essentially within Operations Section
before going into our activities, some
ricin facts
Ricin
Protein toxin from the beans of the castor plant
Fairly easy to produce the toxin and plants are
found worldwide (grows as weed in southwest
U.S. and commonly grown as U.S. ornamental
plant)
> 1 million tons of castor beans processed
annually in production of castor oil
(mainly India, China, Brazil)
Castor beans are 35-55% oil by weight, process
waste mash is 5% ricin by weight (lots of ricin
out there!)
Castor oil production ceased in U.S. in 1970s
due to health and safety issues and low profit
134 NHSRC
-------
Ricin
Very toxic to cells/inhibits protein synthesis
Ricin actually made up of two toxins, each with a
polypeptide chain (A and B), that work together
to cause damage
Toxic by inhalation, ingestion and injection. Not
as toxic as botulinum
Acute inhalation and oral toxicity well beyond the
established "extremely toxic" classification
(ricin LDSOs are in ug/kg range) proverbial
bad stuff.
No vaccine as yet, no prophylactic antitoxin
Ricin - History as Bioweapon
and Some Incidents
WW1 and WW2 ricin weapon development
1978 - assassination of Bulgarian dissident by injection
with ricin-loaded umbrella pellet
1993 -white supremacist traveling through U.S. found to
have ~130 grams of ricin in vehicle
1994-95 - Minnesota Patriots Council found with
~1 gram of ricin threatening to injure law enforcement
2003 - ricin found in threatening letter at South Carolina
postal facility (NIOSH involved)
2004 - Washington State man found to be making ricin in
garage (EPA Region 10 involved)
Castor Plant
•ani
Photo credit:
JBurstein and A Carbone.
Harvard School of Public
Health
Castor Plant as "Weed"
Photo credit:
JBurstein and A
Carbone,
Harvard School of
Public Health
Castor Beans
Photo credit: DOD Bio Agent Training Course
Simulated Crude Ricin Production
Photo credit: DOD Bio Agent Training Course
Decontamination Workshop 135
-------
EPA's Activities
EPA tasked to:
- receive, inventory and store/secure unopened
mail from several buildings until action
determined
- conduct additional characterization sampling*
- perform decon of affected rooms and post-
decon "clearance" sampling
- decon potentially contaminated and
contaminated clothing, mail and miscellaneous
equipment
* sampling earlier performed by FBI and USCP; USCP continued to sample to
augment EPA sampling
EPA's Activities
by February 8, approximately 80 drums of unopened
mail removed from various buildings
clothing from 32 potentially exposed individuals stored
for disposition
at least 670 samples had been collected by FBI, USCP
and EPA (possibly many more) from three known
Dirksen Bldg affected rooms, hallways, common areas
and personnel "quarantine" room (Room 106)
19 positives found - all confined to wipes or H EPA vac
samples collected within Room 464 or in the collection
bag of the room 464-specific vacuum cleaner
Storage of drummed mail
- Storage in Parking Lot
Various Storage/Disposal Containers Used
Personnel Decon after Sampling
136 NHSRC
-------
EPA's Activities by February 8
All air samples collected by USCP were negative
office and personal items from Room 464 were "bagged
and tagged". Large hard surface items left in place
Sampling ongoing to return "high priority" items to
congressional staff
Issue: How to Decon Affected Rooms?
Decision to Decon Dirksen Rooms
EPA tasked to come up with a decon plan (in a few
hours of course) ...we looked toward existing research
data and experts
Our primary document was the USAMRIID "Blue Book"
for ricin decontamination:
" Ricin is stable under ambient conditions, but is
detoxified by heat (80 degrees C for 10 min, or 50
degrees C for about an hour at pH 7.8)"
. .but we soon learned that dry ricin was a different animal
than wet ricin
also
" Decontaminate with soap and water. Hypochlorite
solutions (0.1 % sodium hypochlorite) can inactivate
Decision to Decon Dirksen Rooms
Initially, there was talk "from above" of
using CIO2 gas (!?) in the rooms
....then there was discussion of heating up
the rooms with propane heaters
We prevailed that this would be overkill
and time-consuming.
Decontamination of Rooms
Decision made to "decontaminate" Room 464
and adjacent rooms 463 and 465 as precaution.
Large hard surface items and carpets deconned
in place, (carpet in 464 removed and disposed)
Room 106, where evacuees stationed, also
addressed as precaution
Common hallways, elevators, mail drop points
addressed as precaution
Decision to Decon Dirksen Rooms
Final EPA recommendation:
Use liquid 0.1 to 0.5% sodium hypochlorite solution on
hard surfaces and steam vacuuming (with sodium
hypochlorite added) on carpeted surfaces.
Rationale:
- relatively small size of the area;
- what was known about ricin concentrations in Room
464 and non-detection in other building areas;
- knowledge of ricin properties and what was known
about ricin "carrier" powder;
- research literature and input from EPA ERT, Army
Edgewood, USAMRIID, USPHS, CDC, academia
- input from inter-agency onsite Scientific Support Group
(aka "The Think Tank") formed to recommend to lead
OSC a decon approach, sampling plan, etc
Part of "Think Tank" in Action
....if a bittoo gradually and with
questionable focus
Decontamination Workshop 137
-------
Decontamination of Rooms
Success!
Rooms, hallways, etc. deconned on
February 8 and Dirksen Building opened
on Monday, February 9 !!(?)
(Only rooms 463, 464, and 465 remained
closed for routine renovation)
EPA Tasked to Decon Clothing, Mail
and Equipment, Office Items
Original set - 19 large bags of office items from
Room 464 and 10 bags of clothing from
quarantined personnel - materials not sampled
for ricin
Second Set- 12 large bags - miscellaneous
paper items from Room 464, unopened mail,
mail slitter and vacuum cleaner - limited
sampling revealed contamination
EPA Tasked to Decon Clothing, Mail
and Equipment, Office Items
First Option Most Were Thinking but not to be.
EPA Tasked to Decon Clothing,
Mail and Equipment, Office Items
Knowing that clothing might be able to withstand soaking
and dry cleaning ... take the simple approach for clothing
EPA Tasked to Decon Clothing, Mail and
Equipment, Office Items
Washing and dry cleaning not chosen for
several reasons:
- where to wash/dry? Could we be assured it would
work? Sample afterward? (attempts at finding a federal
facility with an autoclave were unsuccessful)
- decon water disposal issue
- mail/paper could not be washed. Some efficiency in
doing all materials together if possible.
- we were already going down the "heat will probably
work" path based on discussions with researchers, DOD
and others
- saw an opportunity to advance the knowledge base for
ricin decontamination
EPA Tasked to Decon Clothing, Mail and
Equipment, Office Items
We formed a "Decon Team" to come up with a plan to
decontaminate the materials
- members from AFFRI, CDC/NIOSH, CDC Laboratory, EPA
ERT, EPA III, Army Edgewood, Navy NMRC, and Academia
Despite some skepticism, heat was to be used as the
initial decon agent (research data suggested it would
work)
If heat not successful, Ethylene Oxide (EO) to be used
as a second method based on its theoretical plausibility
and availability (except on clothing due to off-gassing
concerns)
Chlorine Dioxide (CIO2) was to be a third option if time
allowed - again, based on theoretical plausibility only
138 NHSRC
-------
HowAVhere to Conduct Decon and Verify
Effectiveness?
Past work during Capitol Hill Anthrax response proved
helpful - EO sterilization facility in Richmond willing to
assist
Facility had ability to get temperature up to ~90
degrees C and relative humidity to ~85% for 24 hours or
more
If needed, CIO2 contractor working on AMI Anthrax
project in Florida also willing to assist
Decon Team efforts focused on how to package items,
setting of sterilization specifications, effectiveness
measurements, "how clean is clean?" opinions
Big Issues for Decon Team -
How Clean is Clean?
After decontamination, in order to make a
recommendation on re-use of the items ("how
clean is clean?"), how much did we know about:
- contamination concentrations including
sampling collection and extraction efficiencies
-the location of contamination on clothing,
mail, etc.
- ricin powder processing characteristics
(crude or purified?, "weapons-grade"?)
- our trust in ricin toxicity values
How Clean is Clean?
EPA ORD did make an effort at coming up with
criteria but cautioned due to many unknowns
Essentially, we decided to proceed with the
decontamination effort and worry about it later
Given the unknowns and potential public health
consequences, it was assumed we would need
to get to close to 100% denaturation of ricin
Big Issues for Decon Team - How to Prove
Effectiveness
' Working with NMRC and Edgewood, we were able to
obtain "live" crude and purified ricin as indicators of
efficacy for each treatment run
• Indicators transported to and from NMRC/Edgewood,
sterilization facility and laboratory....cleared through
CDC Select Agent Transport regs
• This was a new and novel use of Region III vehicles
but ...whatever it takes to get the job done I suppose
Briefly... What was Done
Original Set of Materials - 29 Tyvek bags of
clothing and office items:
- Heat treatment #1 (3/11/04)
- 82-88°C, 80-85% RH, > 24 hours
- 28 crude and 28 purified ricin "tubes"
interspersed within bags for later analyses
- temperature probes placed in bags
(
^IMRC assay ap
s
Heat Treatment #
packet
106-1/464-5
106-2/106-3
106-4/464-12
106-5/106-6
106-7/106-8
106-9/106-10
464-1/464-2
464-3/464-4
464-6/464-7
464-8/464-9
464-10/464-11
464-13/464-14
464-15/464-
16/464-19
464-17/464-18
Orig
HeatTreatme
Droach determines the
amples....or...howmuc
- March 16. 2004 assay
temperature
(degrees C)
82
82
88
88
88
82
82
82
88
88
82
82
82
88
BDRD
Sample*
106-1
106-2
106-4
106-5
106-7
106-9
464-1
464-3
464-6
464-8
464-10
464-13
464-15
464-17
nal Set-
it#1 LabResults-
emaining toxicity activity level of the r
i was the ricin deactivated?):
APG#
30
44
26
46
33
27
42
35
31
32
28
37
29
34
(purified)
BDRD
Ricin
Activity
?
(crude)
APG
Ricin
Activity
(purified)
BDRD %
native
ricin
0.
0
0
cin test
(crude)
APG%
native
ricin
.8
.9
?
Decontamination Workshop 139
-------
Results for Original Set Heat Treatment #1
• 100% deactivation of 13 of the 14 purified ricin
samples removed after treatment (14 of 28
removed)
• 14th sample at 99.8% deactivation
• 94.4 to 99.7 % deactivation of 14 of 28 crude
ricin samples removed
Point: Crude more difficult to deactivate than
purified and we needed to get better efficacy
Original Set - Heat Treatment #2
Heat treatment #2 (3/26/04)
Same temp, RH and time duration range
Plan was to assay remaining 14 crude and
purified ricin samples after undergoing second
heat treatment
Results:
- 4 of 14 crude/ricin samples analyzed within
days
- 9 of 14 analyzed three weeks later (one tube
destroyed by a runaway forklift....)
Original Set - Heat Treatment #2
4 of 14 crude/purified (assayed 3/29):
-100% deactivation of purified
- 99.8 - 99.99 % of crude
9 of 14 crude/purified (assayed 4/21):
- > 99.9% deactivation of crude
- 99.92 - 99.99% deactivation of purified
(not 100% as above) .... WHY? Believed
to be the result of "protein refolding"
So what did we recommend to the USCP
about the fate of the original set of
materials?
Decon Team documentation memo merely
kept to the facts, citing results and
expressing "things to keep in mind"
There was not unanimity on what the
recommendation should be (but close)
Recommendation letter was left up to the
lead EPA Region III OSC
Second Set of Materials
Provided to EPA relatively late (3/22)
miscellaneous paper items, quarantined mail,
Room 464 mail slitter and vacuum cleaner -
some known to be contaminated
What we did:
- Exposed materials to heat treatment #1 (3/28) -
knowing one heat treatment was insufficient we left
22 crude and 22 purified ricin samples in place/did not
assay
- Conducted an EO treatment pilot test (3/31) on store-
bought items similar to the Second Set of Materials -
utilized 4 crude and 4 purified ricin samples
Second Set of Materials
- pilot test results (EO treatment alone)
98.9 - 99.9% deactivation for purified
99.86 - 99.99% for crude
....seemed that EO efficacy on ricin was
more than just a theory
We decided to go with EO treatment on the
Second Set of items already exposed to one
heat treatment
We obtained a new batch of crude and ricin
samples to measure EO efficacy alone to
compare with heat plus EO efficacy
...led to more Beltway drives with ricin
140 NHSRC
-------
Second Set of Materials
The second set, already exposed to heat, was
treated with EO
EO operating parameters (we relied on the
facility's expertise):
— 24 hour duration
- avg EO concentration of 815 mg/l
- RH of -35%
- Temp in 160 °F range
22 crude and 22 purified ricin samples -
-11 crude/purified exposed to heat and EO
-11 crude/purified exposed to EO alone
Second Set of Materials
EO treatment alone:
-11 Crude = 99.939 - 99.999% deactivation
- 11 Purified = 99.978 - 99.997%
Heat plus EO:
- 11 Crude = 9 with 100% deactivation
2 with 99.995 - 99.997 %
- 11 Purified = all 11 with 100% deactivation
Second Set of Materials
Again, Decon Team memo merely
provided a synopsis of results with items
to consider (i.e. for added "protection",
some items had been surface cleaned with
bleach solution prior to heat and EO
treatment)
Lead OSC provided recommendation to
USCP
Conclusions/Lessons Learned
• Capitol Hill responses are always a
little....er... "different"
• An interagency, onsite Scientific Support
Group during a response may have a
place but we need to work the kinks out
(need quicker turnaround and decisions
primarily)
• The offsite Decon Team interagency group
worked surprisingly well but delays can be
expected the larger and more widespread
the group's size
Conclusions/Lessons Learned
Without the participation of the DOD or DOD-
related agencies on the Decon Team, NMRC,
AFFRI and Army Edgewood, this work could not
have occurred (NMRC's assistance went beyond
what we could have hoped). This collaboration
should serve Region 3 well in the future.
We appreciated the opportunity to add to the
ricin decon knowledge base but, in a future
incident, it may be more efficient to take the
simple, run-of-the-mill approach (e.g. dumpsters,
washing machines and/or wash basins)
Decontamination Workshop 141
-------
References
Grow, R.M., Johns Hopkins Center for Civilian
Biodefense Strategies, Ricin Toxin: Bioweapon,
April 2003, PP presentation.
Center for Disease Control and Prevention,
Investigation of a Ricin-Containing Envelope at a
Postal Facility- South Carolina 2003, Morbidity
and Mortality Weekly Report, November 21,
2003,52(46); 1129-11131.
USAMRIID, Ricin in Medical Management of
Biological Casualties Handbook, 4th ed,
February 2001, pp 130-137.
Photo Credits
Burstein, JL and Carbone, A., Harvard
Center for Public Health Preparedness-
Harvard School of Public Health. Ricin as
a Biological Weapon. PP Presentation,
Date not known.
Department of Defense (DOD) Bio-Agent
Training Course
Nick Brescia, EPA Region III OSC.
142 NHSRC
-------
Restoration from Decon
USPS Experience
February 2005
Presented by:
Richard Orlusky
richard.c.orlusky@iisps.gou
I UNITED STATES
'POSTAL SEKVKE.
i Timeline USPS Trenton facility
a October 2001- USPS Trenton P&DC closed
a April 2003-Commenced construction fumigation system
u October 2003 - Building fumigated with Chlorine dioxide gas
a February 2004 - Decision on Re-occupancy issued by ECC
> begin removing fumigation equipment from inside the building and
limited site restoration work such as HVAC cleaning.
> restoration contractors meeting with subcontractors onsite to review
building systems, develop scope of work and cost estimates to
restore the facility
a March 2004 - USPS Maintenance teams begin restoring mail
machinery
u May 2004 - Decontamination contractors demobilize and building
restoration contractors commence work
a February 2005 - Restoration contractors demobilize from site
u March 2005 - Building scheduled to commence operations
. , Pro- FumlBatlon Factors impacting.
Building Restoration
u Age of building, type of equipment and current state of
maintenance.
u Surface cleaning with bleach sojution effective but destroys
equipment. Also damages flooring materials. Alternate products
with less contact time might limit damage and reduce restoration
costs.
a Typically building control systems are inoperable or shutdown
after the building is evacuated. Interior subject to high
temperatures (90 degree F and 90% humidity) especially after
being sealed. This adds to building degradation especially over
time.
u Building systems especially mail processing machinery receive
daily preventative maintenance. Tne machinery degrades without
its normal routine maintenance.
a Building Preparation Activities - removing porous material,
moving fumigation equipment into the building, sealing the
exterior can damages floors, doorways and walls.
' Restoration Considerations
a Direct impacts from "Decon" activities
a Cost of inspecting and servicing components vs.
replacement
a Useful service life of existing building equipment
a Needed building upgrades
a Building aesthetics - employee and customer relations
OurExnerlence
a Mail Machinery/Electronics - USPS Trenton mail machinery rebuilt.
It was learned from the USPS Curseen-Morris fumigation that the
equipment operational with overhaul but the availability was
impacted.
a Electrical Wiring/Circuit Breaker Panels/ Motor Control
Centers/Transformers - need to be thoroughly inspected especially
small contact points (Life Safety Issues). Replace vs. repair
determinations.
a Flooring -overlay performed on work room floor tiles. Damaged
due to bleach cleaning, foot traffic and fumigation preparation
activities. Carpeting in administrative areas replaced.
a Building Systems (HVAC, Boilers, Chillers)-motors, actuators and
pumps replaced.
u Replaced employee lockers, lobby lock boxes, door fixtures.
Painted interior surfaces. Employee and customer relations.
Closing TJioughts on
Building Restoration
a Age of structure, maintenance status, and type of equipment inside is a major
determinate in cost, restoration time, and scope of work.
a Complete and current set of as-builts should be kept outside of building along
with maintenance records and equipment specifications. Emergency response
planning.
a Bring restoration contractor team in early before building is fumigated in order to
begin planning a comprehensive scope of work.
a More testing of Chlorine dioxide and other decon agents for efficacy at lower
concentrations and contact time may be helpful.
a Use surface cleaning agents (i.e. bleach) cautiously if fumigation is to be "decon"
remedy.
a Restore building environmental controls as quickly as possible to maintain
temperature and relative humidity control.
a If possible, perform equipment maintenance (even if building is closed).
a Down time after fumigation seems to be a factor. Reducing implementation of
Sampling and Analysis Plan timeline might help improve equipment
rehabilitation.
a Don't forget to cost in "Industrial Hygiene" services for sampling and HASP
training, emergency response, evacuation planning, and site security.
Decontamination Workshop 143
-------
Another Look at Chlorine Dioxide Fumigation:
Concentration-Times, Efficacy Tests and Biological
Indicators
February 24, 2005
EPA Decontamination Workshop
Paula Krauter & Staci Kane
EPD/ERD L-528
(925) 422-0429
krauter2@llnl.gov
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
Chemical & Biological Nonproliferation Program
Presentation Outline
• Project Background
S Decontamination & Restoration for a Major
Transportation Facility DDAP
S Deliverable: develop & test a rapid efficacy test
• Chlorine dioxide fumigation field-test results
Efficacy tests
Biological indicators
San Francisco Airport are
partners in the DDAP
Sandia National Laboratory and Lawrence Livermore National
Laboratory are collaborating on a Restoration DDAP
The primary objective of the Restoration Domestic Demonstration &
Application Program (DDAP) is to develop and demonstrate a set of
procedures, plans and technologies for the rapid restoration of major
transportation nodes
-''Improve the fumigation verification step
> use of rapid viability determination methods for spore
strips/discs
-''Improve the clearance sampling step
> use of rapid viability determination methods for environmental
samples
Large facilities require thousands of biological indicators
to insure the fumigant is adequately dispersed
• Brentwood Post Office fumigation verification
included 8,000 spore strips
- Analysis of all the spore strips at Brentwood
took approximately 30 days
• Capitol Hill used 1,556 spore strip verification
samples
Our field-test for rapid fumigation verification
included scientific and operational objectives
Operational goals
- Demonstrate-1000 Bl overnight processing capability
- Demonstrate sample tracking/data analysis tools
Scientific goals
- Comparison of Rapid viability test protocol (RVTP) with standard
culture method for biological indicators (Bis)
• Determine accuracy of RVTP relative to standard culture
method
- Perform rigorous QC analysis
• Evaluate potential for cross-contamination
• Determine accuracy of RVTP to detect blind positive samples
• Determine assay sensitivity
Test desian
Analytical
Method
Approx.
CT
(ppmv)
RVTP
Method
Standard
Method
Subtotal
Spore
104
104
Cntl
0
0
50
10
50
10
120
C1O2 exposure Time (hrs)
1246 8 10 12
750 1500 3000 4500 6000 7500 9000
50 50 50 50 50 50 50
10 10 10 10 10 10 10
50 50 50 50 50 50 50
10 10 10 10 10 10 10
120 120 120 120 120 120 120
Number
of discs
400
80
400
80
960
•Total Bl number was 1094
• Half of the samples were analyzed by culture methods and half by RVTP
• Hundreds of samples were exposed to a non-lethal CIO2 cone.
• Additional 50 Bis exposed for 12 hours for inhibition studies
• Each PCR plate had > 10% positive and >10% negative controls
144 NHSRC
-------
Fumigant Generation
1. CIO2 generation combines sodium hypochlorite with
hydrochloric acid to produce chlorine, intermediate
precursor
2. Sodium chlorite is added to produce chlorine dioxide gas
3. The gas is dissolved in water and the chlorine dioxide moves
into the process stream, CIO2 (emitters) stripper removes
CIO2 from water phase to gas phase
Chemical plant
• Sodium chlorite
• Hydrochloric acid
•Sodium hypochlorite
Test facility drawing
Airflow in the chamber
was 3.31 ft3/min
Sabre Technologies's MCAD24R test trailer
Chamber sample tray
Temperature and relative humidity in the chamber was
monitored throughout the test
We averaged 79-85 °F and 78-81% RH
Day1
Day 2
Chlorine dioxide concentration was carefully
controlled during testing
Day 2
ACCUMULATIVE CT
(PPMV-HRS)
CIO2 assayed by a modified
Standard Methods APHA-
AWWA-WPCF-4500. CIO2
releases free iodine from an
acidified Kl solution. The
liberated iodine is titrated
with sodium thiosulfate.
Every other sample was analyzed by RVTP
For all exposure levels, red X or O was cultured, black X or
O was analyzed by RVTP, X = 106 spores on Bl
O = 104 spores on Bl
T
/ All samples were barcoded with the
location information and followed
through each process of analysis using
the methods establish by the National
BASIS/BioWatch programs.
Rapid viability test protocol was developed
for biothreat agents
| There is a rapid increase in DMA copy number during growth
B. anthracis Viability Detectio
i
Y.pestJS Viabilfty Detection
*-— •
____ ^__^— -*"~"
C,,L Til „„'„„„
Graphs shows increasing copies of DMA indicating cell growth
and therefore viability; initial inoculums were below detection
K. Smith, S. Kane, P. Coker, K. Montgomery, P. Imbro, P. Fitch, 2002, ROI pending
Decontamination Workshop 145
-------
Efficacy test protocols
RVTP
1. Place Bl in 96 well plate
2. Add tryptic soy broth (TSB) to
each well
3. Transfer time 0 sample to 96
well PCR plate
4. Lyse cells
5. Transfer aliquot of lysate to
second PCR plate
6. Analyze by real-time PCR
7. Continue to incubate culture
plate at 37°C with shaking
8. Repeat steps 3-5 for 14 hr
sample (endpoint)
Standard Culture
Place Bl in 10 ml TSB
in culture tube
Incubate @30-35°C,
statically for 7 days
Determine positives by
visual turbidity
Results
•s Chlorine dioxide concentration
time curves
Test chamber
Results: RVTP versus culture method using
Biological indicators (106 spores/disc)
|S
s An exposure of 750 ppmv
for a 6 hr resulted in no
viable growth
S There was no significant
difference between the
RVTP results and the
standard culture results
(student T test for mean
differences, P>0.05)
Results: RVTP versus standard culture method
using biological indicators (104 spores)
20
||
££ 15
££•
Is
— *-RVTP(qPCR)
0 *
ft -i
1
z 5
=
\
I I I I I I I I I ;
CIO4 concentration xtime
(ppmv-hr)
/There was no
significant difference
between the RVTP
results and the
results, P>0.05
False-positive occurrence
Standard culture methods resulted in 1.5%
false positives
- False positives for culture samples
determined by RVTP (qPCR)
No false negatives observed for RVTP
- False positive rate for RVTP defined
as percent difference between positive
result for 14 hr RVTP and visible growth
in well
RVTP results are numeric, standard
culturing are visual
Calculated
fumiaation
log10(CFU)
survivors exposed to CIO2
DPG1
730 ppmv, 90% RH, BAA
Time (hrs) Log(CFU)2
0
1
2
4
6
8
12
iiiil
8.2
4.8
2.1
0
0
0
0
HHrsE;i
LLNL
750 ppmv,
Time (hrs)
0
1
2
4
6
8
10
12
80%RH, B.atrophaeus
Log(CFU)
8.2
2.1
1.9
1.4
0
0
0
0
146 NHSRC
-------
Comparison of biological indicators-
discs and strips respond to non-lethal CTs was different
CIO2
Exposure Positives/total sample #
ppmv-hrs Apex disc SGM strip
0
780
1580
3140
10/10
3/10
2/10
0/10
10/10
9/10
10/10
10/10
SGM Biotech Strip- 6. subtilis var. Niger, 106 spores
APEX spore discs- 6. atrophaeus, 106 discs
P <0.05, significantly different results between means
Spores on stainless steel discs
Growth performance is different between the
two type of biological indicators
• Biological indicators may differs in several
qualities:
- Hard versus porous surface material
- Sleeve porosity and adsorptive capacity
- Spore viability
- Purity of spore preparations
-Spore piling
Summary
The Restoration DDAP is developing rapid
methods for restoration of a transportation
facility following a biological attack
We met our objective of decreasing the analysis
time for biological indicators from 7 d to 15 hr
RVTP showed the same sensitivity as the culture
technique and was highly accurate
There are significant differences between
biological indicators
The EPA's CIO2 fumigation recommendation of
750 ppm for 12 hr resulted in 'no viable spores'
in this test
We have 2 field tests planned for '05; 1) test RVTP in a high-throughput
automation mode, and 2) analyze hundreds of environmental samples
(wipes, socks, filters) by RVTP and culturing methods
Acknowledgements
LLNL
Paris Althouse
Tina Legler
Gloria Murphy
Tracy Letain
Mark Wagner
Tina Carlsen
Apex Laboratories, Inc.
Joseph Dalmasso
Sabre Technologies, Inc
Dave Skodack
Darrell Dechant
Kevin Wade
Bob Summerville
Buddy Britton
Funded by the Department
of Homeland Security
Decontamination Workshop 147
-------
Edgewood Chemical Biological Contor
Systematic Decontamination Project
Homeland Security: Verification of Chem/Bio Decon
Technologies
Philip Koga, Ph.D.
US Army Edgewood Chemical Biological Center
Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD
Presented at the USEPA-Sponsored Workshop on Decontamination, Cleanup,
and Associated Issues for Sites Contaminated with CBR Materials
February 23-25, 2005
Washington, DC
-
Edgewood Chomical Biological Contor
Background
How do we clean up anthrax-contaminated buildings?
- Surface treatment vs. fumigation
- Efficacy data
- Impact on building materials and contents
Edgewood Chomical Biological Contor
Systematic Decontamination Project
• Joint effort between USEPA NHSRC and ECBC
• Systematic study on the performance of two to three
commercial fumigant technologies
- chlorine dioxide (CIO2)
- vaporized hydrogen peroxide (VHP™)
-
Edgewood Chomical Biological Contor
Fumigant
^jK^^
""^%^
sa@ff ^^
Indoor Surface Materials
Change in
material
properties
Reduction in
Anthrax / surrogate
load
Losses in
fumigant
concentration
Edgewood Chomical Biological Contor
Bioefficacv - Objectives
1. CT Range Finding:
- series of CT (concentration x time) studies
- six types of material coupons
- Avirulent and virulent B. anthracls
- calculate D values
2. Parametric Study:
- sub-optimal temperature and RH at optimal CT
- one porous and one non-porous material
- selected surrogates
.
Edgewood Chomical Biological Contor
Bioefficacv - Target Microorganisms
1. Bacillus anthracls (Ames or other suitable strain)
2. B. ant/?/-ac/s(NNR1A1, plasmid-free)
3. Geobacillus stearothermophilus (ATCC 7953)
4. B.subtilis (ATCC 19659)
5. B. atrophaeus (B. subtilis var. niger ATCC 49337)
6. Yersinia ruckerii (ATCC 29473)
Bl - Geobacillus stearothermophilus (STERIS)
Bl - B. atrophaeus (Apex Laboratories, Inc.)
148 NHSRC
-------
Edgewood Chemical Biological Contor
Test Materials
Material
Unpainted concrete
Painted steel (I beam)1
Structural Pine Wood
Ceiling tile
Carpet
Painted wall board2
Source - Manufacturer
York Building -Armstrong
Specialized Metals
Home Depot - Bowater
Home Depot - Armstrong
Home Depot - Queen Shaw
Home Depot - US Gypsum
1- Painted with TT-P-636 Red Oxide Primer (Coronado paint)
2- Painted with latex paint
Edgewood Chemical Biological Center
1.3 x 1.3 cm Test Coupons in Petri-plates
Edgewood Chemical Biological Center
Bioefficacv - Test Fumiqants
STERIS VHP™
H202-» 2 OH (free radical)
ClorDiSvs, Inc. (CSI)
2NaCIO2 + CI2-» 2CIO2
2NaCI
"
SABRE Oxi. Tech. (SOT)
2NaCIO2 (25%) + HCI(15%)+ NaOCI
(12.5%)-»2CI02 + 2NaCI
Edgewood Chemical Biological Center
The Cloridox
-GMP
Generator &
Test Chamber
Sampling Ante-
chamber
Fumigation
Chamber-
8cu-ft
Edgewood Chemical Biological Center
Bioefficacv - Test Chamber
• 8 cubic feet (2 ft x 2 ft x 2 ft)
• Constructed by ChlorDiSys, Inc. using 316 SS
• Contains a circulation fan and sensors for measuring
temperature, RH, pressure, CIO2, and H2O2
• Five antechambers for easy access and removal of
coupons (inner and outer airlock doors)
• Separate fumigant feed ports
Edgewood Chemical Biological Center
Bioefficacv - Study Design
1. CT Range-Finding Study (range of CT for 6 log kill)
A. Avirulent anthrax (107 spores in 50 ^L inoculum)
- Six test materials and two biological indicators
- One VHP fumigant and two CIO2 fumigants
- Five replicates at five exposure times for each
of three concentrations plus controls
- CT range = 220 to 1800 ppm-hr for VHP
- CT range = 2000 to 18000 ppm-hr for CIO2
Decontamination Workshop 149
-------
Edgewood Chemical Biological Contor
Bioefficacy - Study Design
1. CT Range-Finding Study
B. Virulent anthrax (107 spores in 50 JJ.L inoculum)
- Two test materials (wood and steel) and two
biological indicators
- One VHP fumigant and two CIO2 fumigants
- Five replicates at five exposure times for each
of two concentrations plus controls
- CT range dependent on results with avirulent BA
Edgewood Chomical Biological Contor
Bioefficacy - Study Design
2. Parametric study at varying temperature and RH
- Four surrogates (107 in 50 JJ.L inoculum)
- Two test materials (wood and steel) and two
biological indicators
- One VHP fumigant and one CIO2 fumigant
- Five replicates at one exposure time and one
concentration for each of two temperatures and
two RH plus controls
^ - CT selected from preceding results
Edgewood Chomical Biological Contor
Bioefficacy - Study Execution
1. Preparation of building material coupons
- Autoclave using dry cycle
- Test 2 coupons per cycle for sterility
- Prepare spore suspension in 0.5% BSA
- Inoculate with 107 cfu in 50 (4.L
- Air dry one hour in the biosafety cabinet
- Use within one week (one hour for Y. ruckerii)
-
Edgewood Chomical Biological Contor
Bioefficacy - Study Execution
2. Spore recovery and enumeration
- Immerse carrier in spore recovery medium
- Sonicate 10 minutes then vortex 2 minutes
- Prepare five 10-fold serial dilutions
- Spread plate 0.1 mL of selected dilutions in
triplicate
- If no recovery observed with spread plates,
repeat with pour plates
Edgewood Chomical Biological Contor
Bioefficacy - Study Execution
3. Exposure of coupons to fumigant
- Use cycle parameters recommended by vendor
- Dehumidification (<30% RH) for VHP
- Humidification (>75% RH) for CIO2
- Conditioning phase (typically 2-10 minutes)
- Introduce coupons at start of sterilization phase
- Remove coupons at pre-selected times and
immediately begin spore recovery process
Edgewood Chomical Biological Contor
Bioefficacy - Study Execution
4. Measurement of fumigant concentration
- VHP: Dra'ger electrochemical sensor in chamber
- VHP independently verified by chemical titration
(H2O2 + Kl + ammonium molybdate -> triiodide
which is titrated with thiosulfate)
- CIO2: spectrophotometric gas sensor in chamber
- CIO2 independently verified using Hach kits
- Hach kits validated using amperometric titration
method
v.—';
150 NHSRC
-------
Edgewood Chemical Biological Contor
Experimental Set up per CT Measurement
Edgewood Chemical Biological Center
Bioefficacv - Schedule
Fumigant
ChlorDiSys
STERIS
Sabre
CT Range-Finding
Underway
Start early March
Parametric
2QCY05
2QCY05
Need generator NLT March 20, 2005
i
Edgewood Chemical Biological Center
Deposition Velocity/Material Compatibility
1. Deposition Velocity Objective
- Lab-scale measurement of the effects of six
building materials on concentration / titer of CIO2
and VHP
2. Material Compatibility Objective
- Measure the effects CIO2 and VHP may have on
the integrity of the six building materials
- Test for residual fumigant
I
Edgewood Chemical Biological Center
Deposition Velocity/Material Compatibility
Related projects spanning a continuum of activity
Deposition Velocity Material Compatibility
Exposure tp^
Fumigant
Coupon Prep
• ~t\ .
2
"Storage & Aging
Testing
o
Edgewood Chemical Biological Center
Deposition Velocity Testing
• Same six test materials used for Bioefficacy study
- Unpainted concrete - Painted steel
- Structural Pine wood - Ceiling tile
- Painted wall board - Carpet
• Two test fumigants
- VHP™ (STERIS)
- CIO2(CDG)
Edgewood Chemical Biological Center
Vaporized Hydrogen Peroxide Setup
Generator: Steris VHP M100-S
'* ., -1
k -Jj -» V.P™,
L« rr
, JK .*• IWBWI '
K.i"— u
Decontamination Workshop 151
-------
Edgewood Chemical Biological Center
VHP Exposure Chamber
|9) r«ncwMun mni Ikmnly $wwy*
wfEPi ccmcKfit coupon* Ibl 9lFwn anVyvn IneJudM
Coupon po«>Mn marud. »rn*or pnd
Exposure Chamber: Plas-Labs compact glove box
&
Edgewood Chemical Biological Center
Chlorine Dioxide Setup
Generator: CDG Technology bench-scale
f\ . chlorine dioxide generator, Model "Micro'
\mj
Edgewood Chemical Biological Center
Chlorine Dioxide Exposure Chamber
Exposure Chamber: Plas-Labs compact glove box
0
Edgewood Chemical Biological Center
Deposition Velocity Testing
Experimental Conditions
Test
Run
1
2
3
4
Fumigant
„
+
+
+
Coupon
+
-
+
+
Comment
Mat. Compat. Controls
Baseline
Full Concentration
1/2 Concentration
same CT as Run 3
•-•
Edgewood Chemical Biological Center
Deposition Velocity Testing
Experimental Conditions
Test Parameter
Temperature
Relative humidity, initial
Concentration 1 (ppm)
Exposure time 1 (hours)
Concentration 2 (ppm)
Exposure time 2 (hours)
Flow rate (cfm)
VHP
>30°C
<30%
250-300
4
125-150
8
0.2
CI02
>24°C
>75%
2000-2500
6
1000-1250
12
3.0
fl
I
Edgewood Chemical Biological Center
Material Compatibility Testing
Test Materials
• Residential circuit breakers added
• Follow same exposure regimen as other materials
Coupon Aging
• Store exposed coupons in open containers for -90
days at room temperature and ambient RH
Compatibility Testing
• Record visual changes at day 0 and day 90
• Test exposed coupons after day 90
,«,
v_^
152 NHSRC
-------
Edgewood Chemical Biological Contor
Material Compatibility Testing
Material
Ceiling tile
Carpet
Wallboard
Test
ASTM C367-99: Strength Properties of
Prefabricated Architectural Acoustical
Tile or Lay-In Ceiling Panels, sections 5.1,
22-28
ASTM D1335-03: Tuft Bind of Pile Yarn
Floor Coverings
ASTM C473 03' Phyical Testing of
Gypsum Panel Products
• *» • ^%
^»; O
;
Edgewood Chomical Biological Contor
Material Compatibility Testina
Material
Wood
Steel
Concrete
Test
ASTM D4761-02a: Mechanical Properties
of Lumber and Wood-Based Structural
Material
ASTM A370-03a: Mechanical Testing of
Steel Products
ASTM C140-03: Sampling and Testing
Concrete Masonry Units and Related
Units
<- ^
;
Edgewood Chomical Biological Contor
Material Compatibility Testing
Material
Wood
Metal
Circuit
Breakers
Test
FTIR: changes in cellulose and other
polymers
Ion chromatography: chloride, chlorite,
chlorate, and perchlorate anions
Store under load
UL Test Method 1077
•fl
™-J
;
Edgewood Chomical Biological Contor
Velocity Deposition/Materials Compatibility
Schedule
Deposition Velocity: Initiated
Materials Compatibility: 2QCY05
Edgewood Chomical Biological Contor
Systematic Decontamination
Decontamination Workshop 153
-------
Battelle
- Illl..!].---, . ' llllllll.lln>II
Verification of Commercial Decontamination
Technologies in Bench-Scale Studies Using
Bacillus anthracis Spores
M.L Taylor, J.V. Rogers, Y.IV. Choi, W.R. Richter, K.R. Riggs, C.L. Sabourin
Battelle Memorial Institute, Columbus and Cincinnati, Ohio
J.C.S. Chang
Environmental Protection Agency, Research Triangle Park, North Carolina
Outline
1 Purpose of Testing
1 Technologies Tested
1 Test Apparatus
1 Test Materials & Organisms
1 Parameters Evaluated
1 Generalized Test Procedures
1 BIOQUELL, Inc. - Hydrogen Peroxide Gas Testing
1 CERTEK, Inc. - Formaldehyde Gas Testing
1 CDG Technology, Inc. -Chlorine Dioxide Testing
1 Acknowledgements
Baielle
Purpose of Testing
EPA ETV Program - Battelle, Testing Contractor
- Verify the performance characteristics of environmental technologies
and report objective information to permitters, buyers and prospective
users
- Testing performed as stipulated in test/quality assurance plans
developed with the participation of technical experts, stakeholders and
vendors
Focus of Initial Tests
- Verify performance of fumigant-type technologies for decontaminating
indoor surfaces inoculated with B. anthracis (Ames) and surrogates
Baneue
Technologies Tested
Technology
Hydrogen Peroxide Gas
Formaldehyde Gas
Chlorine Dioxide Gas
Vendor
BIOQUELL, Inc.
CERTEK, Inc.
CDG Research Corporation
Baneue
Configuration of Testing Apparatus
Technology
being tested
BL-3 Laboratory
Baffeue
Test Chamber
Plas-Labs Compact
Glove Box
modified per vendor's
request (BIOQUELL
configuration shown)
Direct Injection
Port *
154 NHSRC
-------
Test Materials
1 Industrial-grade carpet (1C)
1 Bare wood (pine lumber) (BWD)
• Glass (GS)
1 Decorative laminate (DL)
1 Galvanized metal ductwork (GM)
1 Painted (latex, flat) wallboard paper (PW)
p Painted (latex, semi-gloss) concrete cinder
block (PC).
Baireue
Organisms
Bacillus anthracis Ames
Bacillus subtilis (ATCC 19659)
Geobacillus stearothermophilus (ATCC 12980)
Biological Indicators
- Bacillus subtilis (ATCC 19659)
- Geobacillus stearothermophilus (ATCC 12980)
Spore Strips
- Bacillus atrophaeus (ATCC 9372)
Biological Indicator
_,
Parameters Evaluated
• Biological Efficacy Test
- Log Reduction in viable spores on test materials
- Quantitative
- Positive/Negative bacterial growth at 1 and 7 days
- Biological indicators/Spore strips; qualitative
• Coupon Damage
-Changes in appearance, color, texture, etc.
Batteue
Generalized Test Procedure
• Couple decontamination technology to test chamber
• Prepare coupons of test materials, inoculate
• Place into test chamber
• Implement decontamination technology
• Remove coupons from test chamber
• Analyze
Batteue
Analysis Procedure for B. anthracis Ames
Procedure
Growth
Assessment at 1
and 7 days
Heat Shock for 1 hr
Data Analysis
1 Efficacy (E) Calculation
E = log(NVN)
N' = total viable spores recovered from control samples (no
decon)
N = total viable spores recovered from decontaminated
samples
1 Data (total spores; percent recovery)
1 Expressed as Mean ± SD
Decontamination Workshop 155
-------
Statistical Analysis
1 Two-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) model
1 Compared each mean to zero
1 Compared each simulant to B. anthracis (within material)
1 Compared each simulant to B. anthracis for porous and non-
porous materials
1 SAS® (Version 8.2) GLM procedure
Baielle
BIOQUELL, Inc. - Hydrogen Peroxide
Cycle Parameters
(Provided by Vendor)
•Cycle pressure:
•Conditioning time:
•Gassing time:
•Gassing dwell:
•H2O2 injection rate:
•H2O2 dwell rate:
•H2O2 concentration
during dwell:
•Aeration time:
20 Pascals
10min
20 min
20 min
2.0 g/min
0.5 g/min
MOOOppm
set for 9999 min
CLARUS™ C Unit
Baielle
BIOQUELL, Inc. - Hydrogen Peroxide
Microcondensation
during Dwell Phase
BIOQUELL, Inc. - Hydrogen Peroxide
Results
Mean Efficacy for Spores
Material"
Porous
Non-porous
Industrial -grade
Carpet
Painted Concrete
Bare Wood
Glass
Decorative
Laminate
Painted Wallboard
Paper
Galvanized Metal
Ductwork
a anthracis*
3.01 (2.62-3.55)c
6.36 (3.92-7.58)c
3.70 (3.20-4.46)c
>7.92 (7.92)=
>7.85 (7.85)=
>6.92 (6.92)=
>7.54 (7.54)=
a subtilis*
1.63(1. 46-1. 76):.d
6.09 (5.58-7. 10)=
2.18(1.81-2.75)c.d
>7.57 (7.57)c
>7.66 (7.66)c
>7.52 (7.52)c
6.44 (5.73-7.56)=
G. stearothermophilus^
0.81 (0.69-0.89)d
4.09 (3.09-5. 15)[.d
4.09 (3.80-4.61)c
4.68 (4.27-5. 11)c'd
3.75(2.20-4.77)[.d
5.98 (5.47-6.99)c
1.97(1.90-2.04)[.d
a Three replicates were used for each test material for each organism.
b Log reduction in spores with range in parentheses.
c Mean significantly different from 0 (P<0.05).
d Surrogates significantly different from B. anthracis for specified material (P<0.05).
Baneue
BIOQUELL, Inc. - Hydrogen Peroxide
Statistical Analysis
Material
Porous
Non-porous
Industrial -grade
Carpet
Painted Concrete
Bare Wood
Glass
Decorative
Laminate
Painted Wallboard
Paper
Galvanized Metal
Ductwork
a anthracis
3.01
6.36
3.70
7.92
7.85
6.92
7.54
a subOlis
1.63
6.09
2.18
7.57
7.66
7.52
6.44
G. stearothermophilus
0.81
4.09
4.09
4.68
3.75
5.98
1.97
All values are significantly different than zero (P<0.05)
except
^Baneje_
BIOQUELL, Inc. - Hydrogen Peroxide
Statistical Analysis
Material
Porous
Non-porous
Industrial -grade
Carpet
Painted Concrete
Bare Wood
Glass
Decorative
Laminate
Painted Wallboard
Paper
Galvanized Metal
Ductwork
a anthracis
3.01
6.36
3.70
7.92
7.85
6.92
7.54
a subOlis
1.63
6.09
2.18
7.57
7.66
7.52
6.44
G. stearothermophilus
0.81
4.09
4.09
4.68
3.75
5.98
1.97
Mean value is significantly different than a anthracis (P=O.OS)
^Baneje_
156 NHSRC
-------
BIOQUELL, Inc. - Hydrogen Peroxide
Growth Indicators
Indicator (Organism)
Biological Indicator (B. subtitis ATCC 19659) Control
Biological Indicator (G. stearothermophitus ATCC 12980) Control
Spore Strip (B. atrophaeus ATCC 9372) Control
Biological Indicator (B. subtitis ATCC 19659) Decontaminated
Biological Indicator (G. stearothermophilus ATCC 12980) Decontaminated
Spore Strip (B. atrophaeus ATCC 9372) Decontaminated
Day1
S1
S2
S3
Day?
S1
S2
S3
For all tests, control biological indicators and spore
strips displayed positive growth while those
decontaminated showed negative growth.
Baneue
CERTEK, Inc. - Formaldehyde
Cycle Parameters
(Provided by Vendor)
•Cycle pressure: ambient
•Conditioning time: 1 hour
(ramp-up of formaldehyde concentration)
•Dwell time:
•Formaldehyde
concentration:
•Relative humidity:
•Neutralization:
(ammonium carbonate)
•Total run time: 16-18 hours
10 hours
theoretical - 8600 ppm
actual - 1,100 ppm
75%
1 hour
CERTEK, Inc. Unit
Baireue
CERTEK, Inc. - Formaldehyde
Results
Mean Efficacy for Spores
Material"
Porous
Non-porous
Industrial -grade
Carpet
Painted Concrete
Bare Wood
Glass
Decorative
Laminate
Painted Wallboard
Paper
Galvanized Metal
Ductwork
a anthracis*
>7.00 (7.00)=
7.15(5.93-7.76)c
>7.61 (7.61)=
>7.71 (7.71)=
6.47 (5.61-7.66)c
>5.17(5.17)=
>7.86 (7.86)=
a subtilis*
>8.04 (8.04)c
6.02 (5.61-6.22)=
6.58 (5.57-7.08)=
>7.79 (7.79)=
7.29 (6.38-7.74)=
>7.68(7.68)[.d
6.24(5.39-7.87)=.d
G. stearothermophilus*
5.68 (4.81-7. 18)[.d
6.20 (4.03-7.29)c
>6.82 (6.82)=
>7.24 (7.24)=
>7.12(7.12)=
>7.19(7.19)=.d
>7.64 (7.64)=
a Three replicates were used for each test material for each organism.
b Log reduction in spores with range in parentheses.
c Mean significantly different from 0 (P<0.05).
d Surrogates significantly different from B. anthracis for specified material (P<0.05).
Batteue
R,En™«,./I™™-i»,
CERTEK, Inc. - Formaldehyde
Statistical Analysis
Material
Porous
Non-porous
Industrial-grade
Carpet
Painted Concrete
Bare Wood
Glass
Decorative
Laminate
Painted Wallboard
Paper
Galvanized Metal
Ductwork
a anthracis
>7.00
7.15
>7.61
>7.71
6.47
>5.17
>7.86
a subtilis
>8.04
6.02
6.58
>7.79
7.29
>7.68
6.24
G. stearothermophilus
5.68
6.20
>6.82
>7.24
>7.12
>7.19
>7.64
All values are significantly different than zero (P<0.05)
except
Baireue
U» Bn.ln™. ./Im,.».buii
CERTEK, Inc. - Formaldehyde
Statistical Analysis
Material
Porous
Non-porous
Industrial-grade
Carpet
Painted Concrete
Bare Wood
Glass
Decorative
Laminate
Painted Wallboard
Paper
Galvanized Metal
Ductwork
a anthracis
>7.00
7.15
>7.61
>7.71
6.47
>5.17
>7.86
a subtilis
>8.04
6.02
6.58
>7.79
7.29
>7.68
6.24
G. stearothermophilus
5.68
6.20
>6.82
>7.24
>7.12
>7.19
>7.64
Mean value is significantly different than a anthracis (P=O.OS)
raBBaneue_
CDG Research Corporation - Chlorine Dioxide
Cycle Parameters
(Provided by Vendor)
•Cycle pressure:
•Conditioning time:
•Dwell time:
•Chlorine Dioxide
concentration:
•Relative humidity:
•Temperature:
•Neutralization:
ambient
N/A
6 hours
2000 ppm
1 t
70-80%
23-27°C
30-60 min followed by overnight aeration
(10% NaOH, 10% NaS2O4 in water)
•Total run time: 16-18 hours
Decontamination Workshop 157
-------
CDG Research Corporation - Chlorine Dioxide
Results
Mean Efficacy for Spores
Material"
Porous
Non-porous
Industrial -grade
Carpet
Painted Concrete
Bare Wood
Glass
Decorative
Laminate
Painted Wallboard
Paper
Galvanized Metal
Ductwork
a anthracis*'
4.62(4.11-5.50)
7.25 (6.24-7.76)
4.33(4.10-4.48)
5.70 (5.35-6.06)
>7.68 (7.68)
>7.79 (7.79)
B. subtilis*-
4.44 (4.28-4.62)
4.74 (4.44-4.93)=
4.48 (4.14-4.79)
5.23 (4.89-5.49)
4.62 (3.24-5.47)=
5.57 (S.55-5.63^
G. stearothennophilus*'
3.22(3.17-3.28)c
5.79 (5.08-6.90)c
3.79 (3.70-3.87)
3.87 (3.64-4.20)c
4.44 (4.29-4.59)
5.62 (4.65-6.87)c
3.43 (3.33-3.56)c
a Three replicates were used for each test material for each organism.
b Log reduction in spores with range in parentheses.
c Surrogates significantly different from B. antrhacis for specified material (P<0.05).
Baneue
U, BusmWfcmo^i™
CDG Research Corporation - Chlorine Dioxide
Statistical Analysis
Material
Porous
Non-porous
Industrial-grade
Carpet
Painted Concrete
Bare Wood
Glass
Decorative
Laminate
Painted Wallboard
Paper
Galvanized Metal
Ductwork
a antlnacis
4.62
7.25
4.33
5.70
4.57
>7.68
>7.79
a subtilis
4.44
4.74
4.48
5.23
5.14
4.62
5.57
G. stearothennophilus
3.22
5.79
3.79
3.87
4.44
5.62
3.43
All values are significantly different than zero (P<0.05)
e«eP, g
Baneue
U, BusmWfcmo^i™
CDG Research Corporation - Chlorine Dioxide
Statistical Analysis
Material
Porous
Non-porous
Industrial-grade
Carpet
Painted Concrete
Bare Wood
Glass
Decorative
Laminate
Painted Wallboard
Paper
Galvanized Metal
Ductwork
B. anthracis
4.62
7.25
4.33
5.70
4.57
>7.68
>7.79
B. subtilis
4.44
4.74
4.48
5.23
5.14
4.62
5.57
G. stearothennophilus
3.22
5.79
3.79
3.87
4.44
5.62
3.43
Mean value is significantly different than B. anthracis (P=O.OS)
Batreiie
Acknowledgements
Battelle
Dr. James Estep - Battelle MREF Manager
Dr. Carol Sabourln - Verffication Testing Coordinate
Dr. James Rogers - Study Director
Dr. Michael Taylor - BDT Center Director
Ms. Karen Riggs - BDT Center Manager
Dr. Harry Stone - Senior Reviewer
Mr. Young Choi - Lead Technician
Mr. Will Richter-Technician
Ms. Denise Rudnicki- Technician
Mr. Rick Turtle - Technician
Ms. Nicole Caudill - Qualfty Assurance
External Reviewers
Dr. Phil Koga - U.S. Army Research Development & Engineering C
Dr. Barry Pyle - Montana State University
Ms. Susan Spring!horpe - University of Ottawa
Dr. Lloyd Larson - U.S. Army Dugway Proving Ground
Mr. John Kyme - Defense Group, Inc.
Dr. Greg Knudson, U.S. Central Intelligence Agency
U.S. EPA
Dr. John Chang - BDT Center Manager
Dr. Dorothy Canter, Reviewer
Mr. Jeff Kern pter. Reviewer
Ms. Shirley Wasson, Quality Assurance
Mr. Bruce Henschel, Reviewer
Baneue
New EPA Program: Technology Testing
and Evaluation Program (TTEP)
TTEP established in July 2004 by the EPA National
Homeland Security Research Center (NHSRC)
EPA Project Officer - Eric Koglin
Battelle Project Manager - Karen Riggs
Baireue
Decontamination Technology Evaluation
Tasks in Progress
Three Task Orders for evaluating building
decontamination technologies were received
September 2004
-"Decontamination Technology Testing and Evaluation"
- EPA Task Order Project Officer, Dr. John Chang
- Battelle Task Order Leader, Dr. Mike Taylor
- "Systematic Evaluation of Developmental and
Commercially Available Methods for Biological Agent
Decontamination"
- EPA Task Order Project Officer, Dr. Shawn Ryan
- Battelle Task Order Leader, Dr. Harry Stone
- "Systematic Evaluation of Developmental and
Commercially Available Methods for Chemical Agent
Decontamination"
- EPA Task Order Project Officer, Dr. Shawn Ryan
- Battelle Task Order Leader, Dr. Mike Taylor
Baireue
158 NHSRC
-------
"DIRTYBOMBS" (RDDs)
AND CLEANUP
Fred B. Holbrook
DECON WORKSHOP
February 25, 2005
Terrorism and RDDs
1. Terrorism
2. RDDs
3. Radiological components
4. RDDs versus INDs
Terrorism
The calculated use of violence to
inculcate fear; intended to coerce
or intimidate governments or
societies, in the pursuit of goals
that are generally political,
religious, or ideological. (DOD)
RDDs
RDDs are radiological dispersion
devices or "dirty bombs".
Physical effect: contamination
Overall aim: psychological and
economical
Uses conventional explosives to
disperse radioactive material.
Radiological components
> Cesium-137
> Cobalt-60
> lridium-192
> Strontium-90
30 yrs (half-life)
5.25 yrs
74 days
29 years
> Radium-226 1620 years
> Plutonium-238 88 years
> Americium-241 432 years
> Californium-252 2.7 yrs
Decontamination Workshop 159
-------
RDDs versus INDs
Radiological Dispersion Devices can
generate terror but cause few fatalities.
Improvised Nuclear Device is a crude
nuclear device and causes bldg. to
come down near instantly with high
doses radiation, heat & fires, and lost
lives (depending on yield). Fission:
force, electromagnetic waves, and
fallout.
1300 to 2100 metric tons enriched
uranium in world with questionable
controls.
Radiological Considerations
Availability
Biological Effects
Availability
Specialized materials - weapon grade
UorPu.
• Government control
Radioactive materials
• Uses: academic, industrial, agricultural,
and medical
• Problem: 1 lost source every day/NRC
Availability continued
Cs-137: gauges, well logging, cancer
treatment, irradiators j—1_™
• . *
Co-60: gauges, radiotherapy,
sterilization, radiography
lr-192: radiography, radiotherapy
Am-241: medical diag, research,
gauges, distance, smoke detector
Cf-252: radiography, well logging,
moisture/density, cancer treatment
Problem: little security worldwide
Radiation
Alpha - helium nucleus
shielding - paper or skin
travel - few centimeters
Problem - inhalation and ingestion
Beta - electron
shielding - Al foil or human skin
travel - few feet
Problem - deep and serious burns;
internal
Radiation continued
' Gamma - electromagnetic energy
high energy short wavelength photon,
pure energy, no charge
shielding - lead
travel - go thru many cm. lead
Problem - severe damage internally
' Strength - how many nuclei decay per
second; specific activity, Ci/gram
160 NHSRC
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Biological effects
- Dosage of ionizing
radiation
• 25-50 rem -
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Decontamination Techniques
• Power Brushing mechanical • Shaving - diamond tipped rotary
erosion of contaminate substrate cutting head surface removal
• Pressure Washing - mechanical . Spa||ing _ mechanical impact of
flushing contaminated surface
• Scabbling - mechanical eroding
of contaminant
Decontamination Techniques
• Sponge-jet Blasting -
abrasive removal
• Strippable Coatings -
chemical bonding to
surface contaminates
• Vibratory Processing -
high frequency removal in
liquid media
• Hydrogen Peroxide - dissolution
of materials on surface
• Geobacter Sulfurreducens -
bacterial reduction of rad.
producing precipitation
EPA Homeland Security
Research Program
162 NHSRC
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UK approach to ROD clean-up
Dr Malcolm Wakerley
Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs
(Defra)
Washington, 25 February 2005
Lessons to learn from
Spain, US B-52 bomber nuclear weapons
accident 103tsoil - US, 12,000m3 vegetation
waste
Ukraine, Chernobyl reactor accident 137Cs fallout
across most of Europe
Brazil, Goiania, cancer therapy unit, 137Cs
chloride, 3,000m3 waste
Consequences in UK
• Creation of Radiation Incident Monitoring Network,
RIMNET, 92 gamma detectors about 30km apart and
network of approved labs supplying data to London
• Need for large area monitoring - Airborne Gamma Survey
• 1996 review of decontamination and clean-up techniques
for use in UK following radioactive accidents
- National Radiation Protection Board
- Rolls Royce Nuclear Engineering
- Atomic Weapon Establishment
_t _ r_ _^
GclrO
_
1996 Review
• Simple logic diagram and 22 tables on decontamination
techniques, clean-up rates, resources required, costs
incurred and wastes requiring disposal.
• Covers:-
- metalled surfaces
- large grass areas
- gardens
- trees and bushes
- roofs
- walls and windows
- internal surfaces
dcfro'
1996 Review (cont)
Worked example of a UK town, Gateshead and
surroundings
55 square miles
200,000 population
550 miles of roads
Looked at inventory of mechanical equipment available
within area and UK wide
Used EXPURT (Exposure from Urban Radionuclide
Transfer) Model
dcfra
Responses to 9/11
• Production of a Recovery Handbook for Radiation
Incidents
Production of a Recovery Handbook for CB
Incidents
Ability to feed Airborne Gamma Survey results to
RIMNET
Examination of modelling
ricfrc.
Decontamination Workshop 163
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Radioactive Incident Monitoring Network
(RIMNET)
94 fixed monitoring locations across United Kingdom
• Measuring ambient gamma dose rate
• Measuring Range: 50 nSv/h - 3 mSv/h
• Sensitivity: 15cps/uSv/h
• Temperature Range: -20oC - +40oC
• Energy Response: 60KeV - 1.25MeV, (normalised to
caesium-137)
defrti
derro
Radioactive Incident Monitoring Network
(RIMNET)
Access to modelling capability of UK Met. Office
• Short Range - Area of Impact (Chemet, PACRAM)
• Medium (Mesoscale) - Local effects (ADMS)
• Long Range (Lagrangian diffusion) - Transboundary
impacts (NAME)
defro
CXERCJSE -4
4. *
164 NHSRC
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Radiological Handbook
"To guide decision-makers through the available
recovery options following a radioactive dispersal
event"
Covers radionuclides that could be used by terrorists.
!9mTc
238pu
75Se
103Ru
136Cs
169 Yb
239pu
9°Sr+9°Y
106Ru
137Cs
192|r
M1Am
35Zr
131|
1«Ba
95Nb
132Te
Radiological Handbook (cont)
• Compilation of reliable, consistent and comprehensive
information to help users identify issues and evaluate
options
- Recovery and Radiation Protection
- Agricultural Food Production
- Domestic Food Production and Free Food
- Inhabited Areas
- Drinking Water
• 570 pages and interactive CD format
• Being made available to US via Quad
• Being expanded to cover crops, climate in rest of Europe
Radiological Handbook (cont)
Stepl
Step 2
Step 3
Step 4
StepS
Determine type of incident & scope
radionuclides involved; scope extent & scale of
contamination
Determine extent of existing countermeasures
eg precautionary advice/order, sheltering &
evacuation
Prioritise contaminated area into broad bands
based on urgency of need for decisions.
For each band:
Determine land uses
Divide contaminated area into broadly similar
regions & into topic areas based on
information obtained
dcfro
Radiological Handbook (cont)
Step 6
Step 7
Step 8
Step 9
Step 10
Prioritise regions &/or topic areas.
Develop and implement monitoring strategy
Consider options for each region and/or topic
area
Assess options for each region &/or topic
area
Choose options for each region &/or topic area
Implement options
Monitor & review effectiveness & impact of
chosen options
Radiological Handbook (cont)
INHABITED MiAS
dcfro
Radiological Handbook (cont)
Introduction
Specific criteria for recovery in inhabited areas
Framework for making decisions
Determining the nature and extent of the incident and
characterising the contamination
Estimating doses in inhabited areas
Considering appropriate recovery options
Assess consequences of implementing recovery options
Choice of a strategy
Pre-planning
Decontamination Workshop 165
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SEPA
United States
Environmental Protection
Agency
Office of Research and Development
National Homeland Security Research Center
Cincinnati, OH 45268
Official Business
Penalty for Private Use
$300
EPA/600/R-05/083
October 2005
PRESORTED STANDARD
POSTAGE & PAID
EPA
PERMIT NO. G-35
Recycled/Recyclable
Printed with vegetable-based Ink on
paper that contains a minimum of
50% post-consumer fiber content
processed chlorine free
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