&EPA
United States
Environmental Protection
Agency
REPORT ON
2006 Workshop on Decontamination,
Cleanup and Associated Issues for Sites
Contaminated With Chemical, Biological,
or Radiological Materials
Office of Research and Development
National Homeland Security
Research Center
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EPA/600/R-06/121
January 2007
Report on the 2006 Workshop on Decontamination, Cleanup, and
Associated Issues for Sites Contaminated with Chemical, Biological,
or Radiological Materials
By
Sarah Dun
Eastern Research Group, Inc.
Lexington, MA 02421
For
Contract EP-C-04-056
Joseph Wood
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
Office of Research and Development
National Homeland Security Research Center
Decontamination and Consequence Management Division
Research Triangle Park, NC 27711
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
Office of Research and Development
National Homeland Security Research Center
Cincinnati, OH 45268
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Report on 2006 NHSRC Decontamination Workshop
Notice
This report was prepared by Eastern Research Group, Inc. (ERG), a contractor for the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA), as a general record of discussions for the "2006 Workshop on
Decontamination, Cleanup, and Associated Issues for Sites Contaminated with Chemical, Biological, or
Radiological Materials." This report captures the main points of scheduled presentations and summarizes
discussions among the workshop panelists, but it does not contain a verbatim transcript of all issues
discussed. EPA will use the information presented during the workshop to address decontamination and
cleanup challenges faced at sites contaminated with chemical, biological, or radiological materials.
Disclaimer
The information in this document has been funded wholly or in part by the U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency under contract no. EP-C-04-056 with Eastern Research Group, Inc. Information on which this
report is based was technically reviewed and approved prior to presentation at the workshop. Approval
does not signify that the contents reflect the views of the Agency, nor does mention of trade names or
commercial products constitute endorsement or recommendation for use.
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Report on 2006 NHSRC Decontamination Workshop
Table of Contents
Executive Summary viii
I. Introduction 1
II. Presentations and Associated Question and Answer Periods 3
Opening Remarks and Plenary Session 3
Opening Remarks; Conceptual Timelines for Decontamination Events 3
Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Science and Technology Chemical/Biological
Restoration Programs 5
Evidence Awareness for Remediation Personnel at Weapon of Mass Destruction (WMD) Crime
Scenes 7
General Decontamination Issues 9
Validation of Environmental Sampling Methods: Current Research and Related Projects 9
Decontamination Research at the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) National
Homeland Security Research Center (NHSRC) 11
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Regulation of Biological Decontamination 14
Test Method Update (Office of Pesticide Programs [OPP] Sterilant Registration Protocol
Development) 16
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA): Partner in Protecting the Homeland 18
Technical Support Working Group (TSWG) Decontamination Research and Development
Activities 20
A Decontamination Concept of Operations 22
Decontamination and Consequence Management Division (DCMD) Disposal Research 24
A Sampling of Some of Canada's Decontamination Work 26
The Government Decontamination Service (GDS): The United Kingdom (UK) Perspective on
Decontamination Approaches 27
Environmental Lab Response Network (eLRN) Support and Standard Analytical Methods 29
Decontamination Technologies 31
Bacillus anthracis Spore Detection Using Laser-Induced Breakdown Spectroscopy (LIBS) 31
Chlorine Dioxide Fumigation Developments 33
Decontamination Technology Testing and Evaluation 35
Vapor Hydrogen Peroxide (VHP) Fumigation Technology Update 37
Laboratory Decontamination of 65 Room New Animal Facility Using Chlorine Gas 39
Decontamination Research—A New Approach 41
Decontamination of Toxins and Vegetative Cells Using Chlorine Dioxide 43
Restoration of Major Transportation Facilities Following a Chemical Agent Release 44
The Development of Modified Vaporous Hydrogen Peroxide (mVHP) for Chemical- and
Biological-Weapons Decontamination 46
Spore Contamination: What Concentration Deposits, What Resuspends, and Can We Inhibit Its
Transport? 48
Studies of the Efficacy of Chlorine Dioxide Gas in Decontamination of Building Materials
Contaminated with Bacillus anthracis Spores 49
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Report on 2006 NHSRC Decontamination Workshop
Decontamination Research and Development 52
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) National Homeland Security Research Center
(NHSRC) Ongoing Research Efforts in Understanding the Efficacy and Application of
Decontamination Technologies 52
Rapid Methods to Plan, Verify and Evaluate the Effectiveness of the Decontamination Process. 53
Agent Fate Program 55
Stakeholder Issues Surrounding Chemical Agent Restoration 56
Radiological Dispersion Device Decontamination 59
Strategy for National Homeland Security Research Center (NHSRC) Radiological
Decontamination Research and Development Program 59
Decontamination Technologies for Urban Radiological Dispersion Device (ROD) Recovery 61
Radiological Dispersion Device (ROD) Aerosolization Experiments:
History/Applications/Results 63
Water Decontamination 65
Water Distribution System Decontamination 65
Decontamination of Water Infrastructure 66
Adherence and Decontamination of Chemicals and Biologicals 68
Measurement and Analysis of Building Water System Contamination and Decontamination 70
Water Decontamination and Detection 72
Foreign Animal Disease/Avian Influenza Decontamination 73
Determining the Virucidal Mechanism of Action for Foreign Animal Disease 73
Protection of U.S. Agriculture: Foreign Animal Disease Threats 75
III. Panel Discussion—Lessons Learned, Research and Development Needs, Technology Gaps 78
IV. Agenda 81
V. List of Participants 85
VI. Presentation Slides 91
in
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Report on 2006 NHSRC Decontamination Workshop
List of Abbreviations
AEGL
AMI
ANL
AOAC
BI
BROOM
BSL
CBRNC
CDC
ClorDiSys
CT
CWA
DARPA
DCMD
DDAP
DHS
DOD
DOE
DOJ
DSTL
ECBC
eLRN
EPA
ESF
ETV
op
FBI
FDA
FEMA
FIFRA
ft2
ft3
GDS
gpm
GPS
HSPD
HVAC
IND
Acute Exposure Guideline Level
American Media International
Argonne National Laboratory
Association of Analytical Chemists
biological indicator
Building Restoration Operations Optimization Model
biosafety level
Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Countermeasures
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
ClorDiSys Solutions, Inc.
concentration and time values
chemical warfare agents
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
Decontamination and Consequence Management Division
Domestic Demonstration and Application Program
U.S. Department of Homeland Security
U.S. Department of Defense
U.S. Department of Energy
U.S. Department of Justice
Defense Science and Technology Laboratory
Edgewood Chemical Biological Center
environmental laboratory response network
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
Emergency Support Function
Environmental Technology Verification
degrees Fahrenheit
Federal Bureau of Investigation
U.S. Food and Drug Administration
Federal Emergency Management Agency
Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act
square feet
cubic feet
UK Government Decontamination Service
gallons per minute
Global Positioning System
Homeland Security Presidential Directive
heating, ventilation, and air conditioning
improvised nuclear device
IV
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Report on 2006 NHSRC Decontamination Workshop
List of Abbreviations
LAX
LIBS
LLNL
LRN
mg/L
mm
mVHP
NAS
NOT
NEPA
NHSRC
NIOSH
NIST
OP-FTIR
OPP
ORD
OSC
OTD
PCR
PHILIS
PNNL
ppb
PPE
ppm
PVC
RCE
ROD
Sabre
SARS
SFO
SNL
STERIS
TOC
TSM
TSWG
TTEP
UK
USCG
USDA
Los Angeles International Airport
laser-induced breakdown spectroscopy
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
laboratory response network
milligrams/liter
millimeter
modified vapor hydrogen peroxide
National Academy of Sciences
National Decontamination Team
National Environmental Policy Act
National Homeland Security Research Center
National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health
National Institute of Science and Technology
open-path Fourier transform infrared
Office of Pesticide Programs
Office of Research and Development
on-scene coordinator
Chemical Restoration Operational Technology Demonstration
polymerase chain reaction
Portable High-Throughput Integrated Laboratory Identification System
Pacific Northwest National Laboratory
parts per billion
personal protective equipment
parts per million
polyvinyl chloride
Response Capability Enhancement
radiological dispersion device
Sabre Technology Services
severe acute respiratory syndrome
San Francisco International Airport
Sandia National Laboratory
STERIS Corporation
total organic carbon
Three Step Method
Technical Support Working Group
Technology Testing and Verification Program
United Kingdom
U.S. Coast Guard
U.S. Department of Agriculture
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Report on 2006 NHSRC Decontamination Workshop
List of Abbreviations
USPS U.S. Postal Service
VHP vapor hydrogen peroxide
WMD weapon of mass destruction
WWI World War I
VI
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Report on 2006 NHSRC Decontamination Workshop
Executive Summary
General Decontamination Topics
Martin (EPA) opened the workshop with a discussion of the six elements of the restoration process for a
building contaminated with B. anthracis. He described developments that will greatly reduce the overall
restoration time (compared to past experience) should another biological agent attack occur. These are
primarily related to improvements in decontamination technology (e.g., chlorine dioxide [C1O2]) and the
sample clearance process. For further reducing building restoration time, Martin provided a number of
recommendations, such as: having C1O2 registered with EPA as an approved sporicide, having a full-time
workgroup available on-site for document review, insuring the owner or vendor in lieu of
indemnification, optimizing the characterization and clearance phases, and revising the criteria for and
placement of biological indicators (Bis).
Bettley-Smith discussed the UK's Government Decontamination Service (GDS), which he heads and was
established in October 2005. GDS provides advice and guidance on decontamination issues, and
identifies and assesses available technologies. Local government agencies would provide the personnel
and obtain the equipment necessary to conduct decontamination. The heart of the GDS is a framework of
contractors that are available to provide local agencies with decontamination equipment, supplies, and
experience.
Fingas (Environment Canada) discussed three overarching decontamination-related research and
development projects underway at Environment Canada: the Multi-Agency Restoration Project, the
Demonstration Project, and the Standards Project. The Multi-Agency Restoration Project was a 3-year
study of radiation, chemical, and biological decontamination and waste management techniques, with
testing performed at the laboratory scale. The Demonstration Project, planned for the summer of 2006,
will involve full-scale tests of decontamination technologies. Separate facilities will address chemical,
biological, and radiological contamination scenarios. The Standards Project is a 5-year study to develop
standards for chemical and biological decontamination endpoints.
Kempter (EPA) gave an overview of EPA's regulation of biological agent decontaminants. Pesticides are
approved by EPA under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), either by
registration or by exemption (i.e., emergency, quarantine or crisis use). For the B. anthracis
decontaminations, EPA issued 28 crisis exemptions. To be registered as a sterilant or sporicide, a liquid,
gas or vapor product must pass the qualitative Association of Analytical Chemists (AOAC) Sporicidal
Activity Test. EPA has developed a significantly improved AOAC SAT (pending approval), and is also
working collaboratively to validate a quantitative sporicidal test method (Three Step Method). Gas or
vapor products intended for use in enclosed spaces larger than a glove box must also pass a simulated use
test with Bis. EPA is exploring a new product claim called "Decontaminant". Registration of
"Decontaminant" products (intended to inactivate spore-forming bacteria such as B. anthracis) will
require agent-specific efficacy data and will have label limitations.
Adams (EPA) gave an overview of EPA's National Homeland Security Research Center. NHSRC's
mission is to provide state-of-the-art scientific knowledge and technologies to enable incident responders
to effectively respond and safely restore affected areas following the release of biological, chemical, or
radiological threat agents. She described the three divisions in the Center, and provided more specifics on
the Decontamination and Consequence Management Division (DCMD), which she leads. DCMD has
four main research areas: detection, containment, decontamination, and disposal. Dr. Adams provided a
brief overview of the research in each of these areas.
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Ottlinger (EPA) described the functions of EPA's National Decontamination Team. The objectives of the
group include providing technical support to OSC's and first responders, effectively delivering
information about decontamination options; enhancing preparedness, planning, and partnerships; serving
as a liaison between stakeholders; and identifying operational shortfalls. The NDT develops standard
operating procedures for handling various threat agents and compiles technical information about
decontamination science, methods, validation, and resources, as well as disposal options.
Edwards (EPA) gave an overview of EPA's homeland security responsibilities and described in particular
EPA's Office of Homeland Security (OHS) duties. OHS implements the EPA homeland security agenda
and policy, and also serves as a liaison with the White House (via the Homeland Security Council), DHS,
and other federal departments involved in homeland security concerns. Edwards reviewed EPA's
involvement with six of the Homeland Security Presidential Directives (HSPD), and described EPA's
program office HS responsibilities, such as emergency response, water quality, decontaminant use,
hazardous materials remediation, ambient air monitoring (e.g., Biowatch), and research and development.
Edwards noted several events of national significance where EPA was involved in the recovery, such as
the World Trade Center attack, the 2001 anthrax attacks, the ricin event at Capitol Hill, and Hurricane
Katrina.
Blackmon provided an overview of the Technical Support Working Group (TSWG) decontamination
research and development activities. Blackmon is part of the Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and
Nuclear Countermeasures (CBRNC) Subgroup, which is actively managing about 90 projects. Blackmon
presented an overview of some of their decontamination projects. One involves the development of a low-
cost, easy-to-use personal decontamination kit for victims exposed to chemical agents. In another project,
a strippable polymer coating is being developed that is sprayed on a surface and fixes radioactive particles
in place. TSWG is also working with Argonne National Laboratory to develop chemically-based removal
of cesium-137 from porous building materials after an RDD event. TSWG is also developing software
that will design a statistical surface sampling approach for determining the extent of building
contamination following a CB terrorist attack.
Brooks (DHS) began by noting that DHS is not the primary lead in decontamination efforts, but rather
serves an overall coordinating role and provides emergency services in support of other responding
agencies (e.g., EPA). However, under Presidential Directive #10, DHS is responsible for restoration of
critical infrastructure facilities. Brooks provided an overview of some of the projects he is managing.
These include development of restoration plans for airports, mass transit facilities, and large, outdoor,
urban areas following a chemical or biological attack. Brooks is also managing projects to address
laboratory issues, such as coordinating the Integrated Consortium of Laboratory Networks, the All
Hazards Receipt Facilities to handle unknown samples, and a mobile laboratory prototype called the
Portable High-Throughput Integrated Laboratory Identification System (PHILIS).
Biological Warfare Agent (BWA) Persistence and Decontamination
Rastogi (ECBC) and Ryan (EPA) presented the results of their systematic decontamination studies to
determine the log reduction of B. anthracis viability as a function of C1O2 dose (concentration times time,
or CT) on six different building materials, and to compare the CT needed to achieve no growth on Bis and
the six different building material coupons. Ryan noted that the Bis and coupons had high spore loadings
(6 to 7 logs, i.e., 106 or 107 spores per BI or coupon). The researchers noted that the CT required to
achieve no growth on coupons was not affected by a 2-fold increase in chlorine dioxide concentration.
Unpainted cinder blocks and painted I-beams required a minimum CT of 9,000 ppm hours to obtain no
growth, while for the Bis, no growth occurred on all samples after 5,000 ppm hours. (During the question
and answer period that followed, a discussion ensued regarding issues with using Bis in building
decontamination.)
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In a separate presentation, Ryan presented the results of three other projects he is leading. He discussed a
project which investigated how environmental conditions such as temperature and relative humidity may
impact biological agent persistence. Vaccinia virus levels decreased over time on painted concrete and
galvanized metal, with the decrease occurring more rapidly on the galvanized metal ductwork. Ricin toxin
was very persistent on the painted concrete, but less persistent on the galvanized metal ductwork. Ryan
then presented results of another project to investigate VHP and C1O2 chemical interactions with building
materials. Ryan discussed another project to evaluate four different techniques for measuring C1O2 gas
levels. Two of these techniques provided data in real-time, and were based on electrochemical or
spectroscopic principles.
Wood (EPA) described the evaluation of several bio-agent decontamination technologies. The Sabre
C1O2 fumigant technology was evaluated for bio-efficacy against spores of B. anthracis, B. subtilis, and
G. stearothermophilus on various types of material coupons. The Sabre technology achieved at least a 6-
log reduction in spores on all materials at a concentration of 3000 ppm and contact time of 3 hours.
Wood also described the current evaluation of several liquid sporicidal decontamination technologies
(e.g., aqueous C1O2, hypochlorous acid, hydrogen peroxide) for inactivating the same spores on 3
different types of materials. Lastly, Wood described a project with DoD to demonstrate a mobile
decontamination trailer designed to produce C1O2 at a rate of about 75 pounds per hour. The trailer also
includes a scrubber to remove C1O2 from the gas that would be withdrawn from the building to maintain
negative pressure.
Mason described his C1O2 technology company's (Sabre) decontamination experience, their lessons
learned, enhancements made to their technology, and their efforts to lower building restoration times.
Most of the reductions to the overall building restoration time and cost would be non-technical in nature,
such as having available (or already assembled) equipment, enabling agreements, site agreements for
content handling, pre-engineered insurance policies, first response community communication and
education, draft planning documents, and established clearance criteria. Mason described Sabre's work to
address the extensive mold contamination resulting from Hurricane Katrina. A mobile laboratory is used
during decontamination for sampling and monitoring. Mason discussed the 3 to 4 million ft3 facility that
they decontaminated. With the advances Sabre has made, the total event time lasted only 3 days. Mason
noted that mold fumigation used 3,000 ppm C1O2 for 3 hours.
Czarneski (Clordisys) described their company's experience decontaminating a 180,000 ft3 animal
research facility using C1O2. Much of the facility equipment was decontaminated in place. The
decontamination system consisted of five chlorine dioxide generators and 20 gas sensing points. Fans
distributed the C1O2 gas because the facility was fairly complex with many small rooms and long
hallways. C1O2 concentrations of 0.5 to 0.8 mg/L were maintained for 6 hours. They fell short of the 1
mg/1 target concentration, possibly due to leakage, although air monitoring outside the facility did not
identify measurable concentrations of C1O2.
Leighton (IVD/CHORI) discussed studies using C1O2 to decontaminate vegetative bacterial cells
(surrogates for plague, tularemia, glanders, etc.). He found that a dose of 20 to 50 ppm-hours completely
inactivated most of the surrogates, although S. aureus required a 230 ppm-hours dose. His tests confirmed
that shorter exposure times require higher C1O2 concentrations. Leighton also reported that the C1O2 did
not oxidize cell DNA, thus forensic evidence remains after decontamination. In the next phase of his
research, Leighton examined biotoxin (e.g., botulinum, ricin) inactivation with C1O2 using various
enzymes as surrogates. The study included evaluation of various assays for detecting inactivation, and
development of assay methods continues. A C1O2 dose of 2,400 ppm-hours resulted in a 6-log reduction
in saporin (surrogate for ricin) activity, as measured by the assay.
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Report on 2006 NHSRC Decontamination Workshop
McVey (Steris) and DiVarco (ECBC) discussed the use of VHP, with and with out the addition of
ammonia, to decontaminate biological and chemical warfare agents. (Chemical agent decontamination
presentations are discussed further below.) McVey presented D-values for inactivation of G.
stearothermophilus, and discussed work they have done to determine compatibility of VHP with many
different materials, including sensitive aircraft equipment. Steris has made changes to their technology to
make their VHP delivery systems more portable, yet able to decontaminate larger objects such as aircraft.
Carlsen (LLNL) presented research showing that the level of the decontaminant vaporous hydrogen
peroxide is greatly reduced over the length of galvanized steel ventilation duct, whereas VHP levels in
ductwork made from PVC-lined steel remain essentially unchanged over the length of the duct. They
found that the rate of decrease in the VHP concentration in the galvanized duct decreases with decreasing
temperature and increasing velocity.
Lemieux (EPA) noted that the decontamination method directly affects disposal options. Wastes may
include materials that have been removed from a contaminated building before decontamination, as well
as materials that underwent decontamination but where complete decontamination cannot be confirmed.
Lemieux noted that insurance and indemnification are large concerns for facilities in the disposal
industry. Lemieux described some of his research, such as the development of an online waste disposal
decision support tool, which can estimate the decontamination residue and disposal volume based on a
series of user inputs. The tool also provides disposal options and facility locations. Lemieux also
discussed incinerator and autoclave studies to determine materials impacts on the efficacy of thermally
inactivating B. anthracis surrogates.
Chemical Warfare Agent (CWA) Persistence and Decontamination
Savage, of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency's Agent Fate Program, discussed his research initiated
to understand the interaction between CWA and substrates, assess evaporation of CWA, and develop
predictive models to determine hazard levels on a battlefield. Experiments in wind tunnels and in the
field examine agent fate as a function of substrate, wind speed, drop size, temperature and humidity.
Savage presented results from several substrate interaction investigations. In one test with mustard agent,
it completely evaporated/dispersed after 4 to 4.5 hours. In other experiments with GD in soil and on
concrete, a simulated rain event caused a resurgence of GD vapor. Experiments found degradation rates
for mustard were increased with the presence of water. Mustard is of particular concern because the
primary decomposition product H-2TG is toxic.
Divarco and McVey presented ECBC studies to evaluate modified VHP (mVHP) decontamination of
agents. In experiments with VX, they confirmed that decontamination occurs more rapidly if the agent is
spread thin vs. in a droplet form, and that required contact times are longer for CWA than for BWA. In
general, from chamber tests conducted on numerous CWA, they found that levels on the material surface
and in vapor form were reduced to safe levels within 8-24 hours using mVHP. ECBC has also worked to
reduce the VHP generation equipment size and to improve mVHP distribution within a building, using
computational fluid dynamics models.
Govan, of the UK's Defense Science and Technology Laboratory, discussed his work in developing
decontaminants for CWAs. Their primary concerns are the agents' hydrophobicity (such as HD itself, or
due to the addition of thickening agents) and entrapment into materials. Thus research seeks to identify
decontaminants that have rapid solubility, maintain reactivity, and adherence to surfaces. One approach is
the use of microemulsions, which are very small droplets of oils and water that enhance the solubility of
hydrophobic CWAs. Govan presented results of chamber tests with various microemulsions. Govan also
discussed research with colloidal mixtures (using oil, alcohols, and brine) that create surface turbulence
that forces CWAs from capillary spaces and allows decontamination reactions. Lastly, current DSTL
research includes investigation of surface coatings that will readily absorb liquid agents and prevent
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contamination ingress. Coatings work focuses on improving contaminant absorption, and the addition of
reactive materials to neutralize the agent. Govan presented data from chamber tests using a reactive,
removable coating.
Tucker, of Sandia National Lab (SNL), discussed the development of a restoration plan for an airport
following a CWA release. SNL is partnering with Los Angeles airport (LAX), to develop a plan
specifically for LAX, but a generic CWA restoration template for other airports will also be developed.
The plan will focus on interior restoration, and will address threat scenarios, clean up guidelines,
decontamination technologies, and sampling related issues. The plan will follow most of the concepts
from the biological agent restoration plan for airports (already developed), but must also address issues
such as agent degradation, interaction with surface materials, and long-term air monitoring. In support of
the restoration plan development, an experimental program is underway to investigate surface sampling
issues; interaction of CWA on interior surfaces and natural attenuation/decay rates; gas/vapor
decontamination methods; and statistical sampling algorithm validation.
Raber (LLNL) discussed her work with a stakeholder group to develop CWA clean up levels for transit
facilities such as airports and subways. The study also includes select toxic industrial compounds (e.g.,
hydrogen cyanide, cyanogen chloride, phosgene), and critical degradation products from these agents and
TICs. Raber presented a table of preliminary recommended clean-up levels for several agents, based on
inhalation and ocular exposure. The project team selected the Acute Exposure Guideline Level (AEGL)
as the basis for recommended guidelines for transit passengers. For workers, the occupational exposure
guidelines developed by the military and Federal civilian agencies (e.g., CDC, EPA, NIOSH) were used.
The clean-up levels for workers are much lower than the clean-up levels for transit passengers, and thus
the former may drive the overall restoration plan and the final recommended clean-up levels.
Water System Decontamination
The presentations given in this session primarily focused on adherence and decontamination of agents and
pollutants on different types of pipe materials and other network components. Chattopadhyay (Battelle)
focused on pipe materials used in drinking water systems, and chemical-based decontamination options
for both chemical and biological agents. Randall (EPA) discussed adherence and decontamination of
arsenic, mercury, and B. subtilis on different pipe materials, and the impact of pipe flow rate and biofilm.
He discussed decontaminations techniques such as flushing (including at low pH), and the use of various
chemical reagents. Treado's (NIST) research has been on the measurement and analysis of building water
system decontamination. Building systems have their own particular challenges, such as smaller pipes,
with a wide range of different materials, shorter runs, appliances, drainage, etc. Treado presented their
lab-scale and full-scale research on adherence and decontaminations studies, which explored variables
such as contaminant concentration, pipe material, exposure time, flow velocity, and water chemistry.
Welter (O'Brien and Gere) presented some water system contamination case studies, one of which was an
incident where chlordane was intentionally introduced into a water system. Decontamination was
completed via flushing of the system for 8 months, but monitoring continued for 2 more years. In their
adherence studies, Welter found that attachment is mostly dependent on pipe type, and not significantly
sensitive to water characteristics. Pipes with a biofilm or tuberculation reported the greatest adherence,
and polyethylene and coated cement reported little adherence. Adherence increased overtime, indicating
that rapid decontamination is desirable. Decontamination studies found that surfactants can be effective
for organic agents and chlorine can be effective for microbials if CTs can be maintained. The
decontaminants tested for inorganics were only moderately and inconsistently effective.
Hall (EPA) discussed their research to assess the feasibility of using of common water quality parameters
to indicate contamination by a chemical agent or surrogate. This assessment included evaluating
commercially available real time sensors. Free and total chlorine, and total organic carbon were the most
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useful parameters. Hall noted that one drawback to this approach is that these sensors cannot detect
contamination on the pipe wall or in the biofilm. Flushing and superchlorination are decontamination
techniques for water systems, although some contaminants may remain on the pipe surface, and then
slowly be released over time.
Radioactive material surface decontamination
Mackinney (EPA) provided an overview of the NHSRC's radiological research agenda. The primary
focus is on decontamination following a radioactive dispersal devices (RDD) event, but they will also
begin to investigate issues relative to improvised nuclear devices. He noted that remediation of
Department of Energy nuclear facilities has consisted primarily of demolition and disposal, and not
decontamination. But this approach may not be feasible after in RDD event in an urban area, and hence
NHSRC research is guided by the presumption that structures must remain in place for reuse. Mackinney
noted many issues that need to be addressed, such as cross contamination, recontamination due to
precipitation, vertical decontamination requirements, waste disposal, the speed of available technologies,
surface chemistry interactions, decontamination of cracks/inaccessible areas, and subsurface effects.
Harper (SNL) discussed his research on the aerosolization of RDDs, noting that smaller particles tend to
migrate farther and pose a greater inhalation risk; whereas larger particles do not migrate as far and pose a
greater groundshine risk and dermal contamination risk. Materials reaching the liquid or vapor phase
after detonation will result in respirable sized particles, and the remainder will result in large fragments.
Detonating salts forms both respirable and powder-size particles (e.g., 400 microns), whereas for
ceramics, materials tend to shatter and most particles are greater than 50 microns; achieving greater than
5% aerosolization with ceramics is extremely difficult. His experiments lead him to believe that RDD
modeling may overestimate the impact area.
Drake (EPA) began by noting that for an RDD event, decontamination implies removal of the RDD
material from the substrate, thus making waste disposal a primary concern. In addition, the volume of
secondary waste generated during decontamination may be much greater than the volume of the primary
contamination. Demolition of a contaminated structure is an option, but may not be desirable (e.g.,
historic landmarks). During demolition, dust and debris must be managed. Most decontamination
methods are either mechanical (e.g., water wash down, vacuuming, grinding) or chemical (e.g., chelation,
foams, strippable coatings) based, but novel methods currently under development include the use of
microwaves, lasers and bacteria. Drake noted that decontaminating radiological agents becomes more
difficult as time passes, since they become absorbed into substrates, but also the contamination footprint
spreads via the weather.
Foreign Animal Disease (FAD) Decontamination
Grohs (EPA) discussed threats from FADs, which are diseases endemic in other areas of the world and
may be intentionally or inadvertently introduced to livestock in the U.S. Herds are susceptible to FADs
because animals have lost immunity to these diseases and because of concentrated animal feeding
operations. Challenges facing FAD outbreaks include decontamination and maintaining biosecurity
during depopulation and disposal of animal carcasses. FADs such as avian influenza, foot and mouth
disease, and exotic Newcastle disease are of great concern. Grohs briefly discussed issues regarding
avian influenza.
Bieker (SNL) began by noting that spores are the most resistant bio-agent, while enveloped viruses (e.g.,
influenza) are the least resistant. Currently EPA has only guidelines (no standards) for evaluating
decontaminants for viruses. Understanding the virucide mechanism of action dictates the appropriate
analysis methods. For example, if a virucide disrupts the lipid envelope, then DNA analyses may not be a
useful technique. Bieker discussed the analytical methods used and results from several studies to assess
the efficacy of several decontaminants to inactivate viruses, including avian influenza. After exposure,
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the samples were prepared for efficacy testing by in vitro culture or real-time PCR. Western blot tests
were also conducted for the influenza samples. Tests results found that the organic challenge reduced
decontaminant efficacy, real-time PCR was appropriate for determining viral inactivation caused by RNA
degradation, and some surrogates used may not be appropriate for decontamination studies.
Agent Sampling. Analysis, and Transport
Wagner (FBI) discussed the need for evidence awareness during the recovery phase after an agent attack.
Critical evidence may still be present after the crime scene phase and must be preserved. Discovery of
any potential evidentiary materials during remediation would prompt FBI notification. Remediation
personnel play an important role, but should not take samples with the intent of giving them to the FBI as
evidence. If the FBI determines that critical evidence was found, remediation activities would stop until
the evidence is removed. Wagner highlighted the importance of working together and communicating
during the recovery phase.
Carleson discussed LLNL's development of a technology called Rapid Viability - Polymerase Chain
Reaction (RV-PCR), that would reduce BWA analytical time from up to 7 days using conventional
culturing techniques, down to less than 24 hours. In about 40 minutes, traditional PCR can identify the
presence of a particular organism based on DNA analysis, but cannot determine whether that organism is
viable. RV-PCR detects increases in DNA over time, indicating growth. Although RV-PCR assays can
start detecting growth in a few hours, a period of about 14 hours for an organism such as B. atrophaeus is
required to definitively assess for DNA replication. The technique was demonstrated with different
matrices such as Bis, wipes, swabs, HEPA socks, air filters, and post-fumigation environmental samples.
Various quality assurance-related checks were made of the method, such as comparing accuracy with
culture methods, and assessing cross-contamination, biases, interferences, and detection limits.
Gibb (EPA) presented the use of laser induced breakdown spectroscopy (LIBS) for the detection of B.
anthracis spores. LIBS is based on the principle that spores have divalent and monovalent cations in
higher concentrations than the surrounding media. A majority of the research with LIBS has been
determining how well (using statistical analysis) it differentiates spores from potential confounding
materials such as ambient aerosols (e.g., pollen) household products (e.g., flour), building materials (e.g.,
plastics), dust mixtures, and surface sampling materials. Other work includes making the LIBS portable
in a backpack.
Krauter (LLNL) presented her research on various aerosol properties of bacterial spores. In one project,
the research investigated how spores deposit on different types of ventilation duct materials. Deposition
was highest on the plastic, which may be due to its high negative charge. Krauter presented results of
other projects to examine recovery of spores disseminated in HVAC duct (4-13 % recovery, depending on
the material) and in a mock office (30-35% recovery). Recovery may be diminished due to sampling and
culturing techniques, nonviable spores, reaerosolization, and overcoming spore-surface adhesion forces.
In projects to address spore resuspension, test results show that more spores resuspend from plastic
material than from galvanized steel, probably because more deposits on the plastic. Current work is
underway to examine copolymer solutions that may inhibit spore resuspension.
Martinez (CDC) discussed the validation of sampling methods for B. anthracis spores. At Dugway
Proving Grounds, three surface sampling techniques (wipes, swabs, and a vacuum sock) and three air
sampling methods will be evaluated by three different laboratories. Most of the effort to date for this
project has been in developing and characterizing the chamber/aerosol system. In a separate but related
project with SNL, the efficiency of surface sampling collection and extraction methods for B. atrophaeus
spores on porous and non-porous surfaces was evaluated. Total recovery efficiencies ranged from just
under 20% to slightly over 30%. Martinez also presented the sampling detection limits based on these
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results. Lastly, Martinez discussed projects investigating the reaerosolization of spores during the
processing and opening of contaminated mail.
Rothman (EPA) gave an overview of the EPA/NHSRC Response Capability Enhancement projects. One
project involves providing support to develop the Environmental Reference Laboratory Network. RCE
has modeled the eLRN after the human health laboratory response network (LRN), and has established a
chemical agent reference laboratory, the National Exposure Measurement Center, as part of the eLRN.
Another project is to produce the Standardized Analytical Methods document to provide protocols for the
analysis of chemical, biological, and radiological agents; so far!40 agents are included in the document.
Other involvement includes working with DHS and other partners on the PHILIS and All Hazards
Receipt Facility projects.
Tomasino (EPA) described tests needed to update EPA's Sterilant Registration Protocol requirements.
He first discussed recommendations for an alternative method to the AOAC Method 966.04, which is the
current test required. The alternative method would differ by requiring nutrient agar, target carrier counts
of 105 to 106 spores per carrier, and neutralization confirmation procedures. In a second project,
Tomasino presented results that compared two efficacy test methods that provide quantitative results: the
ASTM E2111-00 and the Three Step Method (TSM). No significant differences in results were found
between the two methods. In the next phase, EPA will validate the TSM against the AOAC Sporicidal
Activity Test Method with eight to ten laboratories. The study will involve one microbe (B. subtilis) on a
glass carrier. In the last project discussed, the TSM was used to determine that B. subtilis and the A Sterne
strain of B. anthracis appear to be suitable candidates for a surrogate for B. anthracis - Ames.
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I. Introduction
This report summarizes presentations and discussions from the "Workshop on Decontamination, Cleanup,
and Associated Issues for Sites Contaminated with Chemical, Biological, or Radiological Materials,"
which was held April 26-28, 2006, in Washington, B.C. The technical content of this report is based
entirely on information and discussions from the workshop.
The workshop allowed participants from federal agencies and laboratories, international organizations,
academia, and decontamination technology companies to share information and data, and discuss issues
associated with the decontamination of chemical, biological, and radiological threat agents.
During the workshop, speakers gave presentations on specific topics. Following each presentation,
speakers held a brief question and answer period. Participants also engaged in a panel discussion to
discuss decontamination issues. The presentations and panel discussion covered a number of topics and
were organized into eight sessions:
• Plenary session. Representatives from the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) National
Homeland Security Research Center (NHSRC), the U.S. Department of Homeland Security
(DHS), and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) presented during the plenary session.
Martin (National Risk Management Research Laboratory) discussed a generic decontamination
timeline and highlighted potential changes in the decontamination process that could shorten this
timeline. Brooks (DHS) provided an overview of DHS projects and programs addressing
decontamination issues. Wagner (FBI) outlined the FBI's role as an enforcement authority during
a threat event and discussed evidentiary concerns during decontamination.
• General decontamination issues. Over the course of 11 presentations, speakers from federal and
international agencies and organizations presented information about programs supporting
decontamination research and international decontamination perspectives. Specific topics
included sampling method development and validation programs, EPA research programs, EPA's
regulation of biological decontaminants, EPA's laboratory response network (LRN), and the
United Kingdom (UK) and Canadian decontamination approaches.
• Decontamination technologies. Researchers and industry representatives gave 11 presentations
that provided specific information about available decontamination technologies and additional
technologies under development. These presentations included technical information regarding
chlorine dioxide and vapor hydrogen peroxide (VHP) decontamination, decontamination
technology validation and efficacy testing, and facility restoration plans.
• Decontamination research and development. The four presentations in this session described
ongoing efforts to systematically test decontamination technologies; to decrease fumigation time
frames through developing tools to rapidly evaluate fumigant efficacy and reduce sample
analytical time; to understand the fate of chemical warfare agents (CWA) in the environment; and
to develop cleanup levels for restoration.
• Radiological dispersion device (RDD) decontamination. Three speakers provided information
about ongoing research and available decontamination technologies for addressing an RDD event.
MacKinney provided an overview of the NHSRC radiological research program. Drake described
the RDD decontamination issues. Harper described ongoing research to understand particle
formation and transport during and immediately following an RDD detonation.
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• Water decontamination. Five speakers presented information about ongoing research projects
addressing water system concerns associated with a contamination event. These projects
primarily focus on understanding contaminant adherence to water distribution system materials
and decontamination efficacy within distribution systems. In addition, one project sought to
develop and validate a water quality sensing system that would indicate potential threat agent
contamination based on changes to typical water quality parameters.
• Foreign animal disease/avian influenza decontamination. Two presentations addressed concerns
associated with foreign animal diseases. Bieker discussed virucidal efficacy testing and
highlighted the numerous factors that influence efficacy. Grohs provided an overview of the
possible impacts of foreign animal disease outbreaks (such as avian influenza), emphasized the
need for preparedness, and described the current structure for a multi-agency response to an
outbreak.
• Panel discussion: lessons learned, research and development needs, technology gaps. Seven
representatives from several federal agencies, including the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention (CDC), DHS, NHSRC, and other EPA offices, participated in the panel discussion.
Participants briefly summarized issues and research needs that they believed were of greatest
importance. They then discussed several questions posed by workshop participants. Overall, the
panel members agreed that communication and collaboration between the various agencies and
organizations completing decontamination and conducting research was critical. Panel members
identified some specific research needs, including (but not limited to) sampling method
validation, restoration time frame reduction, real-time sampling technology development, and,
decontaminant-surface interactions. Several panel members also noted the need to address
decontamination issues that stretch beyond science and technology, such as logistical, political,
and public perception issues associated with conducting restoration.
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II. Presentations and Associated Question and Answer Periods
Opening Remarks and Plenary Session
Opening Remarks; Conceptual Timelines for Decontamination Events
Blair Martin, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, National Homeland Security Research Center
During the 2005 Workshop on Decontamination, Cleanup, and Associated Issues for Sites Contaminated
with Chemical, Biological, or Radiological Materials, Martin discussed the phases of the decontamination
process, including factors that influence each step of the process. This presentation served as a follow-up
to the 2005 presentation and focused on how the projected decontamination timeline has changed. A
review of the decontamination timeline highlighted steps in the process that could be controlled and
condensed with additional research.
In the past, decontamination required many months for completion for a variety of reasons. In Fall 2001,
letters sent through the U.S. Postal Service (USPS) contaminated a number of buildings with B. anthracis.
Decontamination of these buildings employed a variety of methods: removal and disposal of
contaminated material; surface cleaning with bleach, chlorine dioxide, or hydrogen peroxide liquids;
and/or fumigation with chlorine dioxide, hydrogen peroxide, or paraformaldehyde. Most
decontamination/fumigation experience is with chlorine dioxide, which served as the fumigant at the B.
an^rac/'s-contaminated Brentwood facility, Hamilton facility, and American Media International (AMI)
Building. A home and a department store in New York State were also fumigated with chlorine dioxide to
address mold contamination. Martin noted that chlorine dioxide containment with tenting (similar to
termite fumigation), and the use of small carbon cells for its removal, were interesting innovations used
during the mold decontaminations.
Based on his experiences, Martin identified six elements in the decontamination process:
• Decision-making regarding the selection of decontamination methods and identification of
clearance parameters.
• Characterization and monitoring to determine the extent of contamination and track fumigation.
• Building-related activities, which include preparing the building, installing security, and ensuring
the safety of the surrounding community.
• Decontamination, including the selection, design, and performance of the system.
• Disposal of waste materials from the decontamination processes.
• Communication with affected people and the community.
Past experience helped identify areas for improvement to reduce the time and cost of a decontamination
event. Factors that allowed these improvements included additional fumigation experience, technology
advances, equipment availability, streamlined approval processes, reduced material removal prior to
fumigation, and reduce materials for disposal. For example, simply limiting removal activities and
minimizing the time required for workers to wear high-level personal protective equipment (PPE) reduces
the time and cost of a decontamination event.
Martin presented three conceptual timelines illustrating past, current, and possible future decontamination
events. These timelines did not represent actual events. Each was a conceptual model based on
engineering and professional judgment. Timelines can vary based on the duration of individual steps in
the process. For each timeline, Martin presented a Gantt chart illustrating the relative time allotted for
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each step in the decontamination process. Involvement of working groups and event management
occurred throughout the event in each example.
The first timeline illustrated a hypothetical decontamination event based on the state of decontamination
technology in 2001. This example involved a large-volume building contaminated with B. anthracis.
Martin assumed that the fumigant was not registered, formal plans were required, a working group was
formed, indemnification or insurance was obtained, extensive sampling was required, equipment was
obtained or fabricated, some materials were removed before fumigation, and building clearance was
contingent on approval of appropriate authorities (e.g., state and local agencies). Early stages of the
decontamination event included selecting a decontamination technology, contracting with a vendor, and
obtaining or fabricating equipment. In parallel, formal plans (e.g., sampling plans, restoration plans, crisis
exemption applications) were generated and submitted for approval. Familiarity and experience with a
technology strongly influences the permitting process. For example, an unfamiliar fumigant requires
extensive testing before a crisis exemption may be issued. A period of forensic and characterization
sampling occurred to gather evidence for possible legal actions and to determine the nature and extent of
contamination. Part of the characterization phase included assessing the facility's heating, ventilation, and
air conditioning (HVAC) system; identifying the extent of materials to remove prior to fumigation;
determining if and how a building must be modified for fumigation; and integrating the fumigation
system with existing building systems. A building assessment may require internal modifications to allow
for complete fumigation. Fumigation required biological indicator (BI) placement, fumigant monitoring,
BI removal, clearance sampling, and clearance report review. Martin noted that the actual fumigation was
only a 24- to 36-hour event. Finally, disposal and restoration occurred; the time required to complete
these final actions was the most variable component of the decontamination process.
The second timeline illustrated a decontamination event as it would occur today. For this example, the
fumigation technology (e.g., chlorine dioxide) was established, past experience expedited plan and
document preparation, the technology itself was improved, and equipment was more readily available.
Facilities themselves were better prepared by having generic sampling and restoration plans in place and
keeping information about the building systems (e.g., HVAC system) readily available. Technology
improvements included use of negative air units to contain spores, tenting to reduce sealing requirements,
and use of carbon units instead of wet scrubbers. Key in reducing the timeline was the availability of
equipment such as chlorine dioxide generators, which historically required long lead times to procure or
fabricate. A reduction was also seen in the time required to obtain public health exemptions because the
technology was established. The availability of building information sped characterization sampling and
increased confidence in clearance sampling, substantially reducing the time required for the building
assessment. Overall, the timeline was shortened primarily because of the availability of equipment and
confidence in the clearance process.
The third timeline illustrated a possible future decontamination event. In this event, Martin assumed that
chlorine dioxide was a registered fumigant, a full-time working group was available for onsite document
review, insurance by the owner or vendor was available in lieu of indemnification, contents were
fumigated in place, and activities in high-level PPE were minimal. The registration and insurance
components of the decontamination event were very quick. The fumigation, characterization sampling, BI
placement and removal, and clearance sampling did not change much in this timeline as in the second
timeline.
In conclusion, Martin reiterated that the timelines do not represent actual events and were based on
engineering judgment and experience with B. anthracis. The timelines, however, illustrated the potential
for large reductions in the time required to complete a fumigation event. Additional areas for time
reduction may include linking forensic and characterization sampling, optimizing the characterization and
clearance phases, and revising the criteria and placement of Bis. For a large building, the time and
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expense associated with Bis can be quite large. For example, San Francisco International Airport (SFO)
decontamination could require as many as 18,000 Bis, which represents a significant cost, if the whole
airport was involved in a contamination event. In the past, Bis were used as a means to determine that the
fumigant reached the proper concentration and time value (CT) required for decontamination. Recent
research, which was the topic of other presentations during this workshop, indicates that Bis may not be
appropriate for this use. Research into this issue, as well as improving Bis, is ongoing. Martin said he
thought that ongoing research of additional agents of interest, other rumigants, and improved containment
technologies also has expanded capability.
Question and Answer Period
• What is the total time estimated to complete each of the three timelines? Excluding the restoration
phase, which can vary widely, the base event (the first timeline) required approximately 18
months for completion, the second timeline required 14 months, and the fully reduced timeline
(the third timeline) required 8 to 9 months.
Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Science and Technology Chemical/Biological Restoration
Programs
Lance Brooks, Department of Homeland Security
This presentation provided an overview of some of the decontamination programs and research underway
at DHS. Additional presentations at this workshop provided details about specific projects.
DHS is not the primary lead in decontamination efforts: in incidences of national significance, DHS
serves an overall coordinating role and provides emergency services in support of other responding
agencies (e.g., EPA, the U.S. Coast Guard [USCG]). Under Presidential Directive #10, however, DHS is
responsible for detection and restoration of critical infrastructure facilities. As such, many of the DHS
projects have focused on high-traffic facilities.
Projects underway at DHS include:
• Biological—restoration of airport facilities. DHS partnered with SFO to evaluate ways to reduce
the overall time required to restore operation of a critical transportation facility (the airport) after
a biological attack and to create generic decontamination and restoration plans. In looking at
decontamination event timelines, the project team targeted agent contamination characterization
and clearance sampling. They found that preparing characterization plans, selecting
predetermined decontamination technologies, and improving clearance sampling could decrease
the timeline. To improve clearance sampling, the team researched tools that improved monitoring
and sample tracking. As part of this project, SFO will have a final restoration plan that will also
serve as template for other airports.
• National Academy of Sciences (NAS) study. This study addresses concerns about re-opening
public facilities after a contamination event and attempts to answer the question "What levels of
residual agent are acceptable after decontamination?" Instead of providing specific numerical
values and action levels, the project created a decision-making framework that considers issues
and problems that influence decontamination decisions. The framework includes questions that
facility operators need to ask and answer as part of the decontamination process. Considerations
include issues surrounding infectious dose, natural background, quantitative risk assessments,
past cleanup efforts, and residual contamination.
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• Restoration plan for airports. Every day that a facility is closed has a huge economic impact on
an area. DHS believes that having plans in place and having these plans pre-reviewed and
approved can substantially reduce downtime. An airport restoration plan (for a bio-agent attack)
is currently in final draft form and undergoing review by DHS and EPA. The main chapters
consider characterization, remediation, clearance, and recommendations for pre-planning. DHS
will use this document as a basis for transit system restoration plans tailored to system-specific
needs. Transit systems must consider issues and circumstances that vary from airport concerns
and even other transit system concerns. DHS has partnered with transit systems in Washington,
D.C., and New York City. DHS hopes to generate a baseline restoration plan for transit systems.
• Biological—wide area restoration. This project is new in 2006. It shifts the focus from facilities
to large outdoor releases in urban areas. DHS currently operates the BioWatch system, conducts
active bioaerosol monitoring, and works to develop consequence management plans for facilities.
Developing a restoration plan for open areas, which will outline restoration procedures for these
areas, requires considerably more effort. Consequence management plans currently address only
characterization activities; no restoration plans are available and ready to use. DHS is identifying
a research venue and project partners (local government agencies) to work toward creating a
restoration plan. Results from other research projects will be incorporated into this plan. DHS
aims to develop a comprehensive, and easy-to-use, decision-making framework addressing
radiological, chemical, and biological threats for use at a local level.
• Chemical—facilities restoration demonstration. DHS has partnered with Los Angeles
International Airport (LAX) in a project that, though similar to efforts at SFO, focuses on
decontamination technologies available to address a chemical agent contamination event. Under
this project, DHS has examined various threat scenarios and possible contaminants, including
action levels and cleanup levels. This information will feed into a restoration plan specific for
LAX, but will also serve as a basis for developing a generic template for other airport chemical
agent restoration plans, and possibly for other types of transit facilities.
• Integrated consortium of laboratory networks. DHS is also involved in evaluating laboratory
surge capacity in the event of a large-scale chemical or biological attack. If an attack occurs,
characterization and clearance activities will generate a significant number of samples. For
example, an outdoor attack with anthrax could generate tens of thousands of samples. Currently,
the consortium involves incorporating existing networks and does not include building new
facilities or networks. The environmental laboratory response network (eLRN) is new, however,
and is designed specifically to address the lack of capability for CWA. The lead project agencies
include EPA, the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD), CDC, the FBI, and DHS. However, many
other agencies are also involved.
• All hazards receipt facilities. In conjunction with the laboratory consortium, DHS is also
researching sample receipt facilities that will protect laboratory staff and laboratory infrastructure
during the handling of unknown samples. These facilities, which may be stand-alone structures
placed outside laboratories, are designed to assess a large volume of potentially highly toxic,
radiological, or explosive material. They would use a consistent protocol for analyzing and
handling samples to maintain evidentiary credibility. A prototype is near completion and will be
placed at a public health laboratory for a 1-year evaluation period.
• Mobile laboratory (Portable High-Throughput Integrated Laboratory Identification System
[PHILIS]) prototype. PHILIS is a portable laboratory system that can place high-throughput
analysis capabilities on site after an event. The mobile laboratory would be brought on site after a
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large-scale event to allow analysis of thousands of characterization and other samples in a single
day. Brooks noted that the lack of rapid analysis techniques is a shortcoming in current
technologies.
Question and Answer Period
• The first two presentations discussed the time required to receive regulatory approvals, such as
crisis exemptions, but neither mentioned the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) process.
How does NEPA, specifically environmental impact statements, apply to decontamination events?
Jeff Kempter of the EPA Office of Pesticide Programs (OPP) responded that NEPA and
environmental impact statements have not been a component of the regulatory process associated
with decontamination events. The Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA)
and other response authorities primarily oversee decontamination.
Evidence Awareness for Remediation Personnel at Weapon of Mass Destruction (WMD) Crime
Scenes
Jarrad Wagner, Federal Bureau of Investigation
A contamination event can be broken down into many different phases. The FBI focuses on crime scene
and evidence collection aspects of an event. This presentation provided information about the FBI's role
during an event and how the FBI processes a crime scene.
A weapon of mass destruction (WMD) crime scene is incredibly complex, as illustrated by the World
Trade Center destruction. Due to the large amount of debris, remediation may have begun even though
the debris itself may be evidence. A WMD crime scene includes not only the location of a WMD incident,
but also any location where WMD have been prepared or discovered. For example, a laboratory where
WMD material was manufactured or a location where a WMD was hidden presents a public health hazard
because some material may be present and released. A legislative definition of WMD exists; Wagner
defined WMD as any chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, or explosive material.
Wagner outlined four phases in a WMD incidence response: tactical phase, operational phase, crime
scene phase, and remediation phase. The tactical phase includes removal of a hostile threat by responders
trained to ensure that an area is safe from physical threats, such as a sniper. The operational phase
addresses public safety with responders (e.g., National Guard, state and local police) focusing on
identifying and mitigating hazards. The FBI becomes involved in the crime scene phase, which includes
evidence collection and packaging. Remediation, the final phase, includes mitigation of hazards after an
incident.
During crime scene processing of a terror event, the FBI serves as the lead federal investigation agency
and conducts investigation activities for the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ). Wagner works in the FBI
unit involved in the safe collection and transport of hazardous materials evidence. The team responding to
these incidents is specially trained to work in high-level PPE, but local or state personnel may be
integrated with the FBI teams if necessary, trained, and available. The FBI team is on call and can rapidly
respond to incidents.
The FBI processes a crime scene following a 12-step approach. The first nine steps of the process consist
of activities to prepare, secure, and document the crime scene. Evidence collection occurs at step 10.
Releasing the scene for remediation, step 12, is critical. Once the FBI releases a site, EPA remediation
can begin. As part of this step, FBI and EPA personnel walk through the site and the FBI agent describes
what materials were taken and what materials were left. The FBI does not gather all the hazardous
materials, only enough to serve as evidence. For example, if two 5 5-gallon drums are present, the FBI
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will collect only a small sample from the drums and leave the majority of the material for EPA
remediation.
In collecting evidence from a WMD crime scene, personal and public safety are the primary concerns.
The FBI, however, must also maintain sample integrity and preservation. Evidence is collected and then
placed in an over-pack container; the over-pack container is decontaminated, not the evidence itself. The
FBI must also maintain an accurate chain-of-custody for evidence in a criminal case. The chain-of-
custody documentation tracks the movement and location of physical evidence from the time of collection
to presentation in court. Maintaining this chain-of-custody is critical.
Due to the complex nature of WMD sites, the FBI understands that evidence at a WMD crime scene may
remain after the FBI has released the site. Collecting all relevant evidence is not always possible. Wagner
presented a description of FBI needs and evidence characteristics such that decontamination personnel
can identify relevant evidence (e.g., false outlet in the wall) and notify the FBI if additional evidence is
found during remediation.
Forensic evidence at a crime scene includes information that indicates that a crime was committed, as
well as materials taken from the scene or left at a scene by a suspect or a victim. WMD evidence includes
the WMD material and anything contaminated with WMD. WMD evidence must be analyzed at an
appropriate, accredited laboratory equipped to handle chemical, biological, or radiological materials. The
FBI characterizes the WMD to identify sources or unique information (e.g., signature analysis, attribution
for anthrax). Often with pending litigation, the FBI cannot release detailed information about a WMD.
Critical evidence, which includes anything that proves guilt or helps identify the perpetrator, consists of
any improvised chemical, biological, or radiological device components, concentrated WMD, paperwork
detailing attack plans, or identification documents. Discovery of any of these materials during
remediation would prompt FBI notification; the FBI should collect this evidence to maintain integrity for
use in a criminal trial.
Wagner has developed a protocol for notifying the FBI if additional critical evidence is found during
remediation. Personnel should contact the EPA on-scene coordinator (OSC) or liaison, who will then
contact the FBI WMD coordinator. The FBI WMD coordinators are special agents responsible for
interacting with and training people who may come into contact with WMD (e.g., local fire or police
personnel, EPA OSCs). Wagner urged EPA OSCs to contact their WMD coordinators before an incident
occurs. The FBI WMD coordinator will then contact the FBI case agent and other FBI groups, as
necessary, to discuss the evidence and determine the appropriate action. If the FBI determines that critical
evidence has been found, remediation activities will stop. Wagner noted that remediation is a process of
destroying evidence. An FBI team, or other certified team, will return to the crime scene to collect the
evidence. Remediation resumes once the evidence is removed.
Wagner highlighted the importance of working together and communicating during WMD events to
ensure an incident response that not only protects on-scene personnel and the public, but also maximizes
the ability of the FBI and other legal authorities to identify perpetrators. Wagner encouraged workshop
participants to pass this information to other OSCs and remediation personnel.
Question and Answer Period
• If evidence were decontaminated, would the breakdown products serve as evidence in a criminal
case? Using breakdown products to obtain a conviction is untested in case law. Signature analysis
and breakdown products/metabolites analyses can be completed. The totality of this evidence
may indicate that a crime occurred and could be valuable. Ideally, remediation personnel would
contact the FBI before decontamination such that the neat agent could be collected. The FBI must
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also consider how decontamination agents affect traditional evidence (e.g., fingerprints, DNA)
and agents used to collect traditional evidence (e.g., superglue).
• Has the FBI conducted research on sampling techniques and how these techniques affect
evidence credibility? The FBI has considered sampling technique (e.g., swabs, swab materials,
containment materials) impacts on traditional evidence. Wagner was not aware of any FBI
research regarding decontamination materials (e.g., hydrogen peroxide, chorine dioxide) impacts
on traditional evidence.
• How is superglue used? Superglue acts as a fixative to cement together residues that make up a
fingerprint so that the fingerprint remains intact during collection.
General Decontamination Issues
Validation of Environmental Sampling Methods: Current Research and Related Projects
Ken Martinez, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
Martinez' presentation provided an overview of CDC efforts to update and validate surface and air
sampling.
One project involves developing an aerosol system that creates uniform samples of deposited bacteria.
CDC is conducting this research at Dugway Proving Ground in conjunction with multiple partners. The
project goals are to aerosolize B. anthracis (Sterne strain) in a chamber, achieve low-level concentrations
to assess detection limits, compare three surface sampling methods (vacuum, wipe, and wet swab on
stainless steel and carpet), compare three air sampling methods (cascade impactor, PTFE membrane
filters, and gel filters), compare three laboratories, and compare single-pass to multiple-pass analysis. For
this project, Dugway Proving Ground designed and built a sampling chamber that can produce multiple
identical samples of settled bacteria and uniform air concentrations. The chamber is constructed of
stainless steel and Plexiglas and uses fans to stir the air to achieve a homogenous concentration.
To test surface sampling methods, CDC allows the particles to settle on the sampling surfaces within the
chamber. Initially, CDC used agar plates for reference sampling; however, compared to stainless steel
coupons, the agar plates dramatically underestimated the amount of spores present. Work to optimize the
reference sampling is continuing; in addition to the agar plates and stainless steel coupons, CDC also
settled particles on carpet coupons. Martinez provided a schematic diagram of the chamber and briefly
reviewed the steps in chamber operation.
Preliminary results with bacteria found a predictable aerosol decay curve; initial rapid decay was
potentially due to electrostatic losses. Results from 4 runs and 26 agar plates indicated low inter-sample
variability. In conducting tests, researchers found that the act of collecting the samples re-aerosolized the
spores. Lightly covering the non-sampling surfaces with oil addressed this problem.
Martinez described a collaborative second project to evaluate the efficiency of surface sampling
collection methods for Bacillus atrophaeus spores on porous and non-porous surfaces. The project
provides a robust scientific and statistical evaluation of current swab, wipe, and vacuum surface sample
collection methods. Results should answer questions about how well spores can be pulled from a
sampling surface and how well analysis methods extract spores from a swab or collection material.
A wipe sample may only collect 50% of spores on a contaminated surface. The extraction method (by
sonification) then only pulls 50% of the spores from the wipe sample, achieving only a 25% total spore
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recovery. CDC used a homogenous sampling chamber, similar to the chamber developed at Dugway
Proving Ground, to create uniform samples. An aerosol generator feeds into a mixing chamber to reach
the desired spore concentration in air. The spores then settle on a series of sample coupons (stainless steel
[reference material], painted wallboard, carpet, or bare concrete). Non-sample areas between coupons
were coated with an adhesive to prevent spores from re-aerosolizing.
Martinez presented results from testing swab, wipe, and vacuum sock collection methods. Swab
efficiency for stainless steel and painted wallboard was 50% and the extraction efficiency was 80%,
resulting in a total collection efficiency of 40%. Wipe efficiency for stainless steel and painted wallboard
ranged from 55% to 68%, but the extraction efficiency was only 50%, resulting in a total collection
efficiency of 25% to 30%. CDC did not test swabs or wipes on porous materials (carpet and bare
concrete) because the inefficiency of swabs and wipes on these materials is well established. The vacuum
sock was tested on both non-porous and porous materials with the understanding that the vacuum sock is
the preferred method for sampling porous materials. The collection efficiencies were relatively low for all
materials (less than 30% to 50%) and the extraction efficiencies were consistently almost 70%.
Ultimately, the total collection efficiencies ranged from just under 20% to slightly over 30%. This
information, however, was not consistent with observations from actually sampling events. Based on
Martinez' field experience, the vacuum sock samples contained the highest concentrations of anthrax
spores and were most consistent in finding positive detections. In evaluating the study results, CDC found
small microscopic holes (10 to 15 microns) in the filters. These holes were too small to see, but large
enough to allow a spore to pass through. In the field, the large sample volume collected clogs these holes
and prevents pass-through; the small sample volume in a laboratory does not clog the holes.
During this project, CDC also attempted to quantify detection limits for each of the sampling methods.
Martinez presented two tables: one listed detection limits for characterization sampling, which requires
quantitative results, and the other listed detection limits for clearance sampling, which requires qualitative
results (e.g., presence or absence of spores). This information illustrates that the detections limits are
higher (e.g., hundreds of spores) than ideally desired (e.g., tens of spores) for quantitative sampling. The
detections limits drop significantly for qualitative sampling.
In related research, CDC has partnered with several groups in the United States and Canada to assess re-
aerosolization of anthrax in letters. This project examines if following CDC guidelines truly minimizes
anthrax re-aerosolization. Initial evaluations found problems with the guidelines. As a next step, CDC is
examining additional scenarios to evaluate possible changes to the guidelines. CDC will evaluate an open
office with co-workers present—previous studies evaluated a closed office. An actual person, fully clad in
PPE, will open a letter. A number of sampling methods and Bis will assess spore movement and allow for
modeling to assess spore movement. Results will allow agencies to evaluate protocols for responding to
and containing spores during an anthrax event.
Martinez is also involved in a study of spore re-suspension from contaminated envelopes during mail
processing. CDC aims to develop standardized procedures for assessing possible cross-contamination in
the mail. Cross-contamination found in New York and Connecticut motivated this project. In responding
to anthrax events, CDC successfully collected samples, identified spores, and tracked spore movement,
with two exceptions—a nurse in New York City and a woman in Connecticut. CDC was unable to find an
anthrax source although both victims died of inhalation anthrax. These incidents prompted projects to find
lower concentrations of spores in the environment and assess the transfer of spores between letters.
Preliminary studies produced uniform envelope coating with spores and indicated that predictable
concentrations can be achieved. CDC plans to use actual letters from the anthrax event to further study
cross-contamination in an effort to better understand risks to individuals manipulating cross-contaminated
letters (e.g., opening by tearing or with a knife) and to develop better protocols for controlling the spread
of spores through cross-contamination.
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The National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) is working to create a new sampling
technique for collecting bioaerosols. Martinez briefly described a sampler that correlates with other
standard methods. This cyclone-based, micro-centrifuge tube directly collects samples onto the tube,
which simplifies the analysis process because no extraction step is required. Polymerase chain reaction
(PCR), immunoassay, and other standard methods can be used to analyze the sample. With PCR analysis,
detection limits for fungal spore counts are greater than 100 and detection limits for dust are less than 0.2
mg.
Question and Answer Period
• Has CDC worked with the LRN to illustrate the importance of using HEPA-sock techniques?
Martinez recognized that some LRN locations are not comfortable with HEPA-sock techniques
because of personnel safety. Using appropriate analytical techniques and safety measures can
minimize these risks. CDC successfully collected many HEPA-sock samples without incident
during the anthrax events. CDC is developing protocols for analyzing HEPA-sock samples. CDC
is also evaluating alternative sampling methods.
• For the open office study, what is the volume of the office and what is the study time frame?
Martinez did not have the specific measurements for the open office area. For general
perspective, the area is the width of a double-wide trailer and twice as long. A central corridor
with office areas on either side runs the length of the area. The study is scheduled for completion
by September 30, 2006.
• Has CDC evaluated other spore collection methods? CDC has researched alternatives to swabs
and found a manuscript that reports good recoveries using macrofoams, which pull spores from
non-porous surfaces. Research into other materials, such as electrostatic cloths like the
commercial Swiffer product, has not been completed. Martinez expressed concern about
extracting spores from these materials and interferences with chemicals used on the cloth or
during the extraction. CDC is focused on establishing a baseline for methods already in use.
• Is there concern about changes in viability of spores that undergo extraction processes? Would
these changes affect efficiency calculations? Because spores are so viable, persistence has not
been a primary concern. Martinez found that sampling areas a year or more after contamination
still detected high numbers of spores. No effort to compare the number of spores found initially
and in later samples has been conducted.
• Given that 50% of the spores remain after collection, has CDC attempted to collect additional
samples from the exact same sample location after decontamination? The NIOSH and CDC
philosophy has been to resample locations using a targeted approach. Using a grid sample design
is important, but should be combined with a targeted approach to identify areas of greatest
concern for contamination. At the Brentwood facility, CDC specifically recommended that
clearance samples be collected in the same location as characterization samples.
Decontamination Research at the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) National
Homeland Security Research Center (NHSRC)
Nancy Adams, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, National Homeland Security Research Center
Decontamination efforts and research related to threat agents began in EPA 4 years ago with a core group
of about 15 people. Since that time, research efforts have greatly expanded. Adams applauded the
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establishment of multi-disciplinary, multi-agency, and multi-country collaboration about decontamination
concerns, topics, and problems.
EPA organized a temporary NHSRC in 2002 in response to the anthrax letter events, which highlighted
the need to better understand effective decontamination of buildings. NHSRC became a permanent group
in 2004 and currently addresses decontamination of buildings and water systems. NHSRC supports the
EPA's National Decontamination Team (NDT), OSCs, and other EPA responders. NHSRC personnel
typically are not on site, but advise those involved with onsite activities and look to onsite personnel to
identify data gaps and advise NHSRC on research needs.
NHSRC has three divisions—Water Infrastructure Protection, Threat and Consequence Assessment, and
Decontamination and Consequence Management. NHSRC headquarters are located in Cincinnati, Ohio,
with staff also located in Washington, D.C.; Research Triangle Park, North Carolina; and Las Vegas,
Nevada. NHSRC staff also work with a number of collaborators, including the U.S. Department of
Energy (DOE) National Laboratories, the Department of Defense, the National Institute of Standards and
Technology, and other organizations in the EPA Office of Research and Development (ORD).
NHSRC's mission is to provide state-of-the-art scientific knowledge and technologies to enable incident
responders to effectively respond and safely restore affected areas. NHSRC research focuses on
biological, chemical, and radiological threat agents as released in buildings and water systems (e.g., water
distribution and wastewater systems). Initially, building releases were the primary concern; however,
research has expanded to include outdoor urban areas. Technical areas of focus include enhancing
response capabilities, improving sampling and analysis methods, containing releases, evaluating
decontamination and treatment methods, and providing guidance for safe waste disposal.
Adams provided a partial list of the agencies and organizations with which NHSRC has collaborated to
illustrate the many and various disciplines and organization involved in decontamination research. She
also provided pictures of some of the specialized facilities available to NHSRC to illustrate the variety of
research capabilities. These facilities include indoor air chambers, a drinking water pilot plant, a test
house, a drinking water pipe-loop test facility, a combustion research facility, extensive aerosol testing
facilities, wind tunnels, and a biosafety level 3 (BSL-3) laboratory.
NHSRC's Decontamination and Consequence Management Division (DCMD) has four main research
areas: detection, containment, decontamination, and disposal. Adams provided a brief overview of
ongoing research in each of these areas.
• Detection. Research in the detection area includes examination of microbe and chemical
persistence on common indoor materials. NHSRC is also continuing a real-time spore
identification project and beginning a project to develop prion surrogates that could be safely
handled in BSL-2 laboratories. NHSRC adapted open-path Fourier transform infrared (OP-FTIR)
technology for field applications, including miniaturized in-duct (HVAC) chemical detectors and
applications with robotic sampling devices. NHSRC is also developing methods for sampling
emissions during incineration to ensure that agents are not re-released; assessing the sampling
efficiencies for B. anthracis on surfaces; and developing improved BI strips for monitoring
decontamination efficacy. In 2005, NHSRC hosted a workshop to identify and discuss issues and
concerns about characterization and clearance sampling.
• Containment. Research in the containment area examines resuspension of agents from common
indoor and outdoor surfaces, infiltration of agents into buildings during outdoor releases, and
evaluation of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) sheltering-in place guidance.
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NHSRC published an evaluation of shelter-in-place for residential structures and found that
shelter-in-place can be very effective if done properly. An evaluation of sheltering-in-place for
larger buildings will be released soon. NHSRC is working with CDC and other organizations to
assess how human activities (e.g., letter opening, walking on carpeting), environmental conditions
(e.g., temperature, wind direction, relative humidity), and indoor sinks/re-emitters (e.g., materials
that absorb and then slowly re-emit an agent) affect indoor exposure. Additional research
examines retrofitting options (e.g., filters, HVAC system modifications) for older buildings to
make these buildings safer. NHSRC has just initiated a program to guide building managers in
compiling information (e.g., floor plans, maps of HVAC systems) and making this information
readily available to speed responses and improve safety. A graduate program in building
protection has also been initiated at North Carolina Agricultural and Technical State University.
• Decontamination. A number of research projects are underway in the decontamination area.
NHSRC has compiled information on available decontamination methods and is conducting
several studies to optimize the efficiency of methods. NHSRC has assessed and reported on the
remediation of anthrax-contaminated buildings, preparing "lessons learned" from prior
decontamination efforts. Studies are being conducted to assess tenting methods (e.g., efficiency in
containing fumigants) and scrubbing methods (e.g., prevention of release of fumigants to the
atmosphere). One planned research project will prepare test coupons through aerosol deposition,
assessing decontamination efficiency on real-world materials. The Water Infrastructure Protection
Division has collaborated with DCMD to conduct research on RDDs commonly known as dirty
bombs, and their impacts on water systems. Future projects will also examine surface
decontamination after an ROD event. DCMD has compiled available technologies and methods
for addressing ROD contamination. Another new DCMD project will develop and test
bacteriophages, viruses that infect specific bacterial species; bacteriophages may prove to be safe,
efficient, and effective decontamination methods for bacterial pathogens. An ongoing field
program is evaluating a portable chlorine dioxide fumigation system. Another laboratory study
getting underway will assess fumigant reaction kinetics (e.g., rate of decomposition, reactions
with material surfaces, byproducts) on indoor and outdoor surfaces.
• Disposal. In this area, there are research projects examining bench-scale, pilot-scale, and full-
scale thermal destruction, using surrogate threat agents on ceiling tiles, carpet, other
indoor/outdoor materials, and agricultural wastes. Additional research includes developing a
portable gasifier for diseased animal carcass disposal, modeling agent destruction to predict
incinerator performance, and evaluating waste sterilization through autoclaving. NHSRC is also
developing test methods for sampling and analysis of incinerator gases and ash to ensure that
dangerous materials are not released. A decision support tool for decontamination of wastes,
developed by DCMD, is a Web-based program that provides information for decontamination
crews on packing, transport, thermal treatment locations, and disposal sites to support decisions
about waste disposal. This tool has been employed during several incidents and is continually
updated with new information.
Adams briefly discussed NHSRC's Technology Testing and Verification Program (TTEP). TTEP tests
commercial or near-commercial technologies that could be used for detection, containment,
decontamination, or disposal of a threat agent. Through TTEP, NHSRC has tested a number of air
cleaners, filters, detection systems, and decontamination systems. Tests are conducted based on vendor
specified conditions, yet NHSRC tries to be as realistic as possible when testing. Results are published on
the EPA/NHSRC Web site.
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Question and Answer Period
• Collaboration with the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) was mentioned. Has NHSRC
considered working with the avian influenza virus, specifically assessing transmission in poultry
houses or transfer to humans? A number of NHSRC personnel are involved in workgroups
assessing these issues, but NHSRC is not the lead agency addressing avian influenza. NHSRC is
examining issues surrounding the disposal and landfilling of contaminated materials, as well as
decontamination of the virus on surfaces.
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Regulation of Biological Decontamination
Jeff Kempter, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Pesticide Programs
Any substance or device applied to or put into a human is regulated by the U.S. Food and Drug
Administration (FDA). These include any type of drug or medical device. Thus, FDA regulates
decontaminants used on people. Under FIFRA, EPA regulates any substance or device applied to or used
on inanimate surfaces for the purpose of inactivating a pest, including microorganisms; under FIFRA
such decontaminants are considered to be pesticides or pesticide devices.
EPA approves a substance for use as a pesticide either through registration or through exemption.
Registration is the process, as described in Section 3 of FIFRA, of obtaining a license for use. A product
manufacturer submits information regarding the chemical properties and product labeling to EPA for
review and approval. Once the product is approved, EPA considers it registered and the manufacturer can
distribute or sell it commercially with the approved label, which outlines its uses and precautions. Section
24(c) of FIFRA is a lesser-known registration process by which a state may register a product for
additional uses that are not covered by the federal registration. Under this process, EPA is allowed a 90-
day review period to accept, reject, or modify the state registration. State registration allows use only in
the registered state and only for approved purposes. For example, three states recently approved a
chlorine dioxide generating product for remediation of structures contaminated with mold and mildew.
Exemptions, as outlined in Section 18 of FIFRA, allow for a specific use of a product (e.g., crop or pest
control, public health concerns, quarantine). Ordinarily, EPA issues exemptions for agricultural products
and rarely provides exemptions for antimicrobial products. Quarantine exemptions, which are effective
for 1 to 3 years, typically apply to situations at ports or points of entry into the United States. USDA or
another agency may need to treat import materials with a product normally not used or registered in the
United States because of specificity to the foreign pest. A crisis exemption may be issued when
insufficient time is available for a state or agency to apply to EPA for a full exemption. A state or federal
agency—with oversight by EPA—can issue a crisis exemption. A crisis exemption is effective for 15
days and allows for use and application for a full exemption, if needed. During the anthrax events, EPA
issued 28 crisis exemptions and rejected 35 applications.
EPA is currently considering regulatory issues surrounding the move from crisis exemptions to
registration of products for decontamination of threat agents. In registering a product, EPA must consider
two basic questions: what efficacy data should EPA require and what labels requirements are needed? For
anthrax decontaminants, EPA must consider the efficacy of the product for inactivating spores on a
surface and determine to what degree inactivation is acceptable.
Currently, antimicrobial products with public health claims fall into three categories, presented in order of
efficacy: sanitizers, disinfectants, and sterilants/sporicides. Sanitizers provide limited antimicrobial
action. Disinfectants are effective at inactivating most non-spore forming microorganisms. A disinfectant
must pass either the Association of Analytical Chemists (AOAC) Use Dilution Test or the Germicidal
Spray Product Test for registration. Kempter provided a Web site link for more information regarding
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these specific tests. These tests look for inactivation of 59 of 60 treated carriers in three repetitions. The
level of disinfection approval (disinfectant, broad spectrum, or hospital grade) depends on tests showing
inactivation of one, two, or three different organisms. If a manufacture wants to add a microorganism
(e.g., severe acute respiratory syndrome [SARS]) to a product registration, the manufacturer must show
inactivation of the microorganism or an acceptable surrogate. Kempter noted that testing a surrogate can
be time-consuming because acceptability of the surrogate must be proven. Testing the target
microorganism directly is recommended. The manufacturer can add a specific organism to the label upon
EPA review and approval of test results.
Sterilant and sporicides are liquid, gas, or vapor products that address spore forming microorganisms.
EPA and FDA require that a product pass the AOAC Sporicidal Activity Test (SAT). This test is
conducted on porous and non-porous surfaces with representative anaerobic and aerobic spore-forming
bacteria. To pass, EPA and FDA require no growth on 720 carriers. Similar to disinfectants, to add a
claim for a specific microorganism to a registered sterilant, the manufacture must use the AOAC
Sporicidal Activity Test to evaluate the product against the microorganism or an approved surrogate. EPA
approval allows the manufacturer to add the specific microorganism to the product label.
In addition to the carrier tests, gases and vapors intended to be used in large spaces (i.e., greater than 40
cubic feet [ft3]) must pass a simulated use test in a representative test room. These tests include use of Bis
to assess efficacy.
EPA is also considering establishing a new product claim for decontaminants. People involved in
decontamination efforts are concerned that decontamination agents will fail the AOAC SAT, which was
originally designed to assess sterilization in a hospital setting. Decontamination agents have been proven
in other uses. EPA is considering policy issues associated with decontamination claims based on
inactivation of a specific spore forming microorganism based on either the AOAC SAT or other
quantitative Sporicidal test methods and using porous and/or non-porous surfaces.
EPA is also working to improve the AOAC SAT. These improvements have been tested and validated, so
approval is pending. EPA is also evaluating the AOAC SAT with other equivalent quantitative methods
(e.g., Three Step Method [TSM]) to determine the performance standards required for decontaminant
registration. EPA is also considering issues associated with labeling decontaminants. EPA will limit the
sale and distribution of these products to OSCs, authorized decontamination personnel, or registrant-
certified personnel. In 2006, EPA will issue guidance on the terms and conditions of decontaminant
registration and will seek public comment before finalizing the guidance.
EPA ORD has initiated a number of decontamination-related research projects. Kempter highlighted four
issues associated with this research. A number of agencies and organizations are conducting research and
need to communicate and coordinate efforts. A number of different test protocols are available; preferably
researchers will use validated, well-developed, and/or widely accepted methods. Researchers and/or
manufacturers should coordinate to identify product testing parameters. By clearly understanding
objectives and leveraging existing research, researchers can minimize test variables and maximize the
number of products tested without compromising the testing quality.
To review how prepared the United States is to react to another event, Kempter outlined a number of
available and draft guidance documents. These documents address a variety of issues and topics ranging
from anthrax information, sampling methods, response plans, decision-making tools for biological events,
and restoration approaches. These documents tend to be sector-specific (e.g., to address buildings,
transportation, or water systems). Kempter noted that information sharing and coordination between
agencies is critical. Kempter highlighted two reports of interest. NHSRC assessed the overall
preparedness of the United States in responding to a bioterrorism event and is preparing a report for
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submission to Congress. NAS released a report in June 2005 addressing the issue "how clean is safe?"
Key conclusions of this report were that standard infectious doses cannot be determined with confidence,
a contaminated facility cannot be guaranteed to be agent-free, and insufficient information is available to
quantify safe amounts of a residual bacterial agent. These conclusions reinforce the need for site-specific
sampling plans and goals to ensure that a facility is clean enough to return to use.
Question and Answer Period
Workshop participants posed no questions.
Test Method Update (Office of Pesticide Programs [OPP] Sterilant Registration Protocol
Development)
Steve Tomasino, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Pesticide Programs
Tomasino's core research has focused on development of sporicidal test methods and selection of
surrogates for testing sporicides. The program under which Tomasino works began several years ago.
When the program first started, efforts focused on understanding what testing technologies were available
and what efficacy testing was needed. Now, the program goals are to advance the science of efficacy
testing, develop alternative testing methods, standardize and validate testing methods, design comparative
efficacy testing studies to aid regulatory guidance, identify a surrogate to B. anthracis, and prepare for
testing with additional agents.
In 2003, program personnel adopted a three-tiered research approach. In Tier 1, researchers evaluated and
improved existing methods. In Tier 2, surrogates for B. anthracis were evaluated. Tier 3 involved
collaborative validation of test method and surrogate combinations at 10 to 12 different laboratories. As
part of this research, EPA sought to identify a quantifiable analytical method for spore survival that
reported more than a simple present/absent result without completely abandoning existing test methods.
EPA contracted with a number of collaborators for these research efforts. Tomasino presented a timeline
of start-up activities and ongoing actions to highlight research milestones.
Tomasino highlighted key components of five studies recently completed or underway through this EPA
program.
• Modifications to the AOAC Sporicidal Activity Test Method 966.04: Collaboration Study. A
decontaminant passes this AOAC Sporicidal Activity Test only with complete inactivation of
representative anaerobic and aerobic spores on 720 porous and non-porous carriers. This test
requires 21 days for completion and lacks standardization in several key steps. In 2005, Tomasino
proposed modifications to the test. These included replacing the soil extract nutrient broth with a
defined nutrient agar, replacing the porcelain carriers with stainless steel carriers, adding a carrier
count process, establishing a mean minimum spore titer per carrier, and adding a neutralization
confirmation process. These modifications have been evaluated at five independent laboratories.
Testing has been completed and a manuscript outlining recommendations and summarizing
conclusions was presented in March 2006.
To compare the existing methods with the modifications, EPA compared various combinations of
modifications side by side. These comparisons should report similar results, indicating that the
modifications did not change the test or test results. EPA applied three different decontaminants
at two concentrations to carriers and then used both the standard AOAC Sporicidal Activity Test
Method and the modified AOAC Sporicidal Activity Test Method to test the treated carriers.
Tomasino presented detailed results on decontaminants efficacy. Analysis of the test results found
no significant changes based on modifications. Tomasino's manuscript recommends use of the
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proposed modifications: use of nutrient agar, target carrier counts of 105 to 106 spores per carrier,
and neutralization confirmation procedures. Use of stainless steel carriers was not recommended,
however, because research with stainless steel carriers has not been completed.
• Comparative Evaluation of Two Quantitative Test Methods for Determining the Efficacy of
Liquid Sporicides and Sterilants on a Hard Surface. EPA compared and researched two
methods—ASTM E2111-00 and the TSM—used to quantify spore counts. Each method reports a
log reduction in spores from a starting concentration to a final concentration after application of a
decontaminant. Tomasino presented the log reductions found by each method after application of
three decontaminants. No significant differences in results were found. Because no differences in
results were found, EPA submitted questionnaires to analysts to evaluate the ease of completing
each test (e.g., clarity of protocols, simplicity for test preparation, ease of testing itself,
interpretation of results). Analysts selected TSM as the preferred method for further investigation.
As such, EPA has established a protocol for validating TSM against the AOAC Sporicidal
Activity Test Method. Tomasino noted that focus on TSM does not indicate EPA approval or
future preference for this method.
• Comparative Study with B. anthracis—Ames Strain and Two Potential Surrogates (B. subtilis and
B. anthracis /A Sterne]). Because of health and safety concerns, only a small number of
laboratories are equipped to study virulent B. anthracis. Finding a less-virulent surrogate would
allow research in a wider array of laboratories. To be appropriate, the surrogate must be as
resistant or more resistant to sporicides as virulent B. anthracis. As in other studies, inoculated
coupons were treated with one of three different disinfectants. EPA then used TSM to assess the
log reduction achieved for B. anthracis and BSL-1 and BSL-2 surrogates. EPA completed three
replications for each sporicide and microorganism combination. Tomasino presented results from
control tests that indicated that mean spore counts on the carriers were similar, and results from
treated carriers that indicated similar log reductions for each microorganism and disinfectant,
except sodium hypochlorite with B. subtilis. As expected, the lowest reduction was seen with
unaltered bleach treatment. Understanding inter- and intra-laboratory variability in results is
necessary. For this study, EPA only assessed intra-laboratory variability, as indicated by the
relative standard deviation provided. This study found that B. subtilis and B. anthracis (A Sterne)
appear to be appropriate surrogates for virulent B. anthracis. B. subtilis will be used as a test
microbe for validation of TSM. Tomasino noted that study conditions were highly controlled and
the identified surrogates only apply to liquid sporicides on hard surfaces. Future research likely
will look beyond liquids on non-porous surfaces.
• Validation Protocol for the Quantitative Three Step Method. TSM validation, based on a study
protocol reviewed in March 2006, is scheduled for summer 2006. The OPP laboratory will be the
lead in this project. In addition, eight to ten federal, contract, and industry laboratories have
volunteered to participate in the validation studies. As a requirement, half of these laboratories
have no prior experience with TSM. The study will involve one microbe (B. subtilis) on a glass
carrier. Three decontaminants at three different concentrations will be tested with three replicates.
The AOAC Sporicidal Activity Test Method will serve as the reference method. The objective of
the study is to validate a method for quantifying spore counts after liquid decontamination of a
hard surface.
• Determining the Efficacy of Sporicidal Chemicals Using AOAC Method 966.04 and the
Quantitative Three Step Method. As research moves toward quantitative testing methods, there is
a need to correlate frequency of positive results with quantitative log reductions. A series of
commercially available decontaminants were tested using the AOAC Sporicidal Activity Test
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Method and TSM. B. subtilis on porcelain penicylinders served as the test microorganism and
carrier.
Future research will address several areas of concern. EPA will assess the application of current analysis
modifications to gaseous disinfectants and porous materials. Research regarding Clostridium, a key
component of the AOAC Sporicidal Activity Test Method, is also needed. Additional surrogate studies
are underway with Yersinia pestis and Francisella tularensis. EPA plans to investigate different coupon
materials for efficacy evaluations and to compare quantitative test methods for fumigants.
Question and Answer Period
• B. anthracis (A Sterne) lacks the one plasmid, but it is not a completely avirulent strain. Is this
correct? The strain of B. anthracis (A Sterne) studied is considered a BSL-2 organism. A
workshop participant noted that B. anthracis (A Sterne) is fully avirulent; the microorganism
lacks both plasmids. EPA included this strain in the test as an additional possible surrogate if B.
subtilis was unacceptable. Unfortunately, the number of possible treatments limited the study, so
EPA decided to select a single microorganism representative of BSL-1, -2, and -3.
• Because B. subtilis andB. anthracis generate different kinds of spores, European laboratories
conduct research on different strains. Did EPA consider other strains for this research? EPA
selected B. subtilis based on the current association with U.S. regulatory standards. The study
results needed to create a bridge between current AOAC Sporicidal Activity Test Method
requirements and quantitative methods.
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA): Partner in Protecting the Homeland
Jon Edwards, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Homeland Security
The EPA Office of Homeland Security is a small office formed in February 2003. The Director of this
office reports directly to the EPA Administrator to allow coordination of homeland security activities
across EPA. Internally, the office implements the EPA homeland security agenda, supports EPA policy,
and provides a single voice for communicating that policy to other agencies. The office also operates the
Homeland Security Collaborative Network to bring together various EPA program managers with
homeland security responsibilities, receives and disseminates information, and supports program offices
and regions with homeland security responsibilities. The office is also involved in budget development
for various EPA homeland security projects, such as decontamination research and increased water
security. Edwards provided a list of homeland security programs underway at nine different EPA offices,
such as building and outdoor decontamination research, emergency preparedness, and radiological
responses. The EPA Office of Homeland Security works to coordinate these activities and collect the
information generated through these programs. Externally, the office serves as a liaison between EPA, the
White House, DHS, and other federal agencies and organization involved in homeland security concerns;
represents EPA in committees and workgroups; informs the EPA Administrator about external issues and
progress; and serves as a point of contact to ensure appropriate participation in Presidential Directives.
Edwards noted that the OHS works closely with the White House Homeland Security Council, which is
key in developing and driving national homeland security policy.
Edwards reviewed six Homeland Security Presidential Directives (HSPD) that the EPA Office of
Homeland Security follows. HSPD 5 includes management of domestic incidents. The National Incident
Management System and National Response Plan were developed based on this directive. HSPD 7
includes critical infrastructure protection with specific direction for EPA to consider water vulnerability
(e.g., drinking water, wastewater) and best security practices for water utilities. HSPD 8 includes national
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preparedness for training and response to national incidents. HSPD 9 includes defense of agriculture and
food. EPA is involved with this HSPD due to the national water quality monitoring and surveillance
components. HSPD 10 considers biodefense research and decontamination issues. HSPD 12 includes
policies for identification standards (e.g., smart cards) for federal employees.
The EPA Office of Homeland Security leverages EPA's many years of experience in protecting human
health and safeguarding the environment and applies this knowledge to homeland security issues. Most of
EPA's program offices have homeland security-related responsibilities. These include, but are not limited
to, programs that address emergency response, water quality, pesticide use, hazardous materials
remediation, radiation and ambient (Biowatch) monitoring, and research and development. Edwards
provided several examples of events (e.g., the September 11 terror events, anthrax attacks, the Columbia
Space Shuttle disaster, the ricin event at Capitol Hill, Hurricane Katrina) in which EPA applied existing
knowledge to address a concern. EPA also used these incidents to expand its experience and capabilities.
For example, during the Columbia Space Shuttle Disaster, EPA assisted in collecting debris and
conducting a human health risk assessment associated with contact with this debris.
Edwards briefly reviewed EPA projects that fall under White House-defined homeland security program
areas.
• Threat response and incident management. EPA operates an emergency response program to
support local responders if they become overwhelmed during an incident. Recent information
indicates that EPA employs approximately 250 OSCs and responds to about 300 events per year.
Response teams can react quickly and decisively in the event of a hazardous substance or oil
release. These teams also provide scientific, engineering, and technical research and support
during response efforts. Edwards listed specific resources (e.g., the Radiological Emergency
Response Team) available to OSCs. In addition, EPA can provide law enforcement and forensic
support through criminal investigation, national enforcement investigation, and national counter-
terrorism evidence response team capabilities. The EPA laboratory network includes 37
stationary and 8 mobile laboratories, as well as additional contract laboratories, available for
sample analysis. EPA is also involved in efforts with a number of other agencies to build the
national environmental laboratory capacity to address possible surge capacity during a large-scale
event. EPA provides broad-area monitoring capabilities with existing air monitoring networks
and mobile monitoring technologies, such as the Airborne Spectral Photometric Environmental
Collection Technology—a small aircraft that can detect and map a number of chemicals and
radionuclides. EPA is also developing additional mobile monitoring technologies and a national
monitoring system to provide real-time ambient air monitoring data for radiation.
• Biodefense. A number of EPA programs address biodefense concerns. The NOT is a highly
specialized unit with expertise in WMD. The team collaborates with NHSRC and others to
advance agent detection and decontamination technologies. EPA technology research and
development efforts, through NHSRC, advance EPA biodefense efforts. Edwards listed a number
of relevant NHSRC projects, such as threat assessment and simulation exercises, sampling and
analysis method validation and development, and building and water system decontamination
method evaluations. EPA also provides antimicrobial analysis and certification activities, such as
antimicrobial agent certification and ongoing anthrax testing. Finally, EPA operates two BSL-2
laboratories that primarily handle agents that are persistent in the environment.
• Critical infrastructure protection. EPA is the lead federal agency responsible for water supply
and wastewater security and protection. EPA ensures that drinking water systems prepare
vulnerability assessments and emergency response plans, provides technical assistance and
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training to water suppliers, distributes critical response tools, and develops best security practices.
Edwards highlighted a critical project to develop a drinking water contaminant warning system.
EPA is working on this effort in collaboration with other key federal and water sector partners.
Ongoing technology research and development activities include, but are not limited to, threat
assessments, rapid health risk assessment, and sampling and analysis method development and
verification. Although DHS leads chemical industry concerns, EPA supports DHS efforts through
several programs (e.g., risk management program).
• Food and agriculture security. EPA plays a key role in pesticide licensing and safe use. EPA also
supports animal carcass disposal programs and coordinates with other agencies in developing
carcass disposal guidance and emergency response plans.
Question and Answer Period
Workshop participants asked no questions.
Technical Support Working Group (TSWG) Decontamination Research and Development
Activities
Rebecca Blackmon, Technical Support Working Group
Blackmon is part of the Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Countermeasures (CBRNC)
Subgroup of the Technical Support Working Group (TSWG). TSWG has 11 different subgroups plus
additional programs that focus on rapid research and prototype development. Usually, TSWG and
collaborators sign a contract to start a project only 10 months after a research need has been defined.
Typically, projects last about 18 months.
The CBRNC Subgroup identifies interagency user requirements related to terrorist-employed chemical,
biological, radiological, and nuclear materials. Research focus areas include detection, protection,
information resources, and consequence management, which includes decontamination research. The
CBRNC Subgroup collaborates with many different federal organizations (e.g., DOD, DOE, DHS, EPA).
These collaborators may provide funding, technical oversight, and/or expert review. Overall the CBRNC
Subgroup is actively managing about 90 projects. Blackmon presented an overview of some of the
decontamination projects.
• Low-cost chemical personal decontamination system. There is a need for low-cost, easy-to-use
individual decontamination kits for victims exposed to chemical agents. The kits are intended for
use by ambulatory, untrained civilians as an emergency first step in personal decontamination.
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) is working to improve available kits to reduce
or eliminated the need for scrubbing with wipes so that the kit can be used on sensitive areas,
such as mucous membranes, eyes, or open wounds. LLNL is focusing on developing contact
decontaminants for toxic industrial chemicals on skin, with a long-term goal of developing a
system for contact decontamination of sensitive areas.
• Personnel decontamination agent simulant kit. During training exercises, participants need a
means of assessing decontamination effectiveness. The simulant kits include safe (as defined by
the International Dictionary of Cosmetics and Fragrances) surrogates for threat agents. These
surrogates mimic the physical properties of CWA and radiologicals and are mixed with a
fluorescent dye to help responders evaluate decontamination effectiveness. A prototype is
currently available.
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• Wireless Multisensor Environmental Monitors. Blackmon presented information about this
project at the 2005 Decontamination Workshop. Esensors, Inc., developed portable sensor pods
that monitor up to six different parameters simultaneously. The pods are battery-operated and
transmit data through either Internet/ethernet or wireless communication using standard wireless
protocol. The pods are meant to be low-cost and portable and have many applications. In
decontamination, the sensor pods can track CWA or chemical/fumigant concentrations, as well as
environmental conditions such as temperature or humidity. Sensor testing is complete and field
testing of a sensor array is planned. A pod with six basic sensors costs about $2,500; additional
sensors cost from $50 to $700. Blackmon listed 18 gas sensors that are available.
• Expedient mitigation of a radiological release. The CBRNC Subgroup, along with collaborators,
has developed a strippable polymer coating that is sprayed on a surface and fixes radioactive
particles in place. The coating forms a flexible sheet that can be easily pulled off a substrate,
along with the transfixed radioactive particles. Blackmon introduced this project during the 2005
EPA Decontamination Workshop. Efforts in the past year have focused on polymer
reformulations. In decontamination, responders could use the coating to contain radioactive
materials while decontamination planning occurs. The military has also tested the coating as a
dust suppressor (e.g., to create a helicopter landing pad). Various field trials were completed in
2005. Currently available mechanisms and spray applicators can be used to apply the coating. In
addition to smaller, personal applicators, the manufacturer has designed a mobile response unit
that could serve as a command post and a distribution area for the coating.
• Radiological decontamination technologies. Argonne National Laboratory (ANL) is working to
develop chemical processes to remove cesium-137 from porous building materials (e.g., concrete)
after an RDD event. ANL developed a three-part process that includes spraying an ionic wash to
release the cesium-137 particles, spraying an absorbent gel to capture the particles, and
vacuuming the gel to consolidate the waste. Initial testing achieved greater than 70% and 97%
removal from concrete after a single and three repetitions, respectively, of the process. Additional
testing is planned.
• Statistical design tool for sampling contaminated buildings. The CBRNC Subgroup, in
conjunction with Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL), completed and deployed this
software tool in July 2005. Based on existing technologies, PNNL built a software tool that helps
design statistically valid surface sampling regimes for determining the extent of building
contamination following a terrorist event. The program includes a number of decision criteria and
rules and allows import of facility-specific information. The program identifies sample locations
to identify potential hot spots, ensure statistically relevant results, and guide sampling decisions.
One must decide on key considerations (e.g., statistical rules, acceptable cleanup levels) before
running the program.
• Large-scale restorations of biologically contaminated urban areas. The CBRNC Subgroup is
developing a handbook that includes easy-to-use protocols for decontamination of bio-
contaminated areas. Ultimately the handbook will guide decontamination events to reoccupation.
The project began in December 2004 based on input from a round table workshop. A draft report
is currently under review. Protocols should be compiled and available in summer 2006.
• Guidelines for disposal of contaminated plant and animal waste. Disposal of contaminated
biomass is of great interest to TSWG, due to concerns about avian influenza and other foreign
animal diseases. The guidance document is a clear, concise handbook describing the best methods
for disposal of plant and animal materials. Methods are based on an evaluation of engineering,
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economic, and regulatory factors. The guidance document will enable decision-makers to identify
the disposal methods that meet their specific conditions, resources, and needs. A first draft is
under review.
Blackmon briefly described several projects that address worker protection during decontamination. The
Chemical Risk Assessment Tool recognizes that PPE use is a burden during decontamination. This tool
provides incident commanders, through software on a handheld device, with information about chemical
exposure guidelines, suitable PPE, breakthrough times, and stay times in PPE and contaminated areas.
Beta testing is ongoing, and the tool should be widely available in July 2006. The Improved Chemical
Protective Ensemble is a non-encapsulating suit that provides vapor, aerosol, and splash protection. The
goal is to provide Level A protection with a Level B design. Tests to assess compliance with regulatory
standards are ongoing. The suit should be commercially available in June 2006, with some regulatory
testing pending. The Mass Decontamination Protocols provide useful information about decontamination
in the handbook "Best Practices and Guidelines for Mass Personnel Decontamination." The handbook is
available in hard copy or on CD and can be ordered through http://www.cbiac.apgea.army.mil. The
project R-2161 Estimate Waste Quantities and Cleanup of RRD Events is under consideration and would
include a software tool that estimates the quantity of waste and/or debris generated during an RDD event.
Question and Answer Period
• Does the three step decontamination method for cesium-137 apply to alpha, beta, and gamma
radionuclides or is there a difference in response? ANL only assessed cesium-137.
• One workshop participant commented that statistical tools to design sampling events should be
used with caution. During the 2001 anthrax events, CDC found that targeted sampling was the
most efficient use of resources and provided the best means of assessing contamination. A
software tool should not replace input from a qualified person. There is a fear that first responders
will use the tool to replace collaboration with experts. Blackmon noted that hot spots and targeted
sampling approaches can be input to the software. The software simply assists in identifying a
statistically relevant sampling plan.
• Could the sampling program provide a statistically valid sampling plan for a seven-zone area if
contaminants are known to be in just one zone? Users can input incident-specific information and
the software tool will adjust the sampling design accordingly.
• When will the CBRNC Subgroup release the draft documents addressing restoration of large
urban areas and disposal of animal waste? Will there be an opportunity for peer review by other
federal agencies? Blackmon indicated that she could share the draft documents with other federal
agencies, but the documents are not ready for wide distribution.-
A Decontamination Concept of Operations
Michael Ottlinger, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, National Decontamination Team
The NOT has prepared a first draft of a document titled "A Decontamination Concept of Operations." The
process of preparing the document helped clarify the NOT mission and role in decontamination of threat
agents. The NOT does not serve as a response team; most regions already have response teams. As a
group of 15 staff with various technical expertise, the NOT has chosen a role as an information resource
center in support of OSCs, first responders, and other decontamination personnel. Ottlinger outlined the
NDT's mission elements: scientific and technical, operational employment, and policy and management.
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Ottlinger noted that the policy and management element is more appropriately a coordination and training
mission.
The strategic objectives of the group include providing technical support to regions, effectively delivering
information about decontamination options, enhancing preparedness and planning, enhancing
partnerships, serving as a liaison between resources, and identifying operational shortfalls. The NDT
becomes involved at a scene based on a regional request. NDT members can provide technical and
scientific assistance from the start to the completion of decontamination. Currently, the NDT focuses on
concerns associated with large-scale events. In the future, the team hopes to address small scale events as
well.
On a daily basis, NDT members travel extensively to attend meetings and workshops, participate in
technical working groups, meet regional response teams, and identify response team needs. Team
members interface with federal, state, and local partners, as well as commercial manufacturers. The NDT
develops standard operating procedures for handling various threat agents and compiles technical
information about decontamination science, methods, validation, and resources, as well as disposal
options. For example, the NDT will gather information from vendors about a specific decontamination
technology and forward this information in an easy-to-use format to OSCs during an event.
The NDT consists of individuals with technical training, who then must become acclimated to specific
EPA policies and regulations associated with decontamination events, regional response plans, and risk
assessment and risk communication. Team members may also need health and safety training (e.g.,
HAZWOPER, first responder training). In the case of an event, NDT members can safely work at a scene
and support the incident command structure as needed. Members who are not deployed at a scene serve as
support staff in providing technical information. They may also assist in obtaining specialized materials
and equipment or serve a liaison between agencies to coordinate efforts. The NDT is available to respond
to many emergency situations, not just attacks using warfare agents. Recently team members responded to
the aftereffects of Hurricane Katrina.
Ottlinger briefly presented an example threat scenario to illustrate the concerns and milestones in a
decontamination effort. This scenario assumes a release of anthrax to a number of mixed-use buildings
and structures in New York City. This scenario illustrates the complexity and range of concerns that may
be encountered. The NDT becomes involved at the scene during consequence management—after the
initial casualties and actions to close transit systems, evacuate citizens, and secure the contaminated area.
Ottlinger listed a number of concerns and questions regarding public safety issues and decontamination
planning. For example, is sampling needed in three dimensions to account for vertical as well as aerial
contamination; how is the contaminant contained; how is spread monitored; what are the needs for teams
entering a hot zone? The execution of a decontamination plan follows the same process as most
management plans: define goals, organize tasks, select and obtain resources, plan and execute the
mission, chart progress, document quality assurance, and communicate/manage expectations. Within this
framework, planners must establish agent avoidance and containment priorities and plan specific
decontamination elements (e.g., staging areas, hot zone exit routes, exterior versus interior
decontamination). In addition, quality assurance and clearance sampling is critical in monitoring
decontamination and preventing recontamination.
Ottlinger presented the FEMA phases of recovery and related these phases to a decontamination event.
The response phase includes evacuation of people from contaminated areas. The initial recovery phase
allows for safe repopulation once agent concentrations reach levels deemed safe for chronic exposure.
Transitional recovery occurs during the re-establishment of local communities and long-term recovery is
achieved with permanent rebuilding.
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Question and Answer Period
The question and answer period was waived due to time constraints.
Decontamination and Consequence Management Division (DCMD) Disposal Research
Paul Lemieux, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, National Homeland Security Research Center
Disposal occurs when decontamination is deemed completed. EPA is usually left with the waste and must
determine how to handle it. Lemieux has been working on coordinating decontamination and disposal
because the two are linked—decisions made during decontamination directly affect disposal actions. The
total cost of a restoration operation includes the costs for both decontamination and disposal.
Wastes may include materials that have been removed from a contaminated building before
decontamination, as well as materials that underwent decontamination but for which complete
decontamination cannot be confirmed. Wastes include building materials and furnishings (e.g.,
wallboard), office equipment (e.g., computers, desks, paper), indirect residue (e.g., PPE, rags), filters
from HVAC systems, aqueous residues, outdoor materials, and agricultural residues. These materials may
be dry or wet, and involvement with agencies beyond EPA may be needed for proper disposal.
The DCMD goals for the disposal program are to:
• Assure the public that the selected disposal processes and procedures will be safe.
• Give guidance to accelerate disposal permitting activities and to select appropriate facilities and
technologies.
• Give facilities guidance on ensuring permit compliance, worker safety, and protection of assets.
• Give responders guidance on incorporating disposal plans, waste minimization, and balancing of
disposal/decontamination costs into the entire decision-making process.
Lemieux noted that insurance and indemnification are large concerns for facilities in the disposal
industry.
To achieve these goals, DCMD has several disposal research and development programs. Lemieux
provided an overview of some of the guidance document, thermal destruction, and autoclave spore
destruction projects. Lemieux did not present results from projects researching permanency of landfilling
and collaborative efforts with USDA and TSWGto assess agricultural residue disposal.
• Guidance documents. DCMD is developing a guidance document—the online Decision Support
Tool—to outline available information about material disposal. OSCs, regulatory and public
agencies, and facilities themselves are the target audience for this tool. The Decision Support
Tool is a restricted-access, Web-based software program that can estimate the decontamination
residue and disposal volume and mass based on a series of inputs defining the disposal scenario
(e.g., building type). The tool assumes that a decision has been made to dispose of the materials
and does not attempt to influence the choice of decontamination method. The tool includes
databases listing information about disposal facilities (e.g., landfills, combustion facilities,
wastewater facilities, autoclaves), worker safety guidance, packaging and storage guidance, and
transportation guidance. DCMD is working to added latitude and longitude data to assess in
locating disposal facilities geographically. Lemieux presented several screen captures illustrating
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the disposal volume estimator, agent characterization, and facility query information. The tool
was used during Hurricane Katrina cleanup and has been updated based on lessons learned during
that use.
• Thermal destruction. DCMD has also been investigating the ability of thermal incineration to
destroy spores. EPA testing of hospital incinerators in the 1990s found a greater than 6 log
reduction ofGeobacillius stearothermophilus spores in some instances, and less than 3 log
reduction in other instances, as measured in stack gas and ash. These findings prompted bench-
scale incinerator testing. DCMD conducted these tests to develop a kinetic expression for the
destruction of G. stearothermophilus on different materials and at different temperatures. Based
on calibration and modeling at the bench scale, DCMD aims to conduct larger, pilot testing to
further refine and calibrate a model of a full-scale incinerator. Lemieux presented data from
bench-scale tests of wall board. DCMD also conducted a pilot-scale test of 1-pound waste
bundles in a rotary kiln incinerator with an afterburner. DCMD designed test parameters to
maximize the potential for dioxin creation, because many decontaminants are chlorine-based.
Results with carpet and chlorinated bleach as the decontamination agent found increased dioxin
emissions. To evaluate destruction of spores bound to building materials, DCMD embedded Bis
in carpet and ceiling tile and incinerated the materials at about 800 degrees Fahrenheit (°F). The
Bis were then tested for spore viability. Lemieux presented the results from several test runs at
various time intervals: destruction did not occur for up to 30 minutes (wet ceiling tiles), which
indicates that spores may survive a commercial incinerator if care is not taken. Additional
modeling is underway to assess CWA and other types of incinerators.
• Autoclave spore destruction. Autoclaves are regularly used to sterilize hospital wastes, and
commercial autoclaves can sterilize hundreds of tons of material a day. DCMD assessed whether
autoclaves could also be used to sterilize materials contaminated with a threat agent. A series of
paired Bis (one to test for viability and one to quantify survival) were placed in the center of
densely packed wallboard and the wallboard was cycled through a commercial autoclave. A
sensor tracked temperatures throughout the wallboard. (Lemieux presented several photographs
depicting the study conditions.) The first run of the autoclave failed to achieve temperatures
necessary to inactivate the spores. However, a second cycle raised the temperature throughout the
wallboard high enough to achieve sterilization. Lemieux speculated that the steam injected during
the first cycle condensed in the pores of the material and hindered heat transfer. In the second
cycle, the excess water was removed during the vacuum cycle and the material was sufficiently
heated to prevent condensation during steam injection. He showed graphs illustrating the
temperature readings for both cycles. DCMD found that achieving 250 °F for 15 minutes resulted
in no viable spores. The best results were achieved with loosely packed, dry materials undergoing
multiple sequential cycles at a higher autoclave temperature and pressure. Recently, these
findings were applied to sterilize approximately 130 bags of material resulting from a small
anthrax incident in New York City.
Question and Answer Period
• How would you dispose of polymer materials used for radiological contamination containment?
DOE is addressing concerns about radiological disposal. Disposing of wastes from an ROD event
is a huge issue. Wastes will likely be sent to a secured government landfill.
• Will DCMD add radiologicals to the Decision Support Tool? DCMD would like to add
radiological to the tool. The current focus, however, is creating a solid product for chemical and
biological agents. The radiological agents can be integrated later.
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• Why did the New York municipal landfills refuse the waste from the anthrax events? Lemieux
speculated that waste disposal facilities are extremely concerned about the impact of biological
wastes on their business assets. The small quantity of waste—only 130 bags—was probably not
worth the risk. Perhaps a landfill would have accepted a larger amount because the income would
have been worth the risk. Waste disposal facilities also may have wanted to press EPA to address
indemnification issues. A workshop participant noted that waste facilities may have insurance
clauses that do not cover biological wastes; if so, they may not accept such waste. A hospital
waste incinerator would only have a permit for medical waste. Anthrax waste would be outside of
the permit limitations.
• Have you had any contact with the Fort Detrick incinerator operators? They routinely burn
biological wastes and burned much of the waste from the Capitol Hill decontamination. The
Capitol Hill incident was unique because the waste could easily be shipped to Fort Detrick.
DCMD has focused on commercial incinerators because private sector operations likely will not
have access to military incinerators.
A Sampling of Some of Canada's Decontamination Work
Merv Fingas, Environment Canada
Many programs are underway in Canada. For example, $178 million have been slated to fund research
with chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear research. Fingas briefly described a sample of three of
these projects (Multi-Agency Restoration Project, Demonstration Project, and Standards Project). His
presentation slides provided detailed project information. Fingas also noted that Canadian troops were
heavily exposed to mustard gas during World War I (WWI), so decontamination projects were already in
place in Canada at the time of the September 11, 2001, attacks.
The Multi-Agency Restoration Project was a 3-year study of radiation, chemical, and biological
decontamination and waste management. The project focused on testing promising decontamination
methods that had not been tested already and completing an overview of available technologies. A
number of agencies from both Canada and the United States were involved in this project. For this
project, restoration includes decontamination and disposal activities. As a result of efforts under this
project, Environment Canada has completed extensive laboratory research, conducted an extensive
literature review, and produced a basic manual. Additional papers and laboratory reports have been
published.
Many factors affect decontamination; Fingas highlighted the problems associated with oleophilic and
hydrophilic agents. CWA are generally hydrophilic and water-bearing decontaminants are appropriate.
Pesticides are oleophilic, so water-borne decontaminants are ineffective.
Many generic decontaminants are available, and Environment Canada had conducted some testing with
these materials. Environment Canada has also evaluated methods and materials specific to radiological,
chemical, and biological agents. Nuclear and radiological decontamination presents unique concerns.
Historical practice has been to remove the radioactive material from a surface by blasting with water,
concentrate the wastewater, and store the waste at a facility forever. Alternatives under consideration
include methods to use blast water containing acids and chelating agents and then concentrate the water
with zeolites or lignins. Fingas presented results from some of these studies. Another radiological
decontamination study examined membrane rejection as a treatment for the blast wastewater. Chemical
restoration topics were also examined during the Multi-Agency Restoration Project. Environment Canada
did not include CWA in these evaluations because military organizations have conducted extensive
research with CWA. Research efforts focused on testing decontaminants for pesticides. Fingas listed nine
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decontaminants that underwent testing and provided results for diazinon and malathion on carpet and
ceiling tile. Biological restoration has drawn a great deal of attention in the United States because of the
anthrax attacks, and has also been studied for hospital applications. Two sets of studies—one using a
liquid decontaminant and one using a gas decontaminant—are underway. Fingas presented results from
VHP testing.
Environment Canada also conducted disposal studies as part of the Multi-Agency Restoration Project.
About 20 different building materials were tested. These projects addressed legal concerns, pre-
processing needs, neutralization, landfilling, incineration, and alternate technologies.
The Demonstration Project, which is planned for summer 2006, is a full-scale test of well-known
decontamination technologies. Separate facilities will address chemical, biological, and radiological
contamination scenarios. The objectives are to test larger-scale decontamination in comparison to small-
scale coupon research and gather as much data as possible about full-scale decontamination (including
time, cost, and treatment repetition). Fingas detailed the decontamination agents and study parameters in
his presentation slides. Reports from these studies will likely be available in spring 2007.
The Standards Project is a 5-year study to develop standards for decontamination endpoints, excluding
radioactive agents. Project goals include generating information to answer the question "What are the
acceptable cleanup levels?" for priority agents and developing procedures and guidelines for setting
standards for biological and chemical agents. Many international agencies and organization are involved
in this project. Standards must balance the conservative views about applying safety factors and practical
considerations about the technical ability to achieve a standard. Fingas briefly described an example of
decontamination of a large building versus a small building. This example illustrates the impact of the
standard on cost and time requirements to achieve successful decontamination. Often, building a new
facility is faster and cheaper than decontaminating the existing facility. The example scenarios found that
if a standard is more than one or two orders of magnitude less than the average maximum contamination
detected on a surface, decontamination is infeasible and uneconomical. The difference between 85% to
95% decontamination efficiencies creates a tremendous increase in time and cost because of the need for
repeat applications. Fingas presented diagrams that illustrate concepts in setting chemical and biological
standards.
In closing, Fingas noted that the three projects presented are examples of the more than 20 chemical-
specific projects and over 100 chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear projects underway in
Canada.
Question and Answer Period
• For RED decontamination, is there any concern with aerosolization due to power washing or
pressure washing? Aerosolization is very much a concern. During the Multi-Agency Restoration
Project, researchers added materials, such as zeolite, to absorb the radionuclides and minimize
aerosolization.
The Government Decontamination Service (GDS): The United Kingdom (UK) Perspective on
Decontamination Approaches
Robert Bettley-Smith, UK Government Decontamination Service
The UK's strategy for decontamination is to ensure that the government is capable of responding quickly
and effectively to address and recover from the consequences of chemical, biological, radiological, and
nuclear incidents, particularly those caused by terrorism. With that aim, the government created the
Government Decontamination Service (GDS) to address uncertainty in global security, to form a cross-
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government effort to address readiness in the UK, and to work with the chemical, biological, radiological,
and nuclear program led by the Home Security Office. After 2 years of planning, the UK launched GDS
on October 1,2005.
In creating GDS, the UK evaluated a number of options ranging from creating GDS as an emergency
service that only convened in times of emergency to a comprehensive agency that completed all aspects
of a response and waited in a state of readiness. The final format of GDS falls between these two
extremes. GDS operates with a core approach with staff that provides advice and guidance, identifies and
assesses available technologies, and advises the central government on national decontamination issues.
Responsible authorities, similar to local municipalities in the United States, provide the personnel and
obtain the equipment necessary to conduct decontamination. The heart of GDS is a framework of
contractors that are available to provide responsible authorities with decontamination materials and
experience.
Responsible authorities, not GDS, assume responsibility for decontamination events. GDS does not fund
decontamination events; nor does it deal with humans, animals, or their remains; define cleanup
standards; or validate that decontamination standards are achieved. Bettley-Smith noted that conflicts of
interest might arise if a single authority is responsible for setting standards, conducting decontamination,
and monitoring decontamination. (Contractors on the framework have the ability to identify what is
present and that the material has been removed to the required specification.)
Bettley-Smith provided an organization chart illustrating the structure of GDS, which is similar to but not
based on a military brigade. Science, corporate strategy, and resources support three liaison teams made
up of senior personnel. With this structure, GDS is capable of handling an emergency—senior personnel
from the liaison teams are capable of arriving at a scene and directing operations if needed. They also
conduct day-to-day tasks (i.e., providing information, advising the government).
The framework of contractors able to conduct and advise on decontamination activities is critical to GDS.
The first component of this framework was activated in October 2005. GDS is building relationships,
through exercises and meetings, with a first group of contractors to ensure that the contractors are
available and accessible in the event of a decontamination situation. GDS will reopen the framework for
additional contractors in 2007. GDS has established fee schedules with these contractors, which allows
for predictable costs and faster responses during an event. Through GDS, any government department,
public sector organization, responsible authority, or private sector organization responsible for building or
infrastructure safety can access the framework. Inclusion in the framework does not indicate accreditation
or guarantee a technology, nor does it indemnify the contractor. Bettley-Smith indicated that a possible
development is that GDS might offer an accreditation program or indemnification in, say, 5 to 6 years.
For emergencies, GDS has established a five-tier response plan:
• Tier 0: planning advice and guidance. These activities occur before an event or emergency
situation. Bettley-Smith highlighted key guidance document available or in production. The
Radiation Remediation Handbook was first published in 1986 and was revised in summer 2005.
The Chemical and Biological Remediation Handbook, which is in production, mirrors the
Radiation Remediation Handbook.
• Tier 1: provision of information. This tier consists of providing advice and guidance.
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• Tier 2: provision of advice and facilitation at an incident (local response). Although GDS's role
remains primarily providing advice and guidance at this tier, GDS may also serve as a liaison
between stakeholders.
• Tier 3: provision of advice and facilitation at an incident (regional response). In this situation, an
incident affects more than one local, responsible authority. GDS serves as a liaison between
responsible authorities and contractors and GDS may begin to manage the situation.
• Tier 4: provision of advice and facilitation at an incident (national response). At this level, GDS
provides project management in addition to providing advice and guidance and serving as a
liaison.
When researching decontamination, Bettley-Smith felt, given the "relative maturity" of the area of work,
the more we know the more we realize we do not know. For example, GDS staff has found that there is a
shortage of trained people able to wear PPE. During a response, people may be needed to enter a building
to turn values and shut down HVAC systems. Wearing full PPE and completing a task is not easy. The
question becomes, "Is it easier to train an architect to wear PPE or train a responder how to shut down
building systems?" The answer is not simple.
Future tasks for GDS include reviewing data gaps in the contractor framework, identifying additional
decontamination needs, collaborating with international partners, assessing and validating technologies,
evaluating new technologies, and researching material interactions. Bettley-Smith noted the need to
balance the desire for solutions that are good enough for now with the desire to perfect solutions in the
future.
Question and Answer Period
• Will the Chemical and Biological Remediation Handbook include actual scenarios and responses
to these scenarios or will it provide general guidance? When will the handbook be available?
The Chemical and Biological Remediation Handbook will follow the same pattern as the
Radiation Remediation Handbook, which provides decision trees and guidance for responses. The
release date is uncertain. The document is currently a good working draft that could be used
during an event, but is not ready for wide distribution.
• With respect to suppliers, does GDS purchase equipment? GDS does not purchase or stockpile
equipment. Other agencies, such as the Maritime and Coastguard Agency, responsible authorities,
and other first responders, procure materials and stockpile equipment.
• Was GDS involved in the July 2005 event? GDS has been involved in two incidents. GDS worked
with the Health Protection Agency in the remediation of the Underground during the July 2005
event. GDS was also involved in a (currently) classified incident in which a known substance was
found in an unusual location.
Environmental Lab Response Network (eLRN) Support and Standard Analytical Methods
Rob Rothman, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, National Homeland Security Research Center
Rothman works at NHSRC in the Response Capability Enhancement (RCE) group. RCE is responsible
for supporting the eLRN and standardizing analytical methods, among other functions. Rothman provided
an overview of RCE activities and projects.
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• eLRN. RCE is assisting in the establishment of the eLRN. RCE established a chemical agent
reference laboratory—the National Exposure Measurement Center—in Las Vegas, Nevada. This
laboratory has been charged with method development, method validation, surge capacity, quality
assurance, training, and PT samples. These are standard tasks for a reference laboratory in larger
laboratory network. RCE has modeled the eLRN after the CDC human health response network
(LRN). RCE will also establish radiological and biological reference laboratories.
• All hazards receipt facility. RCE, with sponsorship from DHS, participated in a workgroup that
designed and developed a modular triage facility to handle unknown, potentially hazardous
(initially working with CWA, but the goal is to be able to screen for all CBR agents) samples.
The workgroup established a relatively low-cost and low-technology screening protocol for
addressing unknown materials. The facility is in the testing phase. DOD is currently designing
and constructing two mobile unit prototypes for field testing in 2006. The facility was originally
designed as a mobile unit, but could also be implemented in a fixed laboratory.
• PHILIS. (Portable High-Throughput Integrated Laboratory Identification System) DHS and RCE
collaborated to develop a mobile laboratory designed to identify toxic industrial chemicals and
CWA and analyze 1,000 samples in a 24-hour period. In July 2005, they completed field testing
of three prototypes and found that the mobile laboratories could analyze only 200 to 300 samples
in a 24-hour period. Although the laboratories did not achieve the goal throughput, they provide
necessary surge capacity. EPA proposes to use one unit to support the Las Vegas laboratory. RCE
is working to configure the units to analyze samples following EPA methods and meet EPA data
quality requirements.
• Standardized Analytical Methods document. RDE produced the Standardized Analytical Methods
document to provide common protocols for analysis of chemical, biological, and radiological
agents; 140 agents are included in the document. The intent is to have standard methods available
so that multiple laboratories responding to a large event use the same analytical methods. Many
of the methods, however, have not been validated. As such, RCE is working to validate methods.
As a companion to the Standardized Analytical Methods document, RCE is also preparing
Standard Analytical Protocols, which provide direction for conducting all phases of sampling,
from collection to sample preparation, extraction, and analysis. RCE has drafted five protocols to
date and an additional six protocols are scheduled for release in September 2006.
• Analysis of CWA. Access to CWA for research is limited and restricts research opportunities.
RCE is currently working with DOD to gain access to ultradilute solutions of CWA. RCE will be
able to conduct instrument calibration and initial research with these solutions. In the future, RCE
hopes to gain access to dilute solutions for further research. DHS is also working to establish two
CWA prototype laboratories to analyze environmental samples containing ultradilute
concentrations of CWA. An EPA laboratory and a public health laboratory will likely serve as the
prototypes.
• Red team. RCE also supports an emergency response advisory team of about 25 EPA specialists
who are available at all times to assist in the case of an event. The team serves as a support
mechanism for first responders.
• Response tools. The Homeland Security Experts database contains approximately 1,000 experts
in various fields. These experts are available to provide information and advice to EPA as needed.
The Chemical Biological Helpline is an expansion of a DOD document and is available for first
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responders. The Edgewood Chemical Biological Center (ECBC) Reachback is a mechanism in
place to allow access to ECBC experts during an event.
Future RCE activities will focus on supporting the All Hazards Receipt Facility installation and testing,
completing additional Standard Analytical Protocols, validating existing Standard Analytical Protocols,
completing laboratory screening activities, and supporting PHILIS.
Question and Answer Period
• One workshop participant, who had been involved in reviewing the Standard Analytical Method
and some of the Standard Analytical Protocols, felt that these documents focused more on method
collection versus analytical methods. This participant also noted that none of them had been
validated, and they should not be presented as standard methods. Additional input from other
federal agencies should be sought. In regard to the All Hazards Receipt Facility, these
laboratories could be useful for field applications, however, input from CDC seems absent. RCE
agrees that the Standard Analytical Protocols are sample collection documents versus analytical
methods. These documents are rough drafts and will undergo significant revisions. RCE is going
to release some Standard Analytical Protocols that focus on analytical methods and RCE will
seek input from other agencies. RCE is attempting to focus on environmental media (soil, air,
water). A workshop participant noted that CDC includes environmental media sampling for
biological agents in their programs. Rothman agreed that EPA and CDC should collaborate in
these efforts.
Decontamination Technologies
Bacillus anthracis Spore Detection Using Laser-Induced Breakdown Spectroscopy (LIBS)
Emily Gibb, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, National Homeland Security Research Center
Laser-induced breakdown spectroscopy (LIBS) is the process of passing a focused pulsed laser through a
lens to form a plasma on a sample surface. As the plasma forms, it vaporizes the sample, atomizing it. As
the plasma degrades, it emits a light that is characteristic of the sample. For spores, LIBS is based on the
principle that spores have divalent and monovalent cations in higher concentrations than the surrounding
media. Gibb presented a table of spore components and a LIBS spectra of B. subtilis, which serves as a
surrogate for B. anthracis. Advantages of LIBS include little to no sample preparation, real-time in situ
measurements, reagent free/low maintenance (e.g., replace flash lamp, change laser water), relatively low
cost ($30,000 to $50,000), and easy operation.
To investigate the applicability of LIBS to ambient air sampling, Gibb collected particulate matter from a
variety of common ambient aerosols (diesel exhaust, pollen, protein, etc.) mixed with aerosolized anthrax
spores. She then created a spectra library of the individual components of these mixtures and compared
these to the spectra generated when analyzing the mixture. As illustrated by the results presented, the
principal components of the spectra for the individual components overlapped with the principal
components of the mixture. These results indicated that LIBS could apply to the measurement of B.
anthracis spores found in ambient air samples.
As a next phase, the LIBS equipment was configured as a portable device that could be carried in a
backpack. In the first configuration, the backpack housed the power supply, computer, and spectrometer.
Gibb provided photographs of the backpack in use and the system components outside of the backpack.
Requirements for the portable device included no external cooling system, battery operation,
commercially available computer, weight of less than 20 pounds, and ability to operate in extreme
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temperatures. The development of hermetic sealing for the device, which will allow for its easy
decontamination after its exposure to the biological agents, is in progress.
Gibb presented the spectra from several biological threat agents and some common confounding white
powders. LIBS must be able to distinguish these materials for successful use in real-world situations. As
shown, each material has a unique fingerprint. Gibb started with a simple correlation of the entire
spectrum and provided results of this correlation for B. atrophaeus. These simple calculations found close
correlations (implying a potential for false positives) with house dust, but distinct differences with other
materials. Gibb emphasized that these findings represent simple calculations; new software programs now
in place will provide better preprocessing and statistical analysis.
Research also considered the impact of building materials and found that LIBS performed well with
simple surfaces such as aluminum, stainless steel, and plastic, but poorly on complex surfaces. Although
LIBS is meant to be a direct sampling method, Gibb evaluated powders on wipe materials to evaluate
LIBS application to wipe sample analysis. Results provided were from a simple deposition of powder on
the wipe material and do not reflect sampling efficiency.
The Army Research Laboratory conducted statistical analysis of these findings. They preprocessed the
data to create 136 elemental/molecular intensity ratios. The laboratory then conducted principal
component analysis of the original spectra data that Gibb had used for the simple correlation analyses.
Analyses found that results from spores on a floppy disc and spores on cement occupy a different
principal component space than the spore alone or the floppy disc and cement alone. These results are
unacceptable. The spore spectra should overlap regardless of the substrate material. Partial least squares
discriminant analysis of the same data was able to identify the spores on the floppy disc and some other
office material surfaces.
From these studies, Gibb concluded that LIBS is effective in classifying powders on many building
surfaces, Technicloth® is the most suitable wipe material for LIBS, and partial least squares discriminant
analysis works to classify sample spectra. Because sampling problems arose from different sampling
surfaces, use of sampling pumps or filters to provide an optimal background is being investigated.
Current research assesses mixture sampling and detection limits. Principal component analysis of Arizona
dust, which is similar to house dust, and various concentrations of B. subtilis showed that these materials
occupy similar component spaces. Partial least squares discriminant analysis of these spectra was unable
to accurately distinguish the samples with low B. subtilis concentrations. These findings indicate that
spectral discrimination in mixtures is possible, but the potential for false positives increases as the
concentration of the biological threat agent decreases. Additional mixture studies are in progress.
Gibb has also been involved in research on developing a single photon time of flight mass spectrometry.
The technology works by ionizing materials, as shown in a presentation diagram. Initially, research
focused on using the technology to monitor ambient air for toxic industrial chemicals and CWA. Tests,
however, found that one sample could not provide confirmatory results. As such, the focus shifted to
using the technology to determine and quantify fumigant byproducts. Gibb noted that the technology is
valuable because it can achieve extremely low detection limits (i.e., parts per trillion). Currently, the
instrument is available and has been evaluated using a small gas-tripling cell. Additional sensitivity will
be achieved when a larger gas-tripling cell is implemented. Gibb is also planning to evaluate permeation
tubes as a means to calibrate the system. Additional sampling in a fumigation chamber to assess
fumigation byproducts during fumigation and aeration is also planned.
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Question and Answer Period
• Is LIBS applicable to small concentrations, such as clearance sampling? LIBS is a bulk white
powder sampling method. The detection limit is currently 1,000 to 4,000 spores. This detection
limit may be decreased with development of more sensitive instrumentation.
• Have you evaluated spores prepared on different matrices? Gibb answered that she has
completed some research on different spore matrices. She evaluated liquid preparations; however,
LIBS ablates the liquid so testing is difficult. Gibbs is hoping to obtain additional powder
formations for testing and receive additional funding for this research.
• Can LIBS differentiate between spores of closely related bacteria? Testing of closely related
spores has not been completed because the laboratory has been unable to obtain powders of
closely related spores.
Chlorine Dioxide Fumigation Developments
John Mason, Sabre Technology Services
Sabre Technology Services (Sabre) has been striving to lower response times by commencing
decontamination more quickly, reducing the actual fumigation time, and speeding the restoration process.
Sabre is also trying to reduce costs of decontamination. A reduction in time and cost to restore a facility
would lower the overall impact of an event.
Mason listed a series of events and locations in which Sabre participated in fumigation and
decontamination. In the course of these events, the actual time for fumigation was reduced from about 70
hours to only 3 hours. This reduction, however, only minimally affects the overall time frame for
planning, sample characterization, clearance, and other restoration activities. Other factors that influence
the time frame for decontamination include funding authorization, insurance needs, content assessment,
and public perception. Mason provided a table that listed several events—from the U.S. Capitol Hill
incident in 2001 through the Hurricane Katrina responses in 2006—that illustrated the lessons learned
from completing a decontamination event.
Since the first biological threat agent events in 2001, changes accelerating their restoration approach have
included equipment availability, event response software, enabling agreements, site agreements for
content handling, pre-engineered insurance policies, first response community communication and
education, draft planning documents, and established clearance criteria. Mason listed critical
regulatory/procedural assets (e.g., template planning documents, pre-authorized insurance, contract
vehicles) and personnel assets (e.g., event coordinator, science and technology teams, public relations
staff) currently available for an event response. Mason listed the various mobile technologies available to
Sabre as an example of equipment availability as a critical asset in decontamination.
A rapid fumigation sequence currently consists of activating enabling agreements (e.g., contracts),
planning documents, and clearance plans; sealing or tenting the facility; installing and preparing the
fumigation and monitoring equipment; performing low-level chlorine dioxide tests; installing Bis;
completing the fumigation; and conducting clearance sampling. Historically, the Brentwood fumigation
event required approximately 440 days and $180 to $200 million for completion. One year ago, Mason
estimated, a similar fumigation would have required 30 to 60 days and $10 to $15 million for completion.
Excluding the pre-characterization phase, Mason believes, fumigation of a facility similar to Brentwood
would now require only 5 days from start to finish.
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Most recently, Sabre has been involved in a number of responses to address mold, mildew, and other
biological contamination resulting from Hurricane Katrina. Mold and mildew are a tremendous problem.
From the outside, a home may seem untouched, but inside the home and all its contents are covered with
thick layers of mold and mildew. Mason provided a number of photographs of contaminated facilities.
Approximately 90,000 square miles of affected area exists and the most common treatment is gutting a
facility, which results in a huge waste disposal problem. Sabre evaluated how chlorine dioxide fumigation
would apply to this situation. During the question and answer period, Mason noted that demolition of a
typical residence (3,000 square feet [ft2]) requires 6 to 9 months and $130,000 with a substantial amount
of waste produced. Fumigation of the same residence costs about $35,000, requires a much reduced time
frame and produces a much reduced waste stream.
Before beginning fumigations, Sabre scaled down the chlorine dioxide technology for transport through
city streets. They created self-contained units, including the emitters, and tented buildings with ductwork
that feeds to the unit for quick setup. Their system still uses "spider" sampling. The setup period has been
reduced to only a few hours. A mobile laboratory is used for sampling and monitoring. Mason provided a
photograph of a self-contained unit that can treat up to 50,000 ft2. Sabre collected full data sets and filmed
the inside of the facility during fumigation during initial tests. The chlorine dioxide treats the biologicals
by oxidizing them. "Before" and "after" photographs of fumigated facilities illustrate the complete
oxidation of molds. Earlier speakers mentioned the low cost of ceiling tiles and the cost benefit of
removing and replacing the tiles versus decontaminating the tiles. For larger facilities, reusing tiles can
significantly reduce waste volume and cost, and for threat agent decontamination, use of PPE could be
reduced by fumigation before removal.
Mason provided an example of a larger facility that they decontaminated, approximately 3 to 4 million ft3.
With advances in the Sabre technology, the total event time was only 3 days. Mason noted that
fumigation used 3,000 parts per million (ppm) of chlorine dioxide for 3 hours versus 750 ppm and a much
longer dwell time. They drew off about 200 cubic feet per minute of gas and routed it to a carbon cell.
During this fumigation, Sabre placed sampling tubes and spore strips in sealed sheetrock walls to ensure
chlorine dioxide penetrations. Testing found that the only materials chlorine dioxide will not penetrate are
glass or metal-based wallpaper. Tenting, however, allows penetration from the outside and the inside of
the building; the chorine dioxide concentration is the same in the tent as it is in the building.
Decontaminating a commercial restaurant revealed that the chlorine dioxide pulls the oil out of stainless
steel. The oil should be removed shortly after fumigation. Overall, a tremendous amount of
decontamination and research remains to be done in areas affected by Hurricane Katrina. Sabre has
completed fumigation in over 100 buildings in the past 6 months. Mason encouraged others to participate
in this research.
Question and Answer Period
• Do you need to conduct ambient air monitoring during the Hurricane Katrina fumigations? Some
ambient air monitoring occurs, but not to the extent that was required in the past. During trials in
New York, Sabre found that tenting with negative pressure provides containment.
• Is there any reason to believe that people sensitive to mold are less sensitive to oxidized mold?
Research has shown that oxidized, dead mold does not induce an allergic response. Clorox bleach
research shows that bleach, even in low concentrations, eliminates allergenicity. The chlorine
dioxide concentration is very high and oxidizes most everything. One workshop participant noted
a planned research project to examine the residue that results from oxidizing mold.
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• Would the Sabre technology apply to highrises? Sabre was scheduled to tent and fumigate a 14-
story building in May 2006. Most buildings, even the Superdome, can be tented. Paints or
polymer coatings are potential containment options for facilities that cannot be tented, such as an
airport. In addition, Sabre has advanced the chlorine dioxide scrubber technology over the last 4
years so that the equipment can pull the fumigant from a building.
• Do you use fungal spore stripes? Sabre uses B. globigii spore strips because these are an accepted
surrogate. In addition, people are concerned about biological contaminants other than mold. Sabre
places 6 log BI strips in walls to confirm fumigation efficacy.
• How do you preposition equipment and resources? Prepositioning is an issue. Travel time to a
response may require more time than the response itself. Currently, there is no need for a large
chlorine dioxide generator. Constructing a large generator, if needed, would be time-consuming.
• For a porous structure, like wall board and ceiling tile, have you sampled through the material to
identify viable spores? Sabre has tried to culture spores. They have found that when the bleaching
effect occurs, no viable spores are found. Ceiling tiles that were black all the way through before
treatment were completely bleached after treatment. Sabre has submitted these data to EPA.
Decontamination Technology Testing and Evaluation
Joseph Wood, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, National Homeland Security Research Center
EPA NHSRC's Technology Testing and Evaluation Program (TTEP) is an outgrowth from EPA's
Environmental Technology Verification (ETV) program, with a focus on homeland security technologies.
The initial focus (while still under ETV) was on the evaluation of fumigants to decontaminate B.
anthracis. EPA has expanded TTEP to include projects addressing water decontamination and detection
technology verification. TTEP evaluation and testing is typically conducted with the technology vendor,
but vendor involvement is not necessarily a prerequisite. Because TTEP is not bound by vendor
participations, the testing can be more encompassing and more flexible than testing conducted as part of
ETV program. Wood listed a number of people and organizations that are stakeholders in TTEP.
The Sabre chlorine dioxide fumigant technology has undergone TTEP evaluation and testing. The tests,
conducted under controlled laboratory conditions, evaluated the log reduction of B. anthracis, B. subtilis,
and G. stearothermophilus on seven common building materials. Wood listed the specific experimental
parameters during his presentation. Measuring chlorine dioxide concentrations was a key element of this
evaluation. Wood presented the log reductions found for each spore species-building material
combination. These results indicate that, for the most part, B. anthracis is most susceptible to chlorine
dioxide and G. stearothermophilus is least susceptible. As such, one could argue that G.
stearothermophilus would be a better surrogate for B. anthracis than B. subtilis because reductions in G.
stearothermophilus are harder to achieve. Testing and evaluation is complete; results are undergoing
quality assurance review and should be available soon.
Another project under TTEP involves screening 10 liquid decontamination technologies, along with the
use of amended liquid bleach, to determine their efficiency in decontaminating B. anthracis (Ames
strain). The amended bleach consists of commercially available bleach diluted with water and amended
with acetic acid to lower the pH. Based on the screening results, four technologies will be selected to
undergo more in-depth testing with two additional microorganisms and three additional coupon materials.
Wood presented a diagram of the liquid spray decontamination system. The liquid is gravity-fed, with
pressurized air added to atomize the liquid to a spray. The spray hits a coupon and runs into a catch vial.
The coupon remains in contact with the liquid for the recommended contact time before a neutralizing
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agent (primarily sodium thiosulfate) is added to stop the decontamination process. Wood discussed some
of the preliminary testing that was conducted in order to do the decontamination tests. These included the
spray/weigh tests and the neutralization tests. Wood noted that using the correct mass of neutralizing
agent was critical because decontamination needed to cease but excess neutralizing agent could be toxic
to the spores and affect efficacy findings. Wood presented the 10 technologies under review. Most are
chlorine-based and some use more than one active ingredient.
Wood discussed another project dealing with a full-scale portable chlorine dioxide generation system.
Although not a part of TTEP, the project can be considered a technology evaluation. Various
organizations are collaborating in the project. An initial test of the system, in October 2004, identified
leaks and other problems in the system. As a result, the system was redesigned/rebuilt, and a pressurized
flow test with nitrogen and argon (for the generation system) and scrubber leak check was completed in
May 2005. The test found only minor leaks. The next step includes testing the system with chlorine gas
directed to the generation system to form chlorine dioxide, which will then go directly the scrubber; the
test will assess the chlorine dioxide generation process, the emergency shutdown systems, and the
scrubber removal efficiency. Depending on the outcome, a building test may then be conducted. Wood
presented detailed information regarding the system design goals and a schematic of the system.
Question and Answer Period
• Is TTEP considered a more robust evaluation of a technology than the ETV program validation
or would TTEP be considered a method validation program? TTEP and the ETV program are
similar. TTEP, however, does not require vendor agreement or collaboration. As such, TTEP can
provide technology validation and evaluation faster than the ETV program.
• In an earlier presentation, Martin indicated that there was a move from scrubbers to carbon beds
for removing chlorine dioxide from the air. Why does the mobile unit propose a scrubber
technology! Sabre has been successful with carbon bed technologies. Research to quantify and
better understand carbon bed technologies will likely occur. A liquid scrubber was selected
because of concerns about explosive hazards associated with chorine dioxide in the carbon bed.
In addition, a workshop participant noted that the high operating levels of chlorine dioxide used
in this system would quickly overwhelm a carbon bed.
• Have you considered testing materials beyond painted concrete for evaluating fumigantsl Shawn
Ryan is conducting more systematic studies of chlorine dioxide fumigation using additional
materials. Currently TTEP has no plans to further evaluate chlorine dioxide technologies.
• How is the portable chlorine dioxide system unique compared to other available technologies?
The portable system primarily provides an additional decontamination system event response.
The project to design and build the portable system began about 4 years ago as a Defense
Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) project. At that time, portable systems were not
available. TTEP became involved in January 2004 with the goal of completing evaluations by
October 2004. Problems with the system required redesign and delayed the project. At this time,
TTEP plans to move forward to testing the system with chlorine dioxide, although the building
testing may not occur. Martin responded that other technologies, such as the Sabre technologies,
are currently available.
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Vapor Hydrogen Peroxide (VHP) Fumigation Technology Update
Ian McVey, STERIS Corporation
McVey began his presentation with an overview of his company, STERIS Corporation (STERIS). For
decontamination applications, McVey noted the need to understand formulation chemistry in order to
identify successful decontaminants, and process engineering in order to successfully deliver the
decontaminants.
As a result of the anthrax incidents, STERIS identified the need to scale up existing technologies (for the
healthcare industry) so that they would apply to larger decontamination events. STERIS is partnering with
ECBC to develop and test decontamination technologies, focusing on military decontamination
applications.
An ideal decontaminant would act rapidly (i.e., over less than several days), apply to a broad range of
chemical and biological agents, have high material compatibility, and leave no post-fumigation residues.
Based on these criteria, STERIS has focused on VHP. McVey quickly reviewed the VHP generation
process, noting that VHP acts as a sporicide at low concentrations (less than 0.01 milligrams/liter [mg/L])
and degrades to oxygen and water. (A catalyst is used in their scrubbing systems to more rapidly
decompose the VHP.) Removing the humidity from the target air is key to reducing condensation.
Increasing the ambient temperature and VHP concentration reduces the contact time needed for efficient
decontamination. Research in conjunction with ECBC found that the addition of ammonia to VHP
(referred to a modified vapor hydrogen peroxide, or mVHP) improves its ability to decontaminate CWA.
Ongoing research seeks to optimize the ammonia and VHP ratios. McVey's presentation included process
diagrams illustrating VHP and mVHP production.
ECBC conducted studies to evaluate the effect of the surface area to volume (of CW agent) ratio on the
time required for decontamination. In one application, VX was spread as a thin layer; in another, the same
mass of VX was applied as two droplets. The results indicate that decontamination occurs more rapidly
with a greater surface area to volume ratio. Regardless of that ratio, improved decontamination can be
achieved with increased contact times. McVey noted that chemical inactivation times are longer than
biological inactivation times to allow for chemical degradation reactions to occur.
In working with the military, materials compatibility is a significant concern. Equipment must be
decontaminated and reused rapidly. STERIS conducted compatibility studies with materials typically
found in a C-17 aircraft—a critical military resource. Initial studies have focused on critical components
with testing of additional materials planned. To date, only the nylon webbing was affected negatively
(suffering a 10% to 15% loss in tensile strength). The structural materials have been unaffected over a
year after testing.
STERIS designed a VHP delivery system that is modular and portable. With a modular unit, the user can
string together two or more units, depending on the size of the decontamination, and disassemble the
system for easy transport. The military required that the units be small enough for four men to carry. The
military also wanted a system that could decontaminate sensitive equipment for reuse. The initial STERIS
prototype resembled a dishwasher with shelves. Contaminated equipment was placed inside, the
decontamination process ran, and cleaned equipment was removed. Military users found this design too
small, but also too heavy. STERIS redesigned the unit to be smaller and easier to use. Peripherals, such as
the generator, are housed within the unit when not in use or during transport. For larger decontamination
needs, STERIS designed a tent system, which is small enough for transport on a Humvee but large
enough to decontaminate the Humvee when assembled. STERIS has also investigated creating a shelving
system for placement in the tent to allow decontamination of a large quantity of small equipment. McVey
noted that the tenting system also has application in the healthcare industry for decontaminating
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ambulances. Ambulances are hard to disinfect because of their large size and the complexity of their
interiors.
STERIS also conducted testing on F-16 and C-141 aircraft. The F-16 aircraft will fit in the tent system,
but the aircraft construction poses some challenges. The internal wiring and equipment is tightly
constructed, so STERIS is investigating ways to integrate the VHP system with aircraft's air conditioning
systems to ensure decontamination of small spaces. STERIS also completed testing with a C-141 aircraft.
Since presenting information about this research at the 2005 Decontamination Workshop, STERIS has
developed smaller, self-contained VHP units. STERIS completed testing several months ago; a draft
report summarizing findings is in process.
STERIS and their collaborators have completed initial testing associated with several other projects;
results are pending. Sensitive equipment testing involved decontaminating various instruments and
devices and then operating the instrument to evaluate performance. Materials compatibility testing
examines the effect of VHP on various materials. STERIS is also working to optimize and validate the
cycle times for decontamination and writing the permits and protocols needed for VHP operation during a
threat event. Research with F-16 aircraft is also ongoing. McVey noted that the space program has been
examining VHP as a means to sterilize sensitive equipment before space flight to prevent introduction of
biological contaminants during research.
Ongoing and future research includes room decontamination in a hospital setting, cycle time optimization
(e.g., minimizing the off-gassing phase), field generation of VHP, high-temperature mVHP delivery
systems, large-scale mVHP systems for building decontamination, and wide-area decontamination
systems.
Question and Answer Period
• Do the kinetics for spore inactivation justify the use of a linear D-value calculation? Data
obtained to date indicate a straight line D-value calculation for the range of concentrations tested.
A 6 log reduction is the target. The inactivation curve is not completely linear through the whole
reduction. STERIS generates the D-value as the inverse of the first order rate constant for the
death curve. The results shown are a compilation of many internal STERIS studies.
• In terms of materials compatibility, are the ambulances back in service and have the aircraft been
flown? Aircraft testing was completed with aircraft waiting to be scrapped. The military will not
allow any of the test aircraft to be flown or allow reuse of any of the equipment in other aircraft.
STERIS is beginning to gather the materials compatibility data necessary for obtaining an air-
worthiness certificate after decontamination. Pharmaceutical companies regularly decontaminate
equipment with VHP and that equipment returns to use without deleterious effects. McVey
believes that the decontaminated ambulances are back in use.
• One participant suggested that STERIS and other technology vendors consider the economics,
time frame, and logistics of conducting a wide-area decontamination of one city block
contaminated with a threat agent. This scenario should include mixed-use buildings (e.g.,
residential home, restaurant, dry cleaner operation). McVey agreed that no one has fully
addressed a large-scale, wide-area decontamination scenario. A protocol for addressing different
building uses should be developed.
• Looking at the kinetic curve for VX, approximately 2 hours are needed to decontaminate
equipment. The military, however, would often need decontamination completed in as little as 10
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minutes. Liquid technologies can currently decontaminate a vehicle in a matter of minutes. Can
STERIS modify the VHP technology to compare with current methods? McVey agreed that liquid
decontaminants are appropriate for decontaminating the exterior of a vehicle. A liquid, however,
cannot reach all surfaces of the internal systems (e.g., electronics, sensitive computers). The VHP
technology may be most applicable for decontamination at the end of operations.
• Is STERIS focusing on mVHP for military use or hospital use? The addition of ammonia is not
necessary for hospital uses because hospital decontamination focuses on microbes only.
• Has STERIS conducted side-by-side efficacy testing ofmVHP and VHP? The focus of mVHP
testing has been chemical efficacy. Early studies found no differences in biological efficacy.
• How does mVHP or VHP perform when decontaminating porous materials (e.g., carpets)? Are
there permeability data? ECBC has examined nylon webbing and a few other porous materials,
but most studies have focused on military materials (e.g., painted metals).
Decontamination of a 65 Room Animal Facility Using Chlorine Dioxide Gas
Mark Czarneski, ClorDiSys Solutions, Inc.
Czarneski described a recent 65 room, 180,000 ft3 facility decontamination completed by ClorDiSys
Solutions, Inc. (ClorDiSys).
Czarneski briefly reviewed chlorine dioxide's properties and history of use. The yellow-green color
enables real-time monitoring with a photometric device and allows for treatment adjustments, as
necessary, during the course of decontamination. Chlorine dioxide also penetrates water, which allows for
treatment of standing water in sinks or traps, and is a true gas at room temperature. The gas was first
prepared in 1811, but commercial use did not occur until the 1920s. EPA first registered chlorine dioxide
as a sterilant in 1988 and ClorDiSys registered their chlorine dioxide cartridge with EPA in 2004.
Widespread current use means that chlorine dioxide is readily available and many people have already
been exposed to chlorine dioxide (e.g., during fruit and poultry washing and water treatment).
Many chlorine dioxide generation processes are available. Czarneski presented the process employed by
ClorDiSys. This system produces a 4% chlorine dioxide gas using self-contained cartridges and 2%
chlorine gas cylinders. Gas generation occurs on demand at the decontamination site. The individual
generator units are small with a 1 to 60,000 ft3 capacity. The system is scalable: multiple units can be
combined to decontaminate larger areas. The decontamination process includes pre-conditioning to a
relative humidity of 65% to 75%, conditioning at the target relative humidity, charging with the chlorine
dioxide (approximately 360 ppm), dwelling at the target chlorine dioxide concentrations (typically 2
hours), and aerating the facility to remove the chlorine dioxide (usually 12 to 15 air exchanges).
Recently, ClorDiSys decontaminated a new animal research facility. Czarneski provided a blueprint and
photographs of this facility. Decontamination before stocking the facility with animals was necessary to
prevent contamination and cross-contamination from used equipment and other sources. Much of the
facility equipment was decontaminated in place.
The facility owners required a 3-log reduction and evaluated four separate technologies for conducting
decontamination: formaldehyde gas, VHP, chlorine dioxide gas, and manual wiping with a high-level
disinfectant. Formaldehyde gas is inexpensive and effective, but leaves a residue that must be manually
cleaned. EPA also considers formaldehyde a carcinogen. VHP is also effective, but condensation can be
difficult to control and even distribution can be difficult to achieve. The facility would need to be divided
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into smaller sections for VHP decontamination. Manual wiping was impractical because of the need to
decontaminate many surfaces and types of equipment. The facility owners selected chlorine dioxide
because of the effective penetration of the gas, even distributions, and lack of residues to clean.
ClorDiSys prepared for this decontamination effort similar to any building decontamination event. They
sealed the facility, filled drains with water, deactivated the air supply, placed circulation fans, installed
gas generators and sensing equipment, placed Bis, and began decontamination. ClorDiSys installed only a
minimal number of Bis because the facility owners sought only a 3-log reduction for disinfection, not a 6-
log reduction for complete decontamination. The decontamination system consisted of five chlorine
dioxide generators and 20 gas sensing points. Fans distributed the chlorine dioxide gas because the
facility was fairly complex with many small rooms and long hallways. Czarneski provide a facility
blueprint showing the locations of chlorine dioxide injection, sensors, and Bis. Sensors were placed a
locations farthest from the injection points. Czarneski noted that the sensors and Bis were placed in
unique locations because a sensor reaching the target concentration indicates that decontamination has
occurred.
During the decontamination, ClorDiSys targeted a concentration of 1 mg/L, but only achieved
concentrations of 0.5 to 0.8 mg/L (approximately 200 ppm). As such, the contact time was increased from
2 to 6 hours. The rock roof and roof ventilation system, which could not be completely sealed, caused the
reduced target concentration. Ambient air monitoring outside the facility did not identify measurable
concentrations of chlorine dioxide. Chlorine dioxide monitoring data reported one area with low chlorine
dioxide concentrations. This area drove the increased contact time. After the decontamination, the facility
owner indicated that a chiller had broken through the interstitial space and the repair had been of poor
quality. Chlorine dioxide had been lost to the interstitial space in this area.
Czarneski reviewed the advantages of using chlorine dioxide in this situation and provided specific
conclusions from the animal facility decontamination. This project further supports chlorine dioxide as a
practical and effective decontaminant. Decontamination achieved complete BI inactivation. No physical
or measurable residues were observed. No visible indication of material degradation on any of the
laboratory equipment was identified. Czarneski noted that the facility contained minimal paper and wood
materials.
Question and Answer Period
• Has the laboratory equipment been used since decontamination with chlorine dioxide? The
laboratory is operational and no problems have been reported. Czarneski mentioned a
pharmaceutical customer that regularly exposes a $1 million piece of equipment to chlorine
dioxide with no noticeable decrease in function.
• Has ClorDiSys conducted controlled material compatibility studies? Studies of computers,
metals, stainless steel, gaskets, rubbers, and plastics have found no compatibility issues except
with materials prone to corrosion by water (e.g., carbon steel). Chlorine dioxide is an oxidizer, so
materials that oxidize should be handled with care.
• Have you examined copper (e.g., roofs, wiring, circuit boards) reactions with chlorine dioxide?
Copper testing has found no change in function. A thin, green oxidation layer does form. No
change in the function of electrical wiring or outlets has been reported. Circuit boards have a
much lower copper content than electrical wiring, but these are usually coated with a sealant of
some kind. Nonetheless, Czarneski noted that users should always take precautions when
exposing materials that oxidize to and oxidizer.
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• Has chlorine dioxide use in animal production facilities (e.g., poultry houses) been evaluated?
Animal production houses typically are not sealed very well, so gas technologies are probably not
appropriate. Liquid decontamination is likely a better option. ClorDiSys decontaminated an
equine hospital, which was one of the more challenging facilities to treat because of the concrete
floors and wood stalls. They found that if they could seal the building they could reach
concentrations necessary for decontamination. Tenting is an option for these facilities.
Decontamination Research—A New Approach
Norman Govan, Defense Science and Technology Laboratory, UK
The Defense Science and Technology Laboratory (DSTL) is a science and technology research branch of
the UK Ministry of Defense. DSTL focuses on military research, although the technologies can overlap
with commercial uses. Govan noted the importance of strong communication between government
agencies and commercial vendors to share research data and lessons-learned experiences. DSTL is
currently conducting research on a number of technologies; this presentation focused on work with
reactive liquids and coatings to enhance the decontamination process.
Battlefield hazard management aims to maintain operations and prevent the spread of hazardous materials
to reduce casualties and minimize the need for PPE. Hazard management is completed through a
combination of detection, avoidance, weathering, chemical hardening, and decontamination. Govan noted
that decontamination for clearance is a new term implying thorough or complete decontamination.
Current DSTL decontamination research aims to develop technologies that can decontaminate to required
levels, maximize ease of use, apply to personnel and sensitive equipment, and indicate if required
decontamination has been achieved. The military needs verification within hours versus days or weeks
and currently uses chemical agent sniffers to verify decontamination. Thorough decontamination, as
defined by DSTL, is orders of magnitude lower than decontamination levels achieved for clearance. No
single technology is applicable to all situations and all materials. As such, a combination of technologies
is needed to achieve desired decontamination levels.
CWA are water-soluble with exceptions (e.g., sulfur mustard) and are often excellent penetrants that
move into materials and capillary spaces easily. In addition, many weaponized CWA are thickened with
polymers that are water insoluble and render the CWA highly persistent and viscous. As such,
understanding solubility is critical in effective decontamination.
DSTL research includes bench-scale testing and large chamber testing. In one of the large chamber tests,
DSTL applies a liquid decontaminant to large metal plates to assess contact times and total residuals
remaining after decontamination. The residuals include materials on the surface of the metal plates, in
capillary spaces, and on the chamber floor. Govan presented results from entrapment studies with various
liquid decontaminants. None of the tested decontaminants achieved thorough decontamination on a flat
metal surface. Efficacy with complex surfaces (e.g., vehicles) was even lower.
Research on new reactive liquids seeks to identify decontaminant materials that have rapid solubility,
maintain reactivity, and adhere to a surface long enough to work. An ideal decontaminant would combine
all three of these characteristics. DSTL has focused recent research on microemulsions, which are very
small droplets of oils and water that enhance the solubility of hydrophobic CWA materials. DSTL
specifically investigated the microemulsion peracetic acid formed from tetraacetyl ethylenediamine, but
this material requires specific conditions for activation and would be difficult to use in a battlefield.
Acetylated perborate has potential battlefield applications, but is not readily available. DSTL developed
F54, which is a microemulsion formulation based on currently available technologies. F54 is a complex
mixture of solvents, surfactants, and co-surfactants. This formulation is effective at dissolving thickened
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chemical agents, industrially viable, and meets current environmental regulations. Chamber tests with F54
have found thorough decontamination of flat surfaces, but not complex surfaces.
DSTL is also researching novel colloids that are generated by mixing oil, alcohol, and brine to form a
three-layer surfactant with the middle layer consisting of a material with unique detergency properties. At
the tricritical point of the formulation, the colloid creates surface turbulence that forces CWA from
capillary spaces and allows decontamination reactions. Without the surface turbulence, a liquid
decontaminant will sit on the CWA without accomplishing decontamination. This research is just
beginning, and development of these colloids for battlefield application is still far in the future.
DSTL research also includes investigation of coatings, both active and passive. Coatings are materials
that can be applied to a surface, readily absorb liquid agents, reduce contact hazard, and prevent
contamination ingress of treated surfaces. In chamber tests, application of F54 with a removable coating
achieved thorough decontamination on complex surfaces. The combination of liquid decontaminants and
removable coatings is a rapidly maturing decontamination technology. DSTL has conducted extensive
laboratory and field trials with prototype coatings. Plans currently exist to replace camouflage paint on
vehicles with a durable, removable coating. DSTL is also considering uses of this technology on
equipment beyond vehicles.
Ongoing DSTL research with coatings examines different passive and active coating options. Passive
coating research aims to improve absorption without loss of mechanical or signature properties. Improved
absorption is achieved through increased porosity and results in increased capacity and speed of CWA
uptake. Traditional CWA decontamination must occur within approximately 4 hours, when weathering
has removed most gross contamination and remaining CWA has sunk into capillary spaces. Passive
coatings reduce vapor hazards and extend the effective decontamination period by trapping the CWA in
the coating. DSTL is currently evaluating simultaneous use of coatings and other decontamination
technologies, recognizing that coating are only effective for portions of a vehicle. Active coatings
incorporate reactive materials in a coating. These materials actively reduce or eliminate off-gassing by
degrading or otherwise changing CWA. DSTL is considering a wide range of materials, including
materials that physically change (e.g., change color) to indicate the presence of and reaction with CWA.
Question and Answer Period
• Has DSTL evaluated facility decontamination? The bulk of DSTL work has been directed at
military applications.
• Have you examined biological decontamination? DSTL has examined biological agent
decontamination, but did not present these data. The liquid systems have reported 6-log reduction
in biological viability. The coatings are intended to remove materials from a surface, but some
research evaluates trapping biological agents between layers of coating and then removing both
layers.
• Does F54 detoxify CWA? Yes, F54 uses a combination of nucleophilic and oxidative pathways to
neutralize the CWA. The coating compliments the decon process by preventing ingress of the
contamination into capillary traps. Current versions of the coating are inactive; however, work on
active coatings that actively neutralize absorbed agent has been initiated.
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Decontamination of Toxins and Vegetative Cells Using Chlorine Dioxide
Terrence Leighton, IVD/CHORI
Leighton discussed studies funded by DARPA and the FBI. These studies examined the range and scope
of chlorine dioxide decontamination methods for vegetative cells and toxins.
Chlorine dioxide is effective for spore decontamination, as indicated by numerous research studies and
field applications. Chlorine dioxide data, however, are limited to bacterial spores and do not consider non-
spore forming infectious agents or toxins. Leighton's research sought to fill this data gap by generating
chorine dioxide efficacy data for a suite of vegetative cell and toxin surrogates.
Leighton selected five vegetative bacterial surrogates for testing. These surrogates represented a range of
possible threat agents and included bacteria that are multi-drug-resistant, resistant to desiccation, and/or
easily aerosolized. Leighton presented detailed information about each of the surrogates and the
experimental procedures, which followed a standard coupon methodology. Data found that chlorine
dioxide concentrations of 20 to 50 ppm completely inactivated most of the surrogates. S. aureus was most
resistant and established the upper boundary for effective chlorine dioxide decontamination (230 ppm
hours). Similar to spore decontamination, contact times are extremely important—shorter exposure times
require higher chlorine dioxide concentrations. The concentrations used by commercial vendors to
decontaminate spores would effectively address vegetative cells as well. The FBI sponsored research
examining the effect of chlorine dioxide on cell DNA. DNA oxidation has not been found in vegetative
cells or spores. As such, forensic evidence remains after decontamination.
As a next step, Leighton examined biotoxin inactivation by chlorine dioxide. Chlorine dioxide can
inactivate a toxin through several modes (e.g., breaking disulfide bonds, attacking functional sites). As
such, research evaluated the effects of chlorine dioxide on enzyme toxin surrogates. Leighton noted that a
6-log reduction is considered the standard for decontamination. Current methods, however, cannot
measure to this sensitivity, so the study included evaluation of various assays for detecting inactivation.
Leighton provided information about the chemical reactions used to measure inactivation, the
experimental parameters, and the results. The assays used to detect inactivation were extremely sensitive
and able to confirm 6-log reductions in viability for E. coll |3-galactosidase and calf alkaline phosphatase
exposed to chlorine dioxide. Inactivation of saporin, which served as a ricin surrogate, is more difficult to
measure because assays indirectly measure inactivitation. As such, Leighton created a coupled
transcription/translation RIP assay using (3-galactosidase as a reporter enzyme for bioeffects. This assay
directly measures saporin inactivation and can have a greater than 8-log reduction sensitivity.
Development of this method continues. Chorine dioxide concentrations of 4,300 ppm hours resulted in a
6-log reduction in saporin viability, as measured by the RIP assay.
Overall, results indicated that chlorine dioxide can be an effective decontaminant for vegetative cells and
toxins. More research, however, is needed to further understand and develop chlorine dioxide
technologies for application with these types of threat agents.
Question and Answer Period
• When drying the vegetative cells, how long are the desiccated cells viable? The Streptococcus
and Staphylococcus cells are viable for months. The other surrogates were viable for days and
possibly much longer. Some research has shown that E. coli can be viable for months under the
proper circumstances.
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• Is the fi-galactosidase a monomer? E. coli (3-galactosidase is active as a tetramer. Ongoing
research on the RIP assay will consider other plant RIP assays. The intent of these studies,
however, was not to examine receptor binding, but to determine if the basic biochemistry can be
inactivated with chlorine dioxide.
• What coupon recoveries were achieved for the vegetative cells? Approximately 80% to 90% of
the population can be recovered from dried glass or plastic coupons.
• Were the coupon materials toxic? The toxin tests were conducted on glass coupons designed for
high recovery rates.
• How did you generate chlorine dioxide? Standard chemistry was used to generate a pure form of
chlorine dioxide; no chlorine resulted from the reaction.
Restoration of Major Transportation Facilities Following a Chemical Agent Release
Mark Tucker, Sandia National Laboratory
The economic damage to the entire United States from an attack on an office building is relatively small,
because office functions easily transfer to other office buildings. The economic damage resulting from an
attack on a unique facility (e.g., airports, transportation centers) can be enormous, because their functions
cannot be transferred. For example, SFO has estimated an $85 million impact per day closed. Closing
LAX for 15 minutes disrupts worldwide air traffic. Unfortunately, these facilities are also highly
vulnerable to attack because they are open facilities.
The Chemical Restoration Operational Technology Demonstration (OTD) project, funded by DHS,
addresses the need to enhance rapid recovery and minimize health and economic impacts from a chemical
attack. The OTD project primarily focuses on interior restoration of airports, although Tucker
acknowledged that exterior contamination would also be of concern. Sandia National Laboratory (SNL) is
the lead laboratory for the OTD project, and has partnered with LAX for this effort; other DOE National
Laboratories are involved as well. The information generated and documents produced during this project
will serve as templates for other airports.
Tucker provided a diagram illustrating the sequence of activities after an event. The OTD project focuses
on activities occurring after the initial release and first response. To meet the project objectives of
advancing technologies, enhancing rapid recovery, and minimizing impact, research under the OTD
project focuses on pre-planning activities, reducing total restoration time by reducing the time to complete
individual restoration components, and identifying best-available methods for different situations.
A complete restoration plan for LAX is a primary deliverable of the project, but a generic chemical agent
restoration template for other airports will also be developed. The chemical restoration plan will be based
(i.e., issues addressed) on the Biological Restoration Domestic Demonstration and Application Program
(DDAP). The chemical restoration plan, however, must consider agent degradation and interaction with
surface materials. The plan also recognizes that rapid sampling and analysis techniques are available for
chemical agents, decontaminants must be agent-specific, cleanup standards are better defined, and long-
term monitoring may be required.
Tucker listed the various collaborators and partners in the OTD project who are conducting research that
feeds into various aspects of the restoration plan. Project partners are organized into six working groups:
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• Partnership. This workgroup brings stakeholders together to establish and facilitate relationships
between organizations. The workgroup is developing a table of roles and responsibilities for these
stakeholders.
• Threat scenarios. This group develops realistic threat scenarios that will be used to direct the
restoration plan and support tabletop exercises.
• Cleanup guidelines. DHS does not have the regulatory authority to define cleanup standards. This
workgroup will recommend realistic cleanup standards and then coordinate with EPA and other
regulatory agencies to further define standards and guidelines.
• Decontamination. Different decontamination technologies are needed to address different threat
agents. The workgroup identified four different decontamination technology needs: surface and
hot spot, large volume, sensitive equipment, and waste. Any chemical agent event can produce a
large volume of waste and handling of this waste is critical. The workgroup is preparing a survey
of available and emerging technologies.
• Sampling. Often the sampling phase is the most time-consuming task in a restoration. The
sampling workgroup focuses on four sampling phases: characterization, remediation verification,
clearance, and long-term monitoring. The workgroup is also examining approaches for validating
statistical sampling methods and communicating with other agencies to ensure use of the most
up-to-date methods and protocols.
• Decision Support Tool Development. The Building Restoration Operations Optimization Model
(BROOM) is a software tool prepared for the Biological Restoration DDAP. This tool facilitates
sample collection, management, visualization, optimization, and analysis during an event.
Sampling teams collect data using handheld devices (e.g., PDAs) and then download information
to a central database. This workgroup is adapting BROOM for use with chemical agents.
The workgroup efforts all feed into the final restoration plan. Tucker provided the table of contents for the
restoration plan to illustrate the plan components. The body of the document provides general information
and the appendices provide technical and facility-specific information.
During the OTD project, the workgroups and others have identified critical technology and data gaps.
Tucker listed four specific projects underway to address some of these needs. These efforts address
surface sample collection efficiencies and detection limits for chemical agents, interactions of chemical
agents and substrates, gas and vapor decontamination methods, and statistical sampling algorithm
validation. Tucker emphasized the need and desire of the OTD project to cooperate with others to
maximize resources and prevent duplication.
Ongoing activities under the OTD project include completing a restoration plan template and facility-
specific plan for LAX, conducing tabletop exercises, and addressing data and technology gaps. The
tabletop exercises are meant to engage users of the restoration plan and begin the process of developing
facility-specific plans for other airports.
Unrelated to the OTD project, SNL is also conducted decontamination development activities. Tucker
briefly described these activities. Evaluation of surface sampling collection methods for anthrax spores is
ongoing. Current activities focus on collection methods for dirty surfaces; previous work evaluated
collection from clean surfaces. SNL also developed a decontamination product called DF-200 or Sandia
Foam. SNL recently received a report from a Canadian study of various decontaminants investigating bio-
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efficacy, chem-efficacy, material compatibility, and biodegradability. Only the two commercial versions
of DF-200 passed all four criteria and qualified for phase 2 studies to develop a full decontamination
system. Use of DF-200 is more prominent in military applications because of ease of use. However, DF-
200 is approximately 80% water. SNL is also working to create a dry version of DF-200 that can be
hydrated to the proper composition in the field. SNL expects a prototype for testing in June 2006.
Question and Answer Period
• Will the final demonstration of the chemical restoration plan involve an elaborate tabletop
exercise? SNL is still planning the final demonstration, which will likely include a live
demonstration similar to the Biological Restoration DDAP. SNL is seeking the necessary funding
for final demonstration in spring 2008.
• What percent solution is the hydrogen peroxide is created by dissolving the dry DF-200?
Dissolving the DF-200 creates a 4.5% hydrogen peroxide solution by weight.
The Development of Modified Vaporous Hydrogen Peroxide (mVHP) for Chemical- and Biological-
Weapons Decontamination
Stephan Divarco, Edgewood Chemical Biological Center
In a previous presentation, McVey had discussed VHP and mVHP production by STEPJS. STEPJS has
been using VHP technology for pharmaceutical applications for decades. In 2001, STEPJS adapted VHP
technology for decontamination of anthrax during the Capitol Hill event. STEPJS and ECBC created
mVHP with the addition of ammonia. VHP degrades to oxygen and water and mVHP degrades to
oxygen, water, and ammonia, which is removed with scrubbers during aeration. The VHP and mVHP
treatment cycles consist of dehumidification, conditioning, decontamination, and aeration.
In 2002, ECBC began chamber studies of mVHP decontamination of biological agents and CWA (e.g.,
mustard gas, VX). These studies found that mVHP (250 ppm hydrogen peroxide and 15 ppm ammonia)
effectively inactivates B. anthracis and G. stearothermophilus. Similar chamber tests found that mVHP
also decontaminated CWA. Most recently tests were conducted with 500 ppm hydrogen peroxide and 30
ppm ammonia. Contact times were approximately 8 to 24 hours for the CWA tests. Additional chamber
tests focused on optimizing cycle time and concentrations; results from these tests are pending.
Based on successful chamber tests with live agents, ECBC moved to field testing with surrogates in 2003.
Initial field tests with C-141 aircraft considered interior decontamination of the cargo bay only. Divarco
provide diagrams of the test system configurations for C-141 aircraft tests and building tests. The field
tests proved that the technology could produce and maintain mVHP at concentrations necessary for
effective decontamination. These tests only peripherally considered sensitive equipment—a personal
computer was fumigated during one test. ECBC has since conduced more detailed testing of sensitive
military equipment.
A photograph showed the actual mVHP equipment used for field testing and Divarco noted that the early
generation equipment was bulky and awkward. As such, ECBC has also worked to reduce the equipment
size and improve mVHP distribution. Current systems are much smaller than the first-generation system.
Computational fluid dynamics models optimize fan placement to maximize mVHP distribution.
In summer 2005, ECBC participated in a program to assess sensitive equipment decontamination. The
program served to showcase available decontamination equipment and to demonstrate use of this
equipment. The program involved soldiers in mock gear and carrying typical sensitive equipment (e.g.,
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night-vision goggles, Global Positioning System [GPS] tools) completing decontamination. Divarco
provided pictures of the SAMS box, which has been used in military operations for biological
decontamination. ECBC created a similar technology that addresses biological and chemical
contamination simultaneously using mVHP. The report summarizing this program concluded that mVHP
has potential applicability for decontamination of sensitive equipment in rear echelon applications. ECBC
is currently evaluating a prototype system with mVHP to optimize equipment spacing, reduce contact
times, assess the effect of pre-wiping, and identify the highest mVHP concentrations allowable without
affecting sensitive equipment performance.
In concert with field tests of the sensitive equipment decontamination system, ECBC has been conducting
chamber tests with live agents. The chamber mimics the field units and tests have yielded similar results.
ECBC has tested a variety of coupon substrates. Soldiers suggested that pre-wiping gross contamination
from equipment before decontamination could reduce the turnaround time between decontamination and
reuse. ECBC conducted tests with pre-wiping and confirmed that this approach reduced turnaround time.
ECBC continues to conduct large-venue studies to improve these capabilities. Divarco provided a
photograph of a large tent system that can house as many as four F-16 aircraft. The tent system allows
simultaneous decontamination of interior and exterior spaces. VHP concentrations within the tenting
system reached 250 ppm in the F-16 aircraft avionics bay, cockpit, and exterior space. Complete kill on
20 of 25 Bis was accomplished during the 4-hour test. Surviving Bis were located in areas of low VHP
concentrations. Additional testing is ongoing. A second, smaller tenting system that can be carried on a
Humvee has also been developed.
Future VHP and mVHP programs will evaluate these decontaminants for compliance with military
decontamination requirements. The goal is to develop a single technology that meets both chemical and
biological requirements and minimizes equipment needs for soldiers.
Question and Answer Period
• For the flow dynamics and fan placement, do oscillating fans better distribute the mVHP? ECBC
began distribution with oscillating fans in rooms, but the fans generated competing flows. The
optimized fan placement combines the kinetic energy of the fans. Indicator strips and coupons
throughout the C-141 aircraft indicated that distribution and inactivation was achieved throughout
the cargo space. In the most recent field test, ECBC opened the door to the cockpit of the C-141
aircraft and was able to achieve inactivation. Divarco noted that ECBC tested the cockpit radios
before and after the testing and found no reduction in function after 2 weeks of testing.
• Has ECBC examinedfumigants other than VHP and mVHP (e.g., chlorine dioxide)? ECBC
considered a number of technologies but focused on testing VHP and mVHP based a review of
the technology capabilities and user requirements. VHP and mVHP seemed to best meet the user
needs as a flexible and effective technology for biological and chemical agents. Divarco noted
that technology limits exist and VHP and mVHP should not be considered the only necessary
decontamination tool.
• How do you assess chemical decontamination effectiveness? What are the specifications for
assessing acceptable decontamination levels? The standards mentioned apply to military
applications and not civilian commercial use. ECBC conducted a variety of analyses (e.g., off-
gassing, contact testing, material compatibility) during more recent field testing. However, the
concept of acceptable cleanup levels is not defined. One workshop participant described the
source of the target numbers used for one of the military cleanup standards. These standards are
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based on a risk assessment for specific toxicity end points based on a 12-hour exposure in a
confined area, such as the cargo bay of an aircraft. A number of people are working to
establishing methodologies to generate acceptable cleanup levels. Standards for civilian
populations will likely be generated and will be more stringent than military applications.
Another workshop participant noted that EPA has been responsible for fumigant labeling to
indicate product limitations. For public health, the biological standards have been no growth on
Bis because Bis have been the best available technology. Established guidelines on acceptable
levels, however, are available for many chemical agents.
Spore Contamination: What Concentration Deposits, What Resuspends, and Can We Inhibit Its
Transport?
Paula Krauter, Lawrence Livermore National; Laboratory
Krauter provided a progress update for a project, begun 4 years ago, to assess the transport of biological
threat agents. LLNL targeted four research areas—deposition velocity, transport efficiency,
reaerosolization, and aerosol transport inhibition—based on discussions with many scientists and
organizations. Some of the key questions considered were: What is the biological threat agent? How
much settles? How much resuspends? How can we detect the agent? Can we inhibit resuspension?
Krauter provided a list of investigators and publications regarding aerosol transport studies.
Before providing specific study results, Krauter noted that the LLNL studies were conducted with
fluidized spores. Preparation is critical for transport studies. Krauter ensures that the spore samples are
uniform in size and fluidized.
Initial transport efficiency and deposition velocity studies occurred in a ventilation duct system, as
illustrated with a system diagram. A Dixon disseminator introduces the spores into an active air stream
and air mixers create turbulent flow to distribute the spores. The test chamber consists of real-world
materials to assess differences in transport and deposition based on material characteristics. NIOSH
questions the use of air sampling after a ventilation system has been inactive and Krauter agrees that the
initial spore plume moves through the duct system within seconds. This research, however, examined the
effect of deposition and resuspension.
Krauter presented results from deposition velocity testing with flexible plastic, galvanized steel, and
fiberglass. The deposition on galvanized steel and fiberglass was not statistically significant; however,
deposition on the plastic was statistically significant. Krauter conducted a series of evaluations to
understand these findings. Static charge measurements indicated that the galvanized steel and fiberglass
are neutral, whereas plastic has a negative charge and the spores have a positive charge. When in contact
with plastic, the charge on the spores diminishes, but remains. The spore charge encourages spore
mobility and is important in understanding spore transport behavior.
Krauter compared the experimental deposition results to results from three particle models. The models
considered size, density, velocity, duct dimensions, and surface roughness. Krauter presented results from
these models. Comparing the experimental result to these modeled results showed that the experimental
results fell within the modeled parameters and that the macro-scale roughness drove the deposition
velocities. Krauter presented the deposition velocities for each material and noted that the fiberglass value
was very low. She believes that the fiberglass coating contained copper sulfate, which inactivated the
spores' charge.
Krauter also evaluated the adhesion strength of spores on glass versus plastic to determine the influence
of adhesion on spore recovery. Spores adhered to plastic much more strongly than to glass.
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Krauter also presented results from assessing spore transport efficiency in the ventilation duct system.
The total dissemination efficiency equals the percent of the total spores in the powder that aerosolized and
deposited in the system. Although these values seem low (i.e., 4% for plastic, 12% for galvanized steel,
13% for fiberglass), these findings are typical. The geometry of the ventilation duct systems influences
these results. The bends and rise remove the larger spore particles. For comparison, Dugway completed a
study of spore deposition in an office. Researchers introduced 4 grams of spores using a Dixon
disseminator and allowed the spores to settle for several days. Rough calculations of spore recovery
indicated that only 30% to 35% of the initial powder was recovered through sampling.
LLNL research also included assessment of spore reaerosolization potential in ventilation systems.
Krauter completed short-term (i.e., five air exchanges), long-term (i.e., 30,000 air exchanges), and on/off
(i.e., the system is turned on and off to simulate real-world HVAC systems) resuspension tests. Krauter
provided a picture of the test system and indicated that the system is designed to allow resuspension of
only spores that deposit in the test area. Recent results from on/off resuspension tests show that more
spores resuspend from the plastic than from the galvanized steel because more deposits on the plastic.
As another area of interest, LLNL assessed spore transport inhibition by preventing spores from
resuspending. As a concept, research would develop or identify charged solvents that would attract and
bind spores as they settle. In 2005, LLNL tested many materials with powdered, weaponized spores.
These tests found many issues with deploying powders and using mists or droplets to adhere to the
spores. Based on their size (e.g., 100 microns), these droplets will have their own influence on air flow.
This air flow may simply move the spores instead of allowing the spore to adhere to the droplet. As such,
there is a focus on surface force and adhesion force attractions, as well as sheer lift or roll of a spore.
Using a new testing chamber, Krauter disseminated 2 grams of powder, confirmed a homogenous mix,
and then allowed the particles to settle. After 12 to 18 hours, a fraction of the spores remained suspended.
Krauter theorized that thermal convection was responsible. After clearing the chamber of the suspended
spores, Krauter applied a copolymer formulation to cling to deposited spores and prevent resuspension.
Measurements after introducing turbulent air flow found minimal resuspension. Krauter noted that
altitude greatly influences the spray droplet size, which in turns influences results.
Based on these LLNL studies, Krauter posed several research questions: Will refined spores ever deposit?
What airflow and environmental conditions will reaerosolize spores? Can we develop more useful
predictive models based on experimental data?
In summary, LLNL's research found that spore enhancement greatly influences deposition velocity and
transport efficiency. Research also found that particle and surface characteristics influence deposition and
adhesion. Research results that increase the understanding of spore-surface interactions and processes can
be used to enhance predictive models. Overall, resuspension was greater than predicted. A copolymer-
based, film-forming solution, however, may be used to inhibit spore resuspension.
Question and Answer Period
Workshop participants posed no questions.
Studies of the Efficacy of Chlorine Dioxide Gas in Decontamination of Building Materials
Contaminated with Bacillus anthrads Spores
Vipin Rastogi, Edgewood Chemical Biological Center
Shawn Ryan, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, National Homeland Security Research Center
Ryan and Rastogi presented the results from studying the efficacy of chlorine dioxide in decontaminating
B. anthrads spores on building materials. Ryan provided a brief overview of the events that motivated
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this project. The 2001 B. anthracis contamination events involved three buildings decontaminated by
fumigation with chlorine dioxide. For clearance, regulators required no growth on any samples. To date,
Bis have been used to indicate that target fumigant concentrations have been reached. However, there is
an ongoing debate about the use of Bis in sampling, building clearance, and building clearance criteria.
The objectives of this project were (1) to determine the log reduction of B. anthracis viability as a
function of chlorine dioxide dose (concentration x time, or CT) on six different building materials and (2)
to compare the CT needed to achieve no growth on Bis versus no growth on six different building
material coupons. Ryan noted that the Bis and coupons had high spore loadings (6 to 7 logs, i.e., 106 or
107 spores per BI or coupon).
Ryan provided the specific experimental design components. Building material coupons were 13
millimeter (mm) squares of raw wood, unpainted cinder block, carpet, painted I-beam steel, ceiling tile,
and wallboard. Each coupon was inoculated with B. anthracis and 0.5% horse serum. A single fumigation
included five plates. Each plated contained 30 inoculated building material coupons (five of each
material), six uninoculated coupons (one of each material), and a BI with B. atrophaeus. Fumigations
occurred in closed chambers with no airflow. The Sabre or ClorDiSys technologies generated the chlorine
dioxide. The chamber was held at a constant fumigant concentrations, temperature, and relative humidity.
During the study, one plate was removed at different time periods. Ryan provided a matrix illustrating the
number of data points generated during the study.
Results for carpet coupons, as presented by Ryan, showed that data are variable at low CTs. The kill
curve and the variability were not related to the chlorine dioxide generation method and the optimal CT
was not affected by a 2-fold increase in chlorine dioxide. No growth occurred for all carpet samples at a
minimum CT of 6,000 ppm hours. The optimal CT was dependent on the building materials. Unpainted
cinder blocks and painted I-beams required a minimum CT of 9,000 ppm hours for no growth. For the
Bis, no growth occurred on all samples after 5,000 ppm hours. Because these materials were so hard to
decontaminate, this testing indicates that the minimum required chlorine dioxide dose that should be
considered is 9,000 ppm hours. Furthermore, since the Bis used in the tests described herein did not
indicate any viability beyond 5,000 ppm hours, they do not serve as an accurate indicator that the
recommended 9,000 ppm hours CT has been achieved.
Rastogi continued the presentation and noted the lack of correlation between the doses required to achieve
consistent no growth and different building materials. Rastogi discussed findings regarding the D-value
concept. The D-value is the time required for a decimal reduction in the number of viable spores (i.e., the
time required to reduce a 7 log viable spore population to a 6 log viable spore population). The D-value is
one quantitative measure of efficacy. The CT or dose required to achieve a "no growth" finding is another
quantitative measure. Rastogi noted that EPA accepts only no growth results for building
decontamination.
If the Dl-value is the time require for a one log reduction, then the D6-value is the time required for a six
log reduction. Rastogi investigated how different factors affected the D-value and how a Dl-value could
be used to predict the D6-value. He presented two examples of D-value derivations for unpainted pine
wood and carpet. The Dl-value required very little time, although it did change based on the building
material. The D-value also decreased with an increase in chlorine dioxide concentration. Rastogi also
compared the ClorDiSys and Sabre chlorine dioxide generation systems. Some differences were observed
for the D-values for these two systems; however, the CT required for a 6 log reduction was similar.
Rastogi presented data from an example of the D-value for unpainted pine wood. When a Dl-value was
extrapolated to a D6-value, the observed D6-value was significantly higher than the predicted value.
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Rastogi highlighted unique features of the study design. Ceiling tile and wallboard coupons produced a
particulate debris that required the use of three replicate plates, instead of one or two, per dilution assay.
To better assess variability at sub-optimal CTs, five replicate coupons were tested instead of three. To
enssure low detection limits, one third of recovered samples were pour-plated for each sample with a low
number of viable spores.
Future research may include further testing and use of more realistic Bis, identifying chlorine dioxide
efficacy against 8 log or 9 log coupons, comparing decontamination of chlorine dioxide using aerosolized
versus liquid spore deposition, evaluating chlorine dioxide decontamination efficacy at sub-optimal
conditions, and optimizing process parameters for chlorine dioxide to mitigate materials damage.
Question and Answer Period
• One workshop participant disagreed with the statement that the 9,000 ppm hours finding did not
equate with the Bis. Early research indicated at Brentwood that all the Bis had been killed at
6,000 ppm hours. Because of the concern about environmental variability, however, a target of
9,000 ppm hours was selected for decontamination. Decontamination of large buildings has found
that the criteria of 9,000 ppm hours equates well with achieving no growth on all Bis. Ryan
commented that the Bis themselves do not indicate that a level of 9,000 ppm hours was achieved.
Both agreed that multiple measures are necessary to assess decontamination and account for
variability throughout a facility.
• Another workshop participant commented that a BI is a qualitative device and is not intended as a
quantitative measure of spore reduction. A BI simply indicates whether no growth was achieved
or not.
• A workshop participant noted that a fumigation event must meet the process variables established
before fumigation (e.g., fumigant CT, relative humidity, temperature) and all Bis must report no
growth to be deemed successful. In fumigations at Brentwood and Trenton, areas of the buildings
did not meet the 9,000 ppm hour criteria. These buildings were very hot and reaching the relative
humidity in all areas was difficult. Areas that did not meet the 9,000 ppm hour criteria had the
largest number of positive Bis found. Ryan indicated that studies of relative humidity are
planned. A primary finding of this research, according to Rastogi, is that complete kill on Bis
may occur at a concentration of 5,000 to 6,000 ppm hours; however, some building materials
require much higher CTs to achieve complete kill.
• These findings, according to one workshop participant, illustrate that Bis should be viewed at
face value and may not be the best indicators of successful decontamination. The exercise for
SFO estimated a need for approximately 18,000 Bis at a cost of millions of dollars. These
findings highlight the need to optimize BI placement to minimize cost while ensuring
decontamination. Real-time monitoring becomes more important. Another workshop participant
agreed that the limitations of each of the measurement methods should be recognized. When
evaluating building clearance, clearance committees consider multiple factors. They do not base a
final decision about clearance on a single piece of information.
• Have you examined the spore populations to identify possible differences in sub-populations that
would indicate variations in susceptibility? To date, Rastogi and Ryan have only examined spore
viability. However, they have discussed looking more closely at spore structure during future
research.
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Decontamination Research and Development
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) National Homeland Security Research Center
(NHSRC) Ongoing Research Efforts in Understanding the Efficacy and Application of
Decontamination Technologies
Shawn Ryan, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, National Homeland Security Research Center
The purpose of the systematic decontamination work under TTEP is to conduct parametric studies of
technologies for decontaminating biological and chemical agents in both indoor and outdoor release
scenarios. These studies go beyond typical TTEP testing and evaluation activities. They evaluate
decontamination efficacy in non-optimal conditions for B. anthracis but also other chemical and
biological agents. Studies also evaluate interactions between coupon materials, the agents, environmental
conditions, and decontaminants.
The viability of biological microorganisms and chemical agent mass on substrates decreases as a function
of time and can be influenced by a number of parameters (e.g., agent characteristics, substrate materials,
decontaminant concentration, ambient temperature, relative humidity). Ryan presented results from two
efforts to assess optimal CTs (concentration x time, i.e., dose) for combinations of threat agents and
substrate materials, and to evaluate the effect of non-optimal conditions on the CT required for effective
decontamination.
Persistence studies assessed the natural decrease in bioactivity of biological agents applied to building
surfaces as a function of time during normal building HVAC system parameters. The studies sought to
address questions about the fate of an agent that remains on a substrate material over time, the ability of
test methods to assess the effect of decontamination technologies or natural attenuation, the need for
decontamination if natural attenuation occurs, and the effect of manipulating environmental conditions to
alter persistence. EPA tested vaccinia virus (smallpox vaccine strain), ricin toxin, and Coxiella burnetii on
painted concrete and galvanized metal ductwork. EPA excluded bacterial spores because spore
persistence has been well documented. Tests were conducted under ambient conditions, high temperature
and low relative humidity, and high temperature and high relative humidity. Ryan provided graphs
illustrating the persistence overtime of vaccinia virus and ricin toxin on both substrates. Vaccinia virus
(in plaque-forming units [PFU]) decreased over time on both materials with decay occurring more rapidly
on the galvanized metal ductwork. Ricin toxin was very persistent on the painted concrete, but less
persistent on the galvanized metal ductwork.
In addition, Ryan discussed systematic decontamination studies being conducted in collaboration with
ECBC. Ryan mentioned the material compatibility and material demand tests of the STERIS VHP
technology, and decontamination studies with the CDG chlorine dioxide technology. Material demand
testing is complete for VHP and material compatibility work is in progress. VHP material demand testing
found that, in the presence of concrete and wallboard, a higher VHP input is required to maintain the VHP
concentration in a closed chamber. Material demand and material compatibility tests with chlorine
dioxide are in progress.
Ryan then discussed decontamination research at EPA's laboratories in Research Triangle Park, North
Carolina. For chlorine dioxide, EPA will focus on decomposition kinetics, residual reaction products,
material compatibility, and fumigant containment (i.e., permeability and adsorption studies). Ryan
presented a diagram of the lab setup used to generate and manipulate the chlorine dioxide concentration
and environmental conditions, as well as a diagram of the specific testing and sampling chambers. Ryan
provided detailed information regarding a current study to evaluate four chlorine dioxide sampling
methods. He also described the tests to evaluate permeation of chlorine dioxide through tenting materials,
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and chlorine dioxide adsorption and breakthrough (0.05 ppm chlorine dioxide) on potential sorbents under
different temperature and relative humidity conditions.
Question and Answer Period
• Could you please provide additional information about the test conditions for the persistence
studies? Specifically, was degradation by ultraviolet rays considered? The persistence tests
occurred in a translucent plastic container that blocked ultraviolet rays.
• What test method was used for ricin analysis? Ricin was analyzed using an MTT cytotoxicity
assay.
• What endpoints were used to assess persistence? For biological agents, a growth or no-growth
endpoint on the test materials was used. For chemical agents, residual concentrations on the test
material and sampling for the agent in the air serve as the endpoints. A solid-liquid extraction was
used to sample the test material. For both biological and chemical endpoints, results were
reported as a function of time.
• How does the rapid decontamination rate on galvanized metal ductwork affect efficacy testing?
Tomasino commented that these tests go beyond the standard stainless steel coupons used for
efficacy testing. Results from these tests are relevant to real-world decontamination scenarios
where multiple and varied surfaces must be addressed. One workshop participant commented that
research with molds found similar reductions on galvanized metal ductwork.
• Have you evaluated glass versus stainless steel? Ryan's research group has undertaken no
projects to compare these two materials.
• Initial testing included only a few threat agents and substrate materials. Is EPA considering
expanding this research to more substrate materials, particularly those found in real-world
decontamination events? Additional research with other threat agents and substrate materials is
planned. EPA is also considering adding ultraviolet exposures to simulate outdoor conditions.
• How will EPA select the liquid decontamination technologies? EPA is currently soliciting
information about liquid technologies. Ryan requested that workshop participants share relevant
information with him.
Rapid Methods to Plan, Verify and Evaluate the Effectiveness of the Decontamination Process
Tina Carlsen, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
As previous presenters discussed, there is a great need to reduce the time required to resume facility
operations after a biological event. Carlsen described two LLNL projects with the potential to reduce the
fumigation process time frame. The first project focuses on methods to plan and evaluate the fumigation
process and the second focuses on methods to reduce sample analytical time for fumigation verification
and clearance.
During the 2005 Decontamination Workshop, Carlsen presented information from studies of VHP
decontamination of duct systems and the use of duct systems to introduce VHP into a room. With results
from these studies, LLNL aims to develop a simple tool to help evaluate the effectiveness of a fumigant in
a specific setting. Ongoing chambers studies by others have examined the effects and interactions of
fumigants and building materials. The LLNL study of VHP and a study of mVHP by Edgewood
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Chemical and Biological Center use room-scale test systems and models with the goal of creating
computational fluid dynamic models to describe fumigant transport. Results of the fluid dynamic models
would then be used to modify and inform easy-to-use zonal models that could estimate CTs, consider
build materials effects, and provide information about how a fumigant will react in different situations.
Carlsen described the fumigation trailer used in the room-scale testing. The trailer consists of a test room
and a control room. The test room contains approximately 90 feet of duct work with numerous bends and
turns. The STERIS technology is used to introduce VHP into the duct work and various sampling ports
along the duct work allow for VHP concentration monitoring during testing. LLNL has tested both
galvanized steel and polyvinyl chloride (PVC)-lined steel materials. Carlsen presented the results from
testing three different VHP concentrations in both of these materials. The galvanized steel catalyzes the
VHP as it flows through the system so that VHP concentrations drop substantially along the length of the
pipe. The rate of VHP catalysis in the galvanized steel decreased markedly with a decrease in
temperature. Increasing the flow rate also reduced the catalysis of VHP. PVC-lined pipes were essentially
inert to the VHP and injected concentrations were similar to exit concentrations. Modeling of VHP flow
through the systems found lower velocities and lower VHP concentrations at bends in the pipes. Ongoing
studies aim to assess VHP concentrations at the surface of the pipe, where spore deposition occurs, versus
VHP concentrations flowing through the pipe. Additional room studies are underway to validate the
computational fluid dynamic models, enhance existing zonal models, and create simpler zonal models.
LLNL is also researching a state-of-the-art sample processing and analysis method for B. anthracis that
will reduce sampling time. Currently, B. anthracis sampling and analysis methods are labor- and time-
intensive, with a throughput of about 30 samples per day for most laboratories. LLNL developed a rapid,
high-throughput viability method that reduced the analytical time for verification and clearance sampling.
This method is applicable for surface samples and Bis.
The rapid-viability PCR is based on measuring DNA replication over time. In a matter of hours, B.
anthracis and Y. pestis will show measurable increases in DNA copies, which occur during growth. The
rapid-viability PCR leverages information from specific and sensitive real-time PCR assays for B.
anthracis and B. atrophaeus. The real-time PCR assays can provide results in about 40 minutes. Although
the analysis itself requires only 40 minutes, a period of about 14 hours for B. atrophaeus is required to
allow for DNA replication when assessing decontamination verification samples, providing a detection
limit of about five live cells. The rapid-viability PCR provides simple growth or no-growth results and
does not provide quantitative results. LLNL has confirmed the rapid-viability PCR results with culture-
based methods.
LLNL has developed rapid-viability PCR protocols for different sample types (e.g., wipes, swabs, filters).
LLNL is targeting daily throughputs ranging from hundreds to thousands of samples per day, depending
on the sample type. For Bis, LLNL has been able to reach a throughput of 1,000 samples in a day. Most
of the validation has been completed with Bis. Carlsen reported results for 100 samples with 6 log of dead
spores spiked with 10 live spores and 100 samples spiked with 100 live spores. The rapid-viability PCR
method consistently reported growth on all samples, whereas the standard culture method only reported
growth on a portion of the samples. These results illustrate that the rapid-viability PCR can detect low
levels of live spores in large background of dead spores, which is important when assessing clearance.
LLNL conducted a chlorine dioxide test with Bis to demonstrate accuracy and high throughput capacity.
Hundreds of Bis were exposed to non-lethal concentrations of chlorine dioxide in carefully controlled
conditions (e.g., temperature, relative humidity). The samples were then analyzed for growth or no
growth by a standard culture method and the rapid-viability PCR. Analysis included a number of blind
positive samples. No significant difference in culture and rapid-viability PCR was found. The rapid-
viability PCR reported no false negatives based on visual growth after 7 days, no cross-contamination,
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and no residual chlorine dioxide impacts. Carlsen noted that the rapid-viability PCR was able to identify
that several of the false positives reported in the culture analysis were attributable to cross-contamination
with other organisms.
The data presented provides results from testing Bis. Carlsen indicated that LLNL would be interested in
working with alternative Bis as they are developed. Ongoing testing also extends to environmental
samples. Field tests have successfully demonstrated the use of rapid-viability PCR with wipe protocols. A
detection limit of about 10 spores has been reported consistently.
Overall, rapid-viability PCR has performed well for fumigation efficacy testing and clearance sampling.
LLNL is preparing a report summarizing findings and is developing method protocols for release. Future
studies will assess use of rapid-viability PCR with vegetative cells, however, maintaining vegetative cell
viability during sample collection and sample preparation is a concern. LLNL is also planning to validate
sampling and analysis protocols for environmental samples (e.g., filters, swabs). Future research may also
include developing a quantitative rapid-viability PCR and integrating protocols with Bio Watch and LRN
detection protocols.
Question and Answer Period
• How does chlorine dioxide affect DNA? LLNL has not completed studies of DNA impacts from
chlorine dioxide, but existing literature indicates that DNA is unaffected by chlorine dioxide.
Analysis by rapid-viability PCR requires sampling at two time points (e.g., 0 and 14 hours) to
establish the background DNA levels and then to identify the change in DNA levels.
• Are you speaking with contacts at the LRN program for method validation? LLNL is speaking
with these contacts.
• What is the cycle threshold? With vegetative cells, there may be DNA breakdown so the DNA
levels at the start time may be negative. The threshold is 35 to 45. LLNL has a fairly sophisticated
algorithm to ensure detectable growth above background. LLNL has not begun research with
vegetative cells, and Carlsen agreed that DNA breakdown is a concern.
Agent Fate Program
James Savage, Defense Threat Reduction Agency
The Agent Fate Program began 5 years ago. It is an effort to understand the interaction of CWA and
substrates, assess evaporation of CWA, and develop predictive models to determine hazard levels on a
battlefield. Existing field guidance provides a range of conflicting information based on limited and/or
questionable data sets. The research conducted under the Agent Fate Program directly benefits agent
detection, protection, and decontamination efforts; augments existing military tools; and feeds into the
Low Level Toxicology defense technology objective.
The program has three major thrust areas: predictive modeling, laboratory and wind tunnel research, and
methodology development. These areas feed information to one another to support the objective of
developing a science-based predictive capability for agent persistence. Research projects examine agent
fate via wind tunnel evaporation and open air studies, and studies of surface and substrate interactions.
The overall research program covers three CWA, four operationally relevant substrates, three wind
speeds, and three drop sizes at three different relative humidity levels and three temperatures. Testing
each combination of these variables would require over 10,000 experiments. As such, Savage sought
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experimental designs that would maximize the information provided. Using a central composite design,
approximately 1,500 experiments will be conducted on 24 material/agent combinations. Savage noted that
the variables selected will address approximately 95% of expected battlefield conditions.
In the wind tunnel studies, experiments are conducted at three different wind speeds. Experiments involve
a range of different wind tunnel sizes. An outdoor test facility to validate the model created from the wind
tunnel findings is also used. Scaling between the wind tunnels is not necessary because the wind tunnels
possess the same velocity profiles. Savage provided photographs of some of the wind tunnels used for
testing. Tests in these tunnels are intended to mimic real-world atmospheric conditions.
Savage provided data generated from testing mustard agent on glass, sand, and concrete in a lab-scale
wind tunnel, and compared these to model predictions and field guidance. He noted that substrate
influences the drop shape and, in turn, evaporation rates. For example, a drop remains intact on glass, but
will spread and penetrate on concrete or asphalt. Savage presented results from several substrate
interaction investigations.
• Soil/sand substrate and GD. For these experiments, a manufactured soil and sand matrix was
constructed. Savage provided a graph of the GD concentration vs. time required for decay to non-
detect levels. After non-detect levels were achieved, a rain event was simulated. The rain events
caused a resurgence of GD vapor. Similar resurgence was seen with concrete.
• Concrete substrate, temperature, and VX. Results from these studies illustrate the complexity of
reactions, which are based on factors such as moisture, temperature, and location within the
concrete. Decomposition within the mortar fraction occurred at a different rate than
decomposition in other concrete components.
• Various substrates and mustard. Experiments found degradation rates for mustard on various
substrates (e.g., asphalt, sand, limestone). The degradation rates varied with the presence of
water. Mustard is of particular concern because the decomposition product—H-2TG—is toxic.
Future testing will focus on quantifying agents on various substrates to support risk estimates. Additional
open air testing to validate predictive models is planned. Savage provided photographs of the open air
testing area. Open air testing involves dispersing 40 to 50 grams of agent following appropriate regulatory
requirements. Results from the open air testing and laboratory experiments will be used to further refine
predictive models. The Agent Fate Program transitions information from experiments and models to
others to improve safety recommendations.
Question and Answer Period
• Have you analyzed substrates for residues or were analyses for gas alone? Both the substrate and
the gas were analyzed. Savage indicated that they used traditional extraction methods to remove
as much agent as possible from a substrate and then analyzed the substrate itself. The substrate
could contain as much as 20% of the agent. This remaining agent may be available for release
from a substrate by rain or other factors.
Stakeholder Issues Surrounding Chemical Agent Restoration
Ellen Raber, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
Raber provided information about issues important to key stakeholders during chemical agent restoration.
She briefly reviewed general cleanup issues and decision frameworks, outlined stakeholder concerns, and
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provided greater detail regarding regulatory requirements and cleanup levels with a focus on semi-
enclosed environments (e.g., transit scenarios). Fully outdoor and indoor scenarios were excluded,
although most of the discussion was relevant to those scenarios as well. The cleanup levels will be
included in a restoration plan scheduled for future release.
Understanding cleanup levels is key to guiding a risk-informed decision-making process and allows
decision-makers to determine if an actual or potential risk exists. Cleanup levels can guide restoration
actions and decontamination needs. They can also improve understanding of potential secondary
contamination and waste generation concerns. Cleanup levels impact long-term regulatory needs (e.g.,
decontamination approaches and longer-term monitoring) and stakeholder concerns.
Threat agent reentry and decontamination issues have been previously studied and evaluated although
some key technology and science gaps still exist. This objective of this project is to gather the relevant
information and apply this information to the transit semi-enclosed scenario. The lessons learned from
planning and executing military-related projects have applications to the public sector. For example,
environmental impact statements for the chemical stockpile disposal program, emergency response
planning, and agent-specific reference doses are available.
LLNL first published "Decontamination Issues for Chemical and Biological Warfare Agents: How Clean
is Clean Enough?" in 2001 and updated the article in the February 2004 volume of International Journal
for Environmental Health Research. Additional regulatory guidance and information has been released
since 2004 and should also be applied to transit system threat scenarios. This information was discussed
and reviewed as part of this presentation.
The overall project objectives have addressed five main areas: implementing an effective framework with
recommendations addressing key stakeholder issues, summarizing existing regulatory guidance and
applying these values to airports, surveying existing regulations for disposal requirements, recommending
facility restoration and clearance guidelines, and applying standard assumptions and procedures to
develop cleanup levels. The focus of this project has been on the consequence management phase, not the
crisis management phase, of the restoration process. Cleanup levels drive decisions in the consequence
management phase, such as characterization needs, risk communication needs, decontamination
technologies, and clearance goals.
To date, the project has focused on a number of compounds of concern, including nerve and blister
agents, selected toxic industrial chemicals, and critical degradation products. LLNL also considered
additional compounds with key toxicological characteristics (e.g., effects from short-term exposure, range
of potency, multiple effects, rapid and severe effects). Chronic exposure has not been the primary
concern.
Raber listed the key exposure guidelines that the LLNL and ORNL team members considered: ambient
vapor concentrations, skin vapor exposure, surface contact, and ingestion. Data provided in Raber's
presentation focused on ambient vapor concentrations for occupational, general public, and transit
passenger receptors. The final guidance to be recommended by the team will also recommend waste
disposal guidelines, identify critical degradation products, and provide long-term monitoring approaches
as appropriate.
Determining responsible cleanup levels hinges on the existence of well-characterized exposure limits. The
LLNL and ORNL team reviewed available guidelines developed by a number of different agencies.
Occupation exposure guidelines are available through the military and general public exposures
guidelines are available through several agencies (e.g., CDC, EPA, NIOSH). Most values are based on
varying models (e.g., risk-based concentration model) and are typically at very low concentrations. The
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models used to develop these guidelines have been used to develop cleanup levels for Superfund sites.
The LLNL and ORNL team also considered site-specific cleanup levels developed for a recent site
remediation effort near Washington, B.C. Raber noted that, unlike biological threat agents, chemical
agents have sampling methods and detection limits in place, although improvements can still be made that
would be very beneficial.
Most of the existing guidance values assume chronic exposures to a chemical for many years. Exposures
in a threat scenario are not true chronic exposures. For example, transit passenger studies at LAX show
that the average individuals have a stay period in the terminal for typically less than several hours. As
such, the project team selected the 8-hour Acute Exposure Guideline Level (AEGL) as the basis for
recommended guidelines for transit passengers. The team also conducted a straight-line extrapolation of
the AEGL value to develop guidelines for transit passengers in a terminal for more than 8 hours and less
than 24 hours. Raber provided a table of recommended guidelines for several agents and noted that all of
these values were preliminary will be reviewed by appropriate agencies. The table also illustrated the
format that is planned for documentation in the final restoration plan, which is part of the overall project's
deliverable. Raber also noted that the cleanup levels for workers are much lower than the cleanup levels
for transit passengers. The former may drive the overall restoration plan and the final cleanup levels
recommended.
Raber highlighted several of the degradation products that LLNL and ORNL have reviewed. EA-2192,
which is a degradation product of VX, is the most problematic because it is highly toxic and persistent.
The best method for addressing EA-2192 is to prevent formation through use of highly acidic or caustic
decontamination methods. Additional research to understand environmental degradation as a function of
substrate is ongoing as part of the overall project.
Long-term monitoring was also discussed as a key concern for restoration and reuse confidence.
Monitoring should focus on persistent and/or volatile compounds and degradation products. Long-term
persistence is not expected because threat scenario events typically consist of single, short-term releases.
Existing monitoring guidance can be used to design long-term monitoring programs based on facility-,
agent-, and stakeholder-specific needs. Recommendations for long-term monitoring span from days to
possibly months and would be very incident and facility specific.
Overall, restoration requirements for civilian sector decontamination are very demanding and conflicting.
Economic drivers to achieve restoration quickly at critical transportation infrastructure must be balanced
with stakeholder drivers to achieve restoration that ensures safety for reoccupancy.
Question and Answer Period
• Could you please discuss the difference between the transit passenger and the worker cleanup
levels? Raber noted that almost an order of magnitude of difference exists between the
preliminary project-recommended transit passenger and the worker cleanup levels. Regulators
may determine that the worker cleanup levels should drive consequence management and overall
clearance decisions. Raber noted that the existing general population cleanup levels are even
lower than the worker cleanup levels. Information generated by this project would support use of
the worker cleanup levels as protective of members of the general population using a transit
facility. LLNL and ORNL selected the AEGL as the basis of the cleanup levels not only because
of the short duration for which transit passengers are at a facility but also because the agents
disperse and degrade quickly. Typically, agents are present for only short durations. Cleanup
levels must balance the desire to select cleanup values that are conservative enough but with the
need to consider analytical and laboratory constraints. LLNL and ORNL attempted to gather
information about the cleanup levels used by the Japanese government to assess sarin levels after
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the subway incident. No specific information was provided, but data indicate that the subway
station was reopened based simply on non-detect levels found with field instrumentation.
Radiological Dispersion Device Decontamination
Strategy for National Homeland Security Research Center (NHSRC) Radiological Decontamination
Research and Development Program
John MacKinney, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, National Homeland Security Research Center
Potential radiological threat events can be divided into three general types:
• RDDs, which include dirty bombs that spread low-level radioactive materials over a wide area.
Recent intelligence information indicates that a radiological event, if one occurs, would most
likely involve RDD.
• Improvised nuclear devices (INDs), which are nuclear weapons that have been either purchased
illegally or constructed.
• Attacks on nuclear facilities (e.g., airplanes intentionally crashed at nuclear power plants).
The NHSRC radiological decontamination program research focuses on rapid RDD event
decontamination and will include research involving INDs in the future. Attacks on nuclear facilities are
currently not being considered. NHSRC research also excludes responses other than decontamination
(e.g., sampling, PPE); food, agriculture, and non-urban scenarios; groundwater remediation; indoor
decontamination; risk analysis; and work health and safety.
MacKinney provided an illustration of the possible impact area of a dirty bomb detonated in Washington,
D.C. Based on the model predictions, the affected area requiring decontamination could be very large (but
MacKinney noted that models tend to overestimate the impacted area).
Radiological decontamination technologies currently available are based on experiences at DOE facilities
(e.g., Savannah River Site, Rocky Flats, Hanford), and the commercial nuclear industry. Typically,
remediation consists of demolition and disposal, not decontamination. Decontamination for reuse is not
typically cost-effective. Some decontamination may occur for waste minimization. For example,
decontamination may remove a hot spot so that a building can be demolished as non-radioactive waste.
NHSRC presumes that structures must remain in place for reuse after an RDD event. As such,
decontamination options beyond demolition are needed. MacKinney noted that regardless of new
technologies, some demolition would likely be necessary. Decontamination technologies must consider
occupied spaces and logistical needs, as well as cost, time, political, and economic pressures. The size of
the radioactive particles, chemistry of materials on substrates, and a large impacted area drive
decontamination needs. Smaller particles are harder to decontaminate but can affect a larger area, and the
surface area requiring decontamination may encompass millions of square meters. The challenge is to
find faster, better, and cheaper decontamination technologies.
In 2005, NHSRC began a literature search to identify decontamination technologies. This task is ongoing,
and findings will be included in the OSWER/NDT technology portfolio. The literature search includes
library and database reviews, vendor information, and information from other agencies.
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NHSRC also held an ROD cleanup workshop in 2005. The goal of the workshop was to identify
promising RDD decontamination technologies and tools that would meet real-world needs following a
major RDD incident. The workshop brought together federal and private sector experts to discuss
decontamination technology options while considering an RDD scenario. MacKinney also presented a
model illustrating the impact area of the RDD scenario considered during the workshop. In this scenario,
cesium chloride was released in Chicago. They focused on procedural and technology transfer to identify
relevant technologies and technology gaps. MacKinney listed a number of workshop topics considered,
such as cost estimation, worker health and safety, decontamination technologies, and waste management.
Participants in the 2005 workshop identified many practical and technological concerns related to RDD
decontamination. Practical concerns, for example, include project management needs, site
characterization methods, cross-contamination prevention, recontamination due to precipitation, vertical
decontamination requirements, and waste disposal needs. Cross-contamination and recontamination are
inevitable at large, complex decontamination sites. This highlights the urgent need for faster and more
effective decontamination methods. Technological concerns include, for example, the speed of available
technologies for large urban situations, surface chemistry interactions, difficulties with vertical surfaces
and reaching high heights with a decontamination equipment, decontamination of tiny cracks and
seemingly inaccessible areas, subsurface effects, and waste generation. MacKinney noted that strippable
coatings, which are under development, have limited applications. Urban area RDD event
decontamination will require multiple technologies. Overall, the 2005 workshop helped NHSRC define
how decontamination technologies can meet remediation and restoration needs. A technology must
specifically address the urban RDD event, consider site-specific conditions, meet regulatory and cleanup
requirements, minimize waste, and reduce time and cost of the decontamination process.
MacKinney listed ongoing NHSRC initiatives to address the concerns raised during the 2005 workshop.
The RDD Rapid Decon initiative seeks to identify and test promising technologies for urban
decontamination. In the future, research will be aimed at modifying existing non-radiological
technologies to address radioactive contamination (e.g., street sweepers). These initiatives will also
examine water and wastewater impacts, particle-surface chemical interactions, and indoor particle
infiltration.. NHSRC is also considering developing an RDD waste estimator to understand the waste
disposal concerns resulting from an RDD event. As a long-term goal, MacKinney would like to conduct
full-scale testing of an RDD event. Translating decontamination technologies from a coupon in a
laboratory to real-world situations is a concern. Full-scale testing would enable the testing, evaluation,
and validation of decontamination technologies.
MacKinney concluded his presentation with a brief review of IND event concerns. NHSRC has not begun
addressing INDs yet. Historically, other agencies addressed IND issues. In 2005, EPA held a 1-day
workshop to introduce IND concerns to EPA and begin discussions about EPA responses to an IND
event. MacKinney presented a model of the potential impact area from a 50-kiloton IND detonated in
Washington, D.C. The impact area spans hundreds of miles and includes millions of people. Basic
research and development needs include understanding the effects of an IND event on an urban
environment, evaluating the nature of fallout from an urban detonation (e.g., physical and chemical
characteristics, particle partitioning, urban deposition), and developing decontamination, mitigation,
control, and remediation technologies.
Question and Answer Period
• Is monitoring for protection (e.g., evacuating people downwind of a plume) versus monitoring for
detection and treatment possible! In order to monitor for protection, many real-time monitors
would be required. A number of real-time monitors currently exist in the United States, and
organizations are working toward expanding and improving these systems, including DHS.
Unfortunately, the many existing monitoring systems are not interconnected. MacKinney noted
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that monitoring systems in Sweden provided the first indication of the Chernobyl event to the
outside world. Monitoring for protection, however, is critical, especially when considering
nuclear fallout.
• Although not a current focus, will future research consider detection and sampling concerns?
The NHSRC radiation decontamination program is not currently focusing on detection and
sampling concerns. MacKinney suggested that organizations communicate to identify and address
specific research needs.
• One workshop participant emphasized the need for early detection and faster detection methods.
This workshop participant noted several specific monitoring networks and deployable monitoring
systems that are available. Ongoing research focuses on finding better detection methods
MacKinney noted that a successful monitoring system is a function of monitor density. Enough
monitors must be in place to capture and track radioactive material plume movement. Cost is a
restricting factor. In reality, if an IND event occurs, chaos will be likely and processes outlined on
paper may not be appropriate.
• If decontamination technologies are inadequate and the NHSRC budget for radiological
decontamination is small, what tools are available for responding to an RDD event that could
occur in the near future! The current budget for the radiological decontamination group is about
$600,000. MacKinney is hoping to increase this budget. A playbook for responding to an RDD
event is available. Decontamination, however, is based on historical decontamination
technologies, which are inadequate for an urban area event.
Decontamination Technologies for Urban Radiological Dispersion Device (RDD) Recovery
John Drake, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, National Homeland Security Research Center
Drake presented information about decontamination technologies currently available to address RRD
threat events in an urban environment. Radiological agents are different from biological or chemical
agents because radiological agents must be removed. These agents remain radioactive after processing
through an incinerator or via chemical reactions. Thus decontamination implies removal of the RDD
material from the substrate.
For loose contamination, removal techniques could include wiping, vacuuming, scrubbing, or washing
contaminated areas. For fixed contamination, decontamination (removal) could include chemical
extraction or mechanical removal (e.g., scabbling, blasting). Decontamination, however, can be costly and
time-consuming. A single site may require the use of multiple decontamination technologies. Waste
disposal is also a tremendous concern. Often the volume of secondary waste generated during
decontamination is much greater than the volume of the primary contamination. Transport of this waste to
approved disposal sites must also be considered. Demolition, however, is not always feasible (e.g., for
historic landmarks), and decisions about whether to conduct demolition are often based on economic and
political reasons. During demolition, dust and debris must be managed. Disposal and waste transport
issues also apply to demolition.
Drake noted that decontaminating radiological agents becomes more difficult as time passes. Radiological
agents become absorbed into substrates and the contamination footprint increases as wind, weather, and
other activities spread contamination. A restoration plan must consider a wide range of complex surfaces
and geometries. For example, concrete compositions vary, weathering affects materials differently, and
ornate architecture may be present. In addition, cleanup levels and public desire to restore an area to
undetectable concentrations must be balanced with cost considerations.
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Drake divided available decontamination methods into three categories: mechanical, chemical, and high-
tech. Mechanical methods involve some degree of substrate destruction and typically produce secondary
wastes. Dry methods produce dusts as secondary wastes. Often vacuum assistance is required. Mechanical
methods tend to use simple technologies that are slow and cannot be automated. They are most effective
on smooth surfaces decontaminated quickly after an event. Water washdown is cheap and easy to
implement, but increases contaminant mobility and impact area, produces a large volume of secondary
waste, and exacerbates fixed contamination problems. Drake also briefly described several other
mechanical decontamination methods: grinding, scarifying, scabbing, blasting, and vacuuming.
Chemical decontamination methods typically involve substances that are applied to a surface and generate
a secondary waste that must be disposed. Chemical methods can address fixed contamination, which is
more difficult to remove than loose contamination. Examples of chemical methods include chelation
products, solvent extraction methods, acids/alkali substances, and oxidation-reduction techniques. These
methods are typically slow to apply and labor-intensive. Drake thought that chemical foams are the
promising chemical technology. Foams can be used to address large areas and are relatively easy to apply.
These materials, however, require rinse and recovery, possibly produce a mixed waste, and tend to be
expensive—decontaminating a 10-block area would be costly. Strippable coatings have been used
historically and can provide contaminant lockdown or prevent resuspension to minimize migration. These
materials are also costly and labor-intensive, and do not address contamination in small cracks and
crevices.
High-tech decontamination methods are under development and not available for deployment. These
methods include microwave ablation, laser ablation, electro-kinetic technologies, and bacteria
applications.
In summary, no universal solution is available to address an RDD threat event in an urban environment.
Selecting an appropriate decontamination technology requires consideration of many factors, such as
various substrates, multiple radionuclides, complex geometries, site access, restoration speed,
decontamination cost, and acceptable cleanup standards.
Question and Answer Period
• What decontamination methods would you recommend if a cesium event occurred in New York
City today? Drake responded that he was unable to answer that question because the options were
limited. OSCs have information about available decontamination and demolition options used at
DOE sites. Some of these technologies would be appropriate and others would not.
• Does the radiation program consider water security? NHSRC supports another group
specifically tasked with water security. The radiation program sponsored scoping studies to assess
the impacts of an RDD threat event on water, wastewater systems, and drinking water systems.
For urban detonations, the drinking water supply would not be impacted because drinking water
supplies are typically remote from the urban area. Drake noted that NHSRC would like to
research technologies that would protect or mitigate radiological impacts to water and waste
water systems. More basic research, however, is needed.
• Do nuclear industries have response plans and technologies that would be relevant to an RDD
event? Nuclear industries have generated information that could be useful and NHSRC is
gathering this information. Nuclear industries, however, typically address small contamination
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events (e.g., equipment decontamination) and not large scale-decontamination associated with an
RDD threat event. Nuclear industry representatives have been involved in NHSRC workshops.
• One workshop participant noted that this presentation focused on decontamination. Crisis
management and site characterization activities occur before decontamination begins. A multi-
agency effort is required to understand the different aspects of an RDD threat event and discuss
all phases of restoration, including crisis management and characterization.
• Another workshop participant described a scenario in which a 12-by-6 city block area becomes
contaminated during an RDD event. An area this large would require 3 years for restoration, and
during that time all inhabitants in the area would be evacuated. Decontamination would need to
consider weather cycles (e.g., rain, wind) and resulting contaminant migration. Efforts to prevent
resuspension in wind or to capture rainwater runoff would be necessary. Strippable coatings may
be useful, but an entire 12-by-6 block area could not be treated with a strippable coating. Cross-
contamination and recontamination would make things more difficult and affect movement
through the contaminated areas during decontamination efforts. These issues exemplify the
complex nature of an RDD threat event.
Radiological Dispersion Device (RDD) Aerosolization Experiments: History/Applications/Results
Fred Harper, Sandia National Laboratory
Harper has applied his research to responder exposures (e.g., inhalation, dermal penetration) to
radioactive agents. Harper is not as concerned with low-level decontamination issues. Harper briefly
reviewed the types of radiation and associated exposure concerns, which are based on the type of
radiation particle and the size of the particle. For example, alpha particles are most commonly associated
with ceramic materials. Alpha particles do not penetrate skin and pose the greatest concern when inhaled.
Creating particles small enough for inhalation from a ceramic material (e.g., strontium) is difficult. Harper
also noted that smaller particles tend to migrate farther and pose a greater inhalation risk; larger particles
do not migrate as far and pose a greater groundshine risk and dermal contamination risk. Harper presented
results from several models to illustrate particle transport, dispersion, and deposition. Solubility will also
influence exposures because highly soluble materials (e.g., cesium) can dissolve in the lungs and reach
the blood stream when inhaled.
In the past 20 years, SNL researchers have completed more than 500 RDD aerosolization tests with many
different materials. Harper presented results from some of these studies. Based on study results and
modeling information, a 500 meter buffer around a very large source detonation would prevent acute
health effects from groundshine to first responders. In addition, a full respirator would not be necessary in
these events. Additional modeling, however, estimates a very large impact area for lower level
contamination. Modeling tends to overestimate the impact area. In reality, some areas within a radius
around the detonation point will have high radioactivity and other areas will have very low activity.
Harper played a video of an experiment to launch 100-micron particles. This experiment shows how
quickly particles of a certain size leave the influence of the fireball. Most models assume that the particles
are captured and dispersed in the thermal rise, resulting in a large impact area. The experiment indicated
that the particles decouple from the thermal rise and actual dispersal is more localized than predicted.
For a 100-kilogram device, death occurs within 19 meters of the detonation point and survival occurs
more than 890 meters from the detonation point. Between 19 and 890 meters, survival outcome depends
on injury due to debris or possible isolated high radiological doses.
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Harper provided several examples of likely ROD source materials. Although large sources exist, smaller
sources will more likely serve as RDD source material. As such, SNL research has focused on materials
typically found in these sources. Harper provided an overview of the SNL test system, which consists of a
small test chamber and large, enclosed tent for detonations. Harper attempts to achieve 100% recovery of
detonated materials to assess both large and small particle transport. Assuming that detonation creates a
homogenous release of 1 micron particles is incorrect.
Material and device properties are critical when assessing aerosolization potential. Reaching the liquid
phase or the vapor phase for metals depends on the material properties. If the liquid phase or the vapor
phase is achieved, that portion will result in respirable-sized particles; the remainder will result in large
fragments. The particles remain in a vapor for phase for only a very short period (i.e., seconds). For salts,
respirable and powder-size particles (e.g., 400 microns) are formed. The powder-size particles do not
disperse widely. For ceramics, materials tend to shatter. Creating respirable particles from ceramics is
difficult—most are larger than 50 microns. The explosion and pressure created during detonation are
important in creating respirable particles. Harper reviewed available explosives and pressures required to
create respirable particles for various radionuclides.
Harper presented a number of examples of metal and ceramic aerosolization experiments. For ceramics,
achieving a greater than 5% aerosolization is extremely difficult. Most particles are 100 to 150 microns;
at this size transport beyond the detonation point is limited. Harper briefly mentioned the effect of
radiation aging on dispersal. Aged materials will likely react differently, but these differences can be
modeled and extrapolated from the experimental data with materials that have not been aged.
Cesium chloride is the easiest material to aerosolize without sophisticated detonation devices. A
comparison of size distribution generated during detonation identifies two peaks—one within the
respirable range and one beyond the respirable range. These data indicate that people close to a detonation
of cesium chloride can be exposed through inhalation. Harper noted that relative humidity affects the
explosive dispersal of cesium chloride. High-humidity environments result in larger particles, which
impacts possible dispersal.
Harper noted that numerous additional studies have been completed at SNL, such as encapsulation studies
and agglomeration/condensation studies. The presentation presented only a brief overview of one research
area.
Question and Answer Period
• Has your research examined deposition efficiency in the lung with particle size changes,
specifically particles below 10 microns? One of the research goals is to examine smaller particles
and the change from non-respirable to respirable particle sizes. As such, the research typically
focuses on particle sizes of approximately 1 to 2 microns.
• What is the potential for aerosolizing microorganisms? Dry microorganisms are easier to
aerosolize than wet microorganisms. Significant local aerosolization can occur.
• Existing models are inadequate at integrating various particle sizes. When will models be refined
to include this information? As new data are generated, these data are fed into existing dispersion
models. Existing models, however, remain most appropriate for predicting distribution of small,
homogenous particles. Unfortunately, RDD events involve a mixture of particle sizes.
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• Have you found any evidence ofcobalt-60 igniting and burning during detonation? Harper has
not found evidence of cobalt igniting, but other materials (e.g., aluminum) have ignited.
Water Decontamination
Water Distribution System Decontamination
Paul Randall, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, National Risk Management Research Laboratory
The terrorist events of 2001 and beyond have heightened concerns about water safety, including drinking
water, water distribution, and wastewater systems. The Water Security Research and Technical Support
Action Plan, developed jointly by several EPA offices, outlines the issues, needs, and projects that
research should address. The document considers drinking water and wastewater infrastructure and
stresses physical, cyber, and contamination threats. Research and technical support needs include
identifying likely scenarios for physical, cyber, and contaminant threats; improving analytical and
monitoring systems; containing, treating, decontaminating, and disposing of materials; infrastructure
dependencies; human and public risk; and risk communication.
Randall provided initial data generated during contamination and decontamination studies of a water
distribution system. Contamination studies evaluated contaminant adherences to pipe surfaces, the effects
of different pipe materials and flow rates, and the impact of biofilms. These studies considered varying
concentrations of arsenic, mercury, and B. subtilis at three different flow rates. Pipes were made 5-year-
old cement-lined iron and PVC. Decontamination studies assessed the methods specific to different
contaminants, effects associated with different decontamination conditions (e.g., pH, flow rate,
decontaminant concentrations), and impact of pipe materials. These studies assessed simple flushing to
treat arsenic, mercury, and B. subtilis contamination, as well as contaminant-specific technologies for
each agent. Results from these studies can be used to optimize decontamination efforts.
EPA conducted studies in a pilot-scale drinking water distribution system simulator. This system consists
of 75 feet of 6-inch diameter PVC pipe. The system has a 220-gallon capacity with a 100-gallon
recirculation tank. The recirculation tank usually operates with 80 to 85 gallons. Flow rates can be
adjusted from 0 to 500 gallons per minute (gpm). The system has a total surface are of 25,000 square
inches. To test pipe materials, EPA sliced a cement-lined iron pipe, which was used in a distribution
system for 5 years, into 1-inch-wide cross-section coupons. Coupons from a used distribution system pipe
were used to simulate real-world conditions. The test system includes slots for 10 coupons. Randall
provided a photograph and schematic of the test system.
Studies followed similar methodologies. EPA inserted 10 coupons into the test system and ran the system
for 1 to 2 weeks to allow biofilm buildup. Two of the 10 coupons were removed from the system to
analyze the biofilm; then the contaminant was injected. EPA allowed the contaminant to circulate for 2
days. Four of the remaining coupons were removed to assess contamination; then a decontaminant was
injected. EPA removed the final four coupons after completion of decontamination.
Randall provided specific results from contaminant adherence studies. Arsenic and mercury adhered to
the cement-lined pipe at laminar and turbulent flow regimes, with higher adherence rates observed under
turbulent flow. Both adhered more strongly to the cement-lined pipe than the PVC pipe. Mercury adhered
more strongly to the pipes than arsenic. B. subtilis adherence rates were similar for both pipes.
Randall also provided specific results from decontamination studies. Simple system flushing for 2 hours
at a flow rate of 210 gpm removed 51% of the adsorbed arsenic and 57% of the adsorbed mercury from
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the cement-lined pipe. Simple flushing resulted in no removal of B. subtilis. Additional studies are needed
to assess removal rate variability.
EPA expanded decontamination studies to assess the impact of low-pH flushing and contaminant-specific
decontaminants (phosphate buffer [arsenic], acidified potassium permanganate [arsenic and mercury], and
shock chlorination [B. subtilis]). Randall presented details regarding the experimental design and the
results for each of these studies. Removal rates for low-pH flushing with hydrochloric acid remained low
for arsenic (36%) and mercury (23%) in cement-lined pipes. For arsenic, phosphate buffer flushing
resulted in no removal, whereas the acidified potassium permanganate flushing resulted in partial removal
(61%). For mercury, acidified potassium permanganate was highly effective, removing up to 96% of the
adhered mercury. Shock chlorination was a very effective decontamination method for B. subtilis (96%
removal). Randall noted that none of the decontaminants achieved 100% removal and results raise
questions about acceptable cleanup levels.
Study results indicated that decontamination methods are contaminant specific. Randall noted that the test
system and use of actual distribution system pipe provided information directly relevant to real-world
situations, however, the experiments are time and resource intensive. EPA is evaluating modeling as a
possible method for additional evaluations; however, more experiments are needed to provide better data
for modeling. Future research will examine additional arsenic decontaminants, diesel fuel adherence and
decontamination, and alternate pipe materials (e.g., 70- to 80-year-old pipe).
Question and Answer Period
• Did EPA inject the system with spores or vegetative cells? EPA did not add any biological agents
to the system to create the biofilm. B. subtilis spores were used.
• Were the spores remaining after the shock chlorination viable? How long will they persist in the
distribution system? Studies did not examine spore viability or persistence.
• What was the target cleanup level? A 96% removal rate would be considered extremely
ineffective for building. EPA did not establish a target cleanup level. No standards currently exist
for pipe surfaces. EPA did not collect and analyze the bulk water for contaminants.
• For the reduction ofB. subtilis, what method did you use to determine a 96% spore reduction?
Heat treatment of the coupons removed the vegetative organisms and plate counts were used to
assess spore reduction. Analysis required approximately 2.5 hours.
• Do the decontaminants kill the biofilm and create mechanical problems from the biofilm floccing
off the pipe surfaces? Randall indicated that some impact to the biofilm is likely, but the studies
did not examine long-duration impacts. Generally, water suppliers will want to decontaminate a
system as quickly as possible.
• Did the 50% reduction represent a plateau or would a greater reduction occur with a longer
contact time? These studies did not examine the affect of varying contact times.
Decontamination of Water Infrastructure
Greg Welter, O'Brien and Gere Engineers
Welter summarized information gathered and studies completed under a project to develop guidance for
the decontamination of water system infrastructure following contamination with a persistent agent. A
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number of agencies, industries, and individuals are involved in this project and results are being shared
with others conducting parallel research. The project included a literature and historical case study
review, adherence studies, and decontamination studies.
The literature review identified relevant historical case studies of system flushing to address pesticide,
diesel fuel, and mercury contamination; and chemical cleaning to address pesticide and motor oil
contamination. Welter described a specific case study in detail. In 1980, an individual intentionally
released chlordane in a water distribution system. The water supplier discovered the contamination when
customers complained about taste and odor problems. The water supplier isolated the impacted area and
conducted sampling to characterize the contamination. Discovery of the location of the introduction of the
contaminant, with a tested high concentration of 144,000 parts per billion (ppb), indicated that the event
was intentional and created crime scene concerns. Decontamination was completed through simple
flushing of the system continuously for 8 months. During that time, the approximately 10,000 affected
customers were provided with an alternative water supply. Monitoring continued for 2 more years.
The experimental components of the project consist of contaminant adherence testing and laboratory
assessment of chemical decontamination agents. Researchers selected the test agents that are difficult to
remove from a wet surface, likely to be used in a threat event, or documented as part of an actual threat
event. Microbial agents included a spore-forming bacillus and viral bacteriophage. Inorganics included
four toxic inorganic species, and three non-radioactive isotope surrogates for radionuclides of concern.
The two tested organics included a pesticide and an industrial chemical to span the water-octanol partition
coefficient (K0w) range. Studies were conducted at a water utility laboratory, which excluded testing of
more toxic agents. In addition, other organizations are studying biotoxins and CWA. Researchers
included 11 different pipe materials (e.g., PVC, iron, galvanized steel, polyethylene, cement-lined iron,
epoxy coated steel, copper). Some materials were tested with and without biofilms. Welter noted that the
iron pipe is most common pipe material used in water distribution systems, with most iron pipe now
being installed with a cement mortar lining. But he noted that older cities have a significant inventory of
unlined iron pipe in service. The cement lining is present to prevent corrosion and new cement-lined iron
pipe has a factory seal coat on the cement. Both sealed and unsealed cement-lined iron pipe were tested.
Used galvanized steel pipe with heavy scaling and tuberculation served as a surrogate for older, unlined
pipes.
Adherence studies consisted of filling a 12-inch pipe section with a stock solution, capping both ends of
the pipe, and allowing the pipe to incubate for 7 days, with occasional shaking to encourage suspension of
solutes. After 7 days, the pipes were decanted and rinsed with water. As a final extraction step for the pipe
wall, the pipes were rinsed with ammonium chloride after inorganic incubation, methanol after organic
incubation, and buffer water with test tube brushing after microbiological incubation. Results from these
tests indicate that two of the radionuclide surrogates modestly adhered to pipes with tuberculation or
biofilms (5% to 12%). The pesticide attached well to a number of pipe surfaces (30% to 45%). Bacillus
spores attached best to iron pipe with a biofilm (27%). Adherence studies were also conducted to assess
the differences in attachment between 1-hour, 24-hour, and 7-day incubation periods. In these tests, which
were conducted using the organic contaminants, attachment increased over time, indicating that rapid
decontamination is desirable.
Decontamination studies included treatment of microbials with chlorine; treatment of inorganics with
chlorine, household cleaners, and chelators; and treatment of organics with surfactants, all under static
conditions. Decontamination considered a variety of CTs. Formicrobial agents, results were complicated
by difficulties in spore recovery from tuberculated pipes. Welter also noted that the chlorine had been
exhausted at the end of the incubation period. Although chlorine seems like a promising decontamination
agent, with high inactivation reported (up to 100%) as indicated by these static contact tests, maintaining
adequate concentrations during real-world situations may be difficult, especially in older systems. For
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some radionuclide surrogates, household cleaners achieved modest removals (up to 56%). Neither
household cleaners nor chlorine were effective in removing two of the inorganic contaminants; however,
it was noted that the initially adhered mass was quite low. For organics, surfactants were very effective
for the high K0w pesticide, but not for the low K0w industrial chemical, although the latter had a much
lower initially attached mass.
In summary, adherence studies found that attachment is largely a function of pipe type, and not
significantly sensitive to ambient water characteristics (e.g., pH, alkalinity, temperature). Pipes with a
biofilm or tuberculation reported the greatest adherence, and polyethylene and coated cement reported
little adherence. Organics with a high Kow adhered strongly to several pipe materials, inorganics'
adherence was minimal, and microbials adhered to pipes with biofilms. Adherence increased overtime,
indicating that rapid decontamination is desirable. Decontamination studies found that surfactants can be
effective for organic agents and chlorine can be effective for microbials if CTs can be maintained. The
decontaminants tested for inorganics were only moderately and inconsistently effective.
Question and Answer Period
• For the decontamination tests with the microbials, what were the solution pH and exposure
times? A hypochlorite solution was used for the microbiological decontamination. Welter did not
have the specific pH data, but noted that pH would be an important consideration, with lower pH
conditions resulting in a more effective kill. Pipes were decanted to reach specific CT targets, so
the exposure time varied. For the microbiologicals, only decontamination of old galvanized steel
and iron pipe was tested. Removal rates varied from 43% to 100%.
• What was the recovery efficiency? Welter noted that the recovery efficiency was not as high as
desired. Researchers measured concentrations in exposed pipes without decontamination and
exposed pipe after decontamination as a variable. Some effort was made to increase recovery, and
the chemical rinses did improve recovery.
Adherence and Decontamination of Chemicals and Biologicals
Sandip Chattopadhyay, Battelle
There is a growing concern over the potential use of chemical and biological agents to contaminate
drinking water supplies. To provide support to NHSRC (U.S. EPA), Battelle conducted a series of studies
to understand the adherence/attachment of various chemicals, bacteria, and toxins on various types of pipe
materials commonly used for drinking water distribution systems. Tests were also conducted to evaluate
the decontamination of these chemicals, bacteria, and toxins by selected decontaminants. Battelle has
completed these studies and have submitted final reports to U.S. EPA.
Battelle designed these studies to answer questions about the extent of biological and chemical adherence
to various substrates (pipe materials), the amount of adherence that occurs, the impact of rinsing with
water, and the effectiveness of selected decontamination agents. The studies included various types of
biological and chemical contaminants (e.g., organophosphates, bacterial spores, neurotoxins,
mycotoxins). A broad overview of the Battelle studies and specific results for sampling and analytical
protocols of the test contaminants were also provided.
Battelle filled short pipe sections with a contaminated solution and capped the ends of the pipe. Tested
pipe materials included aged black iron, copper, high-density polyethylene, PVC, cement-lined iron, and
steel pipe coated with high solids epoxy. The filled pipe sections were equilibrated for 7 days at room
temperature, for 24 hours at room temperature, or for 7 days at a lower temperature (2-8°C).
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Chattopadhyay described various factors, like chemical (e.g., dissolution, pH, chemical form) and
physical (e.g., percolation, diffusion, scale formation) conditions that influence the adherence and release
of contaminants from the pipe substrate. He also provided detailed information regarding initial
concentrations for several chemicals, bacteria, and toxins tested. Testing focused on high concentrations.
For some contaminants, the tested concentration was at or near the contaminant's solubility limit.
Contaminants can adhere to a surface through a variety of chemical or physical means (e.g., surface pore
diffusion, occlusion in organic matter, solid state diffusion, precipitation). Chattopadhyay calculated an
adherence coefficient based on the contaminant concentration in the pipe at equilibrium and contaminant
concentration in the aqueous phase. This coefficient is expressed as adherence per unit of wetted pipe
surface.
Battelle tested three different decontaminants: hypochlorite, Simple Green™ (a surfactant), and Pipe-
Klean™ (an industrial cleaning agent). Hypochlorite is a bleaching agent that provides a kill step for
reducing microorganism populations and oxidizes chemical contaminants or promotes transformation.
Simple Green™ is a surfactant that removes contaminants by roll up or emulsification. Pipe Klean™ is a
strong acid used to dissolve deposits in pipes. Battelle also tested some other agents, including hot water
and organic solvents. Decontamination focused on solutions that are inexpensive, readily available, and
relatively safe.
Battelle analyzed samples using several methods—liquid chromatography-mass spectrometry, ion
chromatography, gas chromatography-mass spectrometry, induced couple plasma/mass spectrometry, and
cold vapor atomic fluorescence spectrophotometry. Chattopadhyay indicated that Battelle employed a
variety of analytical methods to account for interferences and ensure appropriate quantification of
adherence.
Chattopadhyay provided a few examples of the test results from the tests conducted with mercury,
mevinphos, and biologicals with several pipe substrates. Though mercury adhered to copper pipes, it was
very effectively removed by a strong oxidizing agent. Mevinphos adhered to both the coated and uncoated
cement-lined iron pipe. Microscopic examination of a pipe section indicated that the mevinphos was
trapped in the micro- and macro-pores of the concrete. A decontamination agent that can penetrate these
pores was found to be effective. The calcium present in these cement-lined pipes was very effective to
inactivate bacteria and toxins. Battelle classified bacterial and toxin adherence as high (greater than 10%
recovery in the extraction sample), medium (0.1% to 10% recovery), or low (less than 0.1% recovery).
In general, studies found that adherence and decontamination efficacy varied based on agent, pipe
material, and decontaminant. Changes in pH and temperature did not impact bacteria and biotoxin
viability. Lower adherence rates were found with the shorter exposure duration.
Question and Answer Period
• What were the major differences observed in biological adherence on to different pipe materials?
Copper is toxic in nature and was effective in inactivating a number of microorganisms. As such,
low adherence was observed on copper. Chattopadhyay noted that the surface properties of pipes
and biological contaminants, and the capability of the biologicals to survive, have significant
impact on the adherence test results. The adherence of bacteria was determined based on
recoveries. The rapid toxicity of copper and high alkalinity of cement influenced the recovery
from these pipe materials.
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• The presentation briefly discussed an adherence coefficient, but little information on this value
was provided. Was more information generated during the experiments? Chattopadhyay's
presentation provided an overview of the Battelle studies and results within the allotted time. The
adherence coefficient, which is similar to the partition coefficient in soil (or solid)-water system,
quantifies the amount of chemicals adhered per unit wetted surface area. This parameter allows
ranking of various pipe material-contaminant combinations and can be a very useful tool in
predicting adherence and strength of decontamination agent needed. These coefficients also allow
comparison of results of other research studies, which may have used different concentrations of
contaminants or shape/size of pipe. The ranking of the chemicals and pipes were conducted based
on these coefficients. However, the bacteria and toxins were categorized based on the recoveries.
• Did Battelle vary the starting concentrations of contaminants for different tests? A few tests were
conducted to evaluate the impact of the initial concentration of the contaminant. For example,
mercury adherence was tested using various concentrations of mercury. Chattopadhyay noted that
the studies mostly examined the effect of high concentrations of contaminants (near solubility
limits in water) on adherence.
• What was the impact of the water chemistry (e.g., hard versus soft water)? Battelle used drinking
water from the Battelle plant for the studies. Water parameters, such as hardness, pH, and
alkalinity, were measured and are provided in the final report.
Measurement and Analysis of Building Water System Contamination and Decontamination
Stephan Treado, National Institute of Science and Technology
The National Institute of Science and Technology (NIST), along with a number of collaborators, is in the
middle of a 3-year project to address contamination and decontamination of water systems within
buildings. Water systems within buildings pose unique challenges compared to water distribution
systems. Building systems are complex, with small-diameter pipes (e.g., less than 1 inch), short runs,
numerous fittings and turns, dead ends, multiple materials, and low or intermittent water flow. The small-
diameter pipes create a high surface area to volume ratio. In addition, buildings have appliances, such as
hot water heaters, washing machines, and dishwashers. Hot water heaters often contain sediment that is
hard to remove. Some building system components are open to the atmosphere and turning on faucets,
showers, or appliances can release contaminants to the air.
NIST selected both chemical and biological agents for study. In general, studies conducted as part of this
project range from well-characterized and controlled laboratory experiments altering primary variables
(e.g., contaminant concentration, pipe material, exposure time, flow velocity, water chemistry) to real-
world situations with increased system complexity and design (e.g., valves, fittings, appliances). Specific
studies include small-scale static tests, small-pipe dynamic tests, full-scale plumbing and intermittent
flow tests, and appliance tests. Treado noted that a real-world situation has too many variables to test. The
information provided by these studies will feed into modeling programs.
Treado described the experimental approach for small-scale tests of biological contaminants and provided
a photograph of the test system. He noted that biofilms on the pipe material are very important for
understanding contaminant adherence and decontamination. Contaminants, especially biologicals, are
prone to interacting and adhering to the biofilm. As such, pipe sections were pre-conditioned to allow for
biofilm formation. The test systems consist of a low-flow system with a small section of the test pipe
material and a bioreactor for use with test coupons. Treado provided results for tests of sodium
hypochlorite decontamination of biological agents in a continuous loop system. Treado noted that the
biofilm acts as a chlorine sink, so a new chlorine source was injected into the system. The results
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indicated that higher chlorine concentrations increase biological inactivation. Treado also provided results
from studying the impact of fluid shear on biological contaminant accumulation. Results indicated that
higher accumulation occurred with higher fluid shear, which may be a result of greater contact between
the contaminant and the biofilm at a higher fluid shear. Spore decontamination required higher chlorine
concentrations compared to the vegetative bacterial agents. Copper pipes provided some self-
decontamination because of the potentially toxic properties of copper to bacteria. NIST is currently
assessing ricin and F. tularensis adhesion and removal and modeling surface adhesion forces for bacteria
and spores.
Studies of chemical contaminants are also underway. The objectives of these studies are to identify the
best analytical methods, develop adsorption isotherms, determine adsorption mechanisms, and
appropriate decontamination methods. The test system for these studies consisted of a solution of
contaminated water placed in a beaker with a glass-coated stir bar. Pipe material coupons and various
pipe deposit materials (e.g., calcium carbonate) were added to the mixture. Changes in contaminant
concentration in the solution and on the pipe surface were measured over time. Treado listed the various
contaminants and pipe materials tested, as well as the water parameters measured. Treado provided a
photograph and schematic diagram of the test system used to evaluate impacts of fluid dynamics on
contamination. The system includes a small, rectangular copper pipe section. Tests with diesel found that
the thinnest diesel layers occurred at low and high flow rates; the thickest diesel layer formed on the
copper pipe at an intermediate flow rate. Treado presented a plot detailing these results.
NIST has also begun full-scale laboratory testing. Treado provided a photograph and schematic diagram
of the full-scale test system. This system consists of a five-floor structure that emulates plumbing in a
typical building. The system includes multiple test loops. Computer systems control variables and gather
monitoring data (e.g., flow, temperature, pH). The system includes used copper and iron pipes and used
water heaters. Data generated during full-scale testing will feed into fluid flow models. Treado presented
a cross-section of rectangular pipe which illustrates that diesel remains in the corners of the pipe even
when the sides are clean. In a real-world situation, contaminants will likely remain in areas where there
are turns, valves, or other obstructions. Full-scale testing will include assessing decontamination methods,
such as flushing, mechanical or ultrasonic cleaning, and surface treatment. Decontamination studies will
also consider wastewater handling and decontamination verification issues.
NIST and collaborator studies will continue with more extensive tests with different contaminant,
substrate, and exposure combinations. Additional tests will focus on specific decontamination methods
and procedures. NIST aims to develop specific recommendations for building response plans for a water
contamination event and then generalize these results for wider applicability.
Question and Answer Period
• The fluid dynamics data provide interesting information about potential contaminant hot spots
within a system. What were the units of measure presented for the deposits? The data provide a
relative measure that is unitless. The values do not represent absolute measurements.
• Why were rectangular pipes, not round pipes, used? NIST used the rectangular pipe because the
measurement technique works best with a flat surface. NIST is trying to adapt the information to
a curved surface. Treado recognized that real-world situations would involve a number of
complex geometries.
• A workshop participant noted that a literature search for another project identified approximately
four cases of accidental diesel contamination in water systems. In these cases, flushing removed
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the diesel fairly rapidly (e.g., within days). Treado stated that the laboratory study findings
support the case study findings.
Water Decontamination and Detection
John Hall, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, National Homeland Security Research Center
For the past 3 years, several EPA research offices and programs have been evaluating the ability of
commercially available water quality sensors to detect changes in water quality resulting from
contamination. The research seeks to answer questions about what happens when various contaminants
(such as CWA) enter a water supply and what standard water quality parameters are most effective at
indicating changes in quality.
To address these research questions, EPA conducted a series of studies with a single-pass pipe system.
This system consists of a 1,200-foot length of 3-inch-diameter fiberglass-lined cast iron and PVC pipes
with couplings at the pipe junctions. Some pipe chipping has occurred and some rust and biofilms are
present in the system. The system has a velocity of 1 foot per second. Sensors are located at 80 and 1,200
feet from the contaminant injection point. Hall provided photographs of the test system.
Monitors sound an alarm when sensors report a change in a standard water quality parameter (e.g., pH,
temperature, total organic carbon [TOC]). Although the sensors could identify a change in water quality,
they do not identify specific contaminants. Hall listed the various herbicides, insecticides, culture broths,
microorganisms, inorganics, and other materials injected into the system. Four CWA were also tested
through ECBC facilities.
Hall provided results for malathion, aldicarb, and nicotine injections. The injected contaminant traveled as
a slug throughout the system. The sharp rise and fall in the data shows the rapid change that occurs in a
short period after contaminant injection. Hall noted that these data illustrate the need for multiple sensors
in a facility. Results indicated that chlorine and TOC were the most useful trigger parameters. Aldicarb (a
fast-reacting contaminant) and nicotine (a slow reacting contaminant) provide examples of results from
two very different contaminants. Hall noted that a TOC sensor costs about $20,000. He presented data
from an S:Can sensor, which is a less expensive monitor at $15,000.
Hall provided schematic diagrams of two water sentinel systems. These systems can be used to sound an
alarm with a change in water quality. The alarm triggers more detailed sample analysis to identify specific
contaminants. EPA tests have proven that a sentinel system operates effectively in laboratory conditions.
The next step is testing the system in the field. Field testing serves the dual purpose of improving water
quality and identifying indicator parameters. Laboratory testing indicated that chlorine and TOC are
primary trigger parameters. Hall noted that the monitoring system, as designed, costs about $50,000,
primarily due to the cost of the TOC monitor. The system also does not detect changes associated with
biological or radioactive agents. EPA hopes to conduct radiological studies in 2007. For field testing,
EPA must also consider the sampling required after an alarm sounds and account for routine changes in
the water system (e.g., regular tank filling and emptying).
EPA also conducted decontamination studies using flushing and superchlorination. Flushing consisted of
displacing the contaminated water with clean water, shearing adhered contaminants from the pipe walls,
and delivering a decontaminant through the system. Superchlorination involves flushing and use of a high
chlorine concentration—10 ppm, which is the highest concentration most systems can achieve. In-line
sensors were used to determine when the bulk water returned to baseline conditions. Grab samples were
used to verify decontamination. The sensors could not detect contamination in the pipe wall or biofilm.
EPA found that some contamination remained adhered to biofilms and piping materials, and pipe
conditions (e.g., corrosion, tuberculation) affected the decontamination success.
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Hall described a case study of B. globigii decontamination. EPA injected multiple samples of B. globigii
in the single-pass pipe systems over 12 months. Basic flushing was used to decontaminate the system
after each injection; however, B. globigii was detected in the blank samples after the third trial. EPA
conducted more aggressive flushing, but the spores remained. Swipe sampling found spores remaining on
the corroded iron pipe, but not PVC or fiberglass materials. EPA then injected additional spores to assess
decontamination using superchlorination. The superchlorination only had a small effect on reducing
spores adhered to corroded iron pipe. EPA concluded that some contamination remains after flushing and
chlorine contact. Areas of rust and corrosion may require more aggressive decontamination methods.
Additional health-based toxicity and infectivity data are needed to determine recommended
decontamination levels.
Future research will consider biological agent persistence in drinking water pipes and associated
decontamination needs. This research will include a recirculating pipe loop fabricated with corroded
ductile iron. EPA will monitor spore concentrations overtime and determine CTs for decontaminants.
Question and Answer Period
• Biofilms are highly variable. How does the biofilm that forms in the test system vary from
biofilms that form in real-world situations? EPA has included studies with older pipe to consider
real-world situations.
• How much time is required between collecting a grab sampling and obtaining analytical results?
The time required to analyze samples varies, but can be as much as 24 hours (e.g., plating culture
methods). Hall noted that faster analytical methods are needed.
• How do the CTs (concentration x time) observed in these studies correlate with other studies?
EPA tested very low values (e.g., 1,500 ppm hours) as compared with other studies (e.g., 30,000
ppm x hours).
Foreign Animal Disease/Avian Influenza Decontamination
Determining the Virucidal Mechanism of Action for Foreign Animal Disease
Jill Bieker, Sandia National Laboratory
Understanding the virucidal capacity of various decontaminants is critical to ensure proper efficacy
claims, aid in disease containment, prevent disease transmission, and understand the impact of
environmental factors (e.g., temperature, humidity). Bieker provided the results from several studies to
assess the efficacy of several decontaminants and methods used to evaluate viral inactivation.
Microorganism sensitivity to a decontaminant varies based a number of factors. Bieker listed several
microorganism types and their sensitivity to decontaminants. Spores are traditionally the most resistant;
enveloped viruses (e.g., influenza) are the least resistant. Currently, EPA has guidelines, but no standards,
for evaluating decontaminants against viruses. Standardized testing, however, is necessary for regulatory
processes and for comparison. Bieker noted that initial testing is usually conducted with surrogates and
not the target virus itself. Bieker provided a table of important considerations in virucidal testing. She
noted that understanding cytotoxicity of the decontaminant is important because the treated viruses are
injected into live cells to determine viability. Bleach, for example, is toxic to cells and would kill the cell
before virus propagation could be determined. Removal of the decontaminant is necessary prior to
injecting the virus into the test cells. The organic challenge is also important because it may protect the
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virus or react with the decontaminating agent. In addition, some host systems are more sensitive than
others.
A virus is a fairly simple organism composed of a lipid envelope (in some virus types), capsid protein,
structural protein, and nucleic acid. Different virucides will act on these different components to cause
virus inactivation. Understanding the virucide mechanism of action dictates appropriate analysis methods.
For example, if a virucide disrupts the lipid envelope, resulting in virus inactivation, then DNA analyses
may not be a useful technique. Bieker provided tables summarizing various virucide targets and possible
analytical methods.
The SNL research sought to evaluate various disinfectants against several viruses, including avian
influenza and closely related surrogates. Researchers hypothesized that closely related surrogate viruses
will react similarly to decontaminants and that molecular-based diagnostics can be applied as a rapid
verification tool. The studies followed the EPA guidelines for virucidal testing and considered eight
different decontaminants. The tests consisted of mixing equal parts of a virus solution with a
decontaminant and allowing 1-minute, 10-minute, or 20-minute exposures. For the organic challenge,
either diluted bovine or poultry feces were added to the decontaminant. After exposure, the samples were
prepared for efficacy testing by in vitro culture or real-time PCR. Western blot tests were also conducted
for the influenza samples.
Bieker provided results for influenza decontamination. The 1-minute and 10-minute exposure times with
different decontaminants reported no statistical difference in response between the test and surrogate
virus. The real-time PCR analysis showed that not all of the decontaminants affected the virus RNA even
though the virus had been inactivated. Overall, DF-200 and 10% bleach were most effective for the 1-
minute exposure; Virkon S was effective for the 10-minute exposure. Only DF-200 and 10% bleach
significantly degraded the viral RNA, though the performance of both of these decontaminants was
greatly impacted by the organic challenge.
Bieker also provided results for the virus responsible for foot and mouth disease and a surrogate. Tests
found that the surrogate was much more resistant to acidic decontaminants than the target virus. For the
target virus, all of the decontaminants except 70% ethanol were effective in causing complete loss of
infectivity based on culture analysis with hamster cells. For the surrogate, 10% bleach, EFT, and Virkon
were most effective. As such, the virus evaluated as a surrogate for the foot and mouth disease virus may
not be appropriate. Real-time PCR analysis found that the 10% bleach with the target virus and the EFT,
10% bleach, and 2% sodium hydroxide with the surrogate were most effective in degrading RNA. As
such, real-time PCR could only validated decontamination with these agents.
In summary, the virus structure presents limited targets for decontaminants (e.g., viral RNA, lipid
envelope). Tests results found that the organic challenge reduced decontaminant efficacy. Real-time PCR
was appropriate for determining viral inactivation due to viral RNA degradation. To address differences
in viral susceptibility, SNL is planning additional live agent and surrogate testing. Bieker noted that these
studies did not assess materials compatibility and application expense, which also must be considered
when selecting decontamination methods. Bieker provided several outstanding questions resulting from
this research—what assays are needed in the field to verify viral eradication; is standardized virucidal
efficacy testing needed; are surrogates appropriate for validation studies; and can decontaminant claims
cover specific viruses or whole virus families?
Question and Answer Period
• Were the research findings consistent with clinical practice for infection control? The research
most importantly found that decontamination is highly dependent on the target virus strain. For
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SARS, general good hygiene practices and cleaning with ethanol were highly effective. More
resistant viruses would require more aggressive decontamination.
• What is the persistence of viruses, specifically avion influenza, in the natural world? A virus
leaves an infected host as part of the natural life cycle. The way in which a virus leaves, such as
in mucus, can extend the persistence so that survivability is measured in months or years.
Workshop participants debated survivability information with reports of avian influenza
remaining viable for up to 1 year. Bieker noted that information about virus persistence is
incomplete. As such, detailed reporting of test conditions is critical.
• Were the studies completed with suspension tests? Bieker noted that results are from suspension
tests. Surface tests are planned for 2007.
• Could you provide more information about the organic challenge? In its life cycle, a virus could
be excreted with feces. The organic challenge examines possible protective effects and
interactions with organic matter.
Protection of U.S. Agriculture: Foreign Animal Disease Threats
Bethany Grohs, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response
Grohs is a veterinary medical officer at EPA. She acts as a technical resource for the emergency response
program providing assistance to OSCs in addressing animal emergency response issues on their sites. She
is currently addressing emergency preparedness and agro-terrorism issues. Agro-terrorism events require
response and collaboration by multiple agencies, including USDA, FDA, and EPA.
Historically, USDA responded to agricultural incidents and EPA responded to oil/hazmat spills. Since
9/11, multiple diverse agencies respond jointly to all events. The anthrax events at Capital Hill, the use of
350 search and rescue dogs at the World Trade Center, the outbreaks of foot and mouth disease, and
concerns about avian influenza raised the issue of animal health to a national security level.
Grohs defined bioterrorism as the use of biological agents to target morbidity and mortality in humans,
animals, or plants. Agro-terrorism targets the financial infrastructure of agriculture through the use of
biological, chemical, or radiological agents to affect animals or any agricultural components (e.g.,
livestock, food supply, crops, agricultural workers). Although agro-terrorism can cause animal and public
health issues, the economic impacts are the most destructive. U.S. agriculture is vulnerable to agro-
terrorism because of concentrated animal feeding operations (e.g., feed lots, CAFOs), herd susceptibility
to foreign animal diseases, economic impact (e.g., a halt to imports and exports), and threat agent
availability in other endemic countries. Herds are susceptible to foreign animal disease because animals
are exposed to these diseases infrequently and have lost immunity to these diseases. As such, a disease
can spread rapidly through a population and cause high mortality. Foreign animal diseases (FADs) are
endemic in other areas of the world and may be intentionally or inadvertently introduced to livestock in
the United States.
Grohs listed several examples of agro-terrorism agents. Avian influenza, foot and mouth disease, and
exotic Newcastle disease are of great concern. Grohs noted that an outbreak of Rift Valley fever is a risk
in the Memphis area because Federal Express operations in the area may transport infected mosquitoes.
Nipah/Hendra virus is an emerging disease first reported in Malaysia in the nineties. Asymptomatic fruit
bats carry the disease in their urine, which may spread the disease to swine-raising operations near the bat
caves. Nipah/Hendra virus causes a respiratory and neurologic disease in swine and encephalitis with a
40% mortality rate in humans. When the disease first emerged, PPE needs for humans were unknown and
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several responders contracted the disease during depopulation efforts. This incident highlights concerns
for worker safety and needs to understand human implications. Grohs provided examples of several
recent outbreaks and resulting animal depopulation.
Grohs discussed several challenges faced during a foreign animal disease outbreak. She emphasized the
need for preplanning to ensure rapid and effective responses.
• Worker health and safety. Often responders do not know what level of PPE is appropriate and
necessary. Responders should know what level of PPE to use before arriving at a scene.
Responders also must be aware of the impact of PPE when working with live animals (i.e., PPE
can scare animals).
• Carcass handling. The physical process of carcass disposal is huge problem. Large equipment
may be needed to address large animals or large numbers of animals. The location of the animals
on land or in water must be considered. In addition, workers may be wearing various levels of
PPE that impede activities.
• Depopulation methods. When an outbreak is detected, depopulation through humane euthanasia
often occurs. For smaller animals, such as birds, carbon dioxide gas has been the historical choice
for humane euthanasia. Death from suffocation occurs in about 10 to 12 minutes. Recent research
with fire-fighting foam found that foam physically blocks an airway and causes death within
about 5 minutes. Discussions are ongoing to identify the most humane method. For larger
animals, captive bolt and pithing may be used.
• Disposal and decontamination. Having a depopulation and disposal plan in place can drastically
reduce the number of animals that need to be disposed of. The more time the disease has to
spread, the more animals will require disposal. Timely depopulation and disposal is the current
approach for stopping the spread of disease. Grohs presented a graph illustrating the rapid
increase in affected animals as a function of time elapsing before implementing a depopulation
plan. Ideally, an outbreak should be addressed within 24 to 48 hours. When determining disposal,
the number, size, disease, degree of decomposition and other factors must be considered. Grohs
briefly mentioned three disposal options. Many more options exist and should be considered
during responses. Composting can be cost-effective and rapid, but it can also be difficult to
successfully implement. Rendering requires no land disposal and is available through existing
infrastructure. However, no surge capacity exists and FDA feed rules regulate the materials that
can pass through a rendering plant and enter the food chain. Transportation biosecurity is also a
concern. Landfilling (i.e., commercial facilities) and burial (i.e., onsite disposal) are also
available. Landfills can handle a large capacity, but the landfill design slows decomposition and
permitting concerns and capacity issues exist. Burial on site is inexpensive but can raise agent
fate and transport concerns and impact the land value through deed restrictions. Decontamination
for foreign animal diseases includes both biosecurity on non-infected farms and cleaning and
disinfection after depopulation and disposal on infected farms. All the other farms in an area have
increased biosecurity, which includes activities intended to prevent further spread of the disease
(e.g., cleaning trucks that enter and leave an area). During the foot and mouth outbreaks in the
UK, entire towns were isolated through biosecurity measures. Grohs noted that much of the
expense of an outbreak focuses on biosecurity (preventing the spread of the disease) versus the
actual decontamination of the infected area, since most FAD agents are not environmentally
persistent.
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Various organizations and agencies are working toward addressing the challenges faced during foreign
animal disease outbreaks. Grohs described four initiatives currently underway to improve preparedness:
• Emergency Support Function (ESF) 11. When the National Response Plan was first released,
agricultural incidents were not included. ESF 11 is an annex to the plan that formally recognizes
agriculture and natural resource incidents and responses. Grohs provided a flow chart illustrating
the statutes and plans available to direct responses.
• Federal Food and Agriculture Decontamination and Disposal Rules and Responsibilities. This
document focuses on decontamination and disposal and outlines the roles and responsibilities of
different agencies involved in a response. Overall, the document concludes that agriculture and
emergency management communities must work together to address animal health emergencies.
• Foreign Animal Disease Threats Strategic Plan 2008-2012. This is a White House-mandated
project that involved three focus groups: modeling, countermeasures, and decontamination and
disposal. Grohs chaired the decontamination and disposal group. This group focused on foreign
animal diseases in livestock and identified necessary national, state, and local actions. Overall,
the focus group determined that decontamination and disposal research and preparedness is
significantly under-funded. A national operations system was not in place, so a different agency
or organization responds to different incidents. Establishing a national system would provide a
first step to facilitate information dissemination.
• Avian Influenza Decontamination. Grohs briefly discussed avian influenza. Salmonella has been
used as a surrogate for avian influenza decontamination research, although other surrogates are
available as well. The available industry stockpile of decontaminating chemicals and the
translation of effectiveness in a laboratory to effectiveness in the field are large concerns.
Research will be examining the effectiveness of common household agents (e.g., soap, detergent,
bleach) against avian influenza. Grohs noted that recent research found that some existing
detection methods report false positives after use of known effective disinfectants. This research
highlights the need to understand how disinfectants affect detection methods.
Question and Answer Period
• Does the composting disposal option involve pre-shredding? Pre-shredding is not necessary for
birds because they are small. Grohs noted that the process of grinding and pre-shredding larger
animals can release additional infectious agents, which is a concern. In rendering, carcasses are
reduced in size.
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III. Panel Discussion—Lessons Learned, Research and Development Needs,
Technology Gaps
Participants in the 2006 Decontamination Workshop panel discussion considered lessons learned from
decontamination events and research, identified research and development needs, and described
technology gaps. The panel consisted of representatives from various agencies and disciplines involved in
decontamination efforts. Participants provided a brief statement of their individual concerns and thoughts.
The panel then considered submissions from workshop participants.
Ken Martinez (CDC) highlighted his surprise that CDC and other agencies were not as prepared as they
could have been to respond to a New York City anthrax event that occurred in February/March 2006. Five
years after the initial anthrax events, there should be a better understanding of method validation and
sampling results. An understanding of the transition from sampling results to decontamination was still
lacking. Martinez also noted the need for better communication and collaboration between agencies and
organizations. Through collaboration and communication, data gaps (e.g., method validation) can be
better identified and addressed. Agencies and organizations are working to improve communication and
Martinez applauds these efforts. Martinez noted several collaborative efforts and encouraged continued
and expanded collaboration. Identifying funding sources for basic research is always a concern. As a
specific example, Martinez noted that additional basic research to improve confidence in the BioWatch
system is needed.
Lance Brooks (DHS) indicated that DHS uses a whole system approach when considering
decontamination issues. The current research focus is on critical infrastructure and high-traffic facilities
and identifying restoration time delays and data gaps. DHS is working toward creating baseline
restoration plans in anticipation of a major threat event at these types of facilities. Brooks believes that
there is value in preparing for low-probability/high-consequence events. Brooks noted that obtaining
funding remains difficult; however, a shift is occurring. The recent events of Hurricane Katrina have
highlighted restoration concerns and data gaps. Brooks noted that traditionally exercises and decision-
making frameworks stopped at the response phase and did not focus on the recovery phase. Brooks listed
a number of issues that are of concern (e.g., characterization, agent fate, persistence, infective dose). DHS
has not funded decontamination technologies and relies on other agency research in this area. Brooks also
noted that cleanup levels drive sampling, decontamination, and clearance efforts. Not only are technology
gaps an issue, but also logistical and political issues should be addressed. For example, standardized
laboratory analysis methods should be in place before an event occurs. Restoration plans and concurrence
with these plans is needed before an event occurs. Brooks provided an example of several poultry houses
in which all the birds were killed. The operators knew the procedures to decontaminate and dispose of the
carcasses, but the procedures were not pre-approved. Waiting for approval delayed the decontamination
effort by months.
Anthony Intrepido (LLNL) has participated in a number of clearance committees and technical working
groups. After the September 11, 2001, events, Intrepido spoke with a number of DOD officials about
cleanup concerns. Reducing the time required for cleanup was a critical concern. DOD officials addressed
decontamination needs in terms of hours versus weeks and months. At that time, completing
decontamination within hours seemed inconceivable; however, that goal seems more achievable now.
Technology needs force researchers to make technological leaps. Intrepido expressed concern about
redundancy in efforts between organizations because research is progressing so rapidly. During the
presentations, a workshop participant presented a scenario in which an entire Manhattan city block is
contaminated. Intrepido agreed that researchers and policy-makers should consider this scenario and
begin to discuss how decontamination of a diverse area would proceed. For example, how would
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regulators prioritize and address multiple and conflicting stakeholder needs? Would decontamination
proceed based on ability to fund decontamination or would another factor, such as public service, drive
decontamination priorities?
Shawn Ryan (EPA/NHSRC) highlighted the value of ongoing research to improve methods in the
laboratory combined with engineering experience conducting real-world fumigation. Gaps remain,
however, in understanding sampling efficiencies, surface interactions, and spore transport. If researchers
cannot understand the limitation of sampling efficiencies, then method validation is questionable. Ryan
also noted that large data gaps exist in understanding aerosolization and sampling efficiencies, as well as
agent extraction and removal from complex surfaces.
Jeff Kempter (EPA/OPP) addressed only biological agents. Kempter felt that many data gaps exist;
however, he focused his comments on two specific concerns. Manufacturers should complete required
testing and register products for decontamination uses to eliminate the need for crisis exemptions.
Agencies and facilities should emphasize preparedness planning. Some preparedness planning is
underway and national guidance is under development. As a nation, however, we should be ready for the
next large, high-consequence event. Projects with SFO and in New York City are excellent first steps.
Michael Ottlinger (EPA/NDT) described an anthrax incident in New York City that involved a single
residence and a large warehouse with multiple residences that were decontaminated. This incident
involved multiple agencies working together in a high-pressure environment because of media
involvement. Ottlinger noted that the owner of the larger building conducted the decontamination. When
assessing the scenario in which an entire Manhattan city block is contaminated during a threat event,
multiple major stakeholders may be involved (e.g., department store chains, hotels, businesses). Decision-
makers should examine these events with a business perspective and consider economic impacts.
Ottlinger suggested that larger businesses develop plans for addressing threat events and decontamination
needs. Government agencies can provide information regarding vendors and resources to these businesses
to allow them to complete decontamination. The government should assume decontamination
responsibilities for airports and transit systems, as well as small-scale facilities when owners lack the
resources to conduct decontamination themselves.
Nancy Adams (EPA/NHSRC) noted that public perception has not been mentioned, though it often drives
a decontamination effort. People often want cleanup levels to equal non-detect levels in order to feel safe.
The detection limit, however, is based on instrument limitations. The government should examine
methods for educating people and addressing public perceptions. In addition, technologies are available to
complete decontamination, but these technologies often create extensive amounts of waste and may
interact with and destroy non-target materials. Decontamination remains relatively expensive and often
the decontamination agents are toxic. There is a need for safe, cheap, rapid, and non-destructive
decontamination methods. Adams also noted that research should move beyond the anthrax focus and
examine other possible threat agents. Research indicates that existing decontamination methods would
address other biological threat agents, but data are needed to support this assumption. Additional efforts
are needed in training first responders to confidently and appropriately employ various sampling and
collection methods. Adams suggested that agencies, organizations, and disciplines collaborate to address
the vast amount of research that still remains.
The panel considered two submissions from workshop participants.
• In order to make appropriate restoration decisions, biological agent persistence in priority
environments (e.g., transit systems, critical infrastructure, outdoor/wide areas) need to be
determined. What is the strategy for addressing this need? Adams responded that current research
involves inoculating coupons with known amounts of agent. As part of this research, some of the
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coupons are set aside from decontaminant exposures to assess persistence. Based on findings, the
most appropriate decontamination strategy for organisms with low persistence may be to allow
natural degradation. However, this information must be balanced with information about
interactions with varied surfaces and substrates to ensure that the most conservative
decontamination approach is applied. A workshop participant noted that NHSRC is planning to
expand persistence studies to examine outdoor materials (e.g., brick, soil). These studies are
under discussion. NHSRC may also participate in a joint study that would address outdoor
decontamination approaches. Ryan noted that NHSRC is also pushing to examine four or five
additional agents in persistence studies on complex materials. Martinez noted that very little
persistence information is available; however, some new information was presented during this
workshop. Martinez believes that workshop participants are responsible for reporting new
information to their colleagues. Information sharing is critical because no one agency has all the
resources to address all the decontamination concerns. In fall 2005, CDC and EPA met to share
information, share ideas, and encourage partnerships in research of environmental microbiology.
CDC has also developed a working relationship with the FBI.
A noted data gap is the availability of real-time detection technologies that address many agents
on many materials. Adams agreed that this technology was lacking. A system that provides this
capability would also need to be inexpensive based on the large number of sensors required to
provide meaningful information. Issues of false positives and instrument sensitivity are also
problems with real-time detection technologies.
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IV. Agenda
Wednesday, April 26, 2006
8:00am Registration/Check-in
PLENARY SESSION
9:00am Opening Remarks; Conceptual Timeline for Decontamination Events. Blair Martin
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
9:30am Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Science & Technology
Chemical/Biological Restoration Programs Lance Brooks
Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
10:00am BREAK
10:15am Evidence Awareness for Remediation Personnel at
Weapon of Mass Destruction (WMD) Crime Scenes Jarred Wagner
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
SESSION 1: GENERAL DECONTAMINATION ISSUES
10:45am Validation of Environmental Sampling Methods:
Current Research and Related Projects Ken Martinez
Centers for Disease Control (CDC)
ll:15am Decontamination Research at the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) National Homeland Security Research Center (NHSRC).. Nancy Adams, EPA
National Homeland Security Research Center (NHSRC)
ll:45am LUNCH
12:45pm U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Regulation of
Biological Decontamination Jeff Kempter, EPA
Office of Pesticide Programs (OPP)
1:15pm Test Method Update (Office of Pesticide Programs [OPP]
Sterilant Registration Protocol Development) Steve Tomasino
EPA/OPP
l:45pm U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA):
Partner in Protecting the Homeland John Edwards
EPA, Office of Homeland Security
2:15pm BREAK
2:30pm Technical Support Working Group (TSWG) Decontamination Research
and Development Activities Rebecca Blackmon,
Technical Support Working Group (TSWG)
3:00pm A Decontamination Concept of Operations Michael Ottlinger
EPA, National Decontamination Team
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3:30pm Decontamination and Consequence Management Division (DCMD)
Disposal Research PaulLemieux
EPA/NHSRC
4:00pm A Sampling of Some of Canada's Decontamination Work Merv Fingas
Environment Canada
4:30pm The Government Decontamination Service (CDS): The UK (United Kingdom)
Perspective on Decontamination Approaches RobertBettley-Smith
UK Government Decontamination Service (CDS)
5:00pm Environmental Lab Response Network (eLRN) Support and
Standard Analytical Methods Rob Rothman
EPA/NHSRC
5:30pm ADJOURN
THURSDAY, April 27, 2006
SESSION 2: DECONTAMINATION TECHNOLOGIES
8:00am BacillusanthracisSpore Detection Using
Laser Induced Breakdown Spectroscopy (LIBS) Emily Gibb
EPA/NHSRC
8:30am Chlorine Dioxide Fumigation Developments John Mason
Sabre Technical Services
9:00am Decontamination Technology Testing and Evaluation Joseph Wood
EPA/NHSRC
9:30am Vapor Hydrogen Peroxide (VHP) Fumigation Technology Update Iain McVey
STERIS Corporation
10:00am BREAK
10:15am Laboratory Decontamination of 65 Room New Animal Facility
Using Chlorine Gas Mark Czarneski
ClorDiSys Solutions, Inc.
10:45am Decontamination Research—A New Approach Norman Govan
UK Defense Science and Technology Lab
ll:15am Decontamination of Toxins and Vegetative Cells
Using Chlorine Dioxide Terrence Leighton
IVD/CHORI
ll:45am LUNCH
12:30pm Restoration of Major Transportation Facilities Following a
Chemical Agent Release MarkTucker
Sandia National Laboratory
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l:00pm The Development of Modified Vaporous Hydrogen Peroxide (mVHP)
for Chemical- and Biological-Weapons Decontamination Stephen Divarco,
Edgewood Chemical Biological Center (ECBC)
l:30pm Spore Contamination: What Concentration Deposits, What Resuspends, and
Can We Inhibit Its Transport? Paula Krauter
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL)
2:00pm Studies of the Efficacy of Chlorine Dioxide Gas in Decontamination of
Building Materials Contaminated with BacillusanthracisSpores Vipin Rastogi, ECBC
and Shawn Ryan, EPA/NHSRC
SESSION 3: DECONTAMINATION R&D
2:30pm U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) National Homeland Security
Research Center (NHSRC) Ongoing Research Efforts in Understanding the
Efficacy and Application of Decontamination Technologies Shawn Ryan
EPA/NHSRC
3:00pm Rapid Methods to Plan, Verify and Evaluate the Effectiveness of the
Decontamination Process Tina Car/sen
LLNL
3:30pm BREAK
3:45pm Agent Fate Program James Savage
Defense Threat Reduction Agency
4:15pm Stakeholder Issues Surrounding Chemical Agent Restoration Ellen Raber
LLNL
SESSION 4: PANEL DISCUSSION
4:45 pm Lessons learned, R&D needs, Technology gaps
5:30 pm ADJOURN
FRIDAY, April 28, 2006
SESSION 5: RADIOLOGICAL DISPERSION DEVICE DECONTAMINATION
8:00am Strategy for National Homeland Security Research Center (NHSRC)
Radiological Decontamination Research and
Development Program John MacKinney
EPA/NHSRC
8:30am Decontamination Technologies for Urban Radiological Dispersion Device
(RDD)
Recovery John Drake
EPA/NHSRC
9:00am Radiological Dispersion Device (RDD) Aerosolization Experiments:
History/Applications/Results Fred Harper
Sandia National Laboratory
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SESSION 6: WATER DECONTAMINATION
9:30am Water Distribution System Decontamination Paul Randall
EPA, National Risk Management Research Laboratory
10:00am Decontamination of Water Infrastructure Greg Welter
O'Brien and Gere Engineers
10:30am BREAK
10:45am Adherence and Decontamination of Chemicals
and Biologicals Sandip Chattopadhyay
Battelle
ll:15am Measurement and Analysis of Building Water System
Contamination and Decontamination Stephen Treado
National Institute of Science and Technology (NIST)
ll:45am Water Decontamination and Detection John Hall
EPA/NHSRC
12:15pm LUNCH
SESSION 7: FOREIGN ANIMAL DISEASE/AVIAN INFLUENZA
DECONTAMINATION
1:15pm Determining the Virucidal Mechanism of Action for
Foreign Animal Disease JillBieker
Sandia National Laboratory
l:45pm Protection of U.S. Agriculture: Foreign Animal Disease Threats Bethany Grohs
EPA, Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response
2:15pm WRAP UP
2:45pm ADJOURN
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V. List of Participants
The following pages list workshop participants. This list does not include those who were invited to
participate, but could not attend the workshop. Asterisks denote presenters.
* Nancy Adams
Director, DCMD
National Homeland Security
Research Center
Decon & Consequence Management
U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency
109 TW Alexander Drive (E-343-06)
Research Triangle Park, NC 27711
Thomas Austin
Senior Manager, CBRN Initiatives
Phantom Works
Homeland Security
The Boeing Company
2201 Seal Beach Boulevard (110-
SC45)
Seal Beach, CA 90740
Peter Bass
Director, Agency-Wide
Environmental Policy
Metropolitan Transportation
Authority
347 Madison Avenue
New York, NY 10017
Manolo Bay
Director
Center for Environmental
Restoration, Monitoring &
Emergency Response
Radiation & Indoor Environments
Office of Radiation & Indoor Air
U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency
4220 South Maryland Parkway
(R&IE)
Building C
Las Vegas, NV89119
* Robert Bett ley-Smith
Chief Executive
Government Decontamination
Service
1st Floor, Defra
Electra Way
Crewe, Cheshire CW1 6GL
United Kingdom
Wolfgang Beyer
Priv.-Doz. Dr. Med. Vet. Habil.
Institute of Environmental &
Animal Hygiene
Anthrax-Laboratory
University of Hohenheim
GarbenstraRe 30
Stuttgart 70599
Germany
*Jill Bieker
Virologist
Chemical and Biological
Technologies
Sandia National Laboratories
1515 Eubank, SE (MS 0734)
Albuquerque, NM 87185
Nathan Birnbaum
Senior Staff Veterinarian
Animal and Plant Health Inspection
Service
Veterinary Services Emergency
Programs
U.S. Department of Agriculture
4700 River Road - Unit 41
Room 5D19
Riverdale, MD 20737
* Rebecca Blackmon
Chemical, Biological, Radiological
and Nuclear Countermeasures
Technical Support Working Group
P.O. Box 16224
Arlington, VA 22215
"Mark Brickhouse
R&T
ECBC
U.S. Army - RDECOM
5183 Blackhawk Road
AMSRD-ECB-RT-PD
Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD
21010
* La nee Brooks
Portfolio Manager
Department of Homeland Security
Science & Technology
PPB/10-047
Washington, DC 20528
Karen Burgan
Sr. Policy Advisor
OSWER/OEM/NPPD
U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency
1200 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
(5104A)
Washington, DC 20460
Jon Calomiris
Microbiologist
Air Force Research Laboratory
RDECOM, AMSRD-ECB-RT
Building E3549
Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD
21010
Dorothy Canter
Senior Professional Biophysicist
Applied Physics Laboratory
National Security Technology
Department
The Johns Hopkins University
11100 Johns Hopkins Road (17-
S665)
Laurel, MD 20723
*Tina Carlsen
Environmental Protection
Department
Environmental Restoration Division
Lawrence Livermore National
Laboratory
P.O. Box 808 (L-528)
Livermore, CA 94550
Karen Cavanagh
Senior Vice President - COO
Sabre Technical Services, LLC
17 Computer Drive East
Albany, NY 12205
*Sandip Chattopadhyay
Senior Chemical Engineer
Environmental Restoration
Battelle Memorial Institute
505 King Avenue
Columbus, OH 43201
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Adrian Clark
Detection
Ministry of Defense
Defense Science and
Technology Laboratory
Porton Down
Salisbury, Wilts SP4 OJQ
United Kingdom
Jimmy Cornette
Deputy Undersecretary of the Army
(OR)
Crystal Gateway II
1225 South Clark Street - Suite
1410
Arlington, VA 22202
"Mark Czarneski
Director of Technology
ClorDiSys Solutions, Inc.
P.O. Box 549
Lebanon, NJ 08833
Darrell Dechant
Senior Scientist
Sabre Technical Services, LLC
17 Computer Drive East
Albany, NY 12205
Stephen Divarco
U.S. Army RDECOM-ECBC
Engineering/R&T Directorate
"John Drake
Project Manager
National Homeland Security
Research Center
Decon & Consequence Management
U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency
26 West Martin Luther King Drive
Cincinnati, OH 45268
Leland Ellis
Senior Scientific Advisor, Biological
Countermeasures Portfolio Plans,
Programs and Budget
U.S. Department of Homeland
Security
Washington, DC 20528
Victor Engleman
President
EAI
3129 Carnegie Place
San Diego, CA 92122
William Pagan
Director of Security
US Departmant of Transportation
Federal Railroad Administration
1120 Vermont Avenue (RRS10) -
6th Floor
Washington, DC 20005
*Merv Fingas
Chief, Emergencies Science Division
Environment Canada
335 River Road
Ottawa, ON K1AOH3
Canada
Samantha Floyd
Biological Scientist
Animal and Plant Health Inspection
Service
Policy and Program Division
U.S. Department of Agriculture
4700 River Road - Unit 149
Riverdale, MD 20737
Elizabeth George
Deputy Director,
Biological Countermeasures
Department of Homeland Security
Science & Technology
Washington, DC 20528
"Emily Gibb
Research Chemist
National Homeland Security
Research Center
Decon & Consequence Management
U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency
109 TW Alexander Drive (E-343-06)
Research Triangle Park, NC 27613
* Norman Govan
Detection Department
Defense Science and
Technology Laboratory
Porton Down
Salisbury, Wiltshire SP4 OJQ
United Kingdom
* Bethany Grohs
Office of Emergency Management
U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency
1200 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
(5104A)
Washington, DC 20460
'John Hall
Physical Scientist
National Homeland Security
Research Center
U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency
26 West Martin Luther King Drive
Cincinnati, OH 45268
"Frederick Harper
Senior Scientist
High Consequence Assessment
and Technology
Sandia National Laboratories
P.O. Box 5800 (MS 0791)
Albuquerque, NM 87111
Steve Hawthorn
Director, NOT
OEM
U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency
Craig Heimbach
National Institute of
Standards and Technology
100 Bureau Drive (8461)
Gaithersburg, MD 20899
Dudley Hewlett
Head of Science
Science
Government Decontamination
Service
1st Floor, Defra
Electra Way
Crewe, Cheshire CW1 6GL
United Kingdom
Scott Hudson
Health Physicist
Office of Solid Waste and
Emergency Response
Office of Emergency Management
U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency
26 West Martin Luther King Drive
(MS 271)
Cincinnati, OH 45268
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Anthony Intrepido
Chemical and Biological National
Security Program
Field Operations
Lawrence Livermore National
Laboratory
P.O. Box 808 (L-528)
Livermore, CA 94550
Hirosei Inuzuka
Manager
Aerospace Headquarters
Integrated Defense Systems Group
Mitsubishi Heavy Industries Ltd.
16-5, Konan 2-Chome, Minato-Ku
Tokyo 108-8215
Japan
Shalini Jayasundera
Principal Engineer
Environmental Programs
Civil Systems Development
Computer Sciences Corporation
Federal Sector
6101 Stevenson Avenue
Alexandria, VA 22304
Lawrence Kaelin
Chemist
National Decontamination Team
Office of Emergency Management
U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency
26 West Martin Luther King Drive
(MS-271)
Room 108
Cincinnati, OH 45268
Jon Kaye
Office of Research & Development
NHSRC/AAAS
U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency
1200 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
(8801R)
Washington, DC 20460
*Carlton (Jeff) Kempter
Senior Advisor
Office of Pesticide Programs
Antimicrobials Division
U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency
1200 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
(7510C)
Washington, DC 20460
Anne Kirsch
Assistant Chief Safety Officer
MTA Metro-North Railroad - NY
347 Madison Avenue - llth Floor
New York, NY 10017
Philip Koga
Associate Director for Special
Programs
Edgewood Chemical/Biological
Center
U.S. Army - AMSRD-ECB-RT
5183 Blackhawk Road
Gunpowder, MD 21010
* Paula Krauter
Environmental Microbiologist
Environmental Protection
Department
Environmental Restoration Division
Lawrence Livermore National
Laboratory
7000 East Avenue (L-528)
P.O. Box 808
Livermore, CA 94550
'"Terra nee Leighton
Senior Scientist
CIVD
CHORI
5700 Marthin Luther King Way
Oakland, CA 94609
"Paul Lemieux
Chemical Engineer
National Homeland Security
Research Center
Decontamination &
Consequence Management
U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency
109 TW Alexander Drive (E-343-06)
Research Triangle Park, NC 27711
"John MacKinney
Senior Radiation Scientist
National Homeland Security
Research Center
U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency
1300 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
(8801R)
Washington, DC 20460
Harry Mahar
Director
Domestic Environmental and
Safety Division
U.S. Department of State
2201 C Street, NW - Room B2A61
Washington, DC 20520
Sav Mancieri
Environmental Emergency
Management Coordinator
Environmental Protection
Department
Regulatory Affairs
Lawrence Livermore National
Laboratory
P.O. Box 808, East Avenue (L-627)
Livermore, CA 94550
Maria Cristina Manzoni
Washington Delegation
European Commission
2300 M Street, NW
Washington, DC 20037
"Blair Martin
Associate Director
Office of Research and
Development
National Risk Management
Research Laboratory
Air Pollution Prevention & Control
Division
U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency
109 TW Alexander Drive (E-343-04)
Research Triangle Park, NC 27709
* Kenneth Martinez
Regional Operations Director
National Institute of
Occupational Safety & Health
Centers for Disease Control
4676 Columbia Parkway (Rll)
Cincinnati, OH 45226
Jeanelle Martinez
Toxicologist
Office of Emergency Management
National Decontamination Team
U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency
26 West Martin Luther King Drive
Room 271
Cincinnati, OH 45268
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"John Mason
President
Sabre Technical Services, LLC
17 Computer Drive East
Albany, NY 12205
*Iain McVey
Project Manager
STERIS Corporation
5960 Heisley Road
Mentor, OH 44060
David B. Mickunas
Chemist
Environmental Response Team
TIFSD/OSWER/OSRTI
U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency
2890 Woodbridge Avenue (MS-101)
Building 18
Edison, NJ 08837
Richard Moser
Private Consultant
3891 Arbours Avenue
Collegeville, PA 19426
David Musick
CRQA Director
Radiation and Indoor Environments
National Laboratory (R&IE)
U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency
P.O. Box98517
Las Vegas, NV 89193-8517
Laurel O'Connor
Associate Manager of Testing
Battelle
1204 Technology Drive
Aberdeen, MD 21220
* Michael Ottlinger
Toxicologist/Biologist
Office of Solid Waste and
Emergency Response
Office of Emergency Management
National Decontamination Team
U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency
26 West Martin Luther King Drive
Room 271
Cincinnati, OH 45268
*Cayce Parrish
Senior Advisor
Office of Homeland Security
Office of the Administrator
U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency
1200 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
(1109A)
Washington, DC 20460
202-564-4648
Fax: 202-501-0026
Email: parrish.cayce@epa.gov
Clark Price
Department Manager
Day Engineering, P.C.
40 Commercial Street
Rochester, NY 14614
"Ellen Raber
Deputy Program Leader
CBNP, R Division
Lawrence Livermore National
Laboratory
P.O. Box 808 (L-179)
Livermore, CA 94551
Crystal Leyla Rakani
Consequence Management
Specialist
WMD-T/Foreign Consequence
Management Program
Department of State
1000 Wilson Boulevard - Suite 1500
Arlington, VA 22307
"Paul Randall
Chemical Engineer
Soils and Sediments Management
National Risk Management
Research Lab
U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency
26 West Martin Luther King Drive
Cincinnati, OH 45268
*Vipin Rastogi
R&T Directorate
Biosciences
U.S. Army - ECBC
E-3150 Kingscreek Street, N
AMSRD-ECB-RT-BP
Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD
21010
Jacky Rosati
Environmental Scientist
National Homeland Security
Research Center
Decon & Consequence Management
U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency
109 TW Alexander Drive (E-343-06)
Research Triangle Park, NC 27711
*Rob Rothman
U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency
26 West Martin Luther King Drive
Cincinnati, OH 45268
"Shawn Ryan
Research Physical Scientist
National Homeland Security
Research Center
Decontamination &
Consequence Management
U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency
109 TW Alexander Drive (E-343-06)
Research Triangle Park, NC 27711
"James Savage
Program Manager/Agent Fate
RDECOM
Defense Threat Reduction Agency
315 Kestrel Drive
Belcamp, MD 21017
Lewis Schwartz
Vice President
STERIS Corporation
5960 Heisley Road
Mentor, OH 44060
Charles Serafini
CBRN Decontamination Lead
Engineer
Human Systems Group
CBRN Defense Systems
U.S. Air Force
7980 Lindbergh Landing (HSG/TBR)
Building 578
San Antonio, TX 78235
Tom Sgroi
Chief, Design and Construction
Division
A/OPR/RPM
Department of State
2201 C Street, NW - Room 1264
Washington, DC 20520
-------
Report on 2006 NHSRC Decontamination Workshop
Gerard Shero
Scientist
JPEO-CBD/Camber
5203 Leesburg Pike
Skyline #2 - Suite 800
Falls Church, VA 22041
Kathryn Snead
Environmental Scientist
ORIA/RPD
U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency
1200 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
(6608J)
Washington, DC 20460
Les Sparks
Senior Chemical Engineer
National Homeland Security
Research Center
Decon & Consequence
Management Division
U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency
109 TW Alexander Drive (E343-06)
Research Triangle Park, NC 27711
Harry Stone
Program Manager
Battelle
10300 Alliance Road - Suite 155
Cincinnati, OH 45242
Michael Taylor
Program Manager
Battelle
10300 Alliance Road - Suite 155
Cincinnati, OH 45242
Mark Thomas
On-Scene Coordinator
Emergency Response and Removal
Superfund Division
U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency
901 North 5th Street
Kansas City, KS 66101
Federico Tinivella
Agroinnova, University of Turin
via Leonardo da Vinci 44
Grugliasco, TO 10095
Italy
'"Stephen Tomasino
Senior Scientist
Microbiology Laboratory Branch
Office of Pesticide Programs
Biological and Economic Analysis
Division
U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency
701 Mapes Road (7503C)
Fort Meade, MD 20755
Abderrahmane Touati
Senior Research Scientist
ARCADIS
4915 Prospectus Drive - Suite F
Durham, NC 27713
* Stephen Treado
Project Leader
National Institute of
Standards and Technology
100 Bureau Drive
Building 226 - Room B114
Gaithersburg, MD 20899
*Mark Tucker
Sandia National Laboratories
P.O. Box 5800 (MS 0734)
Albuquerque, NM 87185
Dennisses Valdes
Deputy Director
Environmental Response Team
4220 South Maryland Parkway
Building D - Suite 800
Las Vegas, NV 89108
*Jarrad Wagner
Chemist
FBI Laboratory HMRU
2501 Investigation Parkway
Quantico, VA 22135
Malcolm Wakerley
RAS4
Radioactive Substances
Department for Environment,
Food & Rural Affairs
Zone 3/G27, Ashdown House
123 Victoria Street
London SW1E 6DE
United Kingdom
Lanie Wallace
RDECOM
U.S. Army - ECBC
5183 Blackhawk Road
Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD
21010
Bruce Ware
Department Chief, Construction
Division
Baltimore District
North Atlantic
U S Army Corps of Engineers
10 South Howard Street
Baltimore, MD 21201
Adam Warner
BIOQUELL Inc.
101 Witmer Road
Horsham, PA 19044
Stephanie Watson
Building and Fire Research
Laboratory
Materials and Construction
Research
National Institute of
Standards and Technology
100 Bureau Drive (8615)
Buiding 226 - Room B344
Gaithersburg, MD 20899
John Weimaster
Capability Area Program Officer,
Decontamination
Defense Threat Reduction Agency
8725 John J. Kingman Road - MSC
6201 (CBT)
Ft. Belvoir, VA 22060
Richard Weisman
Environmental Engineer
Office of Water
U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency
1300 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20460
*Greg Welter
Technical Director
O'Brien & Gere
8401 Corporate Drive - Suite 400
Landover, MD 20785
89
-------
Report on 2006 NHSRC Decontamination Workshop
"Joseph Wood
Research Engineer
Office of Research & Development
Decontamination & Consequence
Management Division
U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency
109 TW Alexander Drive (E 343-06)
Durham, NC 27711
90
-------
Conceptual Timelines for Decontamination Events
By: G. Blair Martin, Shawn Ryan,
Emily Gibb, and Nancy Adams
U.S. EPA, Office of Research and
Development
National Homeland Security Research
Center
Presented at: Decon Workshop 2006
Washington, DC
April 26-28, 2006
BACKGROUND
In the fall of 2001 a number of buildings were contaminated with
B.anthracis from letters mailed through the U.S. Postal Service
All of the these buildings have been decontaminated using a
variety of methods
/ Removal and disposal of contaminated materials
/ Surface cleaning with bleach, liquid chlorine dioxide or various
hydrogen peroxide products
/ Fumigation with chlorine dioxide, hydrogen peroxide, or
paraform aldehyde
/ The volumes fumigated at one time ranged from about 8,000 to over
14,000,000 cubic feet
BACKGROUND
Most experience with CIO2 fumigation
Brentwood P&DC - 6.a. contaminated
• 14,000,000 cubic feet
• Liquid CIO2 generation with emitters in HVAC air handlers
• HEPAfilter/wet CIO2 scrubber/carbon unit
• Whole building decontaminated at the same time
Hamilton P&DC - 6.a. contaminated
• 7,000,000 cubic feet
• Brentwood technology relocated/modified
American Media International (AMI) Building - 6.a. contaminated
• 700,000 cubic feet
• Carbon cells
Utica, NY house - mold contaminated
• 40,000 cubic feet
• Termite tenting procedure
Hudson Falls, NY Department Store - mold contaminated
• 1,000,000 cubic feet
• Single tarp
• Small carbon cells
BACKGROUND
• Elements of a decontamination event
• The decision process leading to the fumigation and final
clearance of the building
• Characterization of the extent of contamination and
monitoring of the fumigation
• Building related activities including, preparation and
maintenance and surroundings for security, safety of the
neighborhood, and the ultimate decontamination
• Selection, design and performance of the
decontamination process
• Disposal of contaminated materials and/or wastes from
the decontamination and building reconstruction
• Communication with affected individuals and the
community at large
BACKGROUND
The body of experience generated provides guidance to
improve the timeline for a decontamination event
These improvements also have the potential to reduce the
time and associated cost of the decontamination event
Factors contributing to improvement include:
• Cumulative experience with CIO2 fumigation events
• Technology implementation advances
• Availability of critical equipment
• Improved technology for containment of the fumigant
• Streamlining the approval process
• Reduced materials removal prior to fumigation
• Reduced removal/disposal of contaminated material possible
CONCEPTUAL TIMELINES
This knowledge and experience provides a basis for
conceptual timelines that might be achieved in future
decontamination events
These timelines do not represent any specific event
Conceptual timelines are based on engineering
judgment
Many timelines are possible dependent on duration of
individual steps in the process
Three conceptual timelines are presented
Principal improvements are:
• Timeline #1- Original implementation of the technology
• Timeline #2 -Technology advances with stockpiled equipment
• Timeline #3 - FIFRA registered of fumigant
Each one is based on a specific set of assumptions
-------
CONCEPTUAL TIMELINE #1
This timeline does not represent any actual event
It is a example based on the state of technology in 2001
Assumptions:
• A large volume building has been contaminated
• Aerosolized 6.a. spores have spread throughout the facility
• Fumigant is not registered under FIFRA - "Crisis Exemption" required
• Formal plans (RAP, SAP, AAMP) are required
• A Technical Working Group (TWG) is formed
• Indemnification and/or insurance must be negotiated
• Extensive forensic, characterization and clearance sampling are required
• The technology has not been used for this purpose
• The decontamination equipment must be procured/fabricated
• Some materials and/or contents are removed prior to fumigation
• Building re-occupancy is contingent on approval of a clearance report by the
appropriate authority
• Time for restoration will depend on a number of factors
CONCEPTUAL TIMELINE#1
CONCEPTUAL TIMELINE #2
Conceptual improvements based on the experience to
date
Assumptions:
• CIO2 fumigation is an established technology
• Past experience expedites FIFRA document preparation
• "Generic" or previously prepared RAP, SAP and AAMP available
• Current CAD drawings of building and HVAC are available to aid in
assessment and sampling
• Improvement in technology approach
• Negative Air Units to contain spores
• Tenting of building to eliminate or reduce need for sealing
• Carbon units in place of wet scrubbers
• Long lead time equipment has been stockpiled
• Emitters
• CIO2 generator
CONCEPTUAL TIMELINE #2
.-
CONCEPTUAL TIMELINE # 3
Additional improvements may be possible
Assumptions:
• CIO2 is a FIFRA registered fumigant
• A full time TWG is convened to review documents
• The owner or vendor can bind insurance in lieu of indemnification
• Most building contents are fumigated in place
• Sensitive items are removed
• External decontamination minimized
• Minimal removal of building structure
• Minimum activity in building in high level of PPE
CONCEPTUAL TIMELINE #3
-------
Con elusions
These timelines do not represent any actual event
Current experience is only for B.a.
Conceptual timelines are based on engineering judgment
derived from past experience
These conceptual timelines show the potential for
significant reductions in time for a fumigation event
Additional improvements may be possible
• Improving the linkage of forensic and characterization sampling
• Optimizing the characterization and clearance sampling approach
• Revising the criteria for number and placement of biological
indicators (Bis)
R&D can also lead to expanded applicability
• Additional chemical and biological agents
• Further improvement in containment techniques
-------
DHS S&T Chem/Bio Restoration Programs
2006 Workshop on Decontamination, Cleanup, and Associated
Issues for Sites Contaminated with C, B, or R Materials
Washington, DC
April 26, 2006
Mr. Lance Brooks
Biological/Chemic al
Counterme asure s
Plans. Programs, & Requirements
Science & Technology
Homeland
Security
Biological - Restoration of Airport Facilities
Goal: To reduce the overall time to
restore a critical transportation facility
following a biological attack.
• NAS Study
• Sample Methodology & Planning Tools
- BROOM development and test
- Rapid Viability Method Development
- Sampling Efficiency Study
•Final Restoration Plan
- Expert Review of Restoration Plan
- Fumigation Implementation Plan
Demonstration of Rapid Restoration Techniques
- Field Demonstration of Rapid Viability Method
- Field Demonstration of Data Management Tools
Final Demo held January 2006
* Homeland
' Security
National Academy of Sciences Study
National Research Council Committee on
Standards and Policies for Decontaminating
Public Facilities Affected by Exposure to
Harmful Biological Agents: How Clean is Safe?
National Academy of Sciences Study:
Reopening Public Facilities After a Biological Attack:
A Decision-Making Framework (2005)
• Infectious Dose
• Natural Background
• Quantitative Risk Assessment
• Past Cleanup Efforts
• Residual Contamination
iSII Homeland
Security OHBR^^0ni^
Restoration Plan for Airports
Chapters include:
- Characterization
- Recommendation
for Pre-Planning
Appendices include:
- Considerations for the Notification Phase
- Considerations for the First-Response Phase
- Available Biological Sampling and Analysis Methods
- Considerations for Sampling Design
- Probability-Based Sampling
- Available Decontamination Technologies
- Handling Decontamination Waste at SFO
- Sampling Info Forms for Characterization and Clearance
- Annotated Characterization Sampling Plan Template
- Remediation Action Plan
- Annotated Clearance Sarr
- Restoration Contact List
iling Plan Template
Currently leveraging this work to
develop plans for Transit Systems
Homeland
Security
Biological - Wide Area Restoration
Wide Area Restoration Demonstration
• Produce Plan for Demonstration in FY06
- ID venue/partners (e.g. urban area, EPA, etc)
- Draft management plan prior to the start of the
demonstration program in FY07
•This planning in partnership with EPA, urban area, and
other identified partners as needed
• Utilize SDST findings/guidance
Large-Scale Restoration of Bio-Contaminated Areas
•Analysis/Policy (HSI)
•Technology/Protocols fTSWG)
Study results and developed protocols will
be incorporated into the Wide Area Demo
Homeland
Security
Chemical - Facilities Restoration Demonstration
Goal: To reduce the overall time to
restore a critical facility following a
chemical attack.
• Establish
-Partnerships (facility, federal, state, & local)
-Airport Partner (LAX)
-Threat scenarios
• Survey and identify
- existing clean-up guidelines
- existing / emerging sampling methods
- existing / emerging decontamination technologies
• Develop
- Pre-planning/rapid approval of restoration process
- Methods for contamination characterization
- Decontamination and verification for surfaces
- Clearance Methods and decision tools
Homeland
Security
Conduct Tabletop exercises and
demonstration
-------
Integrated Consortium of Laboratory Networks
Jership Council (JLC)
DHS Chair
fork Coordinating
Group (NCG)
DHSCh :
Homeland
Security
All Hazards Receipt Facilities (Prototypes)
Purpose: Protect staff and infrastructure of
analytical laboratories by ensuring correct
handling of unknown samples through
determination of potential highly toxic or
dangerous chemical, radiological, or
explosive content
• Capability comprises recommended analytical tools
and protocols for use.
• Protocols are consistent with maintenance of
evidentiary credibility.
• Protocols developed as interagency effort among DHS,
DoD, EPA, FBI, CDC, and state public health lab reps.
* Homeland
' Security
Status: prototypes near completion
and to be placed at Public Health Labs
for one-year evaluation period.
Mobile Laboratory (PHILIS) Prototype
Objective: Develop and demonstrate a
rapidly deployable capability for high-
throughput analysis of environmental
sam pies to assess contam inated area
and facilitate restoration
• hundreds of environmental samples per day
• capable of full spectrum chem agent and TIC
analysis
• quantify down to Permissible Exposure Level
• archive samples, maintain chain-of-custody
consistent with forensic use
Homeland
Security
National Conference on Environmental
Sampling (or Bio-Threat Agents
-------
Evidence Awareness for
Remediation Personnel at WMD
Crime Scenes
Presented to:
2006 Workshop on Decontamination,
Cleanup, and Associated Issues for Sites
Contaminated with Chemical, Biological, or
Radiological Materials
Washington, DC
April 2006
ByJarrad R.Wagner, Ph.D.
WMD Crime Scenes are Complex
EPA photo of metal debris from
WTC at Fresh Kills landfill
FBI photo of mail sorting operation
from Capitol Hill Anthrax P|
What is a WMD Crime Scene?
- A crime scene where weapons of mass
destruction have been prepared, used, or
discovered.
- Weapons of mass destruction include
chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear,
and explosive materials.
WMD Incident Response
Phases
Tactical Phase
- Removal of the hostile threat
Operational Phase
- Rescue / Control
• Protect the Public
• Identify and mitigate hazards:
- Explosives, HazMat, Structural, Electrical, etc...
Crime Scene Phase
- Evidence Collection
- Packaging
Remediation Phase- mitigate toxic hazards
WMD Crime Scene Operations
• Contaminated Crime Scene Processing
- FBI HMRU and FBI Hazardous Materials Response
Teams
• Other teams and personnel may be integrated with FBI
personnel, depending on the circumstances
FBI processing of WMD crime
scene
12 step process
1. Preparation
2. Approach the scene
3. Secure and protect scene
4. Preliminary survey
5. Evaluate evidence possibilities
6. Narrative description
7. Photograph the scene
8. Prepare Diagram/sketch
9. Conduct detailed search
10. Collect evidence
11. Final survey
12. Release crime scene
-------
XII. Release the Crime Scene
Advise owner of potential hazards
-WMD/HazMat Clean-up
Re-entry may require warrant
Leave inventory
Release scene to appropriate party
Three Critical Aspects of WMD Evidence
Collection
• Personal and public safety #1
Sample integrity and preservation
Accurate documentation and chain of
custody
Chain of Custody
The movement and location of physical
evidence from the time it is obtained to the
time it is presented in court.
Forensic Evidence
Anything that indicates a crime was
committed
Anything taken from scene or left at the
scene by the suspects
Anything taken from the scene or left at
the scene by the victims
WMD Evidence
Any Chemical, Biological, or
Radiological materials collected during
a WMD incident must be taken to an
appropriate, accredited laboratory for
analysis.
Also, items contaminated with materials
Coordinated by FBI HMRU Science
Program and CBSU
Critical Evidence
Improvised chemical, biological, or
radiological device components
Concentrated WMD material in solid or
liquid form
Paperwork detailing attack planning
Identification documents discovered at
scene
-------
Notification Protocols
Contact EPA on scene coordinator
EPA coordinator should notify FBI case
agent or WMD Coordinator
FBI case agent will notify WMDOU and
HMRU through WMD Coordinator
Conference call will be conducted with
WMDOU and HMRU to determine next
steps
Transition
• Evidence is recognized
• Clean-up is stopped, or steps are taken to
preserve evidence while remediation
continues elsewhere in scene
• Notifications are made
• Evidence is collected
• Remediation continues
Collection Protocols
Evidence needs to be collected with appropriate
photographs and documentation
Either HMRU will respond to scene with
Hazardous Materials Response Team to collect
or appropriately certified hazmat team can make
entry for collection in coordination with FBI
Collected materials will be over-packed,
container decontaminated, and delivered to FBI
case agent for entry into evidence database
Materials will be transported to appropriate
laboratory for analysis
Conclusions
Remediation personnel play a critical role in
WMD attack recovery.
Critical evidence may still be present after crime
scene phase and must be preserved.
Appropriate procedures ensure safe collection
and exploitation of the evidence and require
communications between remediation agency
(EPA) and crime scene agency (FBI).
- Don't attempt to process a WMD crime scene without
contacting the FBI
- Don't take samples with the intent of giving them to
the FBI as evidence
-------
National Research Council Key Issue
Validation of Environmental
Sampling Methods: Current
Research and Related Projects
CAPT Kenneth F. Martinez, MS._._,
Regional Operations Director, NCO
iional Institute for Occupational Safety and Health
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
Research should assess the
sfficiency of collection and analysis
for each type of biological agent.
Unless the sampling efficiency is
known, the amount of contaminant
deposited cannot be estimated with
confidence."
SAFER* HEALTHIER' PEOPLE
Government Accounting Office Key
Issues
How efficient are the various
testing methods, and what
minimum amounts of anthrax
spores have to be present if
anthrax is to be detected by
these methods?
How effective are the various
methods for extracting material
from samples for analysis?
CDC
Development of an Aerosol
System for Creating Uniform
Samples of Deposited Bacteri;
SAFER • H EALTHIER-PEOPLE'
Requirei
Develop a system to:
* produce multiple identical samples
of settled bacteria at several
concentrations to test several
surface sampling methods and
*to produce airborne bacterial
concentrations for comparison of
air sampling methods.
5 AFER • HEALTHIER ' PEOPLE '
-------
Chamber constructed that used stirred settling to
achieve a desired concentration. Sampling
surfaces then exposed to allow particles to settle
onto them.
Stirred settling in a chamber with heiaht
described in Hinds (1999) using the follo^my
equation:
Chamber Operation
Samples placed inside chamber and
covered
Chamber sealed
Powder (about 2 mg) manually
introduced to venturi tube from small
sample vial
Generation chamber sealed off from
rest of system
Air run through mixing system to
clear out aerosol
if Fan cycling controller started
9
SAFER* HEALTHIER•PEOPLE
Chamber Operation - con
eration - c<
p turned on for fast
Chamber pump turned on for faster
aerosol decay
Chamber monitored with APS
When desired concentration
reached, sample covers removed
When settling completed (4-12
hours), samples recovered
Chamber vented to clear remaining
aerosol
Surfaces uncovered and sampl
SAFER • HEALTHIER ' PEOPLE'"
-------
Current Stati
drafted
Finished characterization of the chamber
Performed tests to characterize best
reference sample (agar) treatment
Solved problem of re-aerosolization of
spores by covering (non-sample)
surfaces with light oil
Next: perform test to compare first pass
surface samplina to multiple passes
SAFER-HEALTHIER-PEOPLED
Evaluation of Surface Sample
Collection Methods for Bacillus
Spores on Porous and Non-
Porous Surfaces
Gary S Brown
Sand/a National Laboratories
Albuquerque, NM
Stud'
/ /
Provide a robust scientific and statistical
evaluation of current swab, wipe, and
vacuum surface sample collection
methods for Bacillus spores
SAFER•HEALTHIER-PEOPLE
collection T\ • extraction T\ = recovery T\
-------
SAFER-HEALTHIER-PEOPLE
Wipe Efficiency
1 1 —
p
r .
CDC
SAFER • HEALTHIER • PEOPL.E \WU///sf
Characterization Sample Parameters
- Quantitative Result Required
100-150 400-600 400-600
Sample Area 10-100 100-1000 1000-10,000
0.4-0.6 0.04-0.06
Sensitivity 10,000- 4000-6000 400-600
f) 15,000
-------
learance Sample Parameters
- Qualitative Result Required
neter Swab Wipe Vacuum
LOD I 10-15 15-20 15-20
Sample Area 10-100 100-1000 1000-10000
Sensitivity 0.1-0.15 0.15-0.2 0.015-0.02
Sensitivity 1000-1500 1500-2000 150-200
SAFER-HEALTHIER-PEOPLE
CDC
etter Re-aerosolization Study
(S. Shadomy, R. McCleery, K. Martinez)
/
Purpose: To address concerns
regarding existing guidelines for
handling suspicious letters or packages
Main objective'. To develop and test a
revised model for assessing risk of
exposure to anthrax simulant (BG
spores) under an open office concept.
Collaborators: Defense Research and
Development Canada (Suffield).TSWG,
and Federal Protection Service
SAFER•HEALTHIER-PEOPLE
Letter Re-aerosolization Study
7
Remote facility with open office concept,
co-workers present.
Controlled ventilation, positive pressure.
Evaluation of various scenarios that may
affect exposure risk.
Use of modeling, computerized fluid
dynamics, video exposure monitoring,
and real-time exposure measurements.
Develop objective evidence to refute or
confirm adequacy of 2001 guidance.
SAFER•HEALTHIER-PEOPLE
Re-suspension of Bacillus anthracis Spores
(K. Martinez)
Purpose: To elucidate factors affecting
the extent of re-suspension of B.
anthracis spores from contaminated
envelopes during mail processing.
Collaborators: US Army Edgewood
Re-suspension of Bacillus anthracis Spores
I / / f
Studies motivated by concern that cross-contamination during mail
processing may have been the source of exposure for 2 anthrax
cases where source of exposure was unclear.
Preliminary studies with Bg have produced the following.
» Very good uniformity among envelopes coated simultaneously
» Predictable levels of contamination can be achieved
Cross-contaminated letters from the anthrax attacks of 2001 have
bbeen sequestered.
Results may allow a better understanding of the infection risk to those
nanipulating such cross-contaminated mail and aid in developing
npropriate control recommendations.
5AFER•HEALTHIER•PEOPLE'
5AFER • HEALTHIER • PEOPLE '
-------
Bioaerosol Sampler
(B. T. Chen, G. Feather, J. Keswani)
Sampler: cyclone-based micro-centrifuge tu
(Din ~2 mm), personal/area, 4-L/min, D50
mm
Analysis: PCR, immunoassay, or others
Advantages: samples directly collected in the
tube for preparation/analysis; no need for sample
extraction from filters or other media used by
current samplers
In the case of PCR analysis:
* Detection limit: spore count > 100, dust < 0.2
mg
» Preparation: samples direct for bead-beating
- Using crude extract without DMA purification
-------
til
Nancy Adams, Director
Decontamination and Consequence Management Division
National Homeland Security Research Center
Office of Research and Development
US Environmental Protection Agency
Organized in 2002 to address decontamination of buildings and
water systems
Announced as permanent on November 2004
Three divisions
• Water Infrastructure Protection
• Threat and Consequence Assessment
• Decontamination and Consequence Management
Headquarters in Cincinnati, OH
• DC staff
• RTF staff
• LV staff
• Detailees (DOE, ORD, OSWER, other)
Provide state-of-the-art scientific
knowledge and technology to emergency
responders, building owners, water utility
operators, health departments, and
others to:
• enhance their ability to quickly detect
contamination,
• effectively respond, and
• safely restore areas contaminated by a
terrorist attack.
Contaminants
• Pathogenic bacteria and viruses, biotoxins
• Chemical warfare agents
• Toxic industrial chemicals
• Radiological contaminants
Targets
• Buildings, open areas
• Water systems
• Transportation infrastructure
Technical Areas
• Enhance response capabilities
• Detection (sampling and analysis)
• Containing a release
• Decontamination/treatment methods
• Disposal of decontamination wastes
Selected bKteitial Collaborations
Edgewood Chemical and
Biological Center (DoD)
Lawrence Livermore National
Laboratory (DOE/DHS)
Sandia National Laboratory
(DOE/DHS)
National Institute of Standards
and Technology
National Academy of Sciences
Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention
Counterproliferation Research
Committee (CPRC/DoD)
Defense Intelligence Agency
Central Intelligence Agency
Immune Buildings Program
(Army/Navy)
Department of Homeland Security
National Counterterrorism Center
Office of Science and Technology
Policy
City of Cincinnati
Federal Emergency Management
Agency
Army Research Laboratory
Air Force Research Laboratory
Naval Surface Warfare Laboratory
Real Estate Roundtable
Canadian Food Inspection Agency
Department of Transportation
Society of Toxicology
Homeland Security Advanced
Research Projects Agency
Defense Advanced Research
Projects Agency
Technical Support Working Group
Defense Threat Reduction Agency
Numerous other private groups
eciaUiea Research l-actut
-------
Microbe persistence
Real-time spore identification
Prion surrogates
Adapting OP-FTIR technology
Emissions sampling during incineration
Sampling efficiency for Bacil's4v JU'r-^u-is on surfaces
Workshop on sampling issues
Improved biological indicators (Bis)
Laser-based methods for rapid chem/bio detection in air and
on surfaces
Re-suspension studies
Infiltration studies
She Itering-in-p lace
1 Residential
• Large building
EPATestHouse
Outdoor and indoor airborne dispersion
• Human activities
1 Environmental conditions
• Indoor sinks/re-emitters
Retrofit guidance for safer buildings
• Filters
• HVAC use
Graduate program in building protection
Survey of available methods
Optimization of fumigant
procedures for buildings
Reports on remediation of
anthrax-contaminated buildings
Fumigant studies
• Tenting
• Scrubbing
Test coupons for decontamination (aerosol
deposition)
ROD and water system decon
ROD surface clean-up and decon database
Bacteriophage systems for decon
Portable CIO2 system evaluation
Fumigant reaction kinetics
• Decomposition
• Penetration
• By-products
Systematic decon studies
• Concentration, temperature, RH, dwell time
• Material demand
• Material compatibility
Thermal destruction research
• Bench-scale reactor
• Surrogates for bioagents
• Ceiling tiles, carpet
• Indoor/outdoor materials
• Agricultural wastes
Portable gasifier project
Incinerator modeling of agent destruction, emissions
Autoclave waste sterilization
Development of test method for sampling/analysis of
bacterial spores in incinerator stack gases
Studies related to the disposal of
waste materials contaminated with
biological and chemical agents in
landfill environments
Decision Support Tool for
decontamination wastes
• Packaging
• Transport
• Thermal treatment locations
• Disposal sites
-------
Engineering Support and Guidance
• Lessons learned from anthrax
decontamination
• Economic and engineering analysis of
options
• On-site support for anthrax decontamination
Questions?
Technology Testing and Verification
• Commercially ready, or near-ready technologies
• Testing at vendor specified conditions
* Tests of air cleaners, filters, detection systems,
decontamination systems
Industrial carpet
Bare pine wood
Glass
Decorative laminate
Galvanized metal
Painted wallboard paper
Painted concrete
b-scale testing
-------
emergency, quarantine or crisis use)
Registration:
- For a Section 3 registration, a registrant m
submit an application to EPA along with
required product labeling and data.
must submit an application to a state alony
required labeling and data; the state issues
24(c) registration but EPA has 90-day revie1
period to accept or reject it.
urn
i
- For Section 18 exemptions (specific, public health
or quarantine), a state or federal agency submits its
request to EPA for review and approval. Exemption
is effective for 1 to 3 years.
• In event of a crisis, EPA, a state, or other federal
-gency may issue a cr . Exemption is
ffective for 15 days.
or anthrax cleanups, EPA issued 28 crisis
xemptions and rejected 35 in response to 6
requests.
What efficacy data
should EPA
require to register
an "anthrax"
claim?
What should
PA's labeling
. jquirements be?
-------
-T £I SUM J 3 JJJ
To claim inactivation of a
disinfectant must be successfully test
against that microorganism (e.g., Y.
pestis) or an acceptable surrogate using
one of the above tests.
A reviews and accepts the test
Its, the specific microorganism m
e listed on the product's labeling.
To claim inactivation of a specific soore
forming bacterium, a sterilant must be
successfully tested:
- the virulent agent (e.g., B. anthracis or;
acceptable surrogate)
-with the AOAC SAT
porous and non-porous surfaces.
3A reviews and accepts the test results, the
specific spore-forming microorganism may be
listed on the product's labeling.
iipors -faf Lsirsjs^psi^^
-------
Do AOAC SAT and quantitative sporic
tests provide an equivalent challenge?
EPA (Ft. Meade Lab) has run the AOA
SAT side-by-side with the Three Step
Method (a quantitative sporicidal test).
These tests may help EPA determine the
performance standard that will need to !
met for a "decontaminant" claim.
EPA will limit sal
decontamination products for B. anthracis and
other spore-formers to:
- Federal On-Scene Coordinators
- Other federal, state, tribal and local government workers
authorized to perform bio-decontamination
- Persons trained and certified competent by registrants
vill issue guidance in 2006 for the ter.
ions of registration
„ ,, will seek public comment on a draft propo.
of this approach before issuing it in final form
Research
has initiated several decontaminant test
programs:
- Environmental Testing and Verification Pro
(ETV) (see http://www.epa.gov/etv)
Systematic Decon (nearing completion)
Technology Testing and Evaluation Program
™=) (getting started)
r Security (underway)
How can projects be coordinated within t
agencies?
- Through direct discussions and through groups such as the
Interagency Expert Panel on Anthrax Test Methods and Surrogates
What test protocols should be used?
- Preferably validated or well-developed methods that serve a
regulatory purpose and are widely accepted
Should testing parameters be set according to manufacturer';
directions or determined by researchers?
- Either can be done (e.g., ETV vs. Systematic Decon and TTEP), b
—,—rcher-determined parameters can lead to improvements
.ninimize test variables and maximize number of pr
- The objectives of the project have to be clear and specific
- Available data from previous related tests can help minimizeth
variables and allow testing of more decontaminants
preparedness planning for bio-terrorism?
UNRT Anthrax Technical Assistance Document
UCDC's "Comprehensive Procedures for Collecting
Environmental Samples for Culturing Bacillus
anthracis"
QNational Response Plan and the Biological Incident
" uag£_
uidance tends to be sector specific (i.e.,
jod/agricultural, buildings, transportation, «
systems, outdoors)
Q New guidance on the way:
Q "Biological Restoration Plan for Major
International Airports" (DHS/Lawrence Livermore
Labs)
Q "Cleanup Decision-Making Guidance for
Biological Incidents" (OSTP Sub-committee on
Decontamination Standards and Technologies)
"Wide-Area Biological Restoration" (DHS)
"Protocols for Restoration of Large-Scale Bi
Contaminated Urban Areas" (TSWG)
LJNational Decontamination Portfolio (EPA)
UQuick Reference Guides (EPA)
-------
Q How can the U.S. Government improve th
Nation's overall preparedness to responding to
a bio-terrorism event?
- The U.S. Department of Homeland Security is preparing
a report on this topic to submit to Congress (as required
by FY 2006 Department of Homeland Security
Appropriations Act).
The report will address seven
lop—improving decontamination technologies,
listering decontaminants, pre-positioning assets, etc.
j-Jow CJesijj J
j-
,...dance available on "How Clean is S
n June 2005, the National Academies of Science (MAS) issued
"Reopening Public Facilities after a Biological Attack—A Decision-
Making Framework" (http://books.nap.edu/cataloa/11324.htr
Some key conclusions:
• "Standard infectious doses for harmful biological
agents...cannot be determined with confidence...."
• "A contaminated facility cannot be guaranteed to be agent-
fter cleanup because it is impossible to prove the
V, 3UJVJJVJARY
EPA has developed a signmcanuy improvec
SAT and is working collaboratively to validate a
quantitative sporicidal test method (i.e., the TSM;
Registration of "Decontaminant" products (intended to
kill spore-forming bacteria) will require agent-specific
efficacy data and will have label limitations. Guidance
is being developed.
EPA is coordinating & leveraging its research on bio-
mtaminants across several
Guidance on planning for bioterronsm response is
available and new key documents are coming soon.
-------
Test Method Update
(OPP Sterilant Registration Protocol Development)
2006 ORD Decontamination Workshop
Stephen F. Tomasino, Ph.D. £
EPA Office of Pesticide Programs v,
Microbiology Laboratory
Fort Meade, Maryland
'f ,
Overarching Goals
a Advance the science of efficacy testing and
develop an alternative to the AOAC method with a
quantitative carrier-based procedure
a Perform collaborative, standardized testing to
develop and validate test methods acceptable
across federal agencies
a Design studies to generate comparative efficacy
data to aid in the development of regulatory
guidance
a Identify a suitable surrogate for B. anthracis
a Set the stage for the evaluation of other biological
agents
Tiered Approach
Tier 1: Evaluate and improve selected methods using Bacillus
subtilis
a Select a quantitative method for surrogate studies
a Improve the current method (AOAC method 966.04)
Tier 2: Evaluate surrogates of Bacillus anthracis
a Select at least one surrogate using a quantitative method
Tier 3: Conduct collaborative validation testing of selected
test method/surrogate combination
a Validate a quantitative method and at least one surrogate
Start-up Activities
2003 - lAGs established
2003 - QAPP developed
(category 2)
ID priorities -formulations and
surface type(s)
Provide training and conduct
readiness reviews
2004 - AOACI contract signed
2004 - Quantitative method
research launched
• 2004 - TSM advanced
and Timeline
2005 - Surrogate (Bacillus
anthracis) studies conducted
• 2005 - Collaborative to
improve the AOAC method
completed
2006 - Research initiated on
other select agents (Yersinia,
Francisella)
2006 - Validation of the TSM to
be launched
2006 - Research on additional
carrier materials and
formulations
<
Topics (highlights) for Discussion
Modifications to the AOAC Sporicidal Activity Test,
Method 966.04: Collaborative Study
Comparative Evaluation of Two Quantitative Test
Methods for Determining the Efficacy of Liquid
Sporicides and Sterilants on a Hard Surface
Comparative Study with Bacillus anthracis-hmes and
Two Potential Surrogates (Bacillus subtilis and Bacillus
anthracis - A Sterne)
Validation Protocol for the Quantitative Three Step
Method
Comparison of AOAC SAT and TSM - performance
standards
6. Future Projects
Modifications to the AOAC Sporicidal
Activity Test, Method 966.04:
Collaborative Study
-------
Performance Standard for a Sterilant
Claim (AOAC Method 966.04)
Test challenge = Bacillus
subtil is and Clostridium
sporogenes
Hard surface (Porcelain
Carriers); porous surface
(suture loops) - 60 carriers
each
Full study = 720 carriers
Passing result = zero
carriers positive
Requires 21 days of
incubation/heat shock
Lacks standardization in
several key steps
Proposed Modifications to the AOAC
Method
• Replace the soil extract
nutrient broth with a
chemically defined medium
for B. subtilis spore
production
Replace porcelain carriers
with stainless steel carriers
Add a carrier count
procedure for enumeration
of spore inoculum
Establishment of a mean
minimum spore liter per
carrier
Add a neutralization
confirmation procedure
Timeline of Events
• EPA contract with AOAC signed in Sept. 2004
AOAC Expert Review Panel (ERP) formed in Dec.
2004
ERP convened on Jan. 10-11, 2005
Study protocol was approved by AOAC Official
Methods program in May
Five-lab collaborative study launched in June
Data submitted in August
Data analysis completed in December
Recommendations (Alternative Method) presented
in manuscript to J. AOACI in March 2006
Comparing the Current Method and Proposed
Replacements in the Collaborative Study
Sporulation Medium
Current Method
Soil extract nutrient
broth (SENB)
Modified Method
Nutrient agar with
manganese
sulfate(NA)
Carrier Type
Current Method
Porcelain (PC)
SENB/PC
NA/PC
Modified Method
Stainless Steel
(SS)
SENB/SS
(Not Studied)
NA/SS
10
Parameters for Comparison
Carrier Counts
Resistanc
Efficacy
Wash-off & Quantitative Efficacy
(
Chemical Treatments
Chemicals
1.0% Hydrogen Peroxide &
0.08% Peroxyacetic acid
6.0% Sodium Hypochlorite
2.6% Glutaraldehyde
High
(passing)
30 min contact
pH adjusted
& 60 min contact
8 hr contact
Low
(failing)
5 min contact
pH unadjusted
& 10 min contact
1 hr contact
«
-------
Comparative efficacy
chemical treatments
Chemical
Treatment
Peracetic acid
and hydrogen
peroxide
Glutaraldehyde
Bleach
Medium /Carrier
Combination9
SENB/PC
NA/PC
NA/SS
SENB/PC
NA/PC
NA/SS
SENB/PC
NA/PC
NA/SS
results for high
Outcome and Number of Positive Carriers
Lab No. 1
Fail(1+)
Pass (0+)
Pass (0+)
Pass (0+)
Pass (0+)
Fail (2+)
Fail (3+)
Pass (0+)
La No. 2
s(0+)
s(0+)
s(0+)
s(0+)
s(0+)
s(0+)
F (2+)
P s (0+)
P s (0+)
L b No. 3
ass (0+)
ass (0+)
ass (0+)
ass (0+)
ass (0+)
ass (0+)
ass (0+)
Pass (0+)
Pass (0+)
Lab No. 4
Pass (0+)
Pass (0+)
Pass (0+)
Pass (0+)
Pass (0+)
Pass (0+)
Pass (0+)
Pass (0+)
Pass (0+)
13
Comparative efficacy
chemical treatments
Chemical
Treatment
Peracetic acid
and hydrogen
peroxide
Glutaraldehyde
Bleach
Medium/Carrier
Combination9
SENB/PC
NA/PC
NA/SS
SENB/PC
NA/PC
NA/SS
SENB/PC
NA/PC
NA/SS
results for
low
Outcome and Number of Positive Carriers
Lab No. 1
Fail (16+)
Fail (29+)
Fail (20+)
Fail (15+)
Fail (17+)
Fail (3+)
Fail (13+)
Fail (28+)
Fail (3+)
Lab No. 2
Fail (28+)
Fail (17+)
Fail (30+)
Fail (9+)
Fail (26+)
Fail (27+)
Fail (20+)
Fail (24+)
Fail (22+)
Lab No. 3
Fail (21+)
Fail (28+)
Fail (30+)
Fail (5+)
Fail (22+)
Fail(1+)
Fail (16+)
Fail (6+)
Fail (11+)
Lab No. 4
Fail (28+)
Fail (30+)
Fail (20+)
Fail (23+)
Fail (21+)
Fail (29+)
Fail (29+)
Fail (2+)
Fail (5+)
14
AOAC Official Method 966.04; Sporicidal
Activity of Disinfectants
"Alternative" Method (Manuscript submitted to J.
AOACI) First Action 2006
Equivalency tests support the modifications
Control counts/HCI resistance/efficacy were comparable
• Nutrient agar for spore production
Target carrier count: 105 to 106 spores per carrier
Neutralization confirmation procedure
• Numerous editorial changes
Stainless steel not recommended
Comparative Evaluation of Two
Quantitative Test Methods for
Determining the Efficacy of Liquid
Sporicides and Sterilants on a Hard
Surface:
A Pre-Collaborative Study
Carrier type and volume of sporicide tested for AOAC
Method 966.04 (see A), ASTM E 2111-00 (see B), and TSM (see C).
Circle in C indicates carrier. Volume is 10 ml per five carriers,
1 ml per carrier, and 400 uL per carrier for AOAC Method 966.04,
ASTM E 2111 -00, and TSM, respectively.
I
I
vlean log reduction (LR) Values and
vlethod Performance Statistics for ASTM
E 21 1 1-00 and Three Step Method
Test Chemical
Sodium hypochlorite (3000
ppm with adjusted pH)
Sodium hypochlorite (3000
ppm with unadjusted pH)
Hydrogen
peroxide/peroxyacetic acid
ASTIM E 21 11 -00
LR
7.1
3.6
6.7
SDr
0.36
0.66
0.45
SDR
0.39
1.12
0.52
Three Step Method
LR
7.5
1.2
7.3
SDr
0.27
0.26
0.25
SDR
0.48
0.26
0.75
P'
0.28
0.053
0.25
3t test; two-tailed p-value for comparison of mean LR values between test methods
SDr = repeatability standard deviation
SDR = reproducibility standard deviation
i.
-------
Additional Attributes Necessary
• Questionnaire Submitted to Analysts
a Protocols - use and clarity
a Test Set-up - preparing for the test
a Testing - performing the method, resources
a Results - recording, compiling, and
interpretation
TSM selected for surrogate studies and
validation testing
• Manuscript (pre-collaborative study) submitted to
J. AOACI
Comparative Study with Bacillus
anf/?rac/s-Ames and Two Potential
Surrogates (Bacillus subtilis and
Bacillus anthracis - A Sterne)
Background and Goals
The health and safety requirements for handling and
testing virulent B. anthracis are difficult to satisfy for
most laboratories, and without a surrogate, efficacy
testing of virulent B. anthracis will be limited to a few
laboratories.
One important criterion is the resistance of spores to
standard sporicides, i.e., the spores of an
acceptable surrogate should exhibit comparable or
higher resistance compared to the virulent strain of
interest.
Microbes
Microbe 1: Bacillus subtilis ATCC 19659
Microbe 2: Bacillus anthracis (Ames)
Microbe 3: Bacillus anthracis (A Sterne)
Chemical Treatments
• Test chemical 1: Sodium hypochlorite -
unadjusted pH (pH -10.0), 1:20 overall
dilution (-3000 ppm)
• Test chemical 2: Sodium hypochlorite -
adjusted pH (pH 7.0±0.5), 1:20 overall
dilution (-3000 ppm)
• Test chemical 3: hydrogen peroxide (1.0%)
and peroxyacetic acid (0.08%)
Control Carrier Counts
Microbe 1
Microbe 2
Microbe 3
-------
Treated C
values
7
5
c
o
'•B 4
£ 3
2 2
1
0
Microbe
Test Chemical
larriers: display of the 27 observed LR
8 g o °
0 o a a o o
° 0 0 0
Q O O
73
0
o
123 123 123
1 2 3
25
Mean LR (RSD)
Microbe
B. subtilis
B. anthracis -
Ames
B. anthracis - A
Sterne
Sodium
Hypochlorite
unadjusted pH
1.3(0.66)
4.5(0.97)
4.6(12)
Sodium
Hypochlorite
adjusted pH
4.9(0.77)
5.8 (0.92)
6.0 (0.28)
Hydrogen peroxide/
peroxyacetic acid
5.5 (0. 78)
5.1(7.0)
5.9 (0.53)
With only one exception (sodium hypochlorite unadjusted/6, subtilis compared to
6. anthracis - Ames; p=0.04), the pairwise comparisons of mean log reductions
showed statistical insignificance.
26
Conclusions
Based on this study, 8. subtilis appears to be a
conservative choice for a surrogate for 8.
anthracis - Ames.
The A Sterne strain of 8. anthracis also appears
to be a suitable candidate.
8. subtilis will be used as the test microbe for the
validation of the TSM.
The applicability of the study cpnclusions are
limited to liquid sporicides applied to a hard
surface.
Validation Protocol for the Quantitative
Three Step Method
Overview of the TSM Validation
AOACI under contract to facilitate
OPP Microbiology Lab is the lead lab
Draft protocol reviewed by AOACI in March 2006
8-10 lab validation study, volunteers available
One microbe - Bacillus subtilis
Three chemicals, each with three levels (treatments)
Carrier type is glass
Three replications per laboratory
AOAC Method 966.04 as the reference method
Launch in Spring/Summer 2006
• Potential outcome - a validated quantitative method for liquids on
a hard surface!
Proposed TSM Testing Scheme
Rep
Rep1
(Day1)
Rep 1
(Day 2)
Rep 1
(Day 3)
Treatment
Sodium Hypochlorite
1. High
2. Medium
3. Low
4. Water Contro
Hydrogen peroxide/peracetic acid
1. High
2. Medium
3. Low
4. Water Control
Glutaraldehyde
1. High
2. Medium
3. Low
4. Water Contro
Test Method Performed
TSM
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
TSM
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
TSM
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
AOAC 966.04
Yes
Yes
Yes
AOAC 966.04
Yes
Yes
Yes
AOAC 966.04
Yes
Yes
Yes
'"
-------
Determining the Efficacy of Sporicidal
Chemicals Using AOAC Method
966.04 and the Quantitative Three
Step Method
Background and Objectives
With the interest in adopting a quantitative test method to
replace or augment the AOAC SAT, questions have
been raised about the relationship between the outcome
of the AOAC SAT (frequency of positive carriers) and
Iog10 reduction (LR) values generated by a quantitative
method.
The main goal was to develop efficacy data, both
quantitative and qualitative, and compare the outcomes
for liquids tested on hard, non-porous surfaces only.
In this study, a set of commercially available test
chemicals were subjected to the AOAC SAT and the
quantitative Three Step Method (TSM) in a side-by-side
fashion.
Theoretical Response
(microbial kill)
o;
-•-LR
-m-% Positive Garners^ *-
N. X^
^^ M
^^\f
V^V
/ N.
Increase Dose or Contact Time
a?
-60 5
-40 S
Hill >
33
Experimental Highlights
Test methods: AOAC Sporicidal Activity Test (SAT) and
Three Step Method (TSM)
Test microbe: Bacillus subtilis (ATCC 19659)
The B. subtilis spore suspension was prepared using
nutrient agar amended with manganese sulfate. A stock
suspension of B. subtilis was used to inoculate both the
porcelain penicylinders used in the AOAC SAT and the 5
x 5 mm glass coupons used in the TSM.
Target carrier counts: AOAC SAT: 1.0 x 105 - 1.0 x 106
spores/carrier; TSM: 5.0 x 106 - 5.0 x 107 spores/carrier
Petrifilm™ was used for spore recovery and
enumeration.
Low Efficacy Treatment
3000 ppm bleach unadj. for 10 min
AOAC SAT
a 30/30 +
a 30/30 +
a 30/30 +
TSM (LR)
a 1.1
a 0.1
a 0.0
High Efficacy Treatment
6000 ppm bleach adj. for 60 min
AOAC SAT
a 0/30 +
a 0/30 +
a 0/30 +
TSM (LR)
a 6.8
a 6.8
a 7.1
-------
Results
When zero positives occurred in the AOAC SAT,
the TSM LR was very high (> 6)
When many positives occurred in the AOAC
SAT, the TSM LR was very low (0-1)
Study provided examples of medium to high LR
(5-7) when the AOAC SAT failed with few to
numerous positives
Acknowledgements
(Collaborators and Vendors)
Edgewood Chemical Biological Center
• U.S. FDA (Denver District and Winchester, MA)
Presque Isle Cultures
AOAC International
Volunteer Laboratories
Dr. Martin Hamilton
Future Projects
Bacillus - application of the current modifications on
testing against gases and porous material (silk and
dacron loops)
Clostridium - stainless steel and porous materials
Evaluation study of surrogates of Yersinia pestis
and Francisella tularensis
Investigation of various coupon materials for
quantitative efficacy evaluation of decontamination
chemicals
Comparative evaluation of quantitative test methods
for fumigants
-------
Presentation Summary
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency:
Partner in Protecting the Homeland
2006 Workshop on Decontamination, Cleanup
and Associated Issues for Sites Contaminated
with CBR
EPA's Office of Homeland Security
EPA's Homeland Security - Responsibilities
EPA's Homeland Security - Capabilities
EPA's Homeland Security - Activities
EPA's Homeland Security Programs
• Threat Response and Incident Management
• Biodefense
• Critical Infrastructure Protection
• Food and Agriculture Security
EPA Office of Homeland Security
Established on February 6, 2003
Director reports to the EPA Administrator
Leads and coordinates homeland security at EPA:
• High priority and cross-media activities
• Policy and budget development
Supports program offices and regions in taking on new homela
security responsibilities while carrying on traditional missions.
Serves as primary liaison to White House, DHS, other F
agencies, and external organizations on matters related iu
homeland security
EPA Office of Homeland Security
~ External Roles
Represent Administrator/Deputy Administrator on
numerous inter-agency, high-level committees,
workgroups, etc.
EPA Responsibilities
~ Homeland Security Presidential Directives
(HSPDs)
HSPD 5 - Management of Domestic Incidents
• National Incident Management System
• National Response Plan
Ensure appropriate program participation in White
House and DHS activities.
Point-of-contacton Homeland Security Presidentia
Directives (HSPDs).
Primary liaison to external partners
Keep Administrator/Deputy Administrator informed
and advised on external issues and progress.
HSPD 7 - Critical Infrastructure Protection
• "Sector-Specific Agency" for wat
• Vulnerability assessments
• Best security practices for utilities
HSPD 8- National Preparedness
• Nationally significant terrorist incidents
Assistance to first responders
• Law enforcement/forensic support to DOJ/FBI
-------
EPA Responsibilities
- - Homeland Security Presidential Directiv
(HSPDs)
HSPD-9 Defense of US Agriculture & Food
• National water quality surveillance & monitoring systems
• Laboratory networks to support Water Sentinel
••—-• .........t,_._, — forWMDagents (also for HSPD 10)
HSPD-10 Biodefense for the 21st Century
HSPD-12 Policy for a Common Identification Standard for Federal
Employees and Contractors
into our systems
EPA Homeland Security Capabilities
— leveraging core competencies
• EPA's mission: to protect human health and to safeguard
the environment
• EPA has longstanding capabilities in its core programs
that are directly related to homeland security
• Emergency response • Hazardous materials cleu,,up
• Water quality protection • Radiation monitoring
Ii Pesticides for crop, livestock, Research & development
and human health protection
• In the last five years, we have been called upon to respond to domestic
incidents and enhance our capabilities and role in several areas
EPA Homeland Security Capabilities
- - Enhancing Capabilities and Role
September 11, 2001
• World Trade Center - Technical Support/Sampling/Public
Relations/Disposal
• Pentagon - Air Monitoring/Health & Safety »
• Western Pennsylvania - Evidence Collection/Assessment
Anthrax Attacks
• Capitol Hill - Sampling/Assessment/Cleanup/Disposal/Clearance
• USPS Brentwood, DC & Hamilton, NJ - Oversight/Technical
Support
• Other Federal buildings - Oversight/Post-Cleanup Sampling I
/Technical Support/Clearance
Columbia Space Shuttle Disaster
Ricin at Capitol Hill -.Technical Support/Cleanup
/Disposal/Clearance
Hurricane Katrina
-------
EPA Homeland Security Programs
Threat Response and Incident Management
i Biodefense
Critical Infrastructure Protection
Food and Agriculture Security
Threat Response and Incident Management
EPA's Emergency Response Program
• Responds quickly and decisively to releases of hazardous substances
or discharges of oil
• Supports state/local efforts
• National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan
(NCP) serves as the cornerstone of national HAZMAT preparedness
and response system and is key element of National Response Plan
• 250 EPA On-Scene Coordinators (OSCs) delegated authority to manage
incidents
• EPA can also provide 24/7 scientific and engineering research
technical support
Threat Response and Incident Management
Support for Our On-Scene Coordinators
• 1 National and 13 Regional Response "Teams"
• Federal Special Teams under the NCP, including:
• EPA's Environmental Response Team (3 locations, p>-
2 Trace Atmospheric Gas Analy A
2 locations, scanning vehicles, mobile labs)
• Other Federal Special Teams, such as USCG Strike
Immediate Access to Emergency R<
Contractors
• contracts provide immediate access to field
technical expertise & services
wastes is a mandated subcontracting activity
Threat Response and Incident Management
EPA's Emergency Response Assets
Location of EPA Regional Offices
Environmental Response Team/
Radiological Emergency Respoi
National Counterterrorism Evidc
EPA Criminal Investigation Division Spe<
On-Scene Coordinator locatioi
Res
Threat Response and Incident Management
Environmental Labs Capacity and Capability
•'
• 37 fixed and 8 mobile laboratories nationwide
• Additional contract laboratory capability
• Labs support multiple missions
• Oriented toward routine analysis of industrial ch
radioactivity, pesticides, and conventional pollutar
• EPA is prepared to help with a national need to build
environmental laboratory capacity
• Laboratory diagnostic surge capacity
needed during crises -e.g., 9/11 and anthrax attacks
• HSPDs require national interconnected lab
networks for water surveillance, BioWatch, and
food security I ' I *
• Signed MOD establishing the Integrated Consortium of Lab
Networks (ICLN) (CDC, DHS, and others) including expert work
groups
• Developed compendium of lab capability
-------
Biodefense
BtOHJUARD
Highly-specialized unit
Equipped and trained to decon
buildings, structures
WMD focus
Center and Pesticides Lab
Agent detection
• Clean up methods and m
products
• Equipment
schnology/Research & Development
National Homeland Security Research
Center
Threat asse
biological attacks
Biodefense
Antimicrobial Analysis and Certification
• Authority to license use of antimicrobial chemicals to inactivate
human and animal pathogens on inanimate surfaces and in water
• Evaluating the safety and efficacy of decontamination chemicals and
developing supporting laboratory test methods
• Coordinating with CDC to recommend antimicrobials effective "
inartiuatinn nathogens 3S Outbreaks OCCUT
• wurwny LU Luniplete anthrax testing
Critical Infrastructure Protection
Working with DHS to develop Sector Specific Plan (SSP)
for water infrastructure in accordance with the National
restructure Protection
• 16,000 public wastewater treatment works
• About 3,000 serve major metropolitan areas
Provide technical assistance and training for VAs,
nergency response plans, and security enhance
Provide critical response tools
Develop best security practices
Developing a drinking water contaminant warning
system (Water Sentinel)
• Pilot monitoring and surveillance system to develop "proof of
concept"
• Collaborative effort with key federal and wat~ ~~'"""
partners
-------
Summary
EPA Office of Homeland Security is leading and coordinating
Homeland Security activities and programs
EPA has responsibilities applicable to a wide range of homeland
security threats
Current EPA capabilities and activities are being leveraged to
support critical Homeland Security priorities
-------
od p/an today /s better than a perfect
i tomorrow.
Michael E. Ottlinger, PhD, DABT
US Environmental Protection Agenc
iting
CONOPS Docum
if you can't put it into words, you
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Policy
Op3f=r
and Manageme
fie and Technic
ional Em"1™'™
vide technical expertise in support of
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Development of decon SOP's (TTP's)
Liaison with fed, state, local partners
Dor+i^ofjon jn key working groups
nent of technical information
contamination science
,-nntaminatinn methods (pros and cons)
validation (bench and field)
(logistics)
-------
dividual Tra!
ladine
First responder procedures and practices
National Incident Management System
i /-\g
-------
Anthrax S
uonsiaer a large area persisiem mTeciious
agent release
nvision an urban area with complex and
iried infrastructure
gin planning for tl
mediation phase
tke some modest guesses and use
gination
soms sltcjrir irn-
Detected by Biowatch 24-72 hours
post release
Agent released into the ^»toiriQ •='•••
settled on ground and s
:..•'.
Spread inside bull
Public transit syste
Mandatory evacuation orH
Area secured (avoidanc
CHARACTERIZATION REMEDIATION.' CLEARANCE
Getting Started
Initial sampling yields a crudely defined
two dimensional picture of the
contaminated area (a peri meter first)
Ground level sampling is ongoing
Three dimensional sampling plans ar
ing discussed but are impractical t
implement
-------
What do we d<
-by area
e monitor for spread';
contamination Planning
hat are the risks
inonties?
-it?
Avoidam
Area secured and access restricted
Containment
Adjacent buildings sealed off
craft and traffic exclusion zone
surface water and sewer containment
Drift blockina barriers imorovised
Possible Decontamination
Planning Elements
Multiple staging areas
1' ' me - cold zone equipment/-
.one routes and access
decontamination
rgeted exterior containmei
sensitive, high risk, or high vam
Wide area exterior decontaminatk
uilding interior decontamination
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Decontamii.
d Logistics
nee a decon method(s) is selec—
Who is the vendor and how do we
contract for the resources we need'
What is their capacity (equipment a
people)?
What are the consumable needs?
v do they set up and operate?
onlaiion from
'
with putative decontamination •
goals stated explicitly
- D—onse: Safety-removal of
; where the level of exposure is deemed
unacceptable
• Initial Recovery: Safe repopulation - levels
deemed safe for chronic exposure
• Transitional Recovery: Self-sufficien'
communities - long ter li~*i~
progressing
Long Term Recovery: I
Itimate levels of remediation have been
chieved
^2J/2JJJ
,it QA plan at outset ai
Track progress (metrics)
d recontamination
ame
Do we ever have an end to
environmental monitoring,
remediation, population
udies?
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DCMD Disposal Research
Paul Lemieux
US EPA
National Homeland Security Research Center
Decontamination and Consequence Management Division
Waste Composition
Porous building materials and furnishings (possibly wet)
Office equipment (computers, desks, file cabinets, etc)
Indirect residue from cleanup activities (e.g., rags, PPE,
decontamination agents)
Contaminated HVAC system residues (e.g., spent filter
cartridges, contaminated HEPA filters)
Aqueous residues
Residues from cleanup of contaminated water systems
Outdoor materials
Agricultural residues
Program Goals
Assure public that the selected disposal processes
and procedures will be safe
Give permitters guidance to accelerate disposal
permitting activities and to select appropriate facilities
and technologies
Give facilities guidance to assure permit compliance,
worker safety, protection of assets
Give responders guidance to incorporate disposal
plans, waste minimization, and balancing of
disposal/decon costs into entire decision making
process
Disposal R&D Program
Guidance document development
Thermal destruction of agents bound on matrices
- Bench-scale
- Pilot-scale
- Modeling
- Sampling/analytical methods for stacks and residues
Permanency of landfilling
- Survivability in leachate
- Transport to landfill gas
Destruction of Spores in Autoclaves
Agricultural Residue Disposal (with USDA)
Guidance Documents
The Disposal Decision Support Tool
Target Audience
• OSCs & other responders
• ERT
• National Decon Team
• Public agencies
• Public Health
• Environmental Protection
• Transportation
• Facilities
• Combustors/incinerators
• Landfills
• Building owners/managers
• Water infrastructure
-------
Current Features
Web-based tool with restricted access
Series of inputs defining scenario
Estimates of decon residue mass & volume
Database of combustion and landfill facilities
(location, capacity, technical information, permits)
Access to contaminant and decontaminant
information
Worker safety guidance
Packaging and storage guidance
Transportation guidance (links to DOE GIS tool)
Databases in the DST
Landfills
MSW
C&D
Hazardous Waste
Combustion Facilities
MSW (WTE)
Hazardous Waste
Medical Waste
Decontamination Wastewater Disposal Facilities
Publicly-Owned Treatment Works (POTWs)
Federally-Owned Treatment Works (FOTWs)
Liquid Hazardous Waste Combustion Facilities
Centralized Waste Treatment (CWT) Facilities
Back of the
Envelope
Estimator
Setup
Back of the
Envelope
Estimator
Sample
Results
Sample
BDR
Character-
ization
Sample
Facility Info =«=«
Query
-------
Access to the tool
http://www2.erqweb.com/bdrtool/loqin.asp
For first-time users, you will need to request a
user ID and password - the link above has
directions for making the on-line request.
You get manually added to user database (by
me) and your login ID and initial password
are emailed back to you.
MWI Spore
Survivability Tests
• Commercial hospital waste
by EPA
• Doped with large quantities of
spores
• Spore survival measured in
stack and ash
• > 6 Log reduction in most cases
• < 3 Log reduction in a few cases
• Primary chamber T and
secondary chamber RT were
most significant variables
Source Wood et al , 2004
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Approach
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5 -
4 -
3 -
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• Much slow
organisms
• Consistent
wallboard
duction of Geobacillus
Dthermophilus Spiked on
Wallboard
313 DC 2.0DC,
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10 20 30 40 50 60 70
Heating Time (min)
zr reductions than those for the ceiling tile bound
with the slow heating rates observed for
Pilot-Scale Thermal
Destruction Studies
Scale-up of bench-scale results
Calibrate incinerator models
Investigate thermal destruction issues
-Time/temperature requirements for
destruction
- Emissions of conventional pollutants from
combustion of building decontamination
waste
Experimental Apparatus
Secondary Combustion Chamber Afterburner
Ram
Feed
-------
PCDD/F Emissions
Geobacillus Stearothermophilus
in Carpet Bundle
KT"
Ceiling Tile Time vs Spore
Count
Ceiling Tile Time vs Max T
T\
Incinerator Modeling
Reaction Engineering International
- Based on Army Chem-demil SBIR work
• Combined CFD/kinetics
• Detailed reaction mechanisms for GB, VX, HD
• Analysis of failure modes and agent destruction
- Expanded to include BW agents
- Based on 3 thermal destruction systems
• EPA rotary kiln incinerator simulator
• Dual chamber med-path incinerator
• Commercial haz-waste burning rotary kiln
Destruction of Spores on Building
Decontamination Residue in a
Commercial Autoclave
-------
• Autoclaves
; - Sharps
- Syringes
- Gloves
'-' • Can they be
; contaminate
UBDR) that
Bl Strips (A and B)
"A" strips
analyzed for
viability
J If viable spores,
"B" strips
analyzed for
quantity of
surviving
spores
Flange Placement
BDR Delivered t%Facility
Densely Packed Wallboard
Second Autoclave Cycle (Cut Bags)
-------
Conclusions: General
Achieving 250 ° F for 15 minutes
resulted in no viable spores
Best results obtained from:
- Loose packing arrangement
- Dry BDR material
- Higher autoclave operating T/P
- Multiple autoclave cycles in sequence
- Bags cut open prior to loading
-------
A Sampling of Some of Canada's
Decontamination Work
Merv Fingas
Environment Canada
Overview
Three Proj ects on Decontamination
The Multi-agency Restoration Project
Radiation Decontamination
Chemical Decontamination
Biological Decontamination
Waste Management
Demonstration project
Standards Proj ect
The Restoration Project
Was a three-year, multi-agent project
Focused on research, but combined existing
knowledge into reports and manuals
Effort was to look at facilities, inside and
out and then deal with disposal as well
Project has just been completed and many
reports on its work are out
Agencies Involved
Environment Canada - chemical and ove
SAIC - EETO office - chemical
Washington office - biological
Ottawa office — radiological
Public Health Agency Canada - Winnipeg lab
Ottawa office of Laboratory safety
US EPA - ERT - Edison, NJ
DRDC - Ottawa - radiological
DRDC - Suffield - chemical
VLN Technologies — Ottawa — radiological
Allen-Vanguard — Stoney Creek — chemical
Hytec - Calgary - radiological
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Restoration
Are using term 'restoration' to include
decontamination to the end stage of disposal of
contaminated material
Restoration includes; decontamination,
neutralization, sequestration, removal, disposal,
etc.
Is broader than the traditional 'decon' word
Directed to sites such as buildings and exteriors
Study Results in Summary
Extensive lab work has been carried out in
several areas
A major literature review has been
completed and published
A basic manual has been completed
Three Lab reports are in publishing
Over 12 papers published
Objectives
Review possible and used methods for
decontamination
Combine all information on CBRN decon
and restoration
Test new potential methods on lab scale
Prepare manuals for technical responders
Factors in Decon - generally
Surface topography - characteristics
Temperature
Relative humidity
Organic load
Concentrations
Contact time
Oleophilic/hydrophilic agent/decon agent
-------
Generic Decon Agents
Generics
Sandia Labs - decontamination foam
DF-100, DF-200
ORES - foams (some now NATO)
CASCAD - general decontamination
RSDL - skin decontaminating
BLASTGARD -explosives and CBR
SDF - surface decon - full strength
Lawrence Livermore - L-Gel
US Army - Decon Green
German army agents
But... one decon will
not cover every
situation and all
the factors noted
Nuclear Decon
Current procedure is to blast off the surface
with high-pressure water and then catch
contaminated water
Nuclear material in water trapped with ion
exchange columns or other means
Typical Procedures
1. Remove from surface
2. Collect waste
3. Concentrate waste
5. Store waste forever at a facility
Radiological Alternatives
Rather than blast off with water solubolize
into water: acids, chelating agents
After capture of water remove with zeolites,
lignins or other material rather than ion
exchange
Some of these alternatives have been tested
-------
Studies of Membrane Rejection
One way to treat waste is to use membrane
filtration (reverse osmosis)
One concern was to look at the effect of
surfactants added to commercial
decontamination agents - do they affect
membranes?
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Chemical Restoration
Decon by many means has been explorec
the literature
Generic decon agents - often directed at
chemical warfare agents
Chemical Warfare Agents
Most are very reactive - this means that
those are relatively easy to neutralize
Extensive work in the military to decon
chemical warfare agents
Several tests of procedures, and many lab
studies in existence - so this study did not
focus on CWA's
Research
Major effort in this study at Environment
Canada to test new ideas
Peroxyacids found to be very effective and
much work done
Several tests to compare these to some other
new concepts and existing agents
21 standard surfaces created
-------
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Biological Restoration
Has drawn a lot of attention with Anthrax
incidents in USA
Has been studied for a long period of time
Some information from hospital
sterilization
Two sets of studies - PHAC - Wpg. Gas
sterilization - PHAC - Ott - liquid
sterilization
„
Vulnerability of Species
Lipid-coated viruses (eg. HIV)
Vegetative biota
Rickettsia
Fungi
Non-lipid viruses (eg. HEP A)
Myobacterium tuberculosis
Bacterial Spores (eg. Anthrax)
Prions (eg. BSE)
Traditional Decon
Gas sterilization
Formaldehyde - very frequently used -also
in hospitals
Chlorine dioxide
Ethylene oxide - in closed chambers
Solutions such as chlorine, hypochlorite
-------
Disposal
Legal issues
Neutralizing
Landfilling
Incineration
Alternative treatment technologies
The Demonstration Project
scale, well-known decontamination
methods
Separate facilities will be built to separately
test chemical, biological and radiological
decon
Purpose also to collect practical operational
parameters such as time, cost, etc.
Chemical Test
Will use Surface Decontamination
Formulation (SDF) foam to decontaminate
Diethyl Malonate (DEM) - a surrogate for
G agents - eg. Sarin
A separate facility to represent a small
office building will be built
All work carried out at Suffield, Alberta
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Biological Test
Will be carried out using vaporous
hydrogen peroxide (VHP) on Bacillus
Atrophaeus (a surrogate for anthrax)
A similar special-designed building as the
chemical decon
Tests will be carried out in July, August of
2006
Nuclear Decon
Will be carried out using a variety of
techniques on short-life radionuclides such
asNa
Techniques to be tried include: high
pressure wash with zeolites, chelation, and
regular washing techniques
Will use the exterior of the 'Little House on
the Prairies'
Development of Standards for
Biological and Chemical Cleanup
This study is a 5-year study with many
partners to develop standards for
decontamination end points
Hope to answer the question "how clean is
clean?" for several priority chemical and
biological contaminants
Goal is to develop procedures and specific
Agencies Involved
Environment Canada — chemical and overall
SAIC - EETO office - chemical
Public Health Agency Canada - Winnipeg lab
Ottawa office of Laboratory Safety
US EPA - ERT - Edison, NJ
RHITOP - Volgograd, Russia - toxicological testing
DRDC - Suffield - chemical
Lawrence Livermore - California - chemical
University of Leeds - United Kingdom - biological
CREM- Ottawa - biological
-------
Standards
Are not well-developed at the moment
But .... Are needed
There are standards for radiological cleanup
from international bodies
Chemical standards are more elusive -
biological standards still more elusive
Why Standards are Needed
To make decisions on whether to clean
or demolish
To know how to clean
To know when to stop cleaning
Assure public
Know when to re-occupy
Standards
Are always a compromise between
conservative views and practical
considerations
Lean toward a large safety factor
Require extensive information on exposure
and minimum toxicities to develop
Are very scarce for biologicals and some
chemicals
Study of An Example
An example was created to provide a study on the
effect of standards on costs and time to re-occupy
a building — along with the variables of building
size, dose of toxicant and cleanup effectiveness
Standards were set for a surface contamination
and were set at 0.01, 1 and 100 mg/M2
All values set to realistic values
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Example .. Buildings
A small building with 1000 m2 surface area
and one with 10,000 m2 surface were
chosen
These correspond to buildings of area of
about 170 and 1700 m2 or equivalent to a
house and a small building
All surfaces assumed equal and of the same
ease to clean
Example - Rebuilding Costs/time
• At a cost of 1000 m2 (surface) and cost of
demolition of $150 /m2 plus $50/m2 for
deconing waste materials
• Small building estimated to cost $1,300,000
and large building $13,000,000 (very
conservative and costly to make example
real) and take 540 and 700 days
Example — Decon costs/time
Two methods chosen — one with 85°/o
effectiveness and one with 95% effectiveness
Presumed that if they are performed successively
— will remove the same the next time they are used
- some situations require several successive cleans
High clean (95%) costs $500 /m2 and takes 1 day
for 50 m2 and low clean (85%) costs $100 /m2 and
takes 1 day to do 100 m2
A base cost of $ 100k and 10 days assigned - also
for between decons
Dose
Two doses chosen - low and high
High dose is 1 mg /m2 and low dose 0.1
mg/m2
These corresponded to about the level of the
highest value standard
These are presumed to be the maximum
dose on the surfaces
-------
Rules of Thumb
If the standard is lower than one or two
orders of magnitude less than the average
maximum contamination on the surface - it
is infeasible and uneconomical to decon
There is a major difference between decon
efficiencies of 85 and 95% - related to the
time and number of times to decon
Major Factors in Setting
Chemical Standards
Exposure from surface contact
Exposure from airborne contaminant
Re-aerosolized from surface
Minimum toxic dose (observable sub-lethal)
-------
Chemical Standard Development
Study
process
Measurement techniques
process estimation techniques
compare to cleanup measures
Summary of Chemical Standard
Development
• Meld data from exposures along with
minimum toxicity to yield standard
• Although may appear simple is difficult
and is very data intense
Major Factors in Setting
Biological Standards
Exposure from surface contact
Exposure from airborne contaminant
Re-aerosolized from surface
Minimum infectious dose (observable sub-
lethal)
Assigned Safety Factor
-------
Study g
process £
Exposure
Decreasing viability with time ^ £
Residual
amount
on surface
or in material
'3 o %
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3 .21
Surface variability J — S
iQre-aerosolizatioi
I
s 1
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i|ff
ill
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Effects
Maximum Residual Amount
to achieve minimum effective dose
Standard
Measurement techniques
process estimation techniques
compare to cleanup measures
Summary of Biological Standard
Development
• Meld data from exposures along with
minimum toxicity to yield standard
• Although may appear simple is difficult
and is very data intense - some data may
A Big Issue
Is it worthwhile to decontaminate as
opposed to abandon?
The trade-off should be borne in mind
throughout any decontamination study
-------
Standards Setting
Setting cleanup standards will be an
important exercise
Economics already show that if the standard
is an order or two in magnitude lower than
widespread - then cleanup is not indicated
Closing Remarks
These 3 projects are just examples of about 20
studies underway in Canada
Other projects involve about 4 projects to extend
the applicability of SDF, Cascad and Blastguard;
projects to look at the environmental effects of
some decontaminants; studies on CWA
decontamination; and several studies on
radiological decon
-------
The
Government Decontamination
Service (GDS)
The UK Perspective on Decontamination
Approaches
Robert Bettley-Smith, FRICS
Chief Executive
Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Defra)
UK Government
Decontamination
Service
The GDS (The Journey)
• The Strategy
• The Context
• The History
• The Findings
G
Government's CBRN Strategy
The aim of the Government's CBRN strategy is
to ensure we are:
"capable of responding quickly and effectively to deal with
and recover from the consequences of CBRN incidents,
particularly those caused by terrorism "
G
The Context
Uncertainty surrounding the global security.
Cross-government effort to ensure UK is
prepared for a range of emergencies.
Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear
(CBRN) resilience programme led by the Home
Office.
The Government Decontamination Service
Programme
G
The History
April 2003 - study commissioned to assess the UK's ability to deal
with CBRN clean up
December 2003 - powerful case for improving the UK's arrangements
for decontamination
25 march 2004 - government "actively considering setting up" a
decontamination service
25 January 2005 - government announces "intention to establish" a
decontamination service
21 July 2005 - government announces the launch of the new service
on 1 October 2005
G
-------
The Findings
Options considered included a virtual approach and ranged
from no function of the CDS within Government
... to the whole function of the CDS within
Government
Strong logic in a "core approach" with a Command and Control
team within Government Service
... with recognised, defined and agreed upgrade path
This approach has been used successfully for over 19 years in
the UK by the MCA (Maritime and Coastguard Agency^
G
GDS (The Destination)
• The Concept
• The Organisation
• The Contractors Framework
• Reacting in an Emergency
• Future Developments
The GDS Concept is to:
S Provide advice and guidance to Responsible Authorities
when planning for emergencies, and help test their
arrangements
/ Identify and assess specialist contractors' ability to
decontaminate, and ensure Responsible Authorities have
access to them when needed
/ Advise central government on national decontamination
capability and on the decontamination options available
following a CBRN (or Hazmat) event
G
Some Exclusions
GDS Will Not...
• Assume responsibility for decontamination
• Fund decontamination yv f
• Deal with humans, animals or their remains
• Define how clean is safe
• Confirm decontamination standards achieved
G
The Current Concept is 3 Liaison Teams
Supported bv...
s
c
1
E
N
C
E
LIAISON TEAMS
c s
O T
R R
P A
O T
R E
A G
T Y
E
R
E
S
O
u
R
C
E
S
G*.
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Procurement Aims
CDS will establish a framework of specialist suppliers to
decontaminate buildings and the open environment, and
Make sure that responsible authorities can call on their
services (at indicative cost) when necessary.
Identify and assess suppliers ability to decontaminate
buildings, infrastructure, mobile transport assets and the
open environment: and ensure responsible authorities
have ready access to them if needed
G
Who Can Use the Framework of
Specialist Suppliers?
Any Government Department or Public Sector
Organisation
"Responsible Authority" (Local Authorities)
Private Sector organisations with responsibility for
safety of buildings or infrastructure.
G
The GDS Will ...
•/Advise, provide guidance & facilitate a response
•S Benchmark and test framework capability
•S Exercise the framework suppliers
•/Advise on contractual terms and conditions
•/Advise on logistical requirements when required.
•/ Conduct the procurement process for the renewal
of the framework contracts
G
The GDS Will Not..
X Accredit specialist supplier capability
X Guarantee or indemnify specialist supplier
capability.
GDS Services - reacting in an
emergency
Depending on the seriousness of the event and
need, GDS may provide:
• advice and guidance
• advice, guidance and help securing contracts
• advice, guidance, help securing contracts and
managing them
This is done on the basis of Tiers
G
TierO
Planning Advice and Guidance
Advice and Guidance on Decontamination
Preparedness (including Pre-event and
Contingency planning)
Strategic National Guidance
Radiation Remediation Handbook
(Chemical & Biological Remediation Handbook.^
- currently being drafted
G
-------
Tierl
Provision of Information
Advice and Guidance to the Public and Private
Sector
Advice and Guidance may be general or site/
specific
V
Tier 2
Provision of Advice and Facilitation
at Incident (local response)
Assessment of the decontamination required
Liaison with the specialist contractors
Liaison with the relevant authorities including
emergency planners
Advice on decontamination aspects of media strategy
DS Services in Tier 2 mainly advice based)
TierS
Provision of Advice and Facilitation
at an Incident (Regional Response).
• Assessment of the incident
• Liaison with the specialist contractor(s)
• Liaison with the relevant authorities including
emergency planners
• Advice on decontamination aspects of media strategy
(GDS Services in Tier 3 could involve facilitation and
^co-ordination)
G
Tier 4
Provision of Advice and facilitation at
an Incident (National Response)
At this level the GDS will provide elevated amount
of resource in line with the scale of the incident.
• Provision of advice to those who need it.
• Procurement of appropriate goods and services
• Provision of advice, scientific and logistical
advice. (GDS services in Tier 4 could involve
Project Management.
G
Tier 4 - Advice & Facilitation - National
_^ Response
Tier 3 - Advice & Facilitation - Regional
Response
Tier 2 - Advice & Facilitation - Local
Response
i, Advice & Gi
(Public & Private)
Tier 0 - Advice & Guidance (Pre event
and Contingency Planning)
G
Future Developments
Review gaps in the framework to
ensure we have a robust capacity
Review the need for potential new
services which could include
• M&E Services
• Structural Engineers
• Logistics Management
• Independent Sampling.
G
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Future Developments (Contractors)
• Further collaboration with international partners
• A second procurement round
• Scientific assessment of current technologies
• Further validation of contractors capabilities
SUPPLIER FRAMEWORK
If in the event of a need for CDS specialist suppliers, or advice &
guidance following a CBRN or major HAZMAT incident contact:
GDS Duty officer on : 07990 780 032
General Enquiries: 01270 754255
Government Decontamination Service
Building 14
RAF Stafford
Beaconside
Stafford
ST180AQ
G
Future Developments (Science)
• Evaluation of new decontamination methods
• Investigation of optional approaches
• Increased understanding of interactions
• Consideration of new technologies
Government Decontamination Service
Building 14
RAF Stafford
Beaconside
Stafford
ST180AQ
G
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bL-/Vs Klatlonai Kcmeiand Security
Research Center
bbRK! Su.[2[20Lt £.
Standard Analytical
Rob Rothman
April 26*' 2006
National Exposure
Measurement Center
NEMC Headquartered in Las Vegas
• Chemical - Las Vegas
EPA's Reference Laboratory
Charged with :
• Methods Development
• Method validation
• Surge Capacity
• Quality Assurance
• Training
• PT Samples
Design & Develop Modular Triage/All Hazard
Receipt Unit for Unknowns
Combined Effort of EPA, DHS, DOD and other
Agencies, to develop and test prototype
designs
EPA development & testing of protocols and
procedures
DOD design and assembly of Units
Draft Protocols out
Two field prototypes
be delivered 06
Albany, NY
Region 1
Portable High-Throughput Integrated
Laboratory Identification System (PHILIS)
• Designed to identify and quantify TICs and
CWAs
• Designed to analyze and report on at least
1,000 (vapor, liquid, solid, mixed state)
samples per 24 hour period
• Field Testing of 3 Prototype Designs
completed July 2005
• Final report showed all failed design specs
• Rapidly field-deployable lab analysis system
• Redesign of system with EPAj
needs unde
Compilation of Chemicals,
Biologicals and Radionuclides
Specific method for analyte and
media
Selection based on
detection level,
equipment availability
and scope of method
SAM Version II released
September 29, 2005
Draft method gap analysis available
Standard Analytical Protocols (SAPs)
• 5 drafted to date
• 6 more will be written by September 2006
SAP Method validation
• Semi-Volatile Organics Method validated
during 2006
• Degradation product validation using
Method 8270 ongoing
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tttitf'j
!i3'f$l,'J?^2;tr
j Dilute concentration
1 • 1 Maximum amount of
agent in the solution for
each primary container, not
to exceed the
concentration indicated.
Ultradilute concentrations
4 • Working with DoD to allow
EPA to handle ultradilute
concentrations of CWA
• Proposed ultradilute level
is 1 ml of 10ppm, 10-1
ml vials
1 • Quantities for calibration of
instruments.
Dilute Solutions (AR 50-6)
Agent
Tabun (GA),
Sarin (GB),
Soman(GD),
Cyclosoman (GF)
VX
Mustards
(H, HD, HQ, HT,
Q,T)
Lewisite (L, HL)
Maximum
Total
Quantity1
20 mg
10 mg
100 mg
50 mg
Maximum
Concentra
tion
2.0 mg/mL
(2000
ppm)
1.0 mg/mL
(1000
ppm)
10.0
mg/mL
(10,000
ppm)
5.0 mg/mL
(5000
ppm)
DHS CWA Lab Prototypes
DHS to sponsor two laboratories to
analyze environmental samples
containing ultradilute concentrations of
CWA in 2006
• Possibly, two more laboratories to be
established 2007
Requirements for handling dilute CWA
extracted from AR 50-6
• Details security, equipment, infrastructure,
accountability, etc.
Emergency advisory team to offer
scientific guidance to senior
management
Three teams located at
Washington, DC,
Research Triangle Park,
NC, and Cincinnati, OH
Homeland Security Experts
COOP Tools DVD
CB Helpline
ECBC Reachback
Support AHRF installation and
testing
Completion of additional SAPs
Validation of first chemical SAP
Complete laboratory screening
project
Support PHILIS activities
-------
Bacillus anthracis spore detection
using laser induced breakdown
spectroscopy (LIBS)
Office of Research and Development
Research Triangle Park, N.C. USA
:hase A. Munson, Frank C. De Lucia, Jr., Jenni
L. Gottfried, and Andrzej W. Miziolek
Army Research Laboratory
ATTN: AMSRD-ARL-WM-BD
Aberdeen Proving Ground M.
MD 21005-5069
Decontamination Workshop
Outline
Laser Induced Breakdown Spectroscopy (LIBS)
for the detection of biological agent surrogates
• Principles of operation
• Man-portable system for the classification of white
powders/mysterious substances (ARL)
• Pure powders on building materials
• Mixture studies
Single Photon Time of Flight Mass Spectrometry
• Principles of operation
• Applications (initial and current)
Laser Induced Breakdown
Spectroscopy (LIBS):
Principle of Operation
How does LIBS
— the environ
Molecule / Ion Cells jamol/g
ATP 3.6
ADP 1
NADH 1.95
DPA <0.1
Ca2+
Mg2+
Mn2+
H+ 7.5-8.2
AMP 1
detect Bacillus spores
ment within a spore
ng element/g spores Spores nmol/g
<0.005
0.2
.002
410-470
380-916
86-120
27-56
6.3-6.5
1.2-1.3
Table adapted from: Setlow, P. "Mechanisms which contribute to the long term survival of spores of Bacillus
Species" Journal of Applied Bacteriology Symposium Supplement 1994, 76 49S-60S.
LIBS spectra of Bacillus subtilis (chosen
surrogate for B. anthracis)
Mg (II)
279.551 nm
Na(I)
589.077 nm
X589.647nm
Ca(I) 766.697 nm
422.711 nm H® 769.856 nm
656.285 nm
Why UBS??
Advantages of LIBS:
• Little to no sample preparation
• Real-time in situ measurement
• Reagent free - low amount of
maintenance
• Relatively cost effective
instrumentation
• Simple to operate
:d breakdown spectroscopy
-------
Average Spectra from the Ambient Air- Spore
Mixtures - Principal Component Analysis
Spectra of diesel
exhaust, the
blank, and a low
concentration of
outdoor air
particulate
matter
Spectra of ovalbumin
0.12 0.14 0.16 0.18 0.20 0.22
PC-1 (78.4% of total variance)
Man Portable (MP)-LIBS (version 1)
MP-LIBSOut of the
Important specs for the MP-LIBS
• Actively Q-switched - diffusion cooled laser
• No need for an external water or gas supply for cooling the laser
• Needs 16 Volts to power laser (supply in backpack) and
spectrometer is powered through USB
• Battery operated
• Sony VAIO notebook
• Commercially available - inexpensive
• Weighs less than 10 kg (-20 pounds)
• Light enough for first responders to easily carry-designed to wrap
around waist of hazmat suit
• Can operate at temperatures 0 ± 50 °C
• MP system can be used in Arizona during the summer and
Minnesota during the winter
• Hermetically sealed (IN PROGRESS)
• MP system can be easily decontaminated after use
Spectra of Biological Agent Surrogates
and Confounding White Powders
Average Correlation Coefficient of
White Powders to library spectra of
B. atrophaeus
« 090 — T^T
° 060 •
to 1
£
0 OTl
hbused
X
I
t
T
rf.
^TT
;
— 1
T
-L
T
st Cvalbumin Powdered Pour Sea Salt Talcum
Sugar Row der atro
Powder Identity
~d
1
B
Dhaeus
-------
Correlation of B. atrophaeus spores
on building materials to library
spectra of spores
Carpet Cerrent Cesklop Re Cabinet Ropp/Dsk Mxisepad Njtebook FBper
Buldirrj Materii
Correlation of B. atropheaus spores
on wipe materials
0.80
0.70
0.60
• —
t
—
T
m
i
—
m
I
—
rli
—
i
—
—
*
—
rh
i
-
Dry Gauze Lens Cotton
Eraser Pad Paper Towel
Tack Tecnili Fl°or
cloth cloth ™Pes
Super
absorbent
wipes
Spectra pre-processing
22,986 Intensity Channels/MP-LIBS spectrum
182 elemental and molecular intensities from BS
and office surfaces
17 integrated intensities from summed
elemental and molecular lines
(Al, Ba, C, C2, Ca, CN, H, K, Li, Mg, Mn, N, Na, O, Si, Sr, Ti)
136 elemental/molecular intensity ratios
ofBioagent Simulants and
Interferents
BS on
Floppy
Floppy
Disc
-20 -10 0 10 20 30 4CO 10
PC1
-is -10 -5 o 5 Painted 15 20
PC 1 cement
PLSDA ofBioagent Simulants and
Interferents
BSon
Floppy '
Floppy
Sample Index
PLSDA results on Office Surfaces
120
-------
Conclusions from study of pure
white powders on building materials
• LIBS is effective in classifying powders on many
of the building surfaces
• The techni cloth is the most suitable wipe for LIBS
analysis
• PLSDA works well for classifying sample spectra
Future work
Development of
an impactor that
could interface to
the MP- LIBS
system, use
when analyzing
powders on the
more difficult
building surfaces
* All units are in inches
O
Q_ 0
PC A of BS and Dust (pure
compounds)
V ^
-10 0
Scores PC1
103cfu BS
104cfuBS
105cfu BS
107cfu BS
Bulk BS
AD
PLSDA of BS/Dust Mixtures
0.8
0.4
| 0.0
T3
£ -0.4
-0.8
-1.2
71»
AD /
Sample
71%
50%
20%
10%
5%
Correct
100
67
20
-50 0 50 100 150
Sample Index
20;6U"/0 250 300
Conclusions and Future
Work - Mixture Studies
Spectral discrimination in mixtures is possible
As expected, the potential for false negatives
increases as the concentration of the spores (mixed
with the interferent) decreases
More mixture studies are needed and in progress
Single Photon Time of Flight Mass
Spectrometry -Principles of Operation
®
First Excited Statt
DMMP Mass Spectrum
Single Photon lonization using 118nm
Gas phase ions created by SPI. Ions detected by
Time-of-Flight Mass Spec
-------
Goal of Project
Initial focus - to monitor ambient air for
chemical warfare agents and toxic industrial
chemicals
New focus - to determine fumigant by-
products and to quantitate them (for
modeling the kinetics of their formation)
Technical Progress
Single Photon lonization
(SPI) instrument
^ Instrument built onsite
"/ Small gas tripling cell
evaluated
"/ Waiting for new gas
tripling cell
Future Work:
U Will evaluate permeation
tubes as a way to calibrate
the system
G Plan to sample from
fumigation chamber onsite
and look for by-products
bom during the fumigation
and aeration process
-------
• 2001, NYC Anthrax Response and Remediation Oversight
• 2001, Capitol Hill Anthrax Response and Remediation
• 2002, USPS Mail Facility at Brentwood Anthrax Response and Remediation
• 2003, USPS Mail Facility at Hamilton, NJ - Anthrax Response and Remediation
• 2003, DTRA-Chem Bio Containment & Destruction SOP Development
• 2003, DTRA - Iraq WMD Identification, Safety and Destruction as Necessary
• 2003-Present, DTRA - Russian Biological Weapons Proliferation Prevention
• 2004-Present, DTRA - Ukraine WMD Interdiction and Elimination
• 2004, AMI Building / Boca Raton, FL - Anthrax Remediation
• 2004, Port Newark - Suspect Container Decontamination
• 2004, Utica - Mold Decontamination and Building Encapsulation Demonstration
• 2005, AMI-Emergency Response Containment and Decontamination
• 2005, Hudson Falls - Mold Decontamination and Building Encapsulation Demonstratio
• 2005-Present - Katrina / Rita Incident - Mold Decontamination
• 2006, Brooklyn NY, Anthrax Incident
The Big Debates
Skip: What do we do? Assume decontamination
necessary. Chlorine dioxide gas phase treatment of
structures and contents, and for the destruction of bulk
agents.
•SAMPLING
•MONEY-AUTHORITY
•INSURANCE
•CONTENTS
•CLEARANCE
•THE'F'WORD
f ^ Biological Incident Decontamination
Event Post Event Hindsight
AMI
Lemon Drop (Port Newark)
Utica and Hud son Falls
AMI COI
Kat,ma/R,ta
Brooklyn, NY Anthrax
•-'•' v!j";..",^..-^^.::.:
ThVd plT'^Drte^smf roblem
EHEr"-
|^,l,»,,.~, -i«GA ,.!.»,„ ««nl,,l I.
H,"l,,C.,t»t,E,,l,
cuuB.TaiK.uoa.ugMa
"•'""-'--•--''™-"».
»:r,:rz-
:';;:°"™sr:r
MCAD Critical Asset
Eliminate source reduction practice
Need Policy o, Law
Afumeadaycanbedone
Restoration Accelerators
• Equipment Availability
• Prepared Event Response Software
• Enabling Agreements
• Site Agreements - Contents
• Pre-Engineered Insurance Product
• First Response Community Communication
• Draft RAP, SAP, ERP, and HASP
• Established Clearance Criteria and Draft CAP
-------
Regulatory / Procedural Assets
- Template HASP, RAP, ERP, CAP,
- Template Crises Exemption with Data Pack
- Pre-Authorized Wrap Around Insurance
- Contract Vehicle or Enabling Agreements
Personnel Assets
- Event Coordinator
- Science Team
- Regulatory Team
- Operations Team
- Technical Team
- Security Team
- Public Relations
ChemGen™ response system
• Decon Solution
• Gas Generation
Mobile Critical Asset Decontamination
Mobile Personnel Decontamination
Mobile Containment Systems
Mobile BSL 3 Labs
Mobile Chem & Process Labs
Mobile Process Control & Command Center
Mobile Logistics Support Unit
Wide Area Decon System
BioDestruct On site contents destruction
Rest and Recuperation Vehicles
Mobile Self Contained Camp
Chemical Stockpile
SabreShield facility protection systems
SabreClear™ sample tracking system and
4.
Activate enabling agreements - regulatory / commercial
Activate pre-developed plans (HASP, RAP, SAP etc.)
Activate pre-installed Clearance Plan and Software (critical asset)
Seal or Tent building as required - install carbon based NAU's
5. Set up ChemGen™ & chem plant - (critical asset)
6. Install (park) emitters (critical asset)
7. Install air transfer fans for high energy areas such as power rooms
8. Install monitoring lines and temperature /relative humidity meters,
connect to process control center (critical asset)
9. Perform low level chlorine dioxide test
10. InstallBI's (critical asset)
11. Perform fumigation
12. Perform clearance tests
Post Katrina 700,000 Sq ft P&DC Cost Project!
Start From Scratch
Project Duration
Response Through Clearance Cost
With BioRed Preparation
Project Duration
Response Through Clearance Cost
Post Katrina:
Decontamination - 1 to 5 days
- 440 days
-180-200 million
-180 to 270 days
- $35 to 45 Million
- 30 to 60 days
- $10 to 15 Million
-------
-------
-------
-------
-------
-------
-------
Before and After CIO, Fi
-------
Before and After CIO, Fi
Before and After CIO- Fu
-------
Restoring New Orleans - Job Corp Center- Trenton in 3 days
-------
Decontamination
Technology Testing and
Contamination
Workshop
Joseph Wood
NHSRC
April 26-28, 2006
Technology Testing and Evaluation
Program: Decontamination
• Chlorine Dioxide Fumigant Technology
• Liquid Spray/Foam Decontamination
Technologies
Portable Chlorine Dioxide Generation
System, aka Mobile Decontamination
Trailer
Primary objective is to evaluate building decontamination
technologies that are commercially available (or near so)
Historical focus has been on fumigants to decon B.
Anthrac/s on indoor types of materials
Started under US EPA's Environmental Technology
Verification Program
"Evaluation" impjies one set of experimental conditions to
demonstrate/verify efficacy
More promising techs, would move on to more involved
systematic investigation
Typically done in collaboration with vendor, but not
necessarily a prerequisite (as with ETV)
Acknowledgements
• Battelle is contractor for work described herein: Mike Taylor,
James Rogers, et al.
• EPA collaborators: John Chang, Eric Koglin, Shawn Ryan,
Blair Martin
Stakeholders
• Steve Tomasino, EPAOPP
• Jeff Kempter, EPAOPP
• David Stark, ECBC contractor
• Phil Koga, ECBC
• Paula Krauter, LLNL
• Lloyd Larsen, Dugway
• Rebecca Blackmon, TSWG
• Harry Mahar, Dept. of State
• Gregory Knudson, CIA
• Lab-scale testing
(317 L chamber)
• Liquid inoculation
-~1.0x 108 CPU spores
in 100 uL water
- applied in 16 droplets
on coupon
• Calculation of
Efficacy
- Log Reduct. = log N/N'
N= control (3)
N' = treated
T: 22 - 35 deg C
RH: 75%-90%
Contact time: 3 hr
3,000 ppmv C1O2
Sabre Technical Services
Industrial carpet
Bare pine wood
Glass
Decorative laminate
Galvanized metal
Painted wallboard paper
Painted concrete
Spores: B. Anthracis, B. subtilis, G.
Stearothermophilus
CIO2 measurement:
• Sample from decontamination chamber
removed at 1 L/min for 2 min and drawn
through impingers containing 15 mL of 5%
Kl in phosphate buffer (pH 7.0)
• Sample acidified with 6N HCI and titrated
using 0.1 N sodium thiosulfate
• Titration every 20 minutes
-------
CIO2 Fumigant Technology
Evaluation - Results
a
1
Test Material
Liquid Spray Decontamination
Technology Evaluation
• Screen"! 0 technologies (plus amended bleach) first, then
sprays/foams with highest efficacy will be subjected to more
in-depth testing
• Same microbiplogical procedures for both for in-depth and
screening testing; 4 coupons as controls, 4 subject to decon
agent
• Screening will involve only B. Anthracis Ames strain on
glass coupons
• In-depth testing to be conducted on 4 technologies
• Three organisms will be tested
- Bacillus anthracis Ames
- Bacillus subtilis, Geobacillus stearothermophilus
• 3 materials will be tested (carpet, wood, metal)
Liquid Spray Decontamination
Technology Evaluation
Digital Ti
ner
Digital timer not activated; sprayer "off";
pneumatic valve closed
Liquid Spray Typical
Neutralization Results
Typical Spray/Weigh
Results
Liquid uecon i ecnnoiogies
EasyDecon 200 (foam)
Peri dox Clean Earth
Tech
DeconGreen (foam)
ffl-Clean605
CASCAD GCE 2000
(foam)
Selectrocide
Exterm-6
Frontier Dioxiguard
Hear Water Xinix
Biosafe Antimicrobial
Polymer, HM4100
7 9% H^D2,j™tsiary ammonium compounds 5 5-6 5% ,
H2O2 23-25%, peroxyacetic acid 1-1 4%, acetic acid 1-1 4%
P"~CTH*"oSo~'.S,""oo'"*""
S.i_ »««.,,«lm,l,, „«»«. , ,,™1,«
Sz'E^HSH^r,,.
s.4_«...,,,5-«%,,«™,55-85r,_,^,4,0.
*"^o?4?r™2,*~o'""'' ""*"* '"""'
C1O2 sodium chlorite & chlorous acid. Phosphoric and.
Concenttateda^ousCm
H202,quat
HaOjj.ero^acrtic
H202
HC1O
HC1O
(Hypochlor
ous acid )
C1O2
C1O2
C1O2, HC1O2
C1O2
Quat.
-------
)bjective
Demonstrate the performance of a
mobile chlorine dioxide
decontamination technology in a
building-size application
Work being conducted through an IAG
with Naval Surface Warfare Center
NSWC has contract with SAIC and
Battelle for engineering and
construction
DoD/JPEO, DHS, DARPA participating
Timeline
October 2004: Initial test on a building
January 2005 - May 2005: MDT redesign &
overhaul
• Redesign scrubber, add demister; new
equip.
• Emergency elec. shutdown, chlorine shut-
offs
May 2005 - "Cold" flow test
• Pressurized leak check, 24-hr scrubber
run
Next Steps
Hottest
• Test CIO2 generation and scrubbing systems with chlorine
(previous tests used only nitrogen) - CIO2 ducted directly to
scrubber
• Leak check, interlock system, generation rate/capacity,
scrubbing effectiveness (CIO2 removal), capacity, negative
pressure, fan flow rate, steam generation, emergency shut-off
Building test
• Measure and maintain CIO2 concentration within the
building
• Also measure performance using dispersed B.g. spores
and biological indicators within the building
• Possibly conduct spore re-suspension studies and
determine fumigation effectiveness via environmental
sampling
Design Goals
• Generate about 75 Ib/hr CIO2 on site
reacting chlorine gas with sodium chlorite
• Sustain a level of about 1000 ppm CIO2 in
a 350,000 cubic ft building for about 12
hours under slightly negative pressure
• Negative pressure maintained with an
exhaust fan vented to a scrubber which
removes CIO2 < 0.1 ppm @ ~ 3600 ACFM
• Utilizes sodium hydroxide and sodium
thiosulfate as scrubbing reagents
• Transportable
-------
VHP Fumigation
Technology Update
lain McVey
STERIS Corporation
April 27, 2006
STERIS
Corporate Overview
STERIS Corporation
Develops, manufactures and markets
infection prevention, contamination control,
decontamination, microbial reduction and
surgical and critical care support products.
Serves healthcare, pharmaceutical,
scientific, research, industrial, defense,
aerospace, and government customers
throughout the world.
STERIS
Corporate Overview
MARKET FOCUS
- Healthcare Products and Services
• Sterile Processing
• Applied Infection Control
• Surgical Support
- Life Science Products and Services
• Pharmaceutical Production
• Research - Containment Level 3 and 4 Labs
• Defense & Aerospace Chem-Bio Decontamination
• Decontamination Services
- Contract Sterilization Services
• Medical Devices
• Food Products
• Material Modification STERIS
Corporate Overview
Capabilities
I Prophet;
Technology and Intellectual Property
Development
Microbiological and Chemical Sciences
Formulation Chemistry
Mechanical, Electrical, and Process Engineering
Product Development
Global Manufacturing
Regulatory Compliance and Testing
Customer Training and Education
Field Services
A Technology Leader
Broad based technologies delivered through capital equipment,
chemistries and services...
Defense & Industrial
Scale-up and adapt an established biological
sterilization/decontamination technology - VHP --for new
applications.
Recognize the national need for decontamination capability as a
result of the anthrax attacks of October 2001.
Commit to exploring national and homeland defense needs, as
well as the need for a pathogen-free environment with DoD and
other federal agencies.
Established public-private partnership with the U.S. Army's
Edgewood Chemical Biological Center (ECBC)
Proprietary
STtHIS
-------
Decontammant Requirements
Effective decontaminant:
- Rapid acting
-Chemical and biological efficacy
- Materials compatibility
-No post fumigation residuals
VHP
H20
Vaprox® Sporicidal at low concentrations Nontoxic
35% H O (>1-)-'' mg/L at ambient temperatures) degradation
sterilant solution Odorless, colorless products
STLKIS
The VHP Decontamination Process
3. Decontamination
• Timed phase at target ci
the min. exposure time
4. Aeration
• Hydrogei
ixide injection stopped
LDehumidification
• Reduce condensation formation of the
hydrogen peroxide
• Recommended for high humidity i
cold temperature application
2. Conditioning
Initiation of hydrogei
• High injection rate to rapidly reach target
concentration
e site is exposed to decontaminant for at least
• Dried air purge of hydrogen peroxide from the site
Proprietary
STERIS
VHP Antimicrobial Efficacy
| Proprietar
100 200 300 400 500
[VHP]/ppm (v/v)
STERIS
mVHP™ - Chemical and Biological
Decontamination
Vaprox®
35% H2O2
sterilant solution
Inactivates
biological and chemical warfare agents
at low concentrations
(>0.1 mg/L at ambient temperature)
Odorless, colorless
Nontoxic
degradation
products
STERIS
The mVHP™ Decontamination Process
LDehumidification
• Reduce condensation formation of the
hydrogen peroxide
id/oi
Recommended for high humidity i
cold temperature application
2. Conditionin
Initiation of
peroxide vapor
High injection rate to rapidly
concentration
inia and hydrogen
:h target
3. Decontamination
• Timed phase at target concentration to ensure site is exposed to decontaminant for at least the
I min. exposure time
4. Aeration
• Ammonia and hydrogen peroxide injection stopped
• Dried air purge of ai
Proprietary
monia and hydrogen peroxide from the si
SILK IS
12
-------
ECBC data - Data vs. droplets and films of
chemical agents
VX / mVHP Reaction Kinetics, effect of droplet size
Data from G. W. Wagner et al., Modified Vaporized Hydrogen Peroxide (mVHP)
Decontamination of VX.GD and HD. Presentation-Decon 2005. -> ' LKI 5
mVHP Materials Compatibility Testing
Testing was performed by METSS for the Air Force Research Laboratory
A list of C-17 aircraft materials was reviewed and discussed with engineers at the C-17 Program
Office, Boeing and AFRLto determine the materials most likely to come in contact with mVHP
during and after test exposure
Materials tested included a selection of:
Metals
Rigid Plastics
Flexible Plastics
- Elastomer
- Adhesive:
- Textiles
- Wiring
- Printed Circuit Boards
mVHP was generated using a Steris VHP-1000ED. Materials were exposed to mVHP (275 ppm
VHP, 15 ppm NH3 for 24 hours, or 500 ppm VHP, 30 ppm NH3 for 12 hours)
All testing was compliant with ASTM and SAE standards
With the exception of nylon webbing (whose tensile strength was reduced 10-15%), mVHP had
little to no effect on metals, plastics, elastomers, composites, adhesives, and wire insulation
STERIS
Aircraft Materials Compatibility
Testing to study the effects of exposure to mVH P using ASTM methods
September 2005 to February 2006
Delivery System Requirements
Effective delivery system
- Portability
- Deployability
- Modularity
- Scalability
- Capability
Sensitive Equipment Decontamination
Tactical Vehicle Decontamination
10,000 cu ft
720 sq ft shelving
Whole vehicle
decontamination
srtnis
-------
Healthcare Related
Decontamination
STERIS
F-16 Aircraft Decontamination
C-141 Aircraft Decontamination
Self Contained Truck Mounted mVHP
system
Mounts on 5 ton truck and trailer
Small vaporizer modules provide
flexibility
All removable components man
portable
STERIS
Testing - Results Pending
ECBC
- Sensitive equipment compatibility
- Materials Compatibility
- Cycle time optimization - Agent testing
- F16 biological decontamination
AFRL
- Materials compatibility
JPL
- Efficacy and materials testing
LLNL
- HVACdecon
STERIS
Ongoing Research and Development
Room decontamination
- Consortium of North East Ohio Hospitals (CCF, UH, VA, Metro
etc.)
- C.diff., MRSA, VRE/CCF
Cycle time optimization
Field forward generation of hydrogen peroxide
High temperature mVHP delivery systems
Large Scale mVHP systems for building decontamination
- Designed to leverage locally available rental equipment
- Compatible with commercial air shipment
Systems for Wide Area Decontamination
Ml KIs
-------
Lab Decontamination of 65
Room New Animal Facility
Using Chlorine Dioxide Gas
Mark A. Czarneski
Director of Technology
CSIClorDiSys Solutions, Inc
DSI
ClorDiSys Solutions, It
Overview
1. Define Chlorine Dioxide
2. Define Chlorine Dioxide Sterilization Parameters
3. Chose Decontamination Agent
4. Decontamination Event
5. Advantages/Conclusions
What is Chlorine Dioxide (CD) ?
Cl
0
0
Properties:
> Yellow-Green Gas1
> Water Soluble2
> Boiling Point 10°C
> Tri-atomic Molecule
> Molecular Weight 67.5
1. Ability to be monitored in real time with a photometric device.
Not subject to condensation or affected by temperature gradients.
2. Ability to penetrate water (not all sterilants can penetrate water, vapors can
not)
3. Chlorine dioxide is a "true gas" at room temperatures.
Chlorine Dioxide Time Line
Aqueous Germicide
(Water Treatment
Longest User)
1920
Chlorine Dioxide
Recognized as a Gaseous
Chemosterilizing Agent
1984
IJ/CD-Cartridge
Registered with
US-EPA
Mar 2004
Time (
1811
First Preparation of
Chlorine Dioxide
1940
Bleaching Agent
(Pulp & Paper Industry
Largest User)
First Registered with
the US-EPA for use as
a sterilant
World wide consumption of chlorine dioxide - 4.5 million Ibs/day.
> 743,000 Ibs released to atmosphere in 2000.
> Example: Maine allows 3 Ib's / hour of CD to be emitted
CSI ClorDiSys Solutions, Inc.
Chlorine Dioxide Generation Technology
CI
2(g)
2NaCI0
2(s)
2CI02(g)+ 2NaCI(!
> Performed in solid phase (no liquids)
> Gas generated on demand
> Self-Contained reagents
> Simple to replace consumables
> Small portable generators
> Generator capacity 1-60,000 cu ft
es/
ClorDiSys Solutions, Inc.
The Decontamination Process Steps
> Pre-Conditioning
Raise RH 65%-75%
> Conditioning
Dwell time at RH SP
> Charge
Raise CD Concentration (1mg/L)
> Exposure
Dwell time at CD SP
> Aeration
Rem ove CD Gas 12-15 air exchanges
-------
ffS/ClorDiSys Solutions, Inc.
65 Room New Animal Facility
180,000 cubic feet Total Volume
ffS/ClorDiSys Solutions, Inc.
65 Room New Animal Facility
Chemistry Labs
65 Room New Animal Facility
Changing Stations and BSC's
65 Room New Animal Facility
Storage Rooms
ESI ClorDiSys Solutions, Inc.
65 Room New Animal Facility
Animal Holding Rooms
Why Decontaminate?
New Facility Decontamination (3-log reduction required)
Decontaminate before bringing in research animals
Decontamination performed to prevent contamination or
cross contamination
Decontaminate equipment (some new and some used from
another facility)
Equipment Decontaminated all in place including:
Rodent cages
Rodent racks
BSC's
Bedding changing stations
Video cameras
Microscopes
Various electronic monitoring devices l
-------
ffS/ClorDISys Solutions, Inc.
How to Decontaminate a 180,000 cu ft facility
Four (4) decontaminating techniques were considered for the
space decontamination (3 fumigants and 1 liquid based)
1. formaldehyde gas
2. hydrogen peroxide vapor
chlorine dioxide gas
Manual wiping with liquid high level disinfectant
First three were known to be effective decontaminants to spore
and non-spore forming bacteria under standard laboratory
conditions.
i.e., clean flat surfaces lacking porous materials or potential dead-
legs with which fumigant penetration might be retarded.
DSI
ClorDiSys Solutions
Formaldehyde Gas
Formaldehyde requires the heating of paraformaldehyde to release
the gas
Formaldehyde involves the neutralization, post exposure with
ammonia gas
A residue is commonly left after such treatment, consisting of
polymerized formaldehyde (paraformaldehyde) and the
neutralization product (methenamine)
Removal of such a residue was considered problematic for this
facility
Residual formaldehyde from off gassing was also of concern, due to
its odor and its perceived toxicity.
Formaldehyde is considered a potential carcinogen by the EPA and
an actual carcinogen by the International Agency for Research on
Cancer.
Formaldehyde Cleanup
> Formaldehyde neutralization is done using ammonia bicarbonate
Too little is causes more formaldehyde residuals
> Too much is causes a lot of bicarbonate residual cleanup
Try to balance the two, not wanting formaldehyde residuals and also
not wanting to cause too cleanup
> If balance is not correct then there will be residuals
Residual can affect research performed facility
Residuals add load to HEPA filters
Residual can affect worker safety (tearing, coughing, breathing
issues...)
> Large space decontamination is troublesome due to cleanup required,
can all surfaces realistically be wiped to remove all residues
Hydrogen Peroxide Vapor
Hydrogen peroxide vapor is generated by boiling/vaporizing 35%
liquid hydrogen peroxide
Currently 2 camps of thought for VHP, Wet and Dry
Dry - wants no amount of condensation
Wet-wants "micro-condensation"
Dry Process - difficult to eliminate condensation
Wet Process - difficult to obtain uniform condensation
Both of these issues were believed too restrictive for the current
application, when decontaminating entire volume
It was believed that it would have been difficult to distribute and
maintain an appropriate concentration of vapor hydrogen peroxide
within the many rooms
es/c,
Hydrogen Peroxide Scalability
Hydrogen Peroxide decontamination of 13,000 sq ft (130,000 cu ft)1
Had to break into 3 zones and decontaminate separately
Zone 1, 2, 3 -2hr 10 min exposure cycle + overnight aeration
Total Decontamination time - 3 day period (does not include setup)
> Equipment used 31 vapor generators
1 generator for every 1398 cu ft and 22 aeration modules
If same system as described is used for 180,000 cu ft, then 128
vapor generators would be required to decontaminate this facility
1. Herd, Michael and Warner, Adam. Hydrogen Peroxide Vapor Bio-decontamination of
The Jackson Laboratory's New Animal Facility, Animal Lab News, Vol 4 No. 7,
November/December 2005.
es/c,
Manual wiping with liquid high level
disinfectant
Fogging spray liquids around the room
> Foggers create small droplets that are affected by gravity
Droplets do not reach:
Under side of equipment or components
> Behind equipment
Ceilings
Ventilation grills
Large space decontamination is troublesome, can all
surfaces be realistically be sprayed and wiped
-------
SSI
ClorDiSys Solutions
Chlorine Dioxide Gas
> Chlorine Dioxide is a true gas
True gasses distribute
> True gasses have good penetration abilities
Not affected by temperature
Does not condense on surfaces
Does not require neutralization
Does not require post exposure wipe down
ffSi ClorDiSys Solutions, Inc.
How to do Chlorine Dioxide Gas
Seal the facility, including all doorways, exhaust vents and
supply vents
Fill all drains with water
Deactivate air supply
> Place circulation fans throughout facility (60 used)
Install gas generators and sensing tubing
Place Biological Indicators throughout facility
Start Decontamination Process
Equipment Used
5 chlorine dioxide gas generators (total 10 Injection
points
20 chlorine dioxide gas sensing points
I ClorDISys Solutions. Inc.
Injection and Sensor Locations
10 Injection Locations
20 Sensor Locations
ESI ClorDiSys Solutions, Inc.
Biological Indicator Locations
Total Kill of all Bl's
^Hj b. Atrophaeus Locations
11. in closed cabinet
12. in BSC near HEPA corner
13. in middle of 10" stack of filter
paper
14. in middle of 18" stack of rodent
cage lids
r
BTl F
"
TTr "
iir-Hr.r3Lii-M - i
GSI
Decontamination
Condition raise humidity to minimum 65% RH
Charge
Target Concentration 1 mg/L
Actual concentration 0.5-0.8 mg/L
Exposure
Target 2 hour
Actual 6 hours charge/exposure exposure
Aeration
Loss of gas in ventilation system (up stack)
No measurable concentration outside facility
> No other leaks detected
-------
ClorDiSys Solutions
ffS/
Concentration Readings (mg/L)
DMS-1 Decontaminating Monitoring System
12:20
1:05
200
2.45
3:25
400
4.45
5:35
615
7:00
7:35
750
8:00
0.2 charge
0.4
0.4 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.6
0.6 0.7 0.7
0.7 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.7 0.9
07 08 07 07 07 07 07 06 06 06
0
0.6
0
0
0
0.6
0.1 Aeration
0 Aeration
0 Aeration
•g mg/L '0.567 "0.656 *Q 589 tl.622r 0.6 rQ.622*0.611 '0.622 '0.589'0.656
'g ppm 205.1 237.3 213.2 225.2 217.2 225.2 221.2 225.2 213.2 ~237.3
ppmhrs 1231 1424 1279 1351 1303 1351 1327 1351 1279 1424
| | | | | 1332 Avg ppm hrs
ffS/ClorDiSys Solutions, Inc.
Concentration Readings (mg/L)
DMS-2 Decontaminating Monitoring System
Time 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
12:25 0 0 0.1 0.1 0 0 0 0 0 0
1:10 0.4 04 Q. 5 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.3 03
216 0.5 05 0.5 0.5 04 05 0.5 0.3 03 05
2:50 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.5 05 0.5 0.3 0.3 05
3-35 07 07 0.7 0.6 06 06 0.6 0.4 0.4 06
4:00 08 07 0.8 0.7 06 06 0.6 0.4 0.5 0.6
450 09 08 0.8 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.6
5:35 0.9 09 0.8 0.6 0.5 05 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.6
6:15 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.6 05 05 0.6 0.4 0.5 06
7:00 0.9 0.8 0.8 0.6 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.5
7.35 0 0.1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.1 0
7:50 0000000000
L L L 1
avg ppm 265.5253.4257.4209.2 177 185 193.1136.8144.8193.1
ppmhrs 1593 1520 1545 1255 1062 1110 1158 820.5866.8 1158
1209
(1 332 + 1 209) 12= 1 271 Avg ppm hrs
charge
^^^^
Aeration
Aeration
Avg ppm hrs
26
Chlorine Dioxide Process Advantages
Biocidal at Low Concentration
and Ambient Temperature
Gas Distributes Rapidly
Process Tolerates
Temperature Fluctuations
Non-flammable at Use
Concentrations
No Liquids
Self-contained Reagents
Short Cycles
Size Scalable
• Range of Target Volumes
• Long Distances
Low Residuals
Rapid Aeration (Low-Use
Concentration and Minimal
Adsorption)
Gas Concentration is Easily
and Accurately Monitored
No manual wiping required
No neutralization required
No mixing of solutions
Conclusions
Complete kill of all Biological Indicators
No physical residue observed as would be if formaldehyde was
used.
No visible indication of material degradation on any of the metal
containing equipment left within the building including the
ventilated racks, BSC's, various electronics, etc.
No visible indication of material degradation on any electronics
CD has proven itself to be a practical and effective method for
decontaminating large facilities
Low Chlorine Dioxide Concentrations (Less than 330 ppm)
1271 total average ppm hours
GSIc,
For more information contact:
Mark A. Czarneski
PO Box 549
Lebanon, NJ 08833
Phone: 908-236-4100
Fax: 908-236-2222
Minidox-M
Chlorine Dioxide Gas Generator
e-mail:
markczarneski@cloridsys.com
Cloridox-GMP
Chlorine Dioxide Gas Generator
ffSi ClorDISys Solutions, Inc.
Chlorine Dioxide vs. Hydrogen Peroxide
Cycle Times
Isolator
Decontamination
Volume
Cycle Time
SterisVHP « 25 ft3 (0.7m3) 3-6 hours 1
Bioquell Clarus « 25 ft3 (0.7m3) 3-3.5 hours 1
Chlorine Dioxide 31 ft3 (0.88m3) 1.3 hours2
Room
Decontamination Volume Cycle Time
SterisVHP 300ft3(8.5m3)
SterisVHP 760ft3 (21.5m3)
BioquellClarus 2500 ft3 (70.8m3)
Chlorine Dioxide 2700 ft3 (76.5m3)
_Cyc
7.5 hours 3
4.25 hours Overnight aeration'
10-11 hours5
3.5 hours6
:eutical
1. Caputo Ross A. and Jim Fisher. Comparing and Contrasting Barrier Isolator Decontamination Systems.
Pharmaceutical Technology, Vol 28, No 11, p 68-82, November 2004.
Technology, Vol 29, No 4, p124-133, April 2005.
3. Steris Case Study M1456, VHP Case Study #1 - Hydrogen Peroxide Gas Decontamination of A Material Pass-Through
(MPT) Room, Publication ID #M1456(8/99), Steris, August, 1999.
4. Steris Case Study M1455, Case Study #3 -VHP 1000 Decontamination of a 760 ft3 room Containing Blood and Urine
Analyzers, Publication IDSM1455/990810 (8/99), Steris August 1999.
5. Room Decontamination Presentation to Council on Private Sector Initiatives, Washington, DC, by Henry Vance PE of
Alpha Engineering, February 11, 2002.
6. Lorcheim Paul. Decontamination using Gaseous Chlorine Dioxide, A case study of automatic decontamination of an
animal room explores the effectiveness of this sterilization system. Animal Lab News, Vol 3 No. 4, p25-28,
July/August 2004.
-------
Decontamination Research
A New Approach
Dr Norman Govan
Defence Science & Technology
Laboratory, UK
Decontamination Technology Options
No single technology
applicable to everything
- Requires coi
technologies
rhe new binary approach
- Combines use of reactive
liquid decontaminants and
absorbent strippable coating
dstl x
UNCLASSIFIED
Reactive gases
•• '
-------
New Reactive Liquids
1 Aim to develop next generation
RLs (foams, gels, wipes) in supp
of planned EPs
dstl x
1 Wide range of mild decon
chemistries explored for potential
use in future systems
• New microemulsion formulation
and delivery system has been
developed in support of UDC
UNCLASSIFIED
Acetylated perborate (APB)
dstl
Simple hydrolysis generation reactior
• APB is very soluble
- High concentratior
Potential for battlefield use
UNCLASSIFIED
-------
Novel Colloids
• OIL-organic liquid to dissolve CW
• ALCOHOL - soluble in both water
and oil (amphiphilic)
• BRINE - aqueous electrolyt0
(including reactive ingredient^
• Forms three layers
• Each layer has some of each
component
• Middle phase has special
deterqency properties
-------
Binary Approaches using Strippable
coatings
Extensive lab oratory/field trials
conducted on prototype
coating
Plans to repla
temporary car,,w«,,«M^ ^««u,,M
with dual purpose coating
Looking to extend concept to
other equipment
dstl ;8o'
UNCLASSIFIED
-------
Removal
1 Ability to effectively
remove the coating (in
theatre) is key to the
binary process
1 A reduced vapour hazard
extends the time period
where coating removal
delivers real benefit
dstl :,*
Simultaneous Coating Remova
Decon
e range of methods being
sidered
1 Plan to conduct a systematic
study on potential removal
methods
- Manual stripping
- High pressure water
dstl !„'
UNCLASSIFIED t Dst, |s
Active Coatings
Active Coatings
1 Incorporate reactive
components into coating
- To reduce eliminate off-
Wide range of active materials
being considered
- Nanoparticle
- Reactive micro gels
- Pillared - smectic supports
- Microporous and mesoporous
- Enzymes
- Biocides, biostats
-------
Alternative Binary Approaches
1 Catalysts or disclosing
materials embedded in the
coating could be activated
during decon process
- Softening or embrittlement to
facilitate removal
- Selective oxidation of sulfides
using applied liquid peroxide
- Activated disclosure
lemistries
dstl si.
UNCLASSIFIED
dstl :,*
UNCLASSIFIED
-------
Background
» Chlorine dioxide has been used successfully for large-area
Bacillus anthracis spore decontamination of the
Brentwood (18 million cu. ft) & Trenton (6 million cu. ft.)
USPS Processing and Distribution Centers and the AMI
building (Boca Raton, Florida)
» A single chlorine dioxide fumigation of these buildings
resulted in no culture positive post-remediation
environmental samples
* These anthrax letter attack recovery operations have shown
that chlorine dioxide is an effective gas-phase sporicidal
decontamination technology and generated interest in the
use of this fumigant as a large-area vegetative cell, viral
and toxin sterilization technology
Background
• Existing data sets are only relevant to C1O2
treatment of environmentally persistent and
resistant bacterial spores
There was a need to develop comparable data sets
for non-spore forming surrogates of priority
infectious agents and toxin surrogates
We will present C1O2 killing data for a
representative suite of vegetative cell threat
surrogates (plague, cholera, Q fever, food
poisoning, brucellosis, melioidois, glanders,
tularemia, typhoid and highly desiccation resistant
vegetative threats) and toxin threat surrogates
(ricin, botulism, etc.)
Surrogate
+Escherichia coli ATCC
10536
— Gram negative
— Rod shaped
- Used as a surrogate for plague,
cholera, Q fever and food
poisoning
Surrogate
+Alcaligenes faecalis ATCC
8750
- Rod shaped
- Used as a surrogate for
brucellosis, melioidois and
glanders
Surrogate
^Salmonella typhimurium
ATCC 14028
Rod shaped
Multidrug resistance
Used as a surrogate for tularemia,
typhoid fever and food poisoning
-------
Surrogate
+Streptococcus pyogenes
type strain ATCC 10403
— Gram positive
— Coccus shaped
— Extremely desiccation tolerant
and can be transmitted by
aerosol infection
— Used as a surrogate for
formulated vegetative bacterial
Surrogate
+Staphylococcous aureus
type strain ATCC 12600
— Gram positive
— Coccus shaped
— Aerosol transmission and
multidrug resistant
- Extremely desiccation tolerant
- Used as a surrogate for high-
quality formulated vegetative
Experimental Procedures
• Samples (10|J) were placed on sample coupons (glass
& plastic) and allowed to dry for two hours
• Sample coupons were placed in a test chamber and
exposed to a range of C1O2 gas concentrations for 1 -
2 hours at 80% relative humidity
• Control coupons were left at room temperature in the
absence of C1O2 gas
• Bacillus subtilis spore SteriCharts were also placed in
the test chamber and exposed to C1O2 gas for 1 hour
-------
Conclusions
* S. aureus is the most C1O2 resistant surrogate and sets an
upper boundary for C1O2 Cts required for formulated
vegetative agent killing - 230 ppm-hrs (2 hrs exposure)
» S. pyogenes is highly desiccation resistant but is
considerably more C1O2 sensitive - 100 ppm-hrs (1 hr
exposure)
* The Gram-negative surrogates E. coli, A. faecalis and S.
typhimurium were considerably less desiccation resistant
and were very C1O2 sensitive - 50 ppm-hrs (1 hr exposure)
- These surrogates required specialized conditions for
desiccation survival
Conclusions
* These studies establish that chlorine dioxide is
a very effective gas-phase sterilizing agent for
a broad range of vegetative threat surrogates
dried to a state of high viability
* A Ct of 230 ppm'hrs of C1O2 resulted in a six
log reduction in surrogate viability
- Food-borne pathogens (gastroenteritis and typhoid
fever), tularemia, plague, cholera, Q fever,
brucellosis, melioidois and glanders
- A desiccation resistant pathogen spread by airborne
transmission (Streptococcus pyogenes)
Conclusions
* A Ct of 230 ppni'hrs of C1O2 is likely to be the
lowest practical treatment level achievable in
large-area decontamination scenarios
- Generation and measurement of gas concentrations
below this level are problematic
* A Ct of 230 ppni'hrs of C1O2 would have very
minimal effects on corrosion sensitive
electronics and optics
* Other DARPA and USG data establish that a
Ct of 200 ppm«hrs of C1O2 would also be
sufficient for DNA and RNA virus sterilization
-------
Protein Toxin Inactivation by C1O2
Analysis of C1O2 killing effects on enzyme toxin
surrogates
— Utilize enzyme surrogates that have been extensively
characterized biochemically and structurally
— Utilize enzyme surrogates where the complete amino
acid sequence, three-dimensional structure and reaction
mechanism is known
- Utilize real-time spectrophotometric assays to measure
C1O2 effects on enzyme activity and biochemical
reaction rate constants
Protein Toxin Inactivation by C1O2
> Analysis of C1O2 killing - enzyme toxin
surrogates
- E. coli p-galactosidase
* Botulism toxin surrogate
- Calf alkaline phosphatase
* Resistant protein toxin surrogate - SEE
- Saporin
*Ricin surrogate
-------
Protein Toxin Inactivation by CIO-
E. coli B-
fi-Galactosidase hydrolyzes the colorless
substrate ONPG (o-nitrophenyl-beta-D-
galactopyranoside) to o-nitrophenyl, which is
yellow
*ONPG has a very low spontaneous hydrolysis rate
The reaction is terminated by addition of
sodium carbonate
* Absorbance is read at 420nm
p-galactosidase
Reaction Mechanism
CH2OH
O
no/ L! on
ClhOU
I
gii lactose
p-galactosida$e
+ H20
cii-jon
I
no/ o'on
•J.ll >•. :i" -
I
-------
E. coll P-galactosidase
Quantitative Inactivation Studies
Beta-galactosidase 2350 ppm chlorine dioxide, 80% RH, 2 hour exposure
Wet Control
Dry control
Dry control
4700 ppm-hours CIO2
4700 ppm-hours CIO2
4700 ppm-hours CIO2
4700 ppm-hours CIO2
Average activity reduction due
Specific Activity to drying
4755
620
514
0.075
0.059
0.059
0.050
Average activity reduction due
to CIO2
E. coll P-galactosidase
Quantitative Inactivation Studies
Beta-galactosidase 200 ppm chlorine dioxide,
Wet Control
Dry control
Dry control
Dry control
400 ppm-hours CIO2
400 ppm-hours CIO2
400 ppm-hours CIO2
Specific Activity
6122
311
329
345
0.531
1.062
0.796
80% RH, 2 hour exposure
Average activity reduction due
to drying
0.05
Average activity reduction due
to CIO2
2.02E-03
Calf Alkaline Phosphatase
Quantitative Inactivation Studies
Alkaline Phosphatase 2350 ppm chlorine dioxide, 80% RH, 2 hour exposure
Wet Control
Dry control
4700 ppm-hours CIO2
4700 ppm-hours CIO2
Average activity reduction due
Specific Activity to drying
2028
951
0.051
0.042
0.47
Average activity reduction due
to CIO2
7.05 E-05
Calf Alkaline Phosphatase
Quantitative Inactivation Studies
Alkaline Phosphatase 200 ppm chlorine dioxide, 80% RH, 2 hour exposure
Wet Control
Dry control
Dry control
Dry control
400 ppm-hours CIO2
400 ppm-hours CIO2
400 ppm-hours CIO2
Specific Activity
2973
3185
2818
2709
0.129
0.143
0.157
Average activity reduction due
to drying
0.98
Average activity reduction due
to CIO2
1.21 E-05
/////////////
Ribosome Inactivating Proteins - RIPs
» RIPs are cytotoxic RNA
N-glycosidases that
inactivate ribosomes by
depurination of an
adenosine at position 4324
in 28 S rRNA
* RIPs occur as single chain
(Type 1 - Saporin) or two
chain (Type 2 - Ricin)
proteins
-------
SAP FACTS
Saporii
llic seeds of (be plauT Saponaria afftctrmlh I
ivaling piutem (RIP)
Extremely viable
Noii-silyeosylated
Mo»i aciive RIP
I .111.!]••-! in Me-
RIP Assay
en in vitro n-gau
galactosidase gene
Programming of a translation system with the
p-galactosidase mRNA to produce active
enzyme
Assay of fi-galactosidase activity
RIP Assay
* Assay Performance
translation activity
* Saporin concentration and time of interaction
dependent
* Single molecule sensitivity
Direct enzymic assay for ricin type RIPs
Saporin Inactivation by C1O2
C1O2 ppm«v Log Activity Reduction
Untreated
Dried Control
400 ppm-v
2400ppm-v 4xl07
Conclusions
* These studies establish that chlorine dioxide is
a very effective gas-phase sterilizing agent for
a broad range of toxin threat surrogates dried
to a state of high activity
* A Ct of 4300 ppni'hrs of C1O2 resulted in a six
log reduction in dried toxin surrogate activity
- Ricin, BoNT & SEE surrogates
- C1O2 inactivated surrogates dp not renature to
active forms under the conditions studied
A CT of 2400 ppm«hrs of CIO, resulted in a
six log reduction of crude BoNT & SEB toxin
surrogate activity
Chlorine Dioxide Deployment for
Wide-area Decon Applications
A buffer zone separates 7
log kill decon and
-------
Acknowledgements
* This research was supported by the DARPA
Immune Buildings Program and the FBI
* We are grateful to our many colleagues at
DARPA, FBI, EPA, SAIC and SWRI for
their scientific support and collaboration
E-mail: tleightonfSlchori.org
-------
Restoration of Major Transportation
Facilities Following a
Chemical Agent Release
The Chemical Restoration Operational
Technology Demonstration (OTD)
Mark D. Tucker, Ph.D.
Sandia National Laboratories
mdtucke@sandia.gov
Presentation Outline
OTD Background and Overview
OTD Project Activities
- Restoration Plan Development
- Partnerships
- Threat Scenarios
- Clean-up Guidelines
- Sampling Methodologies
- Decontamination Technologies
- Decision Support Tool Development
- Experimental Studies
Summary
Decon Activities at Sandia
The Project supports the DHS S&T Chemical
Countermeasures Strategic Objectives
The strategic objectives of DHS S&T's Chemical
Countermeasures Program are to:
• Develop a national chemical defense architecture
• Enhance rapid recovery from chemical attacks
• Develop pre-event assessment, discovery, and interdiction
capabilities for chemical threats
• Minimize loss of life and economic impact from chemical attack
• Enhance the capability to identify chemical attack source
A chemical agent release in key
transportation facilities could be devastating
Severe economic impact if closed for even
short periods
Highly vulnerable to chemical terrorism
Wide range of decon and restoration
challenges
The primary focus of the Chemical
Restoration OTD is on major airports
- Project is focusing on interior restoration only
- Project is serving as a 'template' for other
airports to follow
We are working in close collaboration with a partner airport (LAX)
and regulatory agencies
'•-.IB
The activities following a chemical agent
release are complex
Advance the state-of-the-art in facility restoration through the development and
demonstration of efficient planning, decontamination, sampling and analysis tools
Enhance rapid recovery from chemical attacks
Minimize economic impact from chemical attack
Pre-planning and implementing a systems approach
will decrease the time required for restoration
• Advance the state-of-the-art in facility restoration through the development and
demonstration of efficient planning, decontamination, sampling and analysis tools
• Enhance rapid recovery from chemical attacks
• Minimize economic impact from chemical attack
To achieve these objectives, we are focusing on:
• Pre-planning the restoration process
• Reducing the overall restoration time by reducing the time of each activity
• Selecting the "best-available" methods for each activity
fa*
ISS-
-------
The Chemical Restoration OTDwill build off of the
recently completed Bio Restoration DDAP
Many of the concepts will be similar to the
Biological Restoration DDAP, except..
-Agent decay may occur
-Surface interactions with chemical agents
must be considered
-More rapid sampling and analysis
techniques are available
-Decon formulation may vary depending on
the agent
-Clean-up standards better defined
-Long term air monitoring may be required
The Chem ical Restoration OTD utilizes experts from
the National Laboratories and other federal agencies
Collaborators
Sandia National Laboratories - Mark Tucker, PI
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory- Ellen Raber, PI
Los Alamos National Laboratory
Pacific Northwest National Laboratory
Oak Ridge National Laboratory
DHS Project Manager
Julius Chang, ORD
External Advisory Panel
Nancy Adams, US EPA
Veronique Hauschild, US CHPPM
Dennis Reutters, US DHS
Joe Wood, US EPA
Partner Airport
Los Angeles International (LAX)
Presentation Outline
OTD Background and Overview
OTD Project Activities
- Restoration Plan Development
- Partnerships
- Threat Scenarios
- Clean-up Guidelines
- Sampling Methodologies
- Decontamination Technologies
- Decision Support Tool Development
- Experimental Studies
Summary
Decon Activities at Sandia
The Chemical Restoration OTD team has been
divided into a series of Working Groups
Restoration operations will involve a
wide range of stakeholders:
Stakeholders in the Restoration
Operation:
• Facility owners/operators
• Federal, state and local health
agencies
- NIOSH
- US EPA
- Department of Homeland Security
(including TSA)
- State EPA
- Law enforcement (federal and
local)
- Department of Transportation
- Local public health agencies
MOU
- LAX, DHS,SNL,LLNL
Meetings with Partner Airport
- Ongoing
Regulatory Agency Meetings
- LosAngeles-May2005
- Ongoing
Tabletop Exercise (Tentative)
- Objective: To demonstrate pre-
planning capabilities and other tools
- Spring 2007
and responsibilities for inclusion in the Restoration Plan.
The Threat Scenarios Working Group has
established a realistic threat space for the project
Objective: To develop realistic threat space
for critical transportation facilities
- Agents and types of release to be addressed
in the Restoration Plan
- To support the Tabletop Exercise
CW Agent List Defined
- CW Agents (VX, G agents, HD)
- TICs (HCN, Cyanogen Chloride, Phosgene)
Release Scenario Defined for Tabletop
Exercise
- Location - International Terminal at LAX
- CONTAM modeling exercise in progress to
support tabletop exercise
projects and other federal agencies
-------
WThe Clean-up Guidelines Working Group is using
historic data to develop a set of recommended clean-
up standards
The Sampling Working Group is developing
recommendations for sample collection and analysis
Working Group is focusing on four sampling phases:
- Characterization
- Remediation Verification
- Clearance Sampling
- Monitoring
In addition, the Working Group is also focusing on:
- Statistical sampling methods to reduce number of required samples and to increase
confidence in negative results
- Utilization of EPA protocols, the LRN, and mobile laboratories for analysis of
chemical samples
^The Decontamination Working Group is identifying and
recommending methods to decontaminate agents on
the threat list
Four types of technologies needed
- Surface and 'hot spot' decon
• Liquids, foams, gels
- Large volumes (enclosed and semi-enclosed)
• Gases, vapors, and aerosols
- Sensitive equipment
• Gases, vapors, aerosols, and solvent-based
approaches
- Waste
• Liquids, foams, gels
Decon technology may vary depending on agent
released
Have prepared a survey of existing and emerg
decon technologies
Engaging experts from outside of DHS
- DOD, EPA
^^^^^^^^^3
The Decision Support Tool Working Group is
adapting the BROOM Tool for chemical use and
integrating additional tools (VSP)
Building Restoration Operations Optimization Model (BROOM)
BROOM can collect, manage, visualize, and analyze
the large amounts of data associated with a
chemical agent release
!
Data Collection, Management, and
Visualization
- Sample locations
- Sample results
Data Analysis
- Map Contamination
- Map Uncertainty
- Optimize subsequent sampling to reduce
uncertainty in magnitude and extent
Data Management
and Visualization
pre-developed restoration plan will reduce one of
the major delays in previous restoration projects
General Restoration Plan
1. Introduction
2. Characterization
3. Remediation
4. Clearance
5. Recommendations for
pre-planning
A. Notification Phase
B. First Responder Phase
C. Sampling and Analysis
Methods
D. General Sampling Design
E. Probability-based Sampling
Design
F. Decon Technology
G. Handling Decon Waste
H. Sample Unit Forms
I. Characterization Template
J. Remedial Action Plan
Template
K. Clearance Plan Template
Facility Specific
Data Supplement
A. Facility Command
Structure
B. Facility Description
C. Facility Ventilation
D. Facility Decon
Capabilities
-------
The Project is also addressing data and technology
gaps critical to the restoration process (in
collaboration with other agencies)
Surface Sample Collection Efficiency and Detection Limits for CW Agents
(Reynolds, LLNL and Brown, SNL)
- Objective: To determine the collection efficiency and detection limits of the surface sampling
methods on porous and non-porous surfaces that would be typically found in the interior of a
transportation facility. Experimental work will be conducted using relatively low concentrations
relevant to civilian terrorist release scenarios.
Interaction of Chemical Agents on Interior Surfaces and Natural
Attenuation/Decay Rates (Alcarez, LLNL and Ho, SNL)
- Objective: To determine adsorption/desorption and decay rates for chemical agents on interior
surfaces. Experimental work will be conducted using low concentrations relevant to civilian terrorist
release scenarios since there is data available for very high concentrations.
Gas/Vapor Decontamination Method Scale-up Evaluation (Tucker, SNL and
Smith and Verce, LLNL)
- Objective: To evaluate potential gas/vapor technologies at a larger scale by conducting a series of
simulant, live agent and TIC tests. We will also assess barrier materials that could be used to seal
facilities prior to a gas/vapor decontamination process.
Statistical Sampling Algorithm Validation (Knowlton, SNL and MacQueen, LLNL)
- Objective: To validate potential statistical sampling algorithms against data from actual release
sites. In addition, we will integrate the validated methods into BROOM.
Presentation Outline
OTD Background and Overview
OTD Project Activities
- Restoration Plan Development
- Partnerships
- Threat Scenarios
- Clean-up Guidelines
- Sampling Methodologies
- Decontamination Technologies
- Decision Support Tool Development
- Experimental Studies
Summary
Decon Activities at Sandia
For FY06-FY07, the focus of the Chemical
Restoration OTD is to...
Complete the Restoration Plan template for major airports
Complete the site-specific Restoration Plan for our partner airport
(LAX)
Conduct a series of tabletop exercises and workshops to engage the
user community (i.e., transportation facility owners, regulatory
agencies) in the process of developing restoration plans for critical
transportation facilities
Address data and technology gaps critical to the restoration process
that were identified in FY04-FY05 (in collaboration with other
agencies)
- Surface Sample Collection Efficiency and Detection Limits for CW Agents
- Interaction of Chemical Agents on Interior Surfaces and Natural
Attenuation/Decay Rates
- GasA/apor Decontamination Method Scale-up Evaluation
- Statistical Sampling Algorithm Validation
Presentation Outline
OTD Background and Overview
OTD Project Activities
- Restoration Plan Development
- Partnerships
- Threat Scenarios
- Clean-up Guidelines
- Sampling Methodologies
- Decontamination Technologies
- Decision Support Tool Development
- Experimental Studies
Summary
Decon Activities at Sandia
Evaluation of Surface Sample Collection
Methods for Bacillus Spores
race sample collection methods
5wab, wet, syntfietic
Vipe, wet, synthetic
/acuum HEPA filter sock synthetic
aces
que experimental method
Dry deposition surf ace seeding
^Sl?"r^"^ons(999'
ication extraction method
istically valid sample size
surface loadings / surface (1 log, 2 log,
nd A log per sq cm)
^_
Collection
Method
Surface
Stainless
Steel
Painted
Wallboard
Stainless
Steel
Painted
Stainless
Steel
Painted
Carpet
Bare
Mean Recovery
Efficiency
(n=24)
0461 +0 154
0483 ±0224
0590+0 173
0460+0291
0 174+0 138
0268+0030
0 253+0 068
0 181 +0 072
Median Recovery
Efficiency
(n=24)
0455
0442
0573
0377
0118
0022
0 248
0 173
^f 'J Canadian Forces Decontaminant
-^ Testing
Decontaminants were tested against VX, GD, HD, and anthrax spores. Material compatibility
and biodeqradabilitv were also considered. For qualification, decontaminant must meet
efficacy, material compatibility, and biodegradability requirements. Based on this criteria,
EasyDECON-200 and MDF-200 (the two commercial versions of DF-200) were the only
decontaminants qualified.
Decontaminant
EasyDECON-200 (DF-200)
MDF-200 (DF-200)
Ail-Clear
B-C Emulsion
BX24
CASCAD
Decon Shield
DI60
GDS 2000
SDF
Manufacturer
Envirofoam Technologies (EFT)
Modec, Inc.
Kidde Firefighting
OWR
Dew Engineering
Allen Vanguard
Cetec
Karcher
Karcher
Allen Vanguard
Qualification
Qualified
Qualified
Not Qualified
Not Qualified
Not Qualified
Not Qualified
Not Qualified
Not Qualified
Not Qualified
Not Qualified
-------
'Dry' DF-200 Formulation Development for the
US Military
The objective of this project is to develop a configuration of DF-200 that can be
packaged with all water removed. This will reduce the packaged weight of DF-200 by
60-75% significantly lowering the logistics burden on the warfighter. Water (freshwater
or saltwater) can be added to the formulation at the time of use from a local source.
Parameters being considered:
- Weight savings achieved
- Projected cost of m aterials
- Efficacy
- Ease of use (i.e., dissolution
rate, requirements for agitation,
etc.)
- Stability under storage
conditions
- Packaging considerations
- Ease and cost of manufacture
-------
The Development of Modified
Vaporous Hydrogen Peroxide (mVHP)
for Chemical- and Biological-Weapons
Decontamination
Presented by Dr. Stephen R. Divarco
Principal Investigator, Decontamination Sciences
Edgewood Chemical Biological Center
Mark Brickhouse, Steve Divarco, Ten Lalain, Brian Maclver, Jerry Pfarr,
Larry Procell, Mike Schultz, David Sorrick, George Wagner (ECBC);
Lew Schwartz, lain McVey, Tim Meilander, Paul Wiget (STE, Inc.);
David Stark (EAI Corp)
Introduction to the
mVHP Project Timeline
2002 .—PROOF OF CONCEPT
-LARGE-VENUE
TESTS
2006
. EQUIPMENT IMPROVEMENTS
SENSORS AND DISTRIBUTION
.INTRODUCTION TO
SENSITIVE EQUIPMENT
-LABORATORY
OPTIMIZATION STUDIES
_LARGE-VENUES WITH
IMPROVED CAPABILITIES
.FUTURE OF VHP/mVHP
VHP Project Timeline
2002,-PROOF OF CONCEPT
2003
2005
2006
LARGE-VENUE
TESTS
. EQUIPMENT IMPROVEMENTS
SENSORS AND DISTRIBUTION
.INTRODUCTION TO
SENSITIVE EQUIPMENT
-LABORATORY
OPTIMIZATION STUDIES
-LARGE-VENUES WITH
IMPROVED CAPABILITIES
.FUTURE OF VHP tmVHP
VHP ii proven for biological decon
mVHP created for broad application
dtccfl to Inciud* cntmlcal agents
mVHP- Decontamination Cycto
U6 Mill demonilnlt VHP I mVHP
application to both bknogicjl and
cbimlciliginn
r' : li.' ,- t •.:'• '" t ' •'•'.'! ' ••."•• ' >'•'
mVHP Suitable for Biological
Agent Decontamination
Thorough Decontamination: BW
Decontamination by VHP at Room Scale
mVKP HudlH uittg B. vnfuKls NNR1H1
Laboratory studies of the biological warfare agent 6. anthracis and surrogate G.
Stearothermophilus showed mVHP at 250-ppm hydrogen peroxide and 15-ppm
ammonia can decontaminate biological contamination on a wide variety of
substrates.
mVHP Applicable for Chemical
Agent Decontamination
dim IIMHI
Chamber tests confirmed
that a similar mVHP
treatment was effective
against GD, HD and VX on
both absorptive and non-
absorptive surfaces.
In most cases, the hazard
was reduced to below the
JPID ORD for both contact
and vapor hazard in 8 - 24
hours.
-------
Application of the Modular mVHP
System to Aircraft Interiors
Two large-venue tests demonstrated that the improved modular mVHP system
could be used to generate and maintain the mVHP fumigant at concentrations for
effective decontamination.
Application of the Modular mVHP
System to Building Interiors
4 hours was required for kill G. sfearo. innoculated coupons and Bl's.
Thorough kill of G. sfeara. and HD simulant CEPS achieved within 5-10 hrs.
VHP Project Timeline
2002_PROOF OF CONCEPT
2003
LARGE-VENUE
TESTS
_ EQUIPMENT
IMPROVEMENTS
.INTRODUCTION TO
SENSITIVE EQUIPMENT
- LABORATORY
OPTIMIZATION STUDIES
.LARGE-VENUES WITH
IMPROVED CAPABILITIES
.FUTURE OF VHP I mVHP
CFD modeling hey to obtaining uniform
distribution in complex spaces
Computational Flow (or Fluid) Dynamics (CFD) was employed to develop an
mproved strategy for placement of the fans and vaporizer modules within the
interior space for effective vapor distribution.
CFD Simulations - Tlie Influence of Fan Paacemenl
on Air Flow Patterns
VHP Project Timeline
2002,_PROOF OF CONCEPT
2003| LARGE-VENUE
TESTS
. EQUIPMENT IMPROVEMENTS
SENSORS AND DISTRIBUTION
.INTRODUCTION TO
SENSITIVE EQUIPMENT
-LABORATORY
OPTIMIZATION STUDIES
.LARGE-VENUES WITH
IMPROVED CAPABILITIES
.FUTURE OF VHP/mVHP
Tne modular mVHP system could be
applied to a sensitive equipment
decoituminatlc-n ISEOI pfotoivp*
mVHP Sensitive Equipment
Decontamination Prototype
Initial studies in a modified SAMS box showed biological simulant could be
decontaminated on sensitive equipment within four hours.
In June 2005, the mVHP SED apparatus was successfully demonstrated at the
limited objective evaluation (LOE) at Tyndall AFB.
•LOE formal report indicates that mVHP has potential applicability for thorough
decon of sensitive equipment primarily in rear echalon applications as currently
configured on the 463L pallet.
-------
mVHP Prototype Undergoing
CB Surrogate Evaluation
A fully operational prototype is currently being evaluated at ECBC. The ECBC
tests will determine:
The spacing requirements between articles
of sensitive equipment
The decon time required for both a 1-g/m2
challenge (JPID ORD) and a 10-g/m2
challenge (JSSED ORD) of chemical agent
simulant
The effect of prewipe on decon time
especially at higher challenges
The highest fumigant concentration and
shortest cycle time possible without
negatively impacting sensitive equipment.
2002_PROOF OF CONCEPT
—LARGE-VENUE
TESTS
EQUIPMENT IMPROVEMENTS
SENSORS AND DISTRIBUTION
INTRODUCTION TO
SENSITIVE EQUIPMENT
LAB. OPTIMIZATION
STUDIES
1esls will klenlrfy the time and
roVHP concentration required (or
thorough bwtogKal ind chemical
decontaroirultari it optimized fumigant
LARGE-VENUES WITH
IMPROVED CAPABILITIES
FUTURE OF VHP /mVHP
mVHP Prototype Replicated for
Chemical Agent Testing
Evaluation of mVHP against CB
Agents on Complex Materials
The testing utilizes a thorough matrix of
representative materials, statistical replicates and
controls. The ECBC tests will determine
The decon time required for biological
surrogate kill.
The decon time required for live
chemical agent at both a 1-g/m2
challenge (JPID ORD) and a 10-g/m2
challenge (JSSED ORD).
The effect of prewipe on decon time
especially at higher chemical agent
challenges.
mVHP Project Timeline
2002.-PRQOF OF CONCEPT
2003
—URGE-VENUE
TESTS
. EQUIPMENT IMPROVEMENTS
SENSORS AND DISTRIBUTION
.INTRODUCTION TO
SENSITIVE EQUIPMENT
-LABORATORY
OPTIMIZATION STUDIES
\
Improvement* lo lumioant dltlrtbutioli,
equipment loglellcjl demands [size and
iveighl) and design (tents) to be
evaluated during upcoming
demo nit rations
.LARGE-VENUES
IMPROVED CAPABILITY
_ FUTURE OF VHP / mVHP
Large-Venues and Tent-Based Systems
for Interior and Exterior Decon
• The building / C-141 modular mVHP system has been scaled down to fit on the
bed and tactical trailer of an FMTV.
• Current systems utilize tents to enable simultaneous decontamination of interior
and exterior spaces.
• The first large-scale tent decon demo utilized an inflatable tent and an F-16 at
Davis-Month an AFB.
• 250-ppm VHP was achieved in avionics bays, cockpit and exterior of plane.
• Complete kill on 20 of 25 Bl's was accomplished in 4-hour test.
• Surviving Bl's in low distribution areas (to be addressed Jan. 2006.)
-------
First Responder mVHP Unit on HMMWV
Proposed uses for the mVHP First Responder
- Vehicle Interiors (and
optionally exteriors when
used with a shelter)
• Moderate sized rooms
- Sensitive equipment
(when used with a shelter)
2002_PKOOF OF CONCEPT
URGE-VENUE
TESTS
EQUIPMENT IMPROVEMENTS
SENSORS AND DISTRIBUTION
INTRODUCTION TO
SENSITIVE EQUIPMENT
LABORATORY
OPTIMIZATION STUDIES
Current tests will provide a (totalled body
ol «ort *mon«tnbng mVHP m •
potential uchnologi tor both JPID and
J55EO .potation
LARGE-VENUES WITH
IMPROVED CAPABILITIES
FUTURE OF VHP / mVHP
-------
Spore Contamination-
What Concentration Deposits, What Resuspends
and Can We Inhibit its Transport?
April 26-28, 2006
EPA Decontamination Workshop
Paula Krauter
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
Chemical & Biological Nonproliferation Program
Once a Biothreat Agent is Identified, the Question
Becomes Where is It?
We arrived at our understanding ofbiothreat agent (BTA)
transport based on a series of tests over a 4-year period
Where is the BTA?
How much settles?
How much resuspends?
Can we find all, any, none?
How to inhibit resuspension?
3. Reaerosolization
FY04-05
Aerosol Transport
FY05-06
What Do We Know Investigators have Studied -j-^
Particle Distribution Using Several Materials ^t
Investiaator
Alexander & Coldren '51
Chamberlain '67, '84
Shemel'70,Hahnetal'85
Montgomery & Corn '70,
Shemel '68
Kvasnak et al '93
Adams et al '93, Cheong '97
Lai '97
Forney& Spieman'74
Muyshondt et al'96
El-Shobokshy '83
Liu&Agarwal'74
( Sippola, 2002)
Particle Material
water
polystyrene
Ragweed pollen
Lycopodium spores
Tricresyl phosphate
Aitken nuclei
Iron oxide
Uranine
Uranine-m ethyl blue
Glass, rust, dust
Oil smoke
Porous silica
Indium acetylacetonat
Pecan pollen
Ragweed pollen
Polystyrene
Lycopodium spores
Oleic acid
Fluorescein
Olive oil
Zinc sulfide
Particl dia.(um)
7
0
9.0
2.4
0
08
5
0-14
44-2.16
45
5-2.0
5-7.1
0.7
8.5
9.5
2
0.9
20
0-6.2
4-21
4
„..„_.«„ ,
Fluidized Surrogate Spores were Used In All Our
Transport Studies
B. anthracis found in the
Brentwood mailroom
1. Transport Efficiency & Deposition Velocity
of Spores in Ventilation Ducts
m
*"• *to* t»*m
The test system included:
1.Two 90° bends and a 1.5m rise to 14m of 15cm diameter duct
2. Off-the-shelf duct materials •
3. Powdered surrogate BTA released into turbulent airflow
4. Seven analytical instruments
Data Suggest that the Spore Plume was Generally
Limited to a Finite Time Frame
m
' According to NIOSH (2002) air
sampling may be of limited value
in areas that are undisturbed, or
in which ventilation systems have
continued to function for long
periods after a release.
!r
fe
The spore plume moved through
the ventilation duct in about 25
sec (airflow ~3m3/min)
-------
Spores in Transit Will Deposit
Deposition was different in the
:hree duct materials tested
Each duct type was tested twice
formalized surface cone, to air
cone, [(number/cm2/number/cm3)]
We had expected the fiberglass to
rap and hold the greatest number
of spores, however, plastic was
about 100-fold higher
Duct Descriptions and Roughness Measurements
Duct
Material
Flexible
plastic
Galvanized
steel
Fiberglass
Duct Description
Smooth, two layers of
polyester film encapsulating
a galvanized steel wire helix;
multiple 0.1 - to 0.3-cm folds
Smooth, steel sheet,
galvanized with a zinc
coating; a thin film of
corrosion forms when
exposed to the atmosphere
Rough, internal fiberglass
wool insulation on board
coated with acrylic polymer
and a protective agent to
protect coating from
potential growth of fungus
and bacteria
Material
Roughness
Height?
0.005 ± 0.002
0.1 5 ±0.05
Static
Measurement
(nC/g)
-5.84 +0.56
-6.29 +0.62
+0.01 + 0.01
+0.01 + 0.01
+0.020 +0.08
K,flUte,_042706
Electrostatics greatly influences small particles
Static measurement of fluidized spores
Material
Tested
Powdered
spores
Powdered
spores
Charge1
(nC/g ± SD)
+31. 5 ±1.1
+31. 3 ±1.1
Spores aerosols were not
neutralized and were likely charged
as a function of the nature of the
powder dissemination
'Static monitor and Faraday pail,
Detection level was 0.01 nC
Characteristics such as size, coatings, electrostatics are useful information
to determine biothreat agent transport behavior
Adhesion Strength of Spores on Plastic is Stronger —
than Glass or Metal jS
• Effort to recover spores off surfaces could be more related to adhesive
forces of particle to surface than sampling efficiencies
• Adhesion Force Measurements (a combination of optical and atomic
force microscope, AFM) is a direct measurement of shear force
AFMtip
Normal force measurement
Adhesion force
Glass = 6.4 nN
Plastic = 40 nN
Shearforce measurement
Lateral Shear force
Glass= <20 pN
Plastic= 150 pN
Spore Deposition Velocities Compared Against
Predictions from 3 Particle Models
• Deposition velocity for plastic
= 1.4cm/s, steel = 0.16cm/s,
fiberglass = 0.067 cm/s
• Free-flight, turbophoretic and
sublayer predictive models
• Size, density, velocity, duct
dimensions and surface
roughness
• Spore deposition rates were
bounded by all 3 curves in the
rough (/c+=10) by not in the
smooth (/c+=0.1) as expected
• Calculations for deposition of
aerosols in turbulent flow is
from Fuch
Aerobiologia (2005) 21:155-172
2. Transport Efficiency in
Duct Material
Plastic
Galvanized
steel
Fiberglass
Aerosol
Dissemination
Efficiency (%)
1
10
12
New Ventilation Ducts
Total Values were calculated as
Dissemination
Efficiency (%)
Total dissemination efficiency
4 100^
1 2 where Tfl is the total CPU
passing through as aerosol, 1
,.0 istotal CPU surface depositio
IJ TE is total CPUs in powder
preparation
•Transport efficiency is defined as the to!
•The geometry of the system, airflow am
transport efficiency
• Surface interactions of electrostatics, Va
influence spore recovery
al dissemination efficiency
environmental conditions will influence
n der Waals, hydrophobicity and others
K,flUte,_042706 12
-------
Spore Deposition in 14.5 m3 Mock-Office
• Four hundred surface samples per room, -30-35% recovery
• Integrated software was used for the modeling
• Spore loss may also be attributed to (1) sampling and culturing techniques,
(2) nonviable spores, (3) reaerosolization and (4) overcoming spore-surface
adhesion forces
3. Spore Reaerosolization Potential in
Ventilation ducts
Spore
Reaerosolization
Tests Determined:
•Short-term reaerosolization
potential
• Long-term reaerosolization
potential
' On/Off reaerosolization
potential
Particles Reaerosolized Over Time
Simple flux model
! ,
>-^- 7 ^ -•-/
Galvanized Steel
Resuspension rate of
particles deposited on
the duct surface
fpMI linn [i—1|
Seven Fifteen Minute Airflow Cycles
4. Can We Inhibit Spore Transport?
Concept: Copolymer(s) Interact with
the Coulombic Forces on the Particles
Aerosol droplet (-100 |jm) containing
negatively charged copolymers (400
angstrom) attach to particles on surfaces
and in the boundary layer
j^v For example, an aerosol droplet
containing copolymer may attract
positively charged spores (1-3 urn)
Non-charged ends of the polymer
flocculate.
Copolymer coagulate as solvent
evaporates adhering particles to the
surface
Experimental Plan- Laboratory Tests
1. Deposit spores onto surface material(s)
2. Deposit copolymer solution onto
spore/surface material
• Deposition Velocity
Measure resuspension under
conditions of varying airflow and
mechanical action
• Resuspension Velocity
Application of a Liquid, Mist or Vapor Decon Agent Has
the Potential to Shear, Lift or Roll a Spore
Spore-Surface Forces: What Does it Take to Move a Spore?
Velocity field created by sedimenting
droplet near a surface
Spore binding ago-nt
droplet trajectory
Lattice-Boltzmann calculation on computer
cluster, approach velocity U=1.3 mm/s
Surfaces forces, particle properties
& flow field effect spore resuspension
-------
Field Test Apparatus
Air is drawn through an
instrumented 3.5 m3 chamber,
spores are disseminated into a
turbulent airflow and allowed to
settle in the chamber
Antistatic Aerosol Test Chamber
• Four impingers
located at 0.5,
0.75 and 1.4m
from the floor &
effluent
• Three APS ports;
2 in the chamber
and one on the
effluent
• Airflowto mix or
to resuspend
* Spore deposition
velocity &
reaerosolization
• Results pending
More Questions than Answers
' Will refined spores ever deposit?
- Forces of particle transport: thermal conduction
• What airflow & environmental conditions will reaerosolize spores?
- Shear force measurements
• Can we make the predictive models more useful with processes
derived from experimental data?
Summary
Spore 'enhancement' greatly influences deposition
velocity and transport efficiency
Characterization of particles & surfaces will aid
understanding of deposition and adhesion
Knowledge of spore-surface interactions and processes
will enhance predictive models
Resuspension was greater than predicted
We can inhibit spore reaersolization with a copolymer-
based, film-forming solution
Bioaerosol Project Investigators
Art Biermann, Aerosol Physicist
Mark Hoffman, Polymer Scientist
Lloyd Larsen, Microbiologist
Alex Vu, Biochemist
Todd Weisgraber, Fluid Dynamist
DaveZalk, Industrial Hygienist
Tim Ratto, AFM Engineer
Don Schwartz, Designer
Funded by the Departments of Homeland Security and Energy
Contact information:
Paula Krauter
krauter2@llnl.gov
(925) 422-0429
7000 East Ave. L-528
Livermore, CA 94551
-------
Studies of the Efficacy of Chlorine Dioxide
Gas in Decontamination of Building Materials
Shawn P. Ryan1, Vipin K. Rastoqi2, Lalena Wallace2,
G. Blair Martin1, Lisa S. Smith*, Saumil S. Shah*,
and Paul Clark*
II
'U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
Office of Research and Development
National Homeland Security Research Center
Research Triangle Park, N.C. USA
2R & T Directorate, U.S. Army-ECBC, APG, MD
•SAIC, Inc., Abingdon, MD
"Science & Technology Corp., Edgewood, MD
Background Motivation
• In the fall of 2001, a number of buildings were contaminated
with B. anthracis
• Three buildings, ranging from 700,000 - 14,000,000 cubic feet,
were decontaminated via chlorine dioxide fumigation
• Building clearance was based on "no growth" of any
environmental samples
- Over 10,000 clearance samples taken
- No sample positive for B. anthracis
Background Motivation
1 In all fumigation decontamination events for B. anthracis to date,
biological indicator/spore strips (Bis) have been used extensively
to indicate that target fumigant concentrations were reached
"throughout" the building
1 Sampling plan designed to locate placement of Bl
- Random/stratified locations
- Biased in locations of known contamination
- "Hard to reach places"
1 Criterion was one per 100 square feet, but up to three per
100 square feet were required to cover sampling plan
Background Motivation
Few positive Bl returns from some locations
- spot cleaning performed
On-going debate regarding sampling strategies
- Number and intended use of Bl
- Appropriateness of steel-backed Bl
- Approach to the environmental samples for site
characterization and clearance
What should the criteria be for building clearance?
How do you determine that the established criteria were met?
Objectives
1. Determination of the log reduction in viable avirulent Bacillus
anthracis (B.a.) spores as a function of chlorine dioxide (CD)
dose, concentration x fumigation time (CT value), on five
porous and one non-porous indoor building materials
- Liquid inoculation
- 7 log spores per coupon
- Coupons (1.3x1.3-cm) of non-uniform porosity
2. Comparison of the CT to achieve "no growth" on Bl to the "no
growth" of B.a. in the spores extracted from coupons of six
building materials
- 6 log spores per Bl
- Evenly dispersed
Experimental Procedure
• 13x13 mm coupons (5 reps per dish)
- raw wood, unpainted cinder block,
carpet, painted I-beam steel,
ceiling tile, wallboard
• Inoculated with ~107 spores of avirulent
B. anthracis (NNR1A1) in 7x 7.1 fiL drops
• Inclusion of 0.5 % Horse serum as
organic bioburden
Biological Indicator spores strips
B. atrophaeus (^1x106) on stainless steel
backing in Tyvek pouches (APEX)
-------
Experimental Procedure
5 plates, each containing 1 Bl, 30
inoculated, and 6 uninoculated, placed
in the chamber per fumigation
experiment
- one plate withdrawn per time point
CD generation by:
1) ClorDiSys GMP generator
CI2 + 2NaCIO2 -» 2NaCI + 2CD
2) Sabre Technologies
stripping CD from solution
Constant CD concentrations
maintained @ 500, 1000, or 1500 ppm
Temperature and RH maintained at
~75°F and -75% RH throughout the
fumigation
Test Matrix for Each CT Experiment
Per Time Point
6 Types of Test Coupons
+ positive + negative coupons 1_2
50-mL Tubes with 10-mL 42
Sonicated 10-min &
Vortexed 2-min
Dilutions/test sample &
Dilution each from controls
Plates/dilution
180
For samples with low viable
spore #, 1x3-mL samples pour-plated
Per 5 Time Points
210 Coupons
210 50-mL tubes
Dilutions tubes/test sample
(>0 Dilution tubes/controls
900 PLATES/Test samples +
180 PLATES/control samples
ZOO PLATES for pour-plate;
Decon of B. anthracis from Carpet
6-5
j
5-
__ 4-
O
D) 3-
Carpet - CIO
ClorDiSys
Sabre
ClorDiSys
CT (ppm-hr)
500 ppm
500 ppm
1000 ppm
ff n Sabre
i ClorDiSys
f Sabre
};
\
a Sabre
II Jo 0000.
1 000 pp
1 500 pp
1 SOOppr
3000 pp
i
• Large variability in data at
lowCT
• Kill curve and variability not
a function of CD generation
method
• Optimal CT not affected
by 2-fold increase in CD
concentration
• No growth from any
sample after fumigation with a
CT> 6000 ppm-hr for ALL
three concentrations tested
Effect of Material Type on Decon Efficacy
Unpainted Concrete Cinder Block - Sabre CIO I-beam Painted Steel - Sabre CIO
CT (ppm-hr)
CT (ppm-hr)
"No growth" criterion not achieved before 9000 ppm-hr dose on unpainted
cinder block or painted I-beam steel
Log reduction is dependent on CT, no distinct differences noted at
increasing CD concentrations (500 - 3000 ppm)
Effect of CD CT on Bl
Bis - Sabre CIO,
CT (ppm-hr) CT (ppm-hr)
No growth from any Bl after a dose of 5000 ppm-hr; note variability
- not consistent with results of B. anthracis (NNR1A1) on cinder block or wood
- Bis can not be used to indicate that a CT of 9000 ppm-hr has been achieved
Bl results are also independent of CD generation method
- consistent with observations made regarding log reductions on materials
Some Definitions & D-Value Concept
Sterilization is removal or destruction of all viable organisms
Disinfection is killing, removal or inhibition of pathogenic organisms: disinfectants are
chemical agents used on inanimate objects
Sanitization is reduction of microbial population to levels deemed safe, based on
public health standards
Microorganisms are not killed instantly and microbial population death usually occurs
exponentially
D-value is defined as time it takes for a decimal reduction in the number of viable
spores, i.e. if you have 10-million (7-logs) at time zero, exposure time required for a
disinfectant orfumigant to reduce the number of viable spores to 1-million (6-logs)
or 90% reduction is the D-value
Another measure of efficacy is CT, i.e. dose (concentration x time) required for
achieving a 6-log-kill reduction or no growth
We can define a D1 value, the time it takes for the first log reduction, as one measure of
efficacy of a sporicidal agent. Can this value be used to extrapolate a D6 or time
required for a 6-log reduction?
For building cleanup, the ONLY acceptable standard by EPA is "no
growth" of pathogenic spores from environmental samples!
-------
Computation of D-Values
Two Examples of D-value Derivation
Unpainted Pine Wood Carpet
O 35-
0> 30
D-value = -1/m =0.635 hrs = 38.1 min O 9,
04 06 08
Time [hours]
D-values with Increasing CD Cone. (Sabre)
Ceiling Tile Cinder Block I-beam Steel Wallboard
Material Types
Estimated D-values Using CD Gas Generated via ClorDISvs
& Sabre Technologies
1 40
1
I 3°
JL
T
1
f
I
Carpet Ceiling Tile Cinder Block I-beam Steel Wallboard Wood
Material Types
Non-linear D-Values
Example for the reduction of viable spores on unpainted pine wood
Extrapolation of D-values to Estimate D6
vs. Observed Values
Unique Features & Conclusions
• Two of the five porous materials, ceiling tile and wallboard,
resulted in participate debris, which necessitated use of 3
replicate plates instead of 1 or 2 plates per dilution to assay
for viable CPU
' Since kill curves were determined for sub-optimal CT dose,
where significant variability is expected, 5 replicate coupons
(instead of 3) were set up to better assess this variability
• For assuring low detection limit of viable spores (1-5), 1/3rd of
the recovered sample was pour-plated from each sample with
low number of viable spores
|
-------
Unique Features & Conclusions
• A lack of correlation between ease of spore decontamination
of Bl compared to anthrax spores (dried after liquid deposition)
on building materials was clearly evident
• CD gas generated by two distinct methods is similar in its
decontamination efficacy (i.e., CT required for "no growth")
• Carpet and ceiling tile materials are relatively easy to
decontaminate compared to wallboard, steel, and wood
• The kill curves of avirulent B. anthracis on all materials tested
are non-linear, and therefore, require a non-linear D-value
expression
Future Work
1 Further testing in design and use of a more "realistic Bl" for
building cleanup efforts
1 Decontamination efficacy of CD gas against higher spore
inoculum challenge levels, i.e. 8 or 9-logs
1 Comparison of decontamination efficacy of CD gas using
coupons inoculated with aerosolized vs. liquid spore
deposition
1 Decontamination efficacy of CD gas at sub-optimal process
parameters, i.e. 40% RH and/or 50°F temperature
1 Optimization of process parameters for CD gas to mitigate
material damage
-------
EPA/NHSRC On-going Research Efforts in
Understanding the Efficacy and Application
of Decontamination Technologic''
Shawn P. Ryan, Joe Wood, Emily Gibb and G. Blair Martin
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
National Homeland Security Research Center
Harry Stone, James Rogers, Emily Marsh, Young Choi,
William Richter, and Jack Waugh
Battelle Memorial Institute
Matt Clayton and Abderrahmane Touati
Arcadis G&M
Presentation Overview
> Systematic Decontamination Program
• Technology Testing and Evaluation Program
• Collaborative Interagency Agreement with ECBC
> Supporting Decontamination Technologies Research
• Fumigant kinetics studies
• Material demand
• Residual by-products
• Material compatibility
• Fumigant containment
Building Decon Technologies Studies £
TTEP: Systematic Decontamination
Investigation of commercially
ready, or near-ready,
technologies to decontaminate
biological/chemical agents in
indoor/outdoor scenarios
- parametric studies of most promising
technologies at non-optimal conditions
- systematic investigation of efficacy
against multiple chemical and biological p^pHii
agents
- investigation of agent/substrate
(material) and decon agent/material
interactions
Systematic Decontamination Studiesl
Determine decrease in viable biological organisms or the
decomposition of chemical agents as a function of time
Parameters:
> Agents
> Materials
> Technologies
• Concentration
• Temperature
• RH
Determine optimal concentration x time (CT) values for
agent/material combinations and the effect of non-optimal
conditions on the CT required for effective decontamination
Technical Approach
1. Agent Persistence
Manipulation of Environmental Conditions to Alter Persistence (MECAP)
• Is the agent persistent on an array of building materials at achievable
HVAC conditions or decontamination phase environmental conditions?
• Screening approach for decontamination study
• Can we distinguish the effect of the decontamination technology
from the "natural" attenuation?
2. Decontamination Technology Parametric Study
Unlike evaluation, systematic decon work involves:
• Efficacy on an array of agents as a function of concentration x time (CT)
• Efficacy at "non-optimum" conditions (T, RH)
Persistence Screening
Determine the natural decrease in bioactivity of biological
warfare agents applied to building surfaces as a function of
time under building HVAC system parameters
Vaccinia virus (Smallpox vaccine strain)
Ricin toxin
Coxiella burnetii
**spores not included due to their known persistence
ambient conditions (20 °C, 40 % RH)
higher T, lower RH (30 °C, < 40 % RH)
higher T, higher RH (30 °C, > 70 % RH)
Painted concrete
galvanized metal ductwork
-------
MECAP Results: Ricin Toxin
Persistence of Ricin Toxin on Painted Concrete
I 1
J Inoculation = 25 ug
] Average Recovery After 1 Hour Drying = 22.4 |jg
MECAP Results: Ricin Toxin
Persistence of Ricin Toxin on Galvanized Metal
MECAP Results: Vaccinia Virus
Persistence of Vaccinia Virus on Painted Concrete
^Average Inoculation = 7.1x10 PFU
1.0E+C
1.0E+C
1.0E+C
£1.0E+C
|l.OE+(
ll.OE+C
1.0E+C
1.0E+C
1.0E+C
e Recovery After 1 Hour Drying = 9.3x106 PFU
No observed virus at days 9 and 14 for the high
humidity treatment; plotted values show 1 PFU
HHigh RH(Run 1)
^LowRH(Run2) -A- Ambient RH (Runs 1, 2)
MECAP Results: Vaccinia Virus
Persistence of Vaccinia Virus on Galvanized Metal
1.0E408
1.0E407
1.0E-HJ3
1.0E402
:ulation = 6.8x10 PFU
^Average Recovery After 1 Hour Drying = 3.5x10 PFU I
ibserved virus for any coupons at days 3, 9 and 14 fi
ambient and high temp/high humidity treatments;
plotted values show 1 PFU
^LowRH(Run 2) -a- Ambient RH (Runs 1,2)
On-going and Planned Studies
1. Biological Agents:
> Agents: Bacillus anthracis Ames, ricin toxin, vaccinia virus
> Fumigant Technologies: SABRE CIO2, MeBr
> Liquid Technologies: amended bleach, 2 additional
2. Chemical Agents & TICs:
> Agents/TICs: Malathion, DMMP, TNT
Sarin, thickened Soman, thickened VX
> Fumigant Technologies: SABRE CIO2
> Liquid Technologies: TBD
Decontamination Technologies
Fundamental Research
> Material Compatibility and Material Demand
• Collaborative Interagency agreement with ECBC
• STERISVHP®
- Material demand work completed (presented at Decon 2005)
- Material compatibility report in-progress
• CDGCIOj
- Material demand and compatibility work in-progress
-------
Material Demand Results
> STERISVHP®
Decontamination Technologies
Fundamental Research
> EPA/ORD/NHSRC/DCMD's (RTP, NC)
Decontamination Technologies Research Laboratory
• Initial focus on CIO2 (ClorDiSys Cloridox GMP generator)
• Decomposition kinetics (homogeneous and heterogeneous)
• Residual reaction product analysis (MS-MS) from materials
• Material compatibility testing (incl. sensitive equipment)
• Fumigant containment research
- Permeability through materials (e.g., tenting)
- Adsorption (e.g., carbon filters)
Decontamination Technologies
Research Laboratory
Decontamination Technologies
Research Laboratory
CIO2 Measurement Methods
> ClorDiSys EMS/GMP
• Real-time detection using spectroscopy; 50-10,000 ppm
> AWWA SM 4500-CI02-E
• Modified for gaseous sample, CIO2 oxidizes iodide, which is then titrated
with sodium thiosulfate
• Detection range depends on gas volume sampled
> Drager Electrochemical Sensors
• Real-time electrochemical detection; 0-20 ppm
> OSHA ID-202
• Ion chromatographic detection of CIO2 reduced by Kl, CIO2"
• It also detects reduction product of chlorine gas
• Detection range dependent on gas volume impinged
Decontamination Technologies
Research Laboratory
CIO, Measurement Methods
Monitoring
Method
EMS or GMP
Monitor
Modified
4500-CIO2 E
Drager
sensor
ID-202 J
*- -^
Description
Real-time
Spectroscopic detection
of gas sample
Wet Chemistry: titration
of impinged sample
Real-time
Electrochemical
detection of gas sample
Wet Chemistry: Ion
Chromatography of
impinged sample
Concentration
Range (ppm)
50-10,000
32-32,000
0-20
0-100
Decontamination Technologies
Research Laboratory
Fumigant Permeability
Flow
controller
[CI02],n
(@T,RH)
From
mixing
chamber
Flow +
^" controller i :p
f^ Test Material 5 ^
) © Sample ©
Jlif: •^•-~>
Challenge
Chamber
Sample
Chamber
ASTM Test Cell
T, RH, P
ASTM method F 739-99A
Modified to also test
material under negative
pressure (-0.05" H2O)
Permeation as a function
of time and CIO2
challenge concentration
-------
Decontamination Technologies
Research Laboratory
Fumigant Adsorption Studies
ClorDiSys EMS
[CIOJ, T, RH, P
—Drager [CIO2]
(ID-202)
Drager [CO]
T, RH
• ASTM Method D 5060-95 (re-approved 2003)
"Standard Guide for Gas-Phase Adsorption
Testing of Activated Carbon"
• Breakthrough time (when [CIO2]out = 0.05 ppm)
as a function of bed depth
• Determine dynamic adsorption capacity
and critical bed depth of potential
sorbents
• Effect of RH and T
Decontamination Technologies
Research Laboratory
CIO2 Measurement Methods Comparison
B)
E 15
£ m
o
& 5
£
• . • •
o
• mg/L CIO2-
img/L Cl~
100 200 300 400
Minutes after sampling
• No detection of chlorine in sample (DL = 0.001 ppm for 120 L purge)
Decontamination Technologies
Research Laboratory
CIO2 Measurement Methods Comparison
SM-4500JE) CIO (ppm
F-Test results from comparison of fits; At the 0.05 significance level the
two datasets are NOT statistically different.
-------
i Homeland
Security
Rapid Methods to Plan, Verify and Evaluate
the Effectiveness of the Decontamination
Process
TinaCarlsen, PhD
Staci Kane, PhD
Matthew Verce, PhD
Paula Krauter
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
April 27, 2006
USEPA Decontamination Workshop
UCRL-PRES-220802
Great need to reduce the time required to resume
facility operations after a bioattack
LLNL has conducted research in two areas with
high potential to save time in the fumigation
process:
Methods to plan and evaluate the fumigation process
Methods to reduce sample analytical time for
fumigation verification and clearance
We are working on a simple fumigation
engineering design/ guidance tool
Chamber studies:
No transport effects
(USEPA/ECBC
material & viability study)
T
Room • scale studies:
1 Incorporate transport
(STERIS/ECBC mVHP® study;
LLNL/LBNL/STERIS VHP® studv)
Computational Fluid Dynamics:
"Untangles" transport terms for easy use
(STERIS/ECBC mVHP® study; LLNL/LBNL/STERIS VHP® study)
GOAL: An (existing) zonal model with enhanced
capabilities
-Estimates CT values
-Includes materials effects
- Zonal model: easy to use (e.g. not CFD!)
- Existing model: familiar (Don't reinvent the wheel!)
Completed a series of experiments on ducts
study effect of materials on decomposition
absorption cell
*f flow
venturi straightener
VHP® concentration markedly different in
galvanized versus PVC-lined steel duct
Galvanized steel
PVC - lined steel
Temp,87°F-84°F;Flow,~12acfm Length (ft]
•Galvanized steel duct catalyzes surfaces decomposition of VHP8
•Rate of catalysis decreases markedly with decrease in temperature
•Increasing flow rate will increase exit VHP8concentration
•PVC - lined steel is essentially inert toward VHPe
CFD reveals lower velocities, lower VHP®
concentrations at bends
Velocity contours VHP® contours
(diametrical
plane)
-------
Room experiments are underway
Validated CFD simulations will be used to
develop simpler analytical models
Goal is to enhance existing zonal models with
new capabilities
Estimating CT values
- Includes material effects
Simple, easy to use
Provide an ability to evaluate fumigation options
Current state-of-the-art for sample processing _
and analysis for B. anthracis
• CDC/LRN methods available for spore recovery
from swabs, wipes and HEPA vacuum socks
• Current throughput is about 30 samples/day
• Methods are labor- and time-intensive
Excessive sample handling including
centrifugation
Includes multiple transfer steps
Requires preparation of dilution series and plating
• Viability determination based on growth on
culture plate
• Requires confirmation by biochemical tests
Rapid, high-throughput viability method reduces
analytical time for verification and clearance 97
Rapidly determines viability of B.
anthracis or its surrogate
Improves on current turn-around
time and sample throughput
Methods for surface samples
- Compatible with CDC/NIOSH
samples and protocols
Methods for biological indicators
Development leveraged the
resources of BioWatch and earlier
work supported by DARPA
Basis of RV-PCR method is increasing DMA
copies over time through cell replication
200
50
K
Fl
B. anthracis
,»
/
/
01234
Culture Tim e (hr)
—
, — -
Culture Time (hr)
Smith, P. Coker, K. Montgomery, P. Imbro, P. Fitch
nding support from DARPA
There is a rapid increase in DMA copy
number during growth
RV-PCR based on specific and sensitive real-
time PCR assays
• Assays are spe
B. anthracis
* 8 log linear ran
• Detection limit
• Results in < 40
cific for
(B.globigii) -
3e
< 5 cells
min
pc — a— I
» » 2*"I««2P^
• / //" ///
- " Hit ///
t r t 4 r ; /
//// : ///
/ / /' / X /J<
PCR Cycle
Le, ..».„„,,«,
Real-time PCR assays work in environmental backgrounds
.11
Criteria were developed & tested to accurately
distinguish live cells from dead spores
• Shift in fluorescence respc
in DMA and thus, cell num
Accurately distinguishe
• Validated with spores kille
irradiation, steam sterilizat
• 14 hr endpointfor surroga
large sample set
• Results confirmed with •••
culture-based methods „,
nse curve indicates increase
jer
s live cells from dead spores
d by chlorine dioxide,
ion
e validated with
^***y£"
Endpoint / *
""""' / /
/ / res'p'oL
r y
/ jf N«SM»«
PCR cycle
-------
Biological Indicators (Bis) used for fumigation efficacy_
testing and as a model for spores on surfaces
< 9 mm diam. stainless steel disc in Tyvek/Tyvek package
(Apex Labs)
B. atrophaeus ATCC #9372,106 spores/disc
Uses 96 well plates for culturing and high-throughput
sample processing
More representative of hard surface than paper strips
Rapid, high-throughput protocols for sample
processing
Manual, semi- and fully-automated
protocols depend on sample type
Sample Type
HEPASock
Filter Cartridge
Air Filter
Biological Indicator
RV-PCR Target Sample
Volume (# processed/day)
High 100's
LowlOO's
High 100's
Mid-High 100's
MidtoHighlOOO's
CDC processed ~30 samples/day for Brentwood (wipe or sock)
With automation can improve by factor of 10-100
Bis can be processed in volume of 1000's (~100/block)
Automated protocols differ at the front end
RV-PCR consistently detects -10 spores in hi
dead spore background
"fe
Controls
100 live
10 live
10* dead
RV-PCR
50/50
50/50
0/78
Culture
47/50
26/50
0/78
Detected 100% of spore samples in 106 dead spore
background at 14 hr
RV-PCR gives specific detection; culture is non-
specific
CIO2 Field Test of RV-PCR demonstrated
accuracy and rapid, high-throughput capacity ||
Analytical
Method
Approx.
CT (ppm)
RV-PCR
Method
Standard
Method
Subtotal
Total w/ ct
Spore
106
104
106
104
ntrols
0 750 1500 3000 4500 6000 7500 9000
50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50
50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50
120 120 120 120 120 120 120 120
Number
400
80
400
80
960
1130
10% blind positive controls (prepared in field)
Inhibition studies conducted for highest exposure
10% positive and 10% negative controls for PCR
All samples bar-coded and tracked through each process step
Sabre CIO2 technology used to demonstrate RV-PCR
Chlorine dioxide concentration, temperature and
RH were carefully controlled during testing
Consistent CIO2 exposure
Average 79-85 ° F and 78-81 % RH
-------
RV-PCR method (< 17 h) was accurate with
culture method (7 d)
A
Hundreds of samples exposed to non-lethal levels of CIO2
No significant difference between RV-PCR and culture results,
P>0.05
10" Bis RV-PCR results agreed with culture results
Culture method had 1.5% false positive rate determined by qPCR
RV-PCR method showed no cross contamination
or false negatives
No false negatives for RV-PCR method
- based on visual growth at 2, 4, and 7 days
No cross contamination
No influence of 'residual' CIO2
Web-based sample tracking/ put. FPMOOM
data analysis tools ™
allowed rapid reporting f,
RV-PCR uses high-throughput processing
protocols for environmental samples
Compatible with CDC/NIOSH sample
types and real-time PCR analysis
Handles high levels of environmental
backgrounds (dirt, debris, etc)
For 2" x 2" dirty wipe samples:
- 96 samples processed in 4-8 hour
depending on filtration method
- Spore recovery efficiencies > than
those from CDC protocols
Additional protocols designed for
other sample types
Protocols are compatible with swabs, vacuum
socks, and filters
Several field tests successfully demonstrated
RV-PCR environmental wipe protocols
Dugway Proving Grounds
- 8' x 8' mock office sampled after release
of aerosolized B, atrophaeus spores
- 100 wipe samples and controls
- Method handled high levels of
background debris
LLNL Chemistry Building
- >1000 floor and wall sam pies spiked with
low spore numbers
—10 spore detection limit
CIO2 exposed and killed spores
- Consistently distinguished live cells
from dead spores on dirty wipes
RV-PCR technology performed well for fumigation
efficacy testing and clearance sampling
• Fumigation Efficacy Testing: >1000 Bis exposed to 8
levels of CIO2 to compare RV-PCR to standard culturing
- RV-PCR results at~17 hr matched culture results (7 days]
- Automated protocols allow processing of 1000 Bis/day
• Clearance Sampling: 100 wipe samples from DPG, 100's
of wipes from LLNL buildings (floors and walls)
- All DPG samples were positive via RV-PCR despite
presence of high levels of background debris
• Good correlation with plate counts
- Detection limit on spiked dirty wipes consistently -10
spores
- Automated protocols allow processing of ~200 wipes/day
Next Steps for RV-PCR development: Vegetative
cell pathogens
• Viable vegetative cell pathogens can be
detected in hours rather than days
Analysis time for:
y. pestis
Brucella sp.
F. tularensis
Rapid Viability
PCR
6-8 hr
6-8 hr
8-1 Ohr
Conventional
Assay
3-5 days
5-7 days
/days
K. Smith & M. McBride et al., DARPA supported
Y. pestis in <8 hr in background of HEPA
vacuum sock filled with debris
Development will focus on high-throughput sample
processing while maintaining viability and
quantitative RV-PCR
-------
RV-PCR Additional Next Steps
Demonstrate RV-PCR methods for other
environmental sample types in high-throughput
- HEPA vacuum socks, filters, swabs
Develop and evaluate quantitative RV-PCR
Determine initial viable spore or cell density for
characterization and fumigation efficacy testing
Integrate sample processing protocols with
BioWatch/LRN detection protocols
RV-PCR has great potential to reduce the time to
resume facility operations
• Rapid high-throughput viability methods available
for environmental wipes and Bis
• The analysis time for Bis was reduced from 7 d to
-17 hr
< 24 hr for wipe samples
• RV-PCR showed the same sensitivity!
as culturing
Highly accurate in multiple field tests |
• Automated and manual protocols
available
Protocols for other sample types
are ready for field testing
-------
Agent Fate Program
Presented at
2006 Decontamination Workshop
Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA)
27 April 2006
Dr. James Savage, DTRA, 410-436-2429
james.savage@us.army.mil
r
EN1?AT€
What is the Objective of
the Agent Fate Program?
| Improve model predictions of agent persistence |
Objectives:
• Measure and understand the agent/substrate interactions
• Develop predictive algorithm module
Payoffs:
• Support all capability areas:
detection, protection, decontamination
• Augments operational and mission area analysis tools
Joint Effects Model (JEM)
Joint Operational Effects Federation (JOEF)
• Direct feed to Low Level Toxicology DTO (CB.51)
AGWTHOS
Why Do We Need an
Agent Fate Program?
| Models give varying and inaccurate persistence predictions
Field manuals and models
built from limited data
sets & questionable data
Temp
10-30°C
GD
HD
VX
n
|
I
Mf
W\ '
AiJ 1-^
^~- -~"~
FP
Liquid
No Ava
m
_£;
T:
_^
A 3-4
V ap o r
7 - 20 +
I 18-20+
F
Liquid
Not Ava
Not Ava
Not Ava
1
m
I
\ 9
"~--~^^
M 3-9
Vapor
5 - 48
1800 -3600
3
Analysis Tools Chosen to
Match System Under Study
| Best tools applied with strict quality control for high-fidelity |
Evaporation
Wind Tunnels
Sorption
Agent/Substrate
Interaction
Measurements
MsStlK -
Agent Fate
Concept and Approach
Predictive
Modeling
Statistical
Design of
Experiments
A
Lab/Wind Tunnel
^ Surface
Evaporation
Methodology
Development
Understanding of
Agent/ Surface Chemistry
Science Based
Predictive
Capability for
Agent
Persistence
Secondary evap.
model for JEM
Interim
VLSTRACK
CHEMRAT/JOEF
Field Manuals 5
Design of Experiments Minimizes
the Number of Experiments
• Now, about 1500 experiments with
CCD approach
• 3 levels for each parameter
Created central composite
design (CCD) experimental
test matrix
Developed surface
evaporation assessment tool
Incorporated 26,115 new
data elements into
evaporation database
Completed phase II literature
analysis
Fielded CHEMRAT phase I
HD on Concrete CCD Experiments
-------
AGENT.-;
Wind speed near
the drop
Atmospheric
Surface Layer
w
(ffl
1
p
-^7
d 7
Free Stream
-Turbulent Flow
Region
Surl
La
Hei
Droplet
AdfNI-; -
Range of Wind Tunnel
Sizes Used in Agent Fate
50-cm
Environmental
Test Facility
5-cm design enables
multiplexing of tunnels in
chemical fume hoods
m Single/Multiple Droplet
AGENTFA-TC
Scale Independence of
Agent Fate Wind Tunnels
o No scaling corrections are required between the various sizes of
O wind tunnels used in the Agent Fate Program. Since the tunnels
O all possess the same velocity profiles (based on realistic wind
conditions), the agent/substrate combinations being tested
experience the same air flow and evaporation environment.
Accordingly, identical data should be obtained for identical
agents/substrates tested in any of the tunnels. This finding allows
the results from the tunnels to be directly compared and also
eliminates the need to perform duplicate tests in the different
tunnels.
^^-^^^"^^^"^^
•"•<* • v*. - Based on assessment by:
NO SCALING J Dr. Klewicki, University of Utah
CORRECTIONS ^ Recognized expert in theoretical and
experimental atmospheric boundary
REQUIRED l"~
O
o
O
O
Shrinking Down
the Atmosphere
AGENTHUt
3rd Generation
ECBC Wind Tunnel
5 x 5-cm Wind Tunnel
Operational Arrangement
Control
System
Computer
Agent/Substrate Sample
-------
Preliminary Persistence Estimates
AGENTMTE HD on Concrete / Sand Vapor Hazard
Preliminary comparisons of evaporation from operationally relevant substrates
safe unmasking time safe unmasking time
non-porous & concrete sand surface
4 to 4 1/2 hours 8+hours
50 100 150 200 250
Time (Minutes)
AdfNI-; -
Quantitative Image Analysis
Determines Drop Volumes
6 |j|_ HD on Glass
Sessile
Drop
Volume
-!_„ Height /3
* Height «
AGENTHkJE
Image Analysis Determines
Drop Spread Automatically
AGENT ?il
Measuring Drop Shape
Within a Substrate
Concrete sample
Exposed to Agent
Allowed to soak in
Concrete is broken
Exposing cross-section
Developed with Iodine
Non-perturbing process
Photographed
Imaging Systems Display
Agent / Substrate Interactions
Imaging techniques quantify agent penetration into porous media
Asphalt - 4 days
Concrete - 4 hours
Agent/Surface
Interaction Studies
-------
AGENT;;
Agent /Surface
Interaction Studies
NMR determines reaction rates and product identity in materials
«(.rNi ~-± -
HD* and Water on
Asphalt, Sand & Limestone
The sulfonium ion H-2TG (toxic) was the major product, >75%.
An alcohol - thiodiglycol (non-toxic) and/or chlorohydrin - was also formed.
Half-lives: ~1 month for asphalt and limestone, 1-2 weeks for sand.
J.J2.—( j p," '»•» »-•
Ail.7 j|]|,I
„„,>.- It fl
AGENTTOIE
Methodology
Development
Results: Degradation of HD*
on Ambient Substrates
Limestone No reaction in 7 months 1 month
Asphalt No reaction in 2 months 1 month
Sand No reaction in 7 months 1-2 weeks
Mortar Half-lives of weeks to years 3-9 days
Concrete Half-lives of weeks to years 3-9 days
AGENT ?ii
Direct Analysis
in Real Time (DART)
Revolutionary ion source for prep-free
surface analysis with MS
Aluminum
Concrete
Bird Feather
!«J 250 300
Open Air
Testing
The Challenge -
Generate realistic agent fate
data in a controlled laboratory
environment
CY 2006 Open Air Field Trials
Laboratory model corrected and
validated against open air
field trials
Improving Secondary Evaporation is
Key to Improving Hazard Prediction!
Reducing the error between predictions and observations
-------
Improving Field
AGENTMi-rc Persistence Estimates
AFMAN
-50 -»
Surface
G].i;-
Bare -Metal (
Uood
10-26
+50 °C
1
•
2
2 7.
I
-A-
U-L,b
u
R-" S
IKu"ii.n V\ K..mcr
0s
1 tr
x
0"
u*
IV
(HDo
Temp
(°C)
15
35
55
Agent Fate
odel Predictions
n Non-porous Surface)
2-m Height
Wind speed (mis)
0.5 3.0 6.0
24 7 6
4 1 1
1 0.5 0.5
| More accurate and precise contact hazard estimates
25
A'.jtMl,^ t
Agent Fate is a Team Effort!
AGENTFATl
Agent Fate
Transitions Knowledge
Augmenting TTPs & Field Manuals
Agent Fate DTO -» Low-Level Toxicity DTO
Follow-on
DTO for NTAs
Transitioning to Acquisition Programs
JEM,
JEM
JOEF
TIP
VLSTRACK
JOEF, VLSTRACK
Joint Effects Model
Joint Operational Effects Federation
Techniques, Tactics and Procedures
Vapor, Liquid, and Solid Tracking
26
QUESTIONS ?
-------
\ Homeland
' Security1
Stakeholder Issues Surrounding
Chemical Agent Restoration
(Selected Viewgraphs)
Ellen Raber2 and Annetta Watson3
in collaboration with
Linda Hall2, V. Hauschild4, John Sorensen3, Robert Ross3, Karen Folks2
Apr 26-28, 2006
1Work supported by DHS Office of Research and Development, ^Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory,
30ak Ridge National Laboratory, 4U.S. Army Center for Health Promotion and Preventive Medicine
I This presentation will cover key aspects for
r_3 transit facility chemical agent restoration
General cleanup issues and decision framework
Stakeholder concerns
Regulatory requirements and cleanup recommendations
Cleanup requirements and restoration issues
are site-specific
1 Understanding cleanup requirements is key to guide
ft a risk-informed decision-making process
Determines if an actual or potential impact to health, property or the
environment exists
Guides necessary actions to restore essential facilities and/or operations
Guides whether or not decontamination is needed
Provides for understanding of potential secondary contamination and
waste generation issues
Impacts other decisions for long-term regulatory and stakeholder review
Whether or not cleanup criteria have been met
Whether or not to reoccupy or resume operations
Whether longer term monitoring should be employed
fW Agent Reentry and Decontamination (5
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^•^^^K^^^^V^^^^MM
.upic addressed by Programmatic EIS for Chemical Stockpile Disposal
Program (Jan 1988) for DA Program Manager for Chemical Demilitarization
(Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD)
Emergency response planning underway at CW disposal site host
communities under Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program
(CSEPP)(approx. 1991-present) (FEMAand DA)
Planning Guidelines for Recovery Phase Activities for Chemical Stockpile
Disposal Program (FEMAand DA.1997)
CW agent-specific Reference Doses to establish basis for clean up of both
active and formerly used defense sites (NRC, 1999; DA 1998, 2001); used to
develop soil screening levels by USACHPPM (1999)
Ongoing focus area for DHS Chemk
Countermeasures Program as part of Ch<
"Decontamination issues for chemical and biological warfare
agents: How clean is Clean Enough?" first published in 2001 £&.
How Clean
Is Clean
Enough?
How Clean
Is Safe?
ENVIRONMENTAL
IEALTH RESEARCH
Raber, E., Jin, A., Noonan, K.,
McGuire, R., and Kirvel, R.D.
je 1, February , 2004, but
guidance has been updated since paper composition
-------
Additional sources used in this study
Opresko, D., R. Young, A Watson, et al 2001. Chemical warfare agents:
Current status of oral reference doses. Rev. Environ. Contam. Toxicol.
172: 65-85.
• Watson, A, K. Bakshi, D. Opresko, et al 2006. Cholinesterase inhibitors as
chemical warfare agents: Community preparedness guidelines. Ch.5 in R.
Gupta (ed) Toxicology of organophosphate & carbamate compounds.
Associated Press.
• Watson, A, D. Opresko, R. Young, et al 2006. Development and application
of acute exposure guideline levels (AEGLs) for chemical warfare nerve and
sulfur mustard agents. JTEH, PartB 9: 173-263.
More available upon request
I Overall objective for this work has been aimed
=L^ at addressing 5 key areas for CW related incidents
Implement an effective framework with recommendations to
address key stakeholder issues
Summarize existing chemical warfare agent and toxic industrial
chemical exposure guidelines and apply to airports
Survey existing regulatory guidelines for agent and agent-waste
disposal requirements
Recommend facility restoration and site clearance guidelines
applicable to workers and the general public (transit passengers)
Apply standard assumptions and procedures to develop interim
exposure guidelines where guidance is lacking
Cleanup levels drive all consequence management
activities within decision framework
CRISIS MANACEMEN I
FIRST RESPONSE
HEQCCWANC*
Study has focused on multiple compounds of
concern |
Nerve and blister chemical warfare (CW) agents
- Nerve agents GA,GB,GD,GF,VX
- Blister agents H/HD
Selected Toxic Industrial Compounds (TICs) with history of
deployment by terrorist groups
- Hydrogen Cyanide, Cyanogen Chloride, Phosgene
Critical Degradation Products from agents and TICs
Compounds with key toxicological characteristics
- Either immediate or delayed effects following short-term exposure to toxic
concentrations
- Range of potency with potential for large scale impact
- Multiple effects; compound-specific organ/system targets
- Compounds designed for rapid and severe action on combatants; most
dissipate rapidly and chronic exposure not an issue
Input to the restoration process has involved
review/development of key exposure guidelines §
Am bient vapor concentrations (inhalation/ocular, dermal)
- Occupational
- General Public
- Transit passengers
Skin vapor exposure (occupational)
Surface contact
Ingestion guidelines
Critical agent degradation products
Waste disposal regulatory guidelines and disposal path options
Long-term monitoring approaches
Principal chemical warfare agent degradation
products have been reviewed
Key Degradation Products
• Thiodiglycol
None of concern
Methylphosphonic acid
Isopropyl methylphosphonic acid
Methylphosphonic acid
Methylphosphonic acid
Ethyl methylphosphonic acid
S-(diisopropylaminoethyl)-methylphosphonothioate (EA2192)
-------
Post-incident environmental monitoring may be
important for stakeholder confidence
Monitoring should focus on both persistent and more volatile compounds
- Degradation and/or intermediate breakdown products need to be
considered
- Since event short-duration (non-continuous source) release; long-term
persistence not expected
Worker monitoring should utilize existing protocols/guidelines from
industrial releases and CW agent related facilities
- Utilize compound specific TWAs (WPLs) or STELs as established by
NIOSH/OSHAandCDC
- Tooele Chemical Agent Disposal Facility Monitoring Plan
- Newport Chemical Depot
Skull Valley VX Incident (Dugway Proving Ground) degraded after 6 months
Restoration requirements for the civilian sector are
very demanding/conflicting
Economic Drivers are significan
with regard to critical
transportation infrastructure
Fast
Adequate
Reduced Cost"-
Utilize more
hazardous
approaches if
faster/adequate
Stakeholders want high
assurances that facilities/areas
are "safe" for reoccupancy
Safe
Best
Cost Effective
Employ
noncorrosive/
nonhazardous
strategies
I Remediation/cleanup decisions are site-specific and
3 must address stakeholder concerns
Site-specific parameters and usage are key
Likelihood of effect on exposed population(s):
- Potential acute and long-term chronic impacts
- Relevant exposure (e.g., inhalation, dermal, secondary ingestion) routes
- Mobility, fate and multimedia transport of contaminants
Damage and associated costs to land, water, property and equipment
Cost/availability of remediation/decontamination options with time constraints
Potential secondary contamination and waste generation issues
Confidence in remediation methods; including sampling/verification
Public perception and stakeholder
issues will drive cleanup
requirements
Economic drivers and inconvenience
influence stakeholders to accept
higher risks
^
: For additional information, please contact: Grl
•
Ellen Raber
Deputy Program Leader
Chemical and Biological Countermeasures Division
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
7000 East Avenue, L-179
Livermore, CA 94551
Ph: (925) 422-3985
Email: raber1@llnl.gov
Annetta Watson
Guidelines Team Leader
Life Sciences Division
Oak Ridge National Laboratory
1060 Commerce Park Drive, MS6408
Oak Ridge, TN 37830-6480
Ph (865) 576-21 25
Email: watsonap@ornl.gov
s^^wc^s™,^ 16
-------
1HSRC Radiou
Decon R&D Program
i Workshop on Decontamination, Cleanup, and
isociated Issues for Sites Contaminated with Chemic;
Biological, or Radiological Materials
John MacKinney
Homeland Set
Background on Rad. Clean Up
2005 Initiatives
Strategy
Literature Search Efforts
ROD Workshop
Nuke Workshop
2006+ Technology R&D
INDs and Other Initiatives
There are three general types of attack
involving radiological or nuclear materials
about which we are concerned:
Radiological dispersal device (RDD)
Nuclear weapon, of improvised nuclear device
(IND)
Attack on a nuclear facility (which we will not cover)
The urban dirty bomb is more likely, thus the
higher R&D priority
Dirty bomb intelligence, perceived imminence
based on ease of deployment
Primary focus - decontamination
technologies for an urban RDD
• Including basic supporting science
Radiological Dispersal Device
(RDD): Any device used for the
dissemination of radioactive
material in the environment with the
intent to cause harm
Approach: The 80% Solution -
focus on R&D for rapid urban RDD
decontamination technologies
Will begin work on IND impacts,
remediation strategies
Response, except as relates to
decontamination, control, mitigation
technology needs
i.e., not detection/measurement, sampling,
communications, PPE,...
Food, agriculture, or other non-urban
scenarios/environments
Groundwater remediation
Indoor decontamination
Risk or risk analysis
Worker H&S
-------
Current U.S. experience in radiological
decon and site restoration is bounded by
commercial and Federal sector legacy site
clean ups
Done under CERCLA, 10CFR20, state regs
Generally, modus is demolition, or removal
of surface layer
Decontamination used more for waste
minimization than free release of structures
Technologies are designed for specific
purposes; the more high tech, generally
the fewer applications
Presumption: after an ROD, restore the area
leaving infrastructure intact and preserved
Technically, "we can clean up anything," but,
dirty bombs pose unique challenges
Occupied urban environment
Significant logistical problems
Significant cost, time, political and economic pressures
Size is the issue: small particles; large area
Tiny particles travel farther, harder to decon
Surface area to be decontaminated, outdoor/indoor, is
potentially enormous (millions of sq. meters); becomes
the driving factor
Clean-up strategies driven by time, cost, dose
considerations, and public acceptability
Challenge - decontaminate faster, better,
cheaper
Search out decon technologies
Library/database search; DOE, commercial
sources
Vender requests
Work by others; Nat'l Labs, ORIA, OSWER
Other data sources
Will add technologies to NOT Portfolio
ROD Clean-Up Workshop
Scenario-driven look at clean-up needs for a major
ROD incident
Describe the operational environment, practical
considerations, and technology needs for decon and
clean up
Focus and prioritize R&D project funding
Technologies were being evaluated in isolation,
not in "real-world" context
Goal: identify, fund development of promising
ROD decon/clean-up technologies and tools
(the 80% solution), that meet the "real-world"
need
Approach - assemble federal and private sector
experts to compare/contrast current technologies
and approaches needed in order to identify
technology R&D directions/opportunities
Problem Assessment
Used HSC Scenario #11; LANL provided deposition
modeling
Attempted to describe the operational environment of
ROD clean up and site restoration
Assumed DHS RDD/IND optimization clean-up
approach and implementation plan
Focus on procedural/technology transferability,
parallels and gaps; what works; what doesn't?
what needs/gaps exist?
Participants - EPA field and HQ, DHS, DOE,
USAGE, DARPA
Speakers - EPA, Nat'l Labs, private sector
-------
ROD Scenario, and DHS clean up optimization
and implementation plan
Overviews of Superfund, commercial clean ups
Administrative - planning and management,
record keeping, cost estimation, personnel
issues
Worker health and safety (industrial and rad.)
Site deactivation, preparation
Site characterization/final status surveys
Dismantling technologies
Decontamination technologies
Emerging technologies
Waste management; shipping, packaging,
disposal
Case studies - WTC, Cintichem, lr-192 refinery
fire, TMI (concrete decon)
Preliminary Conclusions -Practical:
A large size makes site clean up extremely complicated
Project management will be very difficult
Site characterization will need better methods
Speed may be critical to successful decon
Decon approaches will change - 137Cs binding, rain,
decon water, cross-contam, local priorities
High vertical surfaces require specialized approaches
Contam spread, cross-contam and recontam are
inevitable and a major problem
Technologies must be faster, better, cheaper
New software tools may be useful time/cost savers
No waste disposal options are evident
Preliminary Conclusions -Technological:
Current decon technologies are inadequate
Radio-compound, PSD, surface chemistry are critical
factors in decon technology selection
Leading approach, strippable coatings, is not the answer
(very limited use), neither is sealant
An assortment of technologies will be needed
Low-tech approaches may be most valuable; brush and
vacuum systems, aqueous washing, scabbling
Cannot avoid destructive, removal techniques
Remote operation, automation techs needed to minimize
worker doses, manpower
- Need engineering to reach high surfaces
Special attention needed for nooks and cracks
Subsurface effects cannot be overlooked
Waste generation must be managed, minimized;
preplanning is critical
Workshop helped define how decon
technologies can meet clean-up needs
Technology must:
Technology must fit into urban dirty bomb clean-up
operational environment, procedures, requirements
Be selected for a specific task in a specific
environment
Be part of the whole clean up plan, acceptable to
regulators and the public
Meet clean-up criteria
Minimize waste
Prove speedy and cost-effective
Be demonstrated in the field
(No silver bullets, but a number of promising
directions)
Literature search and technology Dbase
FY05-
RDD Rapid Decon - identify and test
promising technologies on cont'd urban
substrate Fvoe-w
ROD water/wastewater impacts analysis
FY04-06
ROD Waste Estimator (TSWG) FYOS-OJ
ROD particle-surface chemistry analysis
FY06-09
ROD infiltration characterization
Alpha/Beta detector for in-line water
monitoring (TSWG) FYOS-OT
-------
Other potential ROD projects include:
Characterize ROD urban deposition
Develop technologies for rapid 3D characterization of
urban contamination
Adapt existing technologies that are scalable to meet
unique dirty bomb environment - high heights,
automated, efficient waste management
Develop technologies to decon underground pipes,
subsurface areas
Develop and/or test technologies for large volume water
capture and treatment
Develop software tools to estimate ROD clean-up costs
Develop and test indoor decon techniques (for very low
level contamination)
Develop guidance for indoor/outdoor decon approaches
Summer 2010?; Hold a large-scale, live-
agent dirty bomb technology T&E
Potential goals; test, evaluate, validate -
Dirty bomb particle formation, urban
dispersion modeling, deposition
Efficacy of selected decon technologies on
common urban substrates (concrete, brick,
marble, asphalt, ...) in a large scale, outdoor
environment
Possible location; Nevada Test Site
Partners; EPA/OSWER, DHS/S&T,
HSARPA, National Labs
Nuclear Weapon R&D
You thought RDDs were bad?
Historically, nukes not an EPA issue
• But, it is under the NRP, Nuc/Rad Annex
Held a 1-day EPA-only introductory
nuclear weapons workshop, May '05
• Basics - science, health, protection
• Basic nuke design and physics (U)
• Nuclear weapons effects
• Recovery role and needs
Discussed EPA's role/responsibility,
clean-up gaps/needs, potential for R&D
Nuclear Weapon R&D
Basic R&D Needs
• Effects on a modern urban
environment (DHS)
• Nature of fallout from an urban det.
• Physical/chemical characteristics of
fallout particles
• various sources, zones of the torus
• Radionuclide partitioning in particles
• Urban deposition
« Decontamination, mitigation, control,
remediation technology R&D
Focus on large urban ROD
The 80% solution
ROD Workshop helped define the
operational environment for ROD
clean up and guide technology R&D
investment
Several initiatives underway
Nuke clean up R&D a major
challenge
-------
Primer on Rad Contamination
RDD contamination is most likely
articulates dispersed as aerosol
lust be removed - cannot be neutralized
Loose" (smearable) -wiped, vacuur..
Drubbed, washed
Fixed" - chemically extracted (chelation,
solvents, gels) or mechanically removed
(scabbling, grit blasting, grinding)
Worst case is demolition
Disposed as rad waste
Decori or Demolish
Decon Challenges Drive
Technology Selection
No "Silver Bullet" - Myriad technologies exist-toolbox approach
Tim ing - Decon is more difficult as time passes
- Absorbed into substrate
- Increased footprint (spread by response activities, traf.._, ,
resuspension)
Substrates
- Multiplicity of materials/properties
'crevices
- ounaue condition (deposits/pollutants, weathering, etc)
Geometry of buildings
- Access (multistory, alley size, etc)
- Ornate architecture, nooks and crannies
End state issues (significance, cost/benefit, etc)
-------
econ Technologies Developed for
Nuclear Industries
Microwave Ablation
Water Washdown? Opinions Differ
Pros:
- Cheap and fast
- Knocks down removable
- Simple equipment/skills
required
- "Dilution is the solution"
Increases mobility of
contaminants
Increases footprint
(wastewater treatment
systems, stormwater
systems, streets,
reservoirs, etc)
Produces huge
"secondary waste"
Does not remove fixed
contamination
Exacerbates fixed
contamination problem
-------
Microwave Ablation
• Exfoliates concrete
Laser Ablation
• Thermal vaporization
Electro-Kinetic
• Electrical field induce-
migration of ions
cteria
"Eats" concrete surface
>t yet commercialized, i
ar term RDD applicatio
Methods
igh-Tech)
il V
So what is NHSRC doing?
-------
Technology Demonstration
Collaboration with other Agencies underway
• Natl Labs (Argonne, Sandia, Los Alamos, INL, ORNL)
• TSWG
EPA Technology Testing & Evaluation Program (TTEP) existing
chem/bio program will be expanded to support radiological
EPA in-house
rechnology Fostermi
NHSRC radioloaical oroiects onaoina and/or
ROD Waste Estimator (with TSWG) FY06-07
ROD Surface Chemical Interaction pvoe-os
Alpha/Beta Detector for In-line Water Monitoring (TSWG
FY05-07
ROD Infiltration Characterization FYOT-OS
Nuclear Fallout Characterization (DHS.DTRA) FY07-09
Water/Wastewater System Capture/Decon (TSWG) FYOT-O
illaboration/Communication
n Workshops (2005,2006)
Workshop (2005)
Nuclear Consequence Management Workshops (2005,2007
EPA (NHSRC/WIPD, ORIA, OW, NOT)
Other Agency contacts
FedBizOps (Sources Sought, RFP for tech demo)
Participation on other agency stakeholder groups
Commercial decon technologies exist -
none universal - few ready for urban
deployment
EPA/NHSRC pursuing low-tech, "tool box"
approach
R&D aimed at near-term deployable
technologies
Pursuing collaboration with other
stakeholders
-------
-------
RDD aerosolization experiments
History/Applications/Results
Fred Harper
Sandia National Laboratories
Major pathways from release
Background
Types of Radiation and Exposures
• Alpha (a) radiation
- External: no skin penetration, no health risk
- Internal: damage soft tissue, health risk
- Examples: Pu-238, Am-241
Beta (/?) radiation
- External: some penetration, skin bums
- Internal: damage soft tissue, health risk
- Examples (pure Remitter): Sr-90
Gamma (7) radiation
- Highly penetrating
- External and internal health risk
- Examples (p and y): Cs-137, Co-60, lr-192
Neutron (ri) radiation
- Highly penetrating
- External and internal health risk
- Cf-252, Am-241/Be (small sources)
External
Internal
Background
Background
Some basic concepts
Small particles (< 10 |Jm) — primarily an
inhalation problem, but can also be a shine
problem
Large particles (> 100 |Jm - primarily a shine
problem)
To be an inhalation problem, particles must be
in the vicinity of people
Particle Size Effect
From Mike Brown (LANL)
Transport & Dispersion
OJC ***• Fje**t T** Ian
R f "
• 14 .la •• *•
5 micron particles
250 micron
particles
| Applications |
5 micron particles lofted high into the air, 250 micron particles settle towards ground
Deposition Patterns on buildings
(calculations using QUIC, Mike Brown, LANL)
-------
Goiania Brazil 1987: RDD Lessons
- -IT •
Background
Source
~1400Ci,Cs-137
CsCl salt (powder)
~ 60 gm of Cs-137 (1400 Ci) generated 40 tons of radwaste for disposal
Main Cleanup effort: 755 persons x 3 months = 68,000 person-days
Cleanup threshold: — 10 Ci/km2 (ground contamination)
Significant psychological effects on the immediate population
4 deaths
Background
More Basic Concepts
Alpha emitters much more of a problem if inhaled
Most of the alpha emitting radiological sources are in
ceramic form (low solubility - pneumonitis if
inhaled)
Most of the large Sr sources are in the ceramic form
(low solubility - pneumonitis if inhaled)
Most of the large Cs sources are in the salt form (high
solubility — haematopoietic syndrome if inhaled)
Most of the large Co sources are in the metal form
More than 500 RDD
aerosolization tests
have been performed
at SNL in the last 20 years
Have semi-empirical models
for metals in different
geometries, liquids, salts
ceramic powders, and
preliminary models for ceramics
ceramics
Past funding organizations
DOE NEST program
DOD DTRA
DOE international programs
Intel community
NRC
CDC
Material
Ag
Al
Bi
Co
Mo
Pb
[r
Stainless
Fa
U
Ce02
rb/pd
Co
CsCl
BaSO4
CeO2
MnO2
UO2
CeO2
CsCl
BaSO4
Physical Form
Meta
Meta
Meta
Meta
Meta
Meta
Meta
Meta
Meta
Meta
Ceramic (2 densities for each device)
Liquid
Liquid (several different relative
Slurry
Ceramic powder
Ceramic powder
Ceramic powder
Pressed powder
Powdered salt
Powdered salt
Strategies
Tested
7
2
Summary of Sensitivity Studies Performed
Nuclide
Sr-90
Cs-137
Co-60
Pu-238
Am-241
Cf-252
Ir-192
Ra-226
Primary Radiation
Beta (28.6 y)
Beta+Ba-137m
Gamma (30.17 y)
Beta, Gamma (5.27 y)
Alpha (87.75 y)
Alpha (2.64 y)
Beta, Gamma (74.02
d)
Alpha (1600 y)
(SrTiOj)
Salt (CsCl)
Metal
Ceramic (PuO2)
powder (AmO2)
Ceramic (Cf2O3)
Metal
Salt
(RaSO4)
Size of Source for
l.llxlO'GBq
(300,000 Ci)
7.4 x 10*5 GBq
(200,000 Ci)
1.11 xlO7 GBq
(300,000 Ci)
4.92 xlO6 GBq
(133,000 Ci)
Ci)
7.4 x 102 GBq (20
Ci)
3.7xl04GBq
(1000 Ci)
3.7xl03GBq
(100 Ci)
Application that Forms the Bask
for Size of Source
Large radioisotopic thermal
generator (RTG) (Russian ffihU-1)
Irradiator
Irradiator
RTG used for the Cassiri Saturn
space probe
Several neutron radiography or
well-logging sources
Multiple industrial radiography
Old medical therapy sources
„, 1
Realistic RDD Hazard Boundaries for Varying Device Designs
(Areas of highest concern for early response)
Groundshine dose of 100 rad,
24-hour exposure assumed
Inhalation dose of 100 rad to
the bone marrow (30-day
committed dose)
Inhalation dose of 270 rad to
the lung (30-day committed
dose)
lifetime inhalation dose of
100 rem (50-year committed
dose)
5 rem ground shine dose (5-
hour exposure assumed)
10 * ALI for inhalation
Acute groundshine threshold
Acute haematopoietic
syndrome threshold
Acute pneumonitis threshold
Chronic radiation sickness
threshold
Workers can work
unrestricted for 5 hours
Use of Prussian Blue DTPA
highly recommended
Int. Size
Source,
Basic
Eng'g
0
0
0
0
~ 100m
0
Very Large
Source,
Basic Eng'g
~300m
0
0
0
~600m
0
Very Large
Source,
Soph. Eng'g
~300m
~200m
~2km
~7km
~600m
< 10km
| , .pplicatiui. |
Realistic RDD Hazard Boundaries for Varying Device Designs
(Areas of concern for intermediate response)
50 rem (50-year committed
5 rem (50-year committed
1 rem (50-year committed
deposition limit
Evacuation
Sheltering
EPA suggests protective
EPA prescribes relocation
Int. Size
Source,
Basic
Eng'g
< 150m
<600m
2km
8km
Very Large
Source,
Basic Eng'g
< 1km
<3.3km
-10km
~ 100km
Very Large
Source,
Soph. Eng'g
-15 km
< 100 km
> 100 km
> 100 km
Note: Scenario analysis performed with ERAD model which includes buoyant rise,
small and large aerosol transport, but is not building aware
Applications
-------
Distribution of CsCl large
powder scattered ballistically
No wind, no thermal rise
Particle size (um aerodynamic)
Initial measured velocity (m/s)
Extrapolated stopping distance (m)
Observed stopping distance (m)
[particles did not hit ceiling]
Single particle stopping distance in
still air (m)
100
-550
4.3
7.62
0.75
Range of Blast Effects from Selected
Quantities of High Explosive
Standoff distance
considering
fragments or glass
breakage (used pipe
bomb or briefcase
bomb)-890m
Eardrum rupture
from blast - 43 m
Large Radiological Source Applications (from G. Van Tuyle, LANL)
1,000,000
100000
JB
I
1
•
!' i
L I
r «u
55r
rtaafm i
£i?
u
•
•
! "
1 Oft.'.'
I 1 I 1 1
i 1 1 I I
I I I i *
Md
c»-m
*«ra
3700000
Zf
1
IF
Applications
Results of study dominated by large source scenarios
Self-Contained Cs-137 Blood Irradiators
Canister Sealed Source
Used to reduce risk of Graft-Versus-
Host Disease (GVHD)
Source: Cs-137, 500 to 5000 Ci
Number in US: ~ 1000, ~ 20 in NY,
-10 NYC
Machine weight: 1150 kg
-------
Small/Medium Radiological Sources
15 - 20 Cl Well Logging Sonde
8
a
Q
«,»Q 1.
i-i '( -• r-.
Quantity, Size, and Shape of
Particulate Released is Critical
to WMD Consequences
Low Density Aeiosol
1000 mj explosive aerosolization chamber
explosive aerosolization
chamber
Characterization of aerosolization efficiency
and particle size distribution
Hanging cascade impactors
and total mass samplers
(< 30 nm AED)
^lization Experiment!
And other strategies...
What is important to aerosolization
potential
• Device design
• Material form
- Metal
— Ceramic
— Liquid
- Powder
• Material properties
- Thermal properties
— Shock physics properties
— Vapor pressure, surface tension, viscosity, etc.
-------
Stress induces different mechanisms which results
In different initial particle size peaks
Solid fracture
(along grain boundaries)
Solid fracture
(energy limitedspall)
Some explosive values of interest to explosive RDDs
Pressure required to melt (GPa)
n erface pressure (PBX 9404) (GPa)
n erface pressure (TNT) (GPa)
n erface pressure (C4) (GPa)
n erface pressure (ANFO 100 % reacted) (GPa)
n erface pressure (ANFO 75 % reacted) (GPa)
n erface pressure (ANFO 50 % reacted) (GPa)
CsCl
13.1
41.6
25.4
33.0
13.2
7.4
4.7
SrTi03
83
56
34
44
17
Co metal
208
571
62
37
48
18
Bi metal
20
81
53
32
41
15
U metal
96
445
69
40
53
18
Phenomena: Explosive aerosolization of metals
• Fractions depend on
material properties
and device geometries
• Respirable aerosol ranged
from .2% to 80 %
• Very little aerosol
generated between
30 nm and 200 ^m
Form of metal chunks dispersed depends
on material properties and device geometry
-------
Aerosolization of ceramics
pellets used in SNL
and DF shots
CeO2 fluorite crystal structure -
octahedral cleavage (flat triarirnJar v.'t&v•:;-:
Phenomena: Explosive aerosolization of ceramics
• Fractions depend on
material properties
and device geometries
•Respirable aerosol
ranged from 2 % to 40 %
• No phase change
• A lot of aerosol
generated between
30 fjm and 200 fjm
SrTiO3 -perovskite crystal structure - no
cleavage planes (dimpled spall surface)
Large Particle distribution from SC-SrTiQ, 19 and 20
Images of the fracture surface of high and low density SrTiO3
Some likely physical forms following
explosive dispersal of ceramics
SrTiO3 dispersed following attack
on encapsulated ceramic pellet
Pile of SrTiO3 powder dispersed following
inefficient explosive aerosolization device
Examples of impact of radiation aging on ceramics
Disintegration of a PuO2 pellet over 40 years stored under
a Nitrogen environment (He accumulation is the likely
cause of embrittlement (fromRonchi)
Internal sputtering results
in spontaneous translocation
if 238PuO2 particles with two
size peaks: < 1 nmand< 10 nm
(from Cheng et. al, LRRI)
-------
Phenomena: Explosive aerosolization of powders
I Shock sublimation of salts |
rticles < 1 [Jm
Shock melting of salts I
• Fractions depend on
material properties
and device geometries
• Respirable aerosol
ranged from 20 % to
• Very little aerosol
generated between
30 um and 200 um
Comparison of size distribution from sampling and sieving of
SC-CsCl-1 to original CsCl powder size
0 400 600 800 1000 1200 1<
Geometric Mean Diameter (urn) - physical
Note evidence of plastic deformation and evidence of bimodal size distribution
of relative humidity on explosive dispersal of CsClpowder
0 60 0 65
Insights from encapsulation studies
•Encapsulation worth > factor
of 10 if change of phase
required for aerosolization
•No reduction in
aerosolization if small powder
is encapsulated
-------
Agglomeration/condensation
studies
! Ag agglomerated on sand
I (Deposited on stage 4 — GMD 8 JJJTI)
Observations:
a) Bi implosion resulted in Bi vapor
b) Hi concentration of vapor within
fireball stagnation radius resulted in
to .7 (im (aerodynamic)
c) Agglomeration on sand reduced
atmospheric Bi loading and modified
particle size distribution
A variety of chambers available to characterize non-
explosive aerosol behavior for model validation and
development
-------
Water Distribution System
Decontamination
Paul M. Randall
U.S. EPA
E. Radha Krishnan, P.E.
Shaw Environmental
Haishan (Helen) Piao, Ph.D.
SBR Technology Inc
106 Workshop on Decontamination, Cleanup, and Associated
for Sites Contaminated with Chemical, Biological, or Radiolc
Materials
Washington DC
April 28, 2006
Water Security Research and
Technical Support Action Plan
Jointly developed by EPA's OW
andORD
Based around issues, needs, and
projects
Addresses both drinking water and
wastewater infrastructure
Stresses physical, cyber, and
contamination threats
Extensive input from and review by
stakeholders
Reviewed by the National Academy
of Science
Drinking Water System Protection and
Security
Research and Technical Support Needs
• Physical and cyber threats
• Threats, contaminants, and threat scenarios
• Improving analytical methods and monitoring
systems
• Containing, treating, decontaminating, and
disposing of contaminated materials
• Contingencies and infrastructure
dependencies
• Impacts on human health
• Informing the public about risks
Project Objectives
D Contamination
• Adherence to pipe surface
• Effect of pipe materials
• Effect of flow regimes (laminar, turbulent)
• Biofilm effect
D Decontamination
• Decon methods specific to contaminant
• Decon conditions (pH, flow rate, CI2 cone., etc)
• Effect of pipe materials on decon technique
Experiments Conducted to Date
Adherence Study
Contaminant adherence study
• Contaminants: Arsenic, Mercury, and Bacillus
Subtilis
m Contaminant concentration:
• Arsenic/Mercury: 10 mg/L
• Bacillus Subtilis: 103 cells/mL
'ipe materials: 5-year old Ci
on, Clear PVC
Experiments Conducted to Date:
Decontamination Study
• General Decontamination Study
n Simple flushing for arsenic, mercury, and Bacillus Su
n Low pH flushing for arsenic and mercury
• Contaminant: Arsenic (sodium arsenite)
n Phosphate buffer flushing
n Acidified potassium permanganate flushing
• Contaminant: Mercury (mercuric chloride)
Contaminant: Bacillus Subtilis
-------
PjJo^SeaJ
DJsrrjbulJorj S
I 75 feet 6" diameter PMC pipe
(includes one 4" diameter section, 10
feet long)
220 Gal capacity
Recirculation tank, 100 Gal capacity
I Operable at 0-500 GPM
25,000 in2 surface area
Used Pipe Integration into DSS
Used pipe sections from the T & E pipe loop
system
• Cement lined ductile iron
• In service for ~5 years
Cut sections of used pipe & make 1"-long
coupons
Integrate coupons into PVC DSS
Contaminant Adherence Study
Experimental Design
Coupon insertion
Build biofilm in pipe loop system for 1-2
weeks (quantify via HPC assay)
Inject contaminants into pipe loop
Recirculation flow mode: Laminar/Turbulent
, 2 days contact time (Sample bulk
water/collect sensor data)
Sample coupon walls
-------
Arsenic Adherence Study Results
Arsenic Adherence Study
60 GPM
60 GPM
15 GPM
1 GPM
T
I
77
1
i
15 GPM
1 GPM
^W
i
I
60 GPM
15 GPM
1GPM ,™
r— ,—r-i— >J&£\
Beginning of pipe loop Near end of pipe loop Beginning of pipe loop
(Cement-Lined Ductile (Cement-Lined Ductile (PVC control coupons)
Iron Coupon) Iron Coupon)
Coupon Location in the Pipe Loop
3.00 -
^
a, o nn
Mercury Adsorbed
D O 1— I M )
D l/l O l/l «
D O O O C
jrcury Adherence Study Results
Mercury Adherence Study
60 GPM
m
60 GPM
i
!
1™;..;|
1
ii
15 GPM
1 GPM IT^
1
1
I
15 GPM 60 GPM
1 GPM
rr-| m
Beginning of pipe loop Near end of pipe loop Beginning of pipe loop
(Cement-Lined Ductile (Cement-Lined Ductile (PVC control coupons)
Iron Coupon) Iron Coupon)
Coupon Location in the Pipe Loop
Bacillus Subtilis Adherence Study
(Flow Rate: 60 GPM)
Beginning of pipe bop Near end of pipe bop Beginning of pipe loop
(Cement-Line d Ductile (Cement-Lined Ductile (PVC)
Iron Coupon) Iron Coupon)
Coupon Location in the Pipe Loop
Lessons Learned:
Adherence Study Summary
—i
i Arsenic and mercury adhere to the cement-lined ductile
iron pipe surfaces at both flow regimes, laminar and
turbulent.
i The adherence of arsenic and mercury to pipe surfaces
is hiaher under turbulent flow conditions.
Arsenic and mercury showed stronger adherence to
cement-lined ductile iron pipe surfaces as compared to
the clear PVC pipe surfaces.
Mercurv has stronger adherence to cement-lined ductile
iron pipe surfaces compared to arsenic.
Bacillus Subtilis showed similar strong adherence to both
the cement-lined ductile iron and clear PVC pipe
surfaces.
Decontamination Study
Simple Flushing
i/eioci:y:
Flow Rate:
Time:
Flow Mode:
2.5 fps
210 gpm
2-hour flushing
Recirculation
Lessons Learned: Simple Flushing
Decontamination Technique Summary
Simple flushing could remove up to 51% of adsorbed
arsenic from the cement-lined ductile iron pipe surfaces.
Up to 57% of adsorbed mercury could be removed from
the cement-lined ductile iron pipe surfaces by using
simple flushing.
Simple flushing resulted in no removal of Bacillus Subtilis.
Further evaluations on more rigorous decontamination
techniques are necessary to determine if higher removal
efficiencies can be achieved.
-------
Decontamination Study -
LowpH Flushing
Velocity:
Flow rate:
Time:
Flow Mode:
Hydrochloric acid
~ 4
0.7 fps
60 gpm
4-hour
Recirculation
7ea%/w«
Arsenic Decontamination Study
Before Flushing
Before Flushing
After Flushing
After Flushing
Beginning of pipe loop Near end of pipe loop
Coupon Location in the Pipe Loop
Low pH Flushing Results for Cement-Lined
Ductile Iron: Mercury
1.60
— 1-40
u 1.20
•3 i.oo
1 0.80
•o
fr 0.60
I 0.40
0.20
0.00
Mercury Decontamination Study
Befcre Flushing
After Flushing Befcre Flushing
After Flushing
Beginning of pipe loop Near end of pipe loop
Coupon Location in the Pipe Loop
^i/kjarjciy
-------
Experimental Design
Decontamination
losphate Buffer Flushing for
Decontamination Reagent:
1 mM Phosphate buffer (K2HP04:KH2P04 1:1)
Velocity: 0.7 fps
Flow rate: 60 gpm
Time: 4-hour
Flow Mode: Recirculation
Experimental Design -
Decontamination
Acidified Potassium Permanganate
Flushing for Mercury/Arsenic
>Decontamination Reagents:
> 0.4% Potassium permanganate
> 1% Sulfuric acid
Welocity: 0.7 fps
>Flow rate: 60 gpm
>Time: 4-hour
>Flow Mode: Recirculation
Experimental Design -
Decontamination
lock Chlorination for Bacillus Subtilis
- Decontamination Reagent:
200 ppm chlorine
-Time: 2.5-hour
-CT: 30,000 mg/L-min
-Velocity: 0.7 fps
- Flow rate: 60 gpm
- Flow mode: Recirculation
Phosphate Buffer Flushing Results for Arsenic
| °-32 •
•g °-28
0
< nl.
1 nn
0.04
4/28/2006
After Flushing
Before Flushing
<777
-»,
m
%
yx
m
1
After
Before Flushing
I
Flushing
Before Flushing
^553
Beginning of pipe loop Near end of pipe loop Beginning of pipe loop
(Cement-Lined Ductile (Cement-Lined Ductile (PVC control coupons)
Iron Coupon) Iron Coupon)
Coupon Location in the Pipe Loop
28
Acidified Potassium Permanganate Flushing
Results for Arsenic
0.44
0.40
. 0.36
i 0.32
' 0.28
0.24
0.20
0.16
0.12
0.08
0.04
0.00
m
%
%
Beginning of pipe loop Near end of pipe loop Beginning of pipe loop
(Cement-Lined Ductile (Cement-Lined Ductile (PVC control coupons)
Iron Coupon) Iron Coupon)
Coupon Location in the Pipe Loop
Acidified Potassium Permanganate Flushing
Results for Mercury
!°'5
'g 0.20 -
B
fore Fhishhg
H
I
a
Befor
w.
After Flushing %%>
Flushing
1
I
After Flushing
1 Before Flushing
1 1 rezn . . .,
Beginning of pipe loop Near end of pipe loop Beginning of pipe loop
(Cement-lined ductile iron) (Cement-lined ductile iron) (PVC control coupons)
Coupon Location in the Pipe Loop
4/28/2006
30
-------
Shock Chlorination Results for
Bacillus Subtilis
"S l.E+06
Beginning of pipe loop Near end ofpipe bop Begjimiiig ofpipe loop
(Cement-Lined (Cement-Lined (PVC)
Ductile Iron Coupon) Ductile Iron Coupon)
Coupon Location in the Pipe Loop
Lessons Learned: S
Results
I Arsenic
- Phosphate buffer flushing resulted in no removal of
artial decontamination of arsenic
(up to 61%).
Mercury
effective in decontamination of mercury
(up to 96%).
Bacillus Subtilis
- Shock chlorination is a very effective decontamination
method for B. Subtilis (up to 96%).
Conclusions
All contaminants tested, i.e. arsenic, mercury, and bacillus
subtilis, showed strong adherence to cement-lined ductile iron
pipe surfaces. Bacillus Subtilis also adheres to PVC pipe
surfaces.
Simple flushing or low pH flushing is effective in partial
decontamination of cement-lined ductile iron pipe surfaces for
frsenic and mercury. Simple flushing is ineffective for
econtamination of bacillus subtilis from
Phosphate buffer flushing resulted in no removal of arsenic.
Acidified potassium permanganate flushing is effective in
partial decontamination of arsenic (up to 61%) and is very
effective in decontamination of mercury (up to 96%).
Shock chlorination is a very effective decontamination
method for B. Subtilis (up to 96%).
Decontamination study for arsenic
- NSF Standard 60 drinking water treatment chemicals
I NW-310/NW-400 (Johnson Screens, Inc)
I Floran Catalyst/Neo-Line (Floran Technologies, Inc)
- Chelating agents (DMSA, EDTA)
Diesel fuel adherence/decontamination study
Evaluation of alternative pipe material
- 70-80 years old, heavily tuberculated iron pipe
Questions ???
Comments ???
-------
US Environmental Protection Agency
Decontamination Workshop
April 28, 2006
Decontamination of Water Infrastructure!
AwwaRF Project 2981
presented by: Gregory Welter
O
OBRIENG
Project Participants
3 4 Frank Blaha - AwwaRF Project Manager
4 O'Brien & Gere Engineers
4 Gregory Welter, PE DEE, Principal Investigator
4 George Rest, PE, Project Officer
4 Consultants and Co-investigators
4 Dr. Joseph Cotruvo - consultant, (formerly w/ EPA Office of
Drinking Water, and Office of Pollution Prevention and Toxics)
4 Dr. Mark LeChevallier - Director of Research, American Water
4 Richard Moser - consultant, (formerly Vice-President of Water
Quality, American Water Works Service Company)
4 Stacey Spangler - Senior Analyst, American Water
4 Principal funding by AwwaRF and American Water
Project Objectives and Activities
4 Objective: To develop guidance for the
decontamination of water system
infrastructure following contamination with a
persistent contaminant
4 Project Activities
* Literature reviews and case studies
* Collaboration with parallel research studies (e.g.,
EPA-HSRC, Army-CERL, Army-ECBC, NIST)
* Experiments on contaminant attachment and
removal options
Relevant Historical Cases
4 Use of system flushing in response to
incidents involving pesticides, diesel fuel,
mercury.
4 Use of chemical cleaning systems to
accelerate decontamination in incidents
involving a pesticide and motor oil.
1980 Intentional Contamination Incident
* Intentional injection of chlordane into water
distribution system
* Discovered on the basis of customer taste and
odor complaints
* Initial response was to isolate the system and
begin purging operations
* Initial sampling found concentrations up to 144,000
ppb.
Impacted water distribution system area
Impacted area covered approximately 10,000 persons
-------
Finding of Intentional Contamination
Determined point
of injection at
remote pipe
pressure tap on
200 psi main
Sample at
injection tap of
0.27% chlordane.
Notified FBI and
local police
he infattsiicn IM^S n Ihe airen and wsjwtw o[ L,viS ftm
V pSiin rc:p3nj:y<] fur ihi chsmkral csn^tiinslicn fll Ifci
wntr s-f=ifli7i cf V.'esHfn PtAit,lvi.vj Walcr CoirfHfty'in ite
*"•"--- BK 6, 1560.
Goals set by Health Department
3 ppb in one month (the MCL)
1 ppb in two months
0.3 ppb in four months
0.05 ppb in seven months
Alternative water
provided to customers
during until remediation
completed
System and household testing
b
5
Hydrant at Beechview and Bayonne Ave
4 0.05 ppb achieved in August 1981 (8 months)
4 Testing continued into 1983
Project Experimental Strategy
A Phase 1 - Contaminant Adherence Testing
* 1 a: Establishment of experimental / analytical
protocols, and critical test conditions (limited
substrate set)
* 1 b: Testing of contaminant suite against full
substrate list
4 Phase 2 - Lab assessment of chemical
decon agents
Experiments conducted at facilities of American Water
Review of Potential Contaminants
significant potential for a decontamination problem
4 (tendency to adhere to wetted surfaces)
likely candidate for use (or hoax) because of actual
or perceived potential hazard
contaminant was part of a documented actual
attack or threatened use
4 (documented in AwwaRF #2810 - "Actual and Threatened Security
Incidents at Water Utilities")
Tested Contaminants
MicrobiologicalS (a bacterial spore and a virus)
Inorganics
* four toxics (an inorganic, an metalloid, and two metals)
4 three non-radioactive surrogates for radionuclides of concern
Organics
4 A high Kow pesticide (log Kow = 6.2)
4 A low Kow industrial organic (log Kow = 3.4)
Not included in AwwaRF tests: coordinated with
decon research projects by other agencies
Biotoxins
Chemical Warfare Agents
-------
Tested Pipe Substrates
1. CPVC (control)
2. CPVC (w/biofilm)
3. Iron (control)
4. Iron (w/biofilm)
5. Galvanized pipe (used and heavily tuberculated; w/ biofilm)
6. Galvanized (new)
7. Polyethylene
8. Cement lined ductile iron (w/o factory seal coat)
9. Cement lined ductile iron (w/ std factory seal coat)
10. Epoxy coated steel
11. Copper
Phase 1b Pipe Materials
Used Galvanized Pipe
Used galvanized
pipe tested as a
surrogate for
older unlined
cast iron pipe.
(Note heavy
scale and
tuberculation.)
Basic Experimental Protocol
4 12-inch pipe segments filled w/ contaminant
stock solutions, and incubated for 7 days
4 Pipes decanted, and rinsed multiple times
with base water (both decant and rinses
analyzed)
4 Final "getter" extractant step for pipe wall
* 0.1 M ammonium chloride for inorganics
* 50% /100% methanol for organics
* buffer water and test tube brushing for microbes
Attachment Phase Results
PIPE SUBSTRATE PERCENT ATTACHM
Contaminant CPVC CPVC w/ iron Iron / Galvanized Galvanized Copper Cement
biofilm biofilm (new) (tuberculat
Toxic Inorganic #1 o.o o.o
Toxic Inorganic #2 o.o o.o
Radio surrogate #1 o.o o.o
Radio surrogate #2 0.1 0.1
Toxic Inorganic #3 0.4 2.6
Radio surrogate #3 o.o 0.2
Toxic Inorganic #4 o.o o.o
Pesticide 45.8 32.4 1
Bacillus spore o.o o.o
Virus o.o o.o
7 0.9 2.6
3 0.3 0.4
1 4.6 0.0 1
5 B.O 2.0
2 a.a 0.2
6 1.4 6.7
(> 1.8 3.1
7 23.2 2B.9 2
0 27.0 1.0
0 0.0 0.0
) lined D
0
1
0
0
1
0
0
16
I
0
NT
nd the getter)
Cement lined PE Epoxy lined
DIP (sealcoat) Steel
0.0
0.2
0.1
0.6
0.5
3.7
0.2
2.3
2.0
0.0
0.3
1
0
0
0
0
0
16
,
0.0
4 Inorganic Contaminants - Tw radionuclide surrogates attached
modestly to pipes with tuberculated and biofilmed pipe (5 -12%)
4 Organic Contaminants - The pesticide attached well to a number
of pipes; up to 30%-45% for CPVC and biofilmed iron pipe
4 Bacillus spores - attached best to iron pipe with biofilms (27%)
4 Attachment increases over time
4 Suggests early system purging desirable
-------
Phase 2 Experiments
4 Bacillus decontamination with chlorine
4 Inorganics removals with chlorine,
household cleaner, and chelators
4 Surfactant removals of organics (Pesticide
and Industrial chemical)
4 Mass attachment as a function of duration of
exposure (Pesticide and Industrial chemical)
inactivation of Bacillus spores at end of chlorine contact tir
Target Chlorine CT*
Attached spore count
300 mg/L-min
3000mg/L-min
30,000 mg/L-min
Galvanized -
biofilm / tuberculated
69,000 ct
65%
43%
84%
Iron w/ biofilm
500 ct
100%
100%
50%
* Chlorine dosed at 25, 50 and 100 mg/L, for varying contact times
* Cl residual essentially exhausted during the contact periods
4 Results complicated by difficulty in spore recovery from
tuberculated pipe and maintained chlorine residual.
4 In field application, particularly with old unlined cast iron
pipe, maintaining adequate chlorine concentration for target
CT may be difficult
4 Supplemental methods may also be needed. Consider
NSF-60 certified "pipe cleaning aids."
1
?
Two Radionuclide Surrogate % removals
Pipe Substrate Decontamination Protocol Radio Surrogate #1 Radio Surrogate #2
removal (%) removal (%)
Attached mass (mg) 0.99 mg 0.67 mg
30,000 CT Chlorine * 23% - 7.8%
blaoZ"ubetcu,a,ed ;»<££, -™ -™
Attached mass (mg) 34.1 mg 14.2 mg
crnrr ^™r £ si
(w/o seal coat) 10% Simple Green 45% 56%
Attached mass (mg) 40.0 mg 20.3 mg
crnrr -™ :;« -
(w/osealcoat) 10% Simple Green 18% 26%
* Chlorine dosed at 25 mg/L for 20 hours for targetted 30,000 contact time
** Negative removals indicate better removal w/ experimental control (i.e. water wash)
4 Modest removals achieved with readily available household
cleaner containing surfactants and chelators; static contact.
1
1
Other inorganic % removals 1
Percent removal by various decontamination agents of two inorganic contaminants
Pipe Substrate Decontamination Protocol Radio Surrogate #3 Toxic Inorganic #4
removal (%) removal %
Attached mass (mg) 0.035 mg 1.187 mg
30,000 CT Chlorine * - 58% - 32%
1% Simple Green - 280% 70%
10%Simple Green - 110% 6.70%
Attached mass (mg) 0.045 mg 0.030 mg
ralvani/Pri npw 30'000 CT Chlorine * ' 270% ' 87%
Galvanized - new 1% Sjmp|e Green 10Q% 1?1%
10%Simple Green - 150% - 681%
* Chlorine dosed at 25 mg/L for 20 hours for targetted 30,000 contact time
** Negative removals indicate better removal w/ experimental control (i.e. water wash)
4 Neither chlorination nor household cleaner
were effective; however, the attached mass
to be removed was very low.
Surfactant removal of organics
Attached mass
Mttauiieu mass (inyj
0.05% N-60
0.5% N-60
5% N-60
0.05%TDA-6
0.5% TDA-6
5% TDA-6
0.05% LZV
0.5% LZV
5% LZV
** Negative removals inc
j.^j my u.»o my
55% - 5.4%
79% - 5.4%
88% 14%
50% - 6.8%
80% 2%
88% 14%
0% - 9.5%
54% -8.1%
50% 12%
icate better removal w/
j.i j my
28%
62%
80%
17%
65%
89%
51%
-16%
89%
experimental control (i.e
u.^q-o my
5.7%
42%
19%
54%
22%
68%
- 8.8%
15%
15%
. water wash)
u.o^ my
18%
34%
52%
32%
43%
61%
-16%
54%
74%
o.oo niy
14%
-29%
-29%
5.70%
-29%
- 0.2%
-18%
-17%
-11%
4 Tested surfactants are effective in removal
of the pesticide; however, were generally not
effective in removal of industrial chemical.
Summary Observations
4 Attachment studies
4 Decontamination studies
-------
24-Hour
7-Day
Mass attachment over time
7-Day
* cPVC pipe substrate
4 Attachment increases over time
4 Suggests early system purging desirable
Attachment inconsistent, but some trends
Attachment not significantly sensitive to ambient water
characteristics (temperature, pH, alkalinity, TOC).
Substrate (pipe) sensitivity
- Biofilm and pipe tuberculation/scale increased attachment for
several contaminants
- Polyethylene and clean cement lined pipe exhibited little
attachment
Contaminant sensitivity
- The high Kow organic pesticide attached strongly to several
pipe substrates
- Inorganic chemicals tested tended not to attach, although two
of the Radionuclide Surrogates had moderate attachment to
tuberculated and biofilmed pipes
- Bacillus spores seen to attach to biofilmed pipe.
Decontamination observations
4 Organic contaminants - Tested surfactants found to be
effective. Basic field tests of commonly available solvents
would be effective in selecting specific surfactant and dosage.
4 Bacillus spores can be killed with high doses of chlorine,
consistent with standard AWWA water main disinfectant
practice. However, in the tested static system the presence of
heavy scale/tuberculation targeted concentration/time (CT) was
difficult to achieve. Supplemental cleaning measures (pigging,
or use of NSF-60 rated "pipe cleaning aids") may be indicated.
4 Inorganic contaminants - Although little tendency to attach
was observed, decontamination chemicals tested were only
moderately and inconsistently effective.
-------
JUF
Adherence and Decontamination of
Chemicals and Biologicals
ager: Kim Fox, NHSRC, U.S. EPA
.OrOerL^erSmdp
Chattopadhyay, BaKetfe
Objective
• The objective of this work is to understand
adherence/attachment of various contaminants on
materials commonly used for drinking water
distribution systems and their decontamination by
using selected chemicals.
Expected Questions to be Answered
Q Do the selected biological and chemical contaminants
adhere to the pipe surfaces?
U If the contaminants adhere to the plumbing surfaces, can
the amount of contaminant that adheres be estimated?
Q If significant adhesion occurs, can the contaminant be
removed by rinsing the surface with water?
U Are select decontaminating agents effective in
neutralizing or inactivating the adhered contaminant?
Examples of Chemical Tested
Organophosphates o o—ZH,
c—en o' o cii
CxHy
Hydrocarbon mixture
Fungicide
F—CHi—C
V Na+
Rodenticide
Examples of Bacterial spore and Bacteria
Vibrio cholerae ATCC 25870
Schematic Diagram of Test Pipe
QTeflon™ provides a low energy surface and adhesive interracial contact with
test liquid (wettability) is expected to be minimal.
JOne end of the container was capped and the container was filled with the test
liquid to as close to the top as possible to provide maximum coverage of the
internal pipe surface. The containers were sealed by covering the liquid with a
Teflon™ sheet and securing with an end cap with hose clamp and/or cable
ties.
OPipe segments were sized at the smallest diameter available to maximize the
surface to volume ratio while taking into account the practicality of laboratory
handling (like, volume of analyte required).
-------
Pipe Materials
I.D. 2.12 inch X O.D. 2.38 inch X L 3.00 inch
I.D. 1.06 inch X O.D. 1.12 inch X L 8.06 inch
2" Aged Black Iron Pipe
Schedule 40 (Steven Steel
Supply)
ACI
1" Copper Type M
(Westwater Supply Corp.)
Copper
1" High density poly ethylene
(Westwater Supply Corp.)
HOPE
I.D. 1.02 inch X O.D. 1.21 inch X L 8.00 inch
Pipe Materials (continued)
a
1" Poly vinyl chloride Schedule 40
(Westwater Supply Corp.)
I.D. 1.04 inch X O.D. 1.32 inch X L 8.00 inch
PVC
3" Cement lined Ductile iron pipe
DIP53 without seal (Ferguson
Water-work)
DIO
I.D. 2.75 inch X O.D. 4.00 inch X L 3.06 inch
3" Cement lined Ductile iron pipe
CL53 TYTON JT with seal (Ferguson
Waterworks)
DIW
I.D. 2.71 inch X O.D. 3.87 inch X L 3.00 inch
Pipe Materials (continued)
<
2" Steel pipe coated with high solids epoxy
(Martin Painting & Coating Co.)
DIE
Test Conditions
7-day hold test at room temperature
(18-22°C)
l{24-hour test at room temperature (18-22°C)
7-day test at 2-8°C
iHypochlorite, surfactant (Simple
[Green™). and Pipe-Klean™ to test the
efficacy of removal/degradation of
selected contaminants-pipe
combinations at room temperature.
Key Factors Influence the Adherence/Release
Chemical Processes
U Dissolution
a pH
a Alkalinity
LI Chemical form
Q Total composition/availability
LI Oxidation — reduction potential
U Presence of organic matter
(dissolved and total)
LJ Biological activity
LI Temperature
LI Time after contamination
occurred (residence time)
Li Stability in the operating
environment
Physical Factors
LI Percolation
LI Diffusion
LI Scale formation
LI Surface roughness and
porosity
LI Wettability
LI Erosion
LI Presence of
particles/colloidal matters
Hypochlorite
Applying NaOCI (sanitizer) to clean pipe surfaces
O provides a "kill" step for reducing number of
microorganisms
O oxidizes the chemical contaminants and promotes
transformation
-------
loll up or Emulsification of Contaminants from
Pipe Surfaces by Surfactant (Simple Green™)
Roll up
r
:
Chemical Cleaner (Pipe Klean™)
Q Pipe Klean™ is acidic in nature.
Q Strong acid is expected to dissolve deposit.
Q Sometime such chemical cleaners may contain
some metals and other chemicals, which may
interfere during contaminant analysis.
Cs m0-mj/Aw
Kad =
Chattopadnyay, 200
Cs = Cone, of test chemical in pipe at equilibrium; C^ = Cone of chemical in aqueous phase
n0 = amount of chemical In water added to pipe: rri| = final amount of chemical present In water after Interacting with pipe
A...= wetted surface
Typical Initial Concentrations of Some of the
Chemicals, Bacteria and Toxins
Chemicals
Fungicide
(e.g., HgCI2)
Organo-
phosphates
Gasoline
Drug
Initial
Concentration
7738-28,800
mg/L
230-2035
mg/L
10 mL in
each pipe
segment
4 mg/L
Bacteria and
Toxin
Bacillus
anthracis Sterne
Vibrio cholerae
Neurotoxins
Mycotoxin
Initial
Concentration
106 CFU/mL
106CFU/mL
50-80 ug total
3 mg total
Chemicals, Type of Bottles, Solvents
Chemical
Fungicide (e.g.,
HgCI2)
Rodenticide (e.g,
Fluoroacetate)
Gasoline
Sample Bottle
100 ml Plastic
20 ml Plastic
340-mLGIass
VOAs
Preservative
HCI
None
HCI
Extraction Solution
10%H2SOa,
4%KMnOa
Hot Water (50°C Dl
water)
Methanol followed by
Hot Water (50°C Dl
water)
Na2S2O3 = sodium thiosulfate; (CH^CO = acetone;
CH2CI2 = methylene chloride
Liquid Chromatography-Mass Spectrometry
-------
Ion Chromatography
Gas Chromatography-Mass
Spectrometry
GC-MS has been used for analyses of organophosphates
Induced Couple Plasma/Mass Spectroscopies and
Cold Vapor Atomic Fluorescence Spectrophotometry
ICP/MS (upto 0.5 ug/L) and CVAFS (upto 0.5 ng/L)
was used for analyses of Hg.
Adherence or Release of Hg by DIW, PVC,
Copper and DIE Pipes
DIW = Cement lined ductile iron with seal, DIE = Steel pipe with epoxy
Copper Pipe Treated with Hg
Adherence or Release of Mevinphos by
PVC, Copper and DIE Pipes
17 10 mg/m2
DIE = Steel pipe with epoxy
-------
Elemental Map of Mevinphos Treated
Cement Lined Pipe
•L'. =••'•;.••' :i\
Ca
. .
»,-.^" •.-'.-3-.
Backscatter Electron Image (240x)
Ranking of Pipe with Chemical Contaminants
(example)
Contaminant
Organophosphate
Rodenticide
Fungicide
Gasoline
Pipe
DIG > DIW > Copper > ACI x DIE x HOPE x PVC
DIW > DIG > ACI > DIE > Copper > PVC > HOPE
ACI > DIW > DIG > Coppers HOPE > PVC = DIE
ACI > DIE > DIW > DIG > PVC > HOPE > Copper
^^^MMNVftM
, ,, Extraction cone, recovered ....
Adherence = — x100
Total cone, recovered
Bacterial and Toxin Adherence Criteria
Based on % Contaminant extracted from pipe when
compared to the total amount of contaminant
recovered from water, rinses, and extraction
samples
Adherence Criteria
High
Moderate
Low
Recovery From the Extracted Samples
>10% recovery in the extracted sample
0.1% to 10% recovery in the extracted
sample when compared to the total
recovery
<0.1% recovery in the extracted sample
when compared to the total recovery
Adherence Classification and Recovery
(Avg. Adherence %, Classification)
Pipe
Material
PVC
HOPE
Copper
DIE
ACI
DIO
DIW
B. anthracis
x (52%,
High)
x (63%,
High)
x (26%,
High)
x (55%,
)
x (0.44%,
Moderate)
x(5.6%,
Moderate)
x (6.4%,
Moderate)
B, thailandensis
x (65%,
High)
x(51%,
High)
x(7.6%,
"'• '-• "-)
x(0.27%,
V, cholerae
x(2.3%,
federate)
x(0.68%,
Moderate)
x(0.8%,
Moderate)
x(1.8%,
x(ND)
0)
|
x(2.6%,
Moderate)
x(0.01%,
Low)
x (7.4%,
)
x(0.35%,
Moderate)
Botulinum
Unstable
Alfatoxin
x(16%,
High)
x(13%,
High)
x(2.9%,
Moderate)
x(6.3%,
)
x(ND)
Brevetoxin
x(31%,
High)
1
-------
Environmental Restoration
Biotechnology Division
vironmental
-------
Contaminants of Interest
Selection criteria
Chemicals
— Solvents, fuels, poisons, pesticides, herbicides
Biologicals
— Bacteria, spores, toxins (simulants or non-hazardou
-------
Biochemical Science Division: Biological
Threats in Building Water Systems
:. co//O157:H7 (strain lacking toxin
and Frandsella tularensis (vaccine strain)
Spores: Bacillus anthracis IB. thurinqiensis)
,^gvPx \^_^^-^W •-••r\ -^^^f^- • K,
;
Mature Biofilm Conditioned
Pipe Surface
Experimental Approach
Bench top pipe system with
creeping flow of synthetic
water with 24 mg/L humic
substance as growth media,
completely open system
CDC Bioreactor for controlled
shear impact studies of
pathogen deposition on
biofilms established on PVC
and copper coupons
(Biosurface Technologies Corp)
.tf
•
Biofilm Associated Spores
Environmental Scanning Electromicroscopy of biofilm contacted with BT spores.
Sodium Hypochlorite Disinfection of Spores
Associated with Pipe Surfaces with
1 o-.
1 (
1 9
O
O>
°, A
Time (min) ,
r^ro-^20
X 40 50 6
^^^"^-^-^
~^ -j
O BT (-biofilm)
BT(4biofilrr)-FVC
A BT(4biofilrr)-Oj
110 mg/l free chlorir
results in similar rec
of viable spores whe
associated with biof
compared with inac
of free spores
e o
n 2
Im
vation
-4-
1 1 mg/l free
chlorine
Q results in < 1
log reduction
in spores
when
associated
with biofilm
lb"'"'-..2D 30 40 EO
""*-,...
""•
BT (-*iofilrr)-FVC
[mpact of Fluid Shear on Contaminant Accumulation
in CDC Bioreactor
Accumulation in Biofilm
After Chlorine
Shear: Hatched bar = 60 RPM, Solid = 180 RPM
Chlorine Dose: 10 mg/L for £. coli, 100 mg/L for BT Spores
Hydrophobicity: AGIWI BT Spores = 17.3 vs. AGIWI O157:H7 = 30.8 mJ/m2
Work in Progress on Additional Threats
Developing Ricin adhesion and removal
measurements using biofilms grown in
microtiter plates and detection using
fluorescent-labeled antibody
Obtaining Frandsella tularensis (vaccine
strain) from ATCC to begin adhesion and
disinfection experiments
Modeling surface adhesion forces for
bacteria and spores to biofilms
-------
Chemical Contaminants
Determine:
• The best methods to measure chemical
contaminants in water
contaminants in water and pro
anism of adsorption by analyzing
contamination
Appropriate methods for decontamina'
Measurement Objectives
Determine rates and mechanisms of contaminant
accumulation
- Adsorption
Modeling to guide the experimental path
Control experimental complexity
• Static flow versus dynamic flow
• Pure compounds for deposits
Limit variables
• Contaminant type and concentration, flowrate, temperatur
Materials
Chemical Contaminants Pipe Substrate
Dichlorvos
Cyanide Salts (Sodium
and Potassium)
Strychnine
Diesel, Toluene
- Copper, PVC, used pipes
- Samples cut for coupons
• 1.5 cm x 1.5 cm
Deposits
— Powder Materials
- Calcium carbonate, iron
oxide, copper oxides
Experimental Procedure
SOOmL of contaminant/water solution placed in
600mL beakers or SOOmL capped jar
Stirring with glass coated magnetic stir bar
Pipe added as coupons
Deposits added as powder (3 grams)
Measure change in contaminant concentration
over time
— in solution and on pipe surface
Measurement Methods
Water Characterization Pipe Surface Analy
Adsorption Isotherms
CN- ISE
KCN
-------
Pipe Material Analysis
Pipe Analysis
FTIR m icrospectroscopy maps of Cu pipes with Phorate
5A4: 2842ppm, 70-80 min,
30.69± 9.63 (480) 4A6: 282ppm, 125-200 min, 2.23±1.06 (224)
0 mm 2 o mm 2
30 -
1
Q.
1 10 -
Q.
o -
fi\
4
\ ..
0
10
|
1 4
1 a
( I
. * ! *
'
Time, Min
2000 4000 6000
Time, Min
• 29 ppm (1 A)
• 282 ppm (2A)
282 ppm (4A)
* 296 ppm (3A)
* 2842 ppm (5A'
•»• 2842 ppm (6A'
* 1 .8 m M , U sed
8000 10000
Pipes
Path Forward
Isotherm Analysis
Aqueous Cyanide Species Analysis
Organic Chemical Studies
— Purge and Trap
Contaminant exposure to:
— Other pipe types
- Other oxides
- Pipe and deposits
Use of tap water
Dynamic Contamination Measurements
Flow Contamination Test Loop
-------
Fluorescence
measurements,
test
chamber
and
test
surface
84 optical libers
- — i lorexciiaton
quartz lube
near positwnifig/
spectrolluorameCer device
96 mm x 1.6 mm
flew cross secifon
flow
Diesel excess layer at copper surface
o^
50 100 ISO
time(hr)
Plumbing Test Facility
Full scale, five floor structure
Emulates a typical building plumbing
system, including supply and drainage
Multiple test loops
Computer data acquisition and control
system for running tests and monitoring
sensor readings (flow, temperature, pH,
conductivity, chlorine, turbidity, etc.)
Characterization of Pipe Deposits
locations in Maryland and Virginia,
including copper and iron
Used water heaters
-------
Taney Pipe Residue. Rep 2
J, ,
• ••(•. .*
Cross section of pipe
t=200
t=50<
Interface Height
00
'S n
X
time
-------
Decontamination Methods
-ater, cold or hot
eaning solution
Back flush
Mechanical or ultrasonic cleaning
Remedial surface treatment
Handling of waste water
Verification of cleaning effectiveness
Must deal with worst-case
Conclusion
Continuing more extensive tests with different
contaminant/substrate/exposure combinations
Focusing more on specific decontamination
methods and procedures
Develop specific recommendations for response
plans for water contamination events
Generalize the results for wider applicability
-------
.. ater Decontamination an
Detection
2006 Decontamination Workshop
April 28, 2006
John Hall and Jeff Szabo
EPA/NHSRC
Greg Meiners
Shaw Environmental
Disclaimer
Any opinions expressed in this
presentation are those of the author(s)
and do not, necessarily, reflect the
official positions and policies of the
EPA.
Any mention of products or trade
names does not constitute
recommendation for use by the EPA.
Background
EPA has been conducting research over the
last 3 years at EPA Test and Evaluation (T&E)
Facility via:
• Water Assessment Technology Evaluation Research
and Security (WATERS) Center
• Recirculating distribution system simulator loop 6
• Single pass line
• Engineering Testing and Verification (ETV) Program
• Technology Testing and Evaluation Program (TTEP)
Research Purpose
Evaluate the ability of commercially
available water quality sensors to detect
changes in water quality resulting from
contamination
• What happens when various contaminants are
introduced into the water supply ?
• What standard water quality parameters are the
most effective for detecting changes in water
quality ?
Single Pass Pipe
1200 feet of 3 inch
fiberglass lined cast
iron pipe with PVC
sections
• Flow is 1 ft/sec
• Sensors are located at
80 and 1100 ft from
the injection point
• Sensors only see the
contaminants once
• Contaminants injected
with a pump
-------
Monitor Test Rack
with Event Monitor
Online Standard Water
Quality Test Parameters
pH, temperature
ORP, specific conductance
dissolved oxygen
turbidity
free & total chlorine
TOO
ammonia (NH4+-N)
nitrate (NO3--N)
chloride (Ch)
Injected Contaminants
Herbicides
Aldicarb
Glyphosate
Dicamba
Insecticides
Dichlorvos
Malathion
Culture Broths <
Nutrient
Terrific
Trypticase Soy
Microorganisms
E.coli
B.globigii
(w/ and w/o media)
Others
DMSO
Nicotine
Inorganics
Lead Nitrate
Mercuric Chloride
Arsenic Trioxide
Potassium
Ferricyanide
Sodium Thiosulfate
Malathion vs. TOO
Malathion vs. free chlorine
i
F,««,bL2Ai™™d*"bnSi«°ll..ll,
B*^^^\
*'"','" i' "^>v A
^A/**Alv\A|VAi>;%^l / WA JJ^,,
T-Eomm ^^^^±^K^^-^y^~.
IUECTIO»+iHOUBs *
_ ,„,.,
1"™",~1,
A,.,.l,,,,,,h,
Single Pass Data
Free and Total
Chlorine and TOO
were the most useful
trigger parameters
Contaminants travel
as a slug in pipe
Aldicarb and Nicotine
are examples of two
very different
contaminants
Aldicarb=fast reacting
Nicotine=slow reacting
|oe
•E 04
602
$ 00
\ll
6 H
i
-3
(1
30 -20 -10
(In
-20 -10
jection sta
I
Response
ectionstar
\
10 2
J ~~~ J inlet (ATI)
Outlet (AT[)
| Injection Stop|
nejn) '°
to Nicotine at 3B mg/L
satPOmin)
J f
Outlet (ATI)
Injection Stop
-------
S::CAN on the Single Pass
Hach Configuration
Non-Hach Configuration
General Issues
Pros
• Improving water quality (dual benefit)
• TOC and free/total chlorine are proven
primary trigger parameters
Cons
• Cost (Capital and Operational)
• False positives (algorithm development)
Gaps
• Biological and Radiological contaminants
Other Factors
Event detection algorithm (e.g.,
development, use, and selection)
SCADA (field equipment, communication,
data storage and access)
Field testing and sampling requirements for
triggered sample
Historical knowledge of routine distribution
system water quality changes
Post Contamination Event
Decontamination factors
Contaminated water is displaced by clean
water (Flushing)
The bulk phase of the water returns to
baseline conditions established prior to
contamination event as determined by on
line monitors and grab sampling
(parameters and contaminants)
-------
Common Decontamination
Methods
Flushing
• Contaminated water is displaced by clean water
• Adhered contaminants are sheared from the
pipe wall
• Delivers higher disinfectant concentration to the
biofilm and pipe wall
Superchlorination
• Higher chlorine concentration in the bulk
provides more disinfectant at the pipe wall
Role of Water Quality Sensors
Water quality sensors detect when baseline
water quality levels are reestablished in the
bulk phase
• Grab samples will verify absence of
contaminants in the bulk phase
• Sensors monitor Superchlorination levels and
when residual returns to normal
Cannot detect contamination on the pipe
wall or biofilm
What's Left Behind
Some contaminants observed to adhere to
biofilms and piping materials of
construction
Pipe conditions such as corrosion and
tuberculation also affect the ability to
decontaminate
A Case Study with Bacillus globigii
Multiple injections of B. globigii at 104-106
cfu/ml were made in the single pass pipe
over a 12 month period
Basic flushing between test runs (20 gpm,
1 ft/s)
After the 3rd trial, B. globigii began showing
up in the bulk water blanks
• Spores only detected by ultraconcentration
(approximately 400X)
Case Study (cont'd)
More aggressive flushing was implemented
(75 gpm, 3.5 ft/s, 2 hours)
B.g/oJb;g;7 still remained in bulk phase
blanks after flushing
Swipe sampling was implemented
• PVC, fiberglass and corroded ductile iron
surfaces were all in the pipe
• Spores remained on the corroded iron, but not
the other surfaces
Decontamination Study
B. globigii was injected at 106 cfu/ml for
20 min at 5 gpm for chlorination studies
• Concentration on the coupons immediately
after B. globigii injection was 3x103 cfu/cm2
B. globigii was in contact with tap water (1
mg/L free chlorine) for 9 days at 5 gpm
• Reduced levels by 80% of initial coupon
concentration (Ct approx 13,000 mg/L min)
|
-------
Decontamination Study
(cont'd)
Decontamination was undertaken using
superchlorination
• Elevated chlorine disinfection was
implemented (10mg/l for 80 min)
• Small effect of superchlorination on corroded
iron samples (drop of 500 to 400 cfu/cm2)
Future Work
Persistence of biologicals in drinking water
pipes and decontamination
• Recirculating pipe loop with corroded ductile
iron will be used
• Spore concentration will be monitored overtime
• CT values for decontamination will be
determined
Conclusions
Some contaminants remain after flushing
and chlorine contact in the bulk phase
(ultraconcentration) and on the corroded
iron surfaces (swipe samples)
Additional health based toxicity and
infectivity data needed
Areas of rust and corrosion may require
more aggressive decontamination than
flushing and or chlorination
-------
Determining the Virucidal
Mechanism of Action for Foreign
Animal Disease
J.M. Bieker1'2*, W. Einfeld1, M.D. Tucker1, T.
Beckham3, A. Shuler2, R.D. Oberst2
1Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, NM.
2Dept. of Diagnostic Medicine/Pathobiology, College of
Veterinary Medicine, Kansas State University,
Manhattan, KS
3Plum Island Animal Disease Center, Plum Island, NY
Virucidal Validation
Proper validation is necessary for efficacy
claims
- Differences in resistance exist among viruses
Virus inactivation important to aid in
disease containment
- Disrupt transmission cycle
- Dependent on mechanism of inactivation
Preventative measure to help control
reservoirs or vehicles involved in disease
transmission
Environmental factors can effect efficacy
- Organic matter, temperature, humidity, UV
—
I
A
j>?
Virus Sensitivity to Disinfectants
Virus Type
Enveloped
Small Non- \
enveloped I
Large Non-
enveloped
Category
A - marked
sensitivity
B - slight
sensitivity
C - moderate
sensitivity
Distinguishing
Features
Nucleic acid,
capsid protein,
lipid envelope
Nucleic acid,
capsid protein,
Nucleic acid,
capsid protein,
Examples
Influenza, SARS,
Vaccinia, HIV
Polio, FMDV,
Rhino, Coxsackie
Adenovirus,
Rotavirus
VS ; Klein (JjJ) £
•
g
verall Microbial Susceptibility
Most Resistant
Least Resistant
Bacterial spore formers
Protozoa (cysts/oocysts)
Mycobacterium & Non-
enveloped viruses
Fungi
Vegetative bacteria
Enveloped viruses
Virus Methodologies
No US standards currently exist for
evaluating disinfectants against viruses
- EPA guidelines, ASTM
- International Standards: AFNOR, DEFRA
Standardized tests are necessary for
regulatory processes and comparing data
Initial work often conducted using
surrogate viruses
- Member of same virus family but less
pathogenic
arameters in Virucidal Testing
Methods
Parameter
Test Configuration
Test Virus
Cytotoxicity
Organic Challenge
Exposure Interval
Host Cell System
Viral Enumeration
Alternative Diagnostics
Description
Suspension vs. Carrier
Enveloped, Non-enveloped, Surrogate
Washing, purification step
Addition of feces, serum, etc...
Exposure contact time (resistance)
Virus specific, titer differences
Endpoint dilution vs. plaque assay
Nucleic acid, viral proteins, etc...
-------
EPA Guidelines for Virucidal
Testing
Must follow use-directions (surface, liquid, or spray
disinfection) at a specified exposure length at RT
Untreated control should recover a minimum of 104
infectious viral liter
Protocol must include:
- 4 determinations for virus recovery (endpoint)
- Cytoxicity controls
- Activity of germicide for each test dilution
- Any special methods to increase recovery or reduce toxicity
- ID-50 values (tissue culture, embryonated egg, animal infection)
- Data must show complete inactivation of virus at all dilutions, or
at least 3-log reduction in liter beyond cytotoxic level
Evaluating Mechanism of Action
• Viruses present limited targets:
- Lipid envelope
- Capsid protein
- Structural proteins (receptors)
- Nucleic acid
•4-
W.'Srt
Evaluating Mechanism of Action
9
A
Virus target
Lipid Envelope x' ~\
Capsid Protein ^
Structural Proteins ~~-O
O
Nucleic Acid f
Effective
compounds
QACs, Alcohols, Phenols,
Chlortiexidine,
Glutaraldehyde
Chlorine, Oxidizers,
Peracetic acid, Alcohols,
Glutaraldehyde
Chlorine, Oxidizers,
Peracetic acid, Alcohols,
Glutaraldehyde
Oxidizers, Chlorine,
Peracetic Acid
VS*^
?5 4 \\
^
Evaluating Mechanism of Action
Virus target
Capsid Protein ^
( \
Structural Proteins _^»
O
Nucleic Acid £
Alternative
Diagnostic
SDS-PAGE
Western blot
ELISA
SDS-PAGE
Western blot
ELISA
PCR
RT-PCR
Experimental Design
Objective: to evaluate various disinfectants
against FMDV, Avian Influenza (Al), and
closely related surrogate viruses
Hypotheses:
-A closely related surrogate virus will react
similarly to disinfectants
- Molecular based diagnostics can be applied
as rapid verification tools
Experimental Design
Bovine enterovirus-2 (BEV) selected as
surrogate virus for FMDV
- Also a member of Picornaviridae
Mammalian A/WSN/33 was selected as a
surrogate for Al (low pathogenic)
Testing conducted at KSU or at Plum
Island Foreign Animal Disease Center
(FMDV)
- Following EPA guidelines
- Using RT-PCR to show RNA degradation
-------
Test Disinfectants
10% bleach (pH-10)
Sandia Decon Formulation, (EFT, pH ~9.7)
- Surfactant, peracid, hydrogen peroxide
2% Sodium Hydroxide (NaOH, pH -11-12)
4% Sodium Carbonate (NaCarb, pH ~11.5) |
5% Acetic Acid (AA, pH -2.5)
0.4% Oxy-Sept 333 (Oxysept, pH -3)
- Peroxyacetic acid, hydrogen peroxide
1 % Virkon® S (Virkon, pH -2.5)
- Potassium peroxymonosulphate
70% Ethanol (EtOH, pH -6.8)
H2O
Methodology
Equal parts virus:disinfectant were mixed and
exposed for 1, 10, or 20 min at RT
For organic challenge, either bovine or poultry
feces were diluted 10% (wt/vol) and added to the
disinfectant at 10% or 50% cone.
Following exposure, samples were diluted with
PBS, ultracentrifuged, and prepared for infecting
TCID50 plates or RNA extraction for RT-PCR
Western blot was conducted on influenza
samples to visualize effect on nucleocapsid
protein
Experimental Design
-Cytotoxicity of
disinfectants
(MTT) viability kit
-Removed by
ultracentrifugation
washing step
(Preliminary analysis
of disinfectants to
ensure no inhibition)
Inactivation of Influenza A (TCID50)
WWSN/33 Disinfectior
H5N8 Disinfect! or
Inactivation of Influenza A (RT-PCR)
Effect on Viral RNA (RT-PCR)
1 min treatment, no org
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Conclusions (Influenza A)
Both mammalian influenza A/WSN/33 and low
pathogenic H5N8 reacted similarly to each test
disinfectant (no statistical differences observed
forTCID50orRT-PCR)
DF-200 and 10% bleach were most effective for
1 min exposure, and Virkon S was completely
effective at 10 min for each organic challenge
level (0, 10, 50)
Only DF-200 and 10% bleach degraded
significant amounts of viral RNA, but were
greatly impacted with the presence of organic
challenge
Results (Infectivity)
i
BEV propagated in
MDBK cells
FMDV O1 Bruge
propagated in BHK-21 cells
Results (RT-PCR)
I '-'-
Conclusions (infectivity)
Although BEV and FMDV are both
picornaviruses, BEV was much more resistant to
acidic disinfectants (AA, Oxysept, Virkon) than
FMDV
For FMDV, all disinfectants except EtOH were
effective in complete loss of infectivity based on
TCID50
For BEV, 10% bleach, EFT, and Virkon were
most effective
BEV, because of its enteric nature and
resistance to pH may not be best surrogate virus
Conclusions (RT-PCR)
10% bleach was most effective at degrading
FMDV RNA (~ 7.5 Iog10)
- EFT, NaOH, & Oxysept resulted in ~ 4 Iog10 level
RNA degradation
- Remaining disinfectants resulted in ~ no degradation
EFT, 10% bleach, and NaOH were most
effective at degrading BEV RNA (-7-8 Iog10)
- Remaining disinfectants resulted in ~ no degradation
Conclusion: only 10% bleach, EFT, or NaOH
could be validated by RT-PCR (based on this
mechanism of action)
Concluding Remarks
Viruses present limited targets for disinfectants
-Viral RNA
- Viral proteins (surface proteins, nucleoprotein)
- Lipid envelope (Influenza A)
Organic challenge does reduce effectiveness of
disinfectants tested
Continued live agent testing with H5N1 and
FMDV (at remaining time contacts) are next
steps for determining the validity of using
surrogate test viruses
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Concluding Remarks
Real time RT-PCR is being validated for a
rapid field assay for determining viral
inactivation due to degradation of viral
RNA
- If mechanism is against RNA, RT-PCR could
verify disinfection within hours vs. days
What assays need to be done from field
samples to verify eradication efforts prior
to re-introduction of susceptible animals?
MSA
Concluding Remarks
After establishing efficacy, some
consideration needs to be given to the
material for application
- Effect of corrosiveness of chemical
disinfectants
- Reusability H2°
-$$$ equipment
A/.'S,',
Concluding Questions
Does virucidal efficacy testing need to be
standardized in this country?
Can surrogates be used for validation of
disinfectants?
Do disinfectant claims need to be made for
each specific virus or can they cover a
virus family?
ontact & Acknowledgements
Jill Bieker
(505-977-7924, jmbieke@sandia.gov)
Acknowledgements:
-Joe Anderson, Heather Wisdom, Kansas state
University, Manhattan, KS
- Ruben Donis, CDC, Atlanta, GA
- Rita Betty, Gary Brown, J. Bruce Kelley, sandia
National Laboratories, Albuquerque, NM
- Meri ROSCO, Max RasmUSSen, Plum Island Animal
Disease Center, NY
Sandia Decontamination
Chemistry
Formulation developed by
Sandia National Laboratories
- Surfactant/peroxide blend
developed initially against both
chemical and biological agents
of potential mass destruction
- Non-corrosive, non-toxic,
enhanced physical stability
- Deployable as Liquid, Foam,
Fog, Aerosolized Mist
- Currently 2 existing commercial
licensees/producers
- More information available at
www.sandia.gov/SandiaDecon
/ Novel
V Activator
Sandia Decon Foam
How Does it Work?
Kill of BW Agents
Kill of Bio Pathogens
Neutralization of CW
Agents
Neutralization of TICs
Final Peroxide Concentration is ~3.5°/
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Stating the Problem
• Death is a sad but inescapable fact of
farming life. Sheep especially have a
quite remarkable propensity for
dropping dead at a moment's notice,
but any farming operation involving
livestock, no matter how well ordered,
will have its share of casualties.
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U.S. Agriculture
Vulnerable
Dispersed geographically
concentrated operations
Agents are easy to obtain &.
Non-attributional
Potential Livestock BW Agents
Avian influenza Nipah/Hendra virus
Foot and mouth
disease
Exotic Newcastle
Bovine spongiform
encephalopathy
Anthrax
Classical swine fever
Rift Valley fever
-------
Recent Disease Outbreaks
-1997 Taiwan-- 4 million hogs killed
(FMD)
1998 Netherlands—11 million hoas killed
(CSF)
Challenges to mention
a few
• Worker Health and Safety
• Carcass Handling
-Hazmat
- Location
• Depopulation
• Disposal/Decontamination
-------
-------
Diagnosis time elapsej
A. Great Plan & Execution
B. Poor Plan & Delayn
C. Poor Plan - Delaj* & Poor Execution
Composting
Cost efficient
Quick
High temp
destruction of
disease agent
On farm alternative
to burial, mounding
Cover vital
Art + Science
-------
Rendering
• No land disposal
•Commercial value
offsets costs
•Existing infrastructure
•Fewer Plants
•FDA Feed Rule '06
•Capacity/day — 20
tonnes/hr
•Not decomposed
•Transportation
biosecuritv
Landfill - Burial
Commercial Landfill
(Subtitle D)
Existing facilities
Off producers premise
Wide availability/lg capach
Regulated and inspected
Recognized by public
Facility indemnification
Decomposition long term
Volume limits
Premium charge due to PR
concerns
Burial
Inexpensive
On-site - no movement
required
Large capacity
Fate and Transport
unknown
Site deed
Decontamination
i Bio-Security
i Cleaning and Disinfection
-------
ESF#11
• New Annex to our National Response
Plan
• Formal recognition of Agriculture
Incidents
Food/Ag Incident Annex
"Federal Food and Agriculture
Decon and Disposal Roles and
Responsibilities"
•Focus on decontamination and disposal
•Who does what, order of activities, and outcomes
•Summaries of laws & homeland security plans
•Contacts in Federal agencies
•Help State, Tribal, Local agencies and industry plan
and respond
•www.epa.gov/homelandsecurity
Food/Ag CONORS
Agriculture and
emergency
management
communities must be
prepared to work
together closely to deal
with an animal health
emergency
FADT Strategic Plan
2008-2012
• White House OSTP Product
• 3 focus groups
- Modeling
- Countermeasures
- Decontamination and Disposal
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Top-level drivers
National Veterinary Stockpile (NVS)
Priorities of NVS Steering Committee (AI, FMD, RVf
'Customer' for deployment of vaccines &
immunomodulators
National Animal Health Laboratory Network
(NAHLN)
'Customer' for deployment of validated diagnostics
NBII Wildlife Disease Information Node
'Customer' for data acquisition, management, archiving,
curation, and distribution
Decontamination &
Disposal
1 Decontamination is essential to contain t
spread of disease and is an integral par
the eradication plan. If items cannot be
adequately cleaned and disinfected, the
must be disposed of using appropriate
disposal methods. Decontamination an
disposal actions are iterative during the
course of a response."
Wisdom from the Field
Dee Ellis, Texas AHC
Cody Wilson, DHS Center Excellence
Kathy Lee, Iowa DNR
Kent Fowler, CA Dept Food Ag
Jim Howard, NC Dept Ag
Actions Needed at
National Level
• EPA - R+D on disposal methods
(clearinghouse)
• USDA - finalize carcass disposal guidelit
disease-specific biosecurity guides
• DHS
- payment policies in advance for carcass disposal
as debris
- OOP funding for state agencies to hire staff
can't compete with ER personnel or acaden
Actions Needed at
State Level
• Include disposal in all plans
• ID respective rules and regulations
• Clear guidelines for producers and
local responders
-------
Actions Needed at
Local Level
• Disposal planning incorporated into
prevention, response, mitigation plans
(EOP)
• Include Industry in planning
• Pre-identify mass burial locations
Top-level issues
Decontamination and Disposal (D+D) is significantly
under-funded, and authorities map to multiple
agencies (confluence of interest). A national system
of operations not yet in existence remains the critical
first-step in the utilization of R&D products
D+D budget requirements
(FY $ million , new $ in each of 2008-2012)
Program 200 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 Total
7 08-12
base
Ops Base 0.00 8.00 8.00 6.00 4.00 4.00 30.00
Fate and 0.00 8.00 8.00 10.00 12.00 12.00 50.00
Transport
Decon 0.00 4.00 4.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 8.00
Regist.
Envir. 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 12.00
Decon
Sub-total 0.00 20.00 20,00 20,00 20.00 20.00 100.0
EMERGING
INFECTIOUS DISEASES
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Avian Influenza
Decontamination
Surrogates (salmonella for flu)
Industry stockpile issues
Exemptions: FMD (bleach, lye, sod
Relation between lab data and on-
farm use (false sense of security)
Soap/Detergent data
Avian Disease, 2003
• 5 disinfectants effective at inactivating
AIV; RNA still detected by RT PCR in
samples inactivated with phenolic and
quaternary ammonia (false +)
• RTPCR can be used to assure proper
cleaning and disinfection with certain
disinfectants
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&EPA
United States
Environmental Protection
Agency
Office of Research and Development
National Homeland Security Research Center
Cincinnati, OH 45268
Official Business
Penalty for Private Use
$300
EPA/600/R-06/121
January 2007
www.epa.gov
PRESORTED STANDARD
POSTAGE & FEES PAID
EPA
PERMIT NO. G-35
Recycled/Recyclable
Printed with vegetable-based ink on
paper that contains a minimum of
50% post-consumer fiber content
processed chlorine free
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