EPA600/R-07/042
United States
Environmental Protection
Agency
Energy and Water Distribution
Interdependency Issues:
Best Practices and Lessons
Learned
SUMMARY REPORT OF 2005 ENERGY AND
WATER DISTRIBUTION EXERCISE
Office of Research and Development
National Homeland Security Research Center
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Acknowledgements
The 2005 Energy and Water Distribution Exercise was developed and managed by Kathy Clayton of the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) National Homeland Security Research Center, Alice Lippert of the U.S.
Department of Energy's (DOE) Office of Electricity Delivery and Energy Reliability, and Ronda Mosley of Public
Technology Institute (PTI).
EPA, DOE, and PTI wish to thank the workshop participants, the case study contributors (San Diego, CA; Miami
Dade County, FL, and San Francisco, CA), and John Whitler of EPA's Water Security Division for their expertise
and significant contributions toward reducing vulnerabilities resulting from sector interdependencies.
Logistical support for the workshop was provided by the Science Applications International Corporation under EPA
contract 68-C-02-067 and by McMunn and Associates under DOE contract DE-AP26-05NT50444. This report was
prepared by PTI and The Cadmus Group, Inc. under EPA contract number 68-C-02-069.
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I. Statement of the Problem 1
II. Objectives and Summary of Exercise 3
III. Key Discussion from Exercise Participants 4
IV. Recommendations 6
V. Additional Resources and References 8
VI. Attachments 12
A. Participating Organizations in the 2005 Energy and Water Distribution Workshop 12
B. Summary of Exercise Evaluations 13
C. Exercise Sponsors 16
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1.0
Statement of the Problem
Understanding the interdependencies among our
nation's 17 critical infrastructures (defined in
Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD -7)
is critical to sustaining the continuity and resilience of
each infrastructure component as well as the collective
system. This report discusses the relationship of two
critical infrastructures, water and energy, and provides
recommendations for minimizing the effects of energy
emergencies on drinking water distribution.
The reliance on a constant supply of energy is widely
recognized and receives regular coverage in the media.
Repercussions from energy emergencies, such as the
impacts of the 2003 blackout in the northeastern United
States, are commonly understood and well documented
(https://reports.energy.gov/BlackoutFinal-Web.
pdf). Less understood is the criticality of water and
wastewater systems. According to HSPD - 7, an attack
or breakdown of the United States critical infrastructure
and key resources (e.g., water sector) could cause
"catastrophic health effects or mass casualties...
affect our national prestige and morale... [or] have
a debilitating effect on security and economic well-
being."
The following examples demonstrate some of the ways
our society and economy depend upon functioning
water systems and the interdependency between the
water and energy sectors:
• Hospitals, nursing homes, schools, office buildings,
restaurants, and other such facilities all require
drinking water and wastewater service in order to
operate. Water is used for drinking, sanitation, and
heating and cooling systems.
• Many manufacturing operations either use water
as an ingredient in their processes or rely on
wastewater systems to remove and process their
manufacturing waste.
• Water is critical to emergency response in many
ways. The most obvious is fire fighting. Having
ready access to safe water is important in order
to provide mass care services and public health
services, such as supplying potable water for
drinking and ice for preserving food and medicine,
during the emergency.
• Clean water and functioning wastewater treatment
systems are also necessary for sanitation, preventing
the spread of disease among evacuated populations
and emergency responders, and the provision of
temporary housing.
• Power generation and water infrastructures are
significantly interdependent. Drinking water and
wastewater cannot typically be processed without
energy to run pumps and treatment equipment.
Likewise, water is used in many aspects of the
energy infrastructure including electricity generation
(steam generation to turn turbines) and cooling of
generators or other equipment used to provide fuel
and power during emergencies.
Essential work has been done in both the private and
public sectors to enhance the security and protection
of the drinking water/wastewater infrastructure. A key
component of such efforts is assessing and hardening
vulnerabilities. Some vulnerabilities are completely
within the scope and control of the sector, such as
site security. However, others are related to sector
interdependencies. Questions for planners and decision
makers to consider regarding the energy and water
relationship in their community include:
• Are the infrastructures (or specific important
facilities within each infrastructure) so tightly
linked that close coordination and cooperation
will be needed to restore both infrastructures? As
described earlier, water and energy infrastructures
are co-dependent. As a result, it may be necessary to
restore these services simultaneously depending on
how close this relationship is in a community.
• What facilities/operations within the community
require the drinking water/wastewater infrastructure
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be brought on-line first before they themselves can
be restored? For example, health regulations prevent
most facilities, such as schools, hospitals, and
nursing homes, from opening if there is no drinking
water or wastewater service.
Who are the critical water customers? Critical
customers include those facilities that provide
essential services during an emergency or are critical
to the function of a community (e.g., hospitals,
kidney dialysis centers, industrial users, etc.). These
facilities would be given first priority for restoring
service.
What if multiple segments of the drinking water/
wastewater infrastructure are affected? It is
important to prioritize the internal restoration of the
drinking water/wastewater infrastructure if multiple
segments are affected at once during an incident.
For example, water and wastewater themselves are
closely linked; the need for sewer services is less
important following a disaster until the water system
comes back on-line and water is again flowing into
the wastewater system.
To comply with the Bioterrorism Act of 2002, drinking
water utilities serving populations of 3,300 or greater
had to complete vulnerability assessments (VA) and
emergency response plans (ERP) to address those
vulnerabilities. These VA's and ERP's should have
taken interdependencies into account. To assist water
and energy sectors with this effort, U.S. EPA's National
Homeland Security Research Center (NHSRC) in
partnership with U.S. DOE's Office of Electricity
Delivery and Energy Reliability and Public Technology
Institute (PTI) held a workshop in 2005 designed
to identify best practices and lessons learned from
previous crisis incidents that impacted both the energy
and water infrastructures.
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2.0
Objectives and Summary of the Exercise
On August 17, 2005 local, state, and federal officials
and representatives from private industry gathered in
Washington B.C. for a half-day scenario-based tabletop
exercise and lessons learned workshop regarding a case
study of a major energy system disruption, caused by
Hurricane Isabel, in the Washington B.C. Metropolitan
Area and the resulting effects on the water distribution
and supply infrastructure in the area. The exercise was
sponsored by U.S. EPA's NHSRC, U.S. BOE's Office
of Electricity Belivery and Energy Reliability, and PTI.
Exercise presentations and discussions focused on
pre-emergency planning, emergency operation plan
implementation, alternative water supply options, and
energy and water-related best practices and policy-
based options. Exercise participants reviewed actual
occurrences from pre-landfall of Hurricane Isabel to
several days into recovery and restoration, and actively
discussed energy and water issues throughout this
defined timeframe. On September 18, 2003, Hurricane
Isabel made landfall near Cape Hatteras, North
Carolina, as a Category 2 storm with winds near 100
mph. Bespite this fairly modest storm classification,
over the next 24 hours Isabel caused unprecedented
power outages (6.5 million customers) throughout the
Mid-Atlantic region.
Participants were briefed on the issues and challenges
faced by local, state, and federal agencies and private
organizations during response and coordination
efforts. Bringing these agencies and organizations
together periodically to review the special demands of
emergency response and recovery efforts is a unique
way to build understanding, trust, and relationships that
are essential in the fast-paced operating environment of
major disasters. This exercise afforded the participants
the opportunity to conceptualize synchronized
operations related to priorities, capabilities, and
the needs of all partners and customers. A list of
participating organizations is provided in Attachment A.
The exercise and facilitated discussions were intended
to:
• Provide lessons learned from the 2005 hurricane
season related to the energy and water infrastructure.
• Highlight the importance of communications and
establishing working relationships across various
state, federal, and private organizations in advance
of energy and water emergencies as a part of the
planning process.
• Provide opportunities to discuss process and
coordination efforts with various state and local
energy and water authorities in infrastructure
assurance to engage them in reliability issues.
• Assess the technical assistance needs of local
officials with regard to planning for and responding
to an energy and subsequent water supply disruption.
• Provide opportunity for participants to exchange
ideas and best practices for dealing with future
energy emergencies that affect water supply.
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3.0
Key Discussion from Exercise Participants
Hurricanes highlight the unique interdependencies
within the water and energy sectors. A better
understanding of these interdependencies is needed
across all sectors and within the government for the
purposes of planning and mitigation, prioritizing
restoration, and recovery. This exercise helped advance
the degree of mutual understanding of the impacts of a
multi-region/state response to a hurricane. Hurricane
Isabel challenged the water and energy sector, and this
exercise paved the way for improving the effectiveness
of response and restoration operations for water
and wastewater, power, and natural gas networks.
Using the tabletop exercise to guide discussion,
workshop facilitators posed the following questions to
participants:
• What lessons were learned from Hurricane Isabel?
• What are the water sector's priorities in times of
crisis?
• What assistance do local officials and utilities need
from state and federal agencies during this type of a
crisis?
• How do water utilities currently plan to obtain power
during energy emergencies?
• How can the electric utilities do more to help the
water utilities?
With respect to lessons learned, participants impacted
by Hurricane Isabel indicated that it served as a "wake-
up" call for more detailed planning. Although the water
and energy sectors were able to recover from Hurricane
Isabel relatively quickly because it was a comparatively
short-term event, the following were identified as
priorities for plan augmentation:
• Staffing:
• Prepare contingency staffing plans (key personnel
were on vacation when Hurricane Isabel struck in
August);
• Cross-train employees and minimize multiple
responsibilities for individuals;
• Prepare for long-term events (staff sustainability);
• Consider and plan for the needs of employees'
families;
• Utilize Emergency Operations Center (EOC) and
resources from other agencies and organizations
(i.e., Parks and Recreation Department, trade
associations, neighboring jurisdictions, larger
utilities) earlier.
• Communications:
• Redundant communication technologies are
necessary (800 MHz radios, amateur radio, cell
phones);
• Develop protocols for regular interagency
and interdisciplinary communication during
emergencies (to improve communication
and coordination among agencies and other
responding entities);
• Enhance timeliness and effectiveness of
communication to the public, including
alternative methods to communicate emergency
measures when standard modes, such as
television and radio, are not available due to
power loss.
Another key lesson learned from Hurricane Isabel was
the need for urban forestry planning and regular tree
trimming. One of the main after effects of the hurricane
was the number of downed trees and limbs which
in turn downed power lines. There was significant
discussion about the cost to keep tree limbs trimmed
away from power lines. This is a continuing concern
for jurisdictions with a large number of older trees
throughout the community.
Regarding the water sector's priorities during times
of crisis, staffing and communications were again
the primary themes of the discussion. Specifically,
mobilizing staff resources quickly (who needs to report;
where to report; where to respond) and sustaining staff
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resources are priorities. For communications, quickly
and effectively notifying the public of "do not use" or
"boil water" advisories and establishing information
outlets, such as call centers, were priorities.
Regarding assistance from state and federal agencies
during these types of emergencies, participants
indicated that they primarily need quick financial aid.
Coordination support, staffing, equipment resources
(generators) and supplies (fuel, ice, water), and risk
communication assistance were also identified as areas
where assistance would be most helpful.
With respect to obtaining power during energy
emergencies, there was extensive discussion about
back-up generators, including cost, availability,
reliability, maintenance, and associated regulatory
requirements, such as air quality permitting. Obviously,
being able to obtain fuel for emergency generators is
critical. Participants shared strategies for ensuring
that adequate fuel is available, such as establishing
relationships with local as well as out-of-town
suppliers, maintaining fuel stockpiles, and utilizing
underground storage tanks rather than above ground
tanks.
In response to the question of how electric utilities
can help water utilities, participants asked that electric
utilities (recognizing budget limitations) invest in
newer technology (i.e., better transformers, switches,
and fuses, bury power lines), increase staff during
emergencies for quicker recovery (mutual aid and
assistance agreements and MOUs), and participate
in local Emergency Operations Centers (EOC) when
they are activated. During this part of the workshop,
there was discussion regarding the unanticipated
consequences of deregulation and DOE's performance
standards for utilities, specifically as they related to
response and restoration time. It was also noted that
electric utilities could prioritize water utilities as critical
customers so that they would receive assistance in
restoring power supply as soon as possible.
Lastly, each of the questions evoked discussion
regarding water storage capacity as well as the
importance of mutual aid and assistance agreements
and MOUs not only within the sectors, but also among
the sectors. After the workshop, the water sector has
engaged in a large effort to increase the number of
intrastate mutual aid and assistance agreements in
the water sector, commonly referred to as Water and
Wastewater Response Networks (WARNs). The main
resource for this effort has been the "Utilities Helping
Utilities" Action Plan that was published by the
American Water Works Association (http://www.awwa.
org/Advocacy/govtaff/issues/Issue07_Water_Response_
Networks.cfm). This document describes the process
for establishing WARNs based on the CALWARN and
FLWARN models which were the first two WARN
programs developed by the water sector.
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4.0
Recommendations
Although there are a number of areas for improvement,
the overall response and recovery of the water and
energy sectors to Hurricane Isabel was successful.
Local governments and industry deserve considerable
credit for effective planning and preparation as
well as tireless efforts of restoration under difficult
circumstances. Industry and government worked well
together at all levels.
Hurricane Isabel highlighted the unique
interdependencies within the water and energy sectors.
The storm also underscored the criticality of the
Best Practice Case Study -
Miami-Dade, FL
The Miami-Dade Water and Sewer Department
(MDWASD), being in a hurricane zone, has extensive
backup power systems and a sophisticated resource
management plan. Standby power systems (dual fuel
to the extent possible) are installed at major wellfields,
water and wastewater treatment plants, and major
wastewater pumping stations. Rules now require that
new wastewater pumping stations at or above 100
gallons/day average flow be furnished with in-place
standby power systems. Additionally, at the largest
MDWASD water treatment plant, "spinning reserve"
is utilized to ensure the maintenance of adequate
system pressure in the event of a power failure.
Under this approach, at least one standby power
generator and one direct diesel-driven high service
pump are operated continuously in preparation for
power failures. On the approach of significant rain
events, additional units are preemptively started in
anticipation of a power failure. At the other treatment
plant complex, five remote storage tank/pumping
stations facilities are located in the system. These
help maintain pressure in the event of a power failure
at the main treatment plant high service pump station.
Also, as an alternative to the "spinning reserve,"
MDWASD is planning on a system of elevated water
storage tanks to maintain pressure during power
failures (http://www.miamidade.gov/wasd/home.asp).
Best Practice Case Study -
San Francisco, CA
An independent power generation system is a
system that can supply power independent of the
electrical grid. This supplied power will assist with
the distribution of water when electricity services are
disabled. Independent systems can utilize any number
of alternative power sources, such as solar, wind, and
hydroelectric.
The San Francisco Public Utilities Commission
(SFPUC) Wastewater Enterprise (WWE) installed a
1.95 MWcogeneration plant in 2003 at its Southeast
Plant. This unit uses waste gases to produce electricity
and heat, which is used onsite. When running, the
cogeneration plant can provide approximately 40% of
the electricity needs of the facility (http://sfwater.org/).
energy infrastructure. A better understanding of these
interdependencies is needed across all sectors and
within the government for the purposes of planning,
mitigation, prioritizing, restoration, and recovery.
Many participants noted the need to build greater
resiliency in the water and energy sectors, which will
require diversifying energy resources and investing in
new infrastructure.
Analysis of the issues and discussion resulted in the
development of the following recommendations from
the exercise. Local, state, and federal agencies and
industry should evaluate each recommendation to
determine which actions are appropriate to implement
independently or collaboratively. In considering
these recommendations, public and private sector
organizations need to gauge the point at which the cost
of preparation (planning, stockpiling of supplies, etc.)
exceeds the public's willingness to pay for preparation.
Similarly, the public needs to be educated on the level
of service to expect following an emergency that
impacts both energy and water.
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Recommended areas for action:
• Pre-plan personnel and other resource management
and allocation during emergency response and
recovery phases. The ability to obtain resources
proved difficult on many fronts (ice, food, housing,
generators, etc.). Industry, state, and local
organizations should identify resource requirements
and pre-negotiate contracts for emergency
supplies. Consider pooling resources and preparing
contingency staffing plans.
• Better understand what state and federal
governments can deliver and when. Local, state,
and industry personnel were not fully aware of
the resources that the federal sector had to offer to
support preparation and response. Develop and
distribute a catalogue of federal resources available
to responders and key points of contact.
• Communication is key. Develop and pre-
establish protocols for regular interagency and
interdisciplinary communication during emergencies
and ensure redundant communication systems.
• Improve fuel supply for response and recovery.
Fuel supply solutions must be identified to ensure
that adequate supplies are strategically positioned
for use. Pre-negotiated fuel supply contracts or
adequate stockpiles should be considered.
• Establish or improve upon mutual aid and assistance
agreements. Initial results have proven successful
between cities and counties, as well as between
energy and water sectors.
Best Practice Case Study -
San Diego, CA
The City of San Diego's Alvarado Water Treatment
Plant utilizes solar panels to produce approximately
20 percent of the plant's power. The Alvarado
photovoltaic installation was built under a power
purchase agreement (PPA) with SunEdison, North
America's largest solar services company. Under
the agreement, SunEdison installed the photovoltaic
system at no cost to the city allowing residents
to gain the benefits from clean, solar energy
while avoiding an estimated $6.5 million worth of
installation costs (http://www.sandiego.gov/water/
gen-info/history.shtml).
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5.0
Additional Resources and References
In response to HSPD-7 and the National Response Plan,
the federal government has developed several tools that
states, municipalities, and stakeholders may find useful
when developing their emergency operation plans or
responding to an incident.
EPA Resources
The following EPA Web page, http://cfpub.epa.gov/
safewater/watersecurity/home.cfm?program_id=8,
provides a comprehensive list of emergency response
tools that can be used to help with emergency incident
planning. A table on this Web page identifies the
intended users for each tool provided on the page. This
list includes drinking water and wastewater utilities as
well as "other government and private sector entities,
such as public health and law enforcement officials,
emergency responders, laboratories, and technical
assistance providers."
Tools and technical assistance focused more on water
security and antiterrorism measures can be found on
the following EPA Web page: http://cfpub.epa.gov/
safewater/watersecurity/tools.cfm.
Information regarding EPA grant opportunities for
certain organizations to provide training, technical
assistance, and tool development for water security
can be found at this EPA Web page: http://cfpub.epa.
gov/safewater/watersecurity/financeassist.cfm.
EPA also provides a search engine on its Web site
that allows a user to find training courses, meetings,
workshops, and webcasts that are sponsored by EPA
and other organizations involved in water security.
The search engine is found at: http://cfpub.epa.gov/
safewater/watersecurity/outreach.cfm.
DOE Resources
The Department of Energy's Office of Electricity
Delivery and Energy Reliability offers the following
information, lessons learned, and tools to assist all
levels of government and industry with emergency
planning and preparedness.
Florida State's Energy Emergency Response to the
2004 Hurricanes: http://www.oe.netl.doe.gov/docs/
fl2004energy.pdf.
The Office staff worked with DOE's Emergency
Operations Center, Department of Homeland Security,
the Federal Emergency Management Agency, and other
groups to respond to the massive power outages caused
by Hurricane Isabel: http://www.oe.netl.doe.gov/
hurricanes_emer/isabel.aspx.
The State Energy Program (SEP) is the only federally
funded, state-based program administered by the U.S.
Department of Energy that provides resources directly
to the states for allocation by them. More information
about this program, administered by the National
Association of State Energy Officials, can be found at:
http://www.naseo.org/sep/default.htm.
The Infrastructure Security and Energy Restoration
(ISER) Division of the Department of Energy's (DOE)
Office of Electricity Delivery and Energy Reliability
leads the federal government's effort to ensure a
robust, secure, and reliable energy infrastructure.
Information can be found at: http://www.oe.energy.
gov/infrastructure.htm.
EPA Partner Organizations
EPA works closely with many partners on guidance
and best practices for water security and other
interdependency issues, however two were key
participants in this exercise: the American Water
Works Association (AWWA) and the Association of
Metropolitan Water Agencies (AMWA).
AWWA is an international nonprofit scientific and
educational society dedicated to the improvement of
water quality and supply. Founded in 1881, AWWA is
the largest organization of water supply professionals in
the world. Its more than 60,000 members represent the
full spectrum of the water community: treatment plant
operators and managers, scientists, environmentalists,
manufacturers, academicians, regulators, and others
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who hold genuine interest in water supply and public
health (www.awwa.org).
AMWA is an organization of the largest publicly
owned drinking water systems in the United States. The
association was formed in 1981 by a group of general
managers of metropolitan water systems who wanted
to ensure that the issues of large publicly owned water
suppliers would be represented in Washington, B.C.
Among other services, AMWA serves as the U.S. EPA-
designated liaison between the water sector and the
federal government on critical infrastructure protection
and operates the Water Information Sharing and
Analysis Center (WaterlSAC) and the Water Security
Channel (WaterSC) (www.amwa.net).
DOE Partner Organizations
In addition to PTI, the following partner organizations
of the Department of Energy offer topical briefs,
technical papers, and other tools regarding energy
assurance and energy security.
The National Association of State Energy Officials
(NASEO) is the only nonprofit organization that
represents the Governor-designated energy officials
from each state and territory. The organization was
created to improve the effectiveness and quality of state
energy programs and policies, provide policy input and
analysis, share successes among the states, and be a
repository of information on energy issues of concern to
the states and their citizens (http://www.naseo.org).
The National Association of Regulatory Utility
Commissioners (NARUC) is a non-profit organization
founded in 1889. Its members include the governmental
agencies that are engaged in the regulation of utilities
and carriers in the fifty States, the District of Columbia,
Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands. NARUC's member
agencies regulate the activities of telecommunications,
energy, and water utilities (http://www.naruc.org/
displaycommon.cfm?an=l).
The National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL)
is a bipartisan organization that serves the legislators
and staffs of the nation's 50 states, its commonwealths,
and territories. NCSL provides research, technical
assistance, and opportunities for policymakers to
exchange ideas on the most pressing state issues. NCSL
is an effective and respected advocate for the interests
of state governments before Congress and federal
agencies (http://www.ncsl.org/public/govern.htm).
Founded in 1908, the National Governors Association
(NGA) is the collective voice of the nation's governors
and one of Washington, D.C.'s most respected public
policy organizations. NGA provides governors and
their senior staff members with services that range
from representing states on Capitol Hill and before the
Administration on key federal issues to developing
policy reports on innovative state programs and
hosting networking seminars for state government
executive branch officials. The NGA Center for Best
Practices focuses on state innovations and best practices
on issues that range from education and health to
technology, welfare reform, and the environment.
NGA also provides management and technical
assistance to both new and incumbent governors
(http://www.nga.org/portal/site/nga/menuitem.
Cdd492add7dd9cf9e8ebb856all010a0/)
Additional References
ABC7Chicago.com, Water main break causes problems
in Kankakee area, [http://abclocal.go.com/wls/news/
print_071204_ap_ns_kankakee.html]. July 12, 2004.
Adams, Paul, Tunnel blame drama begins,
Baltimoresun.com, [http://www.baltimoresun.com/
news/local/bal-bz.legal27jul27,l,7798825.story], July
27,2001.
American Water Works Association, Water fully
restored after US/Canada blackout, WaterWeek, Vol.
12, No. 34, [http://www.awwa.org/communications/
waterweek/index.cfm?ArticleID=217], August 20,
2003.
American Water Works Association, Blackout highlights
water security issues, Water Security Series, Vol.
47, No. 4, [http://www.awwa.org/Communications/
mainstream/2003/Oct/Lead05_SecuritySeries01 .cfm],
October 2003.
American Water Works Association, Chat Room,
Emergency Backup Power Supply, e-Journal
AWWA, Vol. 96, No. 1, [http://www.awwa.org/
communications/journal/2004/January/News/
0104chatroom.pdf], January 2004.
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Argonne National Laboratory, Infrastructure
Interdependencies Associated with the August 14,
2003, Electric Power Blackout, report prepared by
Infrastructure Assurance Center, Argonne, IL 60439,
August 29, 2003.
Association of State Drinking Water Administrators
and the National Rural Water Association, Security
Vulnerability Self-Assessment Guide for Small
Drinking Water Systems, (May 30, 2002).
Belleville.com, Kankakee water main break affects
business, residents, [http://www.belleville.com/mld/
belleville/9139109.htm?template=contentModules/
printstory.jsp], July 12, 2004.
Calvert, Scott and Michael Scarcella, Rail accident
linked to water main break, Baltimoresun.com,
[http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/local/bal-te.md.
water20ju!20,1,4792291.story], July 20, 2001.
Capital Reports Environmental News Link, EPA
Awards $2 million grant to enhance water security,
available at [http://www.caprep.com/0404006.htm].
City of New York Environmental Protection press
release, EPA Proposes To Continue Grant of
Filtration Avoidance For New York City's CatskiW
Delaware Water Supply, [http://www.nyc.gov/html/
dep/html/press/02-19pr.html], May 23, 2002.
Environmental Protection Agency Alert on Chemical
Accident Prevention and Site Security: [http://www.
epa.gov/ceppo/pubs/secale.pdf].
Environmental Protection Agency Counterterrorism:
[http://www.epa.gov/ebtpages/ecounterterrorism.
html].
Environmental Protection Agency, 2000 National
Public Water Systems Compliance Report - National
Summary, [http://www.epa.gov/ogwdw/annual/
sdwcom2002.pdf].
Environmental Protection Agency, 7999 Drinking Water
Infrastructure Needs Survey, (February 2001), [http://
www.epa.gov/safewater/needs.html].
Environmental Protection Agency, Drinking Water
Treatment, EPA publication 810-F-99-013, [http://
www.epa.gov/safewater/faq/treatment.pdf].
Environmental Protection Agency News Release,
Association of Metropolitan Water Agency (sic)
Awarded Two million Dollars to Enhance Water
Security, March 29, 2004.
Environmental Protection Agency; Office of Water,
Instructions to Assist Community Water Systems
in Complying with the Public Health Security and
Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002,
(January 2003), [www.epa.gov/safewater/security].
Ezell, Barry C., Risks of Cyber Attack to Supervisory
Control and Data Acquisition for Water Supply,
Masters of Science thesis, University of Virginia,
(May 1998), [http://www.riskinfo.com/cyberisk/
Watersupply/SC ADA-thesis.html].
Ezell, Barry C., John V. Farr, and Ian Wiese,
Infrastructure Risk Analysis of Municipal Water
Distribution System, Journal of Infrastructure
Systems. (September 2000).
Gillette, Jerry, James Peerenboom, Ronald Whitfield,
and Ron Fisher, Analyzing Water/Wastewater
Infrastructure Interdependencies, presented at 6th
Probabilistic Safety Assessment and Management
Conference, San Juan, Puerto Rico, June 25, 2002.
Grigg, Neil S., Water Utility Security: Multiple Hazards
and Multiple Barriers, Journal of Infrastructure
Systems. (June 2003).
Hickman, Major Donald C., USAF, BSC, A Chemical
and Biological Warfare Threat: USAF Water Systems
at Risk, The Counterproliferation Papers, Future
Warfare Series No. 3, USAF Counterproliferation
Center, Air War College, Air University, Maxwell Air
Force Base, Alabama, September 1999, [http://www.
au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/cpc-pubs/hickman.htm].
The JournalNews.com, Catskill calamity, [http://www.
thejournalnews.com/print_newsroom/051304/
13edresort.html], May 13, 2004.
MITRE Corporation, Potential Bioterrorism Threats to
U.S. Public Water Supplies, report to the Scientific
& Technical Intelligence Committee of the National
Intelligence Council, (12 September 2002).
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National Infrastructure Simulation and Analysis Center,
Water Infrastructure Simulation Environment, http://
www.lanl.gov/source/orgs/d/nisac/pdfFiles/WISE.pdf,
January 2005.
National Transportation Safety Board, Office of
Research and Engineering, Factual Report on
Howard Street Tunnel Construction and Condition,
January 7, 2003.
National Transportation Safety Board, Railroad
Accident Brief: CSX Freight Train Derailment and
Subsequent Fire in the Howard Street Tunnel in
Baltimore, Maryland, on July 18, 2001, NTSB Report
Number: RAB-04-08, adopted on 12/16/2004, [http://
www.ntsb.gov/publictn/2004/RAB0408.pdf].
NAWC Privatization Study: A Survey of the Use of
Public-Private Partnerships in the Drinking Water
Utility Sector, Hudson Institute for the National
Association of Water Companies, presented to the
United States Conference of Mayors, New Orleans,
LA, June 11, 1999, [http://www.nawc.org/study_
main.html].
NBC5.com, Boil Order Remains in Effect in Kankakee
Area, [http://www.nbc5.com/print/3521129/detail.
html?use=print], July 13, 2004.
New York Times, City May Have to Build Water
Filtration Plant, The New York Times on the Web,
[ www. nytimes .com/00/06/01 /news/national/regional/
ny-water.html], June 1, 2000.
Peerenboom. James, "Infrastructure Interdependencies:
Overview of Concepts and Terminology," National
Science Foundation Workshop, June 2001.
Peerenboom, James, Ronald Fisher, and Ronald
Whitfield, "Recovering from Disruptions of
Interdependent Critical Infrastructures," presented
at CRIS/DRM/IIIT/NSF Workshop, Alexandria, VA,
September 10-11,2001.
Power Magazine. Been there, used that, P 19 March
2004.
President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure
Protection, Critical Foundations: Protecting
America's Infrastructures, October 1997.
Rinaldi, Steven M., James P. Peerenboom, and Terrence
K. Kelly, Critical Infrastructure Interdependencies,
invited paper for special issue of IEEE Control
Systems Magazine on "Complex Interactive
Networks" December 2001.
Styron, Hilary C., CSX Tunnel Fire Baltimore, MD, July
2001, U.S. Fire Administration, Technical Report
Series, USFA-TR-140 (no date).
United States Office of the Press Secretary, Homeland
Security Presidential Directive/HSPD-7, Subject:
Critical Infrastructure Identification, Prioritization,
and Protection, December 17, 2003.
WaterTech.com, Water main break leaves 70,000 dry,
[http://www.watertechonline.com], July 13, 2004.
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6.0
Attachments
Attachment A: Participating Organizations in the 2005 Energy and Water Distribution
Workshop
American Water
American Water Works Association
Arlington County Energy Office
Arlington County Water
Association of Metropolitan Water Agencies
Cincinnati Fire Department
Computer Sciences Corporation
DC Energy Office
Fairfax County
Fairfax Water
Federal Technical Support Working Group
Greater Cincinnati Water Works
Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory
Maryland Department of the Environment
McMunn and Associates
Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments
Pittsburgh Water and Sewer Authority
Public Technology Institute
University of Louisville
U.S. Department of Energy
U.S. Department of Homeland Security
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
Washington Aqueduct
Washington Suburban Sanitary Commission
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Attachment B: Summary of Exercise Evaluations
l.
DOE WORKSHOP
Workshop Evaluation
Customer Satisfaction Survey: OMB #2090-0019 Expires 3/31/06
With what type of organization are you affiliated (check as may as apply)?
a. Regulated facility or business = 2 e. Trade association = 1
b. Industry sector = 2 f. Nonprofit organization = 5
c. Consulting company = 2 g. School or university = 1
d. Government =18 h. Other
EFFECTIVE COMMUNICATION/CLARITY OF INFORMATION
On a scale of 1 to 6 where 1 is very dissatisfied and 6 is very satisfied please indicate your level of satisfaction
with the following:
Readability
2.
a.
b.
3.
a.
Readability (i.e., flow, writing style, and presentation of concepts) of the workshop materials?
6 Very satisfied = 8 3 Somewhat dissatisfied
5 Satisfied =14 2 Dissatisfied
4 Somewhat satisfied = 2 1 Very dissatisfied
Don't know = 5
COMMENT:
-Not really any handouts- PPT was excellent
-Good Visuals
-Supplemental handouts of comparison documents would have been helpful.
-Nothing Handed out
-No materials
-No handout materials
Understandability of the workshop materials (i.e., the ability of the product to convey the
information in a way that is easy to grasp and comprehend)!
6 Very satisfied = 5
5 Satisfied = 18
4 Somewhat satisfied = 4
3 Somewhat dissatisfied = 1
2 Dissatisfied
1 Very dissatisfied
Don't know = 1
COMMENT:
-I thought more emphasis would be on energy.
-Concise format -well focused
-Our objectives were not very clear, lack of attendance from electric utilities degraded meeting
severely.
-Objectives not clear
-Could have used Electric Utilities; if certain water utilities were prepared to present their
lessons learned rather than asked to chime it, there may have been more discussion.
-Consider providing an agenda & reviewing the plan for the meeting prior to starting the actual
workshop.
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4. a. Accuracy of the technical information (knowledge regarding the subject matter) included in the
workshop materials?
6 Very satisfied = 8 3 Somewhat dissatisfied = 1
5 Satisfied =11 2 Dissatisfied = 1
4 Somewhat satisfied = 7 1 Very dissatisfied
Don't know = 1
b. COMMENT:
-Some info was excellent, other info a bit dated or not accurate.
-This did not present other than high level material - already understood
-Facilitators could have had more water knowledge; consider including more industry reps.
Organization and Clarity
5. a. How satisfied are you with the organization (presented in a logical order) of the Meeting?
6 Very satisfied =13 3 Somewhat dissatisfied =
5 Satisfied =11 2 Dissatisfied = 1
4 Somewhat satisfied = 4 1 Very dissatisfied
Don't know =
b. COMMENT:
-No agenda or clear objective- table top did not cause new info to be discovered.
-Could have gone Fed- State- Local
6. a. How clearly (plain and evident) is information communicated in this Meeting?
6 Very satisfied =10 3 Somewhat dissatisfied = 1
5 Satisfied =14 2 Dissatisfied = 1
4 Somewhat satisfied = 4 1 Very dissatisfied
Don't know
b. COMMENT:
-Good interplay and support by presenters.
-Main presenters were excellent.
Other Recommendations:
1. We welcome any other comments you have about this workshop.
-Coverage of the energy side was superficial and lack of utility participation was disappointing.
-Presentation used altered/fake phot of hurricane Isabell on the "Hot Wash" slide.
-Made some good contacts. What other deliverable could have been developed? Identify and
define R & D requirements.
-Consider incorporating an actual exercise into the workshop. I think it would allow the sectors
to develop an even better understanding of each other.
-Is there any research ongoing on types of trees to recommend for home owners to plant? i.e.
Some trees fall/break greater then others. Some trees grow a little shorter.
-More data about other power problems at other utilities could be useful.
-Excellent-Brought it down to local area.
AWARENESS AND UNDERSTANDING
8. a. How satisfied are you that this workshop meets your need for information about the issue/subject
matter?
6 Very satisfied = 6 3 Somewhat dissatisfied = 1
5 Satisfied =12 2 Dissatisfied = 1
4 Somewhat satisfied = 9 1 Very dissatisfied
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b. COMMENT:
-Good to get later dependant entities together. Next time need to have electric utilities in the
works next time.
-Need to link info from "natural disasters" to " un-natural disasters" (i.e. terrorist incidents)
-could have benefitted with more lead-time
-The information presented was very helpful- need more information on planning for an
"unplanned" emergency.
-Not sure what the end result is- develop a report that goes where???
9. a. How satisfied are you that the information presented in this workshop increased your awareness
of the issue/subject matter?
6 Very satisfied = 8 3 Somewhat dissatisfied = 2
5 Satisfied =11 2 Dissatisfied = I
4 Somewhat satisfied = 5 1 Very dissatisfied
Don't know = I
b. COMMENT:
- Good level representation — helps in reintroducing essentials in energies.
-Already knew a fair amount on this issue
10. a. Do you expect to refer to the information from this workshop again?
Yes = 24 No = 5
b. Why or why not?
-Took some lessons learned back to modify our energy planning.
-I'd like a copy of the PPT for future use.
-EPA emergency Response Exercise CD
-Report back to supervisor
-I often work with all utilities, this info will be helpful
-Internal planning for technology development
-Practical first-hand info from actual situations was featured
-Concern for little new information learned
-Met a networking contact on an issue I may need to confront
-Member of our Emergency Mgt coordinating committee can use these.
-It doesn't fall under my scope of work, but it helps me understand what my co-workers do.
-re emphasis on vulnerabilities (critical) that have been discussed but not addressed.
10. a. Would you recommend this workshop to others?
Yes = 25 No = 4
b. Why or why not?
-Useful to take a few minutes and focus
-For those outside the DC area useful / for those here sufficient representation there. No need to
repeat.
-Yes on two levels Policy makers at one; Operational level
-Very informative
-IT was very important information and a networking opportunity
-Practical first hand info from actual situations was featured.
-Some will benefit, others won't
-Networking Opportunity
-Would recommend including a balance of representatives from both sectors
-Down to earth and useful
-It makes you understand all that is involved in a disaster, natural or man made
-Very well presented. Is elevated critical information to public safely and critical information.
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Attachment C: Exercise Sponsors
EPA's National Homeland Security Research
Center
The National Homeland Security Research Center
(NHSRC) develops and delivers reliable, responsive,
expertise and products based on scientific research
and evaluations of technology. NHSRC's expertise
and products are widely used to prevent, prepare for,
and recover from public health and environmental
emergencies arising from terrorist threats and incidents.
Research and development efforts focus on five primary
areas:
• Threat and Consequence Assessment investigates
human exposure to chemical, biological, and
radiological contaminants to define dangerous
levels of these contaminants and establish protective
cleanup goals.
• Decontamination and Consequence Management
focuses on decontamination of buildings and
outdoor environments, as well as the safe disposal of
contaminated materials.
• Water Infrastructure Protection is charged with
protecting the nation's drinking water sources
and distribution systems and ensuring the safety
of wastewater collection, treatment, and disposal
procedures.
• Response Capability Enhancement works directly
with emergency responders and local governments
to provide tools and information needed to make
informed decisions in the event of an attack.
• Technology Testing and Evaluation evaluates
technologies that show potential for use in homeland
security applications. These evaluations are used by
water utility operators, building owners, emergency
responders, and others to make informed decisions
when purchasing security technology.
For additional information, visit NHSRC's website at
www.epa.gov/nhsrc.
DOE's Office of Electricity Delivery and Energy
Reliability
The Department of Energy's Office of Electricity (OE)
Delivery and Energy Reliability's mission is to lead
national efforts to modernize the electric grid, enhance
security and reliability of the energy infrastructure, and
facilitate recovery from disruptions of energy supply.
Program efforts focus on three primary areas:
• Research and Development
Plan, implement, and evaluate a portfolio of
electric delivery and infrastructure security
technology projects, visions, R&D roadmaps,
public-private partnerships, technology transfer
and commercialization plans, and education and
outreach strategies. Manage research, development,
field-testing, and demonstration projects for "next
generation" electric delivery and infrastructure
security technologies. Develop, implement, and
maintain a cyber security program to assist the
Nation's energy sector.
• Permitting, Siting, and Analysis
Conduct analysis of the physical, regulatory, and
institutional barriers that interfere with the efficient
and secure operation of electric transmission
and distribution systems. Conduct analyses
to identify major electric delivery constraints
("bottlenecks"). Coordinate with national, regional,
state, and local organizations and utilities to
develop effective solutions and assess alternatives
increasing the reliability and efficiency of electric
market operations. Coordinate with the Power
Marketing Administrations (PMAs). Evaluate
and, if appropriate, approve applications for
Presidential permits for new electric transmission
lines across U.S. international borders. Evaluate
and, if appropriate, approve applications to export
electricity from the U.S. Collect, analyze, and
disseminate annual data on U.S. international
electricity trade. Participate in bilateral and trilateral
discussions with Canada and Mexico related to
electricity trade and regulation.
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• Infrastructure Security and Energy Restoration
Manage DOE's activities related to the national
critical infrastructure protection program in
coordination with DHS, FERC, and others. Conduct
analysis of energy infrastructure vulnerabilities to
physical disruptions and recommend preventative
measures in coordination with DHS and others.
Provide technical and operational support to other
federal, state, and local agencies in planning
for and responding to energy emergencies. In
accordance with the National Response Plan,
conduct Emergency Support Function Twelve
(energy) operations in support of the Department of
Homeland Security during a declared National or
State Emergency or National Security Special Event.
For additional information, visit OE's website at http://
www.oe.energy.gov/about/384.htm.
Public Technology Institute
The Public Technology Institute (PTI) is a national
member supported organization based in Washington,
DC. As the only technology organization created by
and for cities and counties, PTI works with a core
network of leading local government officials- the PTI
membership - to identify opportunities for technology
research, share best practices, offer consultancies and
pilot demonstrations, promote technology development
initiatives, and develop enhanced educational
programming. Officials from PTI member governments
participate in councils and forums that address specific
technology areas. Through a corporate partner program
with leading technology companies, and partnerships
with federal agencies and other governmental
organizations, PTI shares the results of these activities
and the expertise of its members with the broader
audience of the thousands of cities and counties across
the U.S.
For additional information, visit the PTI web site at
www.pti.org.
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EPA 600/R-07/042 I April 2007 I www.epa.gov/ord
vvEPA
United States
Environmental Protection
Agency
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