Water Environment

Water Sector Security


                                                 June 2006
      Water Sector
Security  Workshops
    U.S. Environmental Protection Agency

       Office of Research and Development

    National Homeland Security Research Center
              Cincinnati, OH

              Office of Water

           Water Security Division
             Washington, DC

       Water Environment Federation

              Alexandria, VA
                June 2006
              Printed with vegetable-based ink on
              paper that contains a minimum of
              50% post-consumer fiber content
              processed chlorine free

Table of Contents
Overview: Water Sector Security Workshops 	1

Workshop Participation	1

Workshop Format	3

Overarching Security Challenges for Water Sector Utilities	4

Maintaining Support for Security Investments by Water Sector Utilities	4

Addressing the Vulnerability of Water Sector Utility Distribution Systems	7

Managing Water Sector Security Information	9

Most Commonly Identified Application and Research Water Sector Security Needs	11

Conclusions and Next Steps	12

List of Tables
Table  1   Water Sector Security Workshop Participants	1

Table  2   EPA and WEF Partner Organizations	2

Table  3   Water Sector Security Workshop Sessions Overview	3

Table  4   Three Overarching Security Challenges for Water Sector Utilities	4

Table  5   Challenges in  Maintaining Support in Security Investments for Water Sector Utilities	5

Table  6   Specific Needs Related to Maintaining Support in Security Investments for
          Water Sector Utilities	5

Table  7   Challenges in Addressing Water Sector Distribution System Vulnerabilities	7

Table  8   Specific Needs Identified to Address Water Sector  Distribution Vulnerabilities	8

Table  9   Challenges in  Managing Water Sector Security Information	9

Table 10   Specific Needs Identified to Manage Water Sector  Security Information	10

Table 11   Most Commonly Identified Application and Research Water Sector Security Needs	11
                                                   Water Sector Security Workshops Mi


Overview:  Water Sector Security  Workshops

Because safe drinking water and properly treated wastewater are critical to modern
life, the federal government has identified the water sector as one of seventeen critical
infrastructures/key resources in the United States (Homeland Security Presidential
Directive 7). During 2005, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), in
cooperation with the Water Environment Federation  (WEF ), hosted three Water
Sector Security Workshops (workshops) involving drinking water and wastewater utility
operators and other key stakeholders. The purpose of the workshops was  to discuss water
sector security issues in order to better gauge the current status of water security, outline
common challenges, and identify what is most needed to better protect the nation's water
    WEF has published interim reports from each of the three workshops on the
Water Security Channel,  at www.watersc.org. These reports summarize the results of
the workshops and detail specific lessons learned and critical needs related to both the
application of water sector security programs and supporting research and technology
    This report will summarize the lessons learned and current needs from all
three workshops. First, however, it is important to describe the stakeholder groups
represented at the workshops, how participants were selected, and how the workshops
were conducted.

Workshop  Participation
Approximately 100 stakeholder group representatives participated in each of the three
EPA/WEF Water Sector Security Workshops. Table 1 shows the breakdown of all
participants by category.
    A major goal of the workshops was to ensure a balance of participation among
key water sector stakeholders. This included small, medium, and large urban water
sector utilities; rural water sector utilities; and other appropriate stakeholders, such
as government agencies, public health organizations, and emergency responders. All
    Table 1
Water Sector Security Workshop  Participants
                     Trade/Professional Organizations (10%)
                           Government (25%)
                     Emergency Responders; Academia;
                     Public Health; Law Enforcement (15%)
                                                        Water Sector Security Workshops 1

workshop invitees were approved by a steering committee of representatives from
WEF, EPA, and the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS).
    The Water Sector Coordinating Council (WSCC) played an essential role in
planning and implementing the workshops. This council, formed in 2004, serves as
a policy, strategy, and coordination mechanism to reduce and eliminate significant
homeland security vulnerabilities to the water sector through interaction with the
federal government and other critical infrastructure sectors. The WSCC consists of
two owner/operator representatives along with one non-voting association staff person
from each of the following associations: American Water Works Association (AWWA),
Association of Metropolitan Water Agencies (AMWA), National Association of Clean
Water Agencies (NACWA), National Rural Water Association (NRWA),  National
Association of Water Companies (NAWC), WEF, Water Environment Research
Foundation (WERF), and AWWA Research Foundation (AwwaRF).
    Several partner organizations (see Table 2) recommended water sector utility or other
stakeholder invitees. The partner organizations also reviewed and provided comments on
the workshop agenda and participated in the workshops.
| ...................................... i
                 EPA and WEF  Partner Organizations

                                     ASSOCIATION OF METROPOLITAN WATER AGENCIES
                                     AMERICAN WATER WORKS ASSOCIATION
                                     AWWA RESEARCH FOUNDATION
                                     NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF CLEAN WATER AGENCIES
                                     NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL SERVICES CENTER
                                     NATIONAL RURAL WATER ASSOCIATION
                                     WATER ENVIRONMENT RESEARCH FOUNDATION


Each workshop spanned two and one-half days and was organized around three major
sessions, including general sessions, a series of facilitated breakout group sessions, and a
final facilitated overall discussion of application and research trends and needs identified
during the course of the workshop. The workshops stressed two major focus areas of
water sector security: application needs and research needs. Table 3 provides a brief
summary of the workshop sessions. Significantly more detail on the methodology used
for the workshops and full workshop agendas are available from the three
interim reports available on the Water Security Channel at www.watersc.org.
                 Water Sector Security Workshop Sessions Overview
All sessions were focused on either water sector security applications (e.g., funding, tools, training) or water sector
security research (e.g., monitoring systems, treatment technology) needs.
 Opening Sessions
 Presentations from EPA Water Security Division,
 EPA National Homeland Security Research Center,
 DHS, states, water sector utilities, and professional
 associations on the current state of water sector

 Breakout Sessions
 Approximately 25 individuals participated in one
 of four facilitated breakout sessions conducted on
 each of the first two days. Breakout sessions on Day
 1 focused on lessons learned and application needs
 while Day 2 sessions focused on research needs.

Opening Sessions
Provide an overview to participants of the current
state of water sector security and updates on
application and research activities in preparation for
focused breakout group sessions.

Breakout Sessions
Increase knowledge among participants regarding
a wide range of current water security practices and
challenges confronting water sector utilities and
stakeholders, and provide stakeholder input to WEF,
EPA, DHS, and others regarding priority water sector
application and research needs.
 Facilitated Discussion of Needs Identified in
 Breakout Groups
 Workshop participants reconvened on the morning
 of Day 3 for additional technical presentations, a
 presentation by workshop facilitators summarizing
 results from Day 1 and Day 2 sessions, and facilitated
 open discussion for participant questions, comments,
 recommendations, and other input to workshop
 sponsors and others.
Facilitated Discussions
Provide an opportunity for workshop participants
to introduce needs and ideas not already discussed;
clarify important needs; share and discuss security
challenges with other stakeholders; ask questions
of WEF, EPA, DHS, and others; and provide input
regarding how best to address needs identified
during the workshops.
                                                             Water  Sector  Security Workshops 3

Although many specific issues and needs were discussed during the individual
workshops, three overarching challenges for the water sector emerged (see Table 4)
and participants identified specific needs associated with each challenge.
    While these overarching challenges are the primary focus of this summary report,
the report will also highlight several other commonly identified application and
research needs from the workshops.
    For a complete listing of issues presented during the workshops, individuals
are encouraged to read the interim report from each individual workshop at
www. wa terse, org.

    V?i     '      Three Overarching Security Challenges
                  for Water Sector Utilities

 Maintaining Support for Security Investments by Water Sector Utilities

 Addressing Vulnerabilities of Water Sector Utility Distribution Systems
 Managing Water Sector Security Information
          5 ! : !C i^'if     < J h .T    < .'*.. !.' n   J »

Issue Overview
The Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002
mandated that every drinking water utility serving populations greater than 3,300
individuals conduct a vulnerability assessment (VA) of its facility and update its
emergency response plan (ERP) based on that VA. According to EPA, 100 percent of the
large and medium-sized drinking water utilities and more than 95 percent of the smaller
drinking water utilities complied with this mandate. EPA continues to work with utilities
to achieve full compliance. While wastewater utilities were not mandated by the federal
government to conduct vulnerability assessments or update their emergency response
plans, many have voluntarily completed both tasks as best business practices.

Specific Challenges Identified in Water Sector Security Workshops
Vulnerability assessments are designed to assist a utility in making decisions as to which
specific security investments would provide the greatest benefit to the utility. According
to participant input, many water sector stakeholders feel that utilities are faced with the
challenge of determining which security investments are of the greatest benefit while
balancing these concerns with the costs of other, no nsecurity- related investments for
their utility (see Table 5). In addition, when deciding which security investments to
make, utility managers and other stakeholders contend that it is difficult to determine
the current state of the art in the relatively new area of water sector security. For example,
deciding on when to phase in contamination detection and monitoring investments
presents a challenge since detection and monitoring technologies are perceived to be
rapidly changing and often unproven for broader security applications.

                 Challenges  in  Maintaining Support in Security
                 Investments for Water Sector Utilities

 How should priorities be set?
 What is the proper balance between security-related investments and nonsecurity-
 related needs?
 What is the state of the art?
 Which security products should be purchased when industry products are
 constantly changing?
 Whose priorities?
 Without a mandate from the government, industry standards, or known threats,
 how and when should a security program be implemented?
    The prioritization concerns noted above are more acute, according to some
workshop participants, in the absence of federal, state, or local government mandates to
implement security measures; industry standards; and clearly defined threats to water
sector systems.
    The importance of creating a "security culture" at a utility; incorporating security
practices as part of normal business operations; was widely recognized at the workshops
as an effective means to implement and maintain water sector security over time. This
would be comparable to companies instilling safety consciousness as part of standard
operating procedures in plant operations.
Specific Needs Identified to Maintain Momentum and Support for
Security Investments
In order to address the challenges listed in Table 5, workshop participants discussed many
needs for water sector utilities. In this context,  participants discussed three basic water
sector groups; each with unique needs as outlined in Table 6.
    Decision makers associated with a water sector utility (such as the board of directors,
the mayor, or other elected officials) were said to need, among other things, a cost/risk
model to show where to invest  precious utility resources across all utility priorities, not

                 Specific Needs  Related  to  Maintaining
                 Support in Security Investments for Water
                 Sector Utilities

 Decision  Maker Needs
 •  Cost/risk model of how and where to invest utility resources across all priorities
    (security and nonsecurity-related)
 •  Assistance with developing a "vision for security implementation"
 •  Strategies on how to derive multiple benefits from security programs

 Utility Staff Needs
 Increased training on strategies for creating a security culture

 Community Needs
 Increased understanding of the "psychology of a contamination event"
                                                            Water Sector Security Workshops 5

just security. While many methodologies have been introduced to the water sector since
9/11 on how to prioritize security-related investments, workshop participants clearly
identified a need for decision makers at the utility to have a more comprehensive tool to
balance all utility needs in order to make sound decisions for budget allocations.
    Decision makers also need  better tools to assist in developing security plans for their
utilities. For example, some workshop participants noted that while planning for utility
upgrades is done in three-, five-, or seven-year increments, security investments are not
necessarily being included in those assessments currently because reliable models do not
exist to help identify what specifically should be included.
    Finally, water sector decision makers need a greater understanding of how to derive
multiple benefits from their security investments. One of the most pressing needs
for water sector utilities across the United States, for example, is the replacement and
rehabilitation of aging infrastructure. Strategies on how to leverage the current emphasis
placed on security by the federal government against these needs may allow for much-
needed infrastructure upgrades while increasing security.
    Water sector utility staff members, particularly managers and operators, need
training on strategies for creating and maintaining a security culture at their utilities.
Those entrusted with the day-to-day operation of a water sector utility need to be
consistently educated on  the value and purpose of security at their facilities, as well as  the
multiple benefits derived from the implementation of an efficient and effective security
program to the overall operation of the utility.
    According to many workshop participants, the communities served by water sector
utilities need a better understanding of potential crisis incidents, their consequences,
and measures that can be taken to reduce risks and minimize impacts. This need can be
addressed in part by developing and distributing effective education tools and outreach
materials. In many cases, the public would be more likely to support water sector security
efforts, financially and otherwise, if the nature of crisis events and security investments
and other measures to prevent or deal with them were better communicated.

Issue Overview
While most critical infrastructures are contained, such as nuclear power plants, water
sector distribution systems are more widely dispersed. Contaminant and physical
intrusion detection are significant challenges faced by water sector utilities in reducing
the vulnerability of their distribution systems.

Specific Challenges in Addressing Water Sector Utility Distribution
System Vulnerabilities
Water sector stakeholders participating in the workshops consistently identified three
categories of distribution system vulnerabilities: access, detection, and lack of coordinated
response protocols for contamination events. Table 7 defines these categories and
provides brief examples from the workshops.
    Since water sector distribution systems have a significant number of access
points, many stakeholders feel that some points will be more difficult to protect than
others. For this reason, they suggest that it would be best to focus on improving
detection and mitigation capabilities while also improving technologies to reduce
access at known key points.
    As explained earlier in this report, workshop sessions covered both water sector
security applications (e.g., funding, tools, training) and water sector security research
(e.g., monitoring and detection technologies). While increased funding was the most
noted applications need, an overwhelming number of workshop participants noted a
lack of real-time detection and monitoring technology as the primary research need.
    Workshop participants were also consistently concerned that up-to-date
response protocols be in place in  their communities and noted that comprehensive
decontamination procedures are often currently lacking. Not having regional response
teams established ahead of time could cause significant delays in recovering from a
terrorist attack or other crisis event.

     1             Challenges in Addressing  Water Sector
                  Distribution  System Vulnerabilities

 Significant number of access points and better capacity to protect some points
 along the system than others.
 Without reliable, real-time detection and monitoring technologies,  contaminants
 may go undetected or false alarms  may occur.

 Coordinated Reponse
 Insufficient reliable response protocols and decontamination procedures, and often
 a lack of regional, cross-organizational response teams.
                                                              Water  Sector  Security Workshops 7

Specific Needs Identified to Address Water Sector Distribution
Workshop participants cited increasing public involvement and developing a culture of
security as two main needs in addressing water sector distribution vulnerabilities. The
public at large can have a significant impact in helping to monitor the security of the vast
water sector distribution systems in their communities by noticing and reporting any
suspicious persons or situations. This could reduce the overall vulnerability of the water
sector to terrorist or other incidents. While the culture of security was generally discussed
in relation to promoting the importance of security among the staffof a utility, it was also
noted that the presence of a security culture in the community could help the public be
more aware and prepared to  assist should an event occur. Table 8 summarizes these and
related needs to address water sector distribution vulnerabilities.
    Research projects relating to real-time detection and monitoring are needed,
according to water sector security stakeholder participants. Integrated, real-time
contaminant monitoring and advanced, reliable intrusion detection systems were
specifically mentioned as needed research projects.
    To address the need for a coordinated response to distribution vulnerabilities, many
workshop participants described a need to establish and maintain emergency response
protocols across participating organizations. Other significant needs include regional
response teams, regional cross-sector training, and reliable decontamination  procedures.

                    Specific Needs Identified  to Address Water
                    Sector Distribution Vulnerabilities

 Greater public involvement, including creation of a culture of security

 Research projects on real-time contaminant monitoring and intrusion detection
 Coordinated Response
 Regional response teams and reliable response protocols and decontamination

Issue Overview
A key overarching challenge raised by all stakeholders, across all issue categories, was
the need to properly manage information on water sector security issues from a variety
of sources. The volume of information, the type of information, and the format of
the information are all critical considerations in assisting water sector stakeholders,
particularly water sector utilities, in making critical decisions regarding how to protect
their customers and the general public from terrorist threats and attacks.

Specific Challenges in Managing Water Sector Security Information
Despite significant efforts by all levels of government, trade and professional associations,
and other water sector security stakeholders, many utilities are unaware of many tools
and training opportunities already available to them and of pertinent ongoing or
completed research. Workshop breakout sessions provided the opportunity for utilities
and other stakeholders to identify both immediate and longer-term application and
research needs for  effectively dealing with security issues. Stakeholders frequently
mentioned a need for security applications or research projects that have already been
developed or are in the process of being developed. This clearly indicates that more work
needs to be done to communicate the availability of water sector security information
to utilities and other stakeholders. Table 9 highlights several of the information
management challenges identified in the workshops.
    Ironically, many stakeholders also cited an overload of information, particularly
"general" information that is difficult to apply at the local level. Several examples of tools
and training that have been published were cited as examples of good work, but they
provided utility managers with little "actionable" information to use in implementing
their day-to-day goal of building a security culture.

Specific  Needs Identified to Manage Water Sector Security Information
One of the most common needs across all workshops was the  need to refine
communication efforts. As noted above, much of the information the water sector
receives is viewed as too general in nature. Simple,  locally relevant, actionable
information was consistently cited by workshop participants as one of the major needs.

                   Challenges in  Managing Water Sector
                   Security  Information

 General  lack of  awareness of available information
 (Many identified needs have been or are being addressed by current resources.)

 Overload of general  information that is hard to apply at the local level
 Defining what information is secure and who should have access
 (e.g..  Freedom of Information Act concerns)
                                                              Water Sector Security Workshops  9

    Once again, public education tools and training, specifically on critical dependencies
and interdependencies of the water sector, are needed to strengthen relationships among
all critical water sector security stakeholders.
    Besides providing useful updates on the current state of water sector security, many
participants noted that the Water Sector Security Workshops themselves provided the
opportunity for much needed peer-to-peer interaction, particularly among utilities. Some
participants recommended additional regional forums, perhaps with an expanded target
audience including stakeholders from other critical infrastructures, such as power utilities
or transportation.
    Finally, many stakeholders cited a general lack of knowledge and training available
on crisis communication strategies. In the event of an attack or viable threat to water
systems, for example, local water utilities and others involved in the response will be
required to answer questions and provide information to the media and public about the
situation, potential risks, and what is being done to deal with the crisis. This will often
occur under difficult conditions of high stress and uncertainty. Water sector stakeholders
are concerned about such issues as who the spokesperson should be, what information
to share and how best to present it, how to effectively respond  to questions, and how to
coordinate communication both internally and with other involved organizations. These
issues should be addressed in a crisis  communication plan established and implemented
before a crisis event occurs.

                    Specific  Needs Identified to Manage Water
                    Sector Security Information

 Refined Communication Efforts
 Keep information simple, locally relevant, and actionable.

 Targeted Information Sharing Programs
 Targeted among and between utilities and the emergency response community

 Public Education Program
 on the critical dependencies of the water sector and additional regional forums to
 increase peer-to-peer access to  information
 Greater Emphasis on Crisis Communication Strategies
 (e.g., message mapping, which involves anticipating likely questions that will be
 asked and developing and practicing delivery of key messages before a crisis

                 '?» l\pf4H*hi It'll
                 %r * t? rt %f
While the three categories of challenges and needs outlined above provide a convenient
organization of issues raised at the three water sector security workshops, it would be
inaccurate to imply that these overarching issues encompass all of the issues raised by
workshop participants. As mentioned earlier, the three water sector security interim
reports available at www.watersc.org pro vide a detailed listing of all issues captured
during the sessions. However, Table 1 1 provides a list of the most commonly identified
application and research needs from all three workshops. The needs are organized
under the five pillars of water security defined by EPAs Water Security Division (WSD)
in its "Framework for EPAs Water Security Strategy." The five pillars are entitled
"overarching," "prevention," "detection," "response," and "recovery." Because response
and recovery are so interrelated, they are captured in one column in the table.
                   Most Commonly Identified Application and Research Water
                   Sector Security Needs

 Guidance and support for
 coordinating the message
 and the messenger in
 communicating with the
 public during/after an
Integration of water
security with other utility
programs (e.g., OSHA,
Improved ability to
identify and characterize
threats, including
integrated real-time
Guidance on best
practices for responding to
contamination incidents,
the comparative efficacies
of various decontamination
protocols and technologies,
and emergency notification
 Communication and
 outreach materials to
 assist utilities with funding
 opportunities for security
 program implementation
Advanced intrusion
detection and distribution
system protection
Public health early
warning and notification
Guidance on how to
determine "how clean is
clean" and how to convince
the public that these
determinations are correct
 Nationwide, peer-to-
 peer network of utilities
 to develop and share
 industry norms, best
 practices, expertise, and
Joint training exercises
to provide better,
more comprehensive
consideration of water
issues and water utility
roles in incident response/
"Consumers' Report"
guide to physical
detection tools,
equipment, and methods
Ways to efficiently deliver
a sustainable alternative
water supply (e.g., examine
 Protocols for better
 characterizing system
 and infrastructure
                          Increased access to
                          and awareness of
                          analytical and laboratory
                          capabilities and services
                          Enhanced incident
                          response coordination
                          and communication. Free
                          qualified facilitation services
                          for utilities to conduct
                          emergency response
                          tabletop exercises
 Expanded awareness
 of the multiple benefits
 of security measures to
 overall utility operations
                          Joint operations centers
                          for monitoring utility
                          facilities (e.g., on a
                          regional basis)
                          Standardized resources
                          within the water utility
                          sector to facilitate sharing
                          and access to resources
                          (e.g., people, expertise,
                          equipment) for emergency
                          response and recovery
                                                            Water Sector Security Workshops 11

To better secure our nation's critical drinking water and wastewater infrastructures, the
water sector focuses on having security programs in place that enhance its ability to
prevent, detect, respond to, and recover from potential terrorist or other intentional
acts and natural disasters. These efforts assist in ensuring the safety of the drinking
water supply and protection of water quality by reducing the risk to public health, the
environment, and critical infrastructure.
    EPA and other water sector stakeholders recognize the continued need to refine
national, state, and local government water security programs and closely partner with
utilities, public health, emergency response, law enforcement, and others responsible for
the security of the nation's critical water sector infrastructure. The three Water Sector
Security Workshops confirmed that the general direction EPA and others are heading to
address the vast security challenges facing the water sector is  appropriate and that work
needs to continue. The following reiterate the general conclusions from the workshops:
   It is important that water utilities and other water sector stakeholders establish a
   "culture of security."
   It is a challenge for utilities to maintain momentum and support for security
   programs and investments, especially at the municipal level.
   Security is a concern for utilities, and it is important to recognize that multiple
   benefits are derived from efforts to enhance security.
   There is a need for additional tools and resources to assist utilities and other
   stakeholders in identifying and characterizing vulnerabilities to  a system and the
   public health and economic consequences of an event.
   Distribution system vulnerability is viewed as a major challenge due to the number
   of service connections.
   There is a need for improved detection, response, and mitigation  capabilities for
   water sector utilities.
   Physical entry and contaminant detection remain a challenge.
   There is a need for continued research and development of real-time detection
   and monitoring technologies, decontamination procedures, and analytical
   Water utilities face the ongoing challenge of educating other members of
   the emergency preparedness community about the role that water sector
   utility operators play in response to an event and in explaining the critical
   interdependencies that exist among the water sector and other critical
   Utilities, especially smaller systems, seem unaware of many existing security-related
   applications, research outputs, and activities that could be better communicated.
   Guidance, tools, and other resources intended to help utilities and others address
   security-related needs should be easy to use and obtain.  (This is especially relevant
   for smaller systems.)

   Information management, including defining what type of information is "security
   sensitive" remains a challenge.
   A community of like-minded water security professionals has emerged in recent
   years, and there is great value in forums that sustain this community.
    EPA has developed its water sector security programs with extensive stakeholder
input and review. The Agency will continue to update and refine its programs, based
on vulnerabilities and threats to drinking water and wastewater utilities and potential
incident consequences, in an effort to assist in reducing risks to the water sector. Input
from the Water Sector Security Workshops will, in part, be used to enhance current
efforts and inform longer-term policy and research planning and decisions.
    Workshop outcomes will influence the development of the EPA Water Security
Division's "Water Security Strategic Framework" and an updated EPA National
Homeland Security Research Center's (NHSRC) "Research and Technical Support
Action Plan."  The WSD's "Strategic Framework" presents a road map of its near- and
long-term programs to  strengthen water security. The NHSRC's "Action Plan"
summarizes key water sector security needs and describes research projects  dealing
with drinking water supply, water treatment, finished water storage, drinking water
distribution system infrastructure, wastewater treatment and collection infrastructure,
wastewater treatment, and treated wastewater discharges.
    It is clear that the federal government alone cannot meet the vast needs of the water
sector. State and local governments, as well as other partnering organizations; including
many of those who participated  in this project; have a continuing responsibility
to educate and cooperate with the federal government and water sector utilities in
communicating the value of water and wastewater security.
    As the sector-specific agency for the water sector, EPA will continue to collaborate
and build upon existing relationships with all parties within the sector—drinking
water and wastewater utilities; the  Department of Homeland Security; other critical
infrastructure sectors; state, local and tribal governments; and stakeholders—to better
understand interdependencies, develop tools and training, improve information sharing
and exchange mechanisms, and conduct  research activities with the goal of ensuring that
water sector critical infrastructure operations are not interrupted by potential terrorist or
other intentional acts.
                                                              Water Sector Security Workshops  13

     United States
     Environmental Protection

     Office of Research and Development
     National Homeland Security Research Center
     Cincinnati, OH 45268
     Official Business
     Penalty for Private Use

     June 2006
            Printed with vegetable-based ink on
            paper that contains a minimum of
            50% post-consumer fiber content
            processed chlorine free