&EPA
United States
Environmental Protection
Agency
         RESEARCH REPORT
        Decontamination, Cleanup, and Associated
        Issues for Sites Contaminated with Chemical,
        Biological, or Radiological Materials
        Office of Research and Development
        National Homeland Security
        Research Center
                                        mi

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                                                       EPA/600/R-05/083
                                                          October 2005
                     Workshop on
       Decontamination, Cleanup, and
           Associated  Issues for Sites
Contaminated With Chemical, Biological,
            or  Radiological  Materials
                                by
                              Sarah Dun
                        Eastern Research Group, Inc.
                          Lexington, MA 02421

                             Joseph Wood
                      U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
                      Office of Research and Development
                    National Homeland Security Research Center
                Decontamination and Consequence Management Division
                       Research Triangle Park, NC 27511

                             Blair Martin
                      U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
                      Office of Research and Development
                   National Risk Management Research Laboratory
                       Research Triangle Park, NC 27511
                         Contract No. EP-C-04-056
                      Office of Research and Development
                      U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
                          Cincinnati, OH 45268
                                                   Recycled/Recyclable
                                                   Printed with vegetable-based ink on
                                                   paper that contains a minimum of
                                                   50% post-consumer fiber content
                                                   processed chlorine free

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ii NHSRC

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Note
The majority of this report was prepared by Sarah Dun of Eastern Research
Group, Inc. (ERG), an EPA contractor, as a general record of discussion for
the "Workshop on Decontamination, Cleanup, and Associated Issues for
Sites Contaminated With Chemical, Biological, or Radiological Agents."
Joseph Wood was coauthor and editor of technical content. This report
captures the main points of scheduled presentations and summarizes
discussions among the workshop panelists, but it does not contain a
verbatim transcript of all issues discussed.
    The production of this document has been funded wholly by the
United States Environmental Protection Agency under Contract No. EP-
C-04-056 to ERG.
                                                              Decontamination Workshop iii

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Table of Contents
    List of Abbreviations and Acronyms	vi
    Executive Summary	viii
    Introduction	xvii
    1. Opening Remarks	1
    2. Presentations and Associated Question and Answer Periods	3
        DHS S&T Biological and Chemical Restoration Programs	3
        Crime Scene Management and WMD Terrorism	5
        CDC/NIOSH and Health Response to Biothreat Agents:
               Environmental Monitoring	6
        Ranking Threats for Decontamination Research	7
        OPP Sterilant Registration Project: Improving the
               Association of Official Analytical Chemists (AOAC)
               Sporicidal Activity Test and the Evaluation of
               Quantitative Methods	9
        Crisis Exemptions for Products Intended to Inactivate Bacillus
               anthracis	10
        Sampling and Clearance Lessons Learned	12
        The Use of the Trace Atmospheric Gas Analyzer (TAGA) to
               Qualitatively and Quantitatively Monitor Ambient
               Air for Chemical Warfare Agents (CWAs) and
               Decontamination Agents in Real Time at Parts per
               Trillion by Volume Levels or Below	14
        Insurance and Indemnity Issues	15
        The Role of the On-Scene Coordinator in the Process	16
        Introduction to the Government Decontamination Services	17
        Laboratory Capacity Issues	18
        Chlorine Dioxide Fumigation and Liquid Chlorine Dioxide	20
        STERIS Chem-Bio Decontamination	22
        Vaporous Hydrogen Peroxide (VHP) for Room/Building
               Decontamination Following Chemical or Biological
               Agent Attack: Overview of Efficacy and
               Practical Issues	23
        Whole-Structure Decontamination of Bacterial Spores by
               Methyl Bromide Fumigation	24
        DF-200 Decontamination of CBW Agents, Other Biological
               Pathogens, and Toxic Industrial Chemicals	25
        Capitol Hill Ricin Incident: Decontamination Dilemmas	26
        Restoration from Decontamination: USPS Experience	28
iv NHSRC

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        Another Look at Chlorine Dioxide Fumigation:
               Concentration-Times, Efficacy Tests, and Biological
               Indicators	30
        Innovative and Emerging Decontamination Technologies	31
        Systematic Decontamination Project: Homeland Security
               Verification of Chemical and Biological
               Decontamination Technologies	33
        Use of HVAC Systems in Building Decontamination	33
        Building Disinfection Byproducts: Experimental Evaluation
               and Decision Tool	35
        Evaluation of Two Biological Decontamination Methods in
               a Room-Sized Test Chamber	36
        Verification of Commercial Decontamination Technologies
               in Bench-Scale Studies Using B. anthracis Spores	37
        Technical Support Working Group Decontamination
               Research and Development Activities	39
        "Dirty Bombs" (Radiological Dispersion Devices  [RDDs])
               and Cleanup	41
        Radiological and Nuclear Terror: Technical Aspects and
               Implications for Decontamination and Site
               Cleanup	42
        UK Approach to ROD Cleanup	44
3- Panel Discussion—Lessons Learned	47
        Information Sharing and Agency Coordination	47
        Preparedness	48
        Sampling and Analytical Issues	49
        Decontamination Process	49
4. Panel Discussion—Research and Development Needs	51
5. Appendices	55
        Appendix A: Agenda	55
        Appendix B: List of Participants	58
        Appendix C: Presentation Slides	62
                                                                Decontamination Workshop v

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 List  of Abbreviations  and  Acronyms
    ANL
    ARL
    ASTM
    ATSDR
    BASIS
    o/^1
    C
    CARC
    Ci
    CDC
    cm2
    CWA
    DCMD
    DDAP
    DEFRA
    DHS
    DIMP
    DoD
    DoE
    ECBC
    eLRN
    EPA
    ETV
    ฐF
    FBI
    FIFRA
    ft2
    ft3
    g
    GC
    CDS
    HVAC
    JPL
    kg
    L
    LANL
    LBNL
    LLNL
    LRN
    m3
    min
    mg
    mrem
    mVHP
Argonne National Laboratory
Army Research Laboratory
American Society for Testing and Materials
Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry
Biological Aerosol Sentry and Information System
degrees Celsius
chemical agent resistant coatings
curie
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
square centimeter
chemical warfare agent
Decontamination and Consequence Management Division
Domestic Demonstration and Application Program
Department for Environment, Food, and Rural Affairs
Department of Homeland Security
diisopropyl methylphosphonate
Department of Defense
Department of Energy
Edgewood Chemical Biological Center
Environmental Laboratory Response Network
Environmental Protection Agency
Environmental Technology Verification
degrees Fahrenheit
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act
square foot
cubic foot
gram
gas chromatograph
Government Decontamination Service
heating, ventilation, and air conditioning
Jet Propulsion Laboratory
kilogram
liter
Los Alamos National Laboratory
Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
Laboratory Response Network
cubic meter
minute
milligram
millirem
modified vaporous hydrogen peroxide
vi NHSRC

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NAS         National Academy of Science
NHSRC     National Homeland Security Research Center
NIOSH      National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health
NMRC      Naval Medical Research Center
NRT        National Response Team
OPCW      Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons
OPP         Office of Pesticide Programs
ORD        Office of Research and Development
OSHA       Occupational Safety and Health Administration
OSC         on-scene coordinator
PCR         polymerase chain reaction
PNNL       Pacific Northwest National Laboratory
ppb          parts per billion
ppm         parts per million
PROTECT   Program for Response Options and Technology
             Enhancements for Chemical/Biological Terrorism
PVC         polyvinyl chloride
RDD        radiological dispersion device
RIMNET    Radiation Incident Monitoring Network
RVTP        Rapid viability test protocol
Sabre        Sabre Technical Services
SAFTEY Act  Support Anti-terrorism by Fostering Effective Technologies
             Act of 2002
SNL         Sandia National Laboratory
STERIS      STERIS Corporation
TAGA       Trace Atmospheric Gas Analyzer
TSM        Three-Step Method
TSWG       Technical Support Working Group
UK          United Kingdom
USAMRIID  U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious
             Diseases
USAR        Urban Search and Rescue
USCG       U.S. Coast Guard
USPS        U.S. Postal Service
UV          ultraviolet
VERIFIN    Finnish Institute for Verification of the Chemical Weapons
             Convention
VHP        vaporous hydrogen peroxide
                                                          Decontamination Workshop vii

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 Executive  Summary

The Decontamination and Consequence Management
Division (DCMD) of EPA's National Homeland Security
Research Center (NHSRC) held its first "Workshop
on Decontamination, Cleanup, and Associated Issues
for Sites Contaminated With Chemical, Biological,
or Radiological Materials" at the International Trade
Center Building in Washington, D.C., February
23—25, 2005- The workshop opened with a plenary
session. The subsequent 31 presentations addressed 5
topics: the decontamination process, decontamination
technologies, research and development, lessons
learned, and radiological contamination. The speakers
represented national laboratories and federal agencies
such as EPA, the Department of Homeland Security,
the Postal Service, the Department of Defense, the
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, and the
FBI; academia; and key companies conducting research
or providing decontamination technologies and services.
Representatives  from Great Britain provided the United
Kingdom perspective on decontamination issues.

Plenary Session
Blair Martin, of EPA's National Risk Management
Research Laboratory, moderated the workshop and gave
the opening remarks. Martin participated in most of the
decontamination activities for the buildings that were
contaminated with B. anthracis spores sent through the
mail in the fall of 2001. These bioterrorist events were
the primary impetus for forming EPA's NHSRC, and
the majority of discussion at the workshop was related to
building decontamination. All  of the affected buildings
have now been successfully decontaminated. Martin
discussed the elements of a decontamination event and
noted that the actual destruction of spores  (accomplished
mostly via fumigation) represents only a small portion
of the overall time and cost of a decontamination event.
The elements of building decontamination also include
establishing a decision-making process; characterization,
sampling, and monitoring of contaminants and
decontamination chemical levels; building preparation;
the decontamination; materials disposal plan; and overall
communications
    Lance Brooks discussed the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS), Science and Technology Directorate's
biological and chemical restoration programs (referred to
as DDAP, i.e., Domestic Demonstration and Applications
Programs). He discussed some of the projects under way
or being planned, most of which focus on transportation
systems and wide urban areas. These projects involve
(or will involve) technology demonstrations, tabletop
exercises, and the development of template response plans
and protocols for particular scenarios, all designed to
reduce the time to get critical facilities or areas restored
and operational. One completed project discussed was
the Biological Aerosol Sentry and Information System
(BASIS), a precursor to the Biowatch program, which is a
network of monitors (with subsequent laboratory analysis)
set up in major urban areas as an early warning system to
detect aerosolized biological agents.
    The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) faces
many challenges with forensics sampling and crime
scene management following an incident involving
chemical, biological, or radiological weapons, according
to Benjamin Garrett of the FBI. These challenges include
determining that a deliberate release (as opposed to a
natural event) has occurred, knowing where to sample,
and conducting analyses of evidence without harming
the investigator or damaging the evidence. The primary
purpose of sampling by the FBI is to gather evidence.
By contrast, EPA conducts sampling to characterize the
extent of contamination and determine the effectiveness of
decontamination. The FBI should share its data with other
agencies such as EPA and the Centers for Desease Control
and Prevention (CDC), but the involved parties  need to
devise a process for doing so without harming the FBI's
investigation.

Session 1: The Decontamination Process
Nancy Adams, Director of the DCMD/NHSRC,
noted that her division conducts research and develops
technologies related to incidents involving biological,
chemical, and radiological agents. Efforts focus on
decontamination science and technology, sampling
methods, contaminant containment, tracking
contaminant movement, and disposal. Adams's
presentation detailed the methods used by NHSRC to
rank threats. These involve the identification and ranking
of high-priority agents, identification and ranking of likely
terrorist targets, and identification of terrorist goals (e.g.,
loss of life, economic damage, and inducing fear). These
viii NHSRC

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components are combined to couple threat agents with
target facilities and to develop likely terrorist scenarios. She
compared the DCMD threat-ranking approach to those
developed by other agencies and noted that NHSRC uses
the ranking results primarily to guide decontamination
research efforts.
    The CDC's Kenneth Martinez explained that
although the primary purpose for environmental
sampling is to address  public health concerns, sample
collection and analytical methods are similar regardless of
whether the data will be used for public health decisions,
scene characterization, or crime scene investigation.
Environmental sampling may identify agent sources,
assess the nature and extent of contamination, support
risk assessment and public health decisions, identify
people needing medical treatment, and guide reoccupancy
decisions. The three sampling phases in a response are
screening, characterization, and restoration. The CDC
has developed a sampling protocol for B.  anthrads spores
and is investigating and validating sampling and analytical
methods for bio-contaminants, focusing in particular
on surface sample collection efficiencies, air sampling,
methods comparison,  and variability issues.
    Steve Tomasino described EPA's Office of Pesticide
Programs (OPP) research and development of biological
agent analysis methods, in particular OPP's evaluation
of laboratory sporicidal efficacy test methods. EPA
regulations require the Association of Official Analytical
Chemists (AOAC) sporicidal activity test to register
and approve the use of a chemical to be used as a
decontaminant for a particular  microorganism such as
B. anthracis. This test has a number of limitations, for
example, the results are qualitative, the test requires 21
days for incubation, and the test lacks standardization.
OPP has identified potential modifications to the existing
AOAC method and two new promising methods that they
are  currently testing with surrogates:  one  developed by
the American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM)
and one referred to as the three-step method (TSM). OPP
submitted the study results to an expert panel, which
selected TSM as the preferred method. As part of ongoing
efforts, OPP will conduct additional surrogate studies with
TSM beginning in April 2005- The TSM will undergo a
multi-laboratory validation study in September 2005, and
a summary report of findings is due in December 2005-
    Registration of bio-decontamination chemicals
requires test data regarding product chemistry, product
toxicity, and product efficacy using the AOAC test,
according to Jeffrey Kempter of EPA's OPP When the
anthrax attacks occurred in September and October 2001,
no products were registered for use against B. anthracis.
Accordingly, crisis exemptions had to be issued for each
decontamination chemical for use at each contaminated
site. Crisis exemption requests had to include remediation
action plans, sampling and analysis plans, and ambient
air monitoring plans. OPP granted crisis  exemptions
for four liquid B. anthracis sporicides for use on hard,
nonporous surfaces only: aqueous chlorine dioxide,
hydrogen peroxide/peracetic acid, sodium hypochlorite,
and hydrogen peroxide/quarternary ammonium foam.
Five gases have received crisis exemptions: gaseous chlorine
dioxide (for buildings), vaporized hydrogen peroxide
(for buildings), paraformaldehyde (for equipment in
tented enclosures), methyl bromide (for laboratory and
field study), and ethylene oxide (for specialized off-site
treatment of specific items). Although no chemicals have
yet been registered for B. anthracis decontamination,  OPP
is moving toward that goal.
    Mark Durno and Tony Intrepido gave a joint
presentation on building sampling and clearance issues. A
technical assistance document prepared by EPA's National
Response Team details a sampling approach for any
biological incident. Other agencies are conducting studies
related to sampling approaches and analytical techniques.
For collecting field data, there are several  methods,
including hand-held assays, infrared sensors, and rapid
polymerase chain reaction (PCR) testing. Verification
sampling (following decontamination, to determine
efficacy and to allow for reoccupation of the building)
typically has been exhaustive, but as research advances
and laboratory techniques become more relevant to field
applications, this process will become more efficient.
    Dave Mickunas, of EPAs Environmental Response
Team, discussed the Trace Atmospheric Gas Analyzer
(TAGA) for real-time monitoring of chemical warfare
agents (CWAs) and fumigants (such as chlorine dioxide)
in ambient air. EPA's TAGA consists of an Atmospheric
Pressure Chemical lonization (APCI) source coupled
to a three-quadrupole mass spectrometer. Mickunas is
developing CWA spectra and calibration  curves and
conducting other analyses, such as verifying detection
limits, determining the dynamic linear range, establishing
surrogates, and identifying interferences.  The TAGA is
situated in a mobile unit (a van) and has been successfully
used at B. anthracis decontamination events to  detect
fumigant leaks.
                                                                   Decontamination Workshop ix

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    In the decontamination of postal facilities, the
United States Postal Service (USPS) accepted full liability
and assigned broad indemnity to the decontamination
contractors, according to Jerry Robinson, an attorney for
the USPS. To minimize their risk, the USPS then obtained
a $100 million insurance policy, which cost $4 million.
However, in a future incident, most government agencies
will not be able to indemnify decontamination vendors
because these agencies are not allowed to enter into the
open-ended contracts required for indemnification.
Decontamination contractors should obtain a SAFETY
Act designation and certification for their technologies,
which would allow them to be immediately available
to perform decontamination services. To be certified,
however, vendors must purchase insurance.
    Marty Powell explained that an EPA on-scene
coordinator (OSC) has two primary responsibilities:
to determine whether the contaminant poses a threat
to the public or environment and to ensure that the
threat is mitigated. Oddly enough, "on-scene" indicates
involvement in an event without requiring a physical
presence. The OSCs are coordinators, not  commanders;
they direct federal response assets. OSCs draw from a large
tool box of resources (e.g., contractor support, scientific
support, special units, and public relations support teams)
and provide these resources  to local and state agencies.
The OSCs ensure that the remediation work at a site
is completed properly. They have the ability to make
decisions at a site without obtaining a permit.
    Robert Bettley-Smith, of the UK Department
for Environment, Food, and Rural Affairs  (DEFRA),
described his country's Government Decontamination
Service (CDS). The CDS will be a DEFRA agency and
will be formally established in summer 2005- The GDS
will provide guidance and identify resources, such as
information about vendors, their capabilities, and their
technologies. In the UK, authorities at  the county level are
responsible for hazardous events and have experience with
chemical transport and releases,  but they lack experience
with biological events. Therefore, GDS will focus its
efforts on such events and develop a response plan. The
agency is considering establishing a centralized data system
to facilitate the sharing of knowledge across nations and to
prevent research overlap.
    Rob Rothman, of EPA/NHSRC, addressed the
development of standard analytical methods and
laboratory capacity issues. EPA has identified 109
priority agents and specific analytical methods for various
matrices. Revisions to these standard analytical methods
are scheduled for June 2005- They will include updates to
existing methods and will add new methods for analysis
of drinking water, CWA degradation products, and four
radiological agents. Laboratories must have the capacity
to handle thousands of samples collected over the course
of a response, from initial identification of the threat
agent to cleanup, clearance, and surveillance. Most of
the samples will be taken in the first few months, but
some sampling will be conducted years after the event.
To address capacity concerns, EPA is working with the
CDC to develop a three-tiered  Environmental Laboratory
Reference Network (eLRN), similar to CDC's existing
LRN. The network would include screening or sentinel
labs, confirmatory labs, and reference labs.

Session 2: Decontamination Technologies
John Mason gave an overview of his company's
technology. Sabre Technical Services (Sabre) has experience
with B. anthracis decontamination, using chlorine dioxide
fumigation at the AMI building in Boca Raton, Florida;
on contaminated containers in Newark Harbor;  and at
a facility in Utica, New York, where tenting was used to
seal the building. With the Sabre technology, sodium
hypochlorite is reacted with HC1 to produce chlorine
gas; the chlorine gas is then reacted with sodium chlorite
solution to produce aqueous C1O2, which is then stripped
to the air. At AMI, Sabre used the building's HVAC
system to distribute the fumigant in order to achieve a
concentration of 750 parts per million (ppm)  for a 12-
hour period. Approximately 200 biological indicator
test strips were placed throughout the building, and in
post-treatment sampling, all strips indicated no growth.
Tracking sample locations and communicating results
were two concerns when dealing with hundreds of
samples.  Sabre has developed software that produces
a three-dimensional sampling map to address these
concerns.
    Most of STERIS Corporation's decontamination
experience involves using vaporous hydrogen peroxide
(VHP) for bio-decontamination in pharmaceutical and
clean room applications, according to Iain McVey Because
of this, his company was selected to fumigate two B.
anthracis-contuminated government buildings. STERIS
is currently collaborating with the DoD to demonstrate
decontamination of chemical agents, using "modified
VHP," and to develop a mobile VHP generating system. A
x NHSRC

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benefit of VHP is that it decomposes to water and oxygen
so residual contamination is not a concern. However, the
rapid decay of VHP also means that repeated injections
are needed to ensure that the proper concentration is
reached. Multiple injection points may be the best option
for optimal distribution.
    Mike Herd, of BIOQUELL, Inc., discussed his
company's hydrogen peroxide vapor technology for room
and building decontamination. The technology works
by flash evaporating a 30 percent to 35 percent aqueous
hydrogen peroxide solution until a micro-condensate
forms on surfaces within the treatment area.  Data showed
that the micro-condensate greatly improves the kinetics
of decontamination. The system is designed to apply
to buildings of any size and consists of self-sufficient
units that can be chained together. Hydrogen peroxide
vapor tends to form strong hydrogen bonds between
the molecules, which limits its movement in air, so
the BIOQUELL system uses a rotating nozzle system
that distributes the vapor dynamically. BIOQUELL
participated in tests by EPA's Environmental Technology
Verification (ETV) program to determine its technology's
effectiveness in destroying B. anthracis spores on seven
different building materials. Herd discussed several case
studies to illustrate the application and effectiveness of the
technology.
    Methyl bromide is commonly used for termite control
and for fumigation of imported produce, according
to Rudolf Scheffrahn of the University of Florida. In
conjunction with EPA, he has conducted laboratory and
field studies to assess methyl bromide as a fumigant for B.
anthracis. In the 2004 field study, a 30,000-ft3 home was
first sealed using tenting, as is commonly done for termite
treatments in Florida. Gaseous methyl bromide was
generated by passing the liquid through a heat exchanger.
Better destruction efficiency with methyl bromide is
achieved with higher temperatures, so fans and heaters
maintained a target temperature of about 35ฐ C within
the house. After fumigation for two days, essentially all
50 spore strips placed throughout the house indicated no
growth. No damage to electronic equipment was observed.
Schaffrahn opined that the advantages to methyl bromide
are that it diffuses readily; is very stable, easily detected,
and low in cost; can be used with any humidity level; has
already been approved to treat some bacteria; and treats
porous and other types of materials with minimal damage.
A disadvantage is that it depletes stratospheric ozone.
     Rita Betty of Sandia National Laboratory (SNL)
presented a report on the testing of a decontamination
formulation (DF-200) for CWAs, toxic industrial
chemicals, and biological agents and for combating
aerosolized chemical and biological agent clouds. DF-
200 is an aqueous-phase formula that has been used
successfully by the military. The commercial product
is a mixture of surfactant, hydrogen peroxide solution,
and a novel activator. After mixing on site, the final
hydrogen peroxide concentration is about 3-5 percent.
DF-200 is less corrosive than bleach and other available
decontamination materials. SNL tested DF-200 with
GD (soman), HD (mustard gas), and the nerve agent
VX in stirred reactor studies and achieved 100 percent
decontamination of live agents after a 60-minute exposure
period. In other studies, DF-200  rapidly (within a
15-minute exposure period) neutralized nerve agents,
sodium cyanide, phosgene, and carbon disulfide, as well
as biologicals (B. anthracis and Y. pestis). Mustard agents
required more time (a 30-minute exposure period) because
of mustard's low solubility. The DF-200 residue in indoor
areas can be  removed using a wet-dry vacuum.
    According to Jack Kelly, of EPA, ricin is a white
powder that can be made fairly easily from the proteins
of castor plant beans. Ricin is considered extremely toxic
by any exposure route, and no vaccines or antidotes are
available. On February 2, 2004, ricin was found in the
mail room attached to a United States senator's office.
EPA et al. had collected at least 670 samples from three
affected rooms and identified 19 positive results, all from
one room. EPA removed and stored personal and office
items from the affected room. Large hard-surface items
were left in place and decontaminated with a sodium
hypochlorite solution. Post-treatment testing found no
ricin activity. Clothing and office materials, along with
indicator vials of crude and pure ricin, underwent heat
treatment, which resulted in 100  percent deactivation of
13 of the 14 purified ricin vials and 94.4 percent to 99-7
percent deactivation for 14 of the 28 crude ricin vials.
Another set of office materials underwent a single heat
treatment and/or ethylene oxide treatment. Results from
test vials undergoing ethylene oxide treatment alone or
heat followed by ethylene oxide treatment indicated that
the combined treatment was most effective.
    Richard Orlusky highlighted the USPS's experiences
in restoring the Trenton mail facility after completing
decontamination. Although B. anthracis contamination
of the Trenton facility occurred in 2001, the building
was not reopened until March 2005- Fumigation with
                                                                   Decontamination  Workshop  xi

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chlorine dioxide gas did not occur until October 2003,
and restoration activities began in February 2004. The
USPS kept the HVAC systems running after closing
the building, but over time, components of the system
failed, resulting in interior temperatures reaching 100ฐE
Restoring environmental controls is key to creating a
comfortable work environment (repairs were conducted
by workers wearing personal protective equipment) and
to minimizing equipment and building degradation. If
fumigation is the selected decontamination method, then
surface cleaning with a bleach agent should be conducted
sparingly,  since it is highly damaging to many materials.
Additional chlorine dioxide research may show effective
decontamination at lower concentrations and reduced
contact times, which may reduce damage caused by the
fumigant  itself.
    Paula Krauter, of Lawrence Livermore National
Laboratory (LLNL), presented research on developing a
rapid viability test protocol  (RVTP), which is a 15-hour
method for processing biological indicator strips using
real-time PCR. They compared the RVTP against the
standard culture method, which requires 7 days for results.
Testing involved exposing more than 1,000 biological
indicator strips to 750 ppm of chlorine dioxide for up to
12 hours (a number of these strips were exposed for less
than 12 hours). Half of the strips were analyzed by RVTP
and half by the standard culture technique. In general,
no significant difference in results provided by the two
methods was identified. The standard culture method
reported a 1.5 percent false positive rate. No false negatives
or positives were observed for RVTP Tests to compare
stainless steel and paper strip biological indicators were
also conducted. At non-lethal doses of chlorine dioxide,
LLNL found a significantly higher number of positive
results for the paper strips, i.e., better kill was indicated
with the stainless steel disks.

Session  3: Decontamination Research and
Development
Mark Brickhouse, of the U.S. Army's Edgewood Chemical
and Biological Center (ECBC), described the work
with public- and private-sector researchers to evaluate
a number of emerging decontamination technologies.
These include modified VHP, which contains ammonia
as an activator for both chemical and biological
decontamination. "Forced hot air" acts to accelerate
weathering and increases off-gassing for chemical agents
but is insufficient for treating biological agents. Decon-
Green is an environmentally friendly decontaminant based
on commercial chemicals and is designed to replace DS2
and DF-200 in military use. Studies have proven Decon-
Green to be effective against chemical and biological
agents, but it is disruptive to surfaces. Surface coatings are
being developed  to either resist or react with and destroy
chemical or biological agents. Enzymes to  decontaminate
nerve agents, sulfur mustard, and biological agents and
toxins are being investigated. Supercritical  carbon dioxide
is an effective cleaning and sterilizing agent and is being
investigated as  a decontamination technology.
    Phil Koga, of ECBC, discussed a systematic
decontamination study funded by EPA. This study will
assess the impact of fumigant (chlorine dioxide and
hydrogen peroxide vapor) concentration, exposure time,
building material (porous and nonporous), temperature,
and relative humidity on destruction of different
microorganisms  (e.g., avirulent and virulent B. anthracis
spores and surrogates). In addition,  testing seeks to  provide
information about  the effects of six  different building
materials on the decay of fumigant concentration in test
chambers (e.g., velocity deposition will be  quantified) and
the effects of the  fumigants on the integrity of the building
materials.
    Tina Carlsen, of LLNL, discussed research on
examining both decontamination of HVAC systems using
hydrogen peroxide vapor and the use of HVAC systems in
the fumigation process. Tests with VHP in a medium-scale
HVAC system indicated that galvanized steel  reduced the
hydrogen peroxide concentration, whereas PVC had less
of an effect. In another test, using 90 feet of galvanized
steel ductwork with sensors located  throughout, the
hydrogen peroxide concentration decreased as a function
of distance traveled along the ductwork, and VHP
decreased with increasing temperature and decreasing flow
rate. Ongoing research will include  biological indicator
tests within the ductwork to characterize kill rates and
optimize VHP efficacy as well as characterization tests
with alternate ductwork materials.
    Research at the University of Texas is focusing on
building material impacts on fumigant levels and gaseous
byproduct production, in a project lead by Rich Corsi.
Corsi stated that the research includes an evaluation of
the chemical interactions of ozone, chlorine dioxide,
methyl bromide, and hydrogen peroxide vapor with 24
common building materials; quantification of deposition
velocities; identification of building decontamination
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byproducts; and incorporation of the results into a novel
software application. Results show significant differences
among disinfectants. Byproduct persistence was also likely,
as indicated by 5-day and 1-year tests of off-gassing. For
most materials, with the exception of ceiling tiles and
HVAC system components, ozone was more reactive than
chlorine dioxide.
    Mark Buttner discussed the research at the University
of Nevada Las Vegas (UNLV) to test the efficacy of
two decontamination products (DF-100 and chlorine
dioxide gas); compare surface sampling methods (swipe,
heavy wipe, and swab sample processing kit); and
compare analytical techniques for biological agents,
using cultures, quantitative polymerase chain reactions
(PCRs), and hand-held assays. Other experimental
parameters included the effects of building material
and environmental background (e.g., dust) on the
decontamination method. Each of the three sampling
methods demonstrated comparable spore collection
efficiencies. After decontamination with DF-100, post-
decontamination samples found no  culturable spores
although the quantitative PCR analysis indicated that
spore DNA remained. Similarly, after decontamination
with chlorine dioxide, post-decontamination samples
found no culturable spores in 24 of 27 samples, but
quantitative PCR analysis indicated  that spore DNA
remained.  The hand-held assay results were positive for all
samples. Neither decontamination method was affected
by environmental background, although the quantitative
PCR analysis method was inhibited  by the dust.
    An overview of EPAs Environmental Technology
Verification (ETV) program for decontamination
technologies was presented by Mike Taylor of Battelle
Memorial  Institute. Three decontamination technologies
(all fumigants) have been verified so far: BIOQUELL,
Inc.'s hydrogen peroxide gas; Certek, Inc.'s formaldehyde
gas, and CDG Research, Inc.'s chlorine dioxide gas.
The verification procedure consisted of connecting
the decontamination technology to the test chamber,
inoculating test  material coupons (representing seven
different materials) with 108 spores of B. anthracis or
surrogates, placing the coupons in the test chamber,
implementing the decontamination technology, removing
the test material coupons, and analyzing the coupons.
Decontamination efficacy was quantified  by calculating
the log reduction in viable spores on the test materials and
by identifying positive or negative bacterial growth on the
biological indicators and spore strips. It was noted that
homeland security related technologies would no longer
be verified under ETV but would be tested under a new
EPANHSRC program called the Technology Testing and
Evaluation Program (TTEP).
    According to Rebecca Blackmon, the Technical
Support Working Group (TSWG) is an independent
federal agency, with oversight from DoD and the
Department of State, that does rapid R&D and
prototyping to support federal agency requirements. The
Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN)
subgroup focuses on agent detection, decontamination,
protection, and information collection, with ongoing
projects. The biological background in critical facilities is
being investigated, since it may interfere with detection
of actual bio-agents. A statistical design tool for sampling
contaminated buildings is under development. In
conjunction with others, TSWG is developing a real-
time, portable sensor system to monitor CWAs and
toxic industrial chemicals. Another sensor web is being
developed to monitor and control building temperature,
humidity, light intensity, and decontaminant agent
concentrations for a facility undergoing decontamination.
Decontamination technologies using plasma and
electrostatics are being developed. Other technologies are
being developed to mitigate the spread of radiological
releases and remove radiological contaminants from
building materials.

Session 4: Lessons Learned and Research  and
Development Needs
Panelists and other participants at the workshop
provided numerous examples of lessons learned from the
decontamination activities that took place following the B.
anthracis incidents in 2001. These are summarized below
in four main categories. During this discussion, several
participants also noted research that is needed; a summary
of these items follows.

Intetagency coordination and information/data
sharing Workshop participants emphasized the
importance of information/data sharing and coordination
not only during a response action,  but also during
ongoing research. They provided examples of information
sharing and coordination efforts, suggested tools to
improve these efforts, highlighted the benefits of sharing
information while addressing research needs,  and
noted security concerns to consider. Several workshop
participants (primarily OSCs) emphasized the need for
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information (e.g., on decontamination methods) when
responding to an event. Several participants suggested the
development of databases or repositories of information
on technologies, agents, available laboratories, test
methods, technical experts, etc. Others noted that this
workshop was a great way for information exchange and
that this type of workshop should be continued.

Preparedness Workshop participants all agreed that
planning and preparing for the aftermath of a terrorist
event is critical to responding quickly and appropriately.
They suggested a number of ways facilities and agencies
could prepare. Workshop participants repeatedly suggested
exercises (especially tabletop) as a means  of identifying
possible threat scenarios,  developing response plans, and
pinpointing data gaps.  They suggested interagency panels
and peer reviews for these exercises. The  focus of such
exercises typically becomes the technical  aspect of the
response plan, but in a real-world situation, the technical
side of a response may  be easy compared with regulatory
or communication issues. Examples of materials that
would help prepare agencies and facilities include a matrix
to link threat agents with appropriate decontamination
methods and site conditions, template response plans, and
standards/protocols (e.g., for sampling).

Sampling issues Workshop participants expressed
diverse views regarding sampling issues. Some suggested
minimizing sampling requirements to streamline a
decontamination event because it consumes much of the
overall response time. Others believed that eliminating
one or more of the sampling phases (characterization,
verification, or clearance) would be detrimental to the
process. Participants also  voiced differences of opinion
over the utility of biological indicators in assessing
environmental contamination. Decontamination events
rely on biological indicators (e.g., spore strips), but results
from these tests may not  correlate well with environmental
conditions (i.e., actual levels of spores). One participant
noted that no positive environmental samples were
found in the B. anthrads  decontamination when the
biological indicators were negative and desired fumigant
concentration had been achieved.

The decontamination process A number of buildings
have now been bio-decontaminated, and participants
noted many specific lessons learned. When fumigation
is the selected decontamination method, the  fumigation
itself is only a small portion of the overall decontamination
timeline. Sealing a building can be costly and time-
consuming, but tenting is an effective technique.
Preserving sensitive and valuable materials should be
considered when one is selecting a decontamination
technology. Leave as much material as possible inside a
building for fumigation to alleviate disposal concerns.
Agencies working with an OSC need to understand the
command structure at a decontamination event. An
environmental clearance committee supports local agency
decisions about when it is safe to reoccupy a building
by providing information and credibility. The clearance
committee itself does not make decisions. To support an
OSC, however, technical working groups should consist
of people who are authorized to make decisions for their
agencies.
    The following is a compilation of suggested research
and development needs, as discussed during the R&D
panel discussion, as well as during the Lessons Learned
discussion. Nancy Adams noted that some of the
suggested research items are currently being investigated or
are already planned for future investigation.

      Decontamination
    • Real-time monitoring of fumigants
    • Tenting as a means of sealing a building
    • Cost analysis of an overall decontamination event,
      including the disposal and restoration
    • The chemical interactions and reaction products
      between decontaminants, threat agents, background
      (e.g., dust, organic material), and materials
      (common building materials but also sensitive/
      valuable equipment)
    • Risk and exposure assessment of biological  agents to
      establish safe levels for reoccupation
      Sampling and Analysis
    • Correlating environmental samples to biological
      indicators; understanding the basic science  of
      biological indicators (Bis); developing new Bis
      using more common materials such as carpet, or
      worse-case materials, in lieu of typical BI materials
      such as paper or steel
    • Real-time monitoring technology (e.g., developing
      faster, cheaper, and better technologies) for all types
      of agents
    • Background levels of live bio-agents
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    •  Comparison of surface sampling methods for bio-
      agents
    •  Using statistics for sampling design and standards
    •  New analytical techniques, such as rapid testing
      protocols
    •  Methods for sampling irreplaceable items (e.g.,
      paintings or historical documents)
    •  Identification of better surrogates
      Other threat agents
    •  Interactions of chemical and radiological agents
      with various materials
    •  Applicability of chelaters, HEPA filters, and other
      decontamination technologies to radiological agents
    Most of the information presented during the
workshop applied to B. anthracis. A number of workshop
participants mentioned the need to expand research
related to the decontamination of other chemical,
biological, and radiological threat agents. Agents
specifically mentioned included ricin.
      Containment
    •  Aerosolization, dispersion, and resuspension of
      biological and radiological agents
    •  Surface coatings and building materials that serve as
      biocides or limit chemical infiltration
    •  Smart building systems, e.g., specially designed
      HVAC systems to limit agent spread
      General
    •  Research is needed to address decontamination of
      wide, outdoor areas, including agricultural product
      decontamination and disposal, and multiple  agent
      attack events.
    •  Identifying  dual-use technologies would help us
      prepare by allowing us to develop technologies
      and manufacture equipment before the next  event
      occurs.
    •  Biotechnology-based decontamination approaches
      (bacteria, enzymes) are needed.
    •  A panel of experts distant from ongoing
      decontamination discussions and research should
      be convened to independently review the collective
      research efforts ongoing at various agencies and
      facilities.
Session 5: Radiological Dispersion Device
Cleanup
Fred Holbrook and John MacKinney, from EPA's
NHSRC, each presented information related to
radiological dispersal devices (RDDs). RDDs use
conventional explosives to disperse radioactive materials.
It is expected that these devices would cause low-level
radiological contamination and cause psychological and
economic harm but that fatalities would be low. Among
the radiological agents that are potential components of
RDDs, cesium fluoride is of particular concern because it
is a fine, talclike powder, which is easily dispersed over a
broad area.
    Worldwide control of radiological materials is a
problem, as evidenced by the large amounts of missing
and unaccounted-for radioactive material. Because of this,
most experts believe an RDD event is the most probable
homeland security threat. Tests are being conducted to
examine whether a radiological agent will aerosolize and
how the shape of the charge may affect dispersion; models
are being developed to predict possible dispersion patterns.
Studies of particle dispersion have shown that indoor
particulate concentrations following an event may be high.
Using threat scenarios, we can create standard response
and mitigation procedures, plan possible cleanup actions,
and evaluate existing technologies.  DHS is assessing
possible optimized approaches to decontamination
and restoration after an RDD release and considering
cleanup criteria based on societal needs, expected land
uses, and decontamination technologies. Radiological
decontamination techniques are based on mechanical,
chemical, or biological removal; some chemical methods
include the use of acids, chelants, foams, gels, oxidizers,
and polymers.
    According to Malcolm Wakerley, after the Chernobyl
nuclear incident, the UK created the Radiation Incident
Monitoring Network (RIMNET). This system consists of
92 gamma detectors (located approximately 30 kilometers
apart) that supply data to a group of laboratories.
Information from these sensors helped the UK identify
areas of contamination after the Chernobyl accident. The
RIMNET system includes a modeling component that
can assess short-, medium-,and long-range impacts and
is linked with meteorological data to backtrack from an
alarmed detector to a radiation source. Additionally, the
UK has created a handbook in response  to a review of
decontamination and remediation  technologies conducted
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following a series of other radioactive accidents.
The handbook includes a simple logic diagram and
22 tables on decontamination technologies and
considerations.
    The UK plans to maintain the handbook over the
next three years and add lessons learned from exercises
and case studies.
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Introduction
This report summarizes presentations and discussions
from the "Workshop on Decontamination, Cleanup, and
Associated Issues for Sites Contaminated With Chemical,
Biological, or Radiological Materials," which was held
February 23-25, 2005, in Washington, D.C. The
workshop objectives were to:
      • Allow agencies, organizations, and individuals
        to share information about the decontamination
        of chemical, biological, and radiological releases.
        Specific topics addressed included elements of a
        decontamination event and ways to reduce the
        response time and cost; decontamination
        technologies used in real-world situations
        (e.g., anthrax events in the United States, hospital
        decontamination projects  worldwide); and
        research and development projects underway or
        planned by various organizations and agencies.
      • Discuss some of the lessons learned about the
        decontamination process and suggest steps to
        improve that process.
      • Identify research needs to  fill data gaps and
        articulate opportunities for improving the current
        understanding of the decontamination process.
    Workshop participants included representatives
from federal agencies and laboratories (e.g., the
Environmental Protection Agency,  the Department of
Homeland Security, the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Lawrence
Livermore National Laboratory, and Edgewood Chemical
Biological Center), academia, and decontamination
technology companies.  During the workshop, speakers
gave presentations on specific topics, including
decontamination event experiences, decontamination
technologies, current and planned research projects, and
radiological agent concerns.  Following each presentation,
speakers held a brief question and answer period. On the
third day of the workshop, participants engaged in two
free-flowing discussion sessions. During the first session,
participants were asked to share the lessons learned during
research projects and real-world decontamination events.
The second session focused on areas and topics in need
of further research. Both discussion sessions allowed
participants to elaborate upon the questions and issues
raised during the presentations.
    This report summarizes the information provided
and issues raised during the workshop presentations and
associated question and answer periods. It also summarizes
the content of the discussion sessions. The technical
content of this report is based entirely on discussions at the
workshop.
    Although workshop presentations and discussions
addressed a number of individual topics, workshop
participants raised several key issues to consider during
ongoing research and future decontamination efforts:
   •  Information sharing and interagency
      coordination  Workshop participants repeatedly
      emphasized the importance of information sharing
      and coordination during a response action, as well
      as ongoing information sharing among researchers.
      During presentations, speakers provided examples
      of both effective and ineffective information
      sharing. They consistently indicated that better
      information sharing leads to faster, cheaper,
      and easier decontamination efforts. During the
      discussion sessions, workshop participants suggested
      tools for improving the sharing of information,
      highlighted the benefits of sharing information
      while addressing research needs, and noted security
      concerns to consider.
   •  Preparedness Workshop participants agreed that
      planning and preparing for threat events is critical
      to responding quickly and appropriately to these
      events. Presentations highlighted a number of
      research projects that focus on preparing facilities,
      specifically airports and transportation centers,
      for future terrorist events and identifying possible
      response actions. During the discussion sessions,
      workshop participants suggested a number of ways
      facilities and agencies could prepare for a terrorist
      event.
   •  Sample methodology and design Workshop
      participants discussed sampling concerns related
      to research projects and decontamination events.
      When discussing research projects, workshop
      participants voiced concerns about developing
      standardized sampling methods so that results were
      comparable across projects, as well as concerns
      about identifying appropriate surrogates. When
      discussing decontamination events, workshop
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      participants emphasized the need for clear sampling
      objectives, the utility of different sampling methods,
      and the need to streamline the sampling process.
      Some conflicting views were raised. For example,
      some suggested minimizing sampling requirements
      to streamline a decontamination event, whereas
      others believed that eliminating sampling phases
      would be detrimental to the process.  Participants
      also voiced differences of opinion about the utility
      of biological indicators and spore strips in assessing
      environmental contamination.
Research needs Workshop participants identified
a number of research needs from basic research in
fumigation chemistry and effectiveness to advanced
research on sampling methods (e.g., developing
cost-effective, real-time sampling methods). See the
"Panel Discussion—Research and Development
Needs" section of this report for further details.
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 Opening  Remarks
Blair Martin, U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency, National Homeland Security Research
Center
The Decontamination and Consequence Management
Division (DCMD) of the U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) National Homeland Security Research
Center (NHSRC) organized this workshop so that
agencies, organizations, and individuals could share
information about the decontamination of chemical,
biological, and radiological releases. Specific topics
included:
   • Elements of a decontamination event and ways
     to reduce the response time and cost
   • Decontamination technologies used in real-world
     situations (e.g., anthrax events in the United States,
     hospital decontamination projects worldwide)
   • Research and development projects  under way or
     planned by various organizations and agencies
   • Lessons learned during real-world situations and
     research projects
   • Additional research and development needs.
    In fall 2001, Bacillus anthrads spores sent through
the mail contaminated several United States Postal Service
(USPS) buildings. Using a variety of methods, the USPS
decontaminated these buildings.  The removal and off-site
decontamination of building contents, surface cleaning,
and fumigation provided the backdrop to  this workshop.
    Drawing on his personal experience, Martin explained
the elements of the decontamination process:
   • Selecting a decontamination technology
     When selecting a decontamination method,
     considerations include building security, interagency
     relationships, incident command structure,
     preparation and review of technical  documents,
     contractor selection, and crisis exemption
     applications and approvals. The last  three items are
     pacing items that affect the project schedule.
   • Building characterization and monitoring
     Characterization and monitoring, which can occur
     simultaneously, are conducted for several reasons.
     Forensic sampling, which tracks the movement
of an agent from the release point, addresses the
criminal aspects of an event. Characterization
sampling identifies the nature and extent of
contamination. Biological indicators, fumigation
sampling, and environmental conditions sampling
(i.e., temperature, humidity, and pressure)
are used to ensure a successful fumigation.
Outdoor monitoring of the fumigant ensures
safety. Clearance sampling confirms successful
decontamination and allows reuse of the building.
Decontamination The decontamination
event includes procuring, installing, testing,
operating, disassembling, and finally removing
the decontamination equipment. Procurement
and testing are pacing items that affect the
project schedule. Considerations during the
decontamination event are system safety; the
heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC)
systems; and possible fumigant leak areas. The EPA
trace atmospheric gas analyzer (TAGA), which
is discussed in detail in a later presentation, is a
mobile testing unit that was useful for identifying
leaks during actual decontamination events. Over
the course of a 2- to 3-year process, the actual
decontamination or fumigation is a 1-day event.
The fumigation may increase to 2 to 3 days if a
no-growth endpoint is selected as the building
clearance requirement. The cost of the fumigation
itself is also only a fraction of the overall cost of the
entire  decontamination process.
Materials disposal Materials may be removed
from a building before or after decontamination.
The decision whether to remove materials depends
on their value, the ease of decontaminating them,
their impact on the decontamination agent, and
the impact of the decontamination agent on them.
Final disposal options must also be considered.
What  special handling is needed to dispose
of material removed from a building prior to
decontamination? Can materials that are removed
after decontamination be sent to nonhazardous
waste landfills or incinerators? Waste disposal
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      also includes any wastes generated from the
      decontamination or fumigation effort itself.
      Communication systems A successful
      decontamination event relies on successful
      communication. Communication plans should
      include law enforcement agencies, health agencies,
      environmental regulatory agencies, advisory groups,
      contractors, on-scene coordinators (OSCs), building
      workers and occupants, as well as residents and
      businesses in the surrounding communities.
Martin also listed a number of building-related activities
that need to be considered: orderly building closure;
contamination containment, especially within the HVAC
system; documentation to guide decontamination; and
equipment storage needs. A building content assessment
is needed to identify items that might be affected by
treatment.
    Finally, Martin indicated that workshop participants
have a broad range of experiences with and perspectives
about decontamination events. He hoped that they could
openly share their knowledge over the course of the
meeting.
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 Presentations  and Associated
Question and  Answer  Periods
DHS S&T Biological and
Chemical Restoration
Programs
Lance Brooks, Department of Homeland Security
This presentation provided a brief overview of restoration
programs under way at the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS).
   Decontamination is being researched and evaluated
by a number of agencies, such as EPA's Office of Research
and Development (ORD), DHS's Homeland Security
Advanced Research Projects Agency (HSARP), and the
Systems Engineering and Development Office. DHS's role
in researching, testing, and evaluating decontamination
processes is outlined in the National Response Plan, which
is scheduled for release on April 14, 2005- DHS hopes to
coordinate efforts with EPA More information is available
at www.HSARPAbaa.com.
   At the beginning of a project, DHS works with
the decontamination-user community to identify and
address their needs. The stated program goal is to provide
"integrated field demonstrations of the next-generation
solutions, which bring together the user, technology,
and ConOps in a real-wo rid test of a particular
solution." In other words,  DHS personnel are looking
to answer the question of how biological or chemical
agent decontamination will be conducted in the future.
They work with off-the-shelf or government-owned
technologies. Although DHS does not intend to
develop technologies, it will, if necessary, work to
further develop technologies near completion.
   Projects conducted by DHS include:
   • Biological Aerosol Sentry and Information
     System (BASIS) BASIS is geared toward providing
     enhanced biological security at special events and
     determining whether a biological release event has
     occurred. The system is easy to set up and deploy
     but has a limited operational period and covers a
     fixed location. It served as a platform for a newer
program called BioWatch. Results reported from
BASIS and BioWatch initiate treatment and
response. BioWatch was used successfully during
the Salt Lake City Winter Olympics and is now in
place in about 30 metropolitan areas.
Program for Response Options and Technology
Enhancements for Chemical/Biological
Terrorism (PROTECT) Developed in partnership
with transit facilities, the project provides
response plans and solutions for events  in such
facilities, for example, the sarin release in the
Tokyo subway. DHS found that implementing
the technology component of a response is often
easier than addressing the response's regulatory,
communications, and other aspects. In a
demonstration project, PROTECT placed agent
detectors and televisions in strategic positions
in a transit facility. The system includes a laptop
from which an incident commander could log
into the system, control cameras, access software,
and examine alarmed detectors to coordinate a
response. The program also includes a formalized
plan for operating the system and creates incident
commander transparency. Using the system reduced
response time from as much as 40 minutes down to
5 minutes.
Restoration of Large Airport Facilities  This
program is in progress and focuses on the
coordination and understanding of the restoration
process for a large airport.  San Francisco
International Airport, for example, loses $80
million a day if closed. This is not a technology-
driven project but focuses  on condensing the
decontamination timeline. The goal of the
project is to reduce the time and money needed
to restore a critical transportation facility after an
attack. Under this project, DHS brought together
stakeholders to conduct tabletop exercises, including
a large-scale demonstration exercise to identify
and address critical aspects of the response (e.g.,
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      development and approval of a decontamination
      plan, fumigation verification, facility clearance,
      and overall coordination and communication).
      Project products include templates that provide
      guidelines for developing response plans and
      protocols that are then pre-approved by EPA
      and other regulatory agencies. The project has
      specifically examined improving the verification
      step (i.e., rapid verification mechanisms), assessing
      sample placement to improve sampling clearance,
      using rapid bioviability sampling technologies, and
      developing decision support software. A project
      report is scheduled for release in late spring 2005-
    The following projects are in the planning phase, and
DHS is looking for a partner agency or organization:
    •  Restoration of a Transit System  This project
      focuses on transit facilities, such as subways, that
      have open platforms, tunnels, and transport from
      below to above ground. These facilities present
      many different challenges. The overall project
      goal is to reduce time between the event and
      restoration. Revenue loss and street traffic impacts
      are problems when these systems shut down. This
      project will draw from the large airport facilities
      project and create templates for response plans and
      protocols (e.g., restoration plans, contamination
      characterization methods, decontamination and
      verification sampling for surface, clearance methods,
      decision tools) that apply to urban transit systems. A
      large-scale demonstration project is planned.
    •  Restoration of a Wide Area (Urban)   This
      project focuses on open areas but will likely include
      indoor areas  as well. In these areas, contamination
      migration to enclosed and semi-enclosed areas
      is a concern. The project goal is to reduce the
      overall time to restore a large outdoor urban area
      following a biological attack. As for other projects,
      DHS will develop strategies, templates, response
      plans, and protocols for addressing an event. Two
      smaller ongoing programs lead into this project.
      One focuses  on technologies and protocols; the
      other examines overall policies. A large-scale
      demonstration project is planned.
    •  Facilities Chemical Restoration  Demonstration
      The goal of this project is to reduce the overall time
      to restore a critical facility following a chemical
      attack. DHS will develop strategies, templates,
      response plans, and protocols for addressing a
      chemical release event. A large-scale demonstration
      project is planned.

Questions, Answers, and Comments
    •  How will DHS reduce the time required to
      complete a decontamination event? DHS projects
      are geared toward understanding what aspects
      contribute to the time and personnel needed to
      complete decontamination and how these aspects
      can be adjusted to reduce the time frame. DHS is
      also exploring sampling software that can speed up
      the decontamination process.
    •  Has DHS partnered with contractors or is
      DHS working to identify technologies to be
      used in place? Demonstration projects are run
      through DHS and NHSRC. These agencies will
      partner with industries, as identified in the pre-
      demonstration phase.
    •  What performance measures were used to
      declare BioWatch a success? BioWatch has
      been implemented in partnership with EPA and
      the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
      (CDC). The agencies determined Bio Watch's
      success by reviewing a matrix of criteria. They
      concluded that the system was operational, reported
      no false positives, and had minimal downtime.
      BioWatch strives to provide biological  security for as
      large an area as possible.
    •  When detection systems are installed, when
      and how do you respond to a positive alarm?
      How does this procedure apply to BioWatch?
      DHS works with EPA, CDC, and the FBI to
      confirm positive responses. When an alarm sounds,
      several layers of testing begin. In the first layer, the
      alarm is reported and agencies provide guidance
      to local organizations. Secondary testing occurs
      in areas around the positive sampler. Organisms,
      if detected, are checked for viability. Agencies
      then determine whether they can confirm that an
      event has occurred. Once an incident is identified,
      investigations move to the FBI and CDC.
      Participants should note that BioWatch is only one
      tool for determining whether an event truly has
      occurred.
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Crime  Scene Management
and  WMD Terrorism
Ben Garrett, Federal Bureau of Investigation
When the FBI becomes involved in a decontamination
event, its goal is to manage the crime scene and handle
weapons of mass destruction. It is concerned about the
criminal aspects of the event. As such, the FBI focuses on
forensics, which is the collecting and gathering of evidence
for the identification, prosecution, and conviction of the
perpetrators.
    Garrett identified four phases to an incident response:
    •  Tactical The tactical phase includes entering the
      affected building or area and removing the threat.
      A plan to enter the area without harm must be in
      place.
    •  Operational This phase involves protecting the
      public and mitigating hazards. The FBI involves
      local emergency response agencies in these efforts.
    •  Crime scene Evidence collecting, packaging, and
      transporting make up this phase.
    •  Remediation The FBI is not responsible for the
      cleanup or decontamination of a building or scene.
      EPA and other partners address that phase of a
      response.
    Some considerations associated with the forensic
aspects of an event include:
    •  Detection To prove that a crime occurred, the FBI
      must be able to detect the crime. For example, when
      anthrax is detected, the FBI must separate natural
      occurrences of anthrax from an intentional release.
    •  Sampling  The FBI's focus is on gathering evidence
      in a manner that will withstand legal challenge.
      In the case of a biological release, the evidence is
      microscopic. How do you find the crime scene?
      How do you collect microscopic evidence? How do
      you preserve the evidence's integrity?
    •  Traditional exams Fingerprints, fibers, genetics,
      and toolmarks are examples of traditional forensic
      evidence. The FBI must consider collecting and
      evaluating this evidence while protecting people
      from the biological or chemical threat. The
      traditional exams  are key to linking the evidence
      to the perpetrator. Therefore, the FBI prefers to
      use decontamination methods that preserve the
      integrity of the evidence. They must consider
      questions such as "Will the decontamination agent
      remove fingerprints?"
    Biological and chemical agents pose unique challenges
for detecting, sampling, and evaluating evidence. These
challenges arise before the FBI arrives at a scene, and
responses to these challenges may compromise evidence.
Similar problems arise when addressing radiologicals.
    Garrett provided two examples that illustrate FBI
concerns and considerations.
   •  The FBI responded to an incident involving three
      family members who had a history of dealing with
      ricin and blaming each other for the crime. While
      evidence was being collected, miscommunication
      led to improper evidence handling, which destroyed
      traditional evidence along with the toxin threat.
   •  A local public health agency investigated a number
      of cases of salmonella poisoning in Oregon. Rumors
      speculated that the illness had been intentionally
      spread in order to influence election results. The
      public health agency determined that the event was
      a natural occurrence, the result of poor hygiene.
      Later, several people confessed to intentionally
      spreading the illness.

Questions, Answers, and Comments
   •  During a weapon of mass destruction event and
      FBI investigation, does the FBI help address the
      public health ramifications? Historically, the FBI
      has been reluctant to share evidence about ongoing
      cases, even when evidence or data may be useful
      for addressing public health concerns. The Bureau,
      however, has made strides to improve information
      sharing. It has a public health agent at CDC to
      serve as a conduit for information and includes
      local, state, and federal public health agencies in
      conference calls discussing investigation results. For
      example, in August 2002, a New Jersey post office
      box tested positive for anthrax. The FBI provided
      information about this event to the New Jersey
      CDC and other public health officials. Although
      the FBI has working relationships with CDC and
      local and state public health agencies, a concern
      that information sharing will compromise an
      investigation will always exist.
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    •  What are your thoughts about sharing
      evidence data with EPA and others assessing
      the extent of contamination and planning the
      decontamination? Garrett believes that the FBI
      should share data, but the involved parties need to
      devise a process for sharing information without
      harming the FBI's investigation. From experience,
      the FBI has learned that it must strike a balance
      between sharing information and maintaining
      the integrity of the investigation to successfully
      prosecute.

CDC/NIOSH  and Health
Response to  Biothreat
Agents: Environmental
Monitoring
Capt. Kenneth F. Martinez, Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention, National Institute for
Occupational Safety and Health
Agencies involved in a bioterrorism event hold many
different perspectives about sampling needs. For CDC,
sampling addresses public health concerns. Sample
collection methods and analysis results, however,
are similar regardless of the data's end use for public
health decisions, scene characterization, or crime scene
investigation, so information sharing between agencies is
important.
    When the first events occurred, communication
between agencies was strained. Agencies now understand
the value of working together and are moving toward
sharing information more freely. They must, however,
remember that each has to address its unique mission.
    Environmental sampling may identify exposure
locations, determine agent sources and exposure pathways,
characterize pathogens and agents, assess the nature and
extent of contamination, support risk assessment and
public health decisions, identify people needing medical
treatment, and guide reoccupancy decisions. Public health
sampling may examine the paths for agent spread in
order to limit that spread. For example, CDC considered
whether postal employees exposed to anthrax transported
spores home on their clothing.
    The National Institute for Occupational Safety
and Health (NIOSH) has also been involved with
sampling at bioterrorism events. NIOSH has focused on
understanding ventilation systems, transport of agents by
people, and safety and health issues. Over the course of
the anthrax outbreaks, agencies collected approximately
10,000 samples. In conducting sampling and obtaining
results, agencies must remember that no numeric criteria
exist to interpret biological sampling data. Sample results
cannot be extrapolated to predict exposure. Developing
standards, however, is currently under way.
    Martinez highlighted the importance of planning
environmental sampling at biological or chemical events.
Environmental sampling can be the driving force behind
public health decisions. CDC's existing sampling plans are
clinically based. When planning sampling, agencies must
consider the need for continuity of operations at a facility
during a response.
    CDC has identified three sampling phases:
   •  Screening Screening occurs in the first few
      days following the incident. For the anthrax
      events, agencies needed assurance that an event
      had occurred (i.e., an agent had  been released).
      Sampling plans should optimize finding sources and
      assessing their concentrations as  soon as possible.
   •  Characterization Sampling for contaminant
      characterization is conducted to  prepare for
      remediation. False positives and  negatives are not as
      much of a concern during characterization.
   •  Remediation/restoration Agencies must have a
      high level of confidence in sampling results. Results
      are used to confirm that the agent was removed.
    CDC responded to anthrax releases in Florida, New
Jersey, New York, Connecticut, and Washington, D.C.
In all but two cases, CDC identified the sources of the
anthrax release. (CDC never found the source of anthrax
affecting a health care worker in New York City or an
elderly woman in Connecticut.) To identify sources, CDC
followed a consistent sampling strategy. They  followed the
trail of the source and considered dissemination methods
(e.g., air, personnel). For anthrax delivered through the
mail, CDC sampled the mail-sorting machines and
electrostatic collection points (e.g., computer  monitors).
At Capitol Hill, CDC collected samples from elevators,
furniture, floors, ventilation systems, vehicles, and
clothing. CDC personnel collected primarily  bulk samples
or surface samples. They rarely collected air samples. At
the time no method to validate spore sampling results
existed. Confidence in sampling results comes from
experience with industrial hygiene sampling and past
disease sampling.
6  NHSRC

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    After the 2001 events, CDC developed a sampling
protocol (which will be updated) and conducted
validation studies. CDC also evaluated validation studies
by Sanderson et al. (collection efficiencies), McCleery et
al. (air sampling), Dugway Proving Ground (biological
agent simulants), and Sandia National Laboratory
(anthrax simulants). The Dugway Proving Ground study,
conducted with EPA, involved releasing an agent in an
air chamber, letting the agent settle, and then collecting
and sending the sample to a laboratory for analysis. This
study allowed method comparison and evaluation of inter-
laboratory variability.
    CDC applied the lessons learned during the anthrax
events to a ricin event in South Carolina (October 2003),
the BioWatch program agent identification in Texas
(October 2003), and the SARS outbreaks (spring 2003).
CDC coordinated with other agencies to share data, based
sampling strategies on potential agent transport pathways,
and applied updated sampling methodologies.

Questions, Answers, and Comments
   • When CDC conducted subway sampling, what
     weie some of the sampling challenges? To assess
     the incident of the health care worker in New York
     City who contracted anthrax, CDC was asked to
     sample as many potential sources as possible. CDC
     could not identify a clear contamination pathway
     but did know the exact subway line that the worker
     rode. Using police department personnel trained
     in sampling techniques, CDC sampled the subway
     line. Each sampling person was accompanied by
     a strategist to help identify appropriate sampling
     locations. None of the samples collected in the
     subway were positive for B. anthracis. Because
     B. anthracis out-competes other organisms,
     interferences were not a concern.
   • Has CDC considered the impacts of
     noncultutable but viable organisms? CDC
     researchers are currently examining this concern.
     They have completed some research with B.
     anthracis; the information gathered for this
     organism, particularly validation studies, is
     applicable to other organisms. CDC has methods
     for identifying organisms. Bioviability and its
     impact on infectivity are critical issues.
   • What validation methods do you plan to use
     in the future? Agencies are currently debating
     validation methods and techniques. At the same
     time, a number of novel technologies are also
     becoming available. CDC research focuses on
     methods that are cost-effective and easily accessible
     to first responders. CDC is also concerned about
     collection and recovery systems. Some specific
     research has examined sampling methods such as
     swabs, wipes, and  vacuuming.


Ranking Threats for

Decontamination  Research

Nancy Adams, U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency, National Homeland Security Research
Center
NHSRC/DCMD provides research to support
decontaminating and restoring facilities by working with
decontamination teams,  emergency response teams, and
on-scene coordinators. One aspect of NHSRC's research
is to identify agents  of greatest interest and to examine
ongoing research to address these agents.
    This presentation  focused on the methods used by
NHSRC to identify and rank threat agents. In addition to
ranking agents, NHSRC/DCMD conducts research on
sampling methods, contaminant containment, tracking
contaminant movement, and decontamination and
disposal issues. NHSRC does not focus  on collecting
evidence.
    Adams discussed four different methods used to rank
threat agents. Specific  results of the ranking processes
were excluded from the presentation because of security
concerns. NHSRC is continually updating ranking results
to ensure that its research has the proper focus.
   • DCMD  approach This  ranking approach
     identifies and ranks high-priority threat
     agents, identifies and ranks likely terrorist
     targets, and identifies terrorist goals (e.g., loss
     of life, economic damage, and inducing fear).
    To identify and rank threat agents, NHSRC
examined the ranking schemes and results of other
agencies and organizations, including CDC, DoD, EPA,
the State Department, and the intelligence community.
NHSRC then developed a list of ranking factors:
infective dose, persistence, availability (e.g., small pox
is well guarded), prior use, ease of detection, severity
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of effects, transmission, preventives/treatments, ease of
decontamination (e.g., fumigation, latent desiccation),
latency, and ease of airborne dispersion. NHSRC is
more concerned with airborne dispersion, but they are
beginning to address water distribution. Each ranking
factor is given a weight (1 to 5) for relevance. The weights
are somewhat arbitrary and can be changed. Each agent is
assigned a value (0  to 4) for each ranking  factor. NHSRC
has clearly defined  the agent-specific values (e.g., for
the ranking factor "severity of effects," 0 is mild and 4 is
death). The overall threat agent rank is the sum of the
products of the ranking weight and  the agent-specific
value.
    NHSRC identified a number of target buildings (e.g.,
shopping centers, convention centers,  airports, hospitals,
museums, and federal agencies). The building ranking
factors are building access, HVAC access,  potential for
infiltration outdoors, room size, and people traffic. Each
of these factors is then weighted (1 to 5). Infiltration has
a low weight because buildings are typically either entirely
open or closed. Each building is assigned  a value (1 to
5) for each ranking factor. The overall  building rank is
the sum of the products of the ranking weight and the
building value.
    NHSRC combines the agent rank, building rank, and
terrorist goals to link agents to events and develop threat
scenarios. NHSRC calculated a threat value by summing
individual ranking factors (e.g., agent availability, agent
hazard index, ease of agent use, people traffic, and non-
health impacts). Agent availability refers to the ease of
obtaining an agent and prior use of an agent. The agent
hazard index involves the infectious  dose,  lethality,
severity of effects, contagiousness, latency, and treatment
availability. Ease of use refers to dispersion options and the
potential for infiltration, and people traffic refers to the
number of people who use an area. Non-health impacts
include economic,  symbolic, political, and psychological
impacts. NHSRC then ranked different threat scenarios
according to visual patterns and statistical cluster analyses
to help focus work on a small number of persistent agents
with severe potential effects.
    • Science Applications International Corporation
      (SAIC) ranking approach SAIC researchers
      completed a similar but independent ranking
      process for NHSRC. They considered threats
      (physical contaminants and "cyber" threats),
      targets (buildings, water systems, and wastewater
      systems), and impacts (health, economic, and
      environmental). SAIC developed a ranking
      algorithm that calculated a risk number based on
      the probability and consequences of an event. The
      risk index was the product of agent availability,
      event feasibility,  and the sum of possible health
      impacts, economic impacts, and environmental
      impacts. Values for each of these variables were
      identified using a series of decision trees. SAIC
      calculated risk indices ranging from 0 to 300,000.
      At the conclusion of the project, SAIC found results
      similar to those of the DCMD approach.
    •  Expert systems approach This approach
      considered the open literature, classified reports,
      NHSRC reports, and EPA lists of contaminants  and
      threats. Experts then gathered in a threat scenario
      meeting and developed a list of priority agents. This
      list was similar to those developed by NHSRC and
      SAIC.
    •  Battelle systematic decontamination effort This
      effort employed  a method similar to the DCMD
      approach and achieved similar results.
    NHSRC received input from a number of agencies to
ensure that the final threat list would be all-encompassing.
NHSRC (including DCMD and the Threat and
Consequence Assessment Division), DHS, DoD, EPA
Office of Water, EPA Office of Solid Waste, and EPA
Emergency Response Team members all provided input.

Questions, Answers, and Comments
    •  How does the NHSRC ranking scheme compare
      with the rankings and categorizations developed
      by other agencies? NHSRC uses the ranking results
      primarily to focus research efforts. Ranking schemes
      and categorizations are based on agency-specific
      missions. For example, CDC is concerned with
      health effects, so it may rank small pox as a threat
      agent because of its drastic health consequences.
      NHSRC is concerned with decontamination; since
      small pox is fragile in the environment, NHSRC
      would rank it as a low priority.
    •  NHSRC should add a category for technical
      surprises (e.g., non-cultural but viable
      organisms). NHSRC is researching methods
      for determining  organism viability as well as
      bioengineered organisms and newer chemical
      threats.
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OPP  Sterilant Registration
Project: Improving the
Association of Official
Analytical Chemists  (AOAC)
Sporicidal Activity Test
and the Evaluation of
Quantitative  Methods
Stephen Tomasino, U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency, Office of Pesticide Programs
EPA's Office of Pesticide Programs (OPP) is researching
and developing biological analysis methods. This
presentation updated workshop participants about the
method development project status and OPP's evaluation
of laboratory sporicidal efficacy methods. OPP operates
a microbiological laboratory, which is the home of this
OPP project, at Fort Meade, Maryland. This laboratory
is registered with CDC's select agent program and may
become part of CDC's Laboratory Response Network
(LRN).
    As part of the method development project, OPP is
developing methods that allow laboratories to simulate
real-world conditions. The methods consider the threat
agent or surrogate, types of materials, application methods,
and carrier systems. Goals of the project include advancing
the science of efficacy testing, standardizing methods,
creating comparable efficacy testing results, identifying
a surrogate for B. anthmcis, and building a platform for
testing additional biological agents.
    OPP's ultimate goal, however, is to design comparable
efficacy data to help develop regulatory guidance. The
AOAC sporicidal activity test is the standard test currently
employed. A single carrier contains 105—106 spores, and
a full study uses 720 carriers. This test has a number of
limitations: results are qualitative, the test requires 21
days for incubation, and the test lacks standardization. A
passing result means that none of the carriers was positive.
OPP is following a four-tiered approach to developing a
method that is easier to run and understand:
    •  Tier 1  OPP evaluated methods, including
      modified AOAC tests, with the agent B. subtilis.
    •  Tier 2 Activities under tier 2 will be launched
      soon and will include evaluating surrogates for B.
      anthracis.
   •  Tier 3 Collaborative and validation testing will
      occur under tier 3-
   •  Tier 4 This step involves identifying, developing,
      and conducting comparative evaluations of field-test
      methods. OPP is currently focusing on laboratory
      assays and is not pursuing field-testing.
    Ensuring that performance standards are maintained
is critical when developing new methods or making
changes to an established method. OPP has identified
modifications to the existing AOAC method and two
new promising methods, which they are testing with
surrogates.
    Modified AOAC Method The current AOAC tests
use a liquid extract from raw garden soil (soil extraction
nutrient broth) as the test medium. To standardize the
test, OPP recommends replacing the extract with a
synthetic broth manufactured to standard specifications.
OPP also recommended replacing porcelain carriers with
stainless steel carriers, adding a carrier count procedure
with a minimum of five to six logs per carrier, adding a
neutralization confirmation procedure, and replacing the
egg-meat medium.
    OPP tested the current AOAC method against the
modified AOAC to examine whether changes in the
test medium and the carrier material affected the text
performance. Tomasino presented a number of slides
detailing these test results. Overall results were comparable.
As part of ongoing efforts, OPP completed a final study
protocol for the modified AOAC method in March
2005 and will begin validation testing in April 2005- The
validation report is due in July 2005, and approval of the
report is expected in August 2005-
    The two new methods under evaluation are
quantitative methods with inoculated vials serving as
the carriers. When identifying new test methods, OPP
considered a number of attributes, such as available
protocol, validation, previous use for testing sporicides,
readily available equipment, expertise, flexible contact
times and temperatures, enumeration approaches, percent
recovery results, deactivation of the agent, reproducibility,
turnaround time, suitability for various product forms,
and adequate controls. Two methods met these criteria:
   •  ASTME 2111-00 Standard Quantitative Carrier
      Test Method  The ASTM method uses a glass vial
      as a carrier. Following exposure, the vial's contents
      are syphoned through a filter to capture  spores. The
      filter is then plated to assess spore growth, which
      indicates that spores remain.
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    •  Three-Step Method (TSM) (Sagripanti et al.,
      1996) TSM employs a glass coupon as the carrier.
      To determine whether spores remain, the coupon
      undergoes a three-step process: centrifuge, sonicare,
      and incubation.
    OPP focused tests on liquids and hard surfaces. Each
test method required a different amount of sporicide. To
assess the variability and repeatability of each method,
three separate laboratories completed three replicates of
tests following each method.
    Repeatability studies highlight inconsistencies
within a laboratory. Reproducibility studies highlight
inconsistencies between laboratories. Repeatability and
reproducibility standard deviations were acceptably small
for all test methods. Tomasino presented slides detailing
the test methods and conditions (e.g., pH, sporicide
concentration, and exposure period) and the results
achieved for each method (expressed as the control carrier
log density or the log reduction). OPP's study results
did not show any method to be clearly superior. OPP
submitted the study results to an expert panel, which
selected TSM as the preferred method. As part of ongoing
efforts, OPP will conduct additional surrogate studies with
TSM beginning in April 2005- TSM and two to three
surrogates will undergo a multi-laboratory validation study
in September 2005, and a summary report of findings is
due in December 2005-

Questions, Answers, and Comments
    •  What fumigants are you testing? To date, OPP
      has tested only liquid fumigants. However, OPP
      believes that TSM can be modified to test other
      fumigants and other surfaces.
    •  What are the surrogate selection criteria? OPP
      began testing with virulent anthrax. The surrogate
      selection criteria will be straightforward and may be
      used by other researchers.
Crisis Exemptions for
Products  Intended to

Inactivate Bacillus anthracis
Jeff Kempter, U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency, Office of Pesticide Programs
Crisis exemption is the process of receiving approval to
use an unregistered chemical as a decontaminant for
a particular microorganism, such as B. anthracis. This
presentation provided background information about the
crisis exemption process, considerations for evaluating and
selecting sporicides, issues that demand attention, and the
current state of the registration process.
    A number of groups (e.g., researchers, regulators,
chemical producers, first responders) and the public are
involved in deciding what chemicals should be used to
decontaminate an  anthrax event. First responders want
chemicals that are safe and act quickly. The public looks
for chemicals that are safe to use but provide adequate
decontamination.
    In the United States, decontamination agents
fall under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and
Rodenticide Act (FIFRA). FIFRA applies to chemicals
sold for inactivating biological agents. These chemicals
are considered pesticides and must be registered. When
anthrax attacks occurred in 2001, no chemical had been
registered for decontaminating B. anthracis. As such, the
government created the crisis exemption process to allow
chemical decontamination. A crisis exemption was needed
for each decontamination event. Of the 63 requests, OPP
approved 28 and rejected 35. Both federal agencies and
private companies  submitted requests and each request
included remediation action plans, sampling and analysis
plans, and ambient air monitoring plans.
    When evaluating and selecting sporicides,
OPP considers both safety and efficacy issues.
    • Safety Concerns regarding safety include
      containment of the contamination area and
      fumigant, fumigant toxicity and potential human
      exposure, fumigant generation method, ability
      to achieve negative pressure in a building, post-
      treatment aeration and scrubbing needs, system
      backups, and ambient air monitoring needs. A key
      concern is that the fumigation be successful after the
      first treatment. Air treatment systems are also a key
      concern when considering containment and post-
      treatment cleanup.
10 NHSRC

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    •  Efficacy  Issues associated with treatment efficacy
      include fumigation processes (e.g., treating the
      building as a whole or in sections), fumigant
      distribution (e.g., using fans), reaching and holding
      decontamination process parameters, monitoring
      process parameters (e.g., concentration, time, and
      relative humidity), biological indicator sampling,
      and clearance sampling. Sealing a building to
      prevent or minimize leaks is a time-consuming part
      of ensuring the fumigation efficacy.
    Liquids OPP has granted crisis exemptions for four
liquid B. anthrads sporicides: aqueous chlorine dioxide,
hydrogen peroxide/peracetic acid, sodium hypochlorite,
and hydrogen peroxide/quarternary ammonium foam.
These liquids were approved for use on hard, nonporous
surfaces only. The exemption for DF-100 was withdrawn
because the fumigant failed tests with the AOAC method.
DF-200, which is the improved version of DF-100, has
reportedly passed testing.
    GasesAkpors  Five  gases and vapors have
received crisis exemptions: gaseous chlorine dioxide
(buildings), vaporized hydrogen peroxide (buildings),
paraformaldehyde (equipment in tented enclosures),
methyl bromide (laboratory and field study), and
ethylene oxide (specialized off-site treatment of specific
items). Several vendors offer hydrogen peroxide as a
decontamination agent.
    OPP is moving toward registering chemicals for
B. anthracis decontamination, but several regulatory
issues must be addressed first. EPA needs to establish
standard efficacy test methods. The registration data
requirements need to be rigorous but reasonable. EPA
must also consider the question of how clean is clean. A
National Academy of Sciences (NAS) study focusing on
anthrax, plague, and small pox is pending. This study will
likely include several recommendations for regulatory
requirements, such as a site-by-site risk assessment. The
study will also address natural versus residual exposures,
past decontamination efforts, and enclosed versus semi-
enclosed facilities.
    Registration requires test data regarding product
chemistry, toxicity,  and efficacy. These tests are
straightforward  and are guided by the concept that a
product registered for use against an agent must be tested
against that agent. OPP may accept surrogate data if the
surrogate is proven to be equally susceptible to a product.
Product labeling includes details regarding the product use
and safety precautions. For registration, a product may be
labeled for restricted use and require a substantial technical
use manual.
    To address efficacy testing, EPA is leveraging
interagency cooperation. EPA and others participate
in an expert panel to share information and prevent
redundancies. They are trying to identify one set of tests
that is acceptable to all the agencies. These tests could
then be used for regulatory and/or registration purposes.
Kempter highlighted the OPP method testing discussed in
Tomasino's presentation.
    Kempter discussed "Lemon Drop" as an example of a
crisis exemption situation. The United States Coast Guard
(USCG)  identified a shipment of lemons with a viable
threat for biological contamination. USCG needed, and
OPP provided, a crisis exemption within 24 hours.
    OPP and others have been successful at completing
decontamination. Certain decontamination methods are
safe and effective, some personnel and equipment can
be mobilized quickly, and OPP can quickly issue crisis
exemptions for known decontamination methods.

Questions, Answers, and Comments
    •  For sporicidal testing,  is there a standard for
      material compatibility? Material compatibility
      standards have not  been required. If OPP identifies
      a chemical that passes toxicity and efficacy tests
      but has known compatibility problems, OPP will
      require the manufacturer to label the product
      accordingly. OPP is unlikely to fail a chemical
      based on compatibility.  A workshop participant
      noted that many concerns are associated with
      material compatibility and fumigation. Material
      compatibility involves more than just damage to a
      material; it also involves the impact of a fumigant
      on materials, the impact of a material on a
      fumigant, and the ability of a fumigant to penetrate
      a material.
    •  Have all the chemicals that were used to
      decontaminate B.  anthracis been registered?
      No chemicals have  been registered for use against
      anthrax. Decontamination is  still conducted under
      crisis exemptions and each situation is reviewed on
      a case-by-case basis. Some of the chemicals used in
      anthrax decontamination, however, are registered
      for other uses. OPP is working with laboratories
      and others to prepare for crisis exemption
      submissions, if needed.
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Sampling  and Clearance
Lessons Learned
Mark Durno, U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency
Tony Intrepido, U.S. Army Center for Health
Promotion and Prevention Medicine
Durno is an OSC and end-user of decontamination
technologies. He was involved in the Capitol Hill anthrax
incident and has participated in technical working groups.
This presentation discussed many of the approaches
presented earlier but provided an end-user's perspective.
    The basic sampling approach is the same for
chemical, biological, and radiological agents. The anthrax
technical assistance document prepared by the National
Response Team (NRT) (available at urww.nrt.org) provides
immediate response actions for first responders at a scene.
The approach outlined in that  document is consistent with
other terrorism response or hazardous release situations.
The specifics of a sampling plan, however, change from
site to site. Parameters to formalize before sampling begins
include objectives, approaches, sampling and analytical
methods, transportation concerns, coordination efforts,
and data interpretation.
    Considerations when developing sampling objectives
include:
    •  Defining goals  Sampling goals may
      include assessing risk, characterizing contamination,
      supporting decisions, or verifying decontamination.
    •  Establishing data quality objectives Even if
      expressed as notes in a log book, data quality
      objectives are critical to a successful sampling event.
    •  Identifying standards No decontamination
      standards are currently available.
    In addition, professionals (e.g., from the medical,
environmental, laboratory, and public health
communities) involved in the decontamination process
should be consulted. Sampling event objectives for first
responders may include real-time monitoring, screening,
bulk material sampling, or unknown material sampling.
As the sampling effort moves toward assessing the extent
of contamination or decontamination, the objectives may
shift to forensics or the effectiveness of decontamination.
Transitional sampling, an Occupational Safety and Health
Administration (OSHA) approach, clears a building for
safe reoccupation.
    Regardless of the objectives, Durno emphasized, the
sampling approach must be logical. An approach devised
in the heat of the moment is destined to have problems.
A carefully designed approach is more likely to lead to
a smooth sampling event. Two examples of sampling
approaches are:
    •  Known source When B. anthmcis was
      transported in the mail, the contaminated letters
      were the known sources. For each room where
      a contaminated letter may have been, sampling
      occurred at the areas through which it most likely
      passed. If a positive result occurred, sampling in the
      affected area was expanded.
    •  Known contamination with an unknown source
      In this instance, statistical analysis of an area can
      improve the probability of finding a positive
      detection and identifying a source. A negative result,
      however, does not necessarily indicate that the agent
      is absent from an area.
    Intrepido continued the presentation with a
discussion of lessons learned from the sampling efforts.
    In April 2004, Intrepido participated in a workshop
to discuss sampling and detection  issues. During that
workshop, discussions included topics such as hazard
identification, field detection, sampling efficacy, analytical
capabilities, and post-decontamination sampling. The first
topic applied to first responders and the last three topics
applied to characterization and remediation activities.
    •  Hazard identification Hazard identification is
      critcal for first responders because their actions may
      spread contamination. Like hazardous materials,
      biological agents must be contained. Assessing and
      establishing the credibility of the threat is key.
    •  Field detections  Several methods for collecting
      field data are available (e.g., hand-held assays,
      infrared sensors, and rapid polymerase chain
      reaction testing). Misuse of these tools, however, can
      lead to poor decisions. Intrepido discouraged using
      these methods without proper training. Other field
      detection technologies are under development and
      testing.
    •  Sampling efficacy Intrepido listed a number of
      available guidance materials and references, as well
      as several studies by NIOSH, USPS, and others,
      that address sampling efficacy concerns. Further
      efficacy studies, however, are needed to identify
      acceptable  detection limits.
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    •  Analytical capabilities Laboratories are working
      to improve analytical capabilities and analytical
      support for decontamination projects. CDC has
      established the Laboratory Response Network
      (LRN) and is working to standardize analytical
      methods used throughout the LRN. DoD is
      establishing a similar environmental LRN (eLRN)
      to harmonize sampling.
    •  Post-decontamination sampling To date,
      verification sampling has been exhaustive. As
      research advances and laboratory applications
      become more relevant to field applications,
      clearance will become more efficient.
    To provide better guidance, the NRT technical
assistance document should consider first responder
needs, include a matrix of appropriate sampling strategies
and methods (including statistical tools), encourage the
use of relevant professionals, and develop consistent
nomenclature.
    Two examples illustrate different factors that affect a
sampling strategy.
    •  Hart building A clear understanding of
      contamination avenues was present. Sampling was
      planned using this knowledge.
    •  USPS buildings People were working for days and
      weeks after the initial release. A dynamic sampling
      plan considered  movement of the agent and objects
      in the building, and so sampling included lifting
      some objects and sampling underneath them.
      Appeasement sampling became part of the approach
      to assuage people's fear. Additional sampling also
      became necessary when one laboratory provided
      quantitative sampling results and other laboratories
      reported only qualitative results  (i.e., positive or
      negative). The quantitative and qualitative results
      were not comparable.

Questions, Answers, and Comments
    •  A workshop participant expressed concern about
      false negatives. Statistical design, if correct, can
      consider data risk.  In research at the Edgewood
      Chemical Biological Center (ECBC), differences in
      kill efficacy were based on differences in surfaces.
      Most tests use a stainless steel surface, which does
      not  account for surface variability in real-world
      situations.
Did you conduct any high-volume air sampling?
NIOSH and the Agency for Toxic Substances and
Disease Registry (ATSDR) helped EPA develop
an aggressive high-volume air sampling protocol,
which was similar to asbestos sampling protocols.
They sealed several rooms and passed one to two
room volumes of air through a dry filter unit.
Although the data were insufficient for statistical
verification,  the results improved EPAs confidence
in other data, such as surface sampling data. EPA
also augmented sampling data using other sampling
methods (e.g., gelatin filters) that can detect low
concentrations. Overall, the dry filters from the
high-volume sampling reported positive results
but not with the same frequency as other sampling
methods. EPA hopes that more research in this area
will be conducted.
When designing a statistical sampling approach
for B. anthracis, the agents specific aerosol
properties are considered. When designing a
statistical sampling approach for two or three
different agents, how do you consider agents'
different aerosol properties? When searching for
unknowns, targeting specific areas for sampling is
difficult. As more information becomes available
and you begin to understand the nature of
contamination, you can target areas and change
sampling approaches.
When identifying the logic behind a sampling
sequence, should you consider clearance
sampling needs? At the Hart Building, vertical
and horizontal grid-style sampling with air
sampling was conducted. Clearance sampling at
this building was more involved than clearance
sampling at other buildings because an extended
period had lapsed between exposure and
decontamination.  Sampling included redundancy,
extensive horizontal (i.e., surface) sampling, and
consideration of airborne movement. Intrepido
noted that the decontamination process at the
Hart Building helped to develop a new sampling
nomenclature. The technical language regarding
the decontamination process is also continuing to
evolve.
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The Use of the Trace
Atmospheric  Gas Analyzer
(TAGA) to Qualitatively
and Quantitatively Monitor
Ambient Air for Chemical
Warfare Agents (CWAs) and
Decontamination Agents in
Real Time at Parts per Trillion
by Volume Levels or Below
Dave Mickunas, U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency, Environmental Response Team
The presenter and others are developing and testing
methods for real-time, low-level monitoring for chemical
warfare agents (CWAs)  and decontamination agents in
ambient air. EPA's TAGA consists of an Atmospheric
Pressure Chemical lonization (APCI) source linked
to a three-quadrupole mass spectrometer. This project
included developing CWA spectra and calibration
curves, developing chemical ionization capabilities to
detect CWAs, verifying detection limits, determining the
dynamic linear range, establishing surrogates, identifying
interferences, and demonstrating methods. Mickunas
presented a series of slides detailing the test methods, test
conditions, test materials, chemicals of interest, and some
unique test conditions.
    Chemical agents of interest throughout the task
included GA (Tabun), GB, GD, GF (cyclosarin),
VX, HD, and the nitrogen mustard agents HNj,
HN2, and HN3. Chlorine dioxide and chlorine were
the decontamination agents of interest. Initial  testing
occurred in a laboratory chamber. EPA used diisopropyl
methylphosphonate (DIMP) as a surrogate for G and B
agents and half mustard as a surrogate for mustard.
    One aspect of the testing was to assess how well agents
would transfer through  a glass sampling tube without
being adsorbed or reacting with the tubing. Because
laboratory testing must  be conducted under a  hood,
researchers could test only a limited tubing length. Results
showed that the glass tubing was not entirely inert. EPA
is considering additional test conditions, such  as adding
heat, to assess reactions with the glass tubing.
    After testing the systems in a fixed laboratory,
EPA moved the system to a mobile laboratory, which
consisted of a TAGA mounted in a bus. The APCI uses
electrons and protons to ionize a chemical. Ambient air
enters the instrument; molecules are ionized and then
passed through the three-quadrupole mass spectrometer.
TAGA measures charges and creates a unique spectral
"fingerprint" as the result for each chemical. Information
gathered in the mobile laboratory can then be sent to an
incident command location via satellite.
    Mickunas presented the TAGA fingerprints for
a number of the agents of interest. The technology
considered the molecular weights of the parent and
daughter ions. TAGA can even detect low concentrations
of chemicals with low vapor pressures, such as VX. Ion
counting is key to the success of this method. For the
tested agents, EPA recorded between 200 and 7,000 ion
counts per part per billion (ppb), which indicates a good
response.
    Overall, TAGA is a good testing method for the
agents of interest. The mobile unit can identify an
evacuation area, but it is not currently configured for
sampling high concentrations. At a decontamination
event, TAGA can be used to detect fumigant leaks and
identify concentrations exceeding shutdown levels (e.g.,
chlorine dioxide concentrations of 25 ppb for three 15-
minute periods, or 100 ppb for one 15-minute period).

Questions, Answers, and Comments
   • Workshop participants commented that TAGA and
     the mobile laboratory can serve as a leak-detection
     technology. The detection limits for hand-held
     sensors are too high to detect leaks. Mickunas
     agreed and noted that the TAGA technology is
     about six times more sensitive than hand-held
     instruments.
   • Is the method applicable to high-molecular-
     weight compounds (e.g., ricin)? The
     pharmaceutical industry, which deals with high-
     molecular-weight compounds, uses this technology.
     Air monitoring was not the original end use of
     the technology. The method works with these
     compounds because it examines charges on
     molecules.
   • Are there concerns about using this technology
     at fumigations in high rises? Downwash is a
     concern. Overall, many opportunities exist to
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      research the logistical implementation of TAGA
      and the mobile laboratory.
    •  Does vehicle exhaust interfere with the lesults?
      Vehicle exhaust interference is minimal, less than
      30 percent.
    •  Are fixed monitoring stations in a community
      required with TAGA and mobile laboratories?
      From experience, this workshop participant
      has found that fixed stations are costly and
      time-consuming to use. Mickunas agreed that
      fixed monitoring stations have limited value. A
      contamination plume from a leak can be very
      narrow and can pass between fixed stations without
      detection. The mobile monitoring unit provides
      more information and more ways to identify and
      resolve leaks.

Insurance and  Indemnity
Issues
Jerry Robinson, U.S. Postal Service
This presentation examined insurance and indemnity
issues at decontamination sites. The USPS is concerned
not with industrial accidents but with terrorist actions.
Therefore, some of the insurance and indemnity options
mentioned in the presentation apply only to terrorist
attacks. An act of terror can be broadly defined as anything
unlawful that causes harm or attempts to use weapons of
mass destruction. A terrorist group does not need to be
identified and the act may be conducted by a domestic or
foreign group.
    In October 2001, anthrax releases contaminated
the USPS Brentwood and Trenton facilities. The attacks
caused illness in 22 people and the death of 5 people.  The
attacks also rendered the facilities unusable,  damaged mail-
sorting equipment, and instilled fear in postal workers and
the public. The USPS contracted with vendors to fumigate
and restore the facilities.
    As the property owner, the USPS needed to protect
contractors from undesirable outcomes occurring as a
result of the decontamination process (e.g., explosion,
unsuccessful fumigation, and harm to postal or vendor
workers). Obtaining this protection comes at great cost
and great delay.
    Addressing  liability for harm to people is the most
difficult aspect of protecting the vendors and the USPS.
Involved parties may try to distribute the liability to
minimize each party's risk. For the decontamination
events, the USPS reluctantly accepted full liability and
assigned broad indemnity with few exceptions (e.g.,
outcomes occurring as a result of gross vendor error).
Many months, however, passed before the USPS reached
the decision to accept liability. To minimize their risk, the
USPS then obtained some insurance coverage—a $100
million policy costing $4 million. Decontamination of
one facility, however, cost more than $ 100 million,  so this
policy did not cover the USPS completely.
    The USPS course of action has two problems.
First, most government agencies cannot indemnify
decontamination vendors because these  agencies are not
allowed to enter into the open-ended contracts required
for indemnification. DoD has exceptions to this restriction
for issues related to weapons. The current administration
is also very reluctant to grant terrorism exceptions; the
USPS has an indefinite income stream and, for this
reason, was able to accept indefinite liability. Second,
insurance is not  an available standby solution  and much
time is needed to negotiate an insurance policy after an
event occurs. Most insurance companies will not hold
an open insurance policy without payment, but opening
an unnecessary insurance policy is not a smart business
practice. Nonetheless, the USPS is looking for an available
standby solution.
    Robinson suggested that contractors obtain a
SAFETY Act designation and certification for their
technologies. This would allow contractors to be
immediately available to perform decontamination
services. The SAFETY Act—that is, the Support Anti-
Terrorism by Fostering Effective Technologies Act of
2002—is part of the Homeland Security Act. The
SAFETY Act covers decontamination technologies
because these technologies are a response to a  terror act.
As well as fostering the deployment of more anti-terrorism
technologies, the Act creates a system of litigation and
risk management for those technologies. Litigation
management restricts punitive and non-economic
damages to government contractors; risk management
restricts liability  to the extent that insurance allows.
    The SAFETY Act, however, requires a vendor to
purchase insurance, determined by DHS, in order to
be certified. The insurance level is supposed to be the
maximum amount that can be purchased without unduly
raising product price. This is a vague standard for DHS
to follow. The SAFETY Act also includes a government
contractor liability exemption. This exemption absolves
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contractors from responsibility for undesirable outcomes
of the decontamination (e.g., damage to property or
personal injury). Some attorneys are concerned that the
government contractor liability exemption will not stand
up in court. For example, a judge faced with a person
harmed during a decontamination event and responsible
for overwhelming medical bills may deem the contractor
liable because no other responsible party is available.

Questions, Answers, and Comments
   •  Does the SAFETY Act cover decontamination
      at private companies?  Private companies are
      covered as long as a terror act, and not an industrial
      accident, caused the damage.
   •  Is federal insurance an option? The atomic power
      industry has used a federal insurer model, but the
      federal government is the insurer of last resort.
      The current Congress has not adopted a federal
      insurance policy for terror acts.
   •  Do you see companies investing in insurance
      because they want decontamination and response
      business? Robinson stated that there is a limited
      market for decontamination services and suggested
      that more insurance options might be available if
      more contractors entered this market.
   •  Is the contractor liability exemption rebuttable?
      This exemption is only rebuttable if there is proof of
      fraud in the application to DHS.

The  Role of the On-Scene
Coordinator in the Process
Marty Powell, U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency
Powell has worked for EPA for 20 years and served as
an OSC for about 10 of these years. This presentation
provided an overview of an OSC's two responsibilities:
   1. To determine whether there has been a release of an
      oil, hazardous substance, pollutant,  or contaminant
      and whether the release poses a threat to the public
      or environment.
   2. To ensure that the threat is mitigated. These
      responsibilities remain the same on  all projects,
      although project specifics change.
    An OSC's role in a project is defined by the title "on-
scene coordinator" itself. "On-scene" implies a different
role from "on-site." "On-site" implies a federal presence at
a specific threat location; "on-scene" indicates involvement
in an event without requiring a physical presence. OSCs
are coordinators, not commanders. Commanders control
site actions, whereas coordinators play  a number of roles to
provide information and support remediation efforts. The
command structure at a site may seem complex, so the
OSC can act as a liaison within this structure.
    OSCs direct federal response assets. They draw from
a large tool box of resources (e.g., contractor support,
scientific support, special units, and public relations
support teams)  and provide these resources to local
and state agencies to ensure that these agencies are not
overwhelmed by the remediation process. They also ensure
that remediation work at a site is completed properly. For
example, the USPS commanded decontamination efforts
at the postal facilities contaminated with anthrax. The
OSC simply supported the USPS's efforts.
    Many workshop participants may be contacted by an
OSC. Researchers may act as information resources for
an OSC, or technology vendors may work with OSCs
to identify resources for testing their technology. OSCs
may also evaluate the remediation equipment used for
decontamination.

Questions, Answers,  and Comments
   • One workshop participant has worked with OSCs
     over the past three years. The OSCs understood
     available  federal information and assets and
     obtained them as necessary and worked behind
     the scene of the decontamination to ensure
     success. Another participant agreed that the OSC
     is a valuable source of information, which can be
     used to support decisions. Powell emphasized that
     OSCs  can access many EPA resources and facilitate
     obtaining these resources. They provide a link
     between scientific research and implementation of
     technologies.
   • Another participant noted that an OSC has a broad
     range of authority and power. For one site, the OSC
     determined the chlorine concentration needed for
     decontamination. Powell responded that an OSC
     has the ability to make decisions for a site without
     obtaining a permit. Regulations  requiring permits
     often do  not consider emergency response needs.
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In addition, OSCs have no liability and cannot
be sued for their decisions. The role of the OSC is
complicated by the needs of different agencies, such
as other offices within EPA, the United States Coast
Guard (USCG), and the Department of Energy
(DoE). Regardless of agency, though, an OSC's
roles and responsibilities remain unchanged: they
work toward an end goal of threat identification and
mitigation.
One participant, who works as an OSC, noted that
a shortcoming in many responses is coordinating
government and academic research to solve
problems. An  OSC may seek more information
about a compound, but the literature may provide
scattered and conflicting information. The OSC
is then charged with making decisions based on
this information. This participant emphasized the
need for more research, planning, and preparedness
information.
What triggers the appointment of an OSC? A
notification of some kind of release, for example,
a call to EPA or the National Response Center,
triggers the appointment. (An industry call to
EPA about a spill is a notification.) An OSC may
respond by granting responsibility to state or
local agencies but is still responsible for ensuring
mitigation. Sometimes the response includes a full-
scale investigation.
In the remediation phase, does the OSC act
as the incident commander under the Federal
Response Plan? In Florida, when the FBI
completed investigations and released the
building for decontamination, did EPA establish
a command structure? An OSC is unlikely
to become the incident commander. The OSC
considers site operations, such as what vendor is
providing what services. The command structure,
however, can vary. The USCG strike team is one
resource available to an OSC. Typically,  this team
serves as the incident commander at coastal sites.
Agencies involved in a decontamination event may
work together to formalize the incident command
structure. EPA is currently working toward
developing a more uniform approach.
Introduction to
the Government
Decontamination Services
Robert Bettley-Smith, Department for
Environment, Food, and Rural Affairs,
Government Decontamination Service
Bettley-Smith presented the United Kingdom
(UK) approach to threat events and subsequent
decontamination and provided a history of events that
have occurred. The UK is examining possible future
threats and building its arsenal of technologies to address
them. These efforts consider global uncertainty and draw
on a cross-government effort to ensure preparedness.
    In April 2003, the UK commissioned a study to assess
the need for an agency to address chemical, biological, and
radiological threats. The study recommended actions to
improve the UK's ability to respond to threat events. In
January 2005, the government announced its intention
to establish the Government Decontamination Service
(GDS). Currently, the government is balancing efforts
to improve the UK's capability to address an event and
establish the organization to implement this capability.
    GDS must consider current government structure
and authority. In the UK, authorities at the county
level are responsible for hazardous events. They are well
prepared for chemical events because of their experience
with chemical transport and releases. They also have
experience with radiological events (e.g., the Chernobyl
event). They lack, however, experience with biological
events, so GDS will focus its efforts on these threats. GDS
considers biological event decontamination as a specialized
field with expertise available from the private sector. There
is a concern that local authorities could be  overwhelmed
by the exigencies of decontamination following an attack
and could respond inappropriately.
    The UK hopes to learn from the U.S.  anthrax
events and other countries' responses to biological
threats. The Australian response plan was evaluated
in November 2003- This plan is grounded in military
actions, a precondition that is not applicable to the
UK. Also reviewed was the French plan, which includes
public notification as required by French laws. Again,
this plan is not wholly applicable to the UK. Bettley-
Smith emphasized the importance of understanding
the background for a response plan model, including
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constitutional restrictions and responsible parties. The UK
has also considered establishing a centralized data system
for facilitating and sharing knowledge across nations and
preventing research overlap.
    In addition to developing a response plan, GDS may
provide information about vendors and technologies
capable of biological decontamination. This information
may be presented in the form of a catalog of available
goods and services, including long-term, durable responses
and proven technologies. GDS may also enter agreements
requiring that vendors offering these services be available
to the government when necessary.
    Overall, GDS will serve three primary functions:
    •  Provide advice and guidance GDS will guide
      responsible authorities as they plan  for emergencies
      and test these plans. It will prepare a strategic
      national guidance document; provide ad hoc advice;
      review case studies; and participate  in exercises  that
      test command and coordination abilities, identify
      solutions, and highlight response plan weaknesses.
      Individuals have already evaluated three case study
      events (a cesium release and two bombings) to  assess
      responses and suggest actions to improve responses.
    •  Identify resources GDS will provide information
      about vendors, their capabilities, and their
      technologies and facilitate interactions between
      local authorities and vendors. Some interim
      arrangements, modeled on the response to the  U.S.
      anthrax events, are in place, but the public demands
      more confidence in vendor relationships and
      technology success. The lack of technology field-
      testing is a concern because a technology must  work
      when needed.
    •  Advise the central government  GDS will track the
      UK's decontamination capabilities and report to the
      central government.
    GDS will not assume responsibility for
decontamination, fund decontamination, or handle
humans, animals, or their remains. If an event occurs
in the UK today, GDS will likely provide  advice and
guidance and help secure contracts. It may also be able to
provide an OSC.

Questions, Answers, and Comments
    •  Is there a perception of urgency to address
      decontamination capabilities and preparedness
      in other European communities?  Bettley-Smith
      was most familiar with activities in the UK and
      was unable to provide an overview of actions
      occurring throughout Europe. Concern has been
      high in Australia since before the Sydney Olympics.
      France is also working to address decontamination
      concerns. Some of the UK actions have been driven
      by threat assessments, and the UK is working to
      ensure that event responses are proportional to the
      risk.
    •  Does the UK face the same insurance and
      indemnity issue as the U.S.? In the UK, the
      government serves as the insurance underwriter,
      with certain reinsurance provisions. The
      government is working with the insurance industry
      to quantify risks. Once insurance providers can
      quantify the risk, they can underwrite it. Key
      contractors will likely carry insurance for a variety
      of situations. After a terror event has occurred, the
      risks during the remediation phase of the event are
      the same as the risks during the remediation phase
      of a hazardous materials release. These are insurable
      risks. Insurance may be difficult, but not impossible,
      to obtain.


Laboratory Capacity  Issues

Rob Rothman, U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency,  National Homeland Security Research
Center
This presentation addressed laboratory capacity issues as
they relate to homeland security. A homeland security
presidential directive requires that "federal agencies
be prepared to respond to  chemical, biological, and
radiological attacks."
    Laboratories face several issues with regard to meeting
this directive:
    •  "Validation Validated sampling methods provide
      a level of confidence in reported sampling results
      and in answering the question "How clean is
      clean?" These methods are lacking for some priority
      chemical, biological, and radiological agents.
    •  Expertise Laboratories must have expertise in
      handling CWAs, which may degrade quickly.
    •  Capacity A laboratory may be called to analyze
      thousands of samples quickly,  especially if an attack
      affects city operations.
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    Creating standardized analytical methods is one way
to address these issues. Standardized methods would
ensure consistent and proficient sample analysis across
laboratories. In September 2004, EPA identified 109
priority agents and specific analytical methods for gas,
solid, oily solid, and aqueous samples.
    Revisions to the standard analytical methods are
scheduled for June 2005- This revision will include
updates to existing methods and will add new methods for
analyzing drinking water, CWA degradation products, and
four radiological agents (strontium-90, cesium, iridium,
and cobalt-60).
    Research with CWAs must occur under high-security
conditions and within laboratories under the rigorous
personnel-reliability program. Only a finite number of
laboratories meet these conditions. Rothman listed some
of the available analytical methods for CWAs, which
include a joint U.S. and Finnish method, Organization for
the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) methods,
Finnish Institute for Verification of the Chemical Weapons
Convention (VERIFIN) Blue Books, and the Wiley
Encyclopedia of Analytical Methods. EPA not only needs
to package this existing information in the standardized
analytical methods document but also needs to develop
new methods. Some chemical-specific concerns in the
development of methods are that GS degrades quickly
(within 24 hours) and VX, mustard, and lewisite are
relatively persistent. Methods, therefore, must be able to
detect either the primary agent or degradation products.
    In addition to developing analytical methods,
laboratories must have the capacity to handle samples
collected during a response. Samples to identify the threat
agent and assess the nature and extent of contamination
are collected at the greatest rate within days of the event.
Thousands of samples, collected within days or weeks
of the initial event may need to be analyzed. Cleanup,
clearance, and surveillance samples taken weeks, months,
and possibly years after the event may be collected in
greater numbers, but likely at slower rates, than initial
sampling.
    To address capacity concerns, EPA is working with
CDC to  develop the environmental Laboratory Response
Network (eLRN). CDC's existing  LRN serves as a
model for the three-tiered eLRN. Screening or sentinel
laboratories will provide analyses and participate in
sampling surges. Confirmatory laboratories will coordinate
with the sentinel laboratories and first responders. These
laboratories will also provide method validation. Reference
laboratories will provide definitive agent identification
for an event, develop methods and guidance, and
provide quality assurance. Tentatively identified reference
laboratories include the EPA ORD laboratories in Las
Vegas (chemical focus) and Cincinnati (biological focus).
These two laboratories are currently working toward
identifying preferred analytical methods for all priority
agents in all media, developing validated methods for
CWAs,  and preparing a nationwide quality assurance
program.
    Optimally, these laboratories will operate under the
same system to provide as much consistency as possible.
The network would also be able to address all hazards,
provide rapid sentinel screening, employ high-confidence
methods, and offer surge capacity. Laboratories will add
real-time technologies to their capabilities when these
methods are validated and supported by research. Through
the eLRN, EPA hopes to eliminate problems of analytical
inconsistencies and lack of sample comparability.

Questions, Answers, and Comments
   • One workshop participant provided additional
      details about CDC's LRN. CDC developed the
      LRN to support medical responses. Sentinel
      laboratories are given cleared status to conduct
      analyses; they include hospitals and others with
      access to biological analysis methods. Confirmatory
      laboratories are part of a secure system addressing
      public health concerns (i.e., state and federal public
      health laboratories). Confirmatory laboratories
      undergo proficiency testing and  follow a quality
      assurance/quality control program. Reference
      laboratories include the CDC laboratories. The
      impetus for creating the LRN was the need for
      high-quality, interpretable results that support
      public health decisions. Security at these laboratories
      is critical. Rothman agreed with the participant
      about security: it is critical, especially when
      laboratories are handling CWAs. EPA is currently
      discussing security issues and will likely limit
      security clearance to a small number of laboratories
      that will develop protocols and then distribute these
      protocols throughout the network. Use of surrogates
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      and degradation products may also facilitate
      material handling and address security concerns.
    •  Is EPA considering geographic distribution
      of the laboratories for the eLRN? Geographic
      distribution is one of the many factors under
      consideration. For example, EPA is considering
      using the 10 EPA regional laboratories as part of the
      eLRN.
    •  How did EPA select the four radiological
      agents for inclusion in the revised standardized
      analytical methods document? These four
      radiological agents represent a starting point. They
      are high-energy gamma emitters that are readily
      available.
    •  Will the eLRN include private laboratories?
      Private laboratories may be included in the eLRN as
      sentinel laboratories.

Chlorine  Dioxide  Fumigation
and  Liquid Chlorine Dioxide
John Mason, Sabre Technical Services
Sabre Technology Services (Sabre)  fumigated the AMI
building in Boca Raton and containers involved in
"Lemon Drop." (USCG identified a shipment of lemons
with a viable threat for biological contamination.) USCG
needed, and OPP was able to provide, a crisis exemption
within 24 hours. Mason presented information about
the chlorine dioxide fumigation technology used at these
locations and the lessons learned from conducting these
fumigations.
    At these events, Sabre sought options to accelerate
the decontamination and clearance process. Options
included minimizing wastes generated, minimizing liquid
pre-treatments, applying mobile fumigation technologies,
streamlining the clearance process, ensuring proper sample
tracking and quality control, and communicating clearly
with the affected community. At both events, Sabre
demonstrated its mobile fumigation technology. At the
AMI building, streamlining the clearance process would
have been the best option to  reduce time. A tremendous
effort was also exerted to describe and discuss the
fumigation process to the public and regulatory agencies.
    To illustrate the process, Mason  described the
fumigation at the AMI building in detail. The fumigation
itself lasted 7 days from equipment setup to complete
fumigation. However, 30 days of planning preceded the
actual fumigation. Before fumigation could start, Sabre
considered whether B. onthntcis contamination remained
after 2.5 years of vacancy. Contamination followed the
mail route and affected the HVAC system above the mail
areas. Sampling protocols developed for the Capitol Hill
anthrax event were applied to the AMI building.
    Having confirmed the presence of B. anthracis, Sabre
demonstrated the technology to ensure that the fumigant
would reach all areas requiring decontamination. Sabre
used the building's HVAC system to distribute the
fumigant. For the demonstration, about 1,500 biological
indicators and 15 test strips were placed throughout
the building. Sabre released the fumigant to achieve a
concentration of 750 parts per million (ppm) for a 12-
hour period. The building remained at a minimum of
75ฐ F and 50 percent relative humidity. The indicators and
test strips confirmed that the fumigant would reach all
targets.
    The Sabre technology involves transforming liquid
chlorine to gas. The technology passes the liquid through
packing material to achieve the phase change. They
controlled for the necessary temperature and humidity
level using the building's HVAC system. In Boca Raton,
dehumidifying the air was necessary.
    During the full-scale AMI  fumigation, Sabre placed
approximately 200 log-8 test strips throughout the
building. In post-treatment sampling, all strips showed
a no-growth response. Tracking sample locations and
communicating results  were concerns, so Sabre developed
a three-dimensional sampling map of the AMI building.
The software enabled people to visualize the sampling
locations and track the  sample chain of custody.
    As Sabre completed the AMI building fumigation,
the company was called to apply the same technology  to
the contaminated containers identified in Newark Harbor.
Sabre used this event to test its mobile equipment. The
total transit time from Boca Raton to Newark was about
20 hours. Within 48 hours of leaving Boca Raton, Sabre
was ready to begin fumigation.  Insurance and a crisis
exemption were both obtained  within 24 hours because
the agencies involved in Newark had worked with Sabre at
the Boca Raton building and were familiar with the Sabre
technology. The fumigation in Newark was completed
within 10 days.
    These two projects illustrate the need for pre-
planning. The planning phase can be streamlined when
agencies and organizations are familiar with a technology.
Data tracking is also critical.  Demonstrations of the
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decontamination technology at the AMI building were
needed partially to ensure that the fumigant was contained
within the building. Sabre has since conducted tests of
tenting with negative pressure to contain fumigants at
a facility in Utica, New York. Obtaining insurance also
contributed significantly to project delays. The AMI
building fumigation was delayed from November to May
because of insurance issues.

Questions, Answers, and Comments
    •  When decontaminating the containers in Newark
      Harbor, were you told what the target agent
      was? Can you discuss project considerations for
      conducting decontamination for an unknown?
      Sabre received minimal information about the
      target agent in this situation. They were told to treat
      the containers for an unknown biological agent.
      This situation highlights the need for  better testing
      and method development. The containers had been
      tested  for only three elements, but treatment was
      needed quickly because of the critical  location of
      the containers. Agencies involved did  not know
      whether the biological threat was real  or a hoax. The
      containers had tested positive for narcotics.  For the
      safety of all involved, they assumed that the threat
      was real. Before a bomb squad or customs officials
      could enter the containers, decontamination for the
      biological threat had to occur.
    •  Can you elaborate on your sampling, specifically
      the different sampling at the AMI building
      points used to track fumigant levels? Sabre
      placed thousands of fumigant indicators to  confirm
      that the fumigant reached desired areas. The
      indicators change color once they reach a certain
      concentration.
    •  How did you gain community support for
      fumigation of the AMI building? Sabre included
      the community early in the decontamination
      process. A public relations firm provided
      community relations support. In addition, the
      project had the mayor's support. Sabre was open
      about  their activities and made themselves available
      to community groups and media outlets. Sabre held
process demonstrations and arranged a round-table
discussion for the community the day before the
scheduled fumigation. More than 100 people from
the community attended this event.
Because the original contamination occurred
long before building closure, how did you
ensure treatment of surfaces that had since
been covered? For surface-to-surface mates, Sabre
inserted a geoplate between the two surfaces to
allow fumigant penetration. They considered items
such as coffee cups on a surface, dictionaries on
tables, and surfaces within chair cushions.
How was electronic equipment handled? The
equipment that could run was kept running during
fumigation. About 60 percent of the equipment
was nonfunctional by the time of fumigation. Since
fumigation, Sabre has not observed soft metal
corrosion. In high-humidity areas, rust films are
forming, but this would occur in any facility left
vacant for a long period.
What was your approach to insurance? Sabre
combined insurance with a no-growth standard
for two reasons: 1) a no-growth standard decreases
the number of possible questions in the clearance
process, and 2) it combines clearance with a
standard. As a private company, Sabre must have
insurance. Immediately following the events
of 9/11, insurance was unavailable because
insurance companies had mold and biological
exclusions to protect themselves from costly mold
situations. Suppliers and vendors on a biological
decontamination project would have lost their
base insurance because of the mold and biological
exclusions. Companies are working to remove this
exclusion for bio-weapons, and standby insurance is
now available.
At the AMI building, Sabre used tubing to
check fumigant concentrations inside. Have you
considered telemetry systems? Sabre selected the
tubing approach—a simple technology—to keep
the overall process simple. Telemetry tied to titration
results is desireable but cost-prohibitive at this
point.
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STERIS Chem-Bio
Decontamination
lain McVey, STERIS Corporation
STERIS Corporation (STERIS) provides technologies to
prevent infection and contamination. Their technologies
are used in the pharmaceutical industry but also apply to
decontamination following biological terror events.
    Vaporous hydrogen peroxide (VHP) decontamination
methods have widespread use in pharmaceutical
companies and clean rooms. A pharmaceutical company
may house manufacturing equipment in a chain of glove
boxes. Decontamination, which may occur monthly or
even daily, consists of simply injecting VHP into the boxes
in this chain.
    After the events of 9/11 and the anthrax attacks,
STERIS began modifying its technologies to apply to
anthrax. STERIS used its proprietary VHP to fumigate
two buildings contaminated with anthrax:
    •  GSA Building 410  This 1.4 million-ft3 building
      was an office supply storage area and a mail-sorting
      facility for the White House. STERIS conducted
      fumigation with the building contents in place. The
      building was separated into 200,000-ft3 fumigation
      zones because no data for fumigation of a whole
      building were available. The HVAC systems were
      treated as separate zones. The decontamination took
      3 weeks.
    •  Building SA-32 STERIS simplified the
      decontamination system based on information
      gathered during the  GSA Building 410
      decontamination. This 1.5 million-ft3 building
      was also separated into 200,000-ft3 zones. All of its
      contents were removed for easier decontamination.
      Decontamination at this building took 2 weeks.
    At both  of these  buildings, STERIS successfully
employed its VHP technology. McVey stated that a benefit
of hydrogen peroxide is that it decomposes to water
and oxygen so residual contamination is not a concern.
However, the rapid decay of VHP also means that
repeated injections are needed to ensure that the proper
concentrations  are  reached. Multiple  injection points,
not a single point, may be the best option for optimal
distribution.
    In collaboration with the ECBC, STERIS continues
to study the VHP technology. ECBC operates an
abandoned building as a large-scale test site. The building
houses former office and lab areas, which provide a variety
of surfaces and materials for testing. When conducting
efficacy tests, STERIS places the VHP units in a sealed
room. Sensors on the unit track the vapor concentrations.
Because the whole unit is within the room, the unit is self-
decontaminating. Bench- and chamber-scale tests have
shown modified vaporous hydrogen peroxide (mVHP™)
(patent pending) to be effective against chemical agents as
well as biological agents.
    Because contamination of the cargo air fleet is a
concern, STERIS also completed a demonstration project
to test mVHP for decontaminating a C-141 cargo aircraft.
STERIS set up the hydrogen peroxide system in a cargo
plane slated to be scrapped. Project setup took 2 days.
STERIS tested different fumigation time periods and
concentrations and conducted chemical and biological
sampling in on-site mobile units.  STERIS also exposed
aircraft materials to 100 hours of hydrogen peroxide
to investigate concerns about structural integrity. Tests
showed that VHP did affect structural components but
that there were no ill effects on avionics.
    STERIS is working to reduce the system size so
that the system will fit on a cargo plane. STERIS is also
working to develop a mobile/modular system, spacecraft
decontamination systems (with NASA),  and an integrated
mVHP/HVAC system.

Questions, Answers, and Comments
   •  Has STERIS tested the different effects of
      VHP on fabrics, materials, paintings, wood,
      and irreplaceable historical artifacts? The GSA
      Building 410 storage area contained personal items
      of the President and Vice President, including
      several paintings. No problems with the paintings
      have been reported to STERIS. Fumigating carpet
      is a concern. The deeper the carpet, the longer the
      exposure period needs to be. Most chemical agents
      make very good plasticizers, so they will soak into
      materials such as paint. When hydrogen peroxide is
      introduced as a gas, it works in a similar fashion.
   •  Is relative humidity control required? STERIS
      personnel use a 35 percent hydrogen peroxide
      aqueous solution for bioefficacy, so they introduce
      water with the hydrogen peroxide. If humidity is
      too high, the hydrogen peroxide gas just condenses.
      STERIS uses a system to keep humidity below the
      condensation level.
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   • At the NBC offices in New York City, was a crisis
     exemption needed for VHP? STERIS obtained
     a crisis exemption for the NBC decontamination.
     There was a concern about releasing VHP in an
     occupied building. Affected rooms, therefore, were
     treated by liquid decontamination. At this site, the
     effect of hydrogen peroxide on personal items was
     also a great concern. STERIS removed personal
     items and fumigated them with VHP off-site.
   • What was involved in emptying Building SA-32?
     STERIS removed the old mail-sorting machine,
     which was autoclaved for decontamination and
     incinerated for disposal. STERIS personnel also
     removed the wallboard down to  the studs, so they
     really fumigated an empty shell of a building.

Hydrogen  Peroxide
Vapor for Room/Building
Decontamination  Following a
Chemical or Biological Agent
Attack:  Overview of Efficacy
and  Practical Issues
Mike Herd, BIOQUELL, Inc.
BIOQUELL, Inc., is a company with experience using
hydrogen peroxide vapor for decontamination applications
in the healthcare, bio-defense, pharmaceutical, and
environmental industries.
    Hydrogen peroxide vapor forms a  condensate at
a submicron level. By nature, it is residue-free because
it degrades to oxygen and water. A treated area can be
reoccupied when the concentration there reaches a
time-weighted average  of 1 ppm. Users must remember,
however, that decontamination using any type of fumigant
does not replace actual cleaning and is not appropriate for
use on spills that must be physically removed.
    The BIOQUELL system was designed  to apply to any
size room or location. The system consists of self-sufficient
units that can be chained together to form an infinitely
scalable system, although Herd noted that practical
application would limit the number of connected units.
The units operate independently of a building's HVAC
system. They are self-sanitizing because they are sealed in
the treatment area.
    The technology works by flash evaporating a
30 percent to 35 percent hydrogen peroxide solution into
the environment. The hydrogen peroxide then creates a
micro-condensate on surfaces within the treatment area.
The micro-condensate greatly improves the kinetics of
decontamination; the D-value is less than 2 minutes when
the micro-condensate occurs and 2 hours without the
micro-condensate. BIOQUELL uses an optic condensation
monitor to detect the onset of the micro-condensation.
Relative humidity has not been a factor in the use of this
technology; success has been achieved in environments
ranging from 5 percent to 85 percent humidity. Modeling
is necessary for planning decontamination events and
ensuring success. In 2002, BIOQUELL published a paper
detailing the physical chemistry behind the process.
    Hydrogen peroxide tends to form  strong hydrogen
bonds between the  molecules, which limits its movement.
To ensure proper distribution, BIOQUELL releases
hydrogen peroxide vapor from a self-contained unit
with a rotating nozzle system that distributes the vapor
dynamically.
    BIOQUELL is currently examining material
compatibility issues associated with using hydrogen
peroxide vapor on different substrates.  Initial efficacy tests
under EPAs Environmental Technology Verification (ETV)
program for decontamination and destruction of anthrax
have been conducted on seven materials (carpet, bare
wood, glass, laminate, galvanized metal ductwork, painted
wallboard, and painted cement). The first four of these
materials are nonporous; the last three  are porous. Some
spore reduction occurred on each  of these materials, which
was unexpected—no reduction was expected on porous
materials, such as the carpet. A report summarizing the
results of this study is available at www.epa.gov/etv. Further
efficacy testing with other pathogens is planned. Herd
indicated that BIOQUELL hopes to conduct  research
with CWAs and would like to identify a partner for this
research.
    Herd discussed several case studies to illustrate
technology applications. The presentation slides provided
specific details regarding these case studies. In  one incident,
BIOQUELL personnel responded to the SARS incident
in Singapore. Within 3 days they arrived on-site and began
decontamination. In this instance, they treated 88 rooms
without having to modify the building. Medical equipment
was included in the treatment. No material compatibility
issues arose after treatments at these or other hospitals.
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Questions, Answers, and Comments
    •  Using the workshop meeting room as an
      example, would you recommend removing
      the contents before fumigating with hydrogen
      peroxide vapor? Vfbuld you recommend pre-
      cleaning? Herd estimated that three of the
      BIOQUELL model R machines would suffice
      to fumigate the meeting room. Decisions about
      material removal or pre-cleaning are made on a
      case-by-case basis and depend on the end use of the
      room (e.g., reuse or replacement of the contents).
    •  How do you seal a hospital room, how long does
      it take, and do you train hospital people to apply
      the technology? Hydrogen peroxide is a "lazy"
      gas and does not move readily. BIOQUELL tapes
      a room and then conducts sentinel monitoring to
      identify possible leaks. BIOQUELL manufactures a
      small decontamination unit for hospitals. Hospital
      staff could be trained to use the technology, but
      they would likely need assistance for room-level
      decontamination.
    •  Does concrete or the concrete surface coating
      interact with hydrogen peroxide vapor? Have
      you seen any interaction with smooth, hard
      surfaces in hospital applications? Vfere your
      material compatibility tests representative of
      real-life conditions? To Herd's knowledge, tests
      found no interaction with concrete. He thought
      that researchers had identified the surface geometry
      of concrete as a key factor in concrete interactions.
      A workshop participant noted that the later
      presentation describing research conducted under
      the EPA ETV program would discuss material
      compatibility findings with regard to concrete.
    •  Has BIOQUELL hung spore strips in the air to
      test whether decontamination of airborne (vs.
      surface) spores also occurs? Some testing of air kill
      has been conducted to assess how HVAC systems
      may affect decontamination. Herd volunteered to
      share the data upon request.
Whole-Structure
Decontamination of Bacterial
Spores by Methyl Bromide
Fumigation
Rudolf Scheffrahn, University of Florida
Scheffrahn is an entomologist with the University
of Florida. His expertise with termite fumigants and
fumigation events research is relevant to decontamination.
He discussed a laboratory and field study of methyl
bromide fumigation and tenting techniques as they apply
to decontamination following a terror event.
    Every day in Ft. Lauderdale, fumigants are used to
clear quarantined fruit and vegetables. Ship containers,
each holding $50,0000 to $60,000 worth of product, are
sealed and fumigated for 2 to 4 hours. Methyl bromide,
which has served as an agricultural chemical for more than
60 years, is one fumigant used. Methyl bromide diffuses
readily and is very stable, which means that clearing a
treated building is necessary. Methyl bromide can be used
with any humidity level and has already been  approved
to treat some bacteria. However, methyl bromide is a
stratospheric ozone depleter.
    In partnership with EPA, Scheffrahn conducted
laboratory and field studies to assess methyl bromide as
a fumigant for anthrax. In laboratory trials, spore strips
were placed in desiccation chambers and exposed to
methyl bromide. The spore strips were then incubated to
assess the kill rate. After 48 hours at 37ฐ C, complete kill
was observed for B. anthmcis and G.  stearothermophilus.
However, B. atrophaeus and B. thuringiensis experienced
only partial kills.
    Research continued with a 2004 field study at
a 30,000-ft3 home in the Florida Keys. The house
represented a typical residential environment with the
addition of computers and electronic equipment  to assess
collateral damage. Researchers placed spore strips (G.
stearothermophilus on paper,  B. thuringiensis on paper, B.
atrophaeus on paper, and B. atrophaeus on stainless steel)
throughout the structure (e.g., on  walls and carpeting,
inside a computer CD drive, in chair fabric, wall plates,
light fixtures, hanging files, and a sealed refrigerator).
They also established eight real-time  monitoring locations
within the house. The house was then sealed,  using
tenting—as is commonly done for termite treatments in
Florida.
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    The fumigation involved passing liquid methyl
bromide through a heat exchanger to create the gas.
At EPA's request, the researchers tested a higher gas
concentration than truly necessary (More than 600
pounds of methyl bromide were used to reach the
mean concentration of 312 milligrams per liter [mg/L].
Scheffrahn estimated that  150 pounds of methyl bromide
would have sufficed.) Reactions with methyl bromide
are temperature dependent; higher temperatures result in
better kill efficacy. As such, fans and heaters maintained
a target temperature of 35ฐ C within the house. The fans
moved the heat through the house but were not necessary
to diffuse the methyl bromide. After a 48-hour exposure
period, the researchers  aerated the structure to remove the
methyl bromide, and after 4 days, methyl bromide was
not detected around the house. At 48 of 50 spore strip
locations, no growth was observed. Growth occurred on
all controls. The two failure locations were the refrigerator
and at an improperly mounted spore strip location. No
damage to electronic equipment was observed.
    Advantages to the  methyl bromide and tenting
system included the low cost (approximately $150 per
1,000 ft3); rapid turnover to completion (approximately
200 hours); treatment  of all porous material, voids, and
HVAC systems; application at any humidity; and absence
of collateral damage. To demonstrate how quickly a home
can be sealed with a tent, Scheffrahn showed an example
of a four-man crew in Ft. Lauderdale installing a tent
around a 3,000-ft2 home in about 40 minutes.
    Scheffrahn also suggested some future research
avenues: real-time infrared methyl bromide detectors; air
displacement with materials (e.g., nylon 66) to reduce the
total treatment volume; silicone ground seals, and methyl
bromide scrubbing. At quarantine locations, scrubbers are
used to treat methyl bromide.

Questions, Answers, and Comments
    • What was the temperature inside the refrigerator?
      [Room temperature.] The refrigerator was off to
     prevent recirculation, and the door was closed
     tightly during the fumigation.
    • If sulfuro fluoride is a substitute for methyl
     bromide, why not use that against anthrax?
     Sulfuro fluoride  treats only insects and has limited
     use against insect eggs. Methyl bromide, however,
     can treat bacteria.
   • Does methyl bromide present an explosion
     hazard? No, methyl bromide was once used as an
     ingredient in fire extinguishers.
   • What are the long-term availability and costs of
     methyl bromide?  Methyl bromide will remain a
     quarantine fumigant until a suitable replacement
     can be found. Researchers have been searching
     for a replacement for 10 years or so. Suitable
     replacements are already available for other methyl
     bromide uses.
   • How would scrubber waste be disposed of?
     Scheffrahn thought that the scrubber waste would
     be treated as a hazardous waste and incinerated.
   • Can methyl bromide be used on wet surfaces?
     There have been some studies with damp (free
     water vs. high-humidity) wood treatment. Methyl
     bromide has low solubility—about 1.5 grams per
     100 milliliters of water.
   • Was there an attempt to have methyl bromide
     approved for treatment of the anthrax releases?
     Scheffrahn understood that Great Lakes, the
     company that manufactures methyl bromide for
     fumigation, was contacted. Research found during
     a literature review indicated that methyl bromide
     could kill anthrax,  but the data were unclear. The
     primary study examined anthrax kill in woolens and
     tested only pure methyl bromide. The uncertainties
     of the data eliminated methyl bromide from
     consideration. More recent research has found that
     a 2 percent methyl bromide by volume is sufficient
     for efficacy.

DF-200  Decontamination
of  CBW Agents,  Other
Biological Pathogens, and
Toxic  Industrial Chemicals
Rita Betty, Sand/a National Laboratory
Sandia National Laboratory (SNL) is testing a
decontamination formulation (DF-200) for neutralizing
CWAs and toxic industrial chemicals, killing biological
agents, and combating aerosolized chemical and biological
agent clouds.
    DF-200  is an aqueous-phase formula that has
been used successfully by the military. The commercial
product is mixed on-site as a tertiary system of surfactant,
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a 7-9 percent hydrogen peroxide solution, and a novel
activator. The hydrogen peroxide solution is below 8
percent to allow for easy shipping. After mixing, the final
hydrogen peroxide concentration is about 3-5 percent.
DF-200 is less corrosive than bleach and other available
decontamination materials.
    SNL tested DF-200 and DS2 (a corrosive
decontaminant used by the military in the past) as
decontaminants for GD, VX, and HD in stirred reactor
studies. Results were similar, with DS2 performing only
slightly better at the 1-minute exposure period. Both
chemicals achieved 100 percent decontamination of live
agents after a 60-minute exposure period. In other studies,
DF-200 rapidly (within a 15-minute exposure period)
neutralized nerve agents, sodium cyanide, phosgene, and
carbon disulfide, as well as biologicals (B. anthrads and Y.
pestis). Mustard agents required more time (a 30-minute
exposure period) because of mustard's low solubility.
A benefit of using DF-200 to neutralize VX is that it
cleaves the phosphorous-sulfur bonds to create less-toxic
byproducts. Overall, SNL has completed a number of tests
of DF-200. Specific results are  classified, but generally the
results demonstrate a high efficacy. Betty provided contact
information for those seeking to learn more.
    Laboratories at Kansas State University have tested
DF-200 and biofilms. Samples consisted of six- to seven-
log biofilms that underwent a 1-minute exposure to DF-
200. The biofilms were allowed to grow for 1, 3, 7, and
14 days prior to treatment. The 1-minute exposure to
DF-200 successfully decontaminated the sample biofilms.
DF-200 was also completely successful in eliminating
infectivity and viral RNA integrity in influenza tests.
    Toxic industrial chemicals, which are an increasing
threat, provide unique challenges for decontamination
because of the variety in their chemical and physical
properties. They also attack by differing mechanisms:
nucleophilic attack, oxidation,  reduction, or  buffering.
Foam is a highly effective treatment method, except
against toxic metals or strong acids and bases that may
react violently.
    SNL is also conducting a feasibility study of using
foam (e.g., DF-200) for knocking down an aerosol agent
cloud intended to drift to target areas. The study explores
methods for cloud knockdown and neutralization. SNL
does not intend to design a system for implementing
treatment.
    DoD considers DF-200 to be the best available
decontamination technology. SNL developed DF-200 to
enable rapid and safe neutralization of agents. Currently,
DF-200 is available in a variety of sizes and dispersal
techniques (e.g., 5-gallon backpack size) to meet multiple
needs. DF-200 is available to first responders addressing
a terror event. In 2004, EPA registered DF-200 for
disinfecting hard, nonporous materials. Applications
beyond decontaminating threat events may also exist.

Questions, Answers,  and Comments
   •  What remains after decontamination with
      DF-200, and how is it treated? The residue and
      cleanup depend on the release scenario. After the
      foam collapses, a wet-dry vacuum will remove it
      from indoor areas. After an outdoor release, the
      foam dries to a light, silky residue, which may
      weather in a short period of time.
   •  What is created in air when the foam mixes
      with the agent? Is the air still dangerous after
      the kill? When is it safe to reoccupy an area? To
      be effective as knockdown, the foam is deployed
      as small droplets that eventually fall to the ground.
      The droplets maximize the capture efficiency of
      the agent. No gas is  involved. Overall, the process
      creates a neutral cloud.
   •  In the subway example, what is the active spray
      duration?  The foam spray is not necessarily
      continuous. In chamber tests, 1-minute spray
      durations were used. For the 8-cubic-foot chamber,
      about 2 liters of DF-200 are deployed in this time.

Capitol  Hill Ricin  Incident:
Decontamination Dilemmas
Jack Kelly, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency,
Emergency Response Team
The ricin incident at Capitol Hill provides a real-world
example of issues faced at a decontamination event. The
Capitol Police responding  to the ricin event had little
information about ricin, so they called in OSCs, whose
primary purpose at this event was to gather information.
This presentation reviews OSC actions. In the end, the
OSCs themselves were forced to make decisions about
ricin based on limited information.
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    Ricin was first developed as a weapon during World
War I. It is a white powder that can be made fairly easily
from the protein toxins of castor plant beans. Worldwide,
more  than a million tons of castor beans are processed for
castor oil annually. Castor oil production in the United
States, however, ceased in the 1970s. Ricin is composed of
two toxins that act together to cause toxicity by inhibiting
protein synthesis in cells. Ricin is considered extremely
toxic by any exposure route (inhalation, ingestion, or
injection). No vaccines or antidotes are available.
    On February 2, 2004, ricin was found in the
mail room attached to a senator's office in the Dirksen
Building. The Capitol Police contacted an OSC that day
and requested assistance. Field sampling and follow-up
laboratory analysis confirmed the presence of ricin. EPA
was asked to receive, inventory, and store mail from the
building; conduct additional characterization; perform
decontamination of the affected areas and their contents;
and conduct clearance sampling. A February 9, 2004,
deadline for decontamination was established.
    By February 8, 2004, EPA had containerized
approximately 80 drums of unopened mail and stored
clothing from 32 potentially exposed individuals. EPA, the
FBI, and Capitol Police had collected at least 670 samples
from three affected rooms and identified  19 positive
results—all from one room. From the affected  room, EPA
removed and stored personal and office items. Large hard-
surface items were left in place.
    The mail room was clearly contaminated. Bordering
rooms on either side were considered buffer rooms and
potentially contaminated. EPA looked toward existing
research and data to  devise a decontamination plan.
The U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious
Diseases (USAMRIID) Blue Book served as  the primary
resource. Technologies considered were chlorine dioxide
fumigation, heat treatment, and sodium hypochlorite
solution cleaning.
    EPA chose to decontaminate with a sodium
hypochlorite solution. This decision was based  on the
small  size of the decontamination area,  the extent of
ricin contamination, knowledge of ricin properties, a
literature review, and input from an advisory group.
Decontamination occurred in the mail  room that was
known to be contaminated; the two buffer rooms; the
room that held evacuees; and the common hallways,
elevators, and mail drops. EPA covered the mail room
with the solution and effectively cleaned the room. Post-
treatment testing found no ricin activity. The building was
reopened on February 9, 2004, with the mail room and
buffer rooms remaining closed for renovations.
    EPA considered several options for decontaminating
the clothing, office items, mail, and mail equipment that
had been removed from the building. A decontamination
team researched the options and suggested heat treatment.
If the heat treatment were unsuccessful, ethylene oxide
fumigation would follow. Chlorine dioxide fumigation
was the third option.
    The decontamination team considered packaging
items for decontamination, setting sterilization
specifications, and establishing efficacy measurements. The
team also considered ricin concentrations, ricin locations
on materials, and ricin toxicity values.  Because of the
unknowns surrounding ricin, EPA decided that near 100
percent denaturation of ricin was needed.
    In cooperation with ECBC and the Naval Medical
Research Center (NMRC), EPA obtained crude and
purified ricin to test treatment efficacy. Clothing and office
materials, along with indicator vials  of crude and pure
ricin, underwent heat treatment. Temperature probes in
the treatment bags tracked the temperature (82—88 ฐC).
Treatment resulted in 100 percent deactivation of 13 of
the 14  purified ricin vials. For the crude ricin, 14 of the 28
vials reported 94.4 percent to 99-7 percent deactivation.
EPA was unable to determine why crude ricin was more
difficult to denature than purified ricin. The vials that did
not achieve 100 percent deactivation underwent a second
heat treatment. Some of the vials were reanalyzed within
4 days  of treatment and others 3 weeks after treatment.
The crude ricin  reported 99-8 percent  to 99-99 percent
deactivation after 4 days and greater than 99-99 percent
deactivation after 3 weeks. The  purified ricin reported 100
percent deactivation after 4 days and only 99-92 percent
to 99-99 percent deactivation after 3 weeks. EPA believed
this reactivation may have been due to protein refolding.
The decontamination team documented their findings in
a brief memorandum. Recommendations for the fate of
the clothing and office materials that underwent the single
heat treatment were left to  the OSC.
    EPA received  a second set of materials, including
paper items, mail, and vacuum  cleaner contents, for
decontamination at the end of March  2004.  These
materials underwent a single heat treatment.  In addition,
EPA conducted ethylene oxide pilot tests to assess efficacy.
The pilot test resulted in deactivation up to 99-9 percent,
so EPA decided to expose the heat-treated materials to
ethylene oxide. Results from test vials undergoing ethylene
                                                                  Decontamination Workshop 27

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oxide treatment alone or heat followed by ethylene oxide
treatment indicated that the combined treatment was
most effective. In the combined treatment, 9 of the 11
crude ricin vials experienced 100 percent deactivation,
with the other 2 samples reporting 99-995 percent and
99-997 percent deactivation. All 11 purified ricin vials
were 100 percent deactivated. Again, the decontamination
team documented findings in a memorandum and the
OSC provided recommendations for reuse.
    Kelly noted several lessons learned from this
decontamination event:
    • Documentation EPA correctly assumed that
     they would receive requests to retrieve information
     for the criminal investigation. Documenting the
     materials held in each container was critical.
    • Communication The decontamination team first
     considered simply disposing of replaceable personal
     items (e.g., clothing) and reimbursing the owners.
     However, the owners were emphatic about having
     items returned. An effective communications
     program might have persuaded owners to accept
     reimbursement as a solution.
    • Coordination Interagency groups and the
     decontamination groups worked well together
     and may have a place in a response. Large groups,
     however, may suffer delays simply because of the
     group size.  Collaboration with other agencies, such
     as ECBC and NMRC, was critical for the research
     projects conducted as part of decontamination. This
     collaboration allowed the involved OSCs to focus
     on managing the response and avoid becoming
     bogged down by the technology.

Questions, Answers, and Comments
    • How do the percentages reported for deactivation
     relate to kill?  The mammalian cell assays assess
     reduction in activity and provide results as the
     percent of toxicity inactivity. Crude and purified
     ricin were used as surrogates for the ricin actually
     found during the event.
    • What was  the ricin particle size? This information
     was never made public.
    • Ricin is a considerable concern for the
     USPS. Have fumigation vendors looked at
     decontaminating ricin? Some studies of ricin
     fumigation have  been conducted. Vendors,
     however, are unable to obtain ricin for testing
      their decontamination technologies. They have
      conducted some studies of protein degradation that
      may be applicable to ricin. Vendors also hypothesize
      that if a fumigant can destroy a prion, it should
      be able to destroy ricin. Overall, ricin should be a
      priority agent for further research.

Restoration From
Decontamination:  USPS
Experience
Richard Orlusky, U.S. Postal Service
In October 2001, the USPS Trenton facility closed as the
result of an anthrax event. This presentation  highlighted
the USPS's experiences in restoring this building after
decontamination.
    Although contamination occurred in 2001, the
Trenton facility was closed until offices in Washington,
D.C., had been decontaminated. Construction of the
fumigation system in Trenton began in April 2003, and
fumigation with chlorine dioxide gas occurred in October
of that year. An environmental clearance committee
recommended reoccupancy in February 2004. At that
time, the USPS and the vendor began  removing the
fumigation equipment, conducting limited building
restoration (e.g., cleaning the HVAC system), and meeting
with restoration contractors to plan restoration activities.
The USPS began restoring the mail machinery in March
2004 and restoration contractors mobilized at the site in
May 2004. The building reopened in March 2005-
    Critical factors that impacted the restoration included:
   •  The building's age and the type and condition of the
      equipment
   •  The effects of the decontamination effort (e.g.,
      surface cleaning with bleach damages equipment
      and flooring)
   •  Building degradation from inoperable control
      systems (e.g., shutting down the HVAC system led
      to high temperatures and high humidity)
   •  Equipment degradation from a lack of preventive
      maintenance (e.g., mail-sorting equipment requires
      extensive preventive maintenance and performs
      poorly after sitting idle)
28 NHSRC

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    Orlusky noted that if the USPS had known the
extent of damage caused by fumigation with chlorine
dioxide, they would have used a different, less damaging
material. They would have  reserved bleach for surface
decontamination only Orlusky also noted that the longer
a building and its equipment are left idle, the longer it
takes to restore the equipment. At the Trenton facility,
the interior temperature reached 90 to 100 ฐF, which
resulted in a harsh working environment. Restoring
environmental controls is key to creating a comfortable
work environment and minimizing equipment and
building degradation.
    Restoration considerations included:
    •  The cost of inspecting and servicing components
      versus replacing components
    •  The service life of existing building equipment
    •  Necessary building upgrades
    •  Building aesthetics
    Inspecting and servicing equipment are hidden costs
of decontamination and restoration. These costs  should be
weighed against the cost of simply replacing equipment.
Aesthetics also carry hidden costs, but the importance
of aesthetics, which impact worker relations and public
relations, should not be underestimated. The USPS
spent  considerable money replacing bathroom fixtures,
renovating the lobby, and replacing locking devices (e.g.,
employee lockers and EO.  boxes).
    At the Trenton facility, restoration included  rebuilding
the mail machinery; inspecting electrical wiring,  circuit
breakers, motor controls, and transformers to identify
replacement versus repair points; laying new flooring
over workroom floor tiles and  replacing carpet in office
areas;  replacing components of the HVAC systems; and
addressing building aesthetics.
    Orlusky discussed the following lessons learned from
the USPS's experiences:
    •  Prepare up-to-date as-built plans. Many delays
      experienced by the USPS stemmed from the lack
      of accurate as-built plans and drawings. These plans
      are critical to ensuring successful decontamination
      and restoration.
    •  Consider the facility.   The  age of the building,
      maintenance status, and type of equipment are
      major determinants of cost, time, and scope. These
      factors should be considered when planning the
      decontamination and restoration.
    •  Plan restoration actions early.  Including the
      restoration contractor in discussions with  the
      fumigation contractor can help with planning a
      comprehensive scope of work.
    •  Select the decontamination technology wisely.
      If fumigation is the selected decontamination
      method, then surface cleaning with a bleach
      agent should be conducted sparingly. Additional
      chloride dioxide research may show effective
      decontamination at lower concentrations and
      reduced contact times, which may reduce damage
      caused by the fumigant itself.
    •  Maintain the facility.  Restoring environmental
      controls as quickly as possible, maintaining
      equipment, and reducing the downtime before and
      after fumigation reduce the overall time needed to
      restore a facility.
    •  Estimate hidden costs. Costs beyond the
      decontamination and fumigation event themselves
      can be substantial. In addition to aesthetic and
      equipment-servicing costs, industrial hygiene
      activities, such as health and  safety training,
      emergency response and evacuation planning, as
      well as site security, add to the overall cost.

Questions, Answers, and Comments
    •  A workshop participant stated that bleach
      alternatives have been approved under crisis
      exemptions. In instances of heavy contamination,
      however, some  pre-cleaning is necessary to reduce
      biocontaminants to levels that will respond to
      additional treatment. Orlusky agreed that bleach
      cleaning is necessary in some instances. After several
      attempts, the decontamination crew developed a
      successful bleaching technique. Bleach cleaning,
      however, was a labor-intensive practice.
    •  How were the  HVAC systems addressed? The
      USPS kept the HVAC systems running after closing
      the building, but over time components of the
      system failed. Workers wore  personal protective
      equipment while conducting repairs.
    •  Did the USPS conduct OSHA restoration
      sampling? OSHA has posted a guidance document
      for restoration sampling on its Internet site, and
      the USPS submitted a restoration sampling plan
      to  OSHA. The agencies worked closely together to
      conduct restoration sampling, which was a major
      effort. The facility employees appreciated this
      relationship with OSHA.
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Another  Look at Chlorine
Dioxide  Fumigation:
Concentration-Times,
Efficacy Tests, and  Biological
Indicators
Paula Krauter, Lawrence Livermore National
Laboratory
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL)
and SNL, in partnership with the San Francisco
International Airport, have been collaborating in a
Domestic Demonstration and Application Program
(DDAP) to develop and demonstrate procedures,
plans, and techniques for the rapid restoration of a
major transportation facility. DDAP consists of many
components. This presentation focused on research,
development, and evaluation of rapid efficacy tests
to improve the verification and clearance phases of
decontamination. LLNL specifically studied fumigation
with chlorine dioxide.
    Researchers developed a rapid viability test protocol
(RVTP), which is an overnight method for processing
biological indicator strips using real-time polymerase chain
reaction (PCR). LLNL's research sought to demonstrate
this method's ability to test thousands of samples and
demonstrate a tracking and data analysis tool. The
research compared the RVTP against the standard culture
method, which requires 7 days for results, to assess the
accuracy of the RVTP The research included a rigorous
quality assurance program  to evaluate potential cross-
contamination, to determine the RVTP's ability to detect
blind positives, and establish assay sensitivity. In testing
the RVTP, LLNL included a number of blind  positives,
degradation products  that would interfere with the
methods, and positive and negative controls.
    LLNL conducted testing over the course of 2 days.
Testing involved exposing more than 1,000 biological
indicator strips to 750 ppm of chlorine dioxide for up
to 12 hours.  A number of strips were also exposed to
nonlethal concentrations of chlorine dioxide by varying
the contact times. (LLNL used a test chamber and
technology provided by Sabre.) Researches were able
to tightly control the chlorine dioxide concentration,
temperature, and humidity within the test chamber. The
chlorine dioxide was generated by combining sodium
hypochlorite and hydrochloric acid to produce chlorine.
The chlorine was then combined with sodium chlorite.
Half of the strips were analyzed by RVTP and half by the
standard culture technique. LLRN barcoded each to track
sample locations in the test chamber and test results. The
barcode maintained the sample chain-of-custody.
    Krauter presented details of the RVTP and standard
culture test conditions. Results of the standard culture
are determined by visual turbidity, which is a subjective
endpoint. RVTP results are less subjective; positive results
are based on a specific number of DNA detections. At
a dose of 750 ppm of chlorine dioxide for 6 or more
hours, no viable growth was identified by either RVTP
or standard  cultures. No significant difference in results
provided by the two methods was identified. The standard
culture method reported a 1.5 percent false positive rate.
No false negatives or positives were observed for RVTP
    Both stainless steel and paper strip biological
indicators were tested. At nonlethal doses of chlorine
dioxide, LLNL found a significant difference in number
of positive results identified for the stainless steel versus
paper strips. These biological indicators differ in several
qualities: porosity, spore viability, purity, and spore piling.
These results highlight considerations for selecting a
decontamination method (gas or liquid) applicable to
conditions (porous versus hard surfaces).
    Overall, LLNL's research met the objective of
developing an analytical method that can provide accurate
results in 15 hours. Continuing research includes testing
RVTP with a high-throughput automation mode and
applying RVTP to a variety of environmental samples
(e.g., wipes and filters).

Questions, Answers, and Comments
   • LLNLs results found better kill on the stainless steel
     disks  versus paper strips. These results conflict with
     other research with glass and paper. Krauter noted
     this inconsistency. LLNL used a different fumigant
     generation process and a different technology
     to apply spores to the stainless steel disks. These
     differences may have affected the results.
   • What kind of variability was there in the
     replicates? For each test  concentration and
     time period, LLNL tested 50 individuals and
     identified positives within the test group. They then
     conducted the standard student T-test on results.
   • How were nonlethal doses achieved?  The study
30  NHSRC

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      consistently exposed test strips to 750 ppm of
      chlorine dioxide, but the exposure period varied to
      achieve a nonlethal dose. The test results indicated
      a need for more information on the 3- to 5-hour
      exposure periods and for log-8 versus log-6 test
      strips.
    •  What is the cost of RVTP? Krauter did not
      have specific information about analysis costs, but
      another workshop participant indicated that RVTP
      costs  about 5 cents per sample.

Innovative and  Emerging
Decontamination
Technologies
Mark Brie/chouse, Edgewood Chemical and
Biological Center
This presentation provided an overview of ECBC
activities. Public- and private-sector  researchers are
evaluating a number of decontamination technologies,
such as mVHP, forced hot air, Decon Green, chlorine
dioxide, enzymes, solvent suspensions and wipes, ionic
liquids, and supercritical carbon dioxide. ECBC  and DoD
are seeking replacements for liquid decontaminants, such
as bleach because of problems with corrosivity.
    Congress funds most ECBC  projects, which have
focused on field-testing technologies. The following
summarizes ongoing efforts.
    •  Modified vaporous hydrogen peroxide
      (mVHP)  ECBC and STERIS co-developed this
      decontamination technology, which includes
      ammonia as an activator. They have conducted
      field-testing at an abandoned  building and in
      a C-141 cargo plane, as described during the
      presentation by McVey of STERIS. Field-testing
      proved  efficacious against biological and chemical
      agents.  The C-141 cargo plane served as a
      demonstration of the mobile technology. For bare
      metal coupons, greater than 99-9 percent kill rates
      were found for biologicals and a mustard simulant
      was reduced to less than the 8-hour time-weighted
      average in 5-, 10-, and 24-hour test runs. On
      more absorptive surfaces, however, longer  exposure
      periods and higher concentrations were required for
      success.
    These tests also examined methods for distributing the
VHP and provided data for modeling efforts. Ongoing
research with mVHP includes reducing the equipment
size to a system transportable on military vehicles; assessing
material compatibility and equipment sensitivities;
expanding aircraft studies; and assessing applications for
ambulances, hospitals, or hotel suites.
    •  Forced hot air Injecting an area with forced
      hot air acts as accelerated weathering. Past tests
      were unsuccessful because of uneven heating;
      even heating prevents recondensation. ECBC has
      conducted more recent testing in aircraft using
      airflow strategies that achieve consistent target
      surface temperatures. Results indicated that forced
      hot air increases off-gassing for chemical agents
      but is insufficient for treating biological agents.
      Studies consistently found that longer cycle
      times are needed for more absorptive materials.
      Considerations for forced hot air systems include
      material compatibility, treatment volume, and air
      distribution.  ECBC believes the system could be
      modified to treat other vehicles.
    •  Combined VHP and forced hot air A combined
      system takes advantage of the benefits of both
      technologies. The forced hot air enhances hydrogen
      peroxide vaporization, controls heat and relative
      humidity, and enhances the diffusion of VHP The
      forced hot air also improves desorption of chemical
      agents. The effluent from treating an aircraft can
      be routed through a carbon-based filtration system,
      catalytic oxidation, or thermal  oxidation treatment
      system. ECBC may conduct further research on the
      combined technology in fiscal year 2007-
    •  Decon Green ECBC is also developing Decon
      Green, an environmentally friendly decontaminant
      formulated using commercial chemicals. Decon
      Green is designed to replace DS2 and DF-200 in
      military use. Studies have proven Decon Green
      to be effective against chemical and biological
      agents, but the chemical is disruptive to surfaces. To
      improve material compatibility, reformulations have
      slightly reduced kill efficacies. Decon Green has a
      number of benefits: it is ready for use 15 minutes
      after mixing, applicable in a variety of weather
      conditions, effective for 12 hours after mixing,
      compatible with protective clothing, and disposable
      as a nonhazardous material after hydrogen peroxide
      degradation.
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    • Resistant coatings Traditional chemical agent
      resistant coatings (CARCs) are nonreactive, durable
      and nonmarring, weather resistant, and flexible.
      Research for next-generation CARCs has been
      funded.
    • Reactive coatings  These materials actively destroy
      surface chemical agent contamination either by
      hydrolysis or oxidation. Research information
      on reactive coatings is readily available, and
      reactive materials such as these are widely used
      in industrial processes. Identifying and studying
      materials resistant to biological and chemical
      agents will likely be a strategic research area in
      the next few years. Potential agents for reactive
      coatings include metal oxides, activated carbon,
      zeolites, microporous membranes, novel polymers,
      dendrimers, and microencapsulation materials.
      Current research with reactive coatings aims to
      identify a coating that could  achieve 99-999 percent
      decontamination when partnered with other
      standard decontamination technologies. ECBC
      is partnering with the Army Research Laboratory
      (ARL) to study hyperbranched polymers and
      polyoxometalates. ECBC will perform the efficacy
      and material compatibility tests.
    • Other research materials ECBC and others are
      conducting research on several other materials. In a
      joint venture with NATICK, ECBC is evaluating
      active moieties in uniforms for personal protection.
      Catalysts, such as metal oxides, activated  carbon,
      and polyoxometalates would be included in
      uniform fabrics to improve personnel protection
      from chemical agent vapors.  ECBC is also
      investigating self-decontaminating coatings (e.g.,
      polyoxometalates and other inorganic catalysts)
      for water infrastructure protection and zeolite-
      based systems that would apply to a wide variety of
      situations.
     In addition to researching specific decontamination
agents, ECBC is conducting several other research
projects:
      • Comparative decontamination The object
      of this study is to compare the efficacy of three
      different commercial fumigation products and
      study the effects of parameters such as temperature
      and relative humidity.
      • Enzyme decontamination ECBC and
      Genencor International have partnered to
      investigate the use of enzymes to decontaminate
      nerve agents, sulfur mustard, and biological agents
      and toxins. They have signed an exclusive patent
      license agreement to begin commercial production
      of viable enzyme products. These products are
      available to first responders.
      • Sensitive equipment decontamination  ECBC
      is also researching small-scale decontamination
      systems that are capable of treating a wide range of
      chemical and agent materials. Two research areas
      are sorbent/reactive suspensions and solvent wipes.
      Ongoing tests of these technologies are planned.
      Nonreactive wipes also play a role in reducing gross
      contamination.
      • Ionic liquid-based decontamination Ionic
      liquid has been a productive research area for the
      past 5 to 10 years. Researchers have identified a
      broad class of ionic liquids for decontamination
      of CWAs.  Ionic liquids would replace traditional
      solvents by combining solvent,  surfactant, buffer,
      and oxidizing agent functionalities. Further tests are
      planned.
      • Supercritical carbon dioxide decontamination
      ECBC developed a bench-scale supercritical
      carbon dioxide reactor to test this decontamination
      technology. This material seems to be an effective
      cleaning and sterilizing agent. Supercritical carbon
      dioxide is also environmentally friendly and recycles
      carbon dioxide,  thus preventing the release of
      greenhouse gases. The technology is readily available
      for garment cleaning, hard-surface cleaning, and
      sterilization.

Questions, Answers, and  Comments
    •  What technologies apply to wide-area
      decontamination, such as large cities? Foam and
      base-activated technologies can both be developed
      for wide areas. GL1800 is modified airport de-icing
      equipment that  can be used for deploying a liquid
      over a large area.
    •  Is the forced hot air technology effective
      against virus contamination? ECBC has tested
      decontamination technologies against virus
      contamination,  but a decontaminant must be
      able to kill a spore to be considered a biological
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     decontaminant. A first responder will not
     necessarily know the differences among viruses,
     biological agents, and spores.
     When conducting aircraft research, why was
     the HVAC system excluded from study? ECBC
     researchers excluded the HVAC system because
     they were considering contamination scenarios that
     may not involve the HVAC system. Contamination
     of the main cargo area was seen as the more likely
     scenario.
Systematic  Decontamination
Project:  Homeland Security
Verification of Chemical and
Biological  Decontamination
Technologies
Phil Koga, Edgewood Chemical and Biological
Center
When decontaminating an anthrax-contaminated
building, one must consider treatment options (e.g.,
surface treatment versus fumigation), efficacy data, and
material impacts. ECBC, in conjunction with NHSRC,
is conducting systematic studies on the performance of
chlorine dioxide and VHP for decontamination.
    As part of its research, ECBC is conducting a
bioefficacy study to assess  concentration and exposure
time, evaluate six types of materials (porous and
nonporous), and test avirulent and virulent B. onthmcis.
The study also examines sub-optimal temperatures and
relative humidities as well  as B. anthrocis surrogates. The
test design included three  fumigants (STERIS's VHP,
ClorDiSys, Inc.'s chlorine dioxide, and Sabre's chlorine
dioxide), six microorganisms, and test coupons made of
six different materials.  The two chlorine dioxide fumigants
differed in that ClorDiSys, Inc., uses a dry generation
process and Sabre uses a wet process.
    ECBC conducted range-finding tests to assess optimal
fumigant concentrations and exposure periods and
examine the effects of temperature and humidity. Koga
presented specific test details. Testing seeks also to provide
information about the effects of six different building
materials on the fumigant concentrations and the effects
of the fumigants on the integrity of the building materials.
This testing is linked with the bioefficacy studies. ECBC is
looking to use American Society for Testing and Materials
(ASTM) standards for strength and other characteristics.
Deposition velocity testing has begun, and material
compatibility testing is slated for April 2005-

Questions, Answers, and Comments
   • When generating chlorine dioxide, determining
     whether chlorine gas is present is critical. Other
     researchers used ammonia-based analytical tests to
     identify chlorine dioxide.
   • One workshop participant suggested that
     ECBC use corrosivity tests developed in the
     telecommunications industry when conducting
     material compatibility tests with circuits. This test
     includes exposing a copper plate to an agent and
     counting the holes that form. Koga indicated that
     ECBC considered testing the circuit function, as
     well as material compatibility.
   • Has ECBC considered pore symmetry tests or
     other methods to assess surface degradation?
     ECBC has considered a number of methods but is
     open to other recommendations.
   • Is there a need for a secondary scrubber for
     chlorine gas when fumigating with chlorine
     dioxide? ECBC is testing for the presence of
     chlorine gas  in the chlorine dioxide gas stream and
     addressing this concern.
   • What was the spore recovery material for the
     coupons? ECBC used a water-based material.


Use of HVAC Systems in
Building Decontamination

Tina Car/sen, Lawrence Livermore National
Laboratory
LLNL and  Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory
(LBNL) became involved in decontamination
research after the sarin release in the Tokyo subway.
This presentation describes their HVAC system
decontamination studies.
   After the Tokyo subway incident, three potential
attack scenarios were identified: open air (e.g., a stadium),
semi-enclosed (e.g., a subway), and enclosed (e.g., a
building or an airplane). In two of these scenarios, HVAC
systems are involved, so LLNL's research focuses on HVAC
systems and gaseous fumigants used in decontamination.
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Specifically, the research examines both decontamination
of HVAC systems and use of HVAC systems in
decontamination. The research includes a medium-scale,
well-instrumented demonstration with hydrogen peroxide
(generated using the STERIS technology).
    The LLNL test facility consists of an office trailer split
into two rooms: a test room and a control room. The test
room contains an HVAC system created with 6-inch-
round galvanized steel ductwork, aged to remove organics.
Preliminary experiments involved injecting the test room
with hydrogen peroxide through the ductwork. The
decontamination cycle consisted of four steps:  dehumidify
to reach 30 percent relative humidity, condition by
injection with hydrogen peroxide at 7-3 grams per
minute (g/min) for 12 minutes, sterilize by injection with
hydrogen  peroxide at 4.2  g/min for 3 hours, and aerate for
4 hours.
    LLNL expected a hydrogen peroxide concentration of
1 mg/L during the sterilization phase. In testing, however,
the hydrogen peroxide concentrations were significantly
lower. Concentrations dropped near one corner of the
room. A test with biological indicators supported this
finding; some positive indicators were found. LLNL
hypothesized that the galvanized steel was affecting the
hydrogen  peroxide concentrations. A subsequent study
using polyvinyl chloride (PVC) ductwork supported this
hypothesis. The bulk hydrogen peroxide concentration
was much greater when introduced with PVC  than with
galvanized steel.
    LLNL created a new circular ductwork configuration
that included 90 feet of galvanized steel with sensors
located  throughout. After injecting this system with
hydrogen  peroxide, LLRN found that the hydrogen
peroxide concentration decreases as a  function of flow rate,
temperature, and distance traveled along the ductwork.
These results indicate a need  for increased injection rates
or multiple injection points.  Condensation is a concern
when increasing the injection rate.
    In conjunction with LBNL, LLNL is creating a
computational fluid dynamic model to characterize
decomposition in the ductwork. Available test  data
indicate that the VHP degradation process  is third order.
Once this model is created and validated, it can be used to
assess longer systems and  larger configurations.
    LLNL is also conducting surveys of buildings with
HVAC systems. The surveys  identify the features that
have the greatest impact on hydrogen peroxide. LLNL
collects  real-world data about these features. Information
collected includes square footage, interior materials,
layout, HVAC system operation modes, injection point
locations, humidity controls, HVAC system returns,
and areas not serviced by the HVAC system. An HVAC
engineer can help to address architectural concerns. LLNL
has collected HVAC system information from three
federal buildings (a two-story, modern office building; an
older, multistory office building; and an indoor arena).
Collected information is classified because these are federal
facilities. The surveys identified architectural features
that would be difficult to decontaminate. LLNL also
concluded that an HVAC engineer should be involved in
the building surveys. The results may support a database of
information needed for developing remediation strategies
and individual building assessments.
    Ongoing research will include biological indicator
tests within the ductwork to characterize kill rates and
optimize VHP efficacy, characterization tests with
alternate ductwork materials, and completion of the
modeling program. Ongoing room-scale studies include
characterization of VHP distribution and development of
predictive models. During characterization tests, LLNL
researchers  will evaluate different modes of fumigant
introduction and dispersal. They will also increase the
sensor density in the test room to provide additional data.

Questions, Answers,  and  Comments
    Workshop participants commented on the application
of the research to real-wo rid situations. Several participants
commented that larger office buildings often use
fiberglass-lined ductwork and that returns may be lined
with papier-mache or fiberglass. Another participant noted
that the presence of slime and dirt in HVAC systems
would affect study results. And yet another participant
noted that the iron content of the ductwork would also
affect results. Carlsen agreed that any lining, material, or
dirt in the ductwork would affect results. An initial project
goal was to provide information for airports, which usually
have HVAC systems made of unlined galvanized steel.
LLNL obtained their galvanized steel ductwork from a
commercial business and did not test for iron content.
LLNL researchers have not yet studied lined ducts, but
they would welcome additional research to add to the
body of knowledge. LLNL started its research with a  basic,
clean system. Subsequent efforts could involve expanding
the system  or testing a dirty system. Because of funding
limitations, LLNL researchers selected room scaling as a
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next phase. They hope to conduct dirty system testing in
the future.

Building  Disinfection
Byproducts: Experimental
Evaluation  and Decision Tool
Richard Corsi,  University of Texas
Corsi's research focuses on the effects of building materials
on fumigants and the production of gaseous byproducts.
The research investigates how materials affect the amount
of fumigant needed for decontamination and provides
anecdotal evidence regarding material compatibility.
    In conducting building decontamination, a
disinfectant must reach a specific dose  to ensure efficacy.
The dose is based on the disinfectant concentration, as well
as on exposure time, and can be expressed as ppm-hours.
Disinfectant consumption by materials in the treatment
space (e.g., a room) affect the dose. Consumption may
reduce the disinfectant air concentration, increase the
time to the threshold concentration, suppress doses, and
require greater mass injection rates and increased injection
times. Another concern of fumigation  is the production
and persistence of disinfectant byproducts. Byproducts
themselves may be toxic, persist in a building, compromise
worker safety, and increase the time to  reoccupation.
    Researchers have evidence that a fumigant can enter
and react with porous materials. The term deposition
velocity describes  the mass transport of a disinfectant in or
out of material and chemical reactions. Corsi presented  an
equation describing disinfectant concentration in a room
over time, which is a function of injection rate, gas-phase
decay, and velocity deposition. The deposition velocity is a
function of time  and materials.
    Issues regarding byproduct formation and release
include byproduct identification, formation factors, and
persistence. Factors affecting byproduct formation include
the disinfectant, disinfectant concentration, material,
relative humidity, and exposure time.
    Corsi's research evaluated 4 disinfectants and 24
materials, quantified deposition velocities, and identified
byproducts and release rates. Some byproducts are
volatile while others are more persistent. This research
tried to identify and quantify byproduct formation.
Data from this research feed several tools: a software
application that will support decisions  regarding fumigant
applications (DADS); a database of experimental results
(e.g., deposition velocities, byproducts); and screening
calculations that facilitate fumigation system design,
consider fumigant consumption, and rank byproducts.
    The test included 96 combinations of materials
and disinfectants that served as standard conditions.
Relative humidity and dose remained consistent. Relative
humidities, disinfectant doses, and disinfectant and
material combinations were then adjusted, yielding 36
variations. Tests were replicated 14 times. The research
generated more than 3,000 samples. The four disinfectants
tested included ozone, chlorine dioxide, hydrogen
peroxide, and methyl bromide. The 24 test materials
included commonly purchased construction materials
(e.g., concrete, carpet, wallboard, ductwork).
    The experiment system consisted of four closed
chambers that were simultaneously injected with a single
disinfectant. The system included controls to maintain
specific disinfectant concentrations, temperatures, and
relative humidities. The four chambers vented to a single
monitored exhaust point and then passed through a
potassium iodide scrubber. In the tests, one of the four
chambers remained empty as a control and the other three
chambers contained test materials. Each test run of the
system consisted of a 9-hour background phase, a 4- to
16-hour disinfection phase, and a persistence phase of at
least 20 hours. During the background phase to identify
chemical emitters from the test materials, test temperature
and relative humidity were reached, but no disinfectant
entered the system. The disinfectant was injected into the
system during the disinfection phase.
    Overall, tests conducted so far have identified
significant materials effects for ozone and chlorine dioxide,
significant disinfectant effects, significant concentration
effects, rapid decay in consumption rates (for ozone
and chlorine dioxide), and non-zero endpoints. Corsi
provided specific test data to illustrate the findings. Ceiling
tiles and office partitions continued to be consumers of
chlorine dioxide and ozone throughout the disinfection
phase. Concrete was almost completely passivated. Most
materials had  low deposition velocities  after 16 hours, but
all materials had non-zero endpoints.
    Byproduct formation is highly dynamic and produces
unique material/disinfectant fingerprints. There were
significant differences among disinfectants. Byproduct
persistence (off-gassing) was also likely; 5-day and 1-
year tests showed persistence in some byproducts. For
most materials, with the exception of ceiling tiles and
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HVAC system components, ozone was more reactive
than chlorine dioxide. Ozone byproducts included 16
saturated carbonyls and about 50 additional, unquantified
chemicals. Chlorine dioxide byproducts also included 16
saturated carbonyls, 6 unknown chlorine compounds,
and a number of additional unquantified compounds.
The chlorine dioxide reaction with latex paint created
significant quantities of an unknown chlorine compound.
The reaction behind this byproduct formation remains
unknown. VHP created only a small amount of volatile
byproducts. Methyl bromide itself was a greater concern
for building reoccupation than byproduct formation.
    Reports summarizing research findings are slated
for release in July 2005- Completion of the software
supporting decisions regarding fumigant applications
(DADS) is scheduled for June 2005-

Questions, Answers, and Comments
   • How were materials placed in the test chambers?
     For carpet or flooring, the bottom of the test
     chamber was completely covered. Other materials
     with edges that would not be exposed in a real-
     world situation were sealed with sodium silicate
     along the edges. Paper, however, was simply stacked
     in the chamber as it would be stacked on a desk.
   • Was the presence of hexanol due to residual levels
     or continual emissions?  Hexanol may have been
     residual. Compared with the amount involved
     in the persistence phase of the test, the amount
     emitted in the background phase was small.
   • How were blanks considered? The beginning
     of each experiment was considered a blank. The
     9-hour background phase was used to identify
     background chemical concentrations.
   • Were the chambers sealed from light? Chambers
     were sealed from light.
   • How were air concentrations considered? Flow
     rates and air concentrations were used to find mass
     per volume. The results are reported as relative
     emissions. Had the tests lasted longer, higher masses
     would have been reported. A workshop participant
     also commented that the test identified only volatile
     byproducts.
   • What efforts were made to establish that no
     chlorine gas was formed? The chamber exhaust
     was tested to prove that chlorine gas was not
     formed.
Evaluation  of Two Biological
Decontamination Methods in
a Room-Sized Test Chamber
Mark Buttner, University of Nevada, Las Vegas
Researchers at the University of Nevada, Las Vegas,
conducted research to test the efficacy of two
decontamination products (DF-100 and chlorine dioxide
gas) and compare surface sampling methods and analytical
techniques for detecting biological agents, using cultures,
quantitative PCR, and hand-held assays.
    DF-100 is a Modec, Inc., decontamination foam
with two liquid components. Product ingredients include
cationic detergents, fatty alcohols, stabilized hydrogen
peroxide, water, and inert materials. DF-100 has since
been replaced by DF-200. The Gas:Solid technology
by CDG Research Corporation produced the chlorine
dioxide for testing. Spores of B. dtrophaeus served as the
test organism and TSAC cultures, hand-held assays,
PCR primer/probe sequences, and TaqMan assay (7700
Sequence Detection System) served as the analysis
methods. The 7700 Sequence has since been replaced by a
7900 Sequence system.
    Researchers conducted tests in a controlled chamber.
They placed the test surface materials in the chamber, ran
the chamber HVAC system, introduced dry spores (using
a Pitt-3 dry aerosol generator), stopped the HVAC system,
and allowed the spores to settle overnight. They conducted
sampling the next day. Test surface materials included
wood laminate (desk material), vinyl tile (flooring), and
painted metal (a metal file cabinet). Predecontamination
samples were collected using readily available methods:
swipe, heavy wipe (damp cloth), and swab sample
processing kit (foam swab). After initial sampling,
researchers injected the decontaminants and collected
post-decontamination samples. Samples were analyzed
using the three test methods (culture, quantitative PCR,
and hand-held assay).
    During spore injection, the average airborne
concentration was 1.5 x 106 spores per cubic meter. The
culture and quantitative PCR methods reported 105 to 106
spore per square foot in the predecontamination samples.
Each of the three sampling methods demonstrated
comparable spore collection efficiencies. Similar levels
of spores were found  on each of the three test surface
materials as well. The results from the predecontamination
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served as the control for the post-decontamination
sampling.
    After decontamination with DF-100, post-
decontamination samples found no culturable spores
although the quantitative PCR analysis indicated that
spore DNA remained. Earlier studies of DF-100 with viral
agents identified no viral RNA after treatment, however, a
virus is more fragile than a spore.
    After decontamination with chlorine dioxide, post-
decontamination samples found no culturable spores
in 24 of 27 samples. Of the three positive samples, each
supported only one colony. The quantitative PCR analysis
indicated that spore DNA remained. The hand-held assay
results were positive for all samples.
    Researchers also conducted one environmental
background trial for each decontamination method to
determine the impact of dust on the effectiveness of the
decontamination method and the analytical method.
They collected dust from the outdoor air filters of several
commercial  buildings and then aerosolized 10 grams of
this dust in the test chamber. They found an approximate
soiling level  of 2 milligrams of soil per 100 square
centimeters. Researchers then injected spores  into the
chamber and conducted decontamination. Spore culture
data were comparable between the predecontamination
samples with and without environmental background.
The dust, however, did inhibit the quantitative PCR
results. Culture data for post-decontamination samples
were similar with or without environmental background.
Quantitative PCR results indicated that spore DNA
remained in post-decontamination samples.
    Buttner listed some practical considerations for
each of the decontaminants tested. DF-100 is fast
and easy to use, but it is limited to use on nonporous,
washable surfaces. It also resulted in material damage
(e.g., it dissolved floor polish, stripped paint, and caused
bubbling of wood laminate). Chlorine dioxide gas can
decontaminate an entire space with contents in place.
This method, however, requires specialized equipment,
training, and personnel. It also causes material damage
(e.g., it yellowed wall paint and corroded aluminum).
    In conclusion, both decontamination methods were
effective in reducing the number of culturable spores
and neither method was affected by environmental
background. Spore DNA remained after treatment with
both decontaminants. The quantitative PCR  analysis
method, however, was inhibited by environmental
background. This study did not assess the infection
potential of nonculturable pathogens.
    Buttner provided the following references for this
research:
   •  Buttner, M.P, P Cruz, L.D. Stetzenbach, A.K.
      Klima-Comba, V.L. Stevens, andT.D. Cronin.
      2004. "Determination of the efficacy of two
      building decontamination strategies by surface
      sampling with culture and quantitative PCR
      analysis." Appl Environ. Microbiol. 70:4740-4747-
   •  Buttner, M.P, P Cruz, L.D. Stetzenbach, A.K.
      Klima-Comba, V.L. Stevens, and PA. Emanuel.
      2004. "Evaluation of the Biological Sampling Kit
      (BiSKit) for large-area surface sampling." Appl.
      Environ. Microbiol. 70:7040-7045-

Questions, Answers, and Comments
   •  Would you expect similar material compatibility
      concerns with DF-200? Buttner indicated that
      speculating about results for DF-200 would be
      inappropriate. Nonetheless, a workshop participant
      speculated that material compatibility issues would
      be fewer for DF-200 than for DF-100 because DF-
      200 has a lower solvent content.
   •  Did you have a biocide neutralization step post-
      sampling? No biocide neutralization step was
      conducted.

Verification of Commercial
Decontamination
Technologies  in  Bench-Scale
Studies  Using B. anthracis
Spores
Mike Taylor, Battelle Memorial Institute
EPAs ETV program verifies environmental technology
performance and objectively reports results to end-users
such as permitters and buyers. The program performs
tests as outlined in quality assurance plans developed in
conjunction with technical experts, stakeholders, and
vendors. ETV does not purposely try to fail technologies.
Battelle works as a contractor to ETV. This presentation
provided results from testing three decontamination
technologies: BIOQUELL Inc.'s hydrogen peroxide gas;
CERTEK Inc.'s formaldehyde gas, and CDG Research
Inc.'s chlorine dioxide gas.
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    The testing apparatus consisted of the technology
under evaluation and a test chamber. The test chamber is
a compact glove box with a decontaminant injection port,
sensors, and an exhaust port. In this system, Battelle used
spore strips to assess biological efficacy and construction
material coupons to assess material compatibility.
Researchers tested seven material coupons (carpet, bare
wood, glass, laminate, galvanized metal ductwork,
painted wallboard, and painted concrete). The painted
concrete coupons consisted of sawed and painted cinder
block. Each coupon measured 0.75 by 5 inches. Battelle
evaluated biological efficacy by assessing the log reduction
in viable spores on the test materials and identifying
positive or negative bacterial growth on the biological
indicators and spore strips. The biological indicators and
spore strips provided a link to real-world events, which
rely on these indicators for decontamination sampling.
Changes in coupon appearance, color, texture, and
other parameters indicated coupon damage and material
compatibility concerns.
    The general test procedure consisted of connecting
the decontamination technology to the test chamber,
inoculating test material coupons and placing them in
the test  chamber, implementing the decontamination
technology, and removing and analyzing the coupons.
Before inoculating the coupons, Battelle wiped each one
with isopropyl alcohol. Coupons were not autoclaved, so
some microbes remained and Battelle observed microbe
growth. Each coupon was inoculated with 108 of the
biological test agents. B. anthrads analyses were conducted
with a 15-minute extraction followed by 1- and 7-day
growth  assessments. The supernatant from the extraction
process  underwent a 1-hour heat shock and dilution
plating for enumeration. Efficacy data (log reductions)
were calculated as the log of the viable spores recovered
from control samples minus the log of the remaining
spores on the decontaminated samples. Battelle also
conducted several statistical analyses to assess results
variability.
    Taylor presented the specific study conditions for
each of the three technologies tested, as well as the specific
study results, including mean efficacy for spore reduction
on each test material, statistical analyses for each test
material, and growth on the biological indicators and
spore strips.  Results for the efficacy tests and statistical
analyses are expressed as log reductions from 1 to 8, with
8 indicating 100 percent kill. Battelle found that surrogate
results did not compare to B. anthracis results. Results for
the biological indicators are qualitative; positive results
indicate growth and negative results indicate an absence of
growth. Some of the biological indicators and spore strips
were positive after decontamination with the CERTEK
Inc. formaldehyde. The indicators and strips were placed
in a pouch and the positives were likely the result of
uneven gas penetration into the pouch. Testing with the
CDG Research Inc. chlorine dioxide gas is undergoing
repeat testing and verification.

Questions, Answers, and Comments
   •  One workshop participant commented that ETV
      originally intended to test technologies volunteered
      by vendors, with vendors sharing the costs. For
      homeland security related technologies, this format
      changed to a new program called Technology
      Testing and Evaluation Program (TTEP) and is
      fully funded by EPA, which allows flexibility in
      testing.
   •  A number of research projects with chlorine dioxide
      gas are ongoing. Additional areas of research
      may examine chlorine gas and reactions in gas
      chromatograph (GC) columns and study flow rates
      through the  test chamber. Chlorine dioxide can be
      as much as 50 times more soluble in organics than
      in water. This is a trait that should be considered.
   •  A workshop participant noted that studies  need to
      consider air exchange rates. The laboratory studies
      should mimic the air exchange rates found in real-
      world situations.
   •  Why was methyl bromide excluded from testing?
      Battelle discussed including methyl bromide, but
      EPA funding and approval, which was not received,
      is necessary. Battelle, however, is willing to  discuss
      various technology options with vendors interested
      in the testing program.
   •  What were the replicates for each
      decontaminant? Because tests began after the
      anthrax incidents following 9/11, Battelle was
      pushed for results. The tests examined a single dose
      (concentration X time) with three replicates.
   •  Are you anticipating any major changes in
      protocol as new projects start? Some minor
      changes may occur, but the overall study design
      should remain the same. Battelle may add monitors
      to examine the rate of volatilization and to identify
      degradation  products.  It will likely change the
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      protocol for cleaning the test material coupons and
      move away from the isopropyl solution wipes.

Technical  Support  Working
Group Decontamination
Research  and Development
Activities
Rebecca Blackmon, Technical Support Working
Group
The presentation provided an overview of projects
underway by the Technical Support Working Group
(TSWG). These projects, which can last from 7
months to 2 years, focus on methods that speed up the
decontamination process. The presentation was organized
by projects that affect activities before, during,  and after
decontamination.
    Under TSWG, the Chemical, Biological,
Radiological, and Nuclear subgroup identifies user needs
related to these materials and conducts rapid research,
development, and prototyping. Their focus areas are agent
detection, decontamination, protection, and information
collection. TSWG and the subgroup projects include:
   •  Biological backgrounds in critical facilities
      The intent of this two-phase project is to determine
      seasonal and diurnal variations in existing
      background bacterial and viral aerosol load with
      a focus on threat agents (e.g.,  B. anthmtis). The
      project will provide information about the bacterial
      background at critical locations, which will help
      responders identify possible interferences if a
      bio terrorist event occurs. As part of the project,
      researchers collect integrated and time-resolved
      samples at multiple locations and link these samples
      with HVAC systems and environmental data.
      Samples undergo analysis with classic microbiology
      and microassay methods. The University of
      Minnesota and Los Alamos National Laboratory
      (LANL) are partners in this project.
    Phase I of the project serves as a demonstration for
Phase II. Under  Phase I, the research partners completed
a 1-month sampling program at local airports to  assess
sampling protocols. Phase I also included developing
extraction protocols and developing and evaluating low-
cost microassay methods. Phase II is in the planning
phase. Over the  course of 1 year, researchers will conduct
quarterly sampling and analyze the samples using the
microassays identified or developed during Phase I. The
data from Phase II will provide an understanding of the
variability and prevalence of biological background as
affected by season, weather, activity level, and geographic
location.
    •  Statistical design tool for sampling contaminated
      buildings Under this project, TSWG, in
      partnership with Pacific Northwest National
      Laboratory (PNNL), will develop a user-friendly
      software tool that will design statistically valid
      surface sampling protocols for determining the
      extent of contamination following a chemical or
      biological terrorist attack. Users will input specific
      statistical requirements and tailor the program's
      generic floor plan to meet specifics of the facility
      and HVAC system under investigation. The
      program includes decision criteria that affect
      sampling protocols (e.g., providing the user the
      confidence intervals that the sampling protocol
      will identify hot spots and maximum agent
      concentrations). Users, however, should discuss
      statistical sampling needs (e.g., level of confidence)
      before an  event occurs. The software will also help
      users estimate costs associated with sampling. The
      project is slated for completion in June 2005-
    •  Wireless multisensor environmental monitors
      In conjunction with Esensor, Inc., and SUNY
      Buffalo, TSWG is developing a real-time sensor
      system that is lightweight, portable, inexpensive,
      and battery-operated. The system contains eight
      interchangeable sensors that monitor CWAs  and
      toxic industrial chemicals. The sensors use wireless
      or Internet/Ethernet connections compatible
      with other wireless systems to communicate
      results. This type of system is especially relevant
      to decontamination events. A bomb squad could
      also use the system to assess suspicious packages.
      TSWG is targeting a cost of $3,000 to $5,000 for
      the system. A prototype has been designed, and
      production of a system for testing is under way.
    •  Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) sensor web
      Although similar to the wireless multisensor
      monitors, the JPL sensor web has unique
      applications. This project responds to an EPA
      requirement for monitoring chlorine dioxide during
      decontamination. The system may also apply to
      urban search-and-rescue operations (e.g., searching
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      collapsed buildings) when inserting a sensor is safer
      than inserting a person to assess environmental
      conditions. This wireless network monitors and
      controls temperature, humidity, light intensity, and
      decontaminant agent concentrations in a facility
      undergoing decontamination. The system is self-
      networking and has proven reliability from  field-
      testing (e.g., monitoring for explosives along the
      Alaska pipeline). JPL has built a 40-pod network
      and demonstrated this network for sensing  chlorine
      dioxide. The pod sensors consist of a single  pass
      sample cell with no mirrors or reference beams.
      The sensors are easy to calibrate and have a wide
      detection range (80 to 1,000 ppm for chlorine
      dioxide). The sensors are also inexpensive to
      produce and require little power to run. As  a next
      step, JPL aims to miniaturize the chlorine dioxide
      sensor and develop an Urban Search and Rescue
      (USAR) gas sensor.
    • Electrostatic decontamination system  This
      is an effective, safe, and logistically efficient
      decontamination system now in its fifth generation.
      Clean Earth Technologies demonstrated chemical
      and biological agent decontamination without
      damaging surfaces. The technology is within the
      EPA regulatory processes, with the biological aspect
      undergoing verification testing.
    The decontamination unit for this technology
has a rugged, compact, modular design. A single
operator can easily use the system. Without brushing,
scrubbing, mopping, or scraping, the decontaminant
provides a greater than log-6 kill for B. anthracis spores
within seconds. Compared with foam technologies,
approximately six times less of this decontaminant is
needed to achieve success. The  decontaminant also has
high material compatibility; a paper document can be
submersed in the decontaminant for 24 hours without
harming the print. The system  can be employed with or
without ultraviolet (UV) light.  UV light increases  the kill
rate when used with the biological decontaminant. Testing
has shown that the system is effective against biological
agents, chemical agents, and viruses (e.g., flu, polio). The
decontamination process does not destroy DNA and
therefore does not compromise DNA evidence.
    • Atmospheric plasma decontamination This
      decontamination method provides effective and
      efficient neutralization of biological agents but
      minimizes damage to high-value items  (e.g.,
items of historical interest). The technology has
been demonstrated with oil paintings, tapestries,
black and white photographs, and ink on paper.
AOAC sporicidal testing has also been successfully
completed. TSWG completed this project in July
2004. A report summarizing results is available on
request.
Expedient mitigation of radiological releases
The project examines methods to minimize the
spread of radioactive particles from a radiological
dispersion device (RDD). Astrippable polymer
coating would be applied to surfaces after rescue
operations and during the decontamination
planning phase. The polymer coating developed
by TSWG requires 24 hours for curing.
Demonstrations have shown that it is durable
yet  easy to strip. The coating can also be applied
using equipment familiar to first responders (e.g.,
hoses and backpack systems). Ongoing efforts
under this project include testing the coating with
radiologicals and investigating a dual use with dust
re-entrainment mitigation.
Radiological decontamination technologies
In conjunction with Argonne National Laboratory
(ANL), TSWG is examining a chemical process to
nondestructively remove cesium-137 from porous
building materials. The process applies an ionic
wash followed by a superabsorbent gel that captures
the cesium-137- The gel is then vacuum-removed
from the surface. The process is particularly
applicable to concrete decontamination. ANL has
completed laboratory testing and may conduct
field-testing in 2005- ANL is also modifying the
gel  formation for other materials and examining
application technologies. Commercialization
negotiations are in progress.
Mass personnel decontamination protocol
TSWG  has completed the guidance document
"Best Practices and Guidelines for Mass  Personnel
Decontamination." This document, which is
available for order on the Internet (www.cbiac.
aprea.army.mil), includes information for
decontamination of chemical, biological, and
radiological agents on people.  A first edition was
completed in 2003, and a second edition was
released in September 2004.
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Questions, Answers, and Comments
    •  What is the minimum detection levels on the
      monitors and sensors (ppm/ppb/ppt)? TSWG
      is involved with two sensor projects—one uses
      existing sensors placed in pods, the other requires
      developing a new technology. Blackmon believes
      these sensors detect contamination to the ppm level.
    •  For the electrostatic decontamination system,
      what was the test substrate and how was the
      biological solution applied?  Blackmon did not
      have immediate access to the project details but said
      she would obtain the information for the workshop
      participant. Blackmon provided her contact
      information to workshop participants.
ii
  Dirty Bombs"  (Radiological
Dispersion  Devices [RDDs])
and  Cleanup
Fred Holbrook, U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency
RDDs, or "dirty bombs," use conventional explosives
(e.g., TNT, RDX) to disperse radioactive materials. These
bombs would cause low-level radiological contamination
and cause psychological and economic damage. Fatalities
from RDD events, however, would be expected to be
low. Holbrook listed several radiological agents that are
potential components of RDDs and specified the half-life
of each.  (The more radioactive materials have shorter half-
lives.) To cause the worst health effects, the radiological
agent must enter a person's lungs. Cesium fluoride is of
particular concern because it is a fine,  talclike powder, i.e.,
it is easily dispersed.
    An improvised nuclear device is a crude nuclear
weapon that can cause vast destruction (e.g., destroy
buildings, start fires, and cause tremendous loss of life).
Enriched uranium can be a fuel source for a nuclear
device; approximately 1,300 to 2,100  metric tons of
enriched uranium throughout the world have questionable
controls. The two bombs dropped on  Japan to end World
War II are examples of nuclear devices. Little Boy, which
was dropped on Hiroshima, used 60 kilograms (kg) of
enriched uranium as a fuel source. Fat Man, which was
dropped on Nagasaki, used 6 kg of plutonium as a fuel
source.
    About 90 percent of specialized radiological
materials, such as weaponized radionuclides (e.g.,
uranium, plutonium), are under government control.
Academic, industrial, agricultural, and medical settings
use radiological materials for many different applications.
Medical treatments, specifically, require thousands of
curies. Of the 2 million sources of radiological agents,
about 5,000 are susceptible to becoming orphaned (lost,
stolen, etc.) each day. Worldwide control is a problem
(e.g., the former Soviet Union contains many "orphans").
    Radiation is described in terms of alpha and beta
particles and gamma rays. Alpha particles move short
distances and can be blocked by paper or skin. Beta
particles are higher energy but can be shielded by
aluminum foil or skin. These particles can travel several
feet and exposures can result in deep, serious burns.
Gamma rays consist of high-energy, short wavelength
protons. These particles are pure energy and can travel
many feet. They are very penetrating and can cause severe
health effects. Radiation is  measured as the number of
nuclei decay per second. One curie (Ci) is considered
a large radiation source; 100 Ci is considered very
dangerous.
    Radiation doses are reported as rems. Holbrook listed
several radiation doses and associated health effects. At 25
to 50 rems, a person may have decreased numbers of white
blood cells. An RDD event is unlikely to produce a dose
above 25 rem.
    A 1987 event in Brazil provides an example of a
nonterror event that nonetheless resulted in a terrible
endpoint. Scavengers found cesium in an abandoned
radiotherapy clinic. The scavengers took the material
home to their village. As a result, 20 people received a
high radiation dose, 129 people were contaminated, and
thousands more were monitored for radiation sickness.
In another event, a young girl found cesium (a glowing
blue powder), painted her body with it, and then ate food
without washing her hands. She died within 30 days. This
event occurred in a tourist  and agricultural area and caused
economic disaster in that area. The cleanup cost about $20
million.
    High cleanup costs are a consideration for addressing
radiological agent events. An obvious first step would
be to reduce the possibility of an event. Holbrook
suggested programs that would encourage users to return
radioactive materials to the manufacturer to minimize the
number of orphan sources. A public health campaign to
educate people about radiation and radioactive releases
                                                                Decontamination  Workshop 41

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may reduce the extent of cleanup required by political
pressures. Holbrook illustrated impact areas from the
release of a 2-Ci source of cesium-137- A large number
of people would receive a dose of 150 millirems (mrems),
which is equivalent to the difference in background
radiation between Washington, D.C., and Denver,
Colorado. However, that small increase in risk may seem
unacceptable if not properly communicated.
    Decontamination options include acid dissolution
of a radiological agent from the contaminated substrate,
chelant bonding for excretion from organisms (including
humans), and blasting with abrasive materials for removal
of the contaminated material. Holbrook highlighted
several specific decontamination technologies in his
presentation. He noted that one strain of bacteria can
consume as much as 0.5 inches of concrete per year when
a sulfur gel is applied to the concrete. He also noted that
DoD and power plant authorities have successfully used
foams on a variety of surfaces.

Questions, Answers, and  Comments

    •  What is the difference between a low-level and
      high-level radioactive waste facility? These two
      types of facilities are vastly different. Only about
      three facilities in the United States currently
      accept low-level radiological wastes, so disposal
      of radiological wastes after decontamination is a
      substantial  problem.
    •  Will radioactive waste facilities accept mixed
      wastes? Will some of the decontamination
      technologies mentioned produce mixed
      waste? Wastes that contain both radioactive and
      hazardous chemical materials are a huge problem.
      Radioactive waste facilities do not accept mixed
      wastes. When reviewing available technologies,
      many characteristics and factors must be considered,
      including cost, feasibility, life cycle, performance,
      maintenance, and safety. Strong acid technologies
      can be hazardous to the people deploying the
      technology and may create a mixed waste.
Radiological and  Nuclear

Terror: Technical  Aspects

and  Implications for
Decontamination and Site

Cleanup

John MacKinney, U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency, National Homeland Security Research
Center
RDDs and nuclear weapons are vastly different. An RDD
(i.e., a "dirty bomb") may consist of radiological agents
injected into an HVAC or water system, dispersed from
a crop duster, or disseminated covertly. A nuclear weapon
may include smuggled weapons or improvised devices
produced with smuggled weapons-grade materials. This
presentation not only discussed issues associated with
RDDs but also identified a nuclear weapon event as a
worst-case scenario.
    The United States and other countries have experience
with radiological agents from activities with uranium
and plutonium in commercial and defense facilities;
remediation at hazardous waste sites; running waste
management facilities; and operating commercial, test,
and research reactors and laboratories. These facilities
are in fixed locations where accident prevention and
response programs are in place. Facilities may also provide
a long warning period before releases occur. Conversely,
terror events are unpredictable. They can occur anywhere
without warning. As such, RDDs present  new challenges
for local and federal responders. Most people, however,
believe an RDD event is the most likely threat, especially
considering the abundance of missing and unaccounted-
for radioactive material.
    The question becomes how do we prepare for an
RDD event. One solution is to develop many different
release scenarios and plan accordingly. The radiation
released from a device is unlikely to result  in fatalities,
although the actual explosion may cause harm. A principal
effect of RDDs is  to deny access to places. An RDD may
consist of an explosive device or any means of dispersing
radiological agents (e.g., spraying from an automobile
or aircraft, injecting into a building or water system). A
device may distribute radiation in a small area (e.g., the
size of the meeting room) or a much larger area (e.g., tens
of city blocks).
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    Chernobyl was the worst nuclear disaster in
history. This event released more than 100 million Ci
of contamination. For contrast, MacKinney presented a
realistic radiological release example. Within 24 hours,
a small radiological device (10 Ci of cesium-137) would
disperse about a 1-rem dose of radiation to an area several
tens of city blocks, based on a simple gaussian dispersion
model.
    Currently, researchers at SNL are examining explosives
and radiological devices. The tests are being conducted in
igloos (50 m3 in size) formerly used to examine explosions
at plutonium pits. Current tests are small and use 0.5
pound of explosive with solid metal  bars or ceramic disks
of radiological materials. The research examines whether a
radiological agent will aerosolize and how the shape of the
charge may affect dispersal. Aerosolized or in vapor form,
a radiological agent can enter a persons body and cause
harm. Researchers tested a number of materials to examine
how the material properties affected aerosolization (e.g.,
form or shape, thermal properties, shock physics, vapor
pressure). Entrainment is not inherent to the radioactive
materials but is another complication because the
explosion will entrain dirt and particles of concrete.
    Stress levels induce different material reactions
and different particle sizes. In a worst-case scenario,
an explosion will impart enough stress to change a
radiological element to a vapor form. (The vapor then
condenses as sub-micron particles, which are readily
dispersed.) For most of the metal bars tested, the
explosion dispersed large chunks of metals. Tests found
that bismuth, however, aerosolizes very well: 80 percent is
aerosolized into the respirable range  because the bismuth
passes to  the vapor stage during the tests. A carefully
configured charge can also aerosolize cobalt. Ceramics,
including strontium 90, used in the  former Soviet Union
shipping beacons, also tended to create large chunks. (A
large chunk is 12  to 15 microns in diameter and a very
large chunk is 1 inch in diameter.) Cesium chloride poses
another threat because it passes through the liquid to the
vapor phase during an explosion.
    Several factors influence the dispersion pattern of
an RDD. Larger chunks remain local to the impact
area. Smaller particles disperse more widely depending
on particle dynamics (e.g., phase changes, size, shape,
and aerodynamics). Buoyant rise—the lift from the heat
of the explosion—and meteorology also play roles in
dispersion. Smaller particles can be caught on air currents.
Models can predict possible dispersion patterns, however,
further research is needed. MacKinney showed examples
of dispersion patterns with and without buildings.
With the buildings, materials disperse in patterns that
are not necessarily intuitive. In addition, studies of
particle dispersion have shown that indoor particulate
concentrations following an event may be high.
    Returning to the topic of preparing for an RDD
event, MacKinney provided several suggestions.
Organizations should develop threat scenarios—much
has been done and is ongoing in this area. Using these
scenarios, we can create standard response and mitigation
procedures, plan possible cleanup  actions, and evaluate
existing technologies. Additional research is needed to
adapt existing technologies to threat scenarios and to
develop and test new technologies. When developing
decontamination technologies, research organizations
should avoid rushing to invest in solutions that address
a single problem and should invest only in technologies
with sound scientific support and  real-world experience.
Research should target technologies that fill gaps.
    The decontamination and restoration periods after
an event follow a similar pattern, regardless of the threat
agent (e.g., chemical, biological, or radiological). The
first step is the safe shutdown of the affected building or
area. A shutdown has huge implications when involving
city blocks and private properties.  Through work  groups,
DHS is assessing possible optimized approaches to
decontamination and restoration after an RDD release.
This approach would be flexible in selecting cleanup
criteria based on societal needs, expected land uses, and
decontamination technologies.
    Nuclear devices present another radiological threat.
They include improvised devices, as well as weapons
bought or stolen from a nuclear state. A nuclear device
has a likely yield of 0 (failure) to 50 kilotons.  The most
likely event would involve a device with a 5- to 20-kiloton
capacity. A 10-kiloton device, which is considered small,
has the explosion capacity of nineteen 100-ton coal cars.
The bomb exploded at Hiroshima was 13 kilotons; the
bomb exploded at Nagasaki was 22 kilotons.
    After detonation, temperatures soar within a  fraction
of a second with the fireball reaching millions of degrees.
The extreme rise in heat is followed immediately by
incredible winds (measured near 700  miles per hours
during historic testing events). Most deaths after
detonation are caused by burns. In addition to proximity
to the detonation point, an individual's specific injuries
depend on location within a building and building
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materials. DHS modeling estimated that a nuclear
detonation in Washington, D.C., would result in 50,000
deaths from the initial blast and another 50,000 to
100,000 deaths due to radiation. Radioactive fallout could
extend hundreds of miles.
    In conclusion, an RDD detonation is a likely threat.
Organizations must understand possible threat scenarios
and can use models to help simulate urban impacts.
Decontamination technologies must mesh with larger
remediation and renovation goals. Although a large
nuclear device attack is unlikely, this threat cannot be
ignored because of the severity of the impact.

Questions, Answers, and Comments
    •  When creating an RDD, why not grind the
      radiological material? Because of the radiation
      dose, grinding may be fatal. If the proper safety
      precautions are used, grinding may work to further
      distribute the ceramic-form radiological materials,
      but grinding metal-form radiological materials
      might prevent the shock wave that creates  the phase
      change. A number of technical issues are involved in
      creating successful RDDs.

UK Approach to  RDD
Cleanup
Malcolm Wakerley, Department for Environment,
Food, and Rural Affairs
The UK learned lessons about radiological contamination
as the result of past nonterrorist, nuclear incidents (e.g.,
the U.S. B-52 bomber accident in Spain, Chernobyl
reactor fallout, and Brazil's cancer therapy unit wastes).
These incidents provided information about contaminant
movement resulting from an RDD detonation. The
Chernobyl incident and the events of 9/11 in the United
States prompted the creation and upgrade of a radiation
monitoring network and radiation response handbook.
This presentation focused on these two items.
    After the  Chernobyl incident, the UK created the
Radiation Incident Monitoring Network (RIMNET).
This system consists of 92 gamma detectors, located
approximately 30 kilometers apart, that supply data
to a group of laboratories. The sensors are very simple
and cannot detect alpha-emitting materials. Many of
the sensors have been in service for more than 20 years.
Information from these sensors helped the UK identify
areas of contamination after the Chernobyl incident. For
example, contamination was patchy because of heavy rains
within the fallout area. The UK identified some areas that
were no longer safe for grazing sheep.
    RIMNET provides a vast amount of data regarding
local background levels of radiation, which can be used
to identify irregular events.  The system is linked to
government departments, and  all departments can access
the data simultaneously. Agencies can use RIMNET as a
tool for communicating with politicians, communities,
and international partners.  For example, an incident
occurring in the UK will also impact nations on mainland
Europe. In an exercise with sensors in Scotland, the
RIMNET database was able to upload years' worth of
sampling data within 30 minutes.
    Updates to the RIMNET  system include a
modeling component that can assess short-, medium-,
and long-range impacts. The system is also linked with
meteorological data. With these components, the system
can backtrack from an alarmed detector to a radiation
source. If a release occurs anywhere in world, the system
can also calculate when radiation will reach the UK. If the
release occurs in the UK, the system can calculate when
radiation will reach other countries. The UK also has the
ability to run models that, within 10 minutes of a release,
can identify areas to shut down to prevent contaminant
movement.
    A model output in the presentation illustrated
releases associated with a 6,000-Ci cobalt bomb that
aerosolized. The map shows the inhalation dose from
the passing cloud. The predominant dose, however,
results from deposition. The area closest to the release
presents the greatest concern. Doses are lower farther from
the release point, but a public relations concern exists
regarding communicating dose impacts to communities.
Commonly, communities want doses to return to levels
present before an event. Determining how and to what
level decontamination occurs becomes a political question.
As such, releases become instruments of economic as well
as health destruction.
    In 1996, the UK created a radiological handbook in
response to a review of decontamination and remediation
technologies conducted after a series of additional
radioactive accidents. The review identified trees, soil,
and grass as contributing substantially to exposure
doses. Vertical surfaces were only minor contributors to
overall dose. The existing response system is predicated
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on equipment available to local authorities, but
specialized military equipment would be available for
decontamination. The radiological handbook includes a
simple logic diagram and 22 tables on decontamination
technologies and considerations. It also includes an
example release incident and discusses the UK inventory
of decontamination equipment.
    After the events of 9/11 in the United States, the
UK expressed increased interest in the 1996 review and
handbook. The handbook has grown since 1996 and now
includes radiological agents that terrorists might use. (The
radiological threat agents addressed by the UK are similar
to the priority radiological threat agents selected by the
United States) The handbook provides reliable, consistent,
and comprehensive information to help decision makers
select the most practical decontamination methods and
to guide them through the decontamination process.
The UK is currently working to expand the handbook to
address various climates and crops so that it is relevant to
all of Europe and potentially to the United States.
    Emergency planners use the handbook during
threat event exercises so its use will be intuitive during
a real event. The handbook follows a 10-step decision
process outlined in detail in the presentation. Generally,
these steps involve considering the nature and extent of
the contamination, the availability and applicability of
decontamination methods, and the land uses of affected
areas. Each land use area is then considered and  evaluated
individually. Land use areas in an inhabited area, for
example, may include residential, commercial, and
recreational areas.
    The UK plans to maintain the handbook over
the next 3 years and add lessons as they are learned. In
exercises, the UK has examined case studies of accidents
using the handbook as a resource and considering
advances in technologies to reassess what actions
should have been taken. The UK is willing to share the
information it has gained, as well as the radiological
handbook, with the United States.
    Wakerly concluded with his thoughts on a potential
RDD attack. The attack will likely occur in an urban
setting.  Ground surfaces, such as soil and grass around
homes and work areas, will provide the predominant
radiation routes of exposure after the initial attack.
Removing radiation from those areas will provide the best
reduction in dose.

Questions, Answers, and Comments
After his presentation, Wakerly commented that the UK
is examining the practical side of using the handbook
and decision trees. The handbook has worked well for
tabletop exercises. In real-world situations, however,
many additional concerns exist (e.g., seals for vehicles
conducting decontamination). Wakerly asked how the
United States was addressing the many radiological issues.
A workshop participant responded that RDDs are a new
research area for the United States Some investigations,
however, are under way. For example, aTSWG project
examines the next generation of materials for personal
protective equipment. These materials will be lightweight
and breathable because  heat is a substantial issue when
using personal protective equipment.
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 Panel   Discussion—Lessons
 Learned
    Several bio-decontamination events are now
complete. Workshop participants shared their experiences
at these events with others in order to discuss lessons
learned about the decontamination process and to suggest
steps that would improve that process.

Information Sharing and
Agency Coordination
Workshop participants uniformly agreed that improving
coordination and information sharing efforts among
federal, state, and local agencies, as well as private
companies and communities, would improve responses to
chemical, biological, and radiological threat events. They
agreed that sharing information early when a threat event
occurs would result in responses that are faster and better.
    • Examples of existing efforts Although
     information sharing and coordination efforts can be
     much improved, workshop participants provided
     examples of current efforts among agencies.
       > EPA ORD recently published two reports
         as a means of sharing information with
         others. The first summarizes EPA data from
         decontamination events. The second compiles
         building decontamination data and reviews
         decontamination options  beyond crisis
         exemption options. EPA has not been proactive
         in distributing these reports, but they are
         available to workshop participants upon their
         request.
       > DoD requires annual internal agency research
         updates and coordinates efforts with EPA.
       > Participants from the UK noted that they
         publish information on the Internet. They also
         encouraged ongoing coordination between the
         United States and UK.
    • Security concerns When sharing information,
     agencies must be cautious that information is not
     used against us. Data security must be considered
     when sharing information. One participant
suggested that CDC and EPA detail employees
to the FBI to facilitate information sharing for
decontamination and public health concerns
without compromising the criminal investigation
aspect of an event. For example, a whole report
may be classified, but only a small portion contains
classified information. Security and classification
issues will likely continue to be a problem.
Suggestions for information sharing methods
One workshop participant suggested that DHS
spearhead efforts toward better information sharing.
Another recognized the benefit of this workshop
and suggested that NHSRC and others regularly
host workshops of its type for government, private,
civilian, and military groups. Others also provided
suggestions for data repositories. One workshop
participant suggested creating virtual repositories
containing electronic documents and paper-
copy documents converted to electronic forms to
maximize information sharing. These repositories
would serve as centralized information centers and
might include:
  >  Research and priority agent repositories
    that list completed, ongoing, or planned
    research efforts and priority agents for
    research If agencies and researchers had a clear
    understanding of efforts underway by others,
    they could reduce potential redundancies,
    address priority issues quickly, and appropriate
    funds properly. EPA has launched an internal
    campaign to track research projects. This effort
    will not only prevent research redundancies but
    also feed into budgeting decisions.
  >  Decontamination portfolios that link threat
    agents with decontamination technologies
    The repository should list technologies that are
    validated as well as those under development. A
    workshop participant noted that the National
    Decontamination Team may be creating this
    type of repository.
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        > Agent repositories that list threat agents linked
          with laboratories able to analyze these agents
          This repository could also include acceptable
          surrogates for research projects and methods
          for preparing these surrogates to provide
          consistency across research studies.
        > Databases that list people with expertise in
          areas pertaining to decontamination  Such
          a database could list training and work
          experience. One workshop participant noted
          that this database exists and is available
          through EPA.
    Several workshop participants who work as OSCs
emphasized  the need for information when responding to
an event. They need information about decontamination
methods that work or do not work and why. They also
need information in order to address the specific concerns
of agencies from multiple levels of government (e.g., local
boards of health, mayors' offices).
Preparedness
Organizations can prepare for a chemical, biological, or
radiological agent event in a number of ways. Workshop
participants repeatedly suggested tabletop exercises
as a way to identify possible threat scenarios, develop
response plans, and pinpoint data gaps. They suggested
interagency panels and peer reviews for these exercises.
The exercises should illustrate the pressures of the event
and the complexity of decontamination planning (e.g.,
addressing HVAC systems). Workshop participants
suggested  focusing these exercises on airports and
transportation facilities. One workshop participant noted
that exercises can become complex and attempt to address
worst-case scenarios. In these exercises, the focus becomes
the technical aspect of the response plan. In a real-wo rid
situation,  the technical side of a response may be easy
compared with regulatory or communication issues.
    Materials that would help prepare agencies and
facilities include:
    •  Matrix of responses  Similar to a decontamination
      database, this matrix would link threat agents with
      appropriate decontamination methods and site
      conditions (e.g., a contained building contaminated
      with anthrax). All known decontamination
      agents and material compatibility issues should
      be included. Some of this information may be
      subjective or anecdotal. Nonetheless, having this
      information readily available would likely streamline
      the response.
    •  Response plans  Workshop participants agreed
      that exercises should encourage organizations to
      prepare plans. For example, plans could identify
      methods to treat irreplaceable objects (e.g.,
      paintings, historical documents) or process large
      volumes of personal items. FEMA has published
      a radiological response plan that addresses
      communication and preparedness concerns. All
      response plans should include communication
      strategies (e.g., protocol for notifying the President
      and other government officials).
    •  Standards  Research and planning for pieces of the
      response is under way or complete, but a means for
      looking at the overall response process is lacking.
      A protocol that outlines a systematic way to assess
      an event would be useful. This protocol should
      cover both simple indoor and complex indoor/
      outdoor situations and should include standards.
      A workshop participant noted that the process
      of writing and preparing standards may identify
      potential problems and force decisions before an
      event.
    •  Up-to-date drawings  In one participant's
      experience, the lack of accurate  building plans led
      to delays and increased expense in decontaminating
      an impacted building. Having accurate plans readily
      available is critical for rapid response.
    One workshop participant noted  that prepositioning
decontamination equipment  may be appropriate. Others
thought that this action was not economically viable. If
the government buys the infrastructure for a technology
now, the technology may be obsolete when needed.
Having the equipment in the right place at the right
time and ensuring that it would operate after years on
standby are also concerns. A participant suggested that
technology vendors research dual uses of decontamination
technologies, such as applications in agricultural
decontamination for insects and mold, responses to
hazardous material releases, or uses in  hospital settings.
Dual-use technologies would provide  a sustainable
business model and provide technologies for addressing
agents if needed. Another workshop participant noted
that the military often develops technologies and then
turns them over to the commercial market. They are then
available commercially when  needed.
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Sampling  and Analytical
Issues
Workshop participants discussed several topics regarding
sampling utility and sampling methods. These topics
included:
    •  Streamlining the sampling process  Several
      workshop participants noted that sampling (for
      characterization, verification, and clearance) took
      up much of the response timeline. They suggested
      streamlined sampling (e.g., minimize or eliminate
      characterization sampling when fumigation is
      the planned response; only screen samples to
      determine viability). When characterization
      sampling is minimized, verification and clearance
      sampling become more important. Individual
      workshop participants noted that the clearance
      samples were most important when reoccupying a
      building and that good communication with the
      affected community (e.g., workers in a building) is
      necessary to minimize clearance sampling.
          Other workshop participants strongly believed
      that no sampling phase should be eliminated. One
      participant believed that characterization sampling
      took up only a small segment of the response
      timeline and should not be compromised.
    •  Using biological indicators  Decontamination
      events rely on biological indicators (e.g., spore
      strips), but results from these tests may not
      correlate to environmental conditions (i.e., actual
      levels of spores).  Several workshop participants
      identified correlating these tests as  a research need.
      Having participated in five or six decontamination
      events, one participant noted that no positive
      environmental samples were found when the
      biological indicators were negative and desired
      fumigant concentration had been achieved.
      Another noted that establishing a link between
      indicators (e.g., paper or stainless steel strips)
      and environmental samples may help speed
      reoccupation of sensitive areas. Several other
      participants noted that pharmaceutical companies
      already use biological indicators to confirm
      sterilization. Decontamination research may be
      able to draw from this experience.  In termite
      fumigation, vendors also rely on indicators to
      confirm complete fumigation.
    Other workshop participants were more
hesitant about linking different types of indicators
to environmental samples. One noted that
spores on steel coupons or paper strips will not
respond the same as spores on desks, fabric, or
other materials in a building. As such, hospital
and pharmaceutical practices may be of limited
usefulness. Currently, biological indicators and
spore strips confirm that a decontamination agent
was present, but indicators and strips do not
directly confirm that decontamination of agents in
the environment has occurred.
Improving sampling methods  Workshop
participants noted lessons learned and identified
concerns regarding sampling methods.
  Lessons learned:
  > Calibrating sampling instruments and
    ensuring       proper operation before
    sampling is critical.
  > Fixed sampling points are costly and difficult
    to site, and they provide a limited amount of
    information. A mobile unit (e.g., TAGA) can
    be more useful.
  > Remotely monitoring a building with a
    titration system can be difficult. In one
    participant's experience, the system required
    5,000 feet of tubing and months for setup
    and operation.
  Concerns raised:
  > Many questions arose from a lack of
    understanding. For example, additional
    environmental sampling was required at
    one facility to address workers'  concern
    about the safety of their workstations.
  > Rapid screening and sampling may overlook
    multiple-agent attacks. For example, a
    terrorist may use a single event to drive people
    toward a  common area and a second event.
  > Any sampling protocol should  address multi-
    agent attacks.  Once an agent is identified
    at an event, agencies may race toward
    decontamination. Other agents may be
    overlooked.
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Decontamination  Process
Workshop participants provided comments based on their
experience at decontamination events.
    •  When fumigation is the selected decontamination
      method, the fumigation itself takes up only a small
      segment of the decontamination timeline.
      For example, a 1-week fumigation requires 6
      weeks of preparation and several months of post-
      fumigation activities.
    •  Knowing the target agent is critical for properly
      planning a response. One workshop participant
      noted that time and money could have been saved
      at one site if the decision makers knew that the
      target agent was a weaponized biological agent.
      They would have selected fumigation immediately
      instead of spending time considering alternative
      decontamination technologies.
    •  Sealing a building can be costly and time-
      consuming. In addition to the cost of sealing the
      building, budgets must also include inspection
      costs. A project in Utica, New York, found tenting
      to be an effective  means of sealing a building.
    •  Preserving sensitive and valuable materials is a
      concern when one is selecting a decontamination
      technology. One workshop participant suggested
      innovative research grants to businesses or
      academics as a way to address concerns about
      preserving materials.
    •  One workshop participant suggested leaving as
      much material as possible inside a building for
      fumigation to alleviate disposal concerns.
    •  CDC is concerned about the public health side
      of an event and facility safety for reoccupation.
      However, decisions about reoccupation are made
      by the local health agencies, so CDC responses
      to an incident must be carefully crafted and must
      respect the command structure. CDC only supports
the local agencies and must be careful not to say
anything that could be construed as policy.
A representative from CDC indicated that
historically a clear understanding of the different
phases of a response was lacking. Participants in
a decontamination  event should recognize that
the response phases are not separate and distinct;
however, activities are becoming clearer as agencies
gain more decontamination experience.
An OSC provides information to agencies involved
in a decontamination event. Agencies use this
information to support their decisions. (One
OSC at the workshop indicated that many of the
technical experts present  could be called upon to
provide information to support a decontamination
event.) Agencies working with an OSC need
to understand the command structure at a
decontamination event.
An environmental clearance committee supports
local agency decisions about when it is safe to
reoccupy a building by providing information
and credibility. The more the local agencies know,
the better able they are to make decisions. The
committee itself does not make decisions.
One workshop participant served on several
environmental clearance  committees. This
participant noted that the facility operator at one
site supported the committee as an independent
group assessing clearance for reoccupation.
An OSC attending the workshop voiced support of
environmental clearance  committees and technical
working groups. To support an OSC, however,
technical working groups should consist of people
who are authorized to make decisions for their
agencies. Environmental  clearance committees
should recognize that they serve as advisory bodies,
recommending cleanup values to the local agencies
that make the decisions.
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 Panel  Discussion—Research  and
 Development  Needs
Over the course of the 3-day workshop, presenters
described a number of ongoing research projects. During
the second panel discussion, workshop participants
suggested many additional research needs. Again, workshop
participants emphasized the need for agency coordination
to maximize research efforts. The following is a list of
suggestions provided during the second panel discussion, as
well as research needs identified during the lessons learned
panel discussion.
   • Both basic and applied research are needed.
     Researchers  must ensure that their efforts translate to
     real-world situations. Small-chamber studies provide
     a systematic approach, but these studies do not assess
     real-life concerns. Studies should simulate responses
     in real buildings. Issues of scale and engineering
     may be a concern when moving from laboratory
     to field-testing. For example, real-world situations
     often include greater surface areas and volumes for
     decontamination. Workshop participants provided
     several specific suggestions for applied research topics:
       > Real-time monitoring technology (e.g.,
         developing faster, cheaper, and better
         technologies) for agents and fumigants
       > Appropriate sampling methods (e.g.,
         determining whether cotton wipes or rayon
         wipes are better for surface sampling) for bio-
         agents (e.g., spores)
       > Validation of decontamination technologies
       > Tenting as a means of sealing a facility for
         fumigation
   • Most of the information presented during the
     workshop applied to B. anthrads. A number of
     workshop participants mentioned the need to
     expand research related to other chemical, biological,
     and radiological threat agents. Most agreed that
     additional basic research on radiological agents is
     needed. Specifically, participants suggested research
     topics including:
       > Interactions of chemical and radiological agents
         with building and environmental materials
       > Movement of fine radiological particles
  > Aerosolization and re-aerosolization of biological
    and radiological agents
  > Effects of heat and humidity on the deactivation
    of ricin
  *• Applicability of chelaters, HEPA filters,
    and other decontamination technologies to
    radiological agents
  > Activated reagents and their use on CWAs
  > Decontamination of infectious agents in an
    environment with a heavy organic load
In addition to expanding research on specific threat
agents, workshop participants thought research
should expand to consider more threat scenarios,
such as a large, outdoor contamination event.
Events that may cause agricultural contamination or
economic damage are also of concern.
Research efforts should assess the whole cost of
a decontamination event, including the disposal
and restoration components. These efforts should
identify potential savings areas that would reduce
the expense and time required for decontamination
and restoration. Gathering information and
conducting decontaminations quickly could cut
costs. A workshop participant noted that removing
building contents before decontamination requires
consideration of the restraints of working in a
contaminated environment as well as packaging
and transporting waste materials pulled from
the building. If materials are removed after
decontamination, perhaps they could be handled
as relatively innocuous materials. Waste products
from the decontamination process itself must also be
considered.
Dual-use technologies should be identified or
developed before the next threat event occurs.
Technologies  for decontaminating biological
agents, specifically, could have many uses (e.g.,
decontaminating mold-infested buildings, hospitals,
and manufacturing facilities). As an added benefit,
research on dual-use technologies can also foster
collaboration  between public and private sectors.
                                                            Decontamination Workshop  51

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      Workshop participants also encouraged research into
      biotechnology-based decontamination approaches
      (e.g., bacteria-eating anthrax). One workshop
      participant mentioned an existing project studying
      viruses that attack anthrax. Another discussed a
      personal experience with a past project researching
      a bacterial virus for remediating a pathogen threat.
      This research was difficult to pursue because of
      concern that this project could be construed as
      biological warfare. Rather than using a bacterial virus,
      an enzyme extracted from the virus could destroy
      B. anthracis and other pathogens very quickly. (This
      technique also has a hospital application.) Current
      research is pursuing enzymes as a means of addressing
      chemical and biological agents.
      Several workshop participants mentioned the
      need for better surrogates. One participant noted
      that identifying surrogates  is more complex than
      identifying a single surrogate for  a single threat
      agent. Surrogates can change based on the threat
      agent, decontamination methods, and material
      characteristics. Researchers should consult
      microbiologists to consider whether biological
      indicators, spore strips, glass disks, and other media
      truly simulate B. anthracis releases. Identifying
      successful surrogates would enable academic
      institutions and others without clearance to work
      with threat agents to advance decontamination
      technologies.
      Workshop participants repeatedly mentioned
      biological indicators and spore strips as an area of
      uncertainty. For example, the test coupons need
      to better represent real-world situations (e.g.,
      carpet coupons versus steel disks). The participants
      suggested additional research to improve available
      indicator and strip technologies and to develop
      new methods for ensuring that agent deactivation
      occurred. One workshop participant specifically
      mentioned the need for understanding the biology
      behind these technologies. Decontamination events
      rely heavily on biological indicators and spore strips,
      but information from these tests  is not directly
      comparable  to environmental samples. As during
      the lessons learned panel discussion, workshop
      participants held conflicting opinions about
      whether relating biological indicators and strips
      to environmental conditions (actual spores) was
      appropriate.
During the lessons learned panel discussion,
workshop participants mentioned specific research
needs regarding existing sampling methods. One
participant identified the need for research to address
several questions: How much sampling is enough?
What samples are truly necessary? How clean is
clean? Other research topics specifically mentioned
were rapid testing protocols, methods for sampling
irreplaceable items (e.g., paintings or historical
documents), accurate and inexpensive real-time
monitors, and sampling standards (e.g.,
1 spore strip per 100 ft2).
Several workshop participants suggested additional
research to develop surfaces and coatings that are
easy to clean, serve as biocides, or limit chemical
infiltration.  Specifically, studies could develop a
way to seal porous materials, which can be difficult
to decontaminate. Some research of surfaces and
coatings is under way.
Architects and engineers are notably absent from
this meeting. These experts can provide information
about designing buildings with smart systems—using
building materials to combat  contamination. A
workshop participant mentioned that comprehensive
planning at  a State Department building resulted in
a structure that minimizes the potential impact of a
contamination event. For example, the mail room
has a self-contained HVAC system with HEPA
filters. Mail  is processed through holding areas that
can be tested for threat agents before the mail enters
the building.
Many of the presentations given during the
workshop discussed material compatibility issues.
Workshop participants agreed that additional
research to understand interactions between
decontaminants (e.g., fumigants), threat agents,
and building materials is needed. Much remains
unknown about chemical off-gassing, for example,
or decontaminant impacts on sensitive equipment
(e.g., computer components,  aircraft systems). A
workshop participant noted that the IBM facility
in Rochester, New York, has a laboratory for testing
sensitive equipment. IBM is open to having others
use this laboratory for research. One presenter found
that a number of carbonyls formed during chlorine
dioxide fumigation tests. Very little of the reacted
chlorine from those tests was  recovered. The fate of
the remaining chlorine remains  unknown.  More
52  NHSRC

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information is needed to understand chemical
reactions during fumigation and the formation of
fumigation byproducts.
Workshop participants suggested research
to characterize background (e.g., dust, filth,
grime) to understand how these materials may
impact decontamination, especially fumigation
technologies. LLNL plans to test and characterize
grime in subways, and DoE seeks to characterize
background characteristics of airborne materials that
could be threat agents. For example, live anthrax
spores can be found everywhere. Understanding
these background levels should prevent unnecessary
fumigation.
Several workshop participants suggested additional
research to  address the question "How clean is
clean?" They suggested conducting risk-based
modeling to understand the aggregate risk before,
during, and after a decontamination event. For
example, if no growth is reported for 106 spore
strips, is a building safe for reoccupation? From
a risk-based perspective, how should we address
intact, nonviable spores?
Nonculturable but viable organisms have not been
addressed. Citing personal observations, a workshop
participant noted that biological indicators report
positive results on different days (i.e., some are
positive on day 1, some on day 4, and occasionally
some on day 6). The reason for this is unknown.
Perhaps results vary based on different culture
media.
One workshop participant suggested convening
a panel of experts distant from ongoing
decontamination discussions and research to
independently review the collective research efforts
ongoing at various agencies and facilities. This
panel may be able to identify topics that have been
overlooked or projects that are redundant. They
may also be able to determine whether current
research is focusing on too few decontamination
technologies or identify other areas of interest. The
panel would meet periodically (e.g., to observe the
presentations and discussions at this workshop).
Their input may prevent us from being blindsided
by an unexpected terrorist attack.
                                                            Decontamination Workshop 53

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54 NHSRC

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Appendices
Appendix A: Agenda

WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 23, 2005
   8:00am Registtation/Check-in

          PLENARY SESSION
   9:00am Opening remarks; decontamination timeline;
          summary of all events thus far	 Blair Martin
                                                    U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA),
                                             National Homeland Security Research Center (NHSRC)

   9:30am DDAP program	 Lance Brooks
                                                       Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
   10:00am BREAK

   10:15am FBI/Forensics sampling	 Ben Garrett
                                                           Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)

          SESSION 1: The Decontamination Process

   10:45am CDC approach to sampling	Ken Martinez
                                                            Centers for Disease Control (CDC)

   ll:15pm Agents of interest 	Nancy Adams, EPA/NHSRC

   ll:45am LUNCH

   12:45pm AOAC sterilant registration method 	Steve Tomasino, EPA

   l:15pm Crisis exemptions	JeffKempter, EPA

   l:45pm Sampling issues	Mark Durno, EPA Region 5

   2:15pm BREAK

   2:30pm Ambient monitoring for fumigants/CWagents-TAGA van	 Dave Mickunas, EPA

   3:00pm Insurance and indemnity issues	Jerry Robinson
                                                            United States Postal Service (USPS)
                                                    Decontamination Workshop 55

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WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 23, 2005 (continued)

           SESSION 1: The Decontamination Process (continued)

    3:30pm The role of on-site coordinators in the process	Marty Powell, EPA

    4:00pm The UK perspective on decontamination approaches	Robert Bettley-Smith
                                                                                     (GDRS)

    4:30pm Lab capacity issues	Rob Rothman, EPA/NHSRC

    5:00pm ADJOURN

THURSDAY,  FEBRUARY 24, 2005

           SESSION 2: Decontamination Technologies

    8:30am C1O2 fumigation, liquid ClO2/bleach	John Mason
                                                                         Sabre Technical Services

    9:00am C1O2 system test Aniston	 Tom McWhorter
                                                                              CDG Technology

    9:30am VHP fumigation, liquid HP, and sporeclenz 	Iain McVey
                                                                           STERIS Corporation
    10:00am BREAK

    10:15am VHP fumigation	Mike Herd
                                                                                  Bioquell, Inc.

    10:45am Methyl bromide fumigation	Rudi Scheffiahn
                                                                            University of Florida

    ll:15am Foam decontamination technologies	 Rita Betty
                                                                      Sandia National Laboratory
    ll:45pm LUNCH

    2:30pm Ricin	Jack Kelly, EPA/ERT

    l:00pm Restoration from decontamination	Rich Orlusky, USPS

    l:30pm Evaluating C1O2 fumigation efficacy	Paula Krauter
                                                            Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory

    2:00pm Innovative/emerging decontamination technologies	 Mark Brickhouse
                                                       Edgewood Chemical Biological Center (ECBC)
56 NHSRC

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THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 24,  2005 (continued)

           SESSION 3: Decontamination R&D

   2:30pm  Systematic decontamination studies 	PhilKoga (ECBC)

   3:00pm  Use of HVAC systems in building decontamination 	 Tina Carlsen
                                                           Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
   3:30pm  BREAK

   3:45pm  Impact of materials on disinfection and byproduct formation	Rich Corsi
                                                                           University of Texas

   4:15pm  Chamber studies	MarkButtner
                                                                  University of Nevada, Las Vegas

   4:45pm  Decontamination ETV program	Mike Taylor
                                                                     Battelle Memorial Institute

   5:15pm  TSWG R&D activities 	 Rebecca Blackmon
                                                               Technical Support Working Group
   5:45pm  ADJOURN

FRIDAY,  FEBRUARY 25, 2005

           SESSION 4: Lessons Learned

   8:30am  PANEL DISCUSSIONS
             • Lessons learned from building decontamination work

   10:30am BREAK

   10:45am   • Research and technology development needs

   12:00pm LUNCH

           SESSION 5: Radiological Dispersion Device Cleanup

   l:00pm  Scenarios	 FredHolbrook
                                                                         (DOE) EPA/NHSRC

   l:30pm  Dirty Bombs	John MacKinney, EPA

   2:00pm  Radiological cleanup 	Malcolm Wakerley
                                                                 DEFRA/Radio Active Substances

   2:30pm  Wrap-up	Blair Martin, EPA
                                                      Decontamination Workshop 57

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Appendix B:  List  of Participants	
The following pages list workshop participants. The list does not include those who were invited to participate but
could not attend the workshop. Asterisks denote presenters.
    Nancy Adams
    Director, Decontamination and
    Consequence Management
    National Homeland Security
    Research Center
    U.S. Environmental
    Protection Agency
    MC E-343-06
    Research Triangle Park, NC 27711

    Nick Adams
    President
    BioQuell, Inc.
    101 Witmer Road - Suite 500
    Horsham, PA 19044

    * Robert Bettley-Smith
    Department for Environment,
    Food & Rural Affairs
    4/E4 Ashdown House
    123 Victoria Street
    London, SW1E6DE
    United Kingdom

    *Rita Betty
    Member Technical Staff
    Chemical and Biological
    Technologies
    Sandia National Laboratory
    P.O. Box 5800 (0734)
    Albuquerque, NM 87185

    * Rebecca Blackmon
    Subject Matter Expert
    Chemical, Biological, Radiological,
    & Nuclear Countermeasures
    Technical Support Working Group
    12821 Old Fort  Road, Suite 302
    Fort Washington, MD 20744

    Nicolas Brescia
    On-Scene Coordinator
    Removal Branch
    Hazardous Site Cleanup Division
    U.S. Environmental
    Protection Agency
    1650 Arch Street (3HS31)
    Philadelphia, PA 19103

    "Mark Brickhouse
    Team Leader
    Decontamination Sciences
    Physical and Chemical  Scientist
    Research Development
    Engineering Command
    Edgewood Chemical
    Biological Center
    5183 Black Hawk Road
    (AMSRD-ECB-RT-PD)
    Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD
    21010-5424
•Lance Brooks
Scientist
Programs, Plans, Budget
Science & Technology Directorate
Department of Homeland Security
Room 10-D47
Washington, DC 20528

Karen Burgan
Senior Policy Advisor
Office of Emergency Management
Office of Solid Waste and
Emergency Response
National Planning and
Preparedness Division
U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency
1200 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
(5202A)
Washington, DC 20460

* Mark Buttner
Microbiplogist
University of Nevada, Las Vegas
4505 South  Maryland Parkway
Box 454009
Las Vegas, NV 89154-4009

"Tina Carlsen
Senior Environmental Scientist
Environmental Chemistry
and Biology
Environmental Restoration
Lawrence Livermore National
Laboratory
P.O. Box 808 (L-528)
Livermore, CA 94550

Karen Cavanagh
General Counsefand Chief
Operating Officer
Sabre Technical Services, LLC
17 Computer Drive, E
Albany, NY  12205

John Chang
Chemical Engineer
IEMB
Air Pollution Prevention
& Control Division
National Risk Management
Research Laboratory
U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency
109 TW Alexander Drive (E305-03)
Research Triangle Park,  NC  27711

"Richard Corsi
Professor
Department of Civil Engineering
Center for Energy &
Environmental Research
University of Texas at Austin
10100 Bumet Road (R7100)
Austin, TX  78757
John Drake
Project Manager
Decontamination and Consequence
Management Division
National Homeland Security
Research Center
U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency
10282 Rock Springs Road
(OH/WVDP)
West Valley, NY 10282

"Mark Durno
On-Scene Coordinator
Emergency Response
Superfuna Division
U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency - Region 5
25089 Center Ridge Road (ME-W)
Westlake, OH 44145

Haroona Franklin
Head of Contracts and Resources
CDS Project
2 Little Smith Street
London  SW1P 3DH
United Kingdom

Scott Fredericks
Environmental Reponse Team
Office of Superfund
Remediation & Technology
Innovation
U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency

"Benjamin Garrett
Senior Scientist for WMD
Hazardous Materials Response Unit
Federal Bureau of Investigation
2501 Investigation Parkway
Quantico,VA 22135

Perry Gaughan
On-Scene Coordinator - Region 3
Removal and Response Branch
Hazardous Site Clean  Up
U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency
1650 Arch Street (3HS31)
Philadelphia, PA 19103

Harold  Heaton
Principal Staff Physicist
Special Applications Branch
National Security
Technology  Department
Johns Hopkins Applied
Physics Laboratory
11100 Johns Hopkins Road
(17N-686)
Laurel, MD  20723
58  NHSRC

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Craig Heimbach
Physicist
Neutron Interactions and Dosimetry
Ionizing Radiation
National Institute of Standards
and Technology
100 Bureau Drive (8461)
Gaithersburg, MD 20899

* Michael Herd
Vice President
Bioquell, Inc.
101 Witmer Road - Suite 500
Horsham, PA 19044

*Fred Holbrook
Senior Engineer
Decontamination and
Consequence Management
National Homeland Security
Research Center
U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency
26 West Martin Luther King
Drive (163)
Cincinnati, OH  45268

Anthony Intrepido
Program Manager
Industrial Hygiene Field Services
Directorate of Occupational Health
U.S. Army Center for Health
Promotion and  Protective Mediums
5158BlackhawkRoad
ATTN:  MCHB-TS-OFS
Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD
21010

Jenna Jambeck
Post-Doc
Atmospheric Protection Branch
Air Pollution Prevention
& Control Division
U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency
109 TW Alexander Drive (E305-02)
Research Triangle Park, NC 27711

Peter Jutro
Deputy Director
National Homeland Security
Research Center
U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency
1200 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
(8801R)
Washington, DC 20460

"Jack Kelly
On Scene Coordinator
Removal Response Branch
Hazardous Site Cleanup Diyision
U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency - Region 3
1650 Arch Street (3HS31)
Philadelphia, PA 19103
*Jeff Kempter
Senior Advisor
Office of Pesticide Programs
Antimicrobials Division
U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency
1200 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
(75IOC)
Washington, DC 20460

Max Kiefer
Assistant  Director Emergency
Preparednness and Response
Office of Director
National Institute fo Occupational
Safety and Health
Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention
1600 Clifton Road (MS E-20)
Atlanta, GA 30333

* Philip Koga
Associate Director for
Special Programs
Edgewood Chemical &
Biological Center
Research  & Technology Directorate
U.S. Army Research
Development & Engineering
Command
RDECOM-ECBC /AMSRD-ECB-RT
Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD
21010-5424

* Paula Krauter
Environmental Microbiplogist
Environmental Protection
Department
Environmental Restoration
Lawrence Livermore
National Laboratory
7000 East Avenue (L-528)
Livermore, CA 94550

Terrance Leighton
Senior Scientist
aVD/CHORI
5700 Martin Luther King Parkway
Oakland, CA 94609

Paul Lemieux
Chemical  Engineer
Decontamination &
Consequences Management
National Homeland Security
Research  Center
U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency
109 TW. Alexander Drive
Research  Triangle Park, NC 27709

*John MacKinney
Senior Scientist
Center For Radiological
Emergency Response/ORIA
U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency
1200 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
(6608J)
Washington, DC 20460
* Blair Martin
Associate Division Director
National Risk Management
Research Laboratory
Air Pollutipn Prevention and
Control Division
U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency
109 TW Alexander Drive
(E343-04)
Research Triangle Park, NC 27511

* Kenneth Martinez
Regional Operations Director
Coordinating Office of Emergency
Preparedness and Response
Office of the Director
Centers for Disease Control/NIOSH
4676 Columbia Parkway (R-ll)
Cincinnati, OH 45226

*John Mason
Chief Executive Officer
Sabre Technical Services, LLC
17 Computer Drive,  E
Albany, NY  12205

Michael  McLoughlin
Program Manager
Department of Homeland Security,
Science and Technology
HSARPA
Washington, DC  20528

*Iain McVey
Project Manager
Defense and Industrial
STERIS Corporation
5960 Heisley Road
Mentor, OH  44060

* David Mickunas
Chemist
Environmental Response Team
Office of Superfund
Remediation Technology Innovation
U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency
Building 18 - 2890
Woodbridge Avenue
Edison, NJ 08837

Mark Minier
Vice President
Sabre Technical Services
17 Computer Drive,  E
Albany, NY  12205

Robert Murtha
President
MURTECH
820 Cromwell  Park Drive
Glen Burnie, MD 21061

Laurel O'Connor
Senior Research  Scientist
Battelle
1204 Research Drive
Aberdeen, MD 21001-1228
                                                               Decontamination  Workshop  59

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    * Richard Orlusky
    Environmental Grardinator
    Environmental Policy Management
    United States Postal Service
    21 Kilmer Road
    Edison, NJ 08899

    Cayce Parrish
    Principal Technical Advisor
    Office of the Administrator
    Office of Homeland Security
    U.S. Environmental
    Protection Agency
    1200 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
    (1109A)
    Washington, DC 20460

    * Marty Powell
    U.S. Environmental
    Protection Agency
    303 Methodist Building
    11th and Chapline Streets (3HS33)
    Wheeling, WV 26003

    Vipin Rastogi
    Senior Research Biologist
    Research & Technology Directorate
    U.S. Army - Edgewood Chemical &
    Biological Center
    E-3150 Kingscreek Street, N
    Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD
    21010

    "Gerald Robinson
    Attorney, Purchasing  &
    Commercial Protection Law
    United States Postal Service -
    Law Department
    475 L'Enfant Plaza, SW
    Washington, DC 20260-1136

    Richard Rossman
    Principal Research Scientist
    SA&E
    Battelle Memorial Institute
    1204 Technology Drive
    Aberdeen, MD 21001

    *Rob Rothman
    Physical Scientist
    Office of Research & Development
    National Homeland Security
    Research Center
    U.S. Environmental
    Protection Agency
    26 West Martin Luther King
    Drive (163)
    Cincinnati, OH 45268

    Shawn Ryan
    Chemical Engineer
    Decontamination & Consequence
    Management Division
    National Homeland Security
    Research Center
    U.S. Environmental
    Protection Agency
    109 TW Alexander Drive
    (MD-H-137-03)
    Research Triangle Park, NC
* Rudolf Scheffrahn
Professpr of Entomology
University of Florida
3205 College Avenue
Ft. Lauderdale, FL  33314

Lewis Schwartz
Vice President, Operations &
Opportunity Development
Defense and Industrial
STERIS Corporation
5960 Heisley Road
Mentor, OH  44060

Les Sparks
Senior Chemical Engineer
Decontamination and
Consequence Management Division
National Homeland Security
Research Center
U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency
(ND 305-03)
Research Triangle Park, NC 27711

Harry Stone
Program Manager
Battelle
10300 Alliance Road - Suite 155
Cincinnati, OH 45242

Michael Takacs
Health Physicist
Nuclear & Chemical Hazards
DHS/FEMA
Department of Homeland Security
500 C Street, SW - Room 200
Washington, DC 20472-0001

•Michael Taylor
Program Manager
Measurement and Data
Analysis Sciences
Energy and  Environment Division
Battelle Memorial Institute
10300 Alliance Road - Suite 155
Cincinnati, OH 45242

Rodney Taylor
Managing Director
Breitstpne & Company, Ltd.
534 Willow Avenue
Cedarhurst, NY 11516

* Stephen Tomasino
Senior Scientist
Microbiology Laboratory Branch
Biological and  Economic
Analysis Division
Office of Pesticide Programs
U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency
Environmental Science Center
701 Mapes Road (7503C)
Ft. Meade, MD 20755

Abe Turetsky
Edgewood Chemical &
Biological Center
U.S. Army
E-3150 Kingscreek Street, N
Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD
21010
John Vitko
Director, Biological
Countermeasurers
Science and Technology Directorate
Department of Homeland Security
Washington, DC 29528

Chris Wagner
On-Scene Coordinator
EPA National
Decontamination Team
26 West Martin Luther King Drive
(MS 271)
Cincinnati, OH 45268

* Malcolm Wakerley
CBRN Specialist
Radioactive Substances
Department for Environment,
Food & Rural Affairs
4/E4 Ashdown House
123 Victoria Street
London SW1E 6DE
United Kingdom

Phan Winter
Associate, SETA for DHS
Booz Allen Hamilton
4001 Fairfax Drive - Suite 750
Arlington, VA 22203

Joseph Wood
Decontamination and
Consequence Management Division
National Homeland Security
Research Center
U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency
E343-06
Research Triangle Park, NC 27711

Rosemary Workman
Environmental Scientist
Office of Homeland Security
U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency
1200 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
(1109)
Washington, DC 20460
60  NHSRC

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Appendix C: Presentation Slides
          Decontamination Workshop

                      Overview


                      Presented by:

                      G. Blair Martin
               USEPA, ORD, MRMRL, APPCD


                      Presented at:

        NHSRC Workshop on Decontamination, Cleanups, and
     Associated Issues for Sites Contaminated with CBNR Materials
                      Washington, DC
                    February 23 to 25, 2005
                WELCOME
The Decontamination  and Consequence
Management Division of National
Homeland Security Research Center
welcomes you to our first workshop on
decontamination
          PURPOSE OF WORKSHOP
        The purpose of the workshop is to share information on
        a variety of subjects related to decontamination of
        CBNR releases in buildings, including:

         / The elements of a decontamination event
         / Technologies that have been used in actual
           decontaminations
         / Research and development to understand and improve
           technologies for additional CBNR agents
         / Discussion of "lessons learned" that might reduce the
           time and/or cost of any future decontaminations
         / Identification of research needs to fill gaps in the
           knowledge base and extend the range of applicability of
           technologies
            BACKGROUND
  In the fall of 2001 a number of buildings were contaminated with
  B.anthracis from letters mailed through the U.S. Postal Service

  All of the these buildings have been decontaminated using a
  variety of methods

   / Removal and disposal of contaminated materials
   / Surface cleaning with bleach, liquid chlorine dioxide or various
    hydrogen peroxide products
   / Fumigation with chlorine dioxide, hydrogen peroxide, or
    paraform aldehyde
   / The volumes fumigated at one time ranged from about 40,000 to over
    14,000,000 cubic feet
      ELEMENTS OF A DECON EVENT
       The decision process leading to the fumigation and final
       clearance of the building
       Characterization of the extent of contamination and
       monitoring of the fumigation
       Building related activities including, preparation and
       maintenance and surroundings for security, safety of the
       neighborhood, and the ultimate decontamination
       Selection, design and performance of the decontamination
       process
       Disposal of contaminated materials and/or wastes from the
       decontamination and building reconstruction
       Communication with affected individuals and the
       community at large
  BUILDING RELATED ACTIVITIES



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               DECISION PROCESS

             Site and structure security
             Interaction with Federal State and Local Agencies
             Incident command structure
             Regulatory and technical document review processes
             Selection of contractors
             Decision on approaches to decontamination
             Documentation for crisis exemption
             Issuance of crisis exemption
             Final documentation for clearance
       CHARACTERIZA TION AND
               MONITORING

 Forensic sampling
 Characterization sampling
 Biological indicators
 Ambient monitoring
 Fumigant Concentration monitoring
 Temperature, Relative humidity, and delta pressure monitoring
 Clearance sampling
       DECONTAMINATION PROCESSES

       J Design interface with building
       s Design decontamination system
       s Design interface with heating, ventilation and air conditioning
         systems
       s Procurement and fabrication of equipment
       s Installation of system and support equipment
       J Testing
       s Fumigation
       s Disassembly and removal
               DISPOSAL
Materials may be removed prior to fumigation
 > High value materials that must be preserved
 > Materials that may be hard to decontaminate
 > Materials that may accelerate decomposition of fumigant
 > Machines or electronics that the fumigant may damage
 > Equipment that may be replaced before building is returned to
   service
Additional material may be removed after fumigation
Wastes from the fumigation system also may require disposal
                  COMMUNICATION

          Law Enforcement Agencies
          Workers and Occupants of the Building
          Residents of Surrounding Community
          Commercial Establishments
          Federal, State and Local Health agencies
          Environmental and Regulatory Agencies
          Advisory Groups
          Contractors
          OCSs
62  NHSRC

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  DHS S&T Biological & Chemical
  Restoration Programs
   February 23, 2005
   Lance Brooks
   Dr John Vitko,
   Biological Countermeasures Portfolio Manager

   Dr. Randolph Long,
   Chemical Countermeasures Portfolio Manager
         Homeland
         Security
R<
;search, Development, Testing and Evaluation
Operational End Users

Office of Research
And Development:
-Federal Stewardship

Homeland Security
Advanced Research
Projects Agency
-Engage Private Sector

Systems
Engineering &
Development:
-Systems Testing and
Acquisition
<• 	 > Ca
,-J
;
0?
\
lability Push/ft/

Office of Programs, Plans
and Budgets (PPB)
-Define Needs
-Identify Gaps
-Prioritize Programs
CBRNE Countermeasures
Critical Infrastructure Protection
Standards
USC i::,USSS,BTS,EP&R
_ _

Operational End Users
Homeland
Security

  Domestic Demonstration & Application Programs
      * Homeland
      " Security
                            Program Goals

                            Integrated field demonstrations
                            of next generation solutions
                            which bring together the user,
                            technology, and ConOps in a
                            real world test of a particular
                            solution.
ogical Aerosol Sentry and Information
em (BASIS)
 need biological security at
 events

 deployment and setup

 ed operational period

 rage for fixed sites-point
essfully deployed at Winter
c Games in Salt Lake City
 Homeland
 Security
Program for Response Options and Technology
Enhancements for Chem/Bio Terrorism (PROTECT)
                                        Closed Circuit Television
                                        Camera (CCTV)
    ฃ-:..:
      f Security
 ration of Large Airport Facilities
                                                                                                         To be Completed FY05
                                                                       o reduce the overall time to
                                                                       a critical transportation facility
                                                                       ng a biological attack.
                                                                       hed
                                                                       tnerships (federal, state, & local)
                                                                       O
                                                                       n Critical Path
                                                                       elopment and approval step
                                                                       igation verification step
                                                                       arance sampling step
                                                                       rail coordination and understanding

                                                                       toration "templates" that provide guidelines
                                                                       rge airports
 Homeland
 Security
                                                                                    Conduct Tabletop exerci
                                                                                    scale demonstration
                                                                         Decontamination Workshop 63

-------
   Restoration of Large Airport Facilities
          ซ•  Improve the development and approval step by pre-planning the restoration process



          •/  Improve the fumigation verification step

              > use of statistical sampling methods and a sampling database
          ซ•  Improve the clearance sampling step




              > use of statistical sampling methods and a sampling database
          ซ•  Improve the overall coordination and understanding of the restoration process


              > development of decision support software (BROOM)
           • Homeland
           • Security
                             Note that the program is not addressing the fumigation step
                                                   Pre-Demonstrations

                                                    Goal: To plan, coordinate and establish
                                                    partnerships for Transit Facility and
                                                    Wide Area Restoration Demonstrations

                                                   • Establish
                                                       - Partnerships (federal, state, & local)
                                                   • Focus
                                                       - Concept of Operation/Protocols
                                                       - overall coordination and understanding
                                                       - Utilize HSI Study, TSWG Protocols, FTA Study
                                                   -Collaboration
                                                       - EPA for Pre-review of sampling & decon plans
                                                       - FTA for Transit systems Tech Transfer
                                                   Develop
                                                       - Restoration "templates/guidelines" for
                                                           Transit Systems & Urban Areas
                                                       DHS S&T will utilize resources and
                                                     experience for conducting a coordinated
                                                             system demonstration.
                                                        ^ Homeland
                                                        W Security
   Restoration of a Transit System
     Goal: To reduce the overall time to
     restore a critical transportation
     facility following a biological attack.
                                                              To be Initiated FY06
    1 Partnerships
        - facility, federal, state, & local
        - FTA (Restoration Analysis, CBRN)
        - WMATA (Restoration Plan)
    1 Leverage Airport Restoration DDAP
        - existing clean-up guidelines
        - existing / emerging sampling methods
        - existing / emerging decontamination technologies
    • Develop
        - Pre-planning/rapid approval of restoration
        process (Template)
        - Methods for contamination  characterization
        - Decontamination and verification for surfaces
        - Clearance Methods and decision tools
           * Homeland
           ' Security
                                          Conduct Tabletop exercises and Larc
                                          scale demonstration
                                                 Restoration of a Wide Area (Urban)
                                                                                                                                                            To be Initiated FY06
                                                    Goal: To reduce the overall time to
                                                    restore a large outdoor urban area
                                                    following a biological attack.
                                                                                                                                         .
                                                   • Partnerships
                                                      -Urban area, federal, state, & local
                                                   • Identify & Survey
                                                      - existing clean-up guidelines
                                                      - existing / emerging sampling methods
                                                      - existing / emerging decontamination technologies
                                                   Develop
                                                      - Pre-planning/Approval of restoration process
                                                      - Methods for contamination characterization
                                                      - Decontamination and verification for surfaces
                                                      -Clearance Methods and decision tools
                                                   Clean Earth Tech. Workshop - Protocols/Technology |
                                                   HSI Workshop - Analysis/Policy                   j
                                                         * Homeland
                                                         ' Security
                                                                                          Conduct Tabletop exercises and Large
                                                                                          scale demonstration
   Wide Area Restoration
         Large-Scale Restoration of Biologically
        Contaminated Areas - Technology/Protocols

        Develop science- and consensus-based protocols to
        restore large-scale urban areas to safe levels for
        unrestricted reoccupation following a bioterrorism
         Large-Scale Restoration of Biologically
           Contaminated Areas - Analysis/Policv
        Transition from crisis response to consequence
        management

        Community involvement and societal values

        Interagency cooperation

        Regulatory and technical issues

        The psycho-social and econom ic im pacts of a wide-
        biological incident
           i Homeland
           ' Security
   Study results and developed
protocols will be incorporated into
      the Wide Area DDAP .
                                                                                                Facilities Chemical Restoration Demonstration
                                                                                                                                                           Initiated FY05
                                                   Goal: To reduce the overall time to
                                                   restore a critical facility following a
                                                   chemical attack.
                                                    Establish
                                                       -  Partnerships (facility, federal, state, & local)
                                                       - Threat scenarios
                                                    Survey and identify
                                                       - existing clean-up guidelines
                                                       - existing / emerging sampling methods
                                                       - existing / emerging decontamination technologies
                                                   1 Develop
                                                       - Pre-planning/rapid approval of restoration
                                                       process
                                                       - Methods for contamination characterization
                                                       - Decontamination and verification for surfaces
                                                       - Clearance Methods and decision tools
i Homeland
' Security
                                                                                                                                  Conduct Tabletop exercises and Large
                                                                                                                                  scale demonstration
64   NHSRC

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  Crime Scene Management &
          WMD Terrorism
              Presented to
    EPA Workshop on Decontaminatio
       Cleanup & Associated Issues
               February 2005
                                                                     Presentation Contents
Overview of Crime Scene Management
Forensic Challenges
 - Detection
 - Attribution
 - Traditional Exams
                       <- FBI crime scene, Seattle,
                       Washington, April 2004

                       Items include (1) bag of castor seeds;
                       (2) hydrogen-filled rockets; (3) 9-mm
                       handgun; (4) spilled mercury; & (5)
                       loose cash.
                                                            Crime Scene Management & WMD Terrorist*
       Response to WMD Terrorism
                    9 Tactical Phase
                      - Removal of the hostile threat
                        (FBI & other SWAT, FBI HRT)

                     Operational Phase
                      - Provide Rescue / Control
                        (protect the public; identify &
                        mitigate hazards)

                     Crime Scene Phase
                      - Evidence Collection, Packaging
                        & Transport

                     Remediation Phase
Crime Scene Management & WMD Terrorisn
                   Detection
            In this context, Detection means
            "determining that a crime has
            occurred"
             -A crime must be detected in order
              to be investigated
            WMD Terrorism Challenge:
            Differentiating natural event from
            a deliberate release or other
            criminal  event
                                                            Crime Scene Management & WMD Terrorisn
                 Detection
        Consider: Victim found with
        gunshot wound determined to be
        fatal
         - Not necessarily apparent that foul
           play occurred
        Consider: Victim found dead with
        bacterial illness determined to be
        cause
         - Not necessarily apparent that foul
           play occurred
     ,e Management & WMD Terrorism
                   Sampling
In this context,
Sampling is the
term the public
uses for what Law
Enforcement
considers
"gathering
evidence"
 - Knowing when,
  where, what & how
  to sample         | What Do You Collect as Evidence? |
                                                            Crime Scene Management & WMD Terrorism
                                                              Decontamination  Workshop 65

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                         Sampling
     Challenge: Pathogens are microscopic, limiting visual
     clues to assist in knowing:
      - Where to collect evidence
      - What items to collect
      - Whether an item or area is connected to the crime scene
      - How best to collect the evidence
                                  <- It is amatter of size:
                                  Magnified area (lower right)
                                  shows a clump of bacteria that
                                  might be hidden within a single
                                  line of a human fingerprint
       Crime Scene Management & WMD Ter
                                                                  Sampling
                                              Consider the gunshot victim
                                               - We can see the gunshot wound
                                               -We can see a gun
                                               -We can see a bullet
                                              Consider the pathogen victim
                                               - We cannot see the disease
                                               - We cannot see the pathogen
                                               - If we cannot see the disease or the pathogen,
                                                 then we might fail to find the scene altogether
                                                                    Crime Scene Management & WMD Ter
                   Traditional Exams
     In this context,
     Traditional forensic
     examinations refers to
     the conduct of fingerprint,
     toolmark, question
     document, trace
     evidence, and related
     exams that are the
     classical tools of forensic
     sciences
       Crime Scene Management & WMD Ter
                                                            Traditional  Exams
                                              Challenge: Conducting traditional
                                              examinations on evidence contaminated with
                                              biological pathogens without
                                               - harming the examiner
                                               -losing evidence
                                              Factors to consider:
                                               - Methods for rendering the pathogen harmless
                                                 are destructive
                                               - Examining contaminated  evidence is hazardous
                                                                    Crime Scene Management & WMD Ter
                      Summary- 1
Crime of "Bioterrorism" presents
unique challenges with regard to
 - Detection
   •  versus natural outbreaks
 - Sampling
   •  Finding microscopic organisms
 - Traditional Forensics
   •  Protecting examiners and exhibits
Similar challenges exist for crimes
related to toxic chemicals and
radiological materials
       Crime Scene Management & WMD Terrorism
                                                                Summary- 2
                                                                  Traditional Forensic Examinations are likely
                                                                  to yield the most useful clues
                                                                  - Fingerprints
                                                                  - Handwriting
                                                                  -Toolmarks
                                                                  - Trace evidence
                                                                  - Questioned documents
                                                                    Crime Scene Management & WMD Ter
66  NHSRC

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               Summary- 3
Despite the novel nature of WMD terrorism,
classical police work is still the most likely
means of solving the case
 Crime Scene Management & WMD Terrorism
Questions or Comments?
                                                          Contact information:
                                                          Benjamin C. Garrett, Ph.D.
                                                          Senior Scientist for Weapons of Mass Destruction
                                                          FBI Laboratory
                                                          2501 Investigation Parkway-Room 3102
                                                          Quantico, Virginia 22135 USA
                                                          + 1-703-632-7929
                                                          Benjamin.Garrett@ic.fbi.gov
                                                             Decontamination Workshop 67

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        CDC/NIOSH Response to
              Biothreat Agents:
        Environmental Monitoring
        CAPT Kenneth F. Martinez, MSEE, CIH
         National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health
     Purpose of Environmental Sampling

    • Determine agent sources, characteristics, and
      exposure pathways
    • Determine the extent and degree of
      contamination
    • Contribute to risk assessment and data-driven
      recommendations
    • Support medical treatment and clean-up
      decisions
    • Provide guidance on re-occupancy
        Initial Public Health Goals

      Characterize contaminant
      • Physical properties (size, morphology)
      • Ability to aerosolize (moisture, additives)
      • Purity
      Limit Spread of Contamination (after dispersal)
      • Fomite transport
      • Personnel transport
      • Air movement (HVAC)
      Determine who may have been exposed and
      what remedial actions are taken
         Some Questions...

Is preventive personal decontamination needed
after an exposure event?
Could clothing act as a vehicle to carry spores
offsite and to worker home environments?
If so what precautions should be recommended?
68  NHSRC

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             Partnerships
Multiple Agency Involvement
 • FBI, EPA, OSHA, CDC, Coast Guard, ACOE, USPS,
   Unions, State Agencies
Defining Roles/Expertise
Strong Views and Personalities
Public Scrutiny, Agency Pressure
Agency Conflicts
 • Technical and programmatic
                                             gjjg
                                              NIOSH Role

                                 Emergency Response
                                 • Assist Epidemiological Team
                                 • Environmental Assessment, Safety and Health
                                 Consequence Management
                                 • Technical Resource
                                 • Advise re: Sampling, PPE, Risk Communication
                                 Approximately 10,000 environmental Samples
                                 • Between 4ฐ/o-50ฐ/o from a given site were positive
     Some Underestimations

Importance of environmental sampling
 • Driving force behind public health decisions
Existing plans clinically based
Need for maintaining continuity of operations
during a response
                                        Phase of a Response
                                 S creening
                                 • Law enforcement and public health partnersl-
                                 • Analysis confined to validated methods
                                 • Targeted sampling approach
                                 Characterization
                                 • Federal (with state and local) and industry pai
                                 • Analysis more flexible
                                 • Probabilistic (with some targeted) sampling a]
                                 Remediation/ Re s to ration
                                 • Federal (with state and local) and industry pai
                                 • Analysis confined to validated methods
                                 • Probabilistic (with some targeted) sampling a]
            CDC Responses
                Anthrax 2001
Florida - AMI
NJ - Hamilton PD&C
NYC - multiple sites
Washington, DC —
Capital Hill and
Brentwood PD&C
Outliers
 • NYC healthcare worker
 • CT elderly woman
--:
                                  Investigative Sampling Strategy
                                        Anthrax Outbreak Investigation
                                 Follow the mail
                                 High traffic areas
                                 Ventilation system
                                 Areas that collect dust
                                                                    Decontamination  Workshop  69

-------
                   Consider.

      Dissemination
       • Air
       • Fomites
       • Personnel
      Surfaces
       • Porous versus non-porous
      Validated sampling protocols
      Methods of analysis
        What Was Sampled?
       Anthrax Outbreak Investigation
Furniture (equipment)
Floors
Ventilation system
 • Filters
 • Return air grills
Vehicles
Clothing
       Environmental Sample Types
           rBulk
           L Surface
                                       Air
  Environmental Sampling Protocols

               Validation Studies

      In the field
       • Sanderson, et al., Curseen/Morns (Brentwood)
         P&DC
       • McCleery, et al., Hamilton (Trenton) P&DC
      In the lab
       • Dugway Proving Grounds
         • CDC (NIOSH and NCID), EPA partnership
       • Sandia National Laboratory
         • CDC, EPA partnership
     Distribution of Samples by
       Geographical Location
  Area Investigated
Number of Samples
    Collected
    Florida                   1224
    Hartford area               891
    Kansas City                 72
    Trenton area               1353
    New York City              449
    Washington, D.C. (Capitol)     4112
    Washington, D.C. (other)      1360
    Total                   9461
70  NHSRC

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       Distribution of Samples
          by Type of Facility
  Type of Facility
Number of Samples
    Collected
   Office Building                 4611
   Postal Processing and Distribution    3299
   Post Office                     492
   Subway                       215
   Other Business                  217
                                          gjjg
 Some Applications of Lessons Learned

i Ricin — Greenville, SC
  • October, 2003
i Bio Watch - Houston, TX
  • October, 2003
  • Tularemia
i SARS — Toronto, Canada
  • Spring of 2003
              Ricin Event
                October 2003
Greenville, SC
Threat letter with ricin found
FBI/local health department/
CDC Investigation
Coordinate with CDC
RRAT lab
Determine sampling and analytical methodology
                                     Sampling Strategy based on...

                                     Interviews with:
                                     • Postal Manager, Union official and employees
                                     • Postal Inspectors, FBI, and Law Enforcement
                                     • Medical Officers regarding health issues, absenteeism
                                     A detailed walkthrough of the facility to identify all
                                     points where package was delivered, moved, stored,
                                     etc., until discovered by alert postal employee
      Conveyor and Controls
                                                     Results

                                     70 Surface swab and 5 vacuum samples collected
                                     overnight
                                     Samples air shipped to CDC after collection for
                                     immediate processing via TRFI and PCR
                                     Results available by 3 pm — all negative
                                     Results significant in decision to reoccupy the facility
                                                                 Decontamination  Workshop  71

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           Houston, Texas - BioWatch
                       October, 2003

       Tularemia detected (and confirmed) on BW
       monitors
       Investigation launched —
       • Syndromic surveillance
       • Laboratory review
       • Environmental
          • Rodent trapping
          • Surface sampling
       NIOSH Investigation

Inspected all sites where positives were
detected (reviewed construction, excavation,
lawn mowing, etc.)
Reviewed laboratory procedures, sample
handling, sample transport, opportunities
for cross contamination
Collected 68 environmental samples (swabs, filters, etc) from
multiple co-located sampling devices and other potential sources
Provided additional air sampling equipment for increased density
of sample locations
                       Findings

       All environmental samples were negative
       Heavy rainfall impeded ability to collect
       additional air samples
       Opportunities for cross-contamination possible
       but an unlikely explanation
       Environmental activities adjacent monitors were
       unremarkable and unlikely to explain results
                   SARS
                Spring of 2003

Toronto, Canada
 • First outbreak
    • Community
    • Vanous hospitals
 • Second outbreak
    • North York General Hospital
              NIOSH Investigation

       Focus on occupational safety and health issues
       • PPE
       • Controls
       • Environmental assessment
       Exposure characterization
       • Wipe samples
          • Swabs
          • Wipes
       • Air samples
72 NHSRC

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        Ranking Threats
                for
       Decontamination
            Research
 Nancy H. Adams, PhD, Director
 Decontamination and Consequence Management Division
 National Homeland Security Research Center
 Office of Research and Development
 US Environmental Protection Agency
 Research Triangle Park, NC

                                                            Multiple Approaches
  DCMD ranking methods
  SAIC rankings
  Expert Panel
  Battelle rankings for decon
  methods studies
  Constant updates
       DCMD Approach
  Identification and ranking of high-
     priority threat agents

  Identification and ranking of
     buildings as terrorist targets

  Identification of terrorist goals

  Coupling threat agents and
     buildings

  Scenario development
  Chemical and Biological
  Threat Agents - Sources
  CDC Category A list
  • Chemical warfare agents
  • Toxic IndustrialChemicals
  Department of State
  Department of Defense
  EPA
  Intelligence community
Ranking Factors for Threat Agents

 - Infective dose (biologicals)
 • Persistence
 • Availability
 • Prior use
 • Ease of detection
 • Severity of effects
 • Transmission between persons (biol)
 • Preventives/treatments
 • Ease of decontamination
 • Latency
 • Ease of airborne dispersion

      Ranking Method

1 - Each factor given a rating (1-5) for
 relevance
2 - Each threat agent ranked for each
 factor(0-4)
   • 0 = not applicable
   • 4 = highest effect
3 - (Factor rank) x (Threat rank for factor)
    = Product
4 - Summed products = Ranking for
    threat agent
                                                     Decontamination Workshop 73

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Factor
Infective dose (biologicals)
Persistence
Availability
Prior use
Ease of detection
Severity of effects
Transmission (biologicals)
Preventives/treatments
Ease of decontamination
Latency
Ease of airborne dispersion
Lethality (chemicals)
Weight
5
2
4
2
3
5
4
3
2
3
3
5

                                                                     Definitions of Factor
                                                                            Rankings
                                                                  Each factor's numerical ranking defined.

                                                                  For example, for Severity of Effects:

                                                                  0 = mild, temporary impairment
                                                                  1 = More severe effects in susceptible
                                                                   group(s)
                                                                  2 = Serious illness of med-long duration
                                                                  3 = Permanent impairment
                                                                  4 = Death
                  Example Ranking
            • Factor = Severity of Effect
            • Factor ranking = 4
            • Anthrax ranking = 4
            • 4x4 = 16

            This product added to the other
              product values for anthrax to
              obtain a ranking value

                                                                         Building Types
Shopping centers
Convention centers
Subways
Airports
Domed stadiums
Hotels
Theaters
Residences
Aircraft
Schools
Hospitals
Office buildings
Apartments
Presidential offices
Congress
Military bases
Embassies
CDC
Museums
                  Building Ranking
                        Factors
              Building access
              HVAC access
              Potential for infiltration for
              outdoors
              Small rooms
              Large rooms
              People traffic

Factor
Building access
HVAC access
Potential for infiltration
for outdoors
Small rooms
Large rooms
People traffic
Weight
5
4
2
3
3
4
74 NHSRC

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    Ranking Method


Factor Weights (1-5)
Building ranks (1-5)
Sum of products (Weight x rank)

      Terrorist Goals
   Health impacts
   Economic
   Symbolic
   Political
   Psychological
 Coupling Threats with
        Buildings
Method of introduction
 • In-room
 • In-duct
 • Outside/proximal
  Coupling Threats with
    Buildings - cont'd

•  Threat Value = 1+2+3+4+5
    1 = Amounts available
    2 = Hazard index
    3 = Ease of use
    4 = People traffic
    5 = Non-health impacts
 Coupling Threats with
   Buildings - cont'd
Term 1- Amount available
 • Availability
 • Prior use

Term 2 - Hazard index
 • Infectious dose
 • Lethality
 • Severity of effects
 • Contagious
 • Latency
 • Availability of treatments
  Coupling Threats with
    Buildings - cont'd

Term 3 - Ease of use
 • Ease of dispersion
 • Potential for infiltration

Term 4 - People traffic

Term 5 - Non-health impacts
 • Economic
 • Symbolic
 • Political
 • Psychological
                                              Decontamination Workshop 75

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                Scenario Development

               Methods of Introduction (3)
               Terrorist goals (5)
               Rankings for each
                • agent,
                • building type,
                • method of introduction,
                • terrorist goal
               Rankings analyzed by
                • Visual patterns
                • Cluster analysis
                                                  SAIC Approach
                Quantitative Ranking of
                    Threat Scenarios
                  Risk = Probability * Consequence
            Probability depends on:
            Availability of agent
            Capability of terrorists
            Past terrorist action
            Ease of dissemination
            Latency
            Persistence
            Existing security
Consequence depends on:
Toxicity of agent
Amount of agent
Contagiousness
Impact on infrastructure
Availability of treatment
Ease of detection
Ease of decontamination
            Requires an artful blend of quantitative and qualitative information.
    Selected Algorithm

Risk Index = A x F x (HI + El + NI)

A = Availability
F = Feasibility
ffl = Health Impacts
El = Economic Impacts
NI = Environmental Impacts

Risk Index varies from 0 to 300,000.
             Health Impacts: Biological
                            Fatality Rate

ow
2%


Medium
2-30%

Hi
>3
            High  Med  Low  High  Med  Low  High  Med  Low
            Hl=0 Hl=0.1 Hl=1  Hl=1  Hl=10  Hl=10      Hl=100  Hl=100
                                          Feasibility Decision Tree
76  NHSRC

-------
Expert System Approach


Open Literature Sources
(CDC, DHS)

For Official Use Only
Sources (DOT), DoS, DOE)
Y Inputs to the Threat y^
V Scenarios Meeting j~
NHSRC Threat Scenario
Reports


EPA lists of Contaminants,
threats, and threat scenarios
(OSWER, OPPTS, OW)

  Battelle Systematic
Decontamination Effort

Approach similar to DCMD
Includes updated information
Provided rankings for study of
decontamination methods

   EPA-Wide Rankings

 Includes input from:
  • EPA Office of Homeland Security
  • Department of Homeland Security
  • Department of Defense
  • EPA Office of Water
  • DCMD
  • Threat and Consequence Assessment
   Div.
  • Office of Solid Waste
  • EPA Emergency Response Team
    • On-scene coordinators
    • Decontamination Team
        Summary


Constantly updated listings
Inputs from multiple sources
Commonality among rankings
       Path Forward

• Threat Scenario Simulations

1 Detailed Risk Assessments

• Development of Play Books
                                              Decontamination Workshop 77

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             ORD Workshop on  Decontamination

                  OPP Sterilant Registration Project
                    (Task SB 3.2 - ORD Safe Buildings Program)

   |~|      Improving the AOAC Sporicidal Activity Test and the
  ~Evaluation of Quantitative Methods	
                 Stephen F. Tomasino, Ph.D.
                 EPA Office of Pesticide Programs
                     Microbiology Laboratory
                       R. Meade, Maryland
                                                                        OPP Microbiology  Laboratory
                                                                        EPA Environmental Science Center, R. Meade, MD
      Renewed Interest in the Evaluation, Research and
      Development of Efficacy Test Methods for Sporicidal Agents
                                                                                    Project Goals
                                                                                    OVERARCHING GOALS
                                                                                     • Advance the science of efficacy testing and replace the
                                                                                      AOAC method with a quantitative carrier-based
                                                                                      procedure
                                                                                     • Perform collaborative, standardized testing to develop
                                                                                      and validate test methods acceptable across federal
                                                                                      agencies
                                                                                     • Design studies to generate comparative efficacy data
                                                                                      to aid in the development of future regulatory
                                                                                      guidance
                                                                                     • Identify a suitable surrogate for B, anthracis
                                                                                     • Set the stage for the evaluation of other biological
                                                                                      agents
OPP's  Role -  Regulatory
            performance Standard for Sporicidal Claim = AOAC
            Sporicidal Activity Test
             M Test Challenge = Bacillus subt/7/sand Clostridium
               sporogenes(VP - 106 Spores/Carrier)
             . Hard Surface (Porcelain Carriers); Porous Surface (Suture
               Loops) - 60 Carriers Each
             . Full Study = 720 carriers
             . Partial Study (B. suittfeonly) = Range Finding (30
               carriers/surface/contact time) and Confirmation (60
               carriers/surface)
             • Passing Result = zero carriers positive
                                                                                   A Tiered Approach
                                                                         Tier 1: Evaluate selected methods using Bacillus
                                                                         subtilis (includes modifications to the AOAC method)

                                                                         Tier 2: Evaluate surrogates for Bacillus anthracis

                                                                         Tier 3: Conduct collaborative validation testing of
                                                                         selected test method/surrogate combination

                                                                         Tier 4: Identify, develop, and conduct comparative
                                                                         testing of field test methods
78  NHSRC

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Two Approaches
( TEST METHOD RESEARCH
AOAC Sporicidal Test
(966.04)
-qualitative
f' "\
Improvements
and
Modifications
1
Quantitative Test
Methods
-log reduction I
f ~\
Comparative Testing
-ASTM
-TSM
1, 	 ,
Mofficial Method Change ] L Surrogate Studies
Publication in J. AOAC 1 }
(

, |f
Publication in 3. AOAC
                                                                 AOAC Sporicidal Activity Test
                                                                A qualitative, carrier-based assay
                                                                Spore-forming bacteria (Bacillus subtilis, Clostridium
                                                                sporogenes)
                                                                Simulates hard (porcelain carriers) and  porous (suture
                                                                loops) surfaces
                                                                Each test is composed of 60 carriers (EPA requirement)
                                                                HCL resistance test
                                                                Passing result = no carriers with surviving spores
                                                                Requires 21 days of incubation
                                                                Lacks standardization in several key steps
 Qualitative Assessment
AOAC Sporicidal Activity Test
Qualitative Data
                                                                 Efficacy of Bleach (~5250 ppm) Against Bacillus subtilis Spores on
                                                                         Porcelain Carriers using the AOAC Method
Recommended Modifications
 Chemically defined medium for B. subtilis spore
 production to replace the soil extract nutrient
 broth
 Replace porcelain carriers with stainless steel
 carriers
 Addition of a carrier count procedure for
 enumeration of spore inoculum
 Establishment of a minimum (average) spore titer
 per carrier
 Addition of a neutralization confirmation
 procedure
 Replacement for the Egg Meat Medium for
 Clostridium sporogenes
 SENB & Carrier Inoculation
                                                                  Decontamination Workshop  79

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           Preparing Carriers
                                                                         Parameters used to Measure the
                                                                         Impact of the Modifications*
                                                                              Spore Production Medium
                                                                                 Current: AOAC SENB
                                                                              Modified: Amended Nutrient
                                                                                     Agar
                                                                                                             Carrier Type
                                                                                                    Current: Porcelain  Modified: Stainless Steel
                                                                                           Spore Counts
                                                                                           HCL Resistance
                                                                                           Efficacy Results
                                                                                           Spore Counts
                                                                                           HCL Resistance
                                                                                           Efficacy Results
                                   Not Applicable

                                   Spore Counts
                                   HCL Resistance
                                   Efficacy Results
                                                                            ^Differences in spores counts can be measured statistically; pass/fail criteria are established for
                                                                            the HCL resistance and efficacy tests and will be used to assess differences.
    1-
AOAC Method Modifications
Extramural Contributors
         U.S. Air Force Research Laboratory, Aberdeen,
         MD
         FDA - Winchester Engineering and Analytical
         Center
         FDA - Denver District Laboratory
         Dr. Martin Hamilton, Professor of Statistics,
         Montana State University
Pre-collaborative Data
Bleach @ 3000 ppm -unadjusted  pH/10 mins
Medium/Carrier
NA/SS
NA/P
SENB/SS
SENB/P
Primary +
28/30
24/30
6/30
8/30
Secondary +
30/30
29/30
3/30
11/30
Total +
30/30
30/30
7/30
16/30
                                                                   NA = Nutrient Agar amended with 5 ug manganese sulfate

                                                                   SENB = AOAC Soil Extract Nutrient Broth

                                                                   SS = Stainless Steel Carriers

                                                                   P = Porcelain Carriers

                                                                   Spore Load: NA/SS (1.1 x 106); NA/P (6.2 x 106); SENB/SS = 4.0 x 106); SENB/P = 1.1
                                                                   xlO6)

HCL Resistance

Medium/ Carrier 2m
NA/SS +/
NA/P +/
SENB/SS +/
SENB/P +/

ins 5 mins
+ +/+
+ +/+
+ 0/0
+ 0/0

10 mins
0/0
0/0
0/0
0/0

20 mins
0/0
0/0
0/0
0/0
Spore Load: NA/SS = 6.8 x 10=
NA/P = 1.9X106
SENB/SS = 3.1x10=
SENB/P = 2.2x10=
                                                                           1-
                                                                       Timeline for the  Modifications Project
                                                                                    Contract with AOAC signed in Sept. 2004
                                                                                    AOAC Expert Review Panel formed in Dec. 2004
                                                                                    Study protocol submitted in Jan. 2005
                                                                                    AOAC ERP completed review in Feb.
                                                                                    Final study protocol will be submitted to AOAC by
                                                                                    March 11
                                                                                    Conduct validation study in late April/early May
                                                                                    Complete and submit validation report and analysis-
                                                                                    July 1
                                                                                    AOAC review and approve validation report-August
                                                                                    26
80  NHSRC

-------
     A Replacement for the AOAC Method
                                                            Test Method Selection - Attributes
                                                                   Available Protocol
                                                                   Validation
                                                                   Previous use for testing
                                                                   sporicides
                                                                   Readily available
                                                                   equipment
                                                                   Expertise
                                                                   Flexible contact times
                                                                   and temperatures
                                                                                   Enumeration method
                                                                                   Percent recovery
                                                                                   Deactivation of product
                                                                                   Reproducibility
                                                                                   Turnaround time
                                                                                   Suitability for various
                                                                                   product forms
                                                                                   Adequate controls
4-
Test Methods Selected for Evaluation
       AOAC Sporicidal Activity Test
       Standard Quantitative Carrier Test Method-
       ASTM E 2111-00
       A quantitative micro-method as reported by
       Sagripanti et al., 1996. (Sagripanti, J.L. &
       Bonifacino, A. 1996. Am. J. Infect. Control'24,
       364-371) - referred to as the Three Step
       Method (TSM)
Carriers used in Sporicidal Efficacy Testing
                                                    Glass vial carrier
                                                    used for ASTM E
                                                                                    Porcelain
                                                                                    penicylinder used
                                                                                    for AOAC SAT
       ASTM 2111-00
                                                            Three Step Method (TSM)
                                                                  Decontamination  Workshop 81

-------
         TSM - fractions
                                                                 Formulations and Materials
                                                                   Liquids
                                                                   Gases & Vapors
                                                                   Sprays, Foams
                                                                   and Gels
                                                                   Devices and
                                                                   Other
                                                                   Technologies
                                                                                Hard (metal,
                                                                                plastics, glass)
                                                                                Porous
                                                                                Other
                                                                                (specialized)
                                                                                (Water)
   4-
Volume of Sporicide per Test Method
    10 ml
    sporicide for	i  7
    AOAC SAT,     I  <•
    w/5 carriers



    1 ml sporicide
    for ASTM E
    2111-00
4-
Important Components of the Test
Method Collaborative
                                                           Limited to glass surface x liquid
                                                           sporicides x spores of B. subtilis
                                                           Three labs/three replications
                                                           Identify/implement quality control
                                                           activities
                                                           Training and readiness review
        Test Method Comparison
        Chemicals & Test Conditions
          pH-adjusted bleach; 3000 ppm/10 minutes @
          20C

          Commercial product (0.8% hydrogen
          peroxide, 0.06% peracetic acid); undiluted/10
          minutes @ 20C

          pH-unadjusted bleach; 3000 ppm/10 minutes
          @20C

          pH-adjusted bleach; 6000 ppm/30 minutes @
          20C for the AOAC test
                                                          Test Method Comparison
                                                          Extramural Contributors and Responsibilities
                                                       U.S. Army Edgewood Chemical and Biological
                                                       Center, Aberdeen, MD, and FDA (Denver District
                                                       Office Laboratory) will provide expertise and
                                                       technical support in  the collaborative testing of
                                                       sporicidal chemicals using efficacy methods
                                                       selected by OPP.
                                                       Dr. Martin Hamilton, Professor of Statistics,
                                                       Montana State University, is the statistician
                                                       assisting on this project. Dr. Hamilton is
                                                       currently under contract with the OPP
                                                       Antimicrobials Division.
82  NHSRC

-------
  Quantitative Results

D control:
    recoverable, viable spores per control
    carrier; specifically, Iog10(cfu/control carrier)

o log reduction (LR):

    LR = Iog10(cfu/control carrier)
         - Iog10(cfu/treated carrier)
  Statistical Goals for the LR Data and
  Control Data
a within-laboratory variance
  (independent repeats of the same test)

a between-laboratory variance
  (measures the variability between labs}

o total variance
       = within-laboratory variance
         + between-laboratory variance
1

'in
o

Control carrie
t*. >ji m
Day
LAB
I/IETHOD
Recoverable, viable spores per control carrier (loglO
scale); red line is the mean

0 KB1*10'?0- -r,
1 fc S^*"01 *bE p*s> ^
uu e "ฐ
Q^ (1.5 X106)
(ฐ)
123 123 123
AOAC ASTM TSM







| AOAC Method
I
Treatment
Bleach SOOOppm pH adj
Peracetic acid/hyd.per.
Bleach SOOOppm unadj
Bleach SOOOppm pH adj
- Collaborative Highlights

Comments
No. positive ranged from 16 to 56
No. positive ranged from 5 to 60
60 out of 60 positives in 4 of 6 tests
0 out of 20 positives in 4 of 6 tests


Bleach 3000 ppm, pH adjusted (each point is a
test; red line indicates the mean)
8
1 6>
|
1 4l
ro
ฐ 2
0-
Lab
Method

0
LR = 6.5
-
123 123 123
AOAC ASTM TSM
Peracetic acid/hydrogen peroxide (each point is
a test; red line indicates the mean)
8
.1 6'
2 2>
0-
Lab
Method

0
LR = 6.8 O LR = 6'7
123 123 123
AOAC ASTM TSM

 Decontamination  Workshop  83

-------
         Bleach 3000 ppm, pH unadjusted (each point is
         a test; red line indicates the mean)
 O   6
 |

 |   4


 2   2-


     0

   Lab    123
Method      AOAC
                          1   2   3
                            ASTM
1    2   3
  TSM
Repeatability SD is acceptably small (less than 0.9)
for all test methods
Repeatability SD
0 0 0 0 -*
r? '" 'ฐ ? ง

J3. /
"""' /"--
S*ff / ""*"*""* 13
,/
/
MettTpeK
— 0— AMC

Bleach adj Bleach unadj Per. acid-hyd. per
   Reproducibility SD is acceptably small (less than 1.3) for
                    all testing methods
    CO
    .Q



    I
        1.00-
       0.75
       0.25
       o.oo
         Bleach adj      Bleach unadj    per. acid-hyd. per.
                                                                   4-
                                 Selecting a Method
                                 Additional Attributes
                               Questionnaire Submitted to Analysts
                                • The Protocols - their use and clarity
                                • Test Set-up - preparing for the test
                                • Testing - performing the method, resources
                                • Results - recording, compiling, and interpretation

                               TSM selected for surrogate studies and
                               validation testing
         Timeline for Surrogate Studies and
         Validation of a Quantitative Test
         Submit manuscript to AOAC on the 2004 test method
         collaborative - May, 2005
         Initiate surrogate studies with TSM - April 18th
         Complete surrogate studies - May 27th
         Surrogate analysis and report - July 1st
         TSM and 2-3 surrogates will be subjected to an AOAC
         multi-lab validation study in September
         Prepare summary report on TSM  validation -
         December
                           1-
                                                                       Acknowledgements
                               Dr. Marty Hamilton for Statistical Support and
                               Guidance on Test Design
                               FDA and ECBC Staff
                               EPA OPP Lab Staff
                               EPA's ORD - Safe Buildings Program
84 NHSRC

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     Crisis Exemptions for
      Products Intended to
             Inactivate
       Bacillus anthracis
Workshop on Decontamination, Cleanup, and Associated Issues for Sites
   Contaminated with Chemical, Biological, or Radiological Materials
    Sponsored by EPA's Office of Research and Development

             Jeff Kempter, Senior Advisor
             Office of Pesticide Programs
            Environmental Protection Agency
                February 23, 2005
             OUTLINE

 Background to
 Crisis Exemptions
 Evaluating and
 Selecting Sporicides.
 Issues That Demand
 Attention
 Are We There Yet?
         INTRODUCTION
 Evaluation, selection and use of chemicals
 to inactivate 6. anthracis and other
 biological agents involves several groups:
 RESEARCHERS
                REGULATORS
                              PRODUCERS
         FIRST
       RESPONDERS
         BACKGROUND

• In the U.S., decontamination chemicals are
 required to be registered or exempted by
 EPA prior to sale or distribution
•When anthrax attacks occurred in October,
 2001, no products were approved specifically
 for use against B. anthracis
•Accordingly, crisis exemptions had to be
 issued for each decon chemical at each
 contaminated  site
     CRISIS EXEMPTIONS
  Of 63 requests for
  crisis exemptions,
  EPA approved 28 and
  rejected 35.
  Federal agencies and
  private companies
  could make requests
  Fumigation requests
  had to include
   o Remediation Action
    Plans
   o Sampling & Analysis
    Plans
   o Ambient Air Monitoring
    Plans
 EVALUATING AND SELECTING
 SPORICIDES FOR B. anthracis
 Safety Issues
 Efficacy Issues
 Liquids
 Gases /Vapors
                                                       Decontamination Workshop 85

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              SAFETY ISSUES
                          i Containment of
                        "   contaminated area
                        1  i Fumigant toxicity &
                            human exposure
                        I • Fumigant generation
                            method
                            Negative air systems
                            Post-treatment
                            aeration & scrubbing
                            System backups/tests
                            Ambient air
                            monitoring
  EFFICACY ISSUES
                 Gas containment
                 Fumigate all at once
                 or in sections
                 Distribution of gas;
                 absorbers of gas
                 Reaching/holding
                 efficacy parameters
                 Monitoring of
                 parameters
                 Biological indicators
                 Clearance sampling
          LIQUID SPORICIDES*

    i  Aqueous chlorine dioxide
    i  Hydrogen peroxide/peracetic acid
    i  Sodium hypochlorite
    i  Hydrogen peroxide/quaternary
      ammonium foam**
    "Hard, non-porous surfaces only
    **Exemptions withdrawn for DF-100
LIQUID SPORICIDES
  CHEMICAL    EFFECTIVE CONC. S
           CONTACT TIME
Aqueous chlorine 500 ppm X 30 min.
  5,000-6,000 ppm X 60 m
  (PH = 7)
                 MATERIALS
                COMPATIBILITY
              No known problems
              based on pesticide usi
                           OTHER USES
Hydrogen per
and quaternar
xide DF-100 ineffective after
  hour; DF-200 is effectiv
jssanitizerand disinfection
 for many uses
 EPA registered as
tssanitizer, disinfectant,


 EPA registered as a
 sanitizerand disinfectant

 DF-200 successfully
 tested by DOD against
             GASES/VAPORS
      Gaseous chlorine
      dioxide (buildings)
      Vaporized hydrogen
      peroxide (buildings)
      Paraformaldehyde
      (equipment in tented
      enclosures)
      Methyl bromide
      (lab/field studies)
      Ethylene oxide (off-site
      sterilization of items)
GASES/VAPORS
CHEMICAL

Formaldehyde
Gas

Chlorine
Dioxide Gas


Hydrogen
Peroxide Vapor


Methyl Bromide
Gas



Ethyl ene Oxide
Gas


GENERATION
METHOD
On-site heating of
paraform aldehyde
prills (flakes)
On-site reaction of
precursor
materials (sodium
chlorite)
On-site
vaporization of
liquid hydrogen
peroxide
On-site
vaporization of
liquid methyl
bromide from
cylinder
Release of gas
into sterilization
chamber

TOXICITY

Acutelytoxic, animal
carcinogen,
genotoxin
Acutelytoxic,
respiratory and eye
irritant, no cancer data

Acutelytoxic,
respiratory irritant, no
cancer data

Acutelytoxic,
neurological effects,
insufficient cancer
data

Acutelytoxic,
reproductive toxin,
genotoxin, animal
carcinogen
EXPOSURE LIMITS

0.75 ppm PEL
2 ppm STEL
20 ppm IDLH
0.1 ppm PEL
0.3 ppm STEL
5.0 ppm IDLH

1.0 ppm PEL
No STEL
75 ppm IDLH

4.0 ppm TLV
20 ppm PEL
250 ppm IDLH


1.0 ppm PEL
5 ppm 15 min.
"Excursion"
800 ppm IDLH
86  NHSRC

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         GASES/VAPORS
 CHEMICAL    MATERIALS
         COMPATIBILITY
Formaldehyde Relatively
Gas      unreactive
Chlorine
Dioxide Gas
Hydrogen
Peroxide
Vapor
Methyl
Bromide Gas
Ethylene
Oxide Gas
May affect metals
(Al, Cu, brass),
computer parts,
carpets and low
grade paper at high
CT values
Relatively
unreactive

May affect animal
fur, leather, natural
latex, and sulfur-
containing articles
Relatively
unreactive
PENETRATION   SPORICIDAL USES

Medium    Biosafety cabinets, clean
        rooms, mail bags, mail
        equipment, buildings
Medium    Medical equipment,
        buildings
                  High
                  High
        Clean rooms, medical
        equipment, buildings

        Experimental (efficacy
        studies on B. anthracis &
        spore strips)

        Medical equipment, critical
        items
                                                      DECONTAMATION REQUIRES
                                                      EXTENSIVE COLLABORATION
^ Interagency technical
  working group (TWG)
  directly supports
  Incident Commander

-------
          SPORICIDE DATA AND

       LABELING REQUIREMENTS

      Test Data
      - Product Chemistry, Acute Toxicity-standard
      - Efficacy Data
        • AOAC Sporicidal Activity Test (B. subtilis & C. sporogenes)
        I Test against virulent agent or surrogate acceptable to EPA
        I Simulated use test for gases & vapors
      Labeling
      - EPA may classify these products for Restricted Use
        Only or somehow limit sale/use to trained personnel
      - Label must bear safety precautions and complete use
        directions (i.e., technical manual)
      - Products that pass efficacy tests are called "sterilants"
        and may list specific microorganisms tested
    "HOW CLEAN IS SAFE?"
The National Research Council
  of the National Academies of
  Science is conducting a
  study due out this Spring
  that will address:
i  Anthrax spores and maybe
  plague, smallpox
  Infectious dose
  Risk assessment methods
  Natural vs. residual
  exposure
  Past cleanup efforts
  Enclosed and semi-enclosed
  facilities
           RESEARCH  ISSUES


     ^Improved and harmonized efficacy
       test methods
     ^Materials compatibility
     ^Parameters for optimal fumigant
       effectiveness

     ^Real-time monitoring methods
 RESEARCH ISSUES (cont'd.)

 ^Scrubbing/removal technology
 ^Field-testing and test bed(s)
 ^Develop effective decon methods
   for outdoor or semi-open sites
 ^Coordinate research across
   agencies
       PREPAREDNESS  ISSUES

    a Develop faster, safer, more cost-effective decon
      methods
    rj Have equipment and resources available and on
      stand-by
    rj Provide more guidance private industry on
      preparedness planning for bio-terrorism
    rj Increase interagency coordination, sharing &
      leveraging
      ARE WE THERE YET?
  YES:
  - Certain decon methods are
    safe and effective for use on
    structures & objects
  - Some personnel and
    equipment can likely be
    initially mobilized quickly in
    emergencies
  - Crisis exemptions can be
    issued quickly for known
    decon methods
  NO:
  - Decon methods are still
    expensive and slow
  - Equipment and trained
    personnel are very limited
  - Many areas need research
  - Research and regulation
    need to be coordinated
  - Preparedness plans are
    needed for critical sites
88 NHSRC

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     Sampling & Clearance
           Lessons Learned

        MarkDumo, U.S. EPA
   Tony Intrepido, U.S. Army CHPPM

          February 23, 2005
       Discussion Topics

Introductions
Sampling Basics
 • U.S. Capitol, USPS, Boca Building
Sampling Issues
 • TAD Workshop Findings
 • Verification Needs
   • Sampling Efficacy
   • Sampling / Spore Strip Approach
   • Aggressive Air Sampling (Large Building)
Anthrax Technical Assistance
            Document
National Response Team
• National Coordination Council
Chapter 6 lays out sampling approach for
any biological contamination event.
www.nrt.org
• Click on "NRT publications"
• Scroll until you find it
  Pre Remediation Samnlin
Considerations
Objectives
Approach
Methods
Analytical
Transportation
Coordination
Interpretation
   Sampling Considerations

Goal
 • Risk, characterize, extent, support, verify
Data objectives
 • Develop your hypothesis
No current standards
 • Lessons learned
Plan development
      Sampling Objectives

Develop in consultation with professionals:
 • Medical
 • Environmental
 • Public health
 • Industrial hygiene
 • Laboratory
 • Building experts
 • Local, state, federal agencies
                                                          Decontamination Workshop 89

-------
             Sampling Objectives
       Real-time monitoring   •  Effectiveness of
       Screening
       Bulk material
       Questionable article
       Extent of
       contamination
decontamination
Clearance for re-
occupancy
Transitional
Crime scene / forensic
                                          Sampling Approach
Logical and systematic
Scheduled
Risk-based
Targeted
Statistical
        Targeted Sampling Approach

       Known sources
       Logical tracking
        • Air movement
        • Cross contamination
       Work toward or away from source


                                                               Statistical Sampling Approach

                                                               Need
                                                                • Source not identified
                                                                • Highly dispersed
                                                               Considerations
                                                                • Maximize the probability of a positive result
                                                                • Assurance that a negative means absence
                                                               Currently, no conclusive approach
                                                                • Lab and sampling inefficiencies
90  NHSRC

-------
          ^
Detection / Sampling Breakout
              Session

     NRT Civilian / Military Anthrax
              Workshop
           Washington D.C.
             April 14, 2004
         Open Discussion

Subjects:
 •  (1) General issues related to NRT / TAD.
 •  (2) Hazard Identification
 •  (3) Field Detection
 •  (4) Sampling Guidance / Efficacy
 •  (5) Analytical Capabilities
 •  (6) PostDecon
      Hazard Identification

Threat Assessment
 • Evaluate credibility of event
 • Determine hazard and physical characteristics
  of questionable substances.
 • If Biological contamination cannot be
  conclusively "ruled-out", and the situation is
  considered credible, confirmation sampling
  should be conducted.
   • For public health response — use culture plate.
         Field Detection
What's out there and widely used?
 • Hand-held assays.
 • Infrared / Hazmat ID (rule-out).
 • Haz-tech system w/microscope & camera.
 • Rapid PCR.
Technologies are "acceptable science" but
need validated for field applications:
 • Some studies planned
 Sampling Guidance / Efficacy

References available:
 • NRT TAD*
 • CDC sampling guidance for anthrax*
 • CDC BioWatch technical guidelines (sensitive)
 • OSHA e-tool for anthrax response
 • OSHA DFU and HEPA sampling methods
 • GSA guidelines for anthrax response
 • www.bt.cdc.gov
                                                             Decontamination  Workshop 91

-------
        Sampling Guidance / Efficacy
        Studies:
        • NIOSH:  Sampling effectiveness (Sanderson)
        • NIOSH:  Validation for air sampling method
        • USPS: Bert-Price statistical study
        • NCID: USPS DCBS 17 re-aerosolization (Dull)
        • Weis/Intrepido:  Daschle re-aerosolization.
        • Canadian / DOJ ??
 Sampling Guidance / Efficacy

Needs:
 • Further studies of sampling efficacy to answer
  the question: What is the detection limit of
  accepted sampling methods?
   • Dugway Proving Grounds (surface / air efficacy)
   • NIOSH / Sandia (surface efficacy)
   • RDECOM (Leahy letter)
   • CDC (Arduino - swab sampling)
             Analytical Capabilities

        LRN / DOD could become overwhelmed with
        multiple large scale events (limited reagents).
        CDC is attempting to standardize analytical
        methods through the LRN for environmental
        samples (wipe / sock being worked on currently).
        DOD is attempting to "harmonize" environmental
        analytical methods with LRN.
        Using non-LRN, non-DOD labs (ag labs, private
        labs) may raise consistency issues if used on a
        response.
    Post Decon / Verification

Verification sampling has been exhaustive
on past responses.
The "ECC" concept is the best approach to
insure adequate protection of public health
through highly qualified professional
debate.
               NRT / TAD Needs

        Better guidance for First Responders.
        Develop a matrix for acceptable sampling type in
        given situations.
        Encourage the use of Occupation Health
        Professionals at the local level.
        National Academy of Sciences: "How Clean is
        clean" study.
        Update links to all recent specific guidance and
        studies.
        Crossing the nomenclature barrier (ASM
        standards)
        NRT / TAD Needs

Chapter 6:
 • Update to include more specifics in certain
  sections:
   • Use of statistical analysis
   • Sampling methods (add / remove)
   • Emphasis on total discipline coordination
   • More efficient verification approach
92  NHSRC

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 National Homeland Security Research Center Decontamination
             Workshop 23-25 February 2005

 The Use of the Trace Atmospheric Gas Analyzer
    (TAGA) to Qualitatively and Quantitatively
   Monitor Ambient Air For Chemical Warfare
Agents and Decontamination Agents in Real Time
 at Parts Per Trillion by Volume Levels or Below


         David B. Mickunas, US EPA/ERT
             ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

                 Nancy H. Adams, Ph.D.
              Safe Buildings Program Director
         National Homeland Security Research Center

                   Mr. Eric N. Koglin
             Contracting Officer Representative
         National Homeland Security Research Center

                     Raj Mangaraj
                     Donald Kenny
                      Anne Gregg
                Battelle Memorial Institute
 AMBIENT AIR MOBILE MONITORING FOR
        CHEMICAL WARFARE AGENTS
                      TASKS                  •/&
    Develop Spectra and Calibration Curves for the CWAS

    Develop Chemical lonization Capabilities to Maximize
    Sensitivity for the CWAs

    Determine and Verify Detection and Quantitation
    Limits for Each CWA

    Determine Dynamic Linear Range for CWAs

s.   Establish Surrogate Relative Response Factors

    Determine if Other Materials Interfere with CWA
    Response

    Establish/ Demonstrate Sample Air Flow Operating
    System and Conditions to Ensure that No Less Than
    85% of Material at the CWAs Quantitation Limit
Task 1. Develop Spectra and Calibration Curves for  M
the CWAs

•All experiments performed with the Perkin Elmer-SCIEX (PE-
SCIEX) API-365.

•The CWAs to be used are GA, GB, GD, GF, VX, HD, HN-1,
 HN-2, and HN-3.
Task 2. Develop Chemical lonization Capabilities to
Maximize Sensitivity for the CWAs

'The proton affinity of the G- and V-series CWAs are sufficiently
higher than that of water to allow proton transfer from the H30+
and H30(H20)n+ reagent ions generated in the APCI source of the
API-365. Therefore, ambient air APCI conditions in the positive ion
mode will be used for ionization of all G- and V-series of agents
for this study.

'The protonated water and associated water clusters under
ambient air APCI conditions are not efficient for the ionization of
sulfur mustard (HD). The sensitivity for HD is enhanced by the
addition of a  small amount (approx 0.03%) of benzene to the
APCI inlet.
                                                                      Decontamination Workshop 93

-------
  Task 3. Determine and Verify Detection and
  Quantitation Limits for Each CWA

   The detection limit for each agent will be determined as three
  times the standard deviation of the ion pair's signal in the
  background (either room air or room air spiked with blank
  hexane) divided by the ion pair's response factor.

  •The quantitation limit for a compound will be determined as ten
  times the standard deviation of the ion pair's signal in the
  background divided by the ion pair's response factor.

  •In order to verify the accuracy of the gas phase agent
  concentrations, the concentration of the standard solutions used
  to generate the agents in the gas phase will be verified via a gas
  chromatographic method.
Task 4. Determine Dynamic Linear Range for CWAs
•The dynamic range of calibration for each agent will be
determined by observing the signals obtained from the detection
limit to the ion current at which the signal is no longer linear (i.e.,
saturation of the reagent ions).

•The dynamic range will be explored by varying the solution
concentration and/or the rate of introduction via the syringe drive
during the generation of calibration curves.
  Task 5. Establish Surrogate Relative Response         fj^\
  Factors

  •Spectra and calibration curves for the surrogate compounds will
  be obtained using the same procedures described above.

  •Both native diisopropyl methyl phosphonate (DIMP) and
  deuterated diisopropyl methylphosphonate (d14-DIMP) will be
  used as surrogates for all of the G- and V-series agents.

  •Chloroethylethylsulfide (CEES, halfmustard) will be used as the
  surrogate for the mustard agents.

  •The relative response factors will be established by comparison
  of the response of the surrogate compound(s) to the response of
  the chemical warfare agents.
Task 6. Determine if Other Materials Interfere with
CWA Response

•Evaluate the effect of two potential interferences (vehicle
exhaust and bleach) at two interferent concentrations to be
determined during testing.
 Room temperature and humidity will not be controlled beyond
the normal operation of the HVAC system.

•Interferent test concentrations will be obtained by diluting a
concentrated feed with air. Depending on the interferent, the
concentrated feed will be provided by one of two methods.

•This procedure will test two agent concentrations at two
interferent concentrations. A false positive test will also be
performed in the  same manner without the introduction of the
CWA.
  Task 7. Establish/Demonstrate Sample Air Flow       /ฃ\
  Operating System and Conditions to Ensure that No
  Less Than 85% of Material at the CWAs Quantitation
  Limit Passes Through the System

  •A double-walled glass tube will extend out of the hood and into
  the ion source of the API-365. This tube is approximately three
  feet in length. In order to demonstrate an 85% transmission of
  the CWAs through the sampling line, initially a three-foot section
  will be used to obtain the baseline transmission and then add an
  additional three  foot length to the sampling line (within the hood).
  The agents will be vaporized into the glass tubing as in previous
  tests at a known concentration and the percent transmission
  through the three- versus six-foot sampling lines will be
  compared.
    n
                                                                                          Experimental Chamber
94  NHSRC

-------
                 Vaporizer Unit
                                                                      Calibration Unit
  Trace Atmospheric Gas Analyzer Mobile Laboratory
Trace Atmospheric Gas Analyzer (TAGA)
Atmospheric Pressure Chemical lonization (APCI) Source
                                                                      TAGA Schematics
                                                             Decontamination  Workshop  95

-------
                 TAGA Operational Process
                                                                              Chemical Agents Investigated
                                        GA- Ethyl /V-dimethylphosphoramidocyanidate

                                         GB - Isopropyl methylphosphonofluoridate

                                         GD — Pinacolyl methylphosphonofluoridate

                                         GF — Cyclohexyl methylphosphonofluoridate

                               VX — 0-Ethyl-S-[2-(diisopropylamino)ethyl] methyl phosphonothioate

                                              HD - 2,2'-Di(chloroethyl)sulfide

                                           HN1 - N-Ethyl-2,2'-di(chloroethyl)amine

                                          HN2 - N-Methyl-2,2'-di(chloroethyl)amine

                                            HNS - 2,2',2"-Tri(chloroethyl)amine
         GB - Isopropyl methylphosphonofluoridate
                    Molecular Weight- 140
                       Parent Ion - 141
             Daughter Ions - 117, 99, 97, 81, 79, 43
                                  o
                         ,CH
                                   \\
                  H3C'
\
                                        CH-,


                                                                                                      	ffl


                                                                                                      ifdiHIniiUlii
96 NHSRC

-------
             XGB CAL CURVE
                                       •<=•-
                                 50      60
VX - 0-Ethyl-S-[2-(diisopropylamino)ethyl] methyl
                phosphonothioate

               Molecular Weight- 267
                  Parent Ion - 268
            Daughter Ions - 128, 97, 86, 44
                                                              H3C   CH2

                                                                       O - P - S
                          CH2-CH2     CH3

                                 N— HC
                                /     \
                        H3C— HC       CH3

                                 CH3
)-Ethyl-S-[2-(ciisopropylamino)ettiyl]methyl pi
                                                               )-Etliyl-S-[2-(ciisopropylamino)etliyl]methyl phosphonothic
                                                             Decontamination Workshop 97

-------
             HD - 2,2'-Di(chloroethyl)sulfide


                  Molecular Weight-158
                     Parent Ion - 158
                  Daughter Ions - 63, 109

                        CH2CI

                   H2C

                        S—CH2

                               CH2CI
D-2,2'Di(chloraettiyl)sull
98  NHSRC

-------
NH1 - N-Ethyl-2,2'-di(chloroethyl)amine


        Molecular Weight - 169
          Parent Ion - 170
      Daughter Ions - 63, 106, 142

       CIH,C

                        CH,
             H,C
                 CH2CI
                                      •<=•-
z
                                                           Diisopropropyl methyl phosphonate
                                                                 Molecular Weight- 180
                                                                   Parent Ion - 181
                                                               Daughter Ions - 79, 97, 115
                                                                  .CH
                                                                         >
-------

                                   -*

                  DIIUP INFUSION
                                                      jr  y = 67804x + 16
                                                    jX^   R' = 0 9994
•^AV
D-14 Diisopropropyl methyl phosphonate ฃ2
Molecular Weight- 194
Parent Ion - 195
Daughter Ions - 79, 80, 99, 117
D3C CD3
CD3 o \
CD PX
3 CH3

















D'\ /CD,
"- P \ฐl
" ' D C/C\/P\
e fti -
1 *' "
.,-

18ฐ 18i m ah ,






,

A\
D





100 NHSRC

-------

                                              DIMP-dH INFUSION
                                                                I
R!=099ฃS^
                                     CEES - 2-Chloroethyl ethyl sulfide
                                          Molecular Weight- 124
                                            Parent Ion - 124
                                          Daughter Ions - 47, 75
                                               ChU
                                           H2C

                                               S - CH2

                                                     CH2CI
                                 Decontamination Workshop  101

-------
        2-Chloraettiyl ethyl sulfide
                                                                                    Source Concentration (ppbv)
                                                                                                             i>

Acronym

GA
GB
G
G
V
H 1
H 2
H 3
DIMP
d,4-DIMP
HD
GEES


Primary
Ion

63>117
41>97
B3>43
81>97
6B=B6
70>106
58=65
04=63
81=79
95=79
58=109
24=75


Method
Detection
Limit
(pptv)

0 52
0 85
14 19
0 36
007
044
031
0 97
083
0 76
1704
126


Method
Quantitation
Limit
(ppvt)

1 7
28
47 3
1
02
148
1 04
324
278
253
5681
419


Limits of
Linearity
(ppbv)

20 76
12 01
2728
19 5
nd
34 1
977
7 13
81
225
9254
nd


Analyte
Response
Factor
(icps/pptv)

145
106
8
94
156
8
14
24
68
261
1
0 2


Surrogate

DIMP
DIMP
DIMP
DIMP
DIMP
DIMP
DIMP
DIMP
DIMP
DIMP
GEES
GEES


Surrogate
Response
Factor
(icps/pptv)

68
68
68
68
68
68
68
68
68
68
02
0 2

#k
Relative
Response
Factor

047
0 64
8 50
0 72
044
850
86
83
00
61
020
1 00

            Immediately


            Health |pptv|
                     s than Acute Exposure Guideline Limit (pptv)
                                                                AMBIENT AIR MOBILE MONITORING FOR
                                                                       DECONTAMINATION AGENTS
102  NHSRC

-------
 TARGET COMPOUNDS
           Chlorine Dioxide
             Chlorine
                                                        Compounds
Chlorine Dioxide
Chlorine Dioxide
Chlorine
Chlorine
Chlorine
                   Parent/Daughter Masses
67/51
69/53
70/35
72/37
72/35
Chlorine Dioxide Generator for TAGA Calibration
                                                                                ii
                                                     Configuration for Calibration of Chlorine Dioxide Generation
                         Wind from NW at 2.3 mph

                                                                                  Wind from NW sis ': 7 mph
                                                        Decontamination Workshop 103

-------
                                                                                  Win
-------
           INSURANCE

               AND

        INDEMNITY ISSUES
              Presented by Gerald J. Robinson
                                                       Insurance and Indemnity Issues
Overview

• Postal Service Anthrax experience

• Indemnity language adopted and
 insurance purchased

• Problems with approach used

• Starting point for resolution
 ' Insurance and Indemnity Issues
Postal Service Anthrax Experience

• October 2001 - Brentwood and Trenton
 contaminated by letter mail filled with
 anthrax

• Need to decontaminate facilities to remove
 hazard and return facilities to service

• Contractors fumigate with chlorine dioxide
 gas
Insurance and Indemnity Issues
 i Contractors refuse to provide service
 without protection from risks inherent in
 decontamination service

 i Risks
  - Harm to workers
  - Harm to community
  - Damage to facility
  - Possibility that process fails to work
  -Regulatory Risks
 Insurance and Indemnity Issues
  i Solution to extraordinary risk
  problem

  i Postal Service indemnifies
  contractors and assumes risks

  i Postal Service purchases insurance
  to mitigate risk assumed
Insurance and Indemnity Issues
• Broad indemnity granted

• Postal Service indemnified
 contractors for all claims caused
 by, arising out of, or in any way
 related to the decontamination
 project
                                                     Decontamination Workshop 105

-------
        Insurance and Indemnity Issues
        i Exceptions

            -Claims caused by actions
             unrelated to the decontamination
             project
            -Claims caused by a violation of
             law unrelated to the project

            -Claims caused by willful
             misconduct or gross negligence
 Insurance and Indemnity Issues

 • Project Insurance Purchased

   -General Liability Insurance

   -Environmental Liability

   -Professional Errors and
    Omissions Liability

   -Aggregate Limit of $100 million
        Insurance and Indemnity Issues
        i Problems with this approach
          -Cost
          - Many Agencies may lack authority to
           indemnify
          -Time involved negotiating
           indemnification and obtaining
           insurance
          -Doesn't provide a standby solution
7 Insurance and Indemnity Issues

 •Suggested approach

 •Contractors obtain
  SAFETY act designation
  and certification for their
  technologies
        Insurance and Indemnity Issues
        i Support anti-terrorism by Fostering
         Effective Technologies Act of 2002
         (commonly called the SAFETY Act)

        i Creates a system of Litigation
         Management and Risk Management
         for qualified anti-terrorism
         technologies
7 Insurance and Indemnity Issues

 Litigation Management
 • No punitive damages
 • Non-economic damages only available
  when plaintiff suffers physical damage
 • Actions only in federal court and only
  against sellers
 • Government contractor defense (no
  liability)
106  NHSRC

-------
 Insurance and Indemnity Issues
 Risk Management
 •Liability is limited to the
  extent of liability limits of
  insurance policy
 •Insurance must be
  purchased
Insurance and Indemnity Issues
 •Decontamination
 technologies are within the
 class of technologies
 covered by the SAFETY
 act
 ' Insurance and Indemnity Issues
 i Technologies that "would be effective in
 facilitating the defense against acts of
 terrorism, including technologies that
 prevent, defeat or respond to such acts"
 Section 863, (b) (7)

  -Decontamination services responds to a
   terrorist act by removing the possibility of
   further infection or harm to the public

  -Also, services may be anti-terrorism
   technologies - Section 865 (1)
Insurance and Indemnity Issues
How SAFETY Act Helps
• Agencies that cannot indemnify
 contractors may use decontamination
 service
• Contractors have no liability or
 liability limited to the extent of
 insurance purchased
• Contractors immediately available to
 perform decontamination service
 ' Insurance and Indemnity Issues
SAFETY Act Problems
• Contractor may be unwilling to spend
 money to obtain insurance before event
 and contract
• Contractor must spend money and time to
 obtain SAFETY Act certification and
 designation
• SAFETY Act benefits may not be enforced
                                                    Decontamination  Workshop 107

-------
       Introduction to the Government
           Decontamination Service
                 Robert Bettley-Smith, FRICS
                    CDS Project Director
      Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Defra)
                                               defra
The Context
  Uncertainty surrounding global security
  Cross-Government effort to ensure UK is
  prepared for a range of emergencies
  CBRN Resilience Programme led by Home Office
                                          defr<
     The History

     • April 2003 - study commissioned to assess the UK's
       ability to deal with CBRN clean up
     • December 2003 - powerful case for improving the
       arrangements for decontamination
     • 25 March 2004 - Government "actively considering"
       setting up a decontamination service
     • 25 January 2005 - Government announces "intention to
       establish" a decontamination service
                                               dcfrei
CDS Concept (1)

• Responsible authorities already obliged to
  prepare for CBRN events, including clean up
• Decontamination is a specialist area
• Expertise available in private sector
• Government recognises a central brigading of
  expertise would be more efficient than RAs each
  carrying  out the same work
                                          dcfr<
     CDS Concept (2)

     • GDS will determine which companies could
       successfully decontaminate buildings and the
       open environment, and

     • Make sure that responsible authorities can call on
       their services when necessary
GDS Functions

• Provide advice and guidance to responsible
  authorities when planning for emergencies, and
  help test their arrangements

• Identify and assess specialist contractors' ability
  to decontaminate, and ensure responsible
  authorities have access to them when needed

• Advise central government on national
  decontamination capability
                                                                                                           defr<
108 NHSRC

-------
CDS Services - advice & guidance


•  Strategic National Guidance

•  Ad hoc advice

•  Case studies

•  Participation in exercises
                                     defrcf
               CDS Services - reacting in an emergency
               Depending on the seriousness of the event and
               need, GDS may provide:

               •  advice and guidance
               •  advice, guidance and help securing contracts
               •  advice, guidance, help securing contracts and
                 managing them
GDS will not...


•  Assume responsibility for decontamination

•  Fund decontamination

•  Deal with humans, animals or their remains
data
               GDS Administrative matters
                 Creation in summer 2005
                 A Defra agency, but a Government service
                 At a site in the Midlands
                 About 20 staff
                 Chief Executive being recruited
                                                                                         defra
                                                                                              •
    gds@defra.gsi.gov.uk

                                                      Decontamination Workshop  109

-------
        Laboratory Capacity Issues
            DECON-WORKSHOP
                  Rob Rothman
                February 23, 2005
                                                                  Homeland  Security
                                                                Presidential Directives
 Federal agencies be prepared
  to respond to chemical,
  biological, and  radiological
  (CBR) attacks.
              TICs vs. CBR Agents
           CAPABILITY/CAPACITY ISSUES
           • Validated sample methods for
           priority agents

           •  Expertise related to CWAs
           •  Laboratory capacity to
           process potential sample demand

     Standardized Analytical
      Methods (SAM) Rev 1
         September 2004
GOAL: To assure consistant/proficient
  sample analyses when called upon to
  respond to a national emergency:

    Identifies -109 Priority agents
    Identifies specific methods for
  analysis in four environmental media:
         * gas
         * solid
         * oily solid
         * aqueous
                   SAM Rev 2

              Update methods
              Add CWA degradation products
              Methods for drinking water
              Add 4 radionuclides:
                    * Strontium 90
                    * Cesium
                    * Iridium
                    * Cobalt 60
                                                                Chemical Warfare Agents
    Nerve (sarin), Blister (lewisite), Blood
    (cyanogans), choking (phosgene)

    Chemical Weapons Convention

    Chemical Surety
     • Army Regulations 50-6
     • Personnel Reliability Program (PRP)
     • Dilute Agents vs. Neat
110  NHSRC

-------

CWA DILUTE LIMITS
AGENT
GA.GB
GD.GF
VX
H,HD
L, HL
MAXIMUM
QUANTITY
2O mg
10 mg
100 mg
50 mg
MAXIMUM
CONCENTRATION
2.0 mg/ml
1.0 mg/ml
10 mg/ml
5.0 mg/ml


                                                                  CWA Methods


                                                         Joint Method(US/Finland
                                                         •   Nerve, Blister, and Degradation
                                                         •   All environmental media

                                                         OPCW Methods

                                                         VERIFIN Blue Books

                                                         Wiley Encyclopedia of Analytical
                                                         Chemistry
            Neat Labs
'  Alion Science and Technology
     Chicago, IL
•  Calspan UB Research Center
     Buffalo, NY
•  Geomet Technologies
     Gaithersburg, MD
•  Southwest Research Institute
     San Antonio, TX
•  Battelle
     Columbus, OH
•  Midwest Research Institute
     Kansas City, MO
•  Edgewood Chemical and Biological
Center (ECBC)
Aberdeen Proving Grounds, MD
                                               I
         Dilute Labs

• Argonne National Lab
     Argonne, IL

• Quicksilver Analytics, Inc.
     Abingdon, MD

• O.I. Analytical
     Pelham, AL

• Oak Ridge National Lab
     Oak Ridge, TN

• Lawrence Livermore National Lab
     Livermore, CA
     Anatomy of Response
                     Months     Weeks

 Forensics
-Clinical (Reference)
 Environmental (Field Analytics)
                      • Clinical (Sentinel)
                       Environmental (Real Time)
                       Environmental (Fixed Laboratory)
                                                  Environmental Laboratory Response

                                                             Network (eLRN)

                                                   EPA, WITH CDC, DEVELOPED A JOINT
                                                   PROPOSAL TO EXPAND THE LRN TO
                                                   ADDRESS ENVIRONMENTAL SAMPLE LAB
                                                   CAPACITY/RESPONSE ISSUES

                                                        •  CDCs ROLE WILL REMAIN FOCUSED ON
                                                        CLINICAL SAMPLES, WHILE EPA WILL
                                                        ESTABLISH AN ENVIRONMENTAL SAMPLE
                                                        COMPONENT

                                                        •   EPA WILL MODEL THE ENVIRONMENTAL
                                                        NETWORK COMPONENT AFTER THE
                                                        EXISTING CDC CLINICAL LAB NETWORK
                                                    Decontamination  Workshop 111

-------
                     LRN: Roles and
                    Responsibilities
                           Definitive Reference Labs
                            -Role: Network Support & Attribution
                            -Responsibilities:
                             1) Definitive identification, 2) Methods
                               development & sampling guidance,
                             3) QA and sampling procedures

                           Confirmatory Labs
                            -Role: Confirmatory Analysis
                            -Responsibilities:
                             1) Coordination with sentinels &
                               first responders, 2) Method
                               validation

                           Screening/Sentinel Labs
                            -Role: Screening & Surge Analysis
                            -Responsibilities: Routine monitoring
                             to identify potential incidents	
              eLRN
                Optimal Characteristics
             "All-Hazards

             Threat based, focused on specific agents and
              locations

             Rapid sentinel screening

             High confidence in methods and staff
                -  "Gold Standard" confirmatory methods
                -  Ongoing training and audits

             Sufficient surge capacity to address alerts and
               response

             Add "real-time" technology when supported
               by research	
 Near-Term EPA Reference Labs
               Activities

EPA ORD Labs in Las Vegas and Cincinnati
    * Las Vegas focus on Chemical
    * Cincinnati focus on Biological
SAM- ID analytical methods for priority agents of
concern
    * Identify validated preferred methods for
       analysis - all environmental media
Develop CWA Capacity
    * Establish validated methods for primary
       agents and degradation products
Expand Cincinnati lab  BSL-3 capability
Develop QA/PT Program for eLRN
Implement a National TRIAGE Program

                        THANK YOU


                Rob Rothman
                Rothman.rob@epa.gov
                513-569-7187
112  NHSRC

-------
                          BIOQUELL
            Hydrogen peroxide vapor ("HPV")
            for room / building decontamination
            following chemical or biological agent attack

            Overview of efficacy and practical issues

            Mike Herd
            Vice President
            BIOQUELL Inc.

            February 2005
                                                                                                                         ฉBDS
                                                                                                                        Overview of science
  Hydrogen peroxide vapour - an overview
                2H202(g)

            Hydrogen peroxide
                 vapour
             Excellent biocide
                                        2H2O    +   O2

                                        Water      Oxygen
                                          "residue-free"
 RBDS - Room Bio-Decontamination Service
     • using hydrogen peroxide vapor technology, BIOQUELL provide an
      "infinitely scalable" room / building bio-decon service
     • Tyvek pouched Slog Gee-bacillus stearothermophilus spores used as
      biological indicators to verify bio-decontamination
    > Applications in the healthcare, bio-defence, pharmaceutical
     and environmental sectors
                                                     BIOQUELL
Condensation monitor

How it works:

        f—<"~"Tr~\     Light
       A  Gassing   1  *  Escapes
        -Environment, j
                         Condensation
                                                                                   Use of optics to detect onset of micro-condensation
Micro-condensation and water chemistry

      1.00E+06^
                     Gassing Time M inutes
              D value before condensation = 120 minutes
               D value after condensation = 1.2 minutes

> Micro-condensation critical for fast kill - D values go from 2 hours (pi
 dewpoint) to <2 minutes (post dewpoint)
H\ WB micro-condensation - often not visible; condensate layer
^ <1 micron                                   r
                                                     BIOQUtLL
                                                                               BIOQUELL's dewpoint model

                                                                               Detailed analysis of the physical chemistry
                                                                                 •  results published in the PDA Journal of Science & Technology (November
                                                                                   2002)
                                                                                 •  won the 2002 Fredrick D. Simon Award for best paper published in the PDA
                                                                                   journal
                                                                                 volume of room
                                                                                 adjustment for
                                                                                 equipment (eg: chairs)
                                                                                 starting temperature
                                                                                 starting RH
                                                                                 concentration of
                                                                                 peroxide liquid
                                                                                 airflow rates
                                  point micro-condensation
                                  starts
                                 1 gas concentration trend line
                                 1 relative humidity trend line
                                 1 max. gas rate injection
                                 1 mass of condensate
                                 1 cycle parameter prediction
                                                                                   Good correlation between theoretical (model) and practical
                                                                                   (experimental) results	HIT)] BIOQUEL
                                                                              Decontamination  Workshop  113

-------
      Gas distribution is key
              Celling
         \

             Vapour exits generator
                  ate. 100fs-'
        ,          A,   /
       Gas effectively "bounces" off hard surfaces in room ensuring good gas
       distribution - and hence good kill,
       even in challenge sites                          RP7J11IOQUELL
Hydrogen bonding - between H2O2 and H2O

                      a*
                                   8- (hydrogen peroxide)
                             8"   c~
                            	i

                      JF
                     '*WV
                                                                                      (hydrogen peroxide)
                                                                                                       y
                                                                                " Hydrogen
                                                                                  bonding
                                                                                            H-
                                                                                             f
                                         "gl_ซvS*

                                           I    (water)
                                                    dฃ> Strong hydrogen bonding between molecules

                                                    H^> Hence high kinetic energy is needed to disperse the gas...

                                                    t^> ...but this can help practically, making BIOQUELL's technolc
                                                       safe with (eg) rooms with a common false ceiling
                                                                                   Material Compatibility



                                                                                   Industrial-grade carpet (1C)

                                                                                   Bare wood (pine lumber) (BWD)

                                                                                   Glass (GS)

                                                                                   Decorative laminate (DL)

                                                                                   Galvanized metal ductwork (GM)

                                                                                   Painted (latex, flat) wallboard paper (PW)

                                                                                   Painted (latex, semi-gloss) concrete cind
                                                                                   block (PC).
      Anthrax bio-deactivation work with US EPA/ ETV

             Glass              7.92 log kill (complete bio-deactivation)

             Decorative laminate   7.85 log kill (complete bio-deactivation)

             Painted wallboard    6.92 log kill (complete bio-deactivation)

                               7.54 log kill (complete bio-deactivation)
             Galvanised metal
             ductwork

             Painted concrete

             Bare wood

             Carpet
6.36 log kill

3.70 log kill

3.01 log kill
       > Note short cycle: 20 minutes gassing; 20 minutes dwell (plus
        issues with limits of detection)
       > Bacillus anthracis Ames bio-deactivation data - report available
        on EPA website (ETV program)                |:f
-------
Case study: Acinetobacter in Hopital Henri-Mondor
                         MDR-Acinetobacter in adult ICU
                         crisis situation (following outbreak in
                         Northern France)
                         total of 7 mortalities (3 patients
                         colonized when BIOQUELL arrived)
                         5-bed ICU comprising a 800m3
                         (2,625ft3) suite of rooms
                         extensive bio-burden present before
                         RBDS (including Acinetobacter) - and
                         none after RBDS
                                           EEffil Bioquai
Case study: Acinetobacter in Hopital Henri-Mondor
                         adjacent ward and public areas monitorec
                         for HPV-no leakage
                         no further patient acquisition following
                         RBDS
                         RBDS has been re-deployed twice by the
                         same hospital to combat a similar problert
                         in other ICUs
                         hospital intends to publish their
                         experience and associated data
Case study: MRSAat Lewisham Hospital, London
                        10 patients were infected / colonised
                        with MRSA - it appeared cross
                        transmission had occurred
                        20-bed surgical ward, "Nightingale"
                        design
                        35.7% of 28 surfaces and 27.7% of 18
                        air samples were found to be
                        contaminated with MRSA
                        ward emptied and cleaned manually for
                        4 days using bleach
                        re-sampled and MRSA recovered from
                        16% of 65 surfaces
                                            •S7JI BIOQUELL
Case study: MRSA at Lewisham Hospital, London
                        BIOQUELL asked to bio-decontaminate
                        the ward using RBDS
                        adjacent ward and public areas
                        monitored for HPV - no leakage
                        RBDS completed in 12 hours
                        ward available for re-occupation
                        immediately after RBDS
                        no new acquisition of MRSA following
                        RBDS
                                                 Bioqua
                                                                          Decontamination Workshop  115

-------
      Case study: Serratia - Royal Hallamshire, Sheffield
                            Serratia is a problematic nosocomial
                            pathogen, which can persist in the
                            environment during outbreaks (Sarvikivi,
                            2004, ICHE)
                            BIOQUELL was contacted by a special
                            care baby unit with an outbreak of
                            Serratia (marcescens)
                               •  cleaning had failed to remove the
                                 organism from the environment
                               •  infection acquisition was continuing
                                 (including mortality)
                                                     [igfi] BIOQUELL
Case study: Serratia - Royal Hallamshire, Sheffield
                        BIOQUELL's RBDS technology was
                        deployed
                        Serratia and S. aureus cultured before
                        RBDS and no environmental
                        contamination detected after RBDS
                        infection acquisition ceased -the 'acid
                        test' of a successful bio-
                        decontamination
      Solution: Clarus R
                                weight: 20kg (44lbs)
                                500m3 (Euro) / 250m3 (US) bio-
                                decontamination volume (17,700 / 9,000
                                cubic ft capability)
                                high kinetic energy of vapour (exit velocity
                                100fs-')
                                2 axis vapour distribution system
                                own H2O2 container
                                infinitely scalable ("daisy chain" together)
                                easily fits in back of vehicle
                                easy to transport upstairs...
                                ...and into awkward places
                                self-sanitising
                                                     Egflfl BIOQUELL
                                                                                       Solution: Clarus R2
                       • weight of top: 8kg (181 bs)
                       • weight of filter / catalytic converter: 21
                         (441 bs)
                       • dual use re. bio-agent and chem age
                         building remediation - effectively an P
                         filter
                       • filter disposable - can be bagged ree
                         incineration
                       • airflow: 450m3/h (16,000ft3/hr)
                       • top self-sanitising
                       ^> Rapid catalytic conversion

                       CJ) HEP A filtration will filter out any
                          remaining bacteria - activated ca
                          will filter chemical agents
      Instrumentation module
                                      Measures:
                                         •  temperature
                                         •  gas concentration
                                         •  relative humidity
               > Monitor key environmental conditions in room which
                effect when dewpoint reached
Software controls



jj||: — —
U— .
H~
B-W-N 	
llQtJl "'^
116  NHSRC

-------
"Scalable"
   Clams R and R2 units
   networked together
                                                   BIQQUELL
RBDS - material compatibility

Excellent material compatibility results - eg:
   • computers
   • electronics
   • furniture
RBDS site survey designed to identify potential problems,
including for example:
   • soft, absorbent materials which will absorb hydrogen peroxide
     vapour - and typically desorb (out-gas) slowly
BIOQUELL able to give detailed responses on material
compatibility and/or carry out a trial on specific materials at
BIOQUELL's facilities

 ^\ BIOQUELL has bio-decontaminated >10 hospital intensive
   care units (ICU) with no adverse effects - hence "real world"
   comfort of excellent material compatibility
Other practical issues encountered

HVAC
   • largest problem area by far
   • HVAC drawings almost always wrong / lost
   • HVAC zones often problematic but BIOQUELL has developed a
     range of techniques
   • HVAC can be dirty / have high levels of organic matter
Clients
   • tend to create further issues
Lesser issues (all manageable but watch out for them)
   • alarm systems
   • absorption of soft materials - hence longer gassing cycles
   • availability of power

 H\ Do not underestimate the advantages of experience -
   BIOQUELL has bio-decontaminated >1,000 rooms / buildings
                                                   BIQQUELL
                                             •    u

                                             HTJ] BIOQUEL
 Singapore hospital - SARS case study

 3 Hospitals
    • 8 partially occupied wards

    • 88 rooms -total volume 6, 700m3
 Client's requirements
 The SARS epidemic in Singapore was worsening; 87% of new
 infections were hospital acquired
 Rapid, residue-free, bio-decontamination was sought - with no holes
 to be drilled in the facilities, no patients to be disturbed or placed at
 risk

 A large volume of equipment (including delicate ICU Equipment)
 needed bio-decontamination
 > Urgent requirement to deploy equipment in Singapore.
  And fast.
                                                   BIOQUELL
                                                                             The RBDS
Results

Using RBDS, BIOQUELL was able to safely bio-decontaminate the
required 88 rooms in 16 days, remaining flexible and sensitive to
patients needs throughout
                                                                            Decontamination  Workshop  117

-------
    An example: East Shore Hospital ICU
     Ability to deploy around hospital staff/patients was critical



                                         EEfil BIOqUELL
                                                                 Singapore ICU RBDS 4 hours from vacation to
                                                                               occupation
    RBDS - Hospital Equipment Compatibility
  Gambro Dialysis  Siemens Servo  Tyco Puritan   Siemens Servo
    Machines     300C Ventilator   Bennett 800   900C Ventilator
                              Ventilator
   Dinamap NIBP
Philips Defibrillators
                                  Siemens Patient
                                  Monitor Systems

> Excellent material compatibility
 characteristics of BlOQUELL's technology   rWV,jl BIQQIIELL
                                                                          W&  BIOQUELL
             rapji BIOQUELL
             BHI^^^^3 BlAdMMVUffllnllhMI MfcrtjflA*

             Hydrogen peroxide vapor ("HPV")
             for room / building decontamination
             following chemical or biological agent attack

             Overview of efficacy and practical issues

             Mike Herd
             Vice President
             BIOQUELL Inc.

             February 2005
118  NHSRC

-------
Whole-Structure Decontamination of
Bacterial Spores by Methyl Bromide
              Fumigation
          Rudolf H. Scheffrahn
                                                     What is needed for B. anthracis
                                                     spore cleanup?

                                                          • Rapid decontamination
                                                          • No sensitive equip, damage
                                                          • Portability
                                                          + Cost effectiveness
                                                          + Safety
                                                                                             UF
Structural remediation alternatives:

      • Foam/liquid disinfection
      + HEPA vacuum/vaccine
      • Fumigation
                                        UF
(CHjBr)
                     COWMOOTY FUMOAWT
               <=qป QUWIANT1NBBEGU,ATOซlf USE ONLY
             SUPERVISION BY REGULATORY AGENT SEQUREO
             ACTIVE INGREDIENTS Wซhf I trnndg     100W
                lhป product wghป 11 d poundm par giilan
                   DANGER • PELJGRO • POISON
                  KEEP OUT OF REACH Of CHILDREN
* Registered foodfelructural tumigani
• Stable up to SOO'F
• Paefcaged in cylindeis
* Non-corrosive alkylalmg agent
* TLV = 5 ppm
• Analysis by simple detection equip.
• Deep diffusion of porous materials
* Part of existing fumigation industry
• No volume or humidity limitations
                                                        Decontamination Workshop 119

-------
     Label: Meth-O-Gasฎ Commodity Fumigant-Great Lakes Chemical Co.
                        EPA Registration No. 5785-41
      TABLE III METH-0-GASQ
   APPLICATION SUMMARY FOR STRUCTURES OR VEHICLES ASSOCIATED WJItLBAW
   OR PROCESSED COMMODITIESQ)	
   TREATM ENT SITE
                            PESTS
   Warehouse, Shipboard, Railroad
   Car, Truck, Air and Sea
   Containers, Grain Elevator,
   Poultry Houses, Food Processing
   Plant, Restaurants, Feed Room,
   Grain  Bin
                                     EXPOSURE
                            RATE     TIM E
                            (Ib/1000ft3l (hrsl
cockroaches, confused flour beetle, rice[
weevil, granary weevil, saw toothed grair
Deetle, rusty grain beetle, lesser grain
Dorer, cadelle, khapra beetle, drugstore
Deetle, larder beetle, carpet beetle,
copra beetle, coffee bean weevil, etc.

rats, mice and brown tree snakes
(Boiga irregularis)
                            fungi and some bacteria
                            (e.g., Solmonella spp.)
                                                        3-4
                                                                 24-36
   ;i)At temperatures below 60ฐF, increase the dosage by 1/2 Ib per 1,000 cu. ft. for every 10ฐF drop in
   :emperature or use an approved procedure to heat the fumigant. No additional fumigant is required for
   •ats and mice. Do not fumigate fungi and some bacteria when inside temperatures are less than 70ฐ F.
                                                                      DF
                                                                                            Lab Trials

                                                                                          Methyl bromide
                                                                                          introduced into
                                                                                          chambers  using
                                                                                          -as-tight syringe
120  NHSRC

-------
<
c
Spore count vs. methyl bromide
:onc. at 37ฐC for 48-hour fumigation


0) fi

D


^^ 	 \
1
\ \
\ \

-*— B. anthracis
-•— G. stearo .
B. atroph.
B.thuring.

0 16 32 48 64 80 96 112
mg/L. MB

UF
                               UF
CPU/slide of B anthracis spores after 48-hour exposure to
methyl bromide at 0 or 120 mg/L and 27ฐC
S a strain
AT." •••
ATCC 937
ATCC 4728
ATCC 9660
ATCC 11966
ATCC 14187
AMES-1-RIID
AMES-RIID
ANR-1
"i.-i.'ME
0 mg MB/L
2 17E+04
3 82E+05
1 02E+06
0 OOE+00
4 34E+02
345E+07
5.56E+07
8 53E+07
506E+08
2 70E+07
120 mg MB/L
0 OOE+00
6 60E+01
0 OOE+00
0 OOE+00
0 OOE+00
240E+04
270E+05
2 19E+05
650E+03
8 OOE+02
                                                                        UF
2004 Field Trial, Big Pine Key, Florida
             •
          N
          V"~~
                               UF
                                            Decontamination Workshop 121

-------
                                                    Non-pathogenic B. anthracis surrogates:
                                                    6. stearothermophiius (paper)
                                                    6. thuringiensis {paper)
                                                    B. atrophaeus (on paper)
                                                    B. atrophaeus (stainless steel disc)
122 NHSRC

-------
Field site conditions:

312 mg MB/L mean cone.
48-hour exposure time
35ฐC mean temperature
                                      Decontamination Workshop 123

-------
   Results of 2004 Field Trial:

    • 48 Spore strip locations: no growth of
    any spore species (Gs, Bt, Ba (paper),
    or Ba (stainless steel), from both
    contract laboratories [IITRI quantitative
    Bt and Ba (paper) or Raven labs (Gs and
    Ba stainless]
    • Growth on all controls (n=10/species)
                                       UF
                                                   Advantages of methyl bromide for
                                                   B. anthracis decontamination:
                                                    ซ• Low cost: $150/1,000 ft3
                                                    • Rapid turnover: ฑ 200 hours
                                                    • All porous materials, voids, HVAC,
                                                      etc. decontaminated - no secondary
                                                      procedures needed
                                                    • No collateral damage
                                                    • No modification of ambient humidity
                                                                                       UF
124 NHSRC

-------
Technology for future MB
       fumigations:

 Real-time IR MB detectors
 Air displacement balloons
 Multilayer or laminated tarpaulins
 Silicone ground seal
 MB Scrubbing
 Portable- Methyl Bromide Monitor
MB 3000 Methyl Bromkde FumtgUHHi

Aaan accurate, sdf-cantairaid iron-tc^,
the Mi-JOOOTM mediums She levels Of
melhyl bteซUc rrt furnqation ftKiiitiej.
                                                  Decontamination Workshop 125

-------
    Commercial fumigation
    structures:
      • Single-family houses
      • Multi-unit complexes
      • Large commercial structures
      • Government facilities
      • Boats & ships
      • Trucks and containers
      • Military hardware
                                     UF
126 NHSRC

-------
Decontamination Workshop 127

-------
                                              10.3 11
128 NHSRC

-------
DF-200 Decontamination of CBW Agents, other Biological
       Pathogens and Toxic Industrial Chemicals


                       Presented at
 EPA Workshop on Decontamination, Cleanup, and Associated Issues for
  Sites Contaminated with Chemical, Biological, or Radiological Materials
                      Washington D.C.

                      February 24, 2005
     Dr. MarkD. Tucker
     mdtuckeO.sandia.gov
     505-844-7264
                               RitaG. Betty
                               rbettvO.sandia.gov
                               505-284-4160
                                                                                                  DF-200
                                                                                            Presentation Outline
^Introduction


^Sandia Decon Formulation (DF-200) Test Results
   Neutralization of Chemical Warfare Agents
   Kill of Biological Agents
   Kill of Other Biological Pathogens
   Neutralization of Toxic Industrial Chemicals
   Aerosolized CBW Cloud Knockdown


^Summary
            Sandia CBW Decon Formulations
                 http://www.sandia.gov/SandiaDecon/
 Neutralization of CW Agents

  E


    "
                                      Rapid and complete coverage
    :eived   Sandia Foam
       Contact Time: 1 Hour
Complete kill of anthrax spores
                                                                                         Sandia Decon Foam
                                                                                              Corrosion Comparisons
                                                                       Deionized Water -
                                                                       24 Hour Exposure
                                                                                         Sandia Decon Foam -
                                                                                          24 Hour Exposure
                                       Bleach-24 Hour
                                          Exposure
                     Sandia DF-200
                     How Does it Work?
         Final concentration of hydrogen peroxide in standard
                  DF-200 formulation is -3.5%
Decontamination of
CW Agents

Decon-
taminant
DS2
DF-200

1
Min.
100
100

GD
30
Min.
-
100


60
Min.
100
100
vx

100
99 100


60
Min.
100
100

1
Min.
100
97

HD
30
Min.
-
100

Percent decontamination of live agents in reactor studies at the Edgewood
Chemical and Biological Center (ECBC). Challenge ratio was 50:1.

60
Min.
100
100


mm.
                                                                           Decontamination Workshop  129

-------
"^^ ^^^
dPo^ DF-200 Performance
Neutralization of CW Agents and TICs
Agent
Nerve Agents (G)
Nerve Agents (V)
Vesicants (HD)
Sodium Cyanide
Phosgene
Carton Bisulfide
Contact Time
(Minutes)
1-10
10-15
15-30
1-15
1-15
1-15
Byproducts
Nucleophilic Attack
Nucleophilic Attack
Oxidation
Oxidation
Hydrolysis
Oxidation
Rapid neutralization of CW agents and TICs
ฎฃ.
                                                                                                   Sandia Decon Foam
                                                                                                     Kill of BW Agents in DF-200

Control
15 Minute
Contact
30 Minute
Contact
60 Minute
Contact
B. Anthracis -
Ames-RIID
Average
CFU/ml
1.21 x10'
No Growth
No Growth
No Growth
Log
Reduction
0
7
7
7
B. anf/jrac/s-ANR-1
Average
CFU/ml
6.42x10'
No Growth
No Growth
No Growth
Log
Reduction
0
7
7
7
Y.pesf/s-(ATCC
11953)
Average
CFU/ml
6.42x10'
No Growth
No Growth
No Growth
Log
Reduction
0
7
7
7
                                                                                  Results of kill tests conducted against BW agents in DF200 solution.
             Decontamination of CW and BW Agents
       	Additional Testing	
     CW Testing
         •Commercial DF200 foam deployed on CARC surfaces
         using Intelegard's Merlin system. Challenge ratio of 120:1
     BW Testing
        •Three strains of anthrax, anthrax surrogate and Ricin toxin
        tested on CARC and in suspension
        •Commercial DF200, High Test Hypochlorite, and Super
        Tropical Bleach
           All results demonstrate high efficacy of DF200
      Contact:  Mr. Vic Murphy, murphvvaiSimcsc.usmc.mil,
                     (703)432-3193
     Effectiveness of DF-200 vs. Biofilms
 Control Samples: Prior to
 treatment with DF-200.
Average adhesion = 6-7 log
     CFU/cm2
Treated Samples: After 1
 min treatment with DF-
 200. Average reduction
  = 6-7 log CFU/cm2
                                                                              Work performed by Jill Bieker-Hawkinson, KSU
              Influenza A (H1N1) Inactivation Studies
           Results: RT-PCR conducted with forward and reverse N1 primers:
             All treatments with Sandia DF-200D resulted in complete
            loss of infectivity and complete loss of viral RNA integrity.
  Work performed by Jill Bieker-Hawkinson, KSU
                                                                                                FBI WMD Threat List
130  NHSRC

-------
      Challenges & Mechanisms of TIC
          Decontamination Chemistry
          Water lnsoluble4-L-tWater Soluble
             Attack Mechanisms
                   Oxidation  Reduction   Bufferini
    Limitations:  toxic metals, strong acids/bases
10^ DF200 Neutralization of TICs
Solution and Headspace Gas Analysis


TIC
Hydrogen Cyanide
(gas)
Hydrogen Cyanide
(gas)
Sodium Cyanide
(solid)
Phosgene (gas)
Carbon Bisulfide
(liquid)
Malathion (liquid)
Capsaicin
(liquid)
Challenge
Ratio,
Solution:TIC
250:1
1:1
200:1
200:1
200:1
200:1
200:1
% Decontaminated in solution/
% Decontaminated in headspace
1 minute
59
96
93
98
>99
89
>99
1 5 minutes
83
95
98
>99
>99
95
Below
detection
60 minutes
>99/>99
48/96
>99/>99
>99
>99
Below
detection
Below
detection
9

      CBW Cloud Knockdown & Neutralization
                          Problem
One mechanism of the dispersal of CBW agents
would be to create a "cloud" of active material
that would drift and affect the intended target
areas.
The objectives of this project are
 >  to explore methods of CBW cloud knockdown
    and neutralization.
 >  If feasible, recommend conceptual deployment
    design

Success will result in
 >  protecting lives, minimizing impact to
    infrastructure and post-event decontamination
    efforts, and
 >  facilitating timely restoration of operations.
   The focus is on determining the feasibility of knocking down
  and neutralizing an aerosol cloud - not systems development
       CBW Cloud Knockdown & Neutralization
                  Large Aerosol Chamber Design
Large Chamber
   - 8 foot high by 8 foot wide by 8 foot
     deep
   - Static Free PVC
   - Inflow from aerosol source with
     filtered exhaust
   - Multiple Aerosol sampling ports
   - Mixing Fans
   - Internal Decon Spray System
                                                                          >New Larger Chamber, Spring 2005
      CBW Cloud Knockdown & Neutralization
          Modeling and Transport Physics of CBW Cloud
                         Conditions
• Use CBW cloud scenarios defined by DoD Guardian program
  - Determined peak plume concentrations, duration, and
    exposure


 NOTE: Atadecon:agentratioof-800:1, DARPA Immune
 Building Program demonstrated an effective interior knockdown
 and decon
  - 8-log knockdown and decon of anthrax simulant
  - HD simulant concentration reduced by two orders of
    magnitude
                    Recent Data
   DF200 Knockdown & Neutralization Spray
                               • "Optimized" spray system

                               • 3.2 g/m3 G-agent simulant

                               • 138 g/m3 DF200 Spray density

                               • Immediate decrease of  nearly
                               4 orders of magnitude

                               •-90,000 gallons of DF200
                               required for 50m x 50m x 1000m
                               spray curtain

                               •Knockdown/neutralization
                               proof of concept

                               •Various simulant and spray
                               densities are being evaluated
                                                                            Decontamination  Workshop  131

-------
            CBW Cloud Knockdown & Neutralization
                             Comments
>Many applications for fundamental capability;
 Technologies developed are also applicable to
 hazmat and civilian incident responses
  -Chemical plants              *'•'*ซ

                                  -„*"'•'•
        -Chemical D-mil
        - Subways
        - Nuclear plants
        -High-profile buildings
                                                                       CBW Cloud Knockdown and Neutralization
                                                                                     Conceptual Design

                                                                           \    	Region of safety	^
                                                                          Incoming
                                                                          CBW Agent
                                                                            Cloud
                                                                       -At.
            CBW Cloud Knockdown & Neutralization
                           Subway Tunnel

                        Spray Array
                       Subway Tunnel
                                                                        CBW Cloud Knockdown & Neutralization
                                                                                      Subway Station
         Sandia Decontamination Technologies
       Sandia has developed unique decontamination formulations
               and application/delivery concepts to
                     enable rapid and safe
     neutralization CBW agents, biological toxins and toxic industrial
                          chemicals.
                      Hazmat Response
                      Intentional/Accidental
                     Liquid, Solid, Gaseous
                        Indoor/Outdoor
^
                                                                                  DF-200 Summary
                                                                 • DF-200 is available for use by the U.S.
                                                                  Military and the nation's first responders in
                                                                  the event of a chemical or biological
                                                                  incident

                                                                 • EPA registration for use as a disinfectant
                                                                  granted in November 2004

                                                                 • Many opportunities exist to utilize the
                                                                  fundamental DF-200 chemistry for other
                                                                  applications
                                                                         Effective against chemical and biological
                                                                       agents,  other biological pathogens and TICs
132 NHSRC

-------
         Sandia Decon Foam (DF-200)
r
                  DF-200 is considered to be the best
                 available decontamination technology
                        by the US Military
     Sandia Decon Formulation (DF-200)
    Project Team
     Mark Tucker
      Rita Betty
     Gary Brown
    Wayne Einfeld
      Pauline Ho
    Caroline Souza
    Mollye Wilson
    Kristine Muroya
   Jonathan Leonard
    Linda Johnson
  Jill Bieker-Hawkinson
     Bruce Kelley


      Website
http://www.sandia.gov/SandiaDecon
                                                                                           Sandia Decon Foam Demonstration for
                                                                                          President George W. Bush; July 22, 2002
                                                                     Decontamination  Workshop  133

-------
           Capitol Hill Ricin Incident:
          Decontamination Dilemmas
      (or... "Can't we just throw it away?")
              Steve Jarvela and Jack Kelly
          EPA Decontamination Technology Workshop
                 Washington D.C.
                February 23-25, 2005

         Special thanks to Dr. Robert Butt and his staff at
       NMRC whose assistance during this incident went well
             beyond what could be expected
      Capitol Hill Ricin Incident -
         Presentation Outline

Incident Occurrence and EPA's Arrival
EPA Activities in Incident Command
Some Ricin Facts
Decontamination of Affected Building
Areas/Post-Decontamination Sampling
The "Decon Team"
Decontaminating Clothing, Mail and
Miscellaneous Items Offsite
              Dirksen Senate Office Building
                            ,
            mum i
                ,1  •

            OFFK
         BUILD!
     Incident Occurrence and EPA's Activities


     February 2, 2004 - suspicious powder found on the mail
     slitter in mail room (Room 464) attached to Senator
     Frist's office in Dirksen Building
     Preliminary field samples and follow-up laboratory
     analyses by FBI/USCP confirm ricin
     Several Region III OSCs arrive at Capitol Hill per
     assistance request from House Sergeant at Arms
     EPA instilled into Incident Command Structure
     essentially within Operations Section

    	before going into our activities, some
     ricin facts
               Ricin
Protein toxin from the beans of the castor plant
Fairly easy to produce the toxin and plants are
found worldwide (grows as weed in southwest
U.S. and commonly grown as U.S. ornamental
plant)
> 1 million tons of castor beans processed
annually in production of castor oil
(mainly India, China, Brazil)
Castor beans are 35-55% oil by weight, process
waste mash  is 5% ricin by weight (lots of ricin
out there!)
Castor oil production ceased in U.S. in 1970s
due to health and safety issues and low profit
134 NHSRC

-------
                  Ricin
Very toxic to cells/inhibits protein synthesis
Ricin actually made up of two toxins, each with a
polypeptide chain (A and B), that work together
to cause damage
Toxic by inhalation, ingestion and injection.  Not
as toxic as botulinum
Acute inhalation and oral toxicity well beyond the
established "extremely toxic" classification
(ricin LDSOs are in ug/kg range)	proverbial
bad stuff.
No vaccine as yet, no  prophylactic antitoxin
    Ricin - History as Bioweapon
          and Some Incidents

WW1 and WW2 ricin weapon development
1978 - assassination of Bulgarian dissident by injection
with ricin-loaded umbrella pellet
1993 -white supremacist traveling through U.S. found to
have ~130 grams of ricin in vehicle
1994-95 - Minnesota Patriots Council found with
~1 gram of ricin threatening to injure law enforcement
2003 - ricin found in threatening letter at South Carolina
postal facility (NIOSH involved)
2004 - Washington State man found to be making ricin in
garage (EPA Region 10 involved)
            Castor Plant
           •ani
                                  Photo credit:
                                  JBurstein and A Carbone.
                                  Harvard School of Public
                                  Health
          Castor Plant as "Weed"
                                   Photo credit:
                                   JBurstein and A
                                   Carbone,
                                   Harvard School of
                                   Public Health
              Castor Beans
     Photo credit: DOD Bio Agent Training Course
                                                                 Simulated Crude Ricin Production
                                                                    Photo credit: DOD Bio Agent Training Course
                                                               Decontamination  Workshop  135

-------
                EPA's Activities
      EPA tasked to:
      - receive, inventory and store/secure unopened
      mail from several buildings until action
      determined
      - conduct additional characterization sampling*
      - perform decon of affected rooms and post-
      decon "clearance" sampling
      - decon potentially contaminated and
      contaminated clothing, mail and miscellaneous
      equipment
      * sampling earlier performed by FBI and USCP; USCP continued to sample to
      augment EPA sampling
            EPA's Activities
by February 8, approximately 80 drums of unopened
mail removed from various buildings


clothing from 32 potentially exposed individuals stored
for disposition


at least 670 samples had been collected by FBI, USCP
and EPA (possibly many more) from three known
Dirksen Bldg affected rooms, hallways, common areas
and personnel "quarantine" room (Room 106)


19 positives found - all confined to wipes or H EPA vac
samples collected within Room 464 or in the collection
bag of the room 464-specific vacuum cleaner
         Storage of drummed mail
-  Storage  in Parking Lot
  Various Storage/Disposal Containers Used
                                                                    Personnel  Decon after Sampling
136  NHSRC

-------
 EPA's Activities	by February 8


All air samples collected by USCP were negative

office and personal items from Room 464 were "bagged
and tagged". Large hard surface items left in place

Sampling ongoing to return "high priority" items to
congressional staff


Issue:  How to Decon Affected Rooms?
       Decision to Decon Dirksen Rooms
   EPA tasked to come up with a decon plan (in a few
   hours of course) ...we looked toward existing research
   data and experts
   Our primary document was the USAMRIID "Blue Book"
   for ricin decontamination:
    " Ricin is stable under ambient conditions, but is
   detoxified by heat (80 degrees C for 10 min, or 50
   degrees C for about an hour at pH 7.8)"
  . .but we soon learned that dry ricin was a different animal
   than wet ricin
               	also	
    " Decontaminate with soap and water. Hypochlorite
   solutions (0.1 % sodium hypochlorite) can inactivate
 Decision to Decon Dirksen Rooms
Initially, there was talk "from above" of
using CIO2 gas (!?) in the rooms


....then there was discussion of heating up
the rooms with propane heaters	


We prevailed that this would be overkill
and time-consuming.
     Decontamination of Rooms

   Decision made to "decontaminate" Room 464
   and adjacent rooms 463 and 465 as precaution.
   Large hard surface items and carpets deconned
   in place, (carpet in 464 removed and disposed)


   Room 106, where evacuees stationed, also
   addressed as precaution


   Common hallways, elevators, mail drop points
   addressed as precaution
 Decision to Decon Dirksen Rooms

Final EPA recommendation:
Use liquid 0.1 to 0.5% sodium hypochlorite solution on
hard surfaces and steam vacuuming (with sodium
hypochlorite added) on carpeted surfaces.


Rationale:
- relatively small size of the area;
- what was known about ricin concentrations in Room
464 and non-detection in other building areas;
- knowledge of ricin properties and what was known
about ricin "carrier" powder;
- research literature and input from EPA ERT, Army
Edgewood, USAMRIID, USPHS, CDC, academia
- input from inter-agency onsite Scientific Support Group
(aka "The Think Tank") formed to recommend to lead
OSC a decon approach, sampling plan, etc
Part of "Think Tank" in Action
....if a bittoo gradually and with
questionable focus
                                                              Decontamination Workshop 137

-------
        Decontamination of Rooms

                      Success!
      Rooms, hallways, etc. deconned on
      February 8 and Dirksen Building opened
      on Monday, February 9 !!(?)


      (Only rooms 463, 464,  and 465 remained
      closed for routine renovation)
   EPA Tasked to Decon Clothing, Mail

       and Equipment, Office Items

 Original set - 19 large bags of office items from
 Room 464 and 10 bags of clothing from
 quarantined personnel - materials not sampled
 for ricin


 Second Set- 12 large bags - miscellaneous
 paper items from Room 464, unopened mail,
 mail slitter and vacuum cleaner - limited
 sampling revealed contamination
        EPA Tasked to Decon Clothing, Mail
             and Equipment, Office Items

        First Option Most Were Thinking	but not to be.
        EPA Tasked to Decon Clothing,
       Mail and Equipment, Office Items
Knowing that clothing might be able to withstand soaking
and dry cleaning ... take the simple approach for clothing
      EPA Tasked to Decon Clothing, Mail and

               Equipment, Office Items

      Washing and dry cleaning not chosen for
      several reasons:
      - where to wash/dry? Could we be assured it would
      work? Sample afterward? (attempts at finding a federal
      facility with an autoclave were unsuccessful)
      - decon water disposal issue
      - mail/paper could not be washed.  Some efficiency in
      doing all materials together if possible.
      - we were already going down the "heat will probably
      work" path based on discussions with researchers, DOD
      and others
      - saw an opportunity to advance the knowledge base for
      ricin decontamination
 EPA Tasked to Decon Clothing, Mail and

         Equipment,  Office Items


 We formed a "Decon Team" to come up with a plan to
 decontaminate the materials
  - members from AFFRI, CDC/NIOSH, CDC Laboratory, EPA
   ERT, EPA III, Army Edgewood, Navy NMRC, and Academia

 Despite some skepticism, heat was to be used as the
 initial decon agent (research data suggested it would
 work)


 If heat not successful, Ethylene Oxide (EO) to be used
 as a second method based on its theoretical plausibility
 and availability (except on clothing due to off-gassing
 concerns)


 Chlorine Dioxide (CIO2) was to be a third option if time
 allowed - again,  based on theoretical plausibility only
138  NHSRC

-------
    HowAVhere to Conduct Decon and Verify
                Effectiveness?

 Past work during Capitol Hill Anthrax response proved
 helpful - EO sterilization facility in Richmond willing to
 assist
 Facility had ability to get temperature up to ~90
 degrees C and relative humidity to ~85% for 24 hours or
 more

 If needed, CIO2 contractor working on AMI Anthrax
 project in Florida also willing to assist

 Decon Team efforts focused on how to package items,
 setting of sterilization specifications, effectiveness
 measurements, "how clean is clean?" opinions
        Big Issues for Decon Team -
            How Clean is Clean?

  After decontamination, in order to make a
  recommendation on re-use of the items ("how
  clean is clean?"), how much did we know about:
  - contamination concentrations including
  sampling collection and extraction efficiencies
  -the location of contamination on clothing,
  mail, etc.
  - ricin powder processing characteristics
  (crude or purified?, "weapons-grade"?)
  - our trust in ricin toxicity values
           How Clean is Clean?

 EPA ORD did make an effort at coming up with
 criteria but cautioned due to many unknowns

 Essentially, we decided to proceed with the
 decontamination effort and worry about it later

 Given the unknowns and potential public health
 consequences, it was assumed we would need
 to get to close to 100% denaturation of ricin
 Big Issues for Decon Team - How to Prove
                Effectiveness

' Working with NMRC and Edgewood, we were able to
  obtain "live" crude and purified ricin as indicators of
  efficacy for each treatment run

• Indicators transported to and from NMRC/Edgewood,
  sterilization facility and laboratory....cleared through
  CDC Select Agent Transport regs

• This was a new and novel use of Region III vehicles
  	but ...whatever it takes to get the job done I suppose
          Briefly... What was Done

Original Set of Materials - 29 Tyvek bags of
  clothing and office items:
  - Heat treatment #1 (3/11/04)
  - 82-88ฐC, 80-85% RH, > 24 hours
  - 28 crude and 28 purified ricin "tubes"
  interspersed within bags for later analyses
  - temperature  probes placed in bags
(
^IMRC assay ap
s
Heat Treatment #
packet
106-1/464-5
106-2/106-3
106-4/464-12
106-5/106-6
106-7/106-8
106-9/106-10
464-1/464-2
464-3/464-4
464-6/464-7
464-8/464-9
464-10/464-11
464-13/464-14
464-15/464-
16/464-19
464-17/464-18
Orig
HeatTreatme
Droach determines the
amples....or...howmuc
- March 16. 2004 assay
temperature
(degrees C)
82
82
88
88
88
82
82
82
88
88
82
82
82
88
BDRD
Sample*
106-1
106-2
106-4
106-5
106-7
106-9
464-1
464-3
464-6
464-8
464-10
464-13
464-15
464-17
nal Set-
it#1 LabResults-
emaining toxicity activity level of the r
i was the ricin deactivated?):

APG#
30
44
26
46
33
27
42
35
31
32
28
37
29
34

(purified)
BDRD
Ricin
Activity





?









(crude)
APG
Ricin
Activity















(purified)
BDRD %
native
ricin



0.








0
0
cin test

(crude)
APG%
native
ricin
.8
.9
?












                                                               Decontamination Workshop  139

-------
     Results for Original Set Heat Treatment #1

    •  100% deactivation of 13 of the 14 purified ricin
      samples removed after treatment (14 of 28
      removed)
    •  14th sample at 99.8% deactivation

    •  94.4 to 99.7 % deactivation of 14 of 28 crude
      ricin samples removed

    Point: Crude more difficult to deactivate than
      purified and we needed to get better efficacy
    Original Set - Heat Treatment #2

 Heat treatment #2 (3/26/04)
 Same temp, RH and time duration range
 Plan was to assay remaining 14 crude and
 purified ricin samples after undergoing second
 heat treatment
 Results:
 - 4 of 14 crude/ricin  samples analyzed within
 days
 - 9 of 14 analyzed three weeks later (one tube
 destroyed by a runaway forklift....)
            Original Set - Heat Treatment #2

      4 of 14 crude/purified  (assayed 3/29):
      -100% deactivation of purified
      - 99.8 - 99.99 % of crude


      9 of 14 crude/purified  (assayed 4/21):
      - > 99.9% deactivation of crude
      - 99.92 - 99.99% deactivation of purified
      (not 100% as above)   .... WHY? Believed
      to be the result of "protein refolding"
So what did we recommend to the USCP
   about the fate of the original set of
               materials?

Decon Team documentation memo merely
kept to the facts, citing results and
expressing "things to keep in mind"
There was not unanimity  on what the
recommendation should be (but close)
Recommendation letter was left up to the
lead EPA Region III OSC
              Second Set of Materials

      Provided to EPA relatively late (3/22)
      miscellaneous paper items,  quarantined mail,
      Room 464 mail slitter and vacuum cleaner -
      some known to be contaminated
      What we did:
      - Exposed materials to heat treatment #1 (3/28) -
        knowing one heat treatment was insufficient we left
        22 crude and 22 purified ricin samples in place/did not
        assay
      - Conducted an EO treatment pilot test (3/31) on store-
        bought items similar to the Second Set of Materials -
        utilized 4 crude  and 4 purified ricin samples
       Second Set of Materials

- pilot test results (EO treatment alone)
   98.9 - 99.9% deactivation for purified
   99.86 - 99.99% for crude
   ....seemed that EO efficacy on ricin was
   more than just a theory
We decided to go with EO treatment on the
Second Set of items already exposed to one
heat treatment
We obtained a new batch of crude and ricin
samples to measure EO efficacy alone to
compare with heat plus EO efficacy	
...led to more Beltway drives with ricin
140 NHSRC

-------
        Second Set of Materials


 The second set, already exposed to heat, was
 treated with EO
 EO operating parameters (we relied on the
 facility's expertise):
 — 24 hour duration
 - avg EO concentration of 815 mg/l
 - RH of -35%
 - Temp in 160 ฐF range
 22 crude and 22 purified ricin samples -
    -11 crude/purified exposed to heat and EO
    -11 crude/purified exposed to EO alone
       Second Set of Materials

 EO treatment alone:
  -11 Crude = 99.939 - 99.999% deactivation
  - 11 Purified = 99.978 - 99.997%


 Heat plus EO:
  - 11 Crude = 9 with 100% deactivation
             2 with 99.995 - 99.997 %
  - 11 Purified = all 11 with 100% deactivation
       Second Set of Materials

Again, Decon Team memo merely
provided a synopsis of results with items
to consider (i.e. for added "protection",
some items had been  surface cleaned with
bleach solution prior to heat and EO
treatment)

Lead OSC provided recommendation to
USCP
 Conclusions/Lessons Learned

• Capitol Hill responses are always a
 little....er... "different"
• An interagency, onsite Scientific Support
 Group during a response may have a
 place but we need to work the kinks out
 (need quicker turnaround and decisions
 primarily)
• The offsite Decon Team interagency group
 worked surprisingly well but delays can be
 expected the larger and more widespread
 the group's size
Conclusions/Lessons Learned

Without the participation of the DOD or DOD-
related agencies on the Decon Team, NMRC,
AFFRI and Army Edgewood, this work could not
have occurred (NMRC's assistance went beyond
what we could have hoped). This collaboration
should serve Region 3 well in the future.


We appreciated the opportunity to add to the
ricin decon knowledge base but, in a future
incident, it may be more efficient to take the
simple, run-of-the-mill approach (e.g. dumpsters,
washing machines and/or wash basins)
                                                        Decontamination  Workshop 141

-------
                   References

      Grow, R.M., Johns Hopkins Center for Civilian
      Biodefense Strategies, Ricin Toxin: Bioweapon,
      April 2003, PP presentation.
      Center for Disease Control and Prevention,
      Investigation of a Ricin-Containing Envelope at a
      Postal Facility- South Carolina 2003, Morbidity
      and Mortality Weekly Report, November 21,
      2003,52(46); 1129-11131.
      USAMRIID, Ricin in Medical Management of
      Biological Casualties Handbook, 4th ed,
      February 2001, pp 130-137.
             Photo Credits

Burstein, JL and Carbone, A., Harvard
Center for Public Health Preparedness-
Harvard School of Public Health. Ricin as
a Biological Weapon. PP Presentation,
Date not known.
Department of Defense (DOD) Bio-Agent
Training Course
Nick Brescia, EPA Region III OSC.
142 NHSRC

-------
   Restoration  from  Decon
                  USPS Experience
  February 2005
            Presented by:

        Richard Orlusky
 richard.c.orlusky@iisps.gou
I UNITED STATES
'POSTAL SEKVKE.
                                                                                  i Timeline USPS Trenton facility
a October 2001- USPS Trenton P&DC closed

a April 2003-Commenced construction fumigation system

u October 2003 - Building fumigated with Chlorine dioxide gas

a February 2004 - Decision on Re-occupancy issued by ECC

   > begin removing fumigation equipment from inside the building and
     limited site restoration work such as HVAC cleaning.

   > restoration contractors meeting with subcontractors onsite to review
     building systems, develop scope of work and cost estimates to
     restore the facility

a March 2004 - USPS Maintenance teams begin restoring mail
  machinery

u May 2004 -  Decontamination contractors demobilize and building
  restoration contractors commence work

a February 2005 - Restoration contractors demobilize from site

u March 2005 - Building scheduled to commence operations
 .    ,  Pro- FumlBatlon Factors impacting.
        Building Restoration	
 u Age of building, type of equipment and current state of
   maintenance.

 u Surface cleaning with bleach sojution effective but destroys
   equipment. Also damages flooring materials. Alternate products
   with less contact time might limit damage and reduce restoration
   costs.

 a Typically building control systems are inoperable or shutdown
   after the building is evacuated. Interior subject to high
   temperatures (90 degree F and 90% humidity) especially after
   being sealed. This adds to building degradation especially over
   time.

 u Building systems especially mail processing machinery receive
   daily preventative maintenance. Tne machinery degrades without
   its normal  routine maintenance.

 a Building Preparation Activities - removing porous material,
   moving fumigation equipment into the building, sealing the
   exterior can damages floors, doorways and walls.
                                             ' Restoration Considerations
                                         a Direct impacts from "Decon" activities

                                         a Cost of inspecting and servicing components vs.
                                           replacement

                                         a Useful  service life of existing building equipment

                                         a Needed building upgrades

                                         a Building aesthetics - employee and customer relations
        OurExnerlence
a Mail Machinery/Electronics - USPS Trenton mail machinery rebuilt.
  It was learned from the USPS Curseen-Morris fumigation that the
  equipment operational with overhaul but the availability was
  impacted.

a Electrical Wiring/Circuit Breaker Panels/ Motor Control
  Centers/Transformers - need to be thoroughly inspected especially
  small contact points (Life Safety Issues). Replace vs. repair
  determinations.

a Flooring -overlay performed on work room floor tiles. Damaged
  due to bleach cleaning, foot traffic and fumigation preparation
  activities. Carpeting in administrative areas replaced.

a Building Systems (HVAC, Boilers, Chillers)-motors, actuators and
  pumps replaced.

u Replaced employee lockers, lobby lock boxes, door fixtures.
  Painted interior surfaces. Employee and customer relations.
                                              Closing TJioughts on
                                                                                   Building Restoration
                                        a Age of structure, maintenance status, and type of equipment inside is a major
                                          determinate in cost, restoration time, and scope of work.

                                        a Complete and current set of as-builts should be kept outside of building along
                                          with maintenance records and equipment specifications. Emergency response
                                          planning.

                                        a Bring restoration contractor team in early before building is fumigated in order to
                                          begin planning a comprehensive scope of work.

                                        a More testing of Chlorine dioxide and other decon agents for efficacy at lower
                                          concentrations and contact time may be helpful.

                                        a Use surface cleaning agents (i.e. bleach) cautiously if fumigation is to be "decon"
                                          remedy.

                                        a Restore building environmental controls as quickly as possible to maintain
                                          temperature and relative humidity control.

                                        a If possible, perform equipment maintenance (even if building is closed).

                                        a Down time after fumigation seems to be a factor. Reducing implementation of
                                          Sampling and Analysis Plan timeline might help improve equipment
                                          rehabilitation.

                                        a Don't forget to cost in "Industrial Hygiene" services for sampling and HASP
                                          training, emergency response, evacuation planning, and site security.
                                                                                 Decontamination  Workshop  143

-------
               Another Look at Chlorine Dioxide Fumigation:
            Concentration-Times, Efficacy Tests and Biological
                                  Indicators
                              February 24, 2005
                      EPA Decontamination Workshop

                           Paula Krauter & Staci Kane

                                EPD/ERD L-528
                                (925) 422-0429
                               krauter2@llnl.gov
                      Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
                 Chemical & Biological Nonproliferation Program

                                                                                              Presentation Outline
                                                                                    •  Project Background
                                                                                        S  Decontamination & Restoration for a Major
                                                                                           Transportation  Facility DDAP
                                                                                        S  Deliverable: develop & test a rapid efficacy test
                                                                                    • Chlorine dioxide fumigation field-test results
                                                                                           Efficacy tests
                                                                                           Biological indicators
                                                                                                                                      San Francisco Airport are
                                                                                                                                        partners in the DDAP
Sandia National Laboratory and Lawrence Livermore National
Laboratory are collaborating on a Restoration DDAP	
        The primary objective of the Restoration Domestic Demonstration &
        Application Program (DDAP) is to develop and demonstrate a set of
        procedures, plans and technologies for the rapid restoration of major
        transportation nodes
               -''Improve the fumigation verification step
                   > use of rapid viability determination methods for spore
                     strips/discs
               -''Improve the clearance sampling step
                   > use of rapid viability determination methods for environmental
                     samples
                                                                                              Large facilities require thousands of biological indicators
                                                                                              to insure the fumigant is adequately dispersed	
                                                                                             • Brentwood Post Office fumigation verification
                                                                                                included 8,000 spore strips

                                                                                                 - Analysis of all the spore strips at Brentwood
                                                                                                 took approximately 30 days

                                                                                             • Capitol Hill used 1,556 spore strip verification
                                                                                                samples
         Our field-test for rapid fumigation verification
          included scientific and operational objectives	

       Operational goals
           -   Demonstrate-1000 Bl overnight processing capability
           -   Demonstrate sample tracking/data analysis tools

       Scientific goals
           -   Comparison of Rapid viability test protocol (RVTP) with standard
               culture method for biological indicators (Bis)
                • Determine accuracy of RVTP relative to standard culture
                  method

           -   Perform  rigorous QC analysis
                • Evaluate potential for cross-contamination
                • Determine accuracy of RVTP to detect blind positive samples
                • Determine assay sensitivity
Test desian

Analytical
Method
Approx.
CT
(ppmv)
RVTP
Method
Standard
Method
Subtotal
Spore

104
104

Cntl
0
0
50
10
50
10
120
C1O2 exposure Time (hrs)
1246 8 10 12
750 1500 3000 4500 6000 7500 9000
50 50 50 50 50 50 50
10 10 10 10 10 10 10
50 50 50 50 50 50 50
10 10 10 10 10 10 10
120 120 120 120 120 120 120
Number
of discs

400
80
400
80
960

•Total Bl number was 1094
• Half of the samples were analyzed by culture methods and half by RVTP
• Hundreds of samples were exposed to a non-lethal CIO2 cone.
• Additional 50 Bis exposed for 12 hours for inhibition studies
• Each PCR plate had > 10% positive and >10% negative controls
144  NHSRC

-------
Fumigant Generation
 1.  CIO2 generation combines sodium hypochlorite with
    hydrochloric acid to produce chlorine, intermediate
    precursor

 2.  Sodium chlorite is added to produce chlorine dioxide gas

 3.  The gas is dissolved in water and the chlorine dioxide moves
    into the process stream, CIO2 (emitters) stripper removes
    CIO2 from water phase to gas phase
           Chemical plant
           • Sodium chlorite
           • Hydrochloric acid
           •Sodium hypochlorite
                                    Test facility drawing
                                                                              Airflow in the chamber
                                                                              was 3.31 ft3/min
                                  Sabre Technologies's MCAD24R test trailer
                                                                                                                        Chamber sample tray
Temperature and relative humidity in the chamber was
monitored throughout the test	

 We averaged 79-85 ฐF and 78-81% RH
           Day1
Day 2
                                   Chlorine dioxide concentration was carefully
                                   controlled during testing	
                                                                                                  Day 2
                                                                                             ACCUMULATIVE CT
                                                                                                (PPMV-HRS)
                                                                                                                         CIO2 assayed by a modified
                                                                                                                         Standard Methods APHA-
                                                                                                                         AWWA-WPCF-4500. CIO2
                                                                                                                         releases free iodine from an
                                                                                                                         acidified Kl solution. The
                                                                                                                         liberated iodine is titrated
                                                                                                                         with sodium thiosulfate.
 Every other sample was analyzed by RVTP
                   For all exposure levels, red X or O was cultured, black X or
                      O was analyzed by RVTP, X = 106 spores on Bl
                      O = 104 spores on Bl
                   T
/ All samples were barcoded with the
location information and followed
through each process of analysis using
the methods establish by the National
BASIS/BioWatch programs.
                                     Rapid viability test protocol was developed
                                     for biothreat agents	

                                 | There is a rapid increase in DMA copy number during growth
                                                                                  B. anthracis Viability Detectio


i




Y.pestJS Viabilfty Detection


*-— •
____ ^__^— -*"~"

C,,L Til „„'„„„
                                    Graphs shows increasing copies of DMA indicating cell growth
                                    and therefore viability; initial inoculums were below detection
                                                                              K. Smith, S. Kane, P. Coker, K. Montgomery, P. Imbro, P. Fitch, 2002, ROI pending
                                                                                  Decontamination Workshop  145

-------
         Efficacy test protocols
                     RVTP

        1.  Place Bl in 96 well plate
        2.  Add tryptic soy broth (TSB) to
           each well
        3.  Transfer time 0 sample to 96
           well PCR plate
        4.  Lyse cells
        5.  Transfer aliquot of lysate to
           second PCR plate
        6.  Analyze by real-time PCR
        7.  Continue to incubate culture
           plate at 37ฐC with shaking
        8.  Repeat steps 3-5 for 14 hr
           sample (endpoint)
 Standard Culture

Place Bl in 10 ml TSB
in culture tube
Incubate @30-35ฐC,
statically for 7 days
Determine positives by
visual turbidity
                                                                                             Results
•s  Chlorine dioxide concentration
   time curves
                                                                                             Test chamber
        Results: RVTP versus culture method using
        Biological indicators (106 spores/disc)	
       |S
                                                     s An exposure of 750 ppmv
                                                     for a 6 hr resulted in no
                                                     viable growth

                                                     S There was no significant
                                                     difference between the
                                                     RVTP results and the
                                                     standard culture results
                                                     (student T test for mean
                                                     differences,  P>0.05)
Results: RVTP versus standard culture method
using biological indicators (104 spores)
20
||
ฃฃ 15
ฃฃ•
Is
— *-RVTP(qPCR)




0 *
ft -i
1
z 5
=

\

I I I I I I I I I ;
CIO4 concentration xtime
(ppmv-hr)

/There was no
significant difference
between the RVTP
results and the

results, P>0.05



        False-positive occurrence
                                   Standard culture methods resulted in 1.5%
                                      false positives
                                      - False positives for culture samples
                                      determined by RVTP (qPCR)

                                   No false negatives observed for RVTP
                                      - False positive rate for RVTP defined
                                      as percent difference between positive
                                      result for 14 hr RVTP and visible growth
                                      in well

                                   RVTP results are numeric, standard
                                      culturing are visual
Calculated
fumiaation
log10(CFU)
survivors exposed to CIO2

DPG1
730 ppmv, 90% RH, BAA
Time (hrs) Log(CFU)2
0
1
2
4
6
8
12
iiiil

8.2
4.8
2.1
0
0
0
0
HHrsE;i

LLNL
750 ppmv,
Time (hrs)
0
1
2
4
6
8
10
12


80%RH, B.atrophaeus
Log(CFU)
8.2
2.1
1.9
1.4
0
0
0
0

146  NHSRC

-------
  Comparison of biological indicators-
  discs and strips respond to non-lethal CTs was different

    CIO2
    Exposure      Positives/total sample #
    ppmv-hrs   Apex disc	SGM strip
    0
    780
    1580
    3140
10/10
3/10
2/10
0/10
10/10
9/10
10/10
10/10
SGM Biotech Strip- 6. subtilis var. Niger, 106 spores
APEX spore discs- 6. atrophaeus, 106 discs
P <0.05, significantly different results between means
                                        Spores on stainless steel discs
Growth performance is different between the
two type of biological indicators	
 • Biological indicators may differs in several
  qualities:

    - Hard versus porous surface material
    - Sleeve porosity and adsorptive capacity
    - Spore viability
    - Purity of spore preparations
    -Spore piling
  Summary
     The Restoration DDAP is developing rapid
     methods for restoration of a transportation
        facility following a biological attack

    We met our objective of decreasing the analysis
    time for biological indicators from 7 d to 15 hr

    RVTP showed the same sensitivity as the culture
    technique and was highly accurate

    There are significant differences between
    biological indicators

    The EPA's CIO2 fumigation recommendation of
    750 ppm for 12 hr resulted in 'no viable spores'
    in this test
We have 2 field tests planned for '05; 1) test RVTP in a high-throughput
automation mode, and 2) analyze hundreds of environmental samples
(wipes, socks, filters) by RVTP and culturing methods
                                                                                    Acknowledgements
                                                                        LLNL
                                                                        Paris Althouse
                                                                        Tina Legler
                                                                        Gloria Murphy
                                                                        Tracy Letain
                                                                        Mark Wagner
                                                                        Tina Carlsen

                                                                        Apex Laboratories, Inc.
                                                                        Joseph Dalmasso
                                                                                     Sabre Technologies, Inc
                                                                                     Dave Skodack
                                                                                     Darrell Dechant
                                                                                     Kevin Wade
                                                                                     Bob Summerville
                                                                                     Buddy  Britton
                                                                                     Funded by the Department
                                                                                     of Homeland Security
                                                                                       Decontamination  Workshop  147

-------
    Edgewood Chemical Biological Contor
     Systematic Decontamination  Project
      Homeland Security: Verification of Chem/Bio Decon
                       Technologies
                    Philip Koga, Ph.D.
            US Army Edgewood Chemical Biological Center
                  Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD
      Presented at the USEPA-Sponsored Workshop on Decontamination, Cleanup,
           and Associated Issues for Sites Contaminated with CBR Materials
                       February 23-25, 2005
                        Washington, DC
       -
                                                                     Edgewood Chomical Biological Contor
                  Background
 How do we clean up anthrax-contaminated buildings?
    - Surface treatment vs. fumigation
    - Efficacy data
    - Impact on building materials and contents
    Edgewood Chomical Biological Contor
        Systematic Decontamination Project
     • Joint effort between USEPA NHSRC and ECBC
     • Systematic study on the performance of two to three
     commercial fumigant technologies
        - chlorine dioxide (CIO2)
        - vaporized hydrogen peroxide (VHP™)
     -
                                                                     Edgewood Chomical Biological Contor
Fumigant
^jK^^
""^%^
sa@ff ^^
            Indoor Surface Materials
Change in
material
properties

Reduction in
Anthrax / surrogate
load

Losses in
fumigant
concentration
    Edgewood Chomical Biological Contor
               Bioefficacv - Objectives
     1. CT Range Finding:
        - series of CT (concentration x time) studies
        - six types of material coupons
        - Avirulent and virulent B. anthracls
        - calculate D values
     2. Parametric Study:
        - sub-optimal temperature and RH at optimal CT
        - one porous and one non-porous material
        - selected surrogates
       .
Edgewood Chomical Biological Contor
   Bioefficacv - Target Microorganisms
1.  Bacillus anthracls (Ames or other suitable strain)
2.  B. ant/?/-ac/s(NNR1A1, plasmid-free)
3.  Geobacillus stearothermophilus (ATCC 7953)
4.  B.subtilis (ATCC 19659)
5.  B. atrophaeus (B. subtilis var. niger ATCC 49337)
6.  Yersinia ruckerii (ATCC 29473)
   Bl - Geobacillus stearothermophilus (STERIS)
   Bl - B. atrophaeus (Apex Laboratories, Inc.)
148 NHSRC

-------
Edgewood Chemical Biological Contor
                Test Materials
Material
Unpainted concrete
Painted steel (I beam)1
Structural Pine Wood
Ceiling tile
Carpet
Painted wall board2
Source - Manufacturer
York Building -Armstrong
Specialized Metals
Home Depot - Bowater
Home Depot - Armstrong
Home Depot - Queen Shaw
Home Depot - US Gypsum
           1- Painted with TT-P-636 Red Oxide Primer (Coronado paint)
           2- Painted with latex paint

                                                               Edgewood Chemical Biological Center
                                                        1.3 x 1.3 cm Test Coupons in Petri-plates
Edgewood Chemical Biological Center

       Bioefficacv - Test Fumiqants
STERIS VHP™
H202-ป 2 OH (free radical)
 ClorDiSvs, Inc. (CSI)
 2NaCIO2 + CI2-ป 2CIO2
 2NaCI
 "
SABRE Oxi. Tech. (SOT)
2NaCIO2 (25%) + HCI(15%)+ NaOCI
(12.5%)-ป2CI02 + 2NaCI
                                                               Edgewood Chemical Biological Center
                                                          The Cloridox
                                                             -GMP
                                                          Generator &
                                                          Test Chamber
                                                                                                 Sampling Ante-
                                                                                                   chamber
                                                                                                  Fumigation
                                                                                                  Chamber-
                                                                                                     8cu-ft
Edgewood Chemical Biological Center

        Bioefficacv - Test Chamber

• 8 cubic feet (2 ft x 2 ft x 2 ft)

• Constructed by ChlorDiSys, Inc. using 316 SS

• Contains a circulation fan and sensors for measuring
temperature, RH, pressure, CIO2, and H2O2

• Five antechambers for easy access and removal of
coupons (inner and outer airlock doors)

• Separate fumigant feed ports
                                                        Edgewood Chemical Biological Center

                                                                Bioefficacv - Study Design

                                                        1. CT Range-Finding Study (range of CT for 6 log kill)

                                                         A.  Avirulent anthrax (107 spores in 50 ^L inoculum)
                                                           - Six test materials and two biological indicators

                                                           - One VHP fumigant and two CIO2 fumigants

                                                           - Five replicates at five exposure times for each
                                                             of three concentrations plus controls

                                                           - CT range = 220 to 1800 ppm-hr for VHP

                                                            - CT range = 2000  to 18000 ppm-hr for CIO2
                                                                  Decontamination  Workshop  149

-------
    Edgewood Chemical Biological Contor
             Bioefficacy - Study Design
    1. CT Range-Finding Study
    B.    Virulent anthrax (107 spores in 50 JJ.L inoculum)
        -  Two test materials (wood and steel) and two
          biological indicators
        -  One VHP fumigant and two CIO2 fumigants
        -  Five replicates at five exposure times for each
          of two concentrations plus controls
        -  CT range dependent on results with avirulent BA
                                                                Edgewood Chomical Biological Contor
                                                                         Bioefficacy - Study Design
                                                                2. Parametric study at varying temperature and RH
                                                                    -  Four surrogates (107 in 50 JJ.L inoculum)
                                                                    -  Two test materials (wood and steel) and two
                                                                      biological indicators
                                                                    -  One VHP fumigant and one CIO2 fumigant
                                                                    -  Five replicates at one exposure time and one
                                                                      concentration for each of two temperatures and
                                                                      two RH plus controls
                                                                  ^ -  CT selected from preceding results
    Edgewood Chomical Biological Contor
           Bioefficacy - Study Execution
    1. Preparation of building material coupons
        -  Autoclave using dry cycle
        -  Test 2 coupons per cycle for sterility
        -  Prepare spore suspension in 0.5% BSA
        -  Inoculate with 107 cfu in 50 (4.L
        -  Air dry one hour in the biosafety cabinet
        -  Use within one week (one hour for Y. ruckerii)
     -
                                                                Edgewood Chomical Biological Contor
                                                                       Bioefficacy - Study Execution
                                                                2. Spore recovery and enumeration
                                                                    -  Immerse carrier in spore recovery medium
                                                                    -  Sonicate 10 minutes then vortex 2 minutes
                                                                    -  Prepare five 10-fold serial dilutions
                                                                    -  Spread plate 0.1 mL of selected dilutions in
                                                                      triplicate
                                                                    -  If no recovery observed with spread plates,
                                                                      repeat with pour plates
Edgewood Chomical Biological Contor
       Bioefficacy - Study Execution
3. Exposure of coupons to fumigant
    -  Use cycle parameters recommended by vendor
    -  Dehumidification (<30% RH) for VHP
    -  Humidification (>75% RH) for CIO2
    -  Conditioning phase (typically 2-10 minutes)
    -  Introduce coupons at start of sterilization phase
    -  Remove coupons at pre-selected times and
      immediately begin spore recovery process
                                                                     Edgewood Chomical Biological Contor
                                                                           Bioefficacy - Study Execution
                                                                     4. Measurement of fumigant concentration
                                                                        - VHP: Dra'ger electrochemical sensor in chamber
                                                                        - VHP independently verified by chemical titration
                                                                          (H2O2 + Kl + ammonium molybdate -> triiodide
                                                                          which is titrated with thiosulfate)
                                                                        - CIO2: spectrophotometric gas sensor in chamber
                                                                        - CIO2 independently verified using Hach kits
                                                                        - Hach kits validated using amperometric titration
                                                                          method
                                                                     v.—';
150  NHSRC

-------
Edgewood Chemical Biological Contor
 Experimental Set up per CT Measurement

                                                             Edgewood Chemical Biological Center
                                                                       Bioefficacv - Schedule
Fumigant
ChlorDiSys
STERIS
Sabre
CT Range-Finding
Underway
Start early March
Parametric
2QCY05
2QCY05
Need generator NLT March 20, 2005
                                                              i
Edgewood Chemical Biological Center

Deposition Velocity/Material Compatibility

1. Deposition Velocity Objective

   - Lab-scale measurement of the effects of six
     building materials on concentration / titer of CIO2
     and VHP

2. Material Compatibility Objective

   - Measure the effects CIO2 and VHP may have on
     the integrity of the six building materials
   - Test for residual fumigant
 I
                                                             Edgewood Chemical Biological Center
                                                            Deposition Velocity/Material Compatibility
                                                            Related projects spanning a continuum of activity

                                                            Deposition Velocity        Material Compatibility
                                                                       Exposure tp^
                                                                       Fumigant
                                                            Coupon Prep
                                                            • ~t\ .
                                                             2
"Storage & Aging
                Testing
                   o
Edgewood Chemical Biological Center

        Deposition Velocity Testing

• Same six test materials used for Bioefficacy study

  - Unpainted concrete      - Painted steel
  - Structural Pine wood     - Ceiling tile
  - Painted wall board       - Carpet

• Two test fumigants
  - VHP™ (STERIS)
  - CIO2(CDG)
                                                             Edgewood Chemical Biological Center
                                                                Vaporized Hydrogen Peroxide Setup

                                                             Generator: Steris VHP M100-S
                                                                '*  .,  -1
                                                               k  -Jj  -ป        V.P™,
                                                                         Lซ rr
                                                                    , JK  .*•  IWBWI  '
                                                                        K.i"—   u
                                                                Decontamination  Workshop 151

-------
Edgewood Chemical Biological Center

          VHP Exposure Chamber
                         |9) rซncwMun mni Ikmnly $wwy*
          wfEPi ccmcKfit coupon*   Ibl 9lFwn anVyvn IneJudM
     Coupon poซ>Mn marud.       ปrn*or pnd
      Exposure Chamber: Plas-Labs compact glove box

    &
                                                                  Edgewood Chemical Biological Center
                                                                            Chlorine Dioxide Setup
                                                                  Generator: CDG Technology bench-scale
                                                               f\ .    chlorine dioxide generator, Model "Micro'
                                                             \mj
    Edgewood Chemical Biological Center
       Chlorine Dioxide Exposure Chamber
      Exposure Chamber: Plas-Labs compact glove box

                                               0
                                                              Edgewood Chemical Biological Center

                                                                      Deposition Velocity Testing

                                                              Experimental Conditions
Test
Run
1
2
3
4

Fumigant
„
+
+
+

Coupon
+
-
+
+

Comment
Mat. Compat. Controls
Baseline
Full Concentration
1/2 Concentration
same CT as Run 3
                                                              •-•
Edgewood Chemical Biological Center
Deposition Velocity Testing
Experimental Conditions








Test Parameter
Temperature
Relative humidity, initial
Concentration 1 (ppm)
Exposure time 1 (hours)
Concentration 2 (ppm)
Exposure time 2 (hours)
Flow rate (cfm)
VHP
>30ฐC
<30%
250-300
4
125-150
8
0.2
CI02
>24ฐC
>75%
2000-2500
6
1000-1250
12
3.0
fl







I
                                                                  Edgewood Chemical Biological Center

                                                                        Material Compatibility Testing
                                                                  Test Materials
                                                                  •   Residential circuit breakers added
                                                                  •   Follow same exposure regimen as other materials

                                                                  Coupon Aging
                                                                  •   Store exposed coupons in open containers for -90
                                                                     days at room temperature and ambient RH

                                                                  Compatibility Testing
                                                                  •   Record visual changes at day 0 and day 90
                                                                  •   Test exposed coupons after day 90
                                                                  ,ซ,
                                                                  v_^
152  NHSRC

-------

Edgewood Chemical Biological Contor
Material Compatibility Testing

Material
Ceiling tile
Carpet
Wallboard

Test
ASTM C367-99: Strength Properties of
Prefabricated Architectural Acoustical
Tile or Lay-In Ceiling Panels, sections 5.1,
22-28
ASTM D1335-03: Tuft Bind of Pile Yarn
Floor Coverings
ASTM C473 03' Phyical Testing of
Gypsum Panel Products
• *ป • ^%
^ป; O
;

Edgewood Chomical Biological Contor
Material Compatibility Testina

Material
Wood
Steel
Concrete

Test
ASTM D4761-02a: Mechanical Properties
of Lumber and Wood-Based Structural
Material
ASTM A370-03a: Mechanical Testing of
Steel Products
ASTM C140-03: Sampling and Testing
Concrete Masonry Units and Related
Units
<- ^
;

Edgewood Chomical Biological Contor
Material Compatibility Testing

Material
Wood
Metal
Circuit
Breakers

Test
FTIR: changes in cellulose and other
polymers
Ion chromatography: chloride, chlorite,
chlorate, and perchlorate anions
Store under load
UL Test Method 1077

•fl
™-J
;
                                                      Edgewood Chomical Biological Contor
                                                     Velocity Deposition/Materials Compatibility
                                                      Schedule




                                                      Deposition Velocity:    Initiated




                                                      Materials Compatibility:  2QCY05
Edgewood Chomical Biological Contor
      Systematic Decontamination
                                                         Decontamination Workshop 153

-------
         Battelle
      - Illl..!].---, . ' llllllll.lln>II
        Verification of Commercial Decontamination
        Technologies in Bench-Scale Studies Using
        Bacillus anthracis Spores
        M.L Taylor, J.V. Rogers, Y.IV. Choi, W.R. Richter, K.R. Riggs, C.L. Sabourin
        Battelle Memorial Institute, Columbus and Cincinnati, Ohio
        J.C.S. Chang
        Environmental Protection Agency, Research Triangle Park, North Carolina
                                                                         Outline
 1 Purpose of Testing
 1 Technologies Tested
 1 Test Apparatus
 1 Test Materials & Organisms
 1 Parameters Evaluated
 1 Generalized Test Procedures
 1 BIOQUELL, Inc. - Hydrogen Peroxide Gas Testing
 1 CERTEK, Inc. - Formaldehyde Gas Testing
 1 CDG Technology, Inc. -Chlorine Dioxide Testing
 1 Acknowledgements
                                                  Baielle
    Purpose of Testing
     EPA ETV Program - Battelle, Testing Contractor
      - Verify the performance characteristics of environmental technologies
       and report objective information to permitters, buyers and prospective
       users
      - Testing performed as stipulated in test/quality assurance plans
       developed with the participation of technical experts, stakeholders and
       vendors
     Focus of Initial Tests
      - Verify performance of fumigant-type technologies for decontaminating
       indoor surfaces inoculated with B. anthracis (Ames) and surrogates
                                                     Baneue
 Technologies Tested
Technology
Hydrogen Peroxide Gas
Formaldehyde Gas
Chlorine Dioxide Gas
Vendor
BIOQUELL, Inc.
CERTEK, Inc.
CDG Research Corporation
                                                                                                                           Baneue
   Configuration of Testing Apparatus
    Technology
    being tested
                         BL-3 Laboratory
                                                     Baffeue
 Test Chamber
Plas-Labs Compact
Glove Box
modified per vendor's
request (BIOQUELL
configuration shown)
                                                                                               Direct Injection
                                                                                                   Port *
154  NHSRC

-------
 Test Materials
 1  Industrial-grade carpet (1C)
 1  Bare wood (pine lumber) (BWD)
 •  Glass (GS)
 1  Decorative laminate (DL)
 1  Galvanized metal ductwork (GM)
 1  Painted (latex, flat) wallboard paper (PW)
 p  Painted (latex, semi-gloss) concrete cinder
   block (PC).
                                                Baireue
Organisms
 Bacillus anthracis Ames
 Bacillus subtilis (ATCC 19659)
 Geobacillus stearothermophilus (ATCC 12980)

 Biological Indicators
  - Bacillus subtilis (ATCC 19659)
  - Geobacillus stearothermophilus (ATCC 12980)

 Spore Strips
  - Bacillus atrophaeus (ATCC 9372)
Biological Indicator
  _,
 Parameters Evaluated
  • Biological Efficacy Test
   - Log Reduction in viable spores on test materials
      - Quantitative
   - Positive/Negative bacterial growth at 1 and 7 days
      - Biological indicators/Spore strips; qualitative
  • Coupon Damage
   -Changes in appearance, color, texture, etc.
                                                Batteue
Generalized Test Procedure
• Couple decontamination technology to test chamber
• Prepare coupons of test materials, inoculate
• Place into test chamber
• Implement decontamination technology
• Remove coupons from test chamber
• Analyze
                                                                                                                 Batteue
 Analysis Procedure for B. anthracis Ames
   Procedure
   Growth
Assessment at 1
  and 7 days
                                         Heat Shock for 1 hr
Data Analysis
 1 Efficacy (E) Calculation
      E = log(NVN)
           N' = total viable spores recovered from control samples (no
              decon)
           N = total viable spores recovered from decontaminated
              samples
 1 Data (total spores; percent recovery)
 1 Expressed as Mean ฑ SD
                                                                       Decontamination Workshop  155

-------
   Statistical Analysis
    1 Two-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) model
    1 Compared each mean to zero
    1 Compared each simulant to B. anthracis (within material)
    1 Compared each simulant to B. anthracis for porous and non-
     porous materials
    1 SASฎ (Version 8.2) GLM procedure
                                                 Baielle
BIOQUELL, Inc. - Hydrogen Peroxide
  Cycle Parameters
  (Provided by Vendor)
•Cycle pressure:
•Conditioning time:
•Gassing time:
•Gassing dwell:
•H2O2 injection rate:
•H2O2 dwell rate:
•H2O2 concentration
during dwell:
•Aeration time:
               20 Pascals
               10min
               20 min
               20 min
               2.0 g/min
               0.5 g/min
               MOOOppm

               set for 9999 min
                                                                                                     CLARUS™ C Unit
                                                                                                                  Baielle
   BIOQUELL, Inc. - Hydrogen Peroxide
    Microcondensation
    during Dwell Phase
BIOQUELL, Inc. - Hydrogen Peroxide
Results
Mean Efficacy for Spores
Material"
Porous
Non-porous
Industrial -grade
Carpet
Painted Concrete
Bare Wood
Glass
Decorative
Laminate
Painted Wallboard
Paper
Galvanized Metal
Ductwork
a anthracis*
3.01 (2.62-3.55)c
6.36 (3.92-7.58)c
3.70 (3.20-4.46)c
>7.92 (7.92)=
>7.85 (7.85)=
>6.92 (6.92)=
>7.54 (7.54)=
a subtilis*
1.63(1. 46-1. 76):.d
6.09 (5.58-7. 10)=
2.18(1.81-2.75)c.d
>7.57 (7.57)c
>7.66 (7.66)c
>7.52 (7.52)c
6.44 (5.73-7.56)=
G. stearothermophilus^
0.81 (0.69-0.89)d
4.09 (3.09-5. 15)[.d
4.09 (3.80-4.61)c
4.68 (4.27-5. 11)c'd
3.75(2.20-4.77)[.d
5.98 (5.47-6.99)c
1.97(1.90-2.04)[.d
a Three replicates were used for each test material for each organism.
b Log reduction in spores with range in parentheses.
c Mean significantly different from 0 (P<0.05).
d Surrogates significantly different from B. anthracis for specified material (P<0.05).
Baneue
BIOQUELL, Inc. - Hydrogen Peroxide
Statistical Analysis

Material
Porous
Non-porous
Industrial -grade
Carpet
Painted Concrete
Bare Wood
Glass
Decorative
Laminate
Painted Wallboard
Paper
Galvanized Metal
Ductwork
a anthracis
3.01
6.36
3.70
7.92
7.85
6.92
7.54
a subOlis
1.63
6.09
2.18
7.57
7.66
7.52
6.44
G. stearothermophilus
0.81
4.09
4.09
4.68
3.75
5.98
1.97
All values are significantly different than zero (P<0.05)
except
^Baneje_
BIOQUELL, Inc. - Hydrogen Peroxide
Statistical Analysis

Material
Porous
Non-porous
Industrial -grade
Carpet
Painted Concrete
Bare Wood
Glass
Decorative
Laminate
Painted Wallboard
Paper
Galvanized Metal
Ductwork
a anthracis
3.01
6.36
3.70
7.92
7.85
6.92
7.54
a subOlis
1.63
6.09
2.18
7.57
7.66
7.52
6.44
G. stearothermophilus
0.81
4.09
4.09
4.68
3.75
5.98
1.97
Mean value is significantly different than a anthracis (P=O.OS)
^Baneje_
156  NHSRC

-------
BIOQUELL, Inc. - Hydrogen Peroxide
Growth Indicators
Indicator (Organism)
Biological Indicator (B. subtitis ATCC 19659) Control
Biological Indicator (G. stearothermophitus ATCC 12980) Control
Spore Strip (B. atrophaeus ATCC 9372) Control
Biological Indicator (B. subtitis ATCC 19659) Decontaminated
Biological Indicator (G. stearothermophilus ATCC 12980) Decontaminated
Spore Strip (B. atrophaeus ATCC 9372) Decontaminated
Day1
S1






S2






S3






Day?
S1






S2






S3






                       For all tests, control biological indicators and spore
                       strips displayed positive growth while those
                       decontaminated showed negative growth.
                                                    Baneue
CERTEK,  Inc.  - Formaldehyde
                                                                          Cycle Parameters
                                                                          (Provided by Vendor)

                                                                          •Cycle pressure:     ambient
                                                                          •Conditioning time:   1 hour
                                                                           (ramp-up of formaldehyde concentration)
•Dwell time:
•Formaldehyde
concentration:
•Relative humidity:
•Neutralization:
(ammonium carbonate)
•Total run time:      16-18 hours
                                                                                          10 hours
                                                                                          theoretical - 8600 ppm
                                                                                          actual - 1,100 ppm
                                                                                          75%
                                                                                          1 hour
                                        CERTEK, Inc. Unit
                                                                                                                            Baireue
CERTEK, Inc. - Formaldehyde
Results
Mean Efficacy for Spores
Material"
Porous
Non-porous
Industrial -grade
Carpet
Painted Concrete
Bare Wood
Glass
Decorative
Laminate
Painted Wallboard
Paper
Galvanized Metal
Ductwork
a anthracis*
>7.00 (7.00)=
7.15(5.93-7.76)c
>7.61 (7.61)=
>7.71 (7.71)=
6.47 (5.61-7.66)c
>5.17(5.17)=
>7.86 (7.86)=
a subtilis*
>8.04 (8.04)c
6.02 (5.61-6.22)=
6.58 (5.57-7.08)=
>7.79 (7.79)=
7.29 (6.38-7.74)=
>7.68(7.68)[.d
6.24(5.39-7.87)=.d
G. stearothermophilus*
5.68 (4.81-7. 18)[.d
6.20 (4.03-7.29)c
>6.82 (6.82)=
>7.24 (7.24)=
>7.12(7.12)=
>7.19(7.19)=.d
>7.64 (7.64)=
a Three replicates were used for each test material for each organism.
b Log reduction in spores with range in parentheses.
c Mean significantly different from 0 (P<0.05).
d Surrogates significantly different from B. anthracis for specified material (P<0.05).
Batteue
R,En™ซ,./I™™-iป,
CERTEK, Inc. - Formaldehyde
Statistical Analysis

Material
Porous
Non-porous
Industrial-grade
Carpet
Painted Concrete
Bare Wood
Glass
Decorative
Laminate
Painted Wallboard
Paper
Galvanized Metal
Ductwork
a anthracis
>7.00
7.15
>7.61
>7.71
6.47
>5.17
>7.86
a subtilis
>8.04
6.02
6.58
>7.79
7.29
>7.68
6.24
G. stearothermophilus
5.68
6.20
>6.82
>7.24
>7.12
>7.19
>7.64
All values are significantly different than zero (P<0.05)
except
Baireue
Uป Bn.ln™. ./Im,.ป.buii
CERTEK, Inc. - Formaldehyde
Statistical Analysis

Material
Porous
Non-porous
Industrial-grade
Carpet
Painted Concrete
Bare Wood
Glass
Decorative
Laminate
Painted Wallboard
Paper
Galvanized Metal
Ductwork
a anthracis
>7.00
7.15
>7.61
>7.71
6.47
>5.17
>7.86
a subtilis
>8.04
6.02
6.58
>7.79
7.29
>7.68
6.24
G. stearothermophilus
5.68
6.20
>6.82
>7.24
>7.12
>7.19
>7.64
Mean value is significantly different than a anthracis (P=O.OS)
raBBaneue_
                                                                        CDG Research Corporation - Chlorine Dioxide
                                                                          Cycle Parameters
                                                                          (Provided by Vendor)
                                                                          •Cycle pressure:
                                                                          •Conditioning time:
                                                                          •Dwell time:
                                                                          •Chlorine Dioxide
                                                                           concentration:
                                                                          •Relative humidity:
                                                                          •Temperature:
                                                                          •Neutralization:
                 ambient
                 N/A
                 6 hours
                 2000 ppm
                                              1  t
                 70-80%
                 23-27ฐC
                 30-60 min followed by overnight aeration
                                                                           (10% NaOH, 10% NaS2O4 in water)
                                                                          •Total run time:     16-18 hours
                                                                              Decontamination  Workshop 157

-------
CDG Research Corporation - Chlorine Dioxide
Results
Mean Efficacy for Spores
Material"
Porous
Non-porous
Industrial -grade
Carpet
Painted Concrete
Bare Wood
Glass
Decorative
Laminate
Painted Wallboard
Paper
Galvanized Metal
Ductwork
a anthracis*'
4.62(4.11-5.50)
7.25 (6.24-7.76)
4.33(4.10-4.48)
5.70 (5.35-6.06)

>7.68 (7.68)
>7.79 (7.79)
B. subtilis*-
4.44 (4.28-4.62)
4.74 (4.44-4.93)=
4.48 (4.14-4.79)
5.23 (4.89-5.49)

4.62 (3.24-5.47)=
5.57 (S.55-5.63^
G. stearothennophilus*'
3.22(3.17-3.28)c
5.79 (5.08-6.90)c
3.79 (3.70-3.87)
3.87 (3.64-4.20)c
4.44 (4.29-4.59)
5.62 (4.65-6.87)c
3.43 (3.33-3.56)c
a Three replicates were used for each test material for each organism.
b Log reduction in spores with range in parentheses.
c Surrogates significantly different from B. antrhacis for specified material (P<0.05).
Baneue
U, BusmWfcmo^i™
CDG Research Corporation - Chlorine Dioxide
Statistical Analysis


Material
Porous
Non-porous
Industrial-grade
Carpet
Painted Concrete
Bare Wood
Glass
Decorative
Laminate
Painted Wallboard
Paper
Galvanized Metal
Ductwork
a antlnacis
4.62
7.25
4.33
5.70
4.57
>7.68
>7.79
a subtilis
4.44
4.74
4.48
5.23
5.14
4.62
5.57
G. stearothennophilus
3.22
5.79
3.79
3.87
4.44
5.62
3.43
All values are significantly different than zero (P<0.05)
eซeP, g
Baneue
U, BusmWfcmo^i™
CDG Research Corporation - Chlorine Dioxide
Statistical Analysis


Material
Porous
Non-porous
Industrial-grade
Carpet
Painted Concrete
Bare Wood
Glass
Decorative
Laminate
Painted Wallboard
Paper
Galvanized Metal
Ductwork
B. anthracis
4.62
7.25
4.33
5.70
4.57
>7.68
>7.79
B. subtilis
4.44
4.74
4.48
5.23
5.14
4.62
5.57
G. stearothennophilus
3.22
5.79
3.79
3.87
4.44
5.62
3.43
Mean value is significantly different than B. anthracis (P=O.OS)
Batreiie
                                                                            Acknowledgements
                                                                            Battelle
                                                                            Dr. James Estep - Battelle MREF Manager
                                                                            Dr. Carol Sabourln - Verffication Testing Coordinate
                                                                            Dr. James Rogers - Study Director
                                                                            Dr. Michael Taylor - BDT Center Director
                                                                            Ms. Karen Riggs - BDT Center Manager
                                                                            Dr. Harry Stone - Senior Reviewer
                                                                            Mr. Young Choi - Lead Technician
                                                                            Mr. Will Richter-Technician
                                                                            Ms. Denise Rudnicki- Technician
                                                                            Mr. Rick Turtle - Technician
                                                                            Ms. Nicole Caudill - Qualfty Assurance
                                                                            External Reviewers
                                                                            Dr. Phil Koga - U.S. Army Research Development & Engineering C
                                                                            Dr. Barry Pyle - Montana State University
                                                                            Ms. Susan Spring!horpe - University of Ottawa
                                                                            Dr. Lloyd Larson - U.S. Army Dugway Proving Ground
                                                                            Mr. John Kyme - Defense Group, Inc.
                                                                            Dr. Greg Knudson, U.S. Central Intelligence Agency
                                 U.S. EPA
                                 Dr. John Chang - BDT Center Manager
                                 Dr. Dorothy Canter, Reviewer
                                 Mr. Jeff Kern pter. Reviewer
                                 Ms. Shirley Wasson, Quality Assurance
                                 Mr. Bruce Henschel, Reviewer
                                                                                                                               Baneue
    New EPA Program: Technology Testing
    and  Evaluation Program (TTEP)

    TTEP established in July 2004 by the EPA National
     Homeland Security Research Center (NHSRC)

                   EPA Project Officer - Eric Koglin

                Battelle Project Manager - Karen Riggs
                                                       Baireue
Decontamination Technology Evaluation
Tasks in Progress

Three Task Orders for evaluating  building
  decontamination technologies were received
  September 2004
  -"Decontamination Technology Testing and Evaluation"
     - EPA Task Order Project Officer, Dr. John Chang
       - Battelle Task Order Leader, Dr. Mike Taylor
  - "Systematic Evaluation of Developmental and
    Commercially Available Methods for Biological Agent
    Decontamination"
     - EPA Task Order Project Officer, Dr. Shawn Ryan
       - Battelle Task Order Leader, Dr. Harry Stone
  - "Systematic Evaluation of Developmental and
    Commercially Available Methods for Chemical Agent
    Decontamination"
     - EPA Task Order Project Officer, Dr. Shawn Ryan
       - Battelle Task Order Leader, Dr. Mike Taylor
                                                                                                                               Baireue
158  NHSRC

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"DIRTYBOMBS" (RDDs)
    AND CLEANUP

    Fred B. Holbrook
  DECON WORKSHOP
    February 25, 2005
    Terrorism and RDDs



   1.  Terrorism

   2.  RDDs

   3.  Radiological components

   4.  RDDs versus INDs

          Terrorism
The calculated use of violence to
  inculcate fear;  intended to coerce
  or intimidate governments or
  societies, in the pursuit of goals
  that are generally political,
  religious, or ideological. (DOD)
             RDDs
     RDDs are radiological dispersion
     devices or "dirty bombs".
     Physical effect: contamination
     Overall aim: psychological and
     economical
     Uses conventional explosives to
     disperse radioactive material.
  Radiological components
  > Cesium-137
  > Cobalt-60
  > lridium-192
  > Strontium-90
30 yrs (half-life)
 5.25 yrs
74 days
29 years
  > Radium-226    1620 years
  > Plutonium-238    88 years
  > Americium-241   432 years
  > Californium-252    2.7 yrs
                                                Decontamination  Workshop 159

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                  RDDs versus INDs

               Radiological Dispersion Devices can
               generate terror but cause few fatalities.
               Improvised Nuclear Device is a crude
               nuclear device and causes bldg. to
               come down near instantly with high
               doses radiation, heat & fires, and lost
               lives (depending on yield). Fission:
               force, electromagnetic waves, and
               fallout.
               1300 to 2100 metric tons enriched
               uranium in world with questionable
               controls.
                                                                     Radiological Considerations
                                                            Availability
                                                             Biological Effects
                       Availability
            Specialized materials - weapon grade
            UorPu.
             •  Government control

             Radioactive materials
             •  Uses: academic, industrial, agricultural,
               and medical
             •  Problem: 1 lost source every day/NRC
                                                           Availability continued

                                                         Cs-137: gauges, well logging, cancer
                                                         treatment, irradiators         j—1_™
                                                                                    •  .    *
                                                         Co-60: gauges, radiotherapy,
                                                         sterilization, radiography
                                                         lr-192: radiography, radiotherapy
                                                         Am-241:  medical diag, research,
                                                         gauges, distance, smoke detector
                                                         Cf-252:  radiography, well logging,
                                                         moisture/density, cancer treatment
                                                         Problem: little security worldwide

          Radiation

Alpha - helium nucleus
shielding - paper or skin
travel - few centimeters
Problem - inhalation and ingestion
Beta - electron
shielding - Al foil or human skin
travel - few feet
Problem - deep and serious burns;
internal
                                                                          Radiation continued

                                                                       ' Gamma - electromagnetic energy
                                                                        high energy short wavelength photon,
                                                                        pure energy, no charge
                                                                        shielding - lead
                                                                        travel - go thru many cm. lead
                                                                        Problem - severe damage internally
                                                                       ' Strength - how many nuclei decay per
                                                                        second; specific activity, Ci/gram
160 NHSRC

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Biological effects

-  Dosage of ionizing
  radiation
•  25-50 rem - 
-------
                                                                        Decontamination Techniques
                                                                       • Power Brushing mechanical    • Shaving - diamond tipped rotary
                                                                       erosion of contaminate substrate  cutting head surface removal

                                                                       • Pressure Washing - mechanical  . Spa||ing _ mechanical impact of
                                                                       flushing                contaminated surface
                                                                       • Scabbling - mechanical eroding
                                                                       of contaminant
            Decontamination  Techniques
           • Sponge-jet Blasting -
           abrasive removal

           • Strippable Coatings -
           chemical bonding to
           surface contaminates

           • Vibratory Processing -
           high frequency removal in
           liquid media

           • Hydrogen Peroxide - dissolution
           of materials on surface
           • Geobacter Sulfurreducens -
           bacterial reduction of rad.
           producing precipitation
EPA Homeland Security
    Research Program
162  NHSRC

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   UK approach to ROD clean-up
              Dr Malcolm Wakerley

Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs
                     (Defra)

         Washington, 25 February 2005
                                                             Lessons to learn from
                                                               Spain, US B-52 bomber nuclear weapons
                                                               accident 103tsoil - US, 12,000m3 vegetation
                                                               waste
                                                               Ukraine, Chernobyl reactor accident 137Cs fallout
                                                               across most of Europe
                                                               Brazil, Goiania, cancer therapy unit, 137Cs
                                                               chloride, 3,000m3 waste
Consequences in UK

•  Creation of Radiation Incident Monitoring Network,
  RIMNET, 92 gamma detectors about 30km apart and
  network of approved labs supplying data to London
•  Need for large area monitoring - Airborne Gamma Survey
•  1996 review of decontamination and clean-up techniques
  for use in UK following radioactive accidents
     - National Radiation Protection Board
     - Rolls Royce Nuclear Engineering
     - Atomic Weapon Establishment
                                          _t _ r_ _^
                                          GclrO
                                              _
                                                             1996 Review

                                                             •  Simple logic diagram and 22 tables on decontamination
                                                               techniques, clean-up rates, resources required, costs
                                                               incurred and wastes requiring disposal.
                                                             •  Covers:-
                                                               - metalled surfaces
                                                               - large grass areas
                                                               - gardens
                                                               - trees and bushes
                                                               - roofs
                                                               - walls and windows
                                                               - internal surfaces
dcfro'
1996 Review (cont)
  Worked example of a UK town, Gateshead and
  surroundings
    55 square miles
    200,000 population
    550 miles of roads
  Looked at inventory of mechanical equipment available
  within area and UK wide
  Used EXPURT (Exposure from Urban Radionuclide
  Transfer) Model
                                          dcfra

                                                             Responses to 9/11
                                                             •  Production of a Recovery Handbook for Radiation
                                                               Incidents
                                                               Production of a Recovery Handbook for CB
                                                               Incidents

                                                               Ability to feed Airborne Gamma Survey results to
                                                               RIMNET
                                                               Examination of modelling
                                                                                                       ricfrc.
                                                               Decontamination Workshop  163

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                                                                 Radioactive Incident Monitoring Network
                                                                 (RIMNET)
                                                                 94 fixed monitoring locations across United Kingdom
                                                                 • Measuring ambient gamma dose rate
                                                                 • Measuring Range: 50 nSv/h - 3 mSv/h
                                                                 • Sensitivity: 15cps/uSv/h
                                                                 • Temperature Range: -20oC - +40oC
                                                                 • Energy Response: 60KeV - 1.25MeV, (normalised to
                                                                   caesium-137)
                                                                                                          defrti
                                              derro
                                                                 Radioactive Incident Monitoring Network
                                                                 (RIMNET)

                                                                 Access to modelling capability of UK Met. Office
                                                                 •  Short Range - Area of Impact (Chemet, PACRAM)
                                                                 •  Medium (Mesoscale) - Local effects (ADMS)
                                                                 •  Long Range (Lagrangian diffusion) - Transboundary
                                                                    impacts (NAME)
defro
                                                                              CXERCJSE   -4
                                                                          4.     *
164  NHSRC

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Radiological  Handbook
"To guide decision-makers through the available
recovery options following a radioactive dispersal
event"
Covers radionuclides that could be used by terrorists.
!9mTc
238pu
           75Se
           103Ru

           136Cs
           169 Yb
           239pu
9ฐSr+9ฐY
106Ru

137Cs
192|r

M1Am
35Zr
131|

1ซBa
                                        95Nb
                                        132Te
Radiological Handbook (cont)

•  Compilation of reliable, consistent and comprehensive
  information to help users identify issues and evaluate
  options
      - Recovery and Radiation Protection
      - Agricultural Food Production
      - Domestic Food Production and Free Food
      - Inhabited Areas
      - Drinking Water
•  570 pages and interactive CD format
•  Being made available to US via Quad
•  Being expanded to cover crops, climate in rest of Europe
Radiological  Handbook (cont)
Stepl


Step 2


Step 3
Step 4
StepS
       Determine type of incident & scope
       radionuclides involved; scope extent & scale of
       contamination
       Determine extent of existing countermeasures
       eg precautionary advice/order, sheltering &
       evacuation
       Prioritise contaminated area into broad bands
       based on urgency of need for decisions.
       For each band:
       Determine land uses
       Divide contaminated area into broadly similar
           regions & into topic areas based on
           information obtained
                                         dcfro

                                                              Radiological Handbook (cont)
                                            Step 6

                                            Step 7

                                            Step 8

                                            Step 9
                                            Step 10
           Prioritise regions &/or topic areas.
           Develop and implement monitoring strategy
           Consider options for each region and/or topic
           area
           Assess options for each region &/or topic
           area
           Choose options for each region &/or topic area
           Implement options
           Monitor & review effectiveness & impact of
           chosen options
Radiological  Handbook (cont)

                INHABITED MiAS
                                             dcfro
                                                              Radiological Handbook (cont)
                                                                      Introduction
                                                                      Specific criteria for recovery in inhabited areas
                                                                      Framework for making decisions
                                                                      Determining the nature and extent of the incident and
                                                                      characterising the contamination
                                                                      Estimating doses in inhabited areas
                                                                      Considering appropriate recovery options
                                                                      Assess consequences of implementing recovery options
                                                                      Choice of a strategy
                                                                      Pre-planning
                                                                     Decontamination  Workshop  165

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SEPA
     United States
     Environmental Protection
     Agency

     Office of Research and Development
     National Homeland Security Research Center
     Cincinnati, OH 45268
     Official Business
     Penalty for Private Use
     $300

     EPA/600/R-05/083
     October 2005
PRESORTED STANDARD
POSTAGE &      PAID
EPA
PERMIT NO. G-35
            Recycled/Recyclable
            Printed with vegetable-based Ink on
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            processed chlorine free

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