$EPA
United States
Environmental Protection
Agency
Report on the 2008 Workshop
on Decontamination Research
and Associated Issues for Sites
Contaminated with Chemical,
Biological, or Radiological Materials
'••
Office of Research and Development
National Homeland Security Research Ce
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EPA/600/R-09/035 | September 2009 www.epa.gov/ord
Report on the 2008 Workshop
on Decontamination Research
and Associated Issues for Sites
Contaminated with Chemical, Biological,
or Radiological Materials
By
Sarah Dun
Eastern Research Group, Inc.
Lexington, MA 02421
Joseph Wood
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
Office of Research and Development
National Homeland Security Research Center
Decontamination and Consequence Management Division
Research Triangle Park, NC
Contract No. EP-C-07-015
Office of Research and Development
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
Cincinnati, OH 45268
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Note
This report was prepared by Eastern Research Group, Inc., a contractor for the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), as a general record of discussions for the
"2008 Workshop on Decontamination and Associated Issues for Sites Contaminated
with Chemical, Biological, or Radiological Materials." This report captures the main
points of scheduled presentations, but it does not contain a verbatim transcript of all
issues discussed. EPA will use the information presented during the workshop to address
decontamination and cleanup challenges faced at sites contaminated with chemical,
biological, or radiological materials.
The gathering of information in this document has been funded wholly by EPA under
Contract No. EP-C-07-015.
This document does not represent the official views of EPA and, as such, no product or
technology endorsement should be inferred.
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Table of Contents
List of Acronyms and Abbreviations vii
Executive Summary xi
I Introduction 1
II Keynote Address 3
III Session 1: Decontamination-General Aspects 5
The Role of a Technical Working Group in Fumigation of a Large Building 5
Medical Aspects of Natural Anthrax: Implications for Decontamination 5
United Kingdom's Government Decontamination Service: An Update for 2008 6
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's Regulation of Sterilants/Sporicides
and Sporicidal Decontaminants 7
Toward a System-of-Systems Approach to Hazard Mitigation 8
Wide-area Restoration Following Biological Contamination: Systems Analysis
for Interagency Biological Restoration Demonstration Program 9
IV Session 2: Biological Agents-Field Experience And Laboratory Testing 11
Danbury Anthrax Response, September 2007 11
Expedited Fumigation of a Large Hospital as Related to Biological Contamination Scenarios 12
Utilizing a Trace Atmospheric Gas Analyzer Triple Quadrupole Mass Spectrometer Technology
Mounted on a Movable Platform to Provide Indoor Air Concentrations Throughout a Structure Before and
After a Chlorine Dioxide Fumigation 13
Decontamination of Surfaces Contaminated with Biological Agents Using Fumigant Technologies 13
Assessment of the Impact of Chlorine Dioxide Gas on Electronic Equipment 14
Laboratory-scale Decontamination Testing in Support of the Interagency Biological
Restoration Demonstration Program 15
Field Evaluation of Gaseous Chlorine Dioxide Treatment for Microbial Contamination 15
Decontamination Family of Systems 16
Decontamination of a Railcar Using a Portable and Economical System 16
Economical Facility Decontamination with Gaseous and Liquid Chlorine Dioxide 17
Assessment of Biological Indicators for Building Interior Decontamination 18
Reduction and Elimination of Biological Contamination Using Bacteriophages 19
Wet Scrubbing and Adsorption for the Capture of Chlorine Dioxide Gas During Fumigation Events 20
Material Demand for Hydrogen Peroxide of Building Materials 20
Bacillus thuringiensis var. kurstaki Agent Fate Characterization 21
Comparing and Contrasting Fumigations of Very Large Facilities for Biothreat Agents and Other
Microorganisms 21
V Session 3: Foreign Animal Disease Agents 23
Animal Disease Outbreak Response-Tools, Status, and Trends 23
Inactivation of Avian Influenza Virus Using Common Chemicals and Detergents 23
Persistence Testing of Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza Virus on Outdoor Materials 24
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VI Session 4: Chemical Agents 25
Understanding Chemical Warfare Agent Interactions with Surfaces and the
Implications for Decontamination 25
Restoration of Major Transportation Facilities Following Chemical Agent Release:
The Facility Restoration Operational Technology Demonstration 25
Systematic Decontamination of Chemical Warfare Agents and Toxic Industrial Chemicals 26
Small-Item Vapor Hazard Determinations in Interior Spaces:
What, Where, When, Why and How Many? 27
The Development of Safe and Highly Effective Chemical and Radiological Agent Simulants 27
Mercury Vapor Emission and Measurement Studies and Evaluation of Cleanup Technologies 28
Development of Standards for Decontamination of Structures Affected by Chemical
and Biological Terrorism 29
VII Sessions: Radiological Agents 31
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's Airborne Spectral Photometric Environmental
Collection Technology Gamma Emergency Mapper Project 31
Evaluation of Commercially-Available Radiological Decontamination Technologies
on Concrete Surfaces 31
VIII Session 6: Disposal, Sampling, and Other Related Topics 33
Thermomicrobiological Techniques for Incinerator Performance Assessment While
BurningContaminated Debris 33
Survivability of Several Years of Recalcitrant Biological and Chemical Agents in Landfill Leachates 34
An Assessment of the Performance of Portable Instruments to Monitor Air Quality
During Structural Decontamination Operations 34
Evaluation of Sampling Methods and Strategies in an Operational Environment 35
The Use of a Sampling Design Strategy to Direct Decontamination Activities
Following a Weapon of Mass Destruction Event 35
National Homeland Security Research Center's Aerosol Test Facility and the Study of the Measurement
and Mechanisms of Exposure to Chemical, Biological, and Radiological Agents 36
Collective Protection Technology Testing of Bioaerosol Air Purification Devices 37
Appendix A: Agenda 39
Appendix B: List of Participants 45
Appendix C: Presentation Slides 53
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Acronyms and Abbreviations
AOAC AOAC International (formerly the Association of Analytical Chemists)
APHIS Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service
APL Applied Physics Laboratory
ASPECT Airborne Spectral Photometric Environmental Collection Technology
ASTM ASTM International (formerly the American Society for Testing and Materials)
BI biological indicator
Btk Bacillus thuringiensis var. kurstaki
BROOM Building Restoration Operations Optimization Model
°C degrees Celsius
CAM chemical agent monitor
CARC chemical agent resistant coating
CBDP Chemical and Biological Defense Program
CBR chemical, biological, and radiological
CBRN chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear
CDC Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
Clean Earth Clean Earth Technologies, LLC
ClorDiSys ClorDiSys Solutions, Inc.
CT Fumigant concentration multiplied by exposure time
CWA chemical warfare agent
DCMD Decontamination and Consequence Management Division
DDAP Domestic Demonstration and Application Program
DEM diethyl malonate
DFoS Decontamination Family of Systems
DHS U.S. Department of Homeland Security
DoD U.S. Department of Defense
DOE U.S. Department of Energy
DTRA Defense Threat Reduction Agency
ECBC Edgewood Chemical Biological Center (Aberdeen Proving Ground, M.D.)
EPA U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
ERT Environmental Response Team
°F degrees Fahrenheit
FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation
FDA U.S. Food and Drug Administration
FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency
FIFRA Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act
G agents Nerve agents: soman, sarin, and tabun
GB sarin
GDS Government Decontamination Service (United Kingdom)
GEM Gamma Emergency Mapper
HD mustard agent
HEPA high efficiency paniculate air
HHA hand-held assay
HHS U.S. Department of Health and Human Services
HPA Health Protection Agency
HPAI highly pathogenic avian influenza virus
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HVAC heating, ventilation, and air conditioning
IBRD Interagency Biological Restoration Demonstration
IMS ion mobility spectrometer
INL Idaho National Laboratory (Idaho Falls, Idaho)
IPC industrial printed circuit
JHU Johns Hopkins University
JPEO Joint Program Executive Office
JSTO Joint Science and Technology Office
Kd distribution coefficient
LAX Los Angeles International Airport
LLNL Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (Livermore, Calif.)
LRN laboratory response network
mg/L milligrams/liter
mVHP modified vaporized hydrogen peroxide
NOT National Decontamination Team
NHSRC National Homeland Security Research Center
NIOSH National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health
OMB Office of Management and Budget
OPP Office of Pesticide Programs
ORD Office of Research and Development
OSC on-scene coordinator
OTD Operational Technology Demonstration
PCR polymerase chain reaction
PDA personal data assistant (also known as personal digital assistant)
PEL Permissible Exposure Level
PNNL Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (Richland, Wash.)
ppb parts per billion
PPE personal protective equipment
ppm parts per million
ppm/hr parts per million/hour
ppmv parts per million by volume
PR Pesticide Registration
QA/QC quality assurance and quality control
ROD radiological dispersal device
RV-PCR rapid viability polymerase chain reaction
Sabre Sabre Technical Services, LLC
SAIC Science Applications International Corporation
SEM scanning electron microscope
SJRMC St. John's Regional Medical Center
SNL Sandia National Laboratory (Albuquerque, N.M.)
STERIS STERIS Corporation
SUMMA Used with "Canister," now a genericized trademark
TAGA Trace Atmospheric Gas Analyzer
TIC toxic industrial chemical
TSM Three Step Method
TWA time-weighted average
TWO Technical Working Group
TSWG Technical Support Working Group
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TTEP Technology Testing and Evaluation Program
ug/m3 micrograms/cubic meter
U.K. United Kingdom
U.S. United States
USAID U.S. Agency for International Development
USDA U.S. Department of Agriculture
US EPA U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
UV ultraviolet
VHP vapor or vaporized hydrogen peroxide
VOC volatile organic compound
VPHP vapor phase hydrogen peroxide
VSP Visual Sample Plan
WMD weapon of mass destruction
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Executive Summary
The United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
held the "2008 Workshop on Decontamination Research and
Associated Issues for Sites Contaminated with Chemical,
Biological, or Radiological Materials" to enable participants
from throughout the world to discuss decontamination issues.
The meeting addressed six topic areas:
Keynote A ddress and Decontamination-General Aspects
These seven presentations focused mostly on policy,
planning, and general aspects of decontamination and
restoration issues facing EPA, the United States Department
of Defense, and the United Kingdom Government
Decontamination Service (GDS). The keynote speaker
(Thomas Dunne, EPA) emphasized the need to focus and
prioritize collective efforts and limited resources to close
significant gaps and better prepare to respond to and recover
from a terrorist attack involving chemical, biological, or
radiological agents. He expressed his view that, at present,
the United States (U.S.) is not prepared to respond to and
recover from a terrorist attack involving a wide-area release
of a chemical, biological or radiological agent. Other EPA
presentations considered how best to manage the technical
aspects of a fumigation; medical and historical perspectives
of natural anthrax and implications for decontamination;
and the regulation of sterilants, including the new EPA
sporicidal decontaminant antimicrobial product designation
for anthrax. Robert Bettley-Smith provided an update of
GDS activities and reviewed lessons learned from the 2006
to 2007 anthrax cases in Scotland and England. The Defense
Threat Reduction Agency representative described a number
of decontamination technologies that the agency is currently
investigating and developing. The final presentation of the
session described the Interagency Biological Restoration
Demonstration Program and a systems analysis underway to
identify data/capability gaps and chokepoints for restoring an
urban area following an anthrax release.
Biological Agents-Field Experience and Laboratory Testing
Researchers and practitioners from the U.S. government and
private industry gave 16 presentations regarding the research,
development, and demonstration of technologies to inactivate
biological threat agents in indoor and outdoor environments.
These presentations provided lessons learned from actual
decontamination response events and field demonstrations,
and results from assessing various technologies in the
laboratory. A number of presentations discussed the use of
chlorine dioxide gas, which provides evidence of the growing
acceptance and maturing of this sporicidal technology.
Other decontamination technologies were also discussed,
such as some "low tech" procedures used in the Danbury
anthrax incident, vaporized hydrogen peroxide, and a
bacteriophage method, which is still under development.
Bacillus anthracis and its bacterial spore surrogates were the
predominant biological agent of concern addressed, although
a few presentations discussed other biological agents, such
as mold, Brucella suis, Yersinia pestis, and Francisella
tularensis. Other related topics included engineering aspects
of fumigation (e.g., interactions with materials, capture on
sorbents), detection/measurement issues, and agent fate and
persistence.
Foreign Animal Disease Agents
Three speakers provided information and data about ongoing
research projects to address foreign animal disease agents.
Lori Miller, U.S. Department of Agriculture, Animal and
Plant Health Inspection Service, described Web-based tools
designed to assist decision-makers in quickly responding
to a disease outbreak, such as foot and mouth disease. The
other two speakers discussed results from research on the
environmental persistence and inactivation (using generic
chemicals) of avian influenza virus strains, including the
H5N1 highly pathogenic virus, and low pathogenic strains.
EPA/Battelle tests demonstrated that the H5N1 virus
remained viable in soil at low temperatures for at least
13 days.
Chemical Agents
Six presentations covered topics related to chemical agents
and toxic industrial chemicals. Tucker provided an update of
activities associated with the ongoing Facility Restoration
Operational Technology Demonstration (OTD). This is an
overarching U.S. Department of Homeland Security-funded
project to address the restoration of an airport following a
chemical agent attack. One specific research project, which
deals with determining the interactions between building
materials and chemical agents conducted under the OTD,
was discussed. Emily Snyder presented an overview of
chemical agent decontamination research projects that EPA
is conducting or has completed. These projects primarily
involve determining the efficacy of a number of technologies
in decontaminating various materials/agents. Campagna
outlined concerns associated with intentional or unintentional
mercury releases, and proposed research to investigate
associated issues, such as vapor release from materials and
decontamination. Other speakers presented research related
to the off-gassing of chemical agents from materials and the
development of chemical agent simulants for training.
Radiological Agents
The four presentations in this session addressed concerns
related to the measurement, fate, and decontamination of
materials containing radiological agents. Cardarelli described
an aircraft that enables EPA to rapidly respond to threat
events throughout the U.S. and contains instrumentation
capable of rapidly detecting and mapping radiological
contamination. Drake presented efficacy test results from the
evaluation of two decontamination technologies that remove
radiological agents (cesium was the test agent) from building
materials via strippable coatings.
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Disposal, Sampling, and Other Related Topics
Paul Lemieux began this session of seven speakers with
a discussion of general waste disposal issues and noted
that waste disposal is often overlooked when developing
recovery plans for an incident involving threat or foreign
animal disease agents. He then described a study to
evaluate the conditions under which bacterial spores, such
as anthrax embedded on building materials, may remain
active following treatment in an incinerator. Paul Lemieux
also discussed results from a field study to demonstrate
a prototype gasifier that could be used for animal carcass
disposal following a foreign animal disease outbreak.
Wendy Davis-Hoover presented results from studies to
determine how long certain bacterial agents would survive
in landfill leachate (over a year for Bacillus anthracis and
Clostridium botulinum) and how long various chemical
agents persisted in the leachate . Patrick Lambert provided
results from testing the performance of air monitoring
devices. Lance Brooks provided an overview of a field
study conducted at Idaho National Laboratory to evaluate
biological agent (e.g., bacterial spore) sampling techniques
and strategies. Sego presented additional details on some of
the available tools for, and statistics involved with, designing
an agent sampling strategy. Russell Wiener described EPA's
National Homeland Security Research Center Aerosol
Test Facility and some of its ongoing projects. Karin
Foarde closed with a description of a study to evaluate
bioaerosol air purification devices used by warfighters.
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I
Introduction
This report summarizes presentations and discussions from
the United States Environemtal Protection Agency's (EPA's)
"2008 Workshop on Decontamination and Associated
Issues for Sites Contaminated with Chemical, Biological, or
Radiological Materials," which was held September 24-26,
2008, in Chapel Hill, N.C. The technical content of this
report is based entirely on information and discussions from
the workshop.
The workshop consisted of 44 speaker presentations,
which were organized in six sessions, followed by brief
question and answer periods. Mr. Thomas P. Dunne, the
Associate Administrator for EPA's Office of Homeland
Security, served as the keynote speaker. Although
Dunne gave the keynote address on the second day of
the workshop due to last minute scheduling conflicts,
a summary of his presentation is provided first (per the
original schedule) in this summary report. One hundred
seventy workshop participants represented federal,
state, and local government agencies and laboratories;
the United States (U.S.) and international organizations
from five countries; academia; and the private sector.
This summary report provides an overview and highlights
of each presentation. The speakers' presentation
slides, which include additional detailed information,
are found in Appendix C of this report. The reader is
encouraged to refer to the presentation slides when
reviewing this report. The presentation summaries
primarily provide a synopsis of the presentation but also
include additional information—beyond that found on
the presentation slides—discussed by the speaker.
This report is organized by topic session and supporting
information as follows:
• Section II includes a summary of the Keynote Address.
• Sections III-VIII contain the presentation and question
and answer period summaries for each of the six topic
areas/sessions: Decontamination-General Aspects;
Biological Agents-Field Experience and Laboratory
Testing; Foreign Animal Disease Agents; Chemical
Agents; Radiological Agents; and Disposal, Sampling, and
Other Related Topics.
• Appendix A provides the meeting agenda.
• Appendix B lists the workshop participants.
• Appendix C includes presentation slides.
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Keynote Address
Thomas P. Dunne, Associate Administrator for the
Office of Homeland Security, U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency
Dunne welcomed participants and explained that the goal
of his remarks was to identify the critical need to focus and
prioritize collective efforts and limited resources to close the
significant gaps and to be better prepared to respond to and
recover from a terrorist attack involving chemical, biological,
or radiological agents. He expressed his view that, at present,
the U.S. is not prepared to respond to and recover from a
terrorist attack involving a wide-area release of a chemical,
biological, or radiological agent. An event like this would
make the issues surrounding Hurricane Katrina look like
child's play. If a terrorist attack involving a wide-area release
of a chemical, biological or radiological agent happened
today, the U.S. would fail—and fail miserably.
Looking back, Dunne pointed out that EPA was
understandably unprepared for the anthrax attacks of 2001.
In the fall of 2001, no one was prepared for the technical and
scientific issues that confronted the nation when responding
to anthrax contamination of a relatively small number of
buildings. EPA emergency responders leveraged their 30+
years of experience in hazardous waste response. EPA
scientists provided insights into the scientific and technical
questions concerning anthrax decontamination that arose at
the time.
Since the attacks in 2001, EPA has invested significantly in
decontamination preparedness. Dunne stated with confidence
that we have improved our ability to respond to and recover
from a small attack based on the collective experience gained
during the 2001 anthrax events; recent naturally occurring
anthrax events in Scotland and the U.S.; significant planning
workshops; and guidance document efforts.
Dunne cautioned that despite these efforts, we have no
experience or comprehension of the challenges we would
face after a wide-area terrorist attack using chemical,
biological or radiological agents. In May 2008 in Portland,
Oregon, Dunne convened a group of EPA response personnel,
scientists, and engineers — Top Officials 4, also known as
TOPOFF 4 — to further examine the response and recovery
aspects of a radiological dispersal device (ROD) or "dirty
bomb" as presented in a national exercise. The meeting
results pointed to many unanswered technical and scientific
questions. Dunne stated that we simply do not know a lot,
and we are a long way away from being prepared for such
an incident.
Over the past year, Dunne has told various audiences that the
U.S. has significant gaps in three areas: 1) decontamination
capability and capacity; 2) laboratory analysis capability
and capacity, and 3) disposal capability and capacity. The
federal government has limited decontamination capacity
and would need to rely on private companies to complete the
majority of the actual cleanup, as done in 2001. Given the
currently limited decontamination capability available, the
decontamination of building interior areas alone, following a
wide-area urban anthrax attack, might require over 15 years,
based on estimates from a U.S. Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) scenario. Dunne noted that researchers
are still working on technical approaches to outdoor
decontamination, so we do not know how long outdoor
decontamination will require.
Dunne has pointed out these three major gaps to senior
officials at the White House Homeland Security Council,
Office of Management and Budget (OMB), and Congress.
He stressed that decontamination is absolutely critical to
recovery from an urban area attacked with a chemical,
biological or radiological agent. A successful recovery is
impossible without adequate decontamination capability
and capacity.
These gaps become magnified when considering the
possibility of wide-area attacks occurring at the same
time in multiple cities. Recent events around the world
(e.g., Madrid, London, Mumbai) have shown that
terrorists use multiple, simultaneous attacks to maximize
physical damage and economic loss, as well as, increase
their psychological impact. The likelihood of multiple,
simultaneous events is a very reasonable planning
assumption. EPA planning aims to enable us to respond
to five simultaneous chemical, biological or radiological
attacks—each similar in scope to the attack on the World
Trade Center towers.
Dunne also cautioned that EPA's ability to continue to make
the necessary investments to fill these critical gaps will
become increasingly difficult for two reasons: 1) fading
public concern and 2) increasing competition for scarce
resources to address other national issues. The nation is
becoming complacent with respect to terrorism. As the nation
transitions to a new administration, many high profile issues,
such as our sagging economy, will compete with homeland
security for resource investments.
What is the solution? Dunne explained that now, more than
ever, researchers need to prioritize resource investments,
leverage existing efforts in order to increase our level of
preparedness for the most significant events, and hold
ourselves accountable for making progress and closing the
critical gaps.
EPA has a number of initiatives to prioritize investments of
limited resources. Dunne led an effort to develop an EPA
work plan that identifies decontamination, with a focus on a
wide-area anthrax release and a dirty bomb attack, as one of
the four EPA priorities. Why focus on these two scenarios?
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First, Dunne, as well as many others at the Homeland
Security Council and DHS, believes that these two scenarios
carry significant risks to the nation. Second, trying to work
on everything leaves you ill prepared for anything.
Investments need to be operationally focused. Dunne stressed
that, given the limited resources and the tremendous gaps
in our knowledge and capability, EPA cannot afford to work
on everything. EPA must focus on specific scenarios and
have an operational focus. At EPA, On-Scene Coordinators
(OSCs) provide our researchers with direction and guidance
that focuses efforts on the science and technology that has the
most immediate field application. Dunne stated that we need
to focus research and development on operational readiness.
Investments must be based on solid analyses of gaps and
priorities. EPA has undertaken several analyses to identify
and prioritize gaps in the area of decontamination. Several
years ago, we initiated a cross agency effort to identify the
scientific and technical information, as well as the policies
and procedures, necessary to perform decontamination. Last
summer, EPA, along with DHS, the U.S. Department of
Health and Human Services (HHS), and the U.S. Department
of Defense (DoD), participated in a White House Homeland
Security Council effort to identify gaps in our ability to
address a wide-area anthrax attack.
Now EPA is leveraging existing efforts in order to increase
our level of preparedness for the most significant events. EPA
is pleased to be working collaboratively with DHS and others
on projects working towards improving our preparedness
for decontamination. For example, EPA is participating in
the joint DoD and DHS Interagency Biological Restoration
Demonstration (IBRD) Program.
Finally, we must hold ourselves accountable for making
progress and closing critical gaps. As other high priority
issues compete with funding for homeland security, we must
effectively demonstrate to our departments and agencies,
OMB, and Capitol Hill that we are investing resources wisely
and achieving real progress. At EPA, we established a goal
for our decontamination preparedness within the EPA work
plan. This "desired end state" for decontamination clearly
articulates what needs to be achieved and estimates our
achievements toward that goal to date.
Dunne wished he could say that we were ready to respond
and recover from a wide-area chemical, biological or
radiological attack, but we are not. In fact, at the current
rate of progress, it will be a long time until we achieve our
"desired end state" for decontamination. In Dunne's view,
this is unacceptable: we cannot fail. We must make every
effort to maximize our return on investment of the precious
resources we have been given.
Given the magnitude of the problem and significance of
the gap in our preparedness, we cannot afford a shotgun
approach to filling these gaps. We need a rifle shot. We need
to focus our collective efforts, prioritize our investments,
leverage each other's work, and hold ourselves accountable
for making significant progress towards addressing the most
important gaps. We cannot afford to do anything less.
Question and Answer Period
• A workshop participant commented that the most
important research questions sought to identify cleanup
standards. This participant thought that establishing set
standards would drive all other research.
Dunne responded that no single cleanup standard could
be established for an agent before an event occurs. More
likely, political, economic, and scientific factors would
contribute to the derivation of a cleanup range for a
particular incident.
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Session 1: Decontamination-General Aspects
The Role of a Technical Working Group in Fumigation
of a Large Building
Blair Martin, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency,
National Risk Management Research Laboratory
Using St. John's Regional Medical Center (SJRMC) in
Oxnard, California, as an example, Martin discussed
the Technical Working Group's (TWG's) role during a
fumigation event. Hospital management decided to treat a
chronic, nuisance mold problem at the hospital with chlorine
dioxide gas. Martin noted that, although the mold was not the
result of a terror event in this instance, the role of a TWO in
responding to a terror event would be similar.
Martin noted that SJRMC is slightly smaller, but much more
complex, than the 2003 Trenton N.J. U.S. Processing and
Distribution Center fumigation, which he has discussed
in previous EPA decontamination workshops. SJRMC
management outlined unique goals for this fumigation,
such as minimizing down time and material damage. To
address all their goals, hospital management convened a
TWO consisting of individuals who provided expertise in
decontamination, sampling, disposal, and communications.
The group also included: private sector decontamination
technology experts; EPA representatives from the Office
of Research and Development (ORD), the National
Decontamination Team (NDT), the Environmental Response
Team (ERT), and an OSC; and hospital representatives. Sabre
Technical Services, LLC (Sabre) conducted the fumigation
and also participated in the TWO.
The TWO provided overall advice, attended meetings,
reviewed and commented on documents, recommended
and provided input on various studies conducted prior
to the fumigation, and was on site for technical support
during the fumigation event. The presentation slides detail
the documents reviewed and the special studies that were
recommended.
The document review process required substantial
coordination between TWO members because members were
not on site throughout the process. Martin suggested that
convening a TWO on site could shorten review cycles by
reducing coordination and scheduling needs. He also noted
that the TWO presence on site during the fumigation allowed
for real-time responses to issues that arose.
The TWO also worked to ensure regulatory compliance. The
group recommended fumigation conditions (i.e., temperature,
chlorine dioxide concentration, relative humidity), sampling
during and after fumigation, and clearance concentrations
for chorine dioxide. The group then worked with California
regulators to agree upon acceptable treatment and clearance
conditions.
Based on his experience at SJRMC and other fumigation
events, Martin concluded that a TWO could serve a valuable
function during decontamination. Individuals in a TWO
are more valuable when working together versus alone
because they encourage innovative thinking and forge
working solutions together. An on-site TWO could expedite
decontamination by providing rapid document reviews and
real-time responses. Ideally, a TWO would be present on
site throughout the decontamination event, or during critical
periods, at a minimum.
Question and Answer Period
• Can you comment on the differences between fumigations
for mold, which may be present on and within materials,
versus anthrax, which may be present only on surfaces?
The fundamental fumigation process is the same for both
mold and anthrax, although there would be different
contact concentrations and time values used. Anthrax
fumigation, however, requires additional preparation and
clearance activities. Martin noted that mold treatments
are considered successful as long as the fumigation
conditions meet the conditions listed on the fumigant
label. No clearance sampling is required. Ideally, he hoped
that some day anthrax fumigation would have a similar
clearance requirement.
• What skill set should a TWG bring to a decontamination
event?
Martin thought that the skill set should match the
decontamination activities. Overall, the TWG members
should bring together response capabilities, research
knowledge, and fumigation experience. The skill set of
the group involved in the SJRMC fumigation would likely
work well in other similar decontamination situations.
• Does a regulatory requirement (e.g., Federal Insecticide,
Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act [FIFRA]) exist for
convening a TWG for decontamination events?
Currently, the incident commander decides whether or not
to convene a TWG. No regulatory requirement for a TWG
exists.
Medical Aspects of Natural Anthrax: Implications for
Decontamination
Curtis Snook, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency,
National Decontamination Team
Prior to 2001, anthrax was known as an agricultural disease,
primarily in animals and secondarily in humans. Vaccines and
improved hygiene have minimized the number of cases in the
U.S. Other countries, which experience more cases of natural
anthrax, were surprised by the extreme reaction to the recent
natural anthrax events in New York City and Connecticut.
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The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)
investigated 40 natural anthrax cases between 1950 and
2001. Most cases occurred in agricultural settings or
textile mills that process animal hides. These cases largely
involved cutaneous anthrax cases with a smaller number of
inhalation anthrax cases investigated. No gastrointestinal
or oropharyngeal cases were investigated. Snook noted that
large outbreaks of gastrointestinal anthrax have occurred
in other parts of the world, likely from food contamination.
Snook reviewed the findings from the CDC investigations
and showed CDC photographs of cutaneous anthrax.
The cutaneous anthrax cases were associated with direct
contact with infected animals or commercial products. The
inhalation cases were associated with presence near activities
that could aerosolize anthrax spores and with underlying
illness that increased susceptibility. A high percentage of
the inhalation cases were fatal. Snook noted that the fatality
rates after the Capitol Hill incident in 2001 were much lower
than the noted "natural" occurrences because during this
incident CDC sought out people showing symptoms and
treated people early. He also noted that the number of cases
decreased between 1950 and 2001 due to vaccines, better
working conditions, process controls, and worker safety and
education. CDC recommends this approach for reducing
anthrax in agricultural settings or associated industries
because recontamination is inevitable and eliminating
anthrax completely would be impossible. One case Snook
reviewed involved inhalation anthrax resulting from the use
of contaminated yarn from Pakistan, which resulted in the
Consumer Product Safety Commission issuing a warning
about imported yarn. Snook wondered if a similar approach
could be taken with imported animal hides.
Snook reviewed three recent cases of natural anthrax (New
York City, Scotland, and Connecticut), each of which
involved making or using drums with anthrax-contaminated
hides. The two inhalation cases resulted in fatalities. In each
case, surface decontamination methods and/or fumigation
successfully remediated indoor areas contaminated with
naturally occurring anthrax.
Question and Answer Period
• What could have been done differently during the New
York City and Connecticut responses, and what are the
implications of these responses?
An event with natural anthrax may not need the same level
of decontamination as an event with weaponized anthrax.
At the time of the New York City event, Snook thought
that additional clearance sampling should have been done.
Considering the overly conservative response to natural
anthrax, however, he now feels that the level of clearance
sampling was appropriate.
• Considering the past responses at postal facilities
with anthrax contamination versus the New York
City anthrax contamination, and whether or not the
anthrax was cutaneous, would you recommend surface
decontamination or fumigation ?
Snook thought that the postal facilities contaminated with
anthrax were different from the residences contaminated
with natural anthrax, and that decontamination decisions
are not necessarily an issue of cutaneous infection or not.
Snook said that decontamination decisions are situational.
Rather than prescribing a single decontamination method,
he thought that a range of decontamination methods is
necessary and responders need to develop a process for
selecting the best method based on the situation.
• Do decontamination methods exist specifically for heating,
ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC) and exhaust
systems? Will spores caught in filters eventually be
deactivated?
Snook indicated that he is not an expert on
decontamination methods for HVAC and would defer
to others on this topic. He did believe that filters
with captured spores would have to be disposed of as
contaminated materials.
United Kingdom's Government Decontamination
Service: An Update for 2008
Robert Bettley-Smith, Government Decontamination
Service, United Kingdom
Bettley-Smith provided an update on the United Kingdom's
(U.K.'s) Government Decontamination Service (GDS)
activities associated with the specialist supplier framework,
recent GDS operations, and general decontamination issues.
GDS developed the specialist supplier framework to allow for
immediate access to resources during an incident response.
The framework allows GDS to evaluate technologies
and create proactive partnerships before an event.
Initially, GDS certified suppliers for one year knowing that
the decontamination field was rapidly evolving. GDS is
currently reevaluating and certifying suppliers for a five
year term. The evaluation involves a five-stage process:
1) technical assessment, 2) case study responses within
supplier experience, 3) case study responses beyond
supplier experience, 4) exercises and tests, and 5) evaluation
during or after an actual event. Suppliers are undergoing
stage 3 evaluations. This stage requires sophisticated
review and realistic case studies involving an actual release
venue. Bettley-Smith noted that information shared by
suppliers during this stage and throughout the evaluation
process remained confidential to ensure open and honest
communication between GDS and suppliers.
The 2006 to 2007 anthrax cases in Scotland and England
illustrated a successful test of the GDS framework during an
actual release and response action. The response began after
pathology tests revealed inhalation anthrax as the cause of
death for an individual using natural hide drums. Case details
were included in the presentation slides and during the 2007
workshop. Four different strains of anthrax were found at
the Scottish sites. The response activities included chlorine
dioxide fumigation of a community hall in Smailholm,
Scotland. The decontamination of a home in England was
less publicized and involved the use of several methods,
including high efficiency paniculate air (HEPA) vacuuming,
surface disinfection, and vapor hydrogen peroxide (VHP)
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fumigation. The response actions highlighted not only
technological issues but also the emotional, social, logistical,
and political issues associated with decontamination.
Since 2007, GDS has become involved in large-scale
hazardous material responses. Bettley-Smith discussed a
situation in which the local responders contacted the Health
Protection Agency (HPA), which in turn requested GDS
assistance at a home containing a large number of unusual
chemical and radiological substances. The necessary
sampling and characterization exceeded the local responder
capacity. As such, GDS called on its contractors and
suppliers for assistance. The home contained asbestos, three
radiological substances, and 120 chemicals. Excavation and
disposal of contaminated soil occurred; radiological source
testing was ongoing.
In conclusion, these instances illustrate how planning could
ensure success. Certain issues arise at every decontamination
event, such as funding sources, waste management,
interagency communication, media interactions, clearance
standards, logistics, and staffing resources. A scenario-based
approach, using real venues and real information, helped in
identifying and analyzing solutions during planning. Bettley-
Smith emphasized that thinking carefully about issues before
an event will precipitate better answers and solutions for a
response.
Question and Answer Period
• Have GDS and specialty suppliers explored partnerships
with the health care industry?
GDS does not get involved in that area and, thus, has
not explored a partnership with the health care industry.
Health issues are a matter for the HPA.
• When considering the differences between natural and
weaponized anthrax, how does the U.K. decide when
GDS becomes involved or when private responses are
appropriate?
Bettley-Smith indicated that GDS makes this decision on
a case-by-case basis. For the community hall in Scotland,
a public facility, GDS clearly had a responsibility to
respond. In principle, decontamination of a private
residence would most likely be the responsibility of the
owner. Many issues, however, must be considered, such as
insurance coverage and public health concerns. Often the
line between government and private responses becomes
blurred.
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's Regulation of
Sterilants/Sporicides and Sporicidal Decontaminants
Jeff Kempter, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency,
Office of Pesticide Programs
Kempter provided a brief overview of FIFRA product
registration requirements, exemptions, and efficacy testing
requirements for sanitizers, disinfectants, virucides, and
sterilants/sporicides. He noted that in the Danbury and New
York City anthrax cases, the state granted FIFRA crisis
exemptions (withEPA's Office of Pesticide Programs [OPP]
oversight) because these cases did not involve intentional
releases of anthrax. Kempter also provided details regarding
a new antimicrobial product designation—sporicidal
decontaminant—and discussed OPP's test method research.
Previously, to receive a product claim as a sterilant/sporicide
specifically for Bacillus anthracis, manufacturers needed
to conduct and pass the AOAC International Sporicidal
Activity of Disinfectants Test (Official Method 966.04) using
a virulent strain of Bacillus anthracis. No manufacturer
has done so to date. OPP, however, wants to encourage
registration of products for use against Bacillus anthracis
on hard, non-porous surfaces. In 2007, OPP proposed the
antimicrobial product category "sporicidal decontaminant."
Less stringent efficacy testing is associated with this
category, allowing possible use of acceptable surrogates.
Kempter noted that OPP was working toward, but had not yet
identified, an acceptable surrogate. The use of quantitative
efficacy test methods, requiring a 6-log reduction, would also
be acceptable.
After meeting these efficacy-testing requirements and
if the product is a gas, the product must also undergo a
simulated use test. For example, products claiming effective
decontamination of a large enclosed space must undergo
simulated use testing in a room or large chamber to ensure
that key fumigant process parameters (e.g., concentration,
relative humidity, and temperature) for effective
decontamination are met. This testing would also establish
required product generation rates (e.g., pounds/hour per
volume).
In August 2008, OPP released the final Pesticide Registration
(PR) notice outlining the terms and conditions for sale and
distribution of products with the sporicidal decontaminant
claim. Kempter noted that manufacturers must develop
competency examination and training materials as part of the
application submission. Currently, OPP is developing generic
templates (e.g., training and competency exams) to assist
manufacturers in completing their applications. In 2009, OPP
also aims to release for public comment a draft guidance
document addressing efficacy test methods supporting
anthrax-related claims.
Kempter also discussed completed research, which was
conducted by OPP's Microbiology Laboratory, related to
sporicidal efficacy test methods. These efforts have involved
improvements to the AOAC Official Method 966.04
(qualitative method); selection and validation of quantitative
test methods, for example the Three Step Method (TSM)
[ASTM E2414 - 05]; and efficacy tests to compare Bacillus
subtilis to two Bacillus anthracis strains and surrogates using
different test methods (both quantitative and qualitative)
and decontaminants. Kempter then described a host of
ongoing research initiatives involving further investigation of
quantitative test methods, surrogates, carrier materials, and
other pathogens in addition to Bacillus anthracis.
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Question and Answer Period
• What is the rationale for the requirement for no growth in
qualitative tests versus a 6 log reduction in quantitative
tests?
For regulatory purposes, OPP considers no growth
in qualitative tests equivalent to a 6 log reduction in
quantitative tests. Overall, OPP would like to move toward
quantitative tests.
• What is the role of surface cleaning in a situation with a
wide-area release and hundreds of buildings impacted?
Fumigating each building would require hundreds or
thousands ofresponders.
Kempter indicated that the unified command will be
responsible for selecting specific decontamination
methodologies during an event. OPP's role will be
to determine if products will be effective when used
according to the label and/or as planned by the unified
command and to ensure that any requests for crisis
exemptions are rapidly reviewed if registered products are
not available.
• Has OPP seen much interest from companies seeking a
sporicidal decontaminant claim for products?
Yes, several companies are interested in and working
toward submitting applications for sporicidal
decontaminant product registrations.
Toward a System-of-Systems Approach
to Hazard Mitigation
Charles Bass, Defense Threat Reduction Agency
During this workshop, Bass was struck by the differing
approach of EPA decontamination versus DoD
decontamination. DoD focuses on tactical decontamination
technologies that reduce risks to a tolerable level.
Bass provided an overview of the Chemical and Biological
Defense Program (CBDP) of the Defense Threat Reduction
Agency (DTRA). Once a technology reaches a certain level
of maturity under the development of the Joint Science and
Technology Office (JSTO), JSTO passes the technology on to
the Joint Program Executive Office (JPEO) for development
and application for use by the warfighter. Bass also discussed
the elements of the program that he manages, which includes
the decontamination and protection areas.
Unlike the Cold War era of large-scale, ongoing attacks,
DoD now expects chemical, biological, radiological, and
nuclear (CBRN) events to consist of small target incidents
that result in intense and local releases. As such, DoD now
investigates hazard mitigation measures that a warfighter
could carry at all times. Out of necessity, these measures
must have a low burden on the warfighter (e.g., lightweight,
easy to use, compact). Otherwise, the warfighter may
perceive the measures as unnecessary and discard or resent
carrying the item.
In developing effective decontamination or hazard mitigation
technologies, DoD seeks to balance hazard reduction,
effectiveness, suitability, and life-cycle management. Hazard
reduction needs change based on specific situations, but
immediate decontamination generally focuses on life-saving
measures implemented by warfighters in combat areas.
DoD has shifted from seeking a single, all-purpose
decontamination technology to researching a number of
dual-purpose technologies, which could be used in concert
to create a system-of-systems decontamination approach.
These technologies, which were detailed in the presentation
slides, included a surfactant wash for removal of chemical
agents from chemical agent resistant coatings (CARCs);
an aqueous chlorine dioxide surfactant solution produced
electrochemically from chlorite; and decontamination
solutions for VX and G-agents produced through the use
of enzymes.
Bass discussed the system-of-systems approach
(i.e., technologies combined or used together) and presented
a scenario of this approach. Technologies under investigation
in this category include antimicrobial surfaces, agent
disclosure solutions, and strippable coatings. By combining
these technologies, DoD aims to reduce or eliminate hazards
as quickly as possible in order to eliminate operational and
thorough decontamination needs to the extent feasible.
Question and Answer Period
• What are the benefits of enzyme-based decontaminants?
Enzyme-based decontaminants require lower quantities
for use and are, therefore, easy to store and ship, which is
often a concern in combat situations. Enzymes also have
high material compatibility. Bass noted that no immediate
solutions existed for toxic degradation products from
chemical warfare agents (CWAs).
• What temperature range must the enzyme decontaminant
stay within to remain effective?
Storage temperatures can reach up to 170 degrees
Fahrenheit (°F). Initial research indicated that
decontaminants could withstand temperatures this high
during short-term storage. Long-term storage at high
temperatures has not been as successful.
• How does DoD identify decontamination technology
research needs?
Decontamination technology users reviewed the functional
needs assessment and functional solution assessment,
which was a large document describing decontamination
needs. The modernization plan outlined DoD's general
goals for decontamination technologies in the future and
was another document used to direct research. Groups met
to discuss information in these documents and worked
together to develop research objectives based on the
information provided.
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Wide-area Restoration Following Biological
Contamination: Systems Analysis for Interagency
Biological Restoration Demonstration Program
Lynn Yang, Sandia National Laboratory
Under the IBRD Program, which is a joint program of the
DoD and DHS, a strategy for addressing a wide-area, urban
release of a biological agent is being developed. Agencies
have established a process for addressing indoor releases.
Although many of the issues with indoor events are also
relevant to outdoor events, many technology, science, policy
and other capability gaps exist for addressing wide-area,
biological restoration. IBRD Program participants include
civilian and military personnel working together to address
these issues using a hypothetical release of Bacillus anthracis
in Seattle, Washington.
This IBRD Program is divided into four tasks: 1) systems
analysis, 2) consequence management plan development,
3) technology development and demonstration, and
4) workshop and exercise completion. Yang presented
activities and findings resulting from Task 1—systems
analysis.
The four steps of the systems analysis process included:
creating an as-is decision framework, developing a baseline
example, identifying critical parameters, and prioritizing data
gaps and chokepoints in the wide-area restoration process.
Creating the as-is decision framework required extensive
expert interviews, workshop discussion, technical advisor
consultation, and document review. Yang noted that if an
incident occurred today, responders would have a basic
understanding of their roles and responsibilities. Supporting
plans, policies, procedures, and technologies, however, are
insufficient and many decisions would occur in real time.
Significant knowledge gaps exist.
In the next step, the group established a base-line
contamination scenario with a hot zone, which would
require decontamination, and a less contaminated
"warm zone," which would require only monitoring.
Yang noted that local officials would likely prioritize
response areas and facilities, but these officials would
need to balance local needs with federal and state
needs. Yang outlined a potential remediation strategy:
decontaminate outdoor areas to minimize contaminant
spread, and then address buildings based on priorities.
Using the as-is framework and the baseline example, Yang
conducted a series of analyses to evaluate the impact of
each action and decision on the decontamination process
to identify gaps and chokepoints. Yang outlined the
assumptions and detailed the analysis methodologies.
These methodologies identified 80 gaps and a number of
chokepoints. For example, results identified laboratory
analysis capacity and throughput and high-density indoor
characterization sampling as chokepoints in the restoration
process. Analyses also found that the suspected area of
contamination impacted all subsequent decontamination
activities and phases. High-priority gaps needing attention
included the lack of a risk-based approach for determining
cleanup goals; lack of validated outdoor characterization
methods; and lack of validated outdoor decontamination
strategies, methods, and technologies.
Yang discussed issues identified through their qualitative
analysis, such as methodologies for prioritizing infrastructure
for restoration, waste disposal concerns, and the role of
"self-remediation" (i.e., citizens would decontaminate their
own homes). Yang concluded that the systems analysis tool
could be used for additional analyses; however, the initial
analyses identified clear gaps. Results from these analyses
are now supporting the next IBRD Program tasks to develop
a consequence management plan and to develop and
demonstrate technologies.
Question and Answer Period
• What level of available resources did you assume for
laboratory facilities and did these resources stem from
federal, state, and/or local agencies?
Yang assumed that recovery would be a multi-year effort
and that the laboratory response network (LRN) would be
used initially. Additional resources and capabilities would
increase over time.
• When considering the fate and transport of contaminants
after the event, did you assume fixed concentrations or
agent mobilization through weathering, degradation,
and other actions that would drastically change the
contaminant footprint?
To simplify this assessment task, Yang assumed a static
hot zone. She agreed that discounting fate and transport
actions resulted in a substantial data gap; however, a fluid
system would be substantially more complex to model.
• The scalability of fumigation is illustrated by the actions
completed in New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina. Time
and cost to fumigate were reduced when working at a
large-scale event versus a single building event. This
participant suggested that Yang review data generated
from New Orleans and reconsider some of the baseline
assumptions.
Yang agreed with this statement and suggestion.
• Why did you select fumigation versus surface
decontamination for addressing contamination?
At the time, Yang selected fumigation because this
method was well known and validated. Yang considered
some level of surface decontamination for addressing
contaminant tracking and secondary contamination.
Yang indicated that she could run the models again with
a greater percentage of surface decontamination. For
this particular scenario, with hundreds of buildings to
decontaminate, she indicated that surface decontamination
techniques are less likely to be critical to restoration.
These methods would need to be validated as a substitute
for fumigation.
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IV
Session 2: Biological Agents-Field Experience
And Laboratory Testing
Danbury Anthrax Response, September 2007
Mike Nalipinski, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency,
Region 1
Approximately 200 OSCs operate throughout the U.S.
and coordinate emergency response efforts, including
decontamination. Nalipinski recommended that everyone
take the Incident Command Structure course offered on the
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Web
site to better understand emergency response procedures.
Although they appreciate information about large-scale
events, more frequently OSCs respond to much smaller-
scale events. As an example of OSC activities, Nalipinski
presented information about a recent anthrax response in
Danbury, Connecticut.
In August 2007, doctors diagnosed a drum maker and his
son with cutaneous anthrax. Per protocol, doctors notified
the Connecticut Department of Public Health, which in turn
notified CDC and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).
When law enforcement determined that the anthrax did not
originate from terrorist activities, these agencies demobilized
from the site. The Connecticut Department of Environmental
Protection remained involved and requested assistance from
EPA, which led to OSC involvement.
EPA, state, and local agencies established a unified
command to address characterization and decontamination
issues. These issues included setting clearance standards
for reoccupancy of the home and work shed, reopening a
major city road, selecting an appropriate decontamination
method(s), addressing structure contents, and integrating
different agency regulations and needs. Decisions from the
unified command were potentially precedent setting, and
they wanted to keep responses simple. Additionally, the drum
maker's spouse was a local school teacher, so the unified
command needed to address concerns about possible anthrax
transport to the public school.
Characterization sampling (with polymerase chain reaction
[PCR] analysis) found anthrax in the work shed, which
contained natural hide drums, and in the home. Samples
collected between the work shed and home detected no
anthrax spores. No sampling was conducted at the school.
The unified command reviewed available information
and, for the work shed, selected a host of decontamination
procedures, including HEPA vacuuming, followed by power
washing, scrubbing with soap and water, and bleach surface
treatment. Nalipinski noted that, based on laboratory testing
results, CDC and the National Institute for Occupational
Safety and Health (NIOSH) did not support these
decontamination methods for porous surfaces.
After soaking materials from the shed in a bleach solution
for 1 hour, sampling and culturing detected no anthrax spores
in 34 of 37 batches of treated materials. HEPA vacuum
sampling of approximately 2.5% to 3% of the work shed
surface area after treatment also found no anthrax spores.
Resampling of additional areas in the home, however,
detected anthrax spores. As such, the state epidemiologist
decided to approve home reoccupancy only after fumigation,
which occurred in December 2007.
Nalipinski concluded with a discussion of lessons
learned and recommendations stemming from this event.
Coordination and communication between agencies and
experts had a large impact. An on-site presence during an
event, as suggested during Martin's earlier presentation,
improved communication and the overall success of the
decontamination event. Nalipinski recommended that
potentially involved agencies formalize a communication
strategy and follow the incident command system. He
also suggested that agencies work to research and validate
HEPA vacuuming and bleach washing as a potential
decontamination approach for porous surfaces.
This event also raised policy issues. EPA funded activities in
the event, but should EPA really be responsible for responses
to natural anthrax events? In the past, doctors simply treated
natural anthrax cases with antibiotics. Nalipinski, however,
thought that the government response was appropriate in this
case because the family's connection to the public school
presented a potentially larger public health concern. He
also noted that doctors do not understand why some people
develop anthrax and others do not. Only two of the four
family members developed anthrax even though all were
exposed to the spores. The event also raised questions about
EPA's role in coordinating with other agencies during a
response and identified a need to evaluate decontamination
methods beyond fumigation.
Question and Answer Period
• Did you conduct a cost analysis for the work shed versus
the home decontamination?
Nalipinski indicated that the action report was finalized
recently but did not include a cost analysis. The report
simply identified how much each component of the
decontamination cost. He noted that the different
decontamination methods required different levels of
characterization and clearance sampling. Waste disposal
was another factor and could be extremely costly; it cost
about $ 1 million to dispose of the waste, which required
autoclaving, incineration and landfilling, following the
New York City anthrax restoration. He noted that this
response generated no waste.
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• Was any sampling conducted on the ground between the
work shed and the house? Was sampling conducted at the
school?
Yes, sampling was conducted between the work shed and
house, but no anthrax was detected. No sampling was
conducted at the school.
• Who pays for responses to chemical releases in homes?
Chemical releases are response specific. An OSC would
respond to a mercury release in a school but not an
asbestos or lead paint situation. In cases with multiple
chemicals in a single location, OSCs may conduct an
emergency response and then seek cost recovery from a
responsible party.
• How are recommendations related to practical research
and development needs communicated to the research
community?
Nalipinski noted that this workshop and similar gatherings
were a way to communicate needs. He also encouraged
researchers, OSCs, and other responders to develop
ongoing relationships. OSCs and responders were the
ultimate customers of research and development findings,
so open communication helped relate research to needs.
Another participant noted that a task force exists to
optimize research and identify OSC needs.
• Has the family returned to the home and how was their
safety addressed?
During the response, the family was relocated and given
a daily living stipend. After the local and state health
agencies, in consultation with CDC, declared the home
free for reoccupancy, the family returned.
Expedited Fumigation of a Large Hospital as Related to
Biological Contamination Scenarios
Darrell Dechant, Sabre Technical Services, LLC
Sabre representative Dechant discussed the fumigation
technology applied to the S JRMC. In addition to addressing
the hospital's mold problem, this fumigation also
demonstrated the feasibility of conducting a rapid, large-
scale fumigation with one application. Dechant noted that
the capacity loss of a major medical center for an extended
period could have serious consequences.
Representatives from several EPA offices, state and local
agencies, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL),
and hospital management collaborated on this project. This
group selected chlorine dioxide fumigation by Sabre to
address a persistent mold problem. Sabre sought to assess the
feasibility of completing mobilization and preparation within
weeks, fumigation within hours, and reoccupation within
hours of finishing fumigation.
Dechant provided details and photographs of the chlorine
dioxide generation, delivery, and monitoring systems. The
target dose was 2,000 parts per million by volume (ppmv)-
hours of exposure. Assuming 12 hours of exposure time,
this dose would result in an average target concentration of
approximately 167 ppmv. Sabre monitored concentrations
via air sampling in impingers, which were then later
analyzed with wet chemistry methods. Sabre also monitored
temperature and relative humidity throughout the process.
Sabre used paired biological indicators (Bis) inoculated with
Bacillus atrophaeus, which Dechant asserted was the most
difficult bacterial spore to inactivate with chlorine dioxide,
to assess efficacy. Tenting combined with slight negative
air pressure in the building contained the chlorine dioxide
within the building. Negative pressure was achieved by
drawing some air out of the building, passing the air through
carbon beds to remove the chlorine dioxide, then emitting
the air to the atmosphere. The EPA's Trace Atmospheric Gas
Analyzer (TAGA) van circled SJPJVIC and the surrounding
neighborhoods to monitor for possible chlorine dioxide leaks.
Sabre began fumigating SJPJVIC at midnight on a Friday to
minimize possible interferences or exposures. At noon the
following day, crews entered the building with the TAGA
mounted to a handcart for manual maneuvering. Chlorine
dioxide concentrations were below exposure standards for
reoccupation. Sabre completed the fumigation, from building
conditioning to final clearance, in less than 48 hours. SJPJVIC
was closed to the public for five days.
Dechant noted that this project demonstrated that a large-
scale fumigation could be completed in a very short time
frame. Several difficulties, however, arose during the
process. Predictably, the HVAC system needed extensive
maintenance. Reaching and maintaining a 75% relative
humidity was challenging. Unexpectedly, Sabre experienced
difficulties in clearing personnel from the facilities. Guards
were needed at entrances and exits to ensure that people did
not reenter the building.
Although a total of 200 people were involved in this project,
many were only peripherally involved, and only 50 or so
were involved at any one time. Caution should be used when
extrapolating these numbers to a wide-area scenario; the
economies of scale should be considered. In comparison,
many more personnel would be needed to complete a surface
decontamination in a similar large facility. The cost of this
labor force would likely make surface decontamination the
more expensive option.
Question and Answer Period
• Another workshop participant involved in this project
explained the approach used to quantify spore reduction.
Each BI location included two Bis. Initially, one BI from
each location was collected and analyzed. At the four
locations with a positive finding on the first BI, the second
BI was collected and analyzed to quantify the degree of
spore inactivation.
• What is the maximum building height appropriate for
tenting?
Mason noted that Sabre has fumigated buildings up to
12 stories high. With higher tensile strength materials,
he believed that buildings 25 to 30 stories high could
be amenable to tenting. He noted, however, that only
continued attempts to tent larger and taller buildings
would identify limitations.
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• What was the half-life of chlorine dioxide from natural
decay? After fumigation, did Sabre allow the chlorine
dioxide to decay naturally?
Natural decay rates vary based on site-specific conditions.
The decay rate in a facility with few porous materials
may be 100 parts per million/hour (ppm/hr), whereas the
decay rate in a large facility with many porous materials,
like a hotel, may be 1,000 ppm/hr. At SJRMC, the decay
rate was rapid and the need for air scrubbers was minimal.
Martin noted that the TWO estimated a clearance time of
18 to 24 hours for concentrations to drop to the 3 parts
per billion (ppb) clearance concentration. Concentrations
actually dropped below 3 ppb within nine hours.
• Did you analyze or account for chlorine dioxide loss in the
sampling manifold?
Sabre recognized that decay could occur in the sampling
tubes, so researchers modeled the decay rate and
accounted for this decay in the sample analysis.
• Was the HVAC system needed to maintain the desired
building temperature?
The Sabre system specified a building temperature of
70 °F. Ambient temperatures met the minimum without
additional heat; the fumigation occurred in southern
California during the summer. For colder climates, the
HVAC system could be used to heat a building.
Utilizing a Trace Atmospheric Gas Analyzer Triple
Quadrupole Mass Spectrometer Technology Mounted on
a Movable Platform to Provide Indoor Air Concentrations
Throughout a Structure Before and After a Chlorine
Dioxide Fumigation
David Mickunas, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency,
Emergency Response Team
The purpose of using the TAGA at the SJRMC was to ensure
that tenting would successfully contain the fumigant; this
was especially important with homes nearby. Consistent with
other fumigation events, regulators set the chlorine dioxide
action level at 25 ppb in ambient air. If detected at 100 ppb,
which was the eight-hour time-weighted average (TWA),
fumigation operations would cease.
Initially, Mickunas was tasked to move throughout the
surrounding neighborhoods with the TAGA van to ensure
compliance with the action level. The TAGA van operated
by moving slowly, continuously pulling a gas sample from
the ambient air, and obtaining a signal for chlorine gas and
chlorine dioxide each second. The TAGA system is a triple
quadrupole mass spectrometer (with no gas chromatograph)
that utilizes an atmospheric pressure chemical ionization
source. The TAGA ionizes the samples and separates
different compounds and daughter compounds using a series
of quadrupoles set to different molecular weights.
In addition, Mickunas tested a prototype cart-mounted
TAGA to ensure that the chlorine dioxide concentrations
within the building decreased to below the 3 ppb clearance
concentration. Personnel manually maneuvered the cart-
mounted TAGA throughout SJRMC before fumigation to
establish a baseline and after fumigation to assess clearance.
Mickunas provided photographs of the TAGA van and
TAGA cart, as well as diagrams of the SJRMC floor plan,
sampling route, and sampling results. Each run through
SJRMC required only 15 minutes. Sampling indicated that
chlorine dioxide concentrations had fallen below 3 ppb,
with the exception of one location. A bucket with water
remained in place during the fumigation. Chlorine dioxide
had dissolved in the water during the fumigation and the
TAGA cart detected subsequent chlorine dioxide off-gassing.
After removing the bucket, ambient chlorine dioxide levels
dropped below 3 ppb.
Mickunas noted that maneuvering the TAGA cart through
SJRMC required several personnel. If used during a
remediation event requiring personal protective equipment
(PPE), maneuvering the TAGA cart with fewer personnel
and less exertion would be beneficial. As such, Mickunas has
added a battery operated cart puller to the TAGA cart.
In conclusion, Mickunas noted the TAGA cart's success in
clearing SJRMC. He also mentioned that separate tests with
CWAs have been conducted and have demonstrated that
the TAGA could detect low-levels of CWAs. Although not
appropriate for identifying high concentrations or hot spots,
the TAGA cart could be used to detect clearance levels of
CWAs for critical facilities, such as airports and train stations.
Question and Answer Period
• Could EPA use the cart-mounted TAGA for detecting toxic
industrial compounds (TICs) (e.g., materials released in
an airport) ?
Mickunas stated that EPA calibrated the TAGA to detect
chlorinated, brominated, and halogenated compounds
during soil vapor intrusion studies in homes. As such, he
thought using the TAGA to detect TICs was possible.
• Could a handheld ion mobility spectrometer (IMS)
monitor chlorine dioxide during fumigation?
Mickunas had not used handheld IMS devices for chlorine
dioxide monitoring. He had heard anecdotal information
that these monitors are easily overloaded and recover
slowly.
• Have you evaluated other proton sources?
In the positive ion mode, proton transfer did occur. In the
negative ion mode, a hydride may form. A high relative
humidity, however, was sufficient for proper operation of
the TAGA.
Decontamination of Surfaces Contaminated with
Biological Agents Using Fumigant Technologies
Shawn Ryan, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency,
National Homeland Security Research Center
Ryan presented results from a series of efficacy studies using
vapor phase hydrogen peroxide (VPHP), methyl bromide,
and chlorine dioxide. His presentation provided a detailed
description of the test methodology, parameters, coupon
materials, and threat agents tested with each fumigant. Ryan
emphasized that the coupon materials impacted results
substantially.
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Results from efficacy tests with Bacillus anthracis on six
different building material coupons indicated that material
demand impacted VPHP efficacy. For example, VPHP
fumigation was ineffective in decontaminating concrete
(essentially no log reduction). Interestingly, this material also
exhibits a high demand for VPHP. Tests also showed that Bis
were much easier to inactivate than the Bacillus anthracis
spores on coupon materials.
Ryan also tested inactivation of Bacillus anthracis and
Bacillus subtilis on eight materials using methyl bromide.
Again, results indicated that the coupon material substantially
impacted the fumigant efficacy. The concentration and
contact time required for complete inactivation of the
Bacillus anthracis Ames spores were highly dependent upon
the material. Testing also indicated that Bacillus subtilis was
significantly more resistant to methyl bromide than Bacillus
anthracis.
Chlorine dioxide results for inactivation of five different
agents (Brucella suis, Yersinia pestis, Francisella tularensis,
vaccinia virus, and Bacillus anthracis) on four materials also
showed that the material and agent affected the concentration
and contact time required for complete inactivation. Ryan
noted that the non-spore forming agents were inactivated
at lower concentrations and contact times than the spore
forming agents. Relative humidity also affected chlorine
dioxide efficacy; a higher relative humidity generally
improves efficacy.
Results from each test found that the material being
decontaminated greatly affected fumigant efficacy. As such,
efficacy results generated for one material should not be
generalized to predict the efficacy for other materials.
Ongoing National Homeland Security Research Center
(NHSRC), Decontamination and Consequence Management
Division (DCMD) research efforts include evaluating
additional fumigants and technologies, assessing coupon
inoculation methods, comparing efficacy test methods, and
developing a chamber facility for additional decontamination
studies.
Question and Answer Period
• For the three fumigants evaluated, does each have a role
in a real-world decontamination or were the limitations
such that real-world applications would be impractical?
All three of these fumigants have a possible role in a
decontamination event. Fumigant selection must consider
site-specific conditions (e.g., materials).
• What was the fate of methyl bromide?
Methyl bromide is extremely persistent, which allowed
for long contact times and material penetration, but also
required procedures to clear the fumigant from structure.
• Do you have any data comparing the mode of distribution
of the contaminant (e.g., liquid inoculation versus aerosol
or powder deposition) ?
Ryan indicated that ongoing efforts were evaluating
differences. Initial results indicated that coupon material
affects the results.
• What form of vaccinia virus did you use?
Was it freeze-dried?
Ryan used a liquid inoculation of the vaccinia virus.
Anecdotal evidence indicated that a freeze-dried
form of the virus might be more persistent.
• What was the impact of soiling (i.e., bioburden)?
Bioburden impacts were specific to the fumigant. For
example, Ryan found that VPHP was impacted by
bioburden, whereas chlorine dioxide was not.
Assessment of the Impact of Chlorine Dioxide Gas on
Electronic Equipment
Mary Mandich, Alcatel-Lucent
Mandich provided a detailed discussion of the methodology
and findings from a collaborative study to assess the impact
of fumigation chemicals on electronic equipment. The
Alcatel-Lucent team studied the effects of chlorine dioxide
because of its use in real-world situations and proven efficacy
against threat agents. Dell computers served as the test
vehicle to represent possible impacts not only to computers
but also other electronic devices and systems. The computers
consisted of a wide range of materials—plastics, aluminum,
copper, silver, and sheet metal. Additional assessment of
material impacts was conducted using pure copper, silver,
and aluminum coupons and industrial printed circuit (IPC)
boards. Effects of short-term chlorine dioxide exposure were
studied for months after exposure, and significant time-
delayed impacts on system reliability were observed.
To initially assess impacts, the team used PC-Doctor®
(PC-Doctor, Inc. Reno, N.V), which is an industry standard
program for assessing computer failures. PC-Doctor®
reported results as pass or fail, which removed any subjective
pass/fail designations assigned by researchers. Results were
reported as cumulative failures over time. Some of the
results indicated that intermittent failures occurred. Visual
inspection of the computers found corrosion on all tested
materials, and color changes on the plastic coated cables.
Measures of the pure metal coupon weight gain, which
is an indication of corrosion, correlated with exposure
conditions (e.g., concentration, temperature, time).
After identifying failures, Mandich examined the exposed
systems to determine the failure causes. Hygroscopic
corrosion product (i.e., dust) formation and transfer caused
reliability problems. Optics damage caused CD-DVD drive
failures. Gold plated connectors failed if the gold layer
thickness was less than or equal to 0.5 microns.
Question and Answer Period
• Could you explain more about how the chlorine dioxide
exposure experiments were conducted?
These experiments were conducted in the NHSRC
laboratories.
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• Did you examine damage to CDs, DVDs, or the hard drive
as part of the forensic data retrieval?
Ryan responded that CDs and DVDs were placed in
the chamber during fumigation. After fumigation, data
from these media were retrieved successfully. Mandich
indicated that attempts to retrieve data from the exposed
hard drives were successful.
• How do these findings extrapolate to whole buildings
and structures?
Mandich indicated that many extrapolations were possible,
but the study team needed to catalog exposed items and
consider impacts before extrapolating findings.
• Did you monitor other co-gases (e.g., hydrogen chloride,
chlorine gas) in addition to chlorine dioxide during the
exposure?
The study included only chlorine dioxide monitoring;
however, future monitoring for hydrochloric acid gas
would be useful.
• A workshop participant commented that, anecdotally,
electronic equipment has remained operational after
fumigation.
Laboratory-scale Decontamination Testing in Support of
the Interagency Biological Restoration Demonstration
Program
Major James G. Rohrbough, Defense Threat
Reduction Agency
Rohrbough reviewed projects that the DTRA is doing in
support of the IBRD Program. (Data from laboratory-scale
decontamination testing were not yet available.) DTRA's
mission is to mitigate potential releases and impacts of
weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) (e.g., threat agents).
The Test-Support Division, in particular, specifically
conducts research that assists with end-to-end threat event
planning and execution. The IBRD Program aims to develop
the policies, plans, and technologies needed for responding to
a large, urban area release of a biological agent.
In support of the IBRD Program, DTRA was conducting
laboratory tests of decontamination products using Bacillus
anthracis surrogates and the quantitative TSM protocol.
Laboratory testing will include a porous and non-porous
surface, Bacillus atrophaeus as a surrogate, and six
commercially available decontaminants.
Planning for field testing—scheduled for 2009—was
currently underway. The field test would likely be a medium-
scale test with multiple surfaces. A simulated, wide-area
decontamination event was scheduled for 2010. Rohrbough
noted that, ideally, results from laboratory and field tests
would help identify which decontaminants had the best
efficacy for different materials. He welcomed workshop
participant feedback and advice about these planned projects.
Question and Answer Period
• How would data from this effort transfer from the
laboratory to operational use?
A panel reviewed many decontamination agents and
selected the six decontaminants used for the laboratory
evaluations. The panel deemed these decontaminants as
most likely to successfully address a wide-area, outdoor
contamination event. Results from the laboratory-scale
tests would be used in decisions about how the field and
then the demonstration tests would be conducted.
Field Evaluation of Gaseous Chlorine Dioxide Treatment
for Microbial Contamination
Nancy Clark Burton, Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention, National Institute for Occupational Health
and Safety
Burton presented the details of decontamination activities
resulting from a requested evaluation of a serious mold issue
at a home proposed for use as a women's shelter. Chlorine
dioxide fumigation was selected as the decontamination
technology for this home. Burton briefly discussed chlorine
dioxide use as a fumigant and the various occupational
exposure limits.
Burton presented detailed information about the treatment
conditions and sampling strategy. She noted that the home
needed heating to reach required treatment conditions.
Sampling locations were established on each floor and in
the basement of the home. A number of different microbial
sampling methods were used because no good correlation
exists between microbial sampling analytes and health
effects. Burton provided photographs illustrating the
sampling locations and fumigation process. She noted that
ants quickly reentered the home after fumigation, probably
because of incomplete sealing of the basement.
For some, but not all of the analytes, statistically significant
differences were observed between the levels before and after
fumigation. Microscopic analysis of tape samples indicated
that fungi structures remained after fumigation. Burton's
presentation slides provided detailed results.
For future study, Burton recommended additional monitoring
to evaluate the impact of chlorine dioxide exposure on
PCR analysis. The team had thought the chlorine dioxide
gas would not impact DNA and RNA samples, but it did.
She also recommended that HEPA vacuuming and other
air filtration devices be used to remove the bioaerosols
remaining after chlorine dioxide fumigation until the health
effects of these bioaerosols are better understood.
Question and Answer Period
• Normally areas contained for fumigation are held under
negative pressure. Why was the area fumigated during this
field evaluation kept under positive pressure?
Burton agreed that most fumigations occurred under
negative pressure. Because this situation addressed
microbial contamination, a positive pressure condition
helped to ensure that microbes outside of the home did not
enter the containment area.
• A workshop participant clarified that chlorine dioxide
was not flammable, unless present at high concentrations
(e.g., 10,000 parts per million [ppm] and 275 °F).
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Decontamination Family of Systems
Mark Zimmerman, Joint Program Executive Office for
Chemical and Biological Defense
(Presentation is unavailable)
Under JPEO, Zimmerman works within the materials
development program. The development program fulfills
requirements from three different entities, which consider
warfighter, documentation, and testing needs. Unlike other
agencies, DoD had substantial oversight for determining
capability gaps and research needs. The development
program also ties into other programs (e.g., CBDP, IBRD
Program), other agencies, and industry to gather information
and data about technologies. Zimmerman noted that open
and consistent communication with other organization was
important for ongoing research and development activities.
Zimmerman discussed capability gaps and research
approaches toward addressing these gaps. Although
capability gaps related to sampling and early warning
systems existed, Zimmerman focused his presentation on
the gaps related to decontamination. Initial decontamination
research has targeted decontamination efforts and
application methods. DoD, however, recently broadened the
decontamination research scope. Zimmerman noted that,
unlike other agencies, JPEO is addressing decontamination of
human remains.
In evaluating field capabilities, most available
decontaminants had some issues associated with their use.
No all-purpose decontamination agent existed (although
Zimmerman noted one successful technology: reactive
skin decontaminant lotion.) As such, DoD research
began to evaluate a Decontamination Family of Systems
(DFoS) approach, which was the same as the system-
of-systems approach discussed by Bass. Zimmerman
provided a schematic depiction of the operational view of
decontamination. Within this view, DoD balanced immediate,
operational, and thorough decontamination needs with
clearance needs. The standards for clearance have historically
presented problems.
The DFoS approach combines decontamination agents and
methods to speed the decontamination process. From the
operational side, this approach aims to reduce the manpower,
logistics, time, and cost of decontamination. For example,
many personnel and a large volume of water are necessary
to decontaminate a single vehicle. A DFoS approach would
identify the technologies that would reduce the personnel
and water requirements. Materials supporting a DFoS
approach included agent identification technologies, dual-
use decontaminants, coatings, and automated application
systems.
In recognizing that no one decontaminant technology exists
to cover all possible situations, DoD accepts that research
must follow an incremental approach, with short-, mid-, and
long-term goals for addressing capability gaps. Zimmerman
briefly mentioned the warfighters' need for tools and
technologies that tailor responses to specific threats, increase
hazard mitigation, and decrease resource requirements.
Question and Answer Period
• A meeting participant noted parallels between military
and other government agency research. Specifically,
DoD research regarding large vehicle decontamination
strategies had implications for civilian decontamination
of large vehicles. This participant encouraged
ongoing communication and resource sharing across
organizations.
Zimmerman agreed and noted that these shared interests
emphasized the importance of open communication.
Decontamination of a Railcar Using a Portable and
Economical System
Tony Contino, Biokinetics, Inc.
Paul Manske, Metropolitan Transportation Authority-
Long Island Railroad
Contino became involved in decontamination, and
specifically chlorine dioxide fumigation, after learning about
a chlorine dioxide micro-reactor technology. This technology,
developed by Selective Micro® Technologies, LLC (Beverly,
Mass.) consists of submerging a sachet filled with dry
reactants in water to generate chlorine dioxide, similar to
steeping a tea bag. The sachet, or micro-reactor, consists of
a gas permeable membrane that allows water vapor to enter
and react with the dry material to form chlorine dioxide gas.
Contino and Manske partnered to demonstrate the micro-
reactor technology as a viable option for addressing interior
and exterior contamination of a passenger railcar. In addition
to inactivating anthrax spores, they sought to demonstrate
that this technology could meet environmental and safety
standards, accommodate changing site conditions, and
minimize damage to materials, including electronic and
safety equipment. Contino presented details of the chlorine
dioxide generation system used for the test, BI sampling,
test methodologies, and site conditions. The generation
system produced chlorine dioxide in the aqueous phase with
numerous large sachets, then sparged the gas into an air
stream.
Chlorine dioxide generation began during the tent
erection around the railcar. Strong winds at the end of the
demonstration tore the tenting material, which released
chlorine dioxide gas and ended the test. The chlorine dioxide
generation in water started about seven hours before the
initiation of gas injection into the railcar. The gas injection
and hold period lasted for 14 hours. For the future, Contino
recommended tenting with a stronger (i.e., heavier) material.
For safety reasons, personnel conducted monitoring adjacent
to the railcar tenting; concentrations did not exceed the action
level of five ppm. Minimizing personnel in the operation
areas or requiring PPE in operation areas also minimized
exposures. Contino noted that only seven personnel from
Biokinetics, Inc. were present during the test.
Results from Long Island Railway's laboratory indicated that
96 out of 98 Bis were inactivated. Successful achievement
of fumigation parameters was also obtained; the relative
humidity, temperature, and the target chlorine dioxide dosage
(concentration x contact time) requirements were met.
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Contino estimated that a chlorine concentration multiplied
by exposure time (CT) of 12,000 to 15,000 ppm/hr was
obtained. The project also demonstrated that the micro-
reactor technology was easily portable and quickly deployed.
The technology also accommodated a range of site conditions
and remained successful. The materials compatibility
results found no apparent physical damage to the railcar six
months after fumigation. Notebook computers and railcar
electronics operated throughout the decontamination process
had no visible damage and could be restarted one year after
fumigation.
Contino concluded that this project demonstrated the
feasibility of the micro-reactor technology and noted that
Long Island Railroad was planning to conduct another test
with three railcars. Because this technology was easily
transported and could be scaled to various fumigation
volumes, it could be carried by warfighters and could be
valuable for the military. Contino recommended additional
technology development and demonstration projects.
Question and Answer Period
• A notebook computer generates a lot of heat when
running. What were the local conditions proximate to
the running notebook computers, and how would these
conditions affect relative humidity, temperature, and
decontamination effectiveness?
The relative humidity ranged from 70% to 80% and
the temperature ranged from the 70s to low-80s °F.
Monitoring tracked only gross conditions in the railcar, so
data local to the notebook computers were not available.
• After introducing the micro-reactor to water, did you seal
the container and monitor the liquid chlorine dioxide
concentrations in the storage tank?
Yes, Contino conducted detailed mass balance calculations
to double check levels measured with their OPTEK
(OPTEK Technology, Carrollton, Tex.) instrument.
Contino indicated that the micro-reactor's gas permeable
membrane allows only water vapor (and not liquid water)
to pass into the sachet, where the water vapor is adsorbed
by the solid, reacts, and produces chlorine dioxide. Since
chlorine dioxide is the only gaseous product formed, it is
the only chemical entity that can leave the micro-reactor,
resulting in little or no toxic or corrosive by-products
entering the liquid water.
• Were you concerned about chlorine dioxide gas
accumulating in the tank headspace at an explosive
concentration? A concentration of6000ppm chlorine
dioxide in the liquid at 75 °F, or 3000 ppm at 100 °F, can
result in explosive levels in the headspace.
Liquid chlorine dioxide concentrations reached 1,500
ppm. Headspace concentrations were up to 1,000 ppm.
• Could homeowners use this technology to conduct their
own decontamination?
Contino indicated that the micro-reactors have been
developed in various sizes and could be appropriate
for use at a wide range (i.e., from small to large scale)
of situations. He personally has used the technology.
Although health concerns are associated with chlorine
dioxide exposure, laboratory testing has shown that
inexpensive, disposable, activated carbon-filled
respirators, when used by experienced technicians,
provide more than adequate protection. He would not
recommend that the average homeowner take on this role
without some training.
• How did you measure the liquid chlorine dioxide
concentration with the OPTEK sensor?
The paper and drinking water industries use OPTEK
sensors to monitor chemical concentrations in both the
gas and liquid phase. These sensors, which are placed
in a pumped recirculation loop for liquid measurements,
provided real-time measurements for chlorine dioxide in
the gas and liquid phases for this project.
Economical Facility Decontamination with Gaseous and
Liquid Chlorine Dioxide
Mark Czarneski, ClorDiSys Solutions, Inc.
Czarneski described a decontamination event at a
pharmaceutical facility. This event illustrated how combining
fumigation and surface methods provided for effective and
economical decontamination.
Czarneski quickly reviewed OPP's antimicrobial pesticide
registration requirements and classifications. He noted that
only 41 products met the criteria for registration as sterilants.
Each of these products includes either ethylene oxide,
hydrogen peroxide, or chlorine dioxide. Czarneski noted that
ethylene oxide was carcinogenic and explosive. Excluding
ethylene oxide, only two companies have gas or vapor
sterilant technologies registered with OPP
No anthrax was present in the facility. The pharmaceutical
company, however, had four laboratory areas with possible
biological (i.e., virus) contamination and additional areas
with a negligible chance of biological contamination.
Levels 1 and 3 of the facility housed the four possibly
contaminated laboratories. Two decontamination approaches
were considered: fumigating all of Levels 1 and 3, or
fumigating the four laboratories and fogging remaining areas
of possible contamination.
Czarneski provided detailed schematics of Levels 1 and 3,
reviewed the on-site equipment, discussed the selected
chlorine dioxide generation technology, and presented
diagrams of the equipment locations and fumigation areas
(Areas A, B, C, and D). He noted that one location (Area D)
had a dropped ceiling. Leakage from Area D to a surrounding
area due to the dropped ceiling accounted for the difference
in the expected versus actual number of chlorine dioxide
cylinders required.
Areas B, C, and D presented unique concerns for the
fumigation. Rather than tenting the entire facility, ClorDiSys
Solutions, Inc. (ClorDiSys) sealed only the doors and the
HVAC system. Windows in Areas B, C, and D presented
a concern because sunlight would breakdown the chlorine
dioxide and window leaks were possible. Beginning
the fumigation after sunset eliminated possible sunlight
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degradation of chlorine dioxide. Human activity in the
area also decreased after sunset, which minimized possible
exposures from leaks. Chlorine dioxide concentration
readings during the fumigation indicated that target
concentrations were difficult to achieve in Areas C and D.
Czarneski presented detailed results for each of the
fumigation areas at the conclusion of his presentation.
Czarneski also presented photographs of the fogging
approach, which occurred in areas that were not fumigated.
ClorDiSys placed commercial foggers on carts and personnel
walked through the facility spraying the surfaces.
After decontamination, no material effects to either facility
equipment or electronics were visibly observed. No physical
residues were identified, and Bis indicated complete kill in
fumigation areas.
Question and Answer Period
• Did the humidity generators run throughout the
decontamination process?
The humidity generators ran during equipment set up
to precondition the facility. The humidity generators
ceased operating during fumigation. Relative humidity
monitoring occurred only during operation of the humidity
generators.
• What was the spore loading on the Bis used in
this project?
The Bis, which were from SGM Biotech, Inc. (Bozeman,
Mont.), had a spore count of 106 Bacillus atrophaeus.
• Did you use window coverings?
ClorDiSys used no window coverings because the facility
was decontaminated after dark. The facility was located
in an industrial park with the next closest building
approximately 0.25 miles away.
• Were fumigations conducted simultaneously?
ClorDiSys fumigated Areas A and B on Level 1
simultaneously, and Areas C and D on Level 3
simultaneously.
• Your reported CTs ranged from 1,100 to 1,800 ppm/hr.
Other fumigation events reported CTs as high as
9,000 ppm/hr. Why were the CTs for this fumigation
substantially lower?
Other fumigation events addressed buildings containing a
host of materials with a higher chlorine dioxide demand,
such as treated wood, carpet, and ceiling tiles. This
facility consisted of painted and sealed surfaces, typical of
pharmaceutical research laboratories. As such, the material
demand was much lower.
• What was the maximum concentration and time listed on
the chlorine dioxide generation system's label?
The generation system operated at a rate of 30 milligrams/
liter (mg/L) for 30 minutes.
Assessment of Biological Indicators for Building Interior
Decontamination
Vipin Rastogi, Edgewood Chemical Biological Center
Bioloigical indicators are standardized spore preparations
on a carrier material and are most commonly used in
pharmaceutical and biomedical industries to validate
sterilization or sporicidal processes. Since the 2001 anthrax
fumigation events, Bis have also been used to indicate that
target fumigation concentrations are reached throughout
a building. Ongoing debate exists, however, about the
use of Bis during fumigations, the appropriate spore type
and backing materials for this application, and associated
clearance requirements.
To inform this debate, Rastogi compared the decontamination
efficacy of chlorine dioxide fumigation for spores on building
materials coupons versus standard Bis, estimated the
D-values for these materials, and evaluated surrogate spores
and backings appropriate for building fumigations. Rastogi
used the term CT to refer to the dose (i.e., concentration in
ppmv multiplied by the exposure time in hours) and the term
D-value to refer to the time in minutes to reduce the viable
spore number by one order of magnitude (i.e., a factor of 10).
The study involved inoculating coupons made of six
different building materials with avirulent Bacillus anthracis.
Rastogi exposed coupons and Bis to chlorine dioxide at
varying concentrations for different durations. Temperature
and relative humidity were held constant as specified by
the manufacturer. Rastogi's presentation slides provided
methodology details.
Rastogi presented results from assessing the CTs required
to achieve no growth on the building material coupons and
Bis and correlating spore kills on Bis versus wood coupons.
Overall, results indicated that some materials require lower
CTs and were easier to decontaminate than others. Wood
was one of the most difficult surfaces to decontaminate. Bis
were generally inactivated at CTs lower than other materials,
regardless of the chlorine dioxide generation method.
Using a series of specially prepared Bis, Rastogi evaluated
different coupon materials and spore surrogates to develop
Bis appropriate for interior building decontamination. Results
identified the surrogate and coupon material combinations
with the highest and lowest sensitivities to chlorine dioxide
gas. The results indicated that Bis made from stainless
steel were more difficult to inactivate compared to those
made from nitrocellulose and a loading of 107 spores was
appropriate. Geobacillus stearothermophilus appeared to be
the most resistant spore for interior building decontamination
with chlorine dioxide gas.
Question and Answer Period
• Did the BI population, which is usually 106 spores,
affect results?
Spore loading did affect results. Rastogi recommended a
spore loading of 107 for future Bis.
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• Did you take scanning electron microscope (SEM)
photographs of coupons with 107 and 10s spore loadings
to assess spore distribution?
Rastogi did not assess spore loading as part of this
study; however, another research program examined
spore distribution and migration on pine wood and steel
surfaces.
• A workshop attendee noted that other research found
that clumping and non-uniform spore distribution at
concentrations oflO7 spores and higher was a concern
and could affect results. This attendee also noted that
biomedical studies found Geobacillus stearothermophilus
to be the most resistant spore to vaporized hydrogen
peroxide, and Bacillus atrophaeus was most resistant to
ethylene dioxide and chlorine dioxide. Additional review
of the biomedical literature was suggested.
Rastogi noted this concern and indicated that he had
conducted a literature review.
• Did you use steel or nitrocellulose membrane discs?
This study included stainless steel disc (Apex
Laboratories, Inc., Apex, N.C.) Bis. Rastogi had run
studies with nitrocellulose membrane and steel Bis
and found that steel-based Bis were more difficult to
decontaminate.
• Would hydration of spores prior to fumigation make them
more susceptible to decontamination agents? If so, would
hydration prior to decontamination produce a greater
response?
Rastogi noted that chlorine dioxide efficacy depended
on relative humidity. At a relative humidity of 40%, kill
kinetics were flat. At a relative humidity of 90%, rapid kill
occurred. As such, relative humidity was carefully tracked
during fumigation.
• What controls did you include to ensure that the results
were from spore inactivation versus low recovery rates?
Each experiment in the study included five positive and
five negative controls. Recovery rates ranged from 30% to
80%, and each study included controls to assess recovery.
Rastogi simply excluded the control results from the
presentation slides.
Reduction and Elimination of Biological Contamination
Using Bacteriophages
Timothy Dean, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency,
National Risk Management Research Laboratory
Dean provided a brief background and overview of
bacteriophages. Bacteriophages are viruses that infect a
bacteria host. They are highly specific to individual bacteria
strains and, when sought, have been found for every
bacterium. Historically, bacteriophages have been used to
treat human infections, such as those in the gastrointestinal
tract or skin infections from burns. With the advent of
penicillin, research with bacteriophages nearly ended,
except in Russia and the Republic of Georgia. In the future,
bacteriophages may become important again as bacteria
continue to increase their resistance to antibiotics. Although
bacteria may develop resistance to bacteriophages, the
bacteriaphages may in turn develop mechanisms to overcome
the bacterial resistance.
Dean began researching the potential for taking lytic
bacteriophages from their normal environment in
biological systems and applying them to surface materials
(e.g., wallboard, glass) for decontamination purposes. In
addition to being highly specific to a host, other benefits of
bacteriophages, include their ability to self-replicate until
the host bacteria are infected and then self-limit further
reproduction.
Phase I of Dean's research sought to develop and characterize
a bacteriophage "cocktail" for Escherichia coli. Dean worked
with Intralytix, Inc. (Baltimore, M.D.), a company that
primarily develops phages used in patient treatment. Phase
II examined the efficacy of bacteriophage preparations in
reducing E. coli on hard, inanimate surfaces. Dean selected
E. coli because these bacteria cause $700 million in damages
in U.S. each year, were highly studied, required only a
biosafety level-2 laboratory, and were typically absent from
building materials.
Dean listed the various E. coli bacteriophages and
combinations considered and tested during Phase I. He
selected bacteriophages that infected 70% to 80% of E. coli,
but no other bacteria, and mixed these together to develop
treatment preparations. Dean noted that challenging bacteria
to several bacteriophages during treatment minimized
development of bacterial resistance. Two preparations
were tested in Phase I; both had similar efficacy in
suspension tests.
In Phase II, Dean carried forward one of the preparations
identified in Phase I and treated glass and gypsum wallboard
surfaces inoculated with 105 E. coli. He presented results for
controls and treatments after a five-minute contact time. Dean
suggested that higher concentrations of phage per surface
area may increase the decontamination efficacy.
Using the results of the initial research, Dean is moving
forward with research involving bacteriophage treatment
preparations for Yersiniapestis, a biosafety level-3 organism.
His research also involves assessing the applicability
of phage on various building materials and evaluating
application, storage, and use parameters.
Question and Answer Period
• How would this approach work for a spore-forming
organism?
Phages do not infect spores, so treatment must include a
component that causes the spore to germinate. Currently,
researchers are examining phage enzymes, specifically
those that cause cell rupture, for inactivating spores.
Initial research found that organisms could not develop
resistance when exposed to an enzyme alone.
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Wet Scrubbing and Adsorption for the Capture of
Chlorine Dioxide Gas During Fumigation Events
Joseph Wood, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency,
National Homeland Security Research Center
Chlorine dioxide has been proven to be efficacious in
inactivating anthrax spores, ricin, molds, and other agents.
Chlorine dioxide, however, is highly hazardous; it is a severe
respiratory and eye irritant and has a very low Permissible
Exposure Level (PEL). As such, fumigation is typically
performed with a facility under negative pressure to prevent
chlorine dioxide leaks. The air withdrawn from the facility
to maintain negative pressure must be treated to remove the
chlorine dioxide before release to the atmosphere.
Wood described tests to evaluate two different techniques
to remove chlorine dioxide from air—wet scrubbing and
carbon adsorption. Although both technologies have been
used, no data were available to evaluate the performance of
either method.
The wet scrubber evaluation occurred as part of a field test
to demonstrate a mobile chlorine dioxide generation and
scrubbing system. Wood presented detailed information about
the field test conditions, results, and conclusions. Of the two
scrubbers involved in the demonstration, one performed
adequately. The other malfunctioned during preliminary tests
and was not tested during the final exercise. Drawbacks to the
wet scrubbing technique include the extra equipment needed,
spill containment requirements, handling of hazardous
materials, and hazardous waste disposal.
The sorbent tests occurred at a laboratory scale; five sorbent
materials were evaluated to determine their adsorption
capacity. Three of the sorbents evaluated were impregnated
with various chemicals. Wood presented a diagram of the
test bed system and details of the test methods and results.
The evaluation tests included three replicates and extensive
monitoring and quality control sampling. Each test replicate
was run until monitoring identified that chlorine dioxide
breakthrough had stabilized.
Results indicated that the simple carbon formulations
performed better (i.e., provided higher adsorption capacity)
than the impregnated carbon formulations. Preliminary
desorption tests showed that chlorine gas was the
predominant chemical species measured. Temperature
increases in the sorbent bed were a potential concern that the
study also considered. Wood did not observe any substantial
increase in temperature, but suggested that further research
could or should be conducted.
Question and Answer Period
• For the wet scrubbing demonstration, how did you select
an acceptable outlet concentration (i.e., <0.5ppmv
chlorine dioxide)? This workshop participant noted that
standard field practice included ceasing operations and
switching to another chlorine dioxide removal system
if monitoring detected any chlorine dioxide at the
scrubber outlet.
The involved parties, which included EPA, selected
an acceptable outlet concentration based on internal
discussions, existing standards, and current exposure
limits.
• Could you provide information about the scrubbing
solution and effluent characteristics?
The wet scrubbing solutions, which consisted of
the hazardous materials sodium thiosulfate and
sodium hydroxide, reacted with chlorine dioxide to
form hazardous by-products that required disposal as
hazardous waste.
• Did you wet the sorbent material prior to introducing
chlorine dioxide? From field experience, channeling
sometimes occurred in dry carbon beds and resulted in
faster breakthrough. Wetting the carbon beds minimized
channeling and increased the time to breakthrough.
After measuring the moisture content of the carbon,
the sorbents were sealed to prevent additional moisture
capture. But no additional moisture was added.
Material Demand for Hydrogen Peroxide of
Building Materials
Brian Attwood, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency,
National Homeland Security Research Center
Attwood noted that experience with vaporized hydrogen
peroxide (VHP) in the pharmaceutical industry provided
some material demand data about the technology, but
these data did not directly translate to a large-scale
decontamination of an office building or similar facility.
As such, Attwood evaluated demand by various building
materials. He noted that results from this research might
support vendors seeking product registration under FIFRA.
Many processes (e.g., homogeneous decomposition,
reversible adsorption) contribute to material demand. Some
of these sinks are subsequently sources of VHP release.
The project objectives included examining material demand
and developing a tool to estimate VHP requirements
for specific fumigation events. Attwood evaluated the
BIOQUELL, Inc. (Horsham, Perm.) and STERIS Corporation
(STERIS) (Mentor, Ohio) technologies. Each technology
has different characteristics, advantages, and disadvantages.
The BIOQUELL, Inc. unit relies on micro-condensation
for decontamination, rather than a specific vapor phase
concentration, thus complicating the material demand studies.
In contrast, the STERIS unit decontaminates by keeping the
hydrogen peroxide in the gas phase.
In addition to presenting details about each VHP technology,
Attwood also presented information about the five material
coupons, the test chamber, and the test methods employed
for this study. The coupon materials were selected as
representative of those found in office spaces. About four
square feet of coupon material is used for each test.
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Testing with the BIOQUELL, Inc. unit is underway and
involves introducing a known amount of hydrogen peroxide
(determined based on achieving micro-condensation)
for approximately 20 minutes, and then measuring VHP
concentration changes over time.
Attwood presented preliminary results for the control
condition (i.e., an empty chamber) and the coupon materials
at two different VHP injection concentrations and relative
humidities. Variations in the initial peak concentration of
hydrogen peroxide for the materials indicated variations
in initial VHP absorption, with the lower peaks indicating
greater initial absorption. Attwood noted that the carpet
appeared to have a greater affinity for water vapor, which
resulted in VHP condensation. Results indicated that chamber
conditions did not occur as a steady state.
Attwood briefly presented the material demand or flux
equation under consideration. This equation would be the
basis for a tool to estimate VHP requirements. To further
support fumigation efficacy and tool development, Attwood
suggested further studies to examine VHP impacts on other
materials and studies to evaluate other potential fumigants.
Question and Answer Period
• What do you think about using a simple hydrogen
peroxide liquid solution applied to a surface, rather than
fumigation with VHP?
Attwood thought that a hydrogen peroxide solution could
decontaminate a surface if surface contamination were
the only concern. Ryan noted that the project simply
focused on material demand impacts and did not assess
decontamination efficacy. Another workshop participant
noted that EasyDECON™ DF200 (Intelagard, Inc.,
Burbank, Calif.) served as a hydrogen peroxide-based
surface decontaminant.
Bacillus thuringiensisvar. kurstaki Agent
Fate Characterization
Kristin Omberg, Los Alamos National Laboratory
Gypsy moth caterpillars annually deforest millions of
acres. To control the caterpillars, forest managers and
others have release thousands of kilograms per year of
Bacillus thuringiensis var. kurstaki (Btk), which produces
a gypsy moth caterpillar toxin. Btk shares many similar
physical and biological properties with Bacillus anthracis.
As such, Omberg is studying the long-term persistence,
resuspension, fate, and transport of Btk as a surrogate for
Bacillus anthracis. Omberg focused this presentation on her
evaluation of the persistence of Btk at known, controlled
spray areas in Seattle, Washington, and Fairfax, Virginia.
Literature regarding Btk persistence in the environment
reported spore viability ranging from a half-life of 100
days in a cabbage plot to 60 years in a laboratory held
soil sample. Omberg reviewed Btk spraying records for
the Seattle area, where spraying typically occurred every
year. She identified several sampling locations to represent
a control area (i.e., areas never sprayed), areas with
repeated spraying, and areas with two years of Btk spores
detected. Omberg presented photographs of the sampling
locations and discussed the sampling plan design. A flow
chart illustrated the sampling location selection process.
The sampling approach, which combined probabilistic, close,
and targeted sampling schemes, focused on determining
the presence of spores. Omberg provided a schematic of
the laboratory analysis process. In general, Omberg pooled
samples for analysis. She pooled only similar sample types
(e.g., swipe samples with swipe samples) and no more than
three samples together. These pooled samples were analyzed
for Btk DNA, and positive samples (over 1000 target copies
per reaction) were then cultured and analyzed by PCR again
for confirmation. Samples were collected from both vegetated
and non-vegetated areas. Sampling grids (e.g., 10x10 yard
grids, or 3x3 yard grids) for non-vegetated areas were sized
based on the sampling location characteristics.
Sample analysis results indicated that Btk remained viable
in the Seattle environment for more than two years. (Since
communities did not spray Btk in Seattle in 2008, samples
were collected in Fairfax for a short term study. Samples
were collected two weeks before spraying in Fairfax and then
at various intervals during the year following spraying.) Soil
samples tended to have a much higher percentage of viable
Btk spores, compared to the swipe or water samples. In
addition, analysis of probabilistic and close samples indicated
non-uniform spore distribution.
Question and Answer Period
• What was your detection limit?
The analyses have approximately a 10 organism per
sample detection limit. Omberg stated that organism loss
would occur during transport and sample preparation. Soil
samples of 20 milliliters allowed for initial analysis and
later reanalysis, if necessary.
• Can you comment on the low extraction efficiency for
soil samples?
Omberg agreed that the extraction efficiency in soil was
very low, but the high collection efficiency balanced this
concern. Conversely, swipe sample collection efficiency
was low and extraction was high. Swipe samples from
the parking lots had the worst recovery rates. As such,
Omberg targeted non-porous surfaces (e.g., manhole
covers) for sampling, if possible.
Comparing and Contrasting Fumigations of Very Large
Facilities for Biothreat Agents and Other Microorganisms
Dorothy Canter, Johns Hopkins University, Applied
Physics Laboratory
Canter has been involved with responding to and preparing
forbiothreat agent release events since the 2001 anthrax
releases. Most recently, she observed the mold fumigation
effort at SJRMC. To identify lessons learned, Canter
compared the fumigation conducted at the U.S. Postal
Service's Processing and Distribution Center on Brentwood
Road (now the Curseen-Morris facility), Washington, D.C. to
address Bacillus anthracis contamination and the fumigation
at SJRMC to address mold contamination.
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Since 2001, structural fumigations have addressed biological
contamination ranging from Bacillus anthracis released as
a threat agent to "natural" Bacillus anthracis occurrences
and mold outbreaks. Canter provided a brief summary of
each type of fumigation event (e.g., Hart Senate Office,
the New York City drummer's apartment, and SJRMC).
Other fumigations have been conducted to decontaminate
pharmaceutical and research laboratories.
To compare fumigation activities at the Brentwood postal
facility and SJRMC, Canter focused on the remediation
phase of a response and recovery matrix. The remediation
process consists of three phases: site characterization,
decontamination, and clearance. Canter compared the
Brentwood and SJRMC facility characteristics. She
noted that the Brentwood facility was the first very large
facility (>14 million cubic feet) to undergo chlorine
dioxide fumigation. Canter also compared the site
characterization activities, decontamination planning
steps, site preparation needs, source reduction, fumigation
components, waste disposal, and clearance activities.
Canter presented photographs of both facilities to illustrate
different components of the decontamination process. The
photographs highlighted how the chlorine dioxide generation
equipment changed (i.e., decreased in size) over time. Canter
also noted the differences in waste disposal handling at the
two facilities. At the Brentwood facility, disposal of waste
contaminated with infectious substances presented many
difficulties. At SJRMC, no such waste was present, so waste
disposal was not a significant issue.
Other key differences included the time criticality of
responding to a biothreat event, the extent of required
site security, target fumigation concentrations for
achieving effective decontamination, PPE levels, and
environmental characterization and clearance sampling
requirements. Similarities also existed and included
the need for effective containment of chlorine dioxide
during fumigation, potential HVAC system modification,
an extensive staging area for equipment and chemicals,
removal of essential items before fumigation, ongoing
risk communication, input from a TWO, and utilization of
a systems engineering approach. The overall fumigation
process also remained the same at both facilities.
Canter concluded that despite the advancements occurring
since the 2001 Brentwood postal facility fumigation,
large-scale fumigations still required substantial planning.
Substantially more resources would be required to address
multiple, simultaneous events. Canter recommended
additional research to improve real-time chlorine dioxide
monitoring, to conduct in-depth materials compatibility
tests with chlorine dioxide, and to evaluate chlorine dioxide
distribution through HVAC systems.
Question and Answer Period
• Was the problem that caused the mold problem at
SJRMC corrected?
The hospital fixed leaks identified as causing the mold
contamination before the fumigation.
• Was clearance sampling conducted for the mold
fumigation and were clearance sampling data available
for review and analysis?
Canter understood that Bis were used to measured
fumigation efficacy, and no environmental clearance
sampling was conducted. Data collected as part of the
clearance process were considered confidential.
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Session 3: Foreign Animal Disease Agents
Animal Disease Outbreak Response-Tools, Status,
and Trends
Lori Miller, U.S. Department of Agriculture, Animal and
Plant Health Inspection Service
The U.S. Department of Agriculture's (USDA) Animal and
Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) serves as the lead
agency when responding to animal or plant disease and pest
outbreaks of substantial economic impact. Miller noted that
animal and environmental health were inter-related with
human health.
Outbreaks often follow a cyclical pattern from disease
confirmation to quarantine, depopulation, decontamination,
disposal, and repopulation, which eventually could lead
to new or recurring disease. After providing background
information about animal disease, Miller primarily focused
on disposal issues, decontamination concerns, bio-security
issues, and response tools available from APHIS.
The impact of disease outbreaks on animal and
environmental (e.g., plant) health is staggering and affects
a range of facilities from feedlots to pet stores. A feedlot
outbreak could require depopulating tens of thousands of
cattle or pigs or hundreds of thousands of chickens. Disposal
of the resulting biomass is a tremendous undertaking. As a
complicating factor, the response—from disease confirmation
to disposal—must occur within a 24- to 48-hour period for
successful disease containment.
Researchers at APHIS are developing a number of on-line
tools to help responders wade through the complexity of
outbreak response technologies and identify appropriate
actions. Miller illustrated the decision-making process during
an outbreak response by walking through the Disposal
Options Decision Tool, which was one of the APHIS
Emergency Management Animal Disease Tools. This tool
helps responders evaluate various carcass disposal options,
such as composting (requires a large carbon source), burial
(potential for pathogens to remain viable in ground water),
incineration, microwave sterilization, alkaline hydrolysis
(requires high temperature, high pressure, and high pH), and
landfilling. A disposal decision tree is available on the APHIS
Web site to guide the responder through the various disposal
options.
Miller also presented EPA's disposal decision support tool,
which is linked from the APHIS Web site and includes
information about disposal facilities throughout the U.S..
Miller discussed several other available tools, such as
a Cleaning and Disinfecting training tool, the Canadian
Pathogen Safety Data Sheets, and Health and Safety Plan
templates. Miller provided a case study for decontaminating
a quail facility contaminated with low-pathogenic avian
influenza.
In addition to developing tools, Miller noted the need
for the following: research on agent fate and transport in
carcass disposal methods, new and/or improved disposal
technologies, and an analysis of disposal costs and benefits.
In collaboration with EPA, USDA (at the Plum Island, New
York laboratory facility) was researching the efficacy of
common household products (e.g., bleach) as disinfectants for
various agents under various conditions. In collaboration with
the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID),
APHIS is also developing and deploying biosecurity
information and response tools to developing nations.
Question and Answer Period
• A workshop participant noted that disease outbreak
responses occurred in many settings beyond threat event
responses (e.g., hospital outbreaks, cruise ship Norwalk
virus occurrences, agricultural pest infestations). This
participant suggested that Miller communicate with these
industries to identify relevant response protocols and
gather information about their response actions.
Miller agreed that ongoing communication with various
industries would be useful.
• Was security required for anthrax and other bio-threat
agent outbreaks?
Outbreaks involving select bio-threat agents require bio-
security measures. Responders were bound to regulatory
requirements for decontaminating these agents.
• What role does sampling serve in an outbreak response?
Sampling results from an outbreak response were difficult
to interpret. A positive sample indicates the presence
of a pathogen, although no cleanup standards exists for
comparison to determine what action to take. In addition,
risks to host animals depended on many factors
(e.g., health, age). As such, responders often used
sampling simply to determine if a pathogen was present.
In some cases (e.g., poultry outbreaks), responders placed
sentinel animals in a facility as a means of confirming
decontamination prior to fully repopulating the facility.
Inactivation of Avian Influenza Virus Using Common
Chemicals and Detergents
Brian Ladman, University of Delaware
In 2007, the poultry industry in the U.S. was a $21.5
billion industry. Disease outbreaks, therefore, could have
substantial economic impact. The avian influenza virus has
both a low- and high- pathology strain. The low pathology
strain, which causes respiratory effects, is common in wild
birds. Outbreaks in poultry houses sometimes mutate to
a high-pathology strain, which causes systemic illness. In
response to low- or high- pathology strain outbreaks, farmers
depopulate, clean, and disinfect poultry houses, which are
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often simple structures made from porous (e.g., concrete,
wood) and non-porous (e.g., plastic, galvanized steel)
materials. If no contamination or other issues are present, a
poultry house may get cleaned only once every three years.
Many currently approved disinfecting agents have
limited availability, are expensive and corrosive, and
present environmental concerns. An ideal economical and
environmentally sound disinfecting agent would effectively
treat the avian influenza virus, biodegrade, and be widely
available at a low cost.
Ladman evaluated common, commercially available
disinfectants and chemicals to assess their efficacy against
the avian influenza virus. He detailed the control conditions,
test methodologies, and results from two experiments.
Experiment 1 included three coupon materials and ten
disinfecting agents tested against a low-pathology strain.
Ladman reported results as a neutralization index; a value of
2.8 or higher indicated successful virus inactivation assuming
no virus remained (i.e., no hemmaglutination activity).
The porous materials results were inconsistent and Ladman
noted that virus recovery from porous coupon materials was
difficult. Non-porous material results indicated consistent
virus inactivation. In Experiment 1, Group B results reported
a number of tests with neutralization indices greater than
2.8, but the tested disinfecting agents were still considered
ineffective because the virus remained. Experiment 2 used
only galvanized steel coupons, four disinfecting agents, and
three different avian influenza type A viruses (both high- and
low-pathology). Results from Experiment 2 were consistent
with the galvanized steel coupon results achieved in
Experiment 1. Results indicated that the three avian influenza
strains reacted similarly to the different disinfecting agents.
Question and Answer Period
• The 1% citric acid solution was an effective disinfecting
agent, but is citric acid environmentally sound?
Kempter indicated that OPP would consider a 1% citric
acid solution environmentally sound.
Persistence Testing of Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza
Virus on Outdoor Materials
Harry Stone, Battelle1
The highly pathogenic avian influenza virus (HPAI) is highly
contagious and lethal to birds. Close contact with infected
birds has resulted in some human infection cases, of which
60% were lethal. Human-to-human transmission is limited,
but virus mutation to a form more readily transmissible could
result in a pandemic.
The purpose of this research project is to assess HPAI
persistence and viability under various environmental
conditions (including using ultraviolet [UV] radiation-A
and B to simulate sunlight). Another phase of the research
project will investigate the efficacy of generic chemicals
in inactivating HPAI on outdoor surfaces. Stone noted that
little information was available regarding decontaminant
efficacy using generic chemical disinfectants. Data from this
research would also complement the University of Delaware
decontaminant efficacy research.
Stone detailed the project materials and methods used for
the persistence and decontamination tests. In general, test
methods included inoculating test coupons with HPAI,
exposing the coupons to the environmental condition for a set
amount of time (or for the decontamination testing, treating
the coupons with the disinfectant), and then extracting and
quantifying the HPAI from the coupons. Low virus recovery
from three materials (i.e., basswood, bare concrete, and pine
wood) precluded their use for further testing. Due to time and
cost considerations, issues with obtaining consistently high
liters and appropriate assays precluded further work with the
low-pathogenic virus.
A summary of all the persistence tests was presented and
indicated that the virus remains the most active in cold
conditions. For example, the virus survived in soil up to
(and possibly beyond) 13 days at low temperatures with no
exposure to UV radiation, and up to (and possibly beyond)
4 days at low temperatures with UV radiation exposure to
simulate sunlight.
Question and Answer Period
• Would it hove been possible to culture the virus directly
with the porous materials that had insufficient recovery?
Stone noted that the small amount of HPAI recovered
from the porous materials was insufficient to calculate a
quantitative decrease. He also noted that culturing bacteria
on the material is possible, but for an obligate parasite,
like HPAI, culturing using that approach is difficult.
• Why were you concerned about the lack of HPAI
recovery? Would the low or non-detect recovery levels
indicate minimal persistence ?
Stone agreed that the low or non-detect levels found
during virus recovery would be a positive result if
researchers could confirm that the virus was no longer
viable.
'Young Choi, the scheduled speaker, was unable to present. Harry Stone presented Choi's research findings.
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VI
Session 4: Chemical Agents
Understanding Chemical Warfare Agent Interactions with
Surfaces and the Implications for Decontamination
Adam Love, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
Love provided information about one segment of the Facility
Restoration Operational Technology Demonstration (OTD)—
improving the understanding of CWA persistence and fate
on indoor surfaces. The project considers three CWAs and
eleven surfaces.
Understanding CWA persistence and fate on indoor surfaces
enables responders to make smarter decisions and to
react to events more quickly. This information may help
responders mitigate CWA transport, target possible hot spots
for characterization, and focus decontamination and waste
disposal efforts. Love stated that source control was critical
to preventing impacts to larger areas and, thus, increased
decontamination needs. Very little information and data are
available for these agents' interactions at low concentrations
with materials.
During a CWA event, the agent may deposit on surfaces
from either a liquid or vapor phase. A liquid release would
likely involve a small area at a high agent concentration,
whereas a gas release would likely involve a large area with
contamination at a low concentration. Love remarked that
the vapor pressures of the agents in his research are all less
than the vapor pressure of water. Love also noted that the
overall agent persistence involved many mechanisms acting
simultaneously to affect agent fate and transport.
Love presented results from vapor affinity tests, in which
surfaces were exposed to the agents as saturated vapor,
and found that the porous and plastic/polymeric surfaces
accumulated substantial amounts of sarin (GB) and mustard
agent (HD), but not VX (due to its low vapor pressure).
Love noted that this study did not consider dirt, dust, or
other particles that might be present on surfaces. Each
surface material was clean and un-used prior to testing.
The oil residue remaining on galvanized steel from the
manufacturing processes increased agent affinity.
Persistence tests with agents in liquid form (i.e., one
microliter droplets deposited on coupons) found varying
persistence between HD, GB, and VX. HD and GB
completely volatilized from impermeable surfaces in as short
a time as eight and two hours, respectively. But for some
porous surfaces, a portion of the HD or GB agents remained
after one week. VX on some materials remained after one
week, and on polymeric surfaces in particular, showed no
reduction in mass after one week.
Tests examined agent persistence on materials that were
loaded with the agent during exposure to the agent in the
vapor phase. Love found that HD and GB remained on some
polymeric surfaces after a week of exposure to clean air.
Question and Answer Period
• Have you coordinated with military efforts that researched
agent interactions with fabric?
Love had not specifically partnered with the military,
but has communicated with others conducting similar
research. The military typically uses different CWA
concentrations.
• When examining porous versus non-porous materials, did
you consider materials with similar compositions? If so,
what were the differences?
The project did not include matched porous versus non-
porous materials. Concrete was the only inorganic, porous
material studied and was reactive for all three agents.
The degree to which a porous, but non-reactive, material
impacted persistence depended on permeability and
porosity. Longer persistence was expected in porous and
permeable materials as a result of slower evaporation.
• What were the experimental conditions?
The vapor exposure tests were conducted with the
coupons in sealed glass jars at agent saturation levels.
Desorption tests occurred in a stainless steel chamber with
laminar flow (five to six air volumes exchanged per hour)
across the coupons at ambient temperature and relative
humidity. Love noted that agent saturation levels were not
achieved in the desorption chamber atmosphere during
desorption. Blanks and controls placed in the desorption
chamber confirmed that no cross-contamination from one
coupon to another occurred in the chamber.
Restoration of Major Transportation Facilities Following
Chemical Agent Release: The Facility Restoration
Operational Technology Demonstration
Mark Tucker, Sandia National Laboratory
Tucker indicated that this project focused on the rapid
restoration of a major transportation hub to minimize
economic damage. These types of facilities are highly
vulnerable to chemical releases, and facility functions
cannot be transferred easily to other locations. The Facility
Restoration OTD involves a systematic review of event
response and recovery processes to identify technology
gaps and address those gaps in order to minimize response
and recovery times. This project builds on similar concepts
from the completed Biological Restoration Domestic
Demonstration and Application Program (DDAP).
The Facility Restoration OTD addresses four tasks:
preplanning, technology evaluation and development,
experimental studies, and exercises and demonstrations. For
preplanning, a remediation guidance document has been
drafted for the Los Angeles International Airport (LAX) and
will serve as a template for other facilities. Document review
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is currently underway. The section related to developing
cleanup guidelines remains a major unfinished piece of the
document.
To address technology evaluation and development,
Tucker described efforts to adapt and enhance the Building
Restoration Operations Optimization Model (BROOM)
decision support tool for chemical use. This tool assists
in data collection, tracking, management, visualization,
and analysis. Another experimental task under the Facility
Restoration OTD involves evaluating a rapid surface
sampling and analysis technology developed by Oak
Ridge National Laboratory in Oak Ridge, Tennesssee. This
technology uses a heated sampling head to "lift" chemical
agents off materials for real-time analysis with an ion trap
mass spectrometer. Results to date indicate the technology
may have some applicability during the characterization
phase of the recovery process.
Tucker provided some details on other OTD experimental
projects to address data and capability gaps. These projects
include an evaluation of traditional surface sampling methods
at low-level contamination, decontamination method
evaluation, and statistical sampling method validation. For
the decontamination experimental studies in particular, the
focus is on investigating the efficacy of hot and humid air. No
experimental data are available at this time.
A tabletop exercise using the remediation guidance document
developed for LAX was scheduled for November 2008.
During this exercise, participants from various response
agencies will follow two response and recovery scenarios
to demonstrate the operation and utility of the document. A
final field demonstration is tentatively planned for September
2009.
Question and Answer Period
• Did you review information from the Tokyo subway sarin
gas release?
Tucker extensively reviewed information about the
Tokyo subway sarin gas release. Researchers learned
from this information; however, the Japanese approach
to decontamination and restoration was different from
the U.S. approach. No cleanup levels were implemented.
Decontamination occurred very quickly due to the agent's
lack of persistence.
Systematic Decontamination of Chemical Warfare
Agents and Toxic Industrial Chemicals
Emily Snyder, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency,
National Homeland Security Research Center
Snyder presented available results from three studies. These
studies investigated the neutralization of CWAs and TICs on
surfaces using chlorine-based decontaminants (a draft report
is undergoing clearance); neutralization of CWAs using
steam and modified vaporized hydrogen peroxide (mVHP);
and neutralization of TICs using fumigants. Agent persistence
studies were also conducted in conjunction with some of the
decontamination research; these results were also presented.
Snyder provided a brief overview of the experimental
procedures for the projects.
Chlorine dioxide fumigation testing achieved greater than
99% efficacy for VX under all tested conditions. Snyder
speculated that the high relative humidity, and resulting
hydrolysis, may have contributed to the VX degradation.
By-product analysis of the coupon was not completed, so it
is unclear if the toxic by-product EA 2192 formed. Chlorine
dioxide was ineffective or only partially effective for
thickened soman and sarin on the materials tested.
Decontamination tests with bleach were presented; bleach
proved to be highly effective for most of the short contact
times and materials tested.
Tests of liquid chlorine dioxide decontamination of G agents
(nerve agents: soman, sarin, and tabun) in solution showed
this approach to be ineffective, so no further testing of this
approach with G agents occurred. Snyder presented results
for liquid chlorine dioxide and VX, using acidified water as a
control. Because the acidified water had a much higher than
expected efficacy in neutralizing the VX, the results of tests
with liquid chlorine dioxide and VX should be viewed with
caution.
Snyder then discussed the project to examine the efficacy of
steam and mVHP fumigation for CWAs and TICs. During the
method development work for this project, Snyder evaluated
several solvents for extracting VX or mustard agents from
ceiling tile coupons. Snyder presented results from testing
the persistence of mustard agents on four materials. Method
development activities were completed, and decontamination
efficacy tests were commencing.
For the TIC neutralization project, Snyder detailed the test
methods and provided preliminary results for the methyl
parathion studies. Although the U.S. banned methyl parathion
use as a pesticide, illegal use still occurs. Decontamination
of porous surfaces with chlorine dioxide was somewhat
effective; however, methyl paraoxon (a toxic by-product)
formed. Decontamination tests with another TIC, the
rodenticide tetramethylene disulfotetramine, are beginning.
Question and Answer Period
• Did you identify the decontamination by-products
produced by fumigating VXwith chlorine dioxide?
Project limitations prevented an evaluation of VX
fumigation by-products. Snyder agreed that VX
degradation by-products (e.g., EA2192, which is
very toxic) would be expected.
• For the coupon extractions, did you use an aqueous-
based solvent?
Extractions were conducted with only organic solvents.
• How realistic was the one milligram challenge?
This amount was chosen based on the military's indoor
challenge levels.
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• How did you choose to evaluate chlorine dioxide and
m VHP fumigants?
The chlorine-based decontaminants were selected prior
to Snyder's involvement in the project. Snyder included
mVHP to compare and fill gaps from the DoD efficacy
studies conducted with mVHP. Steam decontamination
was chosen to complement the hot air studies conducted
by LLNL.
• Did you consult with demilitarization organizations that
handle CWAs regularly?
A stakeholder group has provided input in support of this
project. Consultation with this group continues as research
efforts moved forward.
Small-Item Vapor Hazard Determinations in Interior
Spaces: What, Where, When, Why and How Many?
Brent Mantooth, Edgewood Chemical Biological Center
Mantooth described efforts to better understand small item
decontamination requirements in terms of the resulting
vapor hazards that may occur from residual agent on an
item. For example, warfighters may individually encounter
small individual hazard sources that are harmless alone.
When grouped together in an enclosed area, such as during
transport, those small sources can combine and pose a hazard
to the warfighter.
Overall, understanding vapor hazards requires understanding
mass transport processes. Mantooth's presentation slides
detailed the steps, methodologies, and calculations used
to assess vapor hazards. Generally, the research process
involved placing a known amount of agent on a material in a
dynamic vapor chamber, conducting scheduled air sampling,
and developing a vapor emission factor model based on the
data. After developing the emission factor model, Mantooth
applied the model to calculate a vapor concentration for
various scenarios. Changes to the scenario substantially
impacted the predicted vapor concentrations.
To determine if any health effects may occur from the
predicted vapor concentration, a toxic load model was used
in lieu of TWA concentrations. Mantooth presented a case
study with soman (GD) that predicted that no health effects
(e.g., miosis) would be observed using the TWA approach.
However, health effects were predicted using the toxic load
method. Based on these results, most of the toxic loading
occurred during the first few hours as a result of the initially
high vapor concentration.
Mantooth discussed the fact that, although one item
with residual agent following decontamination may not
necessarily present a vapor hazard, multiple items in the same
enclosed area (e.g., vehicle) may do so.
Question and Answer Period
the toxicity level in the test chamber evaluated based
on the air changes per hour?
The air changes per hour directly impacted the vapor
concentration. A greater number of air changes will result
in greater dilution and lower vapor concentrations. The
calculations presented considered the source and the test
chamber conditions, so the vapor concentration could be
determined for any environment given information about
the air change rate and scenario volume.
• Were TICs examined? Is a report available?
Mantooth indicated that the study focused on CWAs, but
the test method should apply to all volatile chemicals. The
clearance and release of the report is uncertain.
• Were chemical mixtures considered?
This project focused on identifying a method for
estimating releases of a single chemical. Future
research is needed to evaluate chemical mixtures.
• Were reversible or irreversible toxicity endpoints
evaluated?
As a first generation study, researchers focused on short
term toxicity endpoints that were easy to measure and
assess.
• Could the model account for the effect of sinks
(e.g., carpet liner)?
Mantooth stated that calculation adjustments to the model
could account for sinks. The adjusted calculations would
be much more complex than the equations described in
this presentation.
The Development of Safe and Highly Effective Chemical
and Radiological Agent Simulants
Bruce Clements, Clean Earth Technologies, LLC
Clements provided information about the evolution of
simulants and ongoing research efforts to improve and/or
develop simulants.
Clements listed several characteristics for an ideal simulant:
mimicks an agent's physical properties, appears readily
visible to trainers and trainees, meets criteria for use in
unrestricted areas, poses no hazard to users, appears in the
International Cosmetic Ingredient Dictionary (Personal Care
Products Council), and causes no skin or mucous irritation in
humans. Clements warned that newly developed simulants
must have no potential long-term effects.
Clean Earth Technologies, LLC (Clean Earth) identified two
compounds that met these criteria—triacetin and salicylate
ester. Triacetin was the more promising compound, but Clean
Earth tested both in case one exhibited problems with use as
a simulant.
Clements then detailed the methods for, and results from,
comparing the physical properties of some simulants to
mustard agents, VX, soman, sarin, and tabun. Physical
properties tested included viscosity, surface tension, density
and relative density, solubility, and fluorescence. In the
fluorescence tests, the fluorescence of uncontaminated
surfaces (e.g., wallboard, construction materials, firefighter
turnout gear, civilian clothing) was compared to the
fluorescence from the surface after the simulant was applied.
Clean Earth also compared simulant and threat agent vapor
pressures.
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In addition, Clean Earth assessed the simulants as potential
skin and eye irritants. These tests followed standardized
procedures and used human subjects. Based on the
aforementioned test results, Clean Earth developed TrainSaf ™
Simulants.
Question and Answer Period
• Were other physical properties (e.g., hydrolysis, Henry's
Law Constant) considered?
Clean Earth has not evaluated these chemical properties
and does not have plans for doing so.
• In the pharmaceutical industry, a study group of 20 is
considered too small to determine if a product is safe. Did
Clean Earth plan post-market research to further evaluate
possible sensitivities?
Clements agreed that post-market research would
be beneficial. He noted that the simulant ingredients
were known cosmetics; therefore, premarket testing
requirements per U.S. Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) regulations were minimal.
• What were the radiological simulant ingredients?
The radiological simulant is a non-respirable granular
silica that mimics fallout or residue from a dirty bomb.
Granular silica did not dissolve in water and, therefore,
was easy to detect.
• Was triacetin the active ingredient in the simulants for
mustard agents, sarin, and VX?
Yes, triacetin was the simulant for mustard agents, sarin,
andVX.
• What are you trying to simulate with the product?
Detection, decontamination, or fate and transport of the
agent?
The product is used to simulate agent contamination of
the skin, so that skin decontamination can be practiced
and efficacy can be determined in training exercises. The
simulant helps trainees understand and practice washing
an agent off the skin using various methods.
Mercury Vapor Emission and Measurement Studies and
Evaluation of Cleanup Technologies
Philip Campagna, U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency, Emergency Response Team
Decontamination research has primarily focused on responses
and recoveries after a threat event involving a WMD, CWA,
or TIC. Remediation of mercury releases has received very
little attention. Yet mercury is readily available, highly toxic,
and difficult to remediate; it is frequently released, both
intentionally and unintentionally. A mercury release in a
transportation hub or public place would cause substantial
disruption. Campagna noted that every EPA region has
addressed mercury releases at one point or another. In some
cases, the remediation process extended for weeks or months.
Little information is available to assess mercury emission
rates from contaminated materials so that air concentrations
after a release could be predicted. Filling these data gaps
would allow responders to make more informed decisions
during an event response and recovery. EPA's ERT proposed
a two-phase research project to fill these data gaps. Phase 1
would involve determining mercury vapor emission rates in
changing conditions (e.g., impacted surface area, temperature,
air flow). Campagna described the hypotheses and test
methods for four experiments that would be conducted under
Phase 1. Phase 2 experiments would evaluate four existing
mercury decontamination products for effectiveness, cost,
ease of use, and impacts. Campagna noted that results from
the Phase 2 experiments would also inform recommendations
for safely disposing of broken compact fluorescent light
bulbs, which contain small amounts of mercury.
Question and Answer Period
• Is mercury adsorption onto materials a concern, and if so,
what remediation is required?
No, adsorption is not an issue, although mercury does
sometimes become entrenched in brooms, mops, and
dust, which complicates remediation. The main problem
in a response has been trying to locate all of the mercury,
which can break up into small or fine beads.
• A workshop participant requested more information about
the remediation of a Washington, D.C. public school.
This incident involved a high school student who
intentionally released mercury, obtained from a school
laboratory, throughout the school. Remediation occurred
in multiple rounds because additional mercury beads
were found after initial remediation. The school remained
closed for one and a half months and the remediation
effort cost approximately $200,000 to $300,000. Another
school in the area, which was previously contaminated
with mercury, cost about $500,000 to clean. Campagna
noted that EPA Region 5 receives, on average, about one
call per week related to a mercury release.
• What methods were used to remediate the contaminated
Washington, D. C. public school?
Remediation consisted of a combination of existing
technologies followed by heating over time to vaporize
the mercury. Campagna noted that their cleanup goal was
a mercury vapor concentration less than 0.3 micrograms/
cubic meter (ug/m3), which is based on a health effects
level set by the CDC. Removal or remediation efforts are
initiated if vapor levels are 1 ug/m3 or higher; analytical
methods usually reported a detection limit no lower that
2 ug/m3 for mercury. Campagna noted that the outer layer
of a mercury bead oxidizes and prevents further vapor
release until the bead is disturbed.
• How much mercury is in a thermostat?
A building thermostat contains approximately two to three
grams of mercury. Campagna noted that ERT was called
to respond when the mercury vials in three thermostats
were intentionally broken.
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Development of Standards for Decontamination
of Structures Affected by Chemical and Biological
Terrorism
Robert Focht, Science Applications International
Corporation Canada
Focht began with an overview of the many international
project participants. For many chemicals, cleanup standards
exist. Without similar standards for threat agents, responders
and regulators have minimal information to support their
decisions about decontamination and safe reoccupation.
Focht noted that political, economic, and scientific factors
contributed to standard setting. His presentation focused on
scientific factors. This project aimed to generate relevant
data for some threat agents and to develop a method for
establishing decontamination standards. The approach
included establishing a relationship between the magnitude
of exposure and expected health effects, assessing real and
potential exposures, and characterizing risks to determine
potential toxicity.
Studies underway sought to establish a link between surface
concentrations of several threat agents, the resulting air
concentrations, and human health impacts. Focht provided an
example model illustrating the many factors that influence an
agent's behavior on surfaces.
Biological agent studies focused on decontamination
methods and efficacy, sampling procedures, and surrogate
identification. Researchers first need to develop effective
sampling procedures that accurately identify the presence
of a biological agent, with a sufficiently low detection
limit, so they can establish a decontamination standard.
Focht provided results from a project to determine bacteria
recovery from sampling swabs. He also described a project to
determine virucidal efficacy of VHP using hepatitis A virus as
a surrogate.
Chemical agent studies focused on understanding agent
desorption from material coupons. Focht briefly described
the desorption test methods and provided results for lindane,
which was one of many chemicals tested. Tests were
conducted on various materials, at varying temperatures,
and with various amounts of the chemical inoculated onto
the coupons. Analyses of the vapor phase included the
parent compound and breakdown products. Overall, the
concentrations of lindane in the air were similar for all
surfaces tested. Focht noted that the test chamber quickly
reached a saturation point.
Inhalational and dermal toxicity studies were also conducted
using animal models. Focht detailed the calculation steps
and described experiments in which doses were determined
based on skin exposure to the test agent. The next step in
these experiments was linking the determined doses to health
effects and risk-based cleanup levels.
Focht concluded with a review of the additional next steps in
this project, such as improving economic models, identifying
data gaps, and compiling findings in a final report.
Question and Answer Period
• This study combined many factors, which was a difficult
task. Will uncertainties be addressed in determining the
risk-based standards?
Focht only recently became involved in this project
and was not involved in developing test methods or
conducting analyses.
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VII
Session 5: Radiological Agents
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's Airborne
Spectral Photometric Environmental Collection
Technology Gamma Emergency Mapper Project
John Cardarelli, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency,
National Decontamination Team
In March 2008, EPA initiated the Airborne Spectral
Photometric Environmental Collection Technology
(ASPECT) Gamma Emergency Mapper (GEM) Project,
which aims to provide first responders with timely and useful
data about radiological releases by integrating monitoring
equipment onto an airborne platform.
The aircraft will enable EPA to rapidly respond to events
throughout the U.S., to integrate with local responders, and
to collect and communicate data findings. ASPECT can
deploy within one hour, no matter the time of day or night.
EPA has also integrated aerial photography capabilities into
the aircraft. ASPECT uses a stand-off detection approach,
meaning that the aircraft will not fly into a chemical
or radiological plume. The team averages about one sortie
per month.
ASPECT employs three primary sensors: an infrared line
scanner, a high speed infrared spectrometer, and a gamma-ray
spectrometer. Cardarelli provided photographs to illustrate
equipment arrangement in the airplane. He also provided
details about the gamma-ray detector and showed gamma
contour results from a flyover of a nuclear power plant that
was undergoing a steam separator replacement.
Under the GEM Project, EPA is working to improve ground
based gamma-screening and mapping capabilities to improve
EPA's overall capacity to respond to an RDD event. This
project involves numerous stakeholders. EPA continues to
expand interagency interactions, strengthen relationships, and
increase awareness about ASPECT.
Once at the site, the aircraft would fly multiple passes over
the areas of concern to gather real-time data that would be
combined with data gathered from ground-based monitoring.
As an example, Cardarelli showed a Chernobyl fallout map
that required many months to develop. ASPECT GEM could
produce a similar map within hours.
As a next step, EPA plans to purchase and install more
advanced gamma radiation detection technologies, based
on advanced digital spectrometry. Installation of multiple
detectors was scheduled for completion prior to March 2009.
Other future actions include working with U.S. Department
of Energy (DOE) to compare results with their aircraft
detection technology, accelerating real-time data mapping
capabilities, automating on-board quality assurance and
quality control (QA/QC), and improving communications
with ground-based systems. Cardarelli noted that the GEM
would be a screening tool, and not used for clearance of an
area following decontamination.
Question and Answer Period
• Were you planning on integrating the real-time data with
predictive models to assess modeling capabilities?
Yes, EPA plans on having the capability to do this.
• Does the ASPECT aircraft include monitoring devices
capable of measuring particulate size?
Paniculate monitoring would require other instruments.
EPA is considering this technology, but the aircraft is
not currently equipped with the capability to measure
particulate size.
Evaluation of Commercially-Available Radiological
Decontamination Technologies on Concrete Surfaces
John Drake, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency,
National Homeland Security Research Center
For this project, Drake is evaluating commercially available
RDD decontamination technologies. The focus is on
concrete, which is one of the more difficult materials to
decontaminate.
In the project, cesium-137 was applied as an aqueous mist
to concrete coupons at an activity level representative of
what might be encountered in the field, but not necessarily
at ground zero. Dry deposition of the agent produced
unpredictable distribution; wet deposition allowed for better
reproducibility and simulated weathering better.
The coupons were sized to allow use of full-scale
technologies and arranged vertically and horizontally in
a radiological laboratory hood. Gaps remained between
coupons and the arrangement created uneven surfaces to
represent real-world situations with cracks and crevices.
Seven and 30 days after the cesium-137 deposition, Drake
followed vendor specifications and applied the two strippable
coatings under evaluation. The first coating (manufactured by
Bartlett Services, Inc., Plymouth, Mass.) uses a mechanical
type of removal process, and the second one (Isotron Corp.,
Seattle, Wash.) employs a chelating-based technology. Each
vendor recommended that the coating be applied and stripped
from the coupons three times for testing.
Drake presented detailed results for the two coatings as the
average from three applications and six replicates. Neither
technology adequately decontaminated the test coupons
(~ 32% removal using the first coating and -76% removal
using the second coating). For both technologies, the highest
percentage of cesium-137 removal occurred after the first
application. Results were similar for coating applications
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that were applied seven or 30 days after coupon inoculation.
Analyses to understand these results were ongoing.
Drake also presented other performance factors, such as
cost and labor requirements. A cost analysis found that the
first coating had a lower cost per square meter because this
coating was easier to apply and easier to remove.
As this project moves forward, Drake plans to evaluate other,
large-scale, physical decontamination technologies.
Question and Answer Period
• What were the test temperatures and humidity?
Tests were conducted at room temperature and the
ambient relative humidity, which was approximately 17%.
Researchers thought that more humid environments would
pose problems, but more humid conditions have yet to be
tested.
• Did you measure the depth of the application and
afterwards, the depth of removal?
No, the testing evaluated only the technology
performance.
1 Did you consider including earlier time points (e.g., one
day) to assess differences in decontamination ability?
Drake agreed that earlier information would be interesting,
but this scenario considered a realistic time frame for EPA
involvement at a release.
1 Many different concrete grades exist. Could researchers
extrapolate results from this type of concrete to other
concrete grades?
The concrete formulation selected for this project was
typical of concrete found in buildings. Insufficient
information was available to determine the effect of the
concrete formulation on decontamination.
1 Did the decontamination technology vendors recommend
pretreatment?
EPA involved vendors in the testing to allow for feedback
and comments on the testing methods. No vendor
recommended pretreatment.
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VIM
Session 6: Disposal, Sampling,
and Other Related Topics
Thermomicrobiological Techniques for Incinerator
Performance Assessment While Burning
Contaminated Debris
Paul Lemieux, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency,
National Homeland Security Research Center
Decontamination and restoration activities following a WMD
event could generate a substantial amount of waste, which
would then require proper disposal. As an example of this
often overlooked problem, Lemieux noted that a tabletop
exercise simulating a large-scale RDD event predicted waste
streams that would quickly overwhelm the current U.S.
radiological waste capacity. In general, restoration-related
waste streams could contain materials ranging from office
furnishings and building materials to aqueous residues and
agricultural biomass. EPA typically delegates waste disposal
responsibility to state and local regulators, who must consider
environmental laws and impacts when selecting a disposal
option. Waste disposal facilities have a host of concerns when
accepting such wastes, such as contamination of equipment,
long-term indemnity, and permit restrictions.
Lemieux discussed thermal treatment as a waste disposal
option and described two studies. The first study evaluated
incineration as a means to inactivate bacterial spores
(e.g., surrogates for anthrax) on building materials, and
the second evaluated animal carcass gasification under a
foreign animal disease outbreak scenario.
In the early 1990s, EPA assessed the ability of medical
waste incinerators to inactivate spores by introducing a
known quantity of Geobacillus stearothermophilus spores
to incinerators and measuring spores in the stack and ash to
estimate the log reduction. EPA found a greater than six log
reduction for most incinerators, but a few achieved a less
than three log reduction.
Lemieux conducted pilot-scale thermal destruction studies
to identify optimal operating conditions and to provide
assurance that an incinerator could consistently process
materials to inactivate spores. The studies consisted of
placing Bis (e.g., Geobacillus stearothermophilus, Bacillus
atropheus, or Bacillus anthracis [Sterne]) in an enclosed
pipe, encasing the pipe in a substrate material (e.g., carpet,
ceiling tiles, or wallboard), and placing the bundle in a
pilot-scale rotary kiln incinerator. After a period of time, the
bundle was removed, and the remaining spores on the Bis
were quantified to determine the log reduction. Lemieux
noted that although an incinerator operates as a dry heat
(i.e., with a relative humidity less than 100%) the actual
humidity is quite high because of the high temperature.
Conversely, an autoclave environment is saturated with
water vapor.
Lemieux adapted an existing model to predict the time
required to completely destroy a microbial population when
heated in an incinerator. He then compared the predicted
results to the experimental results. Per the experimental
results, some spores remained active after up to 35 minutes
in the incinerator and with bundle temperatures up to about
300 degrees Celsius (°C). In general, the experimental
results showed that spores are more thermally resistant than
predicted by the model. The incinerator results also indicate
that Geobacillus stearothermophilus is more resistant than
Bacillus anthracis (Sterne).
Lemieux also presented results from testing a transportable
animal carcass gasifier prototype. The gasifier may serve as
another tool to assist with carcass disposal in the event of a
major foreign animal disease outbreak. As compared to an
incinerator, gasification requires a lower air flow rate, smaller
equipment, simpler design, and potentially lower auxiliary
fuel needs. A gasifier, therefore, is easier to transport to a site.
Lemieux outlined the gasifier specifications and presented
a diagram. Photographs illustrated the gasifier components,
including the macerator that homogenized the feed stream
and the telescoping stack that allowed for easy transport.
Lemieux presented the emissions test matrix and results.
Preliminary findings support the use of this gasifier as
a transportable and rapidly deployed system. The feed
preparation and transport system worked well. Data also
suggest that emissions were low and ash quality was
acceptable. The throughput, however, was lower than
planned and a few other problems existed (e.g., ash removal,
feed system cleanout, feed system biosecurity). Overall,
the gasifier could become a valuable tool with additional
testing and refining. A report with preliminary results was
undergoing clearance review.
Question and Answer Period
• Could existing incinerators used for chemical weapon
demilitarization be used for decontamination waste
disposal?
The Technical Support Working Group (TSWG) designed
a transportable rotary kiln incinerator that was modeled
on demilitarization incinerators. But the high construction
and operation costs rendered this incinerator impractical.
Some CWA demilitarization incinerators operate in the
western U.S. under an international treaty until CWA
stockpile is gone. The potential for U.S. government
use of these incinerators after stockpile depletion was
unknown.
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Survivability of Several Years of Recalcitrant Biological
and Chemical Agents in Landfill Leachates
Wendy J, Davis-Hoover, U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency, National Risk Management Research Laboratory
Davis-Hoover is exploring potential concerns associated
with landfilling decontamination wastes, which could include
large volumes of solid wastes, liquid wastes, and steel drums.
Landfills have evolved to include sophisticated designs and
liners intended to prevent leachate releases. Leaking landfills
may pose a risk if their cells allow releases and exposures.
A photograph of an operating landfill, with the open cells
highlighted, illustrated the magnitude and scale of an
example landfill.
The overall purpose of the project was to determine whether
or not a municipal solid waste landfill could safely store or
detoxify previously contaminated building debris and to
determine agent survival durations in leachate, which is the
most likely mode of escape. Davis-Hoover used triplicate
microcosms to simulate real-world conditions (mimicking
aerobic, then anaerobic conditions) and incubated the
microcosms at 12 °C and at body temperature. These would
be worst case incubation temperatures. She also assumed
that agents would always encounter undiluted leachate
before release.
Bacterial agent tests included four agents: Bacillus anthracis,
Yersinia pestis, Francisella tularensis, and Clostridium
botulinum. Agent sampling occurred at regularly scheduled
intervals over the course of 12 months. Davis-Hoover
hypothesized that the bacterial spore formers would survive
in the landfills and facultative anaerobic bacteria would
survive longer than aerobic bacteria. Results indicated that
the Yersinia pestis and Francisella tularensis bacteria died in
less than 20 days; Bacillus anthracis spores and Clostridium
botulinum bacteria persisted for more than 368 days.
Temperature did not affect survival greatly.
Davis-Hoover outlined the target chemicals (i.e., CWAs), the
associated analytical methods, and detection limits. Results
found varying persistence between the chemicals tested.
For example, tabun and mustard gas dissipated in less than
one day, whereas VX and a lewisite derivative persisted
for greater than 168 days. In the case of mustard gas, the
hypothesized persistence was absent.
Question and Answer Period
Workshop participants posed no questions.
An Assessment of the Performance of Portable
Instruments to Monitor Air Quality During Structural
Decontamination Operations
Patrick Lambert, Environment Canada
In summer 2006, Environment Canada researchers conducted
a demonstration project that evaluated decontamination
technologies. An overview of the results from this
project were presented during EPA's 2007 Workshop on
Decontamination, Cleanup, and Associated Issues for Sites
Contaminated with Chemical, Biological, or Radiological
Materials. In conjunction with this project, Lambert
conducted air monitoring to evaluate portable instrumentation
performance.
The technology demonstration project involved disseminating
diethyl malonate (DEM) and malathion in a three-room test
structure and applying decontamination agents. DEM and
malathion served as reactive simulants for CWAs. The test
structure included four sampling ports—one in each room
and one on the ceiling. Perimeter monitors were placed
10 meters from the exterior of the structure on all four sides.
Lambert listed the selected instruments for both the structure
and perimeter stations. These instruments represented a
combination of real-time monitoring devices and sample
collection devices for laboratory analysis. The instruments
also represented a range of target analytes. Lambert noted
that the chemical agent monitor (CAM) IMS located inside
the structure and used to detect CWA failed shortly after the
simulant was disseminated.
Real-time volatile organic compound (VOC) monitoring
provided nearly instantaneous readings during DEM and
malathion application. Lambert noted that the applied
malathion consisted of a commercial grade product that
contained 50% petroleum distillate and 50% malathion.
Whether the monitoring devices responded to the petroleum
distillate or the malathion was unclear. A small VOC peak
occurred at the onset of decontamination. Lambert speculated
that the chlorine-based decontaminant triggered an additional
VOC release. He also noted that the VOC readings never
returned to baseline levels. Monitoring found no unexpected
chlorine or sulfur compounds. Perimeter monitoring detected
minimal VOCs, and these detections correlated well with the
structure door opening and closing.
Lambert also reviewed results from sample collection
devices, specifically the SUMMA Canisters, and laboratory
analyses. SUMMA Canister analyses provided results for
approximately 150 standard VOCs. Benzene concentrations
exceeded other VOC concentrations, with indoor air
concentrations exceeding short-term risk factors for health
and safety. Lambert thought that one of the indoor building
materials was off-gassing benzene. Low levels of chlorinated
VOCs, likely resulting from the building materials and the
decontamination agent, were also detected. VOC partitioning
within the structure was also observed. Perimeter sampling
results were consistent with wind direction. Downwind
samples contained the highest VOC concentrations.
Overall, the real-time monitoring devices provided useful
information about contaminant fate and transport, helped
maintain personnel health and safety, and proved suitable
for on-site operations. The sampling devices provided
credible and scientifically defensible analytical results,
as well as information about specific VOC detections
and concentrations. These methods, however, required
modifications to meet unique decontamination circumstances.
Question and Answer Period
Workshop participants posed no questions.
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Evaluation of Sampling Methods and Strategies in an
Operational Environment
Lance Brooks, Department of Homeland Security on
behalf of Dr. Michael Walter, Joint Program Executive
Office for Chemical and Biological Defense
Brooks began by noting that the primary impetus for this
project was a U.S. Government Accountability Office report
that critiqued the sampling and analytical procedures used
following the 2001 anthrax attacks. This project is led by
DHS and involves the Validated Sampling Plan workgroup
comprised of a number of other U.S. government agencies.
The goal of the project is to validate (using the International
Standardization Organization definition) anthrax sampling
procedures.
Multiple sampling methods (e.g., wipes, vacuums) are
available to characterize contamination following a biological
threat agent release. A laboratory-scale study was conducted
by Johns Hopkins University (JHU) Applied Physics
Laboratory (APL) for DoD to evaluate existing and new
(e.g., micro-vacuum) sampling methods.
Following the laboratory study, a field-scale test facility at
Idaho National Laboratory (INL) in Idaho Falls, Idaho, was
used to simulate an operational setting. The test facility has
two levels containing multiple rooms along a central hallway
and was furnished with office equipment. The workgroup
developed test objectives that included comparing sampling
strategies (probabilistic versus judgmental), applying
sampling and analytical methods, and using the data to
validate dispersal and sampling tools. The test plan involved
sampling (characterization), fumigating, and resampling
(clearance).
For the test, one gram of Bacillus globigii was released in
one confined area of the facility. Brooks noted that the release
made establishing a concentration gradient difficult. Future
tests would use smaller releases. After agent dissemination,
the team completed characterization, fumigation, and
clearance activities. Sabre conducted the chlorine dioxide
fumigations between tests and installed a two-layer tenting
system with one layer on the building and a second layer on a
metal frame over the building.
The project participants used Visual Sample Plan (VSP),
which is a data quality objective-based statistical tool, to
design a sampling plan that indicated the number of samples
required and the sampling locations needed to achieve
confidence in the sampling data. BROOM was used to track
sample collection and analysis results. Brooks presented
a diagram of sampling results following the release of
fluorescent particles (performed prior to the Bacillus globigii
release) in the test building. This diagram illustrated the
distribution gradient within the test facility. Brooks noted
that creating the agent gradient required HVAC system
manipulations. Photographs illustrated sampling activities
and analysis equipment.
Results were provided for the number of spores/square
centimeter recovered as a function of sampling method
(HEPA vacuum sock samples). The hand-held assay (HHA)
method reported approximately 60% of the samples as
positive for Bacillus globigii, compared to the approximately
90% positive samples reported by culture. The rapid viability
polymerase chain reaction (RV-PCR) and culture results were
statistically equal.
Brooks noted that some clearance samples collected after
fumigation were positive, possibly due to the use of a
more robust sampling method (filter plating) or cross-
contamination from personnel entering and exiting the
facility through one entry point.
Question and Answer Period
• What was the detection limit for the HHAs?
Past studies examining residual powders on hard
surfaces found a detection limit of 106 to 107 spores/
square centimeter. With this high detection limit, DHS
recommended HHAs for bulk sampling only.
• Did you place Bis during fumigation?
No Bis were used during the fumigation.
• The results from the three sampling methods appeared
statistically equal. Was one method preferred based on
ease of use?
The preferred method depended on the sampling surface.
Swabs were most useful in vents, which have hard, non-
porous surfaces. HEPA technologies were most useful
for carpets. Overall, responders need a range of sampling
options.
• Was reasonableness considered? For example, the study
considered recovery from ceiling tiles. In an actual event,
responders would likely remove and dispose of ceiling
tiles because these tiles are inexpensive. In addition,
people do not often contact ceiling tiles.
This study focused on creating an agent concentration
gradient in the test facility and comparing sampling
methods. The study was not meant to provide a strategy
for characterization sampling. Brooks noted that a
sampling strategy and sampling methods must be
event-specific.
• Why was chlorine dioxide selected for the fumigation and
how did it perform?
Many real-world fumigations with chlorine dioxide
(i.e., not experimental testing) have been completed
successfully. So, this is a proven decontamination
technology. Generating data regarding the
decontamination efficacy was not a purpose of the project.
The Use of a Sampling Design Strategy to Direct
Decontamination Activities Following a Weapon of
Mass Destruction Event
Landon Sego, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory
Sampling occurs throughout the response and recovery
process, including forensic investigation, agent nature and
extent characterization, area clearance, and long-term reuse
monitoring. Decision makers often describe site conditions
through a conceptual site model, which is an iterative
process that evolves as knowledge is gained about the site
-------
contamination. Statistical methods are needed to be able
to quantify the confidence level that a building is free of
contamination when sampling results are all negative.
The sampling plan should define the sampling objectives and
identify sampling locations, based on the sampling strategy
(e.g., targeted, statistical, geostatistical). Sego noted that each
sampling strategy had potential benefits, and selection of the
appropriate strategy depended on site-specific conditions.
A new trend involves combining targeted and statistical
sampling strategies, although some form of statistical
sampling is required to be able to quantify uncertainty. The
sampling plan should also identify the level of confidence
required to support decisions. Being able to predict that 100%
of the area is uncontaminated would require a prohibitive
number of samples.
VSP developed by Pacific Northwest National Laboratory
(PNNL) and BROOM developed by Sandia National
Laboratory (SNL) are two available sampling support tools.
VSP generates a statistical sampling design based on data
quality objectives, and is undergoing validation. VSP can be
used for outdoor sites, although it contains many features
related for use within buildings. BROOM, which has been
successfully deployed, serves as a tool to collect, manage,
and analyze sample data using a series of personal data
assistant (PDA) devices and readers. Data in BROOM can
be transferred wirelessly, which maintains the sample chain
of custody. PNNL and SNL were collaborating to integrate
VSP and BROOM in order to create a tool that shared data
and provided real-time sampling strategy updates based on
sampling results. The combined technology was scheduled
for completion in autumn 2009.
To illustrate the importance of selecting the proper sampling
strategy, Sego presented an example release of a gaseous
CWA in a transportation hub. This example scenario excluded
air sampling and focused on surface sampling. Sego assigned
contamination zone classifications to describe conditions.
In Zone 1, targeted sampling simply sought to determine
contaminant magnitude to direct decontamination. Targeted
sampling in Zone 2 sought to identify either contaminated
areas for reclassification as Zone 1 or areas lacking
contamination. If sampling in Zone 2 found no contaminants,
applying a hotspot sampling approach would improve data
confidence. In Zones 3 and 4, statistical sampling, possibly
combined with targeted sampling, improved the confidence
level that an area was free of contamination. Achieving
a greater confidence level required additional sample
collection.
Traditional sample designs only accounted coarsely for
spatial variations. Geostatistical sampling methods account
for spatial correlation (i.e., if a sample is positive, a higher
probability exists that a sample in its vicinity will also be
positive). This method could potentially decrease the number
of samples needed to characterize or clear an area and lends
itself to an adaptive sampling approach.
Question and Answer Period
• What was the benefit of combining VSP and BROOM?
Some of the individual tool functions overlapped, but
many others were complementary. The combined tool
enabled users to increase their confidence level in
sampling results.
• Was BROOM tied to a specific hardware?
Other hardware could likely operate BROOM software.
However, the existing hardware, which facilitated data
communication (e.g., wireless transmission), and served as
a key BROOM function and benefit.
• Did VSP exist for outdoor events?
Initially, VSP addressed outdoor sample design strategies
and included broad outdoor capabilities. More recently,
users have applied VSP to indoor areas.
• Another program, CONTAM (multizone airflow and
contaminant transport analysis software), also exists.
Would this program also have applications if combined
with VSP and BROOM?
Sego is involved in a project that examined combining
CONTAM with VSP. Combining all three tools would
enable responders and decision makers to use predictions
about contamination to guide the sampling strategy and
track sampling results.
National Homeland Security Research Center's Aerosol
Test Facility and the Study of the Measurement and
Mechanisms of Exposure to Chemical, Biological, and
Radiological Agents
Russ Wiener, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency,
National Homeland Security Research Center
Research laboratories at EPA's Research Triangle Park
location include the Aerosol Test Facility (ATF). The ATF
includes two wind tunnels, aerosol research chambers, and
bench scale testing laboratories. The larger wind tunnel
includes a four meter by three meter cross section to
accommodate human-size studies and a two meter by two
meter cross-section to accommodate ambient air sampling
analysis studies. The smaller wind tunnel is used for studies
requiring non-invasive sampling technologies. In general,
the ATF supports research related to aerosol monitoring
techniques, fluid dynamics, and human exposure. Wiener
stated that partnering opportunities existed with EPA to
conduct research with the ATF.
Wiener continued with a discussion of some of the field
studies and aerosol-related research his group has recently
conducted. He briefly described the Brooklyn, New York,
field study, in which they evaluated and modeled the canyon
effect in an urban environment and the impact on aerosol
dispersal.
Wiener then described a study conducted in the ATF to
examine the resuspension of particles from floors, which may
contribute significantly to movement of particles inside a
building. This study was prompted by the 2004 ricin incident
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on Capitol Hill. EPA used a mechanical foot and a heated
manikin to assess particle transport from the floor into the
breathing zone. Measurements of ricin simulant (ovalbumin)
aerosol levels led to estimates of possible exposures.
Wiener concluded with a discussion of a project to evaluate
EPA's RadNet samplers (a network of samplers that would
be used to measure atmospheric radiological contamination).
Sampler testing involved releasing particles in the wind
tunnel and measuring the mass concentrations and collection
efficiency as a function of particle size and wind speed.
The testing has identified design concerns associated with
this sampler; at higher wind speeds, the sampling efficiency
declined. Turbulence at the sampling head caused by the
sampler design impacted results.
Question and Answer Period
• Did you test multiple orientations of the RadNet sampler?
Tests of a second orientation were underway. Current
funding allowed for evaluation of only two orientations.
• Were particles released during the Brooklyn, New York,
study?
The field study conducted in Brooklyn, New York, used
auto exhaust—including particulates—as a tracer and
followed trace constituent movement in the street canyon
and infiltration into a building. This study included renting
a three-story apartment building to evaluate infiltration.
• With regard to the particle resuspension study, do you
think particles of a similar size, but different material,
act in the same manner as was tested? Or do different
material characteristics affect material actions?
An aerosol material's natural properties (e.g., size,
electrostatics, other surface properties) greatly affect
how the particle is transported. The appropriate surrogate
properties must be selected depending on the experiment.
Egg albumin (ovalbumin) was used as the surrogate for
ricin in the study. In general, finding suitable surrogates
was difficult.
Collective Protection Technology Testing of Bioaerosol
Air Purification Devices
Karin Foarde, Research Triangle Institute International
In collaboration with the Edgewood Chemical Biological
Center (ECBC), and with funding from DTRA, Foarde
evaluated air purification devices that protect a warfighter by
either removing or inactivating biological agents in air.
This study was part of a test program evaluating air
purification for various agents, including chemical,
biological, and paniculate agents. Foarde focused on the
biological agent evaluation. The test method followed
protocols previously developed under EPA's Technology
Testing and Verification Program (TTEP) and DoD, and was
reviewed by stakeholders. The study, which included a small-
and large-scale test, sought to identify the design-limiting
conditions for a device and considered worst-case scenarios.
Foarde listed the types of devices and technologies that this
study included.
Evaluations considered bioaerosol inactivation or collection
efficiency, as well as device power consumption, and other
factors relevant to a warfighter (e.g., weight, size, noise).
Foarde noted that each device could be compared to a HEPA
filter, which was considered an effective technology, but was
not appropriate for all situations.
To account for both the protective factors naturally occurring
in bacteria (e.g., atmospheric aerosol components), as well as
protective factors engineered for bacteria weaponization, the
study included organisms as both singlets and agglomerates,
several relative humidity levels, and proteins in nebulizing
fluids as a representation of dirt and other materials in the
environment. Biological simulants were used in testing and
needed to mimic actual agent physiological (e.g., spore coat)
and physical (e.g., particle size) characteristics. The simulants
also needed to meet the laboratory biosafety level limits.
Foarde presented a list of the simulants used in testing.
Diagrams and photographs of the large- and small-scale test
apparatus illustrated the test systems. These systems were
adapted from paniculate tests and included an injection
point, a sampling point before the air purification device, the
device, a sampling point after the device, and an outlet. Both
the large- and small-scale test apparatus met quality control
parameters for a variety of conditions (e.g., uniform air
velocity, temperature, relative humidity).
The test series for a single device included a number of
control tests. The transmission test, however, was critical and
examined bioaerosol loss in the test apparatus without the
air purification device. The subsequent test results were then
corrected for this loss. Stringent QA/QC requirements were
also followed. Foarde provided example data for an effective
and an ineffective device. Although the ineffective device
was unable to inactivate several Bacillus strains, this device
was effective for a vegetative bacteria and a virus.
Test method verification consisted of evaluating the method
usability, testing devices using the method, and comparing
venfication data against existing data. Overall usability was
good; however, some recommendations for improvement
were identified. The method was robust and both the large-
and small-scale tests produced high-quality data. Ongoing
efforts would address the unresolved issues regarding
neutralizer use and nebulizing fluid composition.
Question and Answer Period
• Would results remain classified?
Results would likely remain classified (likely "for official
use only" at a minimum) based on the specific devices
tested and results found.
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Appendix A
Agenda
v>EPA
United States
Environmental Protection Agency
Decontamination and Consequence Management Division and
National Decontamination Team
2008 Workshop on Decontamination and
Associated Issues for Sites Contaminated with
Chemical, Biological, or Radiological Materials
Sheraton Chapel Hill Hotel
Chapel Hill, NC
September 24-26, 2008
Agenda
WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 24, 2008
SESSION 1: DECONTAMINATION - GENERAL ASPECTS
The Role of a Technical Working Group (TWG) in Fumigation of a Large Building Blair Martin
US EPA, National Risk Management Research Laboratory
Medical Aspects of Natural Anthrax: Implications for Decontamination Curtis Snook
US EPA, National Decontamination Team
Government Decontamination Service (GDS): An Update for 2008 Robert Bettley-Smith
Government Decontamination Service, United Kingdom
EPA's Regulation of Sterilants/Sporicides and Sporicidal Decontaminants Jeff Kempter
US EPA, Office of Pesticide Programs
Toward a Systems-of-Systems Approach to Hazard Mitigation Charles Bass
Defense Threat Reduction Agency
Wide-area Restoration Following Biological Contamination: Systems Analysis for
Interagency Biological Restoration Demonstration (IBRD) Program Lynn Yang
Sandia National Laboratory
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WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 24, 2008 (continued)
SESSION 2: BIOLOGICAL AGENTS - FIELD EXPERIENCE AND LABORATORY TESTING
Danbury Anthrax Response, September 2007 Mike Nalipinski
US EPA, Region 1
Expedited Fumigation of a Large Hospital as Related to
Biological Contamination Scenarios Darrell Dechant
Sabre Technical Services, LLC
Utilizing a Tracer Atmospheric Gas Analyzer (TAGA) Triple Quadrupole Mass Spectrometer
Technology Mounted on a Movable Platform to Provide Indoor Air Concentrations
throughout a Structure before and after a Chlorine Dioxide Fumigation David Mickunas
US EPA, Emergency Response Team
Decontamination of Surfaces Contaminated with Biological Agents
Using Fumigant Technologies Shawn Ryan
US EPA, National Homeland Security Research Center
Assessment of the Impact of Chlorine Dioxide Gas on Electronic Equipment Mary Mandich
Alcatel-Lucent
Laboratory-scale Decontamination Testing in Support of the Interagency Biological
Restoration Demonstration (IBRD) Program Major James G, Rohrbough
Defense Threat Reduction Agency
Field Evaluation of Gaseous Chlorine Dioxide Treatment for
Microbial Contamination Nancy Clark Burton
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, National Institute for Occupational Health and Safety
The Decontamination Family of Systems (DFoS) Mark Zimmerman
Joint Program Executive Office for Chemical and Biological Defense
Decontamination of a Railcar Using a Portable and Economical System Tony Contino, Biokinetics
Biokinetics, Inc.
Paul Manske
Metropolitan Transportation Authority (MTA)-Long Island Railroad
Economical Facility Decontamination with Gaseous and Liquid Chlorine Dioxide Mark Czarneski
ClorDiSys Solutions, Inc.
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THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 25, 2008
Keynote Address Tom Dunne,
Director of the Office of Homeland Security, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (US EPA)
SESSION 2: BIOLOGICAL AGENTS - FIELD EXPERIENCE AND LABORATORY TESTING (CONTINUED)
Assessment of Biological Indicators for Building Interior Cleanup Vipin Rastogi
Edgewood Chemical Biological Center
Reduction and Elimination of Biological Contamination Using Bacteriophage Timothy Dean
US EPA, National Risk Management Research Laboratory
Wet Scrubbing and Adsorption for the Capture of Chlorine Dioxide Gas
during Fumigation Events Joseph Wood
US EPA, National Homeland Security Research Center
Material Demand for Hydrogen Peroxide of Building Materials Brian Attwood
US EPA, National Homeland Security Research Center
Bacillus Thuringiensis var. kurstaki (Btk) Agent Fate Characterization Kristin Omberg
Los Alamos National Laboratory
Comparing and Contrasting Fumigations of Very Large Facilities for Biothreat Agents
and Other Microorganisms Dorothy Canter
Johns Hopkins University, Applied Physics Laboratory
SESSION 3: FOREIGN ANIMAL DISEASE AGENTS
Animal Disease Outbreak Response-Tools, Status, and Trends Lori Miller
U.S. Department of Agriculture, Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service
Inactivation of Avian Influenza Virus Using Common Chemicals and Detergents Brian Ladman
University of Delaware
Persistence Testing of Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza Virus (HPAI)
on Outdoor Materials Harry Stone
Battelle
SESSION 4: CHEMICAL AGENTS
Understanding Chemical Warfare Agency (CWA) Interactions with Surfaces and
the Implications for Decontamination Adam Love
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
Restoration of Major Transportation Facilities Following Chemical Agent Release:
The Facility Restoration OTD Mark Tucker
Sandia National Laboratory
Systematic Decontamination of Chemical Warfare Agents (CWAs)
and Toxic Industrial Chemicals (TICs) Emily Snyder
US EPA, National Homeland Security Research Center
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THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 25, 2008 (CONTINUED)
SESSION 4: CHEMICAL AGENTS (CONTINUED)
Small Item Vapor Hazard Determinations in Interior Spaces:
What, Where, When, Why and How Many? Brent Mantooth
Edgewood Chemical Biological Center
The Development of Safe and Highly Effective Chemical and
Radiological Agent Simulants Bruce Clements
Clean Earth Technologies, LLC
Mercury Vapor Emission and Measurement Studies and
Evaluation of Cleanup Technologies Philip Campagna
US EPA, Emergency Response Team
FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 26, 2008
SESSION 4: CHEMICAL AGENTS (CONTINUED)
Development of Standards for Decontamination of Structures
Affected by Chemical and Biological Terrorism Robert Focht
Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC) Canada
SESSION 5: RADIOLOGICAL AGENTS
EPA Airborne Spectral Photometric Environmental Collection Technology
Gamma Emergency Mapper Project John Cardarelli
US EPA, National Decontamination Team
Evaluation of Commercially-Available Radiological
Decontamination Technologies on Concrete Surfaces John Drake
US EPA, National Homeland Security Research Center
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FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 26, 2008 (CONTINUED)
SESSION 6: DISPOSAL, SAMPLING, AND OTHER RELATED TOPICS
Thermomicrobiological Techniques for Incinerator Performance
Assessment While Burning Contaminated Debris Paul Lemieux
US EPA, National Homeland Security Research Center
Survivability of Several Years of Recalcitrant Biological and
Chemical Agents in Landfill Leachates Wendy J, Davis-Hoover
US EPA, National Risk Management Research Laboratory
An Assessment of the Performance of Portable Instruments to
Monitor Air Quality During Structural Decontamination Operations Patrick Lambert
Environment Canada
Evaluation of Sampling Methods and Strategies in an Operational Environment Lance Brooks
Joint Program Executive Office for Chemical and Biological Defense
The Use of a Sampling Design Strategy to Direct Decontamination Activities
Following a Weapon of Mass Destruction (WMD) Event Landon Sego
Pacific Northwest National Laboratory
NHSRC Aerosol Test Facility (ATF) and the Study of the Measurement and Mechanisms
of Exposure to Chemical, Biological, and Radiological (CBR) Agents Russ Wiener
US EPA, National Homeland Security Research Center
Collective Protection Technology Testing of Bioaerosol Air Purification Devices Karin Foarde
Research Triangle Institute (RTI) International
Notes:
All speakers given 20 minutes for talk, plus 5 minutes for questions, unless noted.
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Appendix B
List of Participants
v>EPA
United States
Environmental Protection Agency
Decontamination and Consequence Management Division and
National Decontamination Team
2008 Workshop on Decontamination and
Associated Issues for Sites Contaminated with
Chemical, Biological, or Radiological Materials
Sheraton Chapel Hill Hotel
Chapel Hill, NC
September 24-26, 2008
Attendee List
Nancy Adams
NHSRC/DCMD
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
109 TW Alexander Drive (E-343-06)
Research Triangle Park, NC 27711
Steve Alvarez
U.S. Department of Defense
1636 Regulus Avenue
Virginia Beach, VA 23461
*Brian Attwood
Environmental Engineer
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
109 TW Alexander Drive (E343-06)
Research Triangle Park, NC 27711
*Julia Barzyk
Postdoctoral Fellow
National Homeland Security Research
Center/Decontamination and Consequence
Management Branch
ORISE
109 TW Alexander Drive (E343-06)
Research Triangle Park, NC 27711
*Charles Bass
Physical Science and Technology
Chemical and Biological
Technologies Directorate
Defense Threat Reduction Agency
8725 John J. Kingman Roas (Stop 6201)
Fort Belvoir, VA 22060
Jennifer Becker
U.S. Army Research Office
PO Box 12211
Research Triangle Park, NC 27709
Doris Betancourt
Microbiologist
Indoor Environment Management Branch
Air Pollution,Prevention and Control Division
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
109 TW Alexander Drive (E 305-03)
Research Triangle Park, NC 27711
*Robert Bettley-Smith
Chief Executive
Government Decontamination Service
Building 14 - MOD Stafford
Beacon Barracks, Beaconside
Stafford, Staffs ST18 OAQ
United Kingdom
Rita Betty
Member of Technical Staff
Chemical & Biological Systems
Sandia National Laboratories
PO Box 5800 (MS 0734)
Albuquerque, NM 87185
Nathan Birnbaum
Senior Staff Veterinarian
APHIS
Veterinary Services Emergency Management
U.S. Department of Agriculture
APHIS VS NCAHEM
4700 River Road - Unit 41
Riverdale, MD 20737-1231
Rebecca Blackmon
Chemical, Biological, Radiological and
Nuclear Countermeasures
Technical Support Working Group
PO Box 16224 - CTTSO/TSWG
Arlington, VA 22215
Deborah Boling
Health Assessor
Site and Radiological Assessment
Health Assessment and Consultation
Agency for Toxic Substances and
Disease Registry
4770 Buford Highway -DHAC/SRAB (F-59)
Atlanta, GA 30341
*Lance Brooks
Program Manager
Department of Homeland Security
S&T/8-015
Washington, DC 20528
Carl Brown
Chief, ESTD
Science and Technology Branch
Environmental Science & Technology Division
Environment Canada
335 River Road
Ottawa, ON K1AOH3
Canada
Jay Burcik
Chemist
Department of Homeland Security
950 H Street, NW
Washington, DC 20223
*Speaker
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Timothy Burgin
Scientist
Asymetric Defence
Naval Surface Warfare Center
4045 Higley Road - Suite 345
Building 1480 - Room 237
Dahlgren, VA 22448
Joan Bursey
Scientist
DCMD/NCBA/NHSRC
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
(E343-06)
Research Triangle Park, NC 27711
*Nancy Burton
Industrial Hygienist
HETAB/DSHEFS
CDC/NIOSH
4676 Columbia Parkway (MS R-ll)
Cincinnati, OH 45226
M. Worth Calfee
National Homeland Security Research Center
Office of Research and Development
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
109 TW Alexander Drive
Research Triangle Park, NC 27711
*Philip Campagna
Chemist
ERT
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
2890 Woodbridge Avenue (MS 101)
Edison, NJ 08527
* Dorothy Canter
Senior Professional Biophysicist
Johns Hopkins University Applied
Physics Laboratory
11100 Johns Hopkins Road (17N-664)
Laurel, MD 20723
Erica Canzler
National BioWatch Coordinator
Office of Emergency Management
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
1200 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW (6450M)
Ariel Rios Building
Washington, DC 20460
Joseph Cappello
Research Scientist
CUBRC
4455 Genesee Street
Buffalo, NY 14221
Gerald Capraro
Microbiologist
Life Sciences
Clean Earth Technologies, LLC
101 North Chestnut Street - Suite 101
Winston-Salem, NC 27101
*John Cardarelli II
Health Physicist
National Decontamination Team
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
26 West Martin Luther King Drive
- Room 271
Cincinnati, OH 45268
Karen Cavanagh
COO, Chief Counsel
Sabre Technical Services, LLC
1891 New Scotland Road
Slingerlands, NY 12159
Kimberly Chapman
VP Sales and Marketing
Morphix Technologes
2557 Production Road
Virginia Beach, VA 23454
Shih-Yew Chen
Strategic Area Manager
Risk & Waste
Environmental Science
Argonne National Laboratory
9700 South Cass Avenue
Argonne, IL 60439
John Chiefari
PM&C
1 National Cicuit
Barton, ACT 2600
Australia
*Young Choi
Master Technician
Biomedical Research Center
Molecular Toxicology
Battelle
505 King Avenue (JM-7)
Columbus, OH 43201
Adrian Clark
DSTL Porton
Ministry of Defence
Porton Down
Salisbury, Wiltshire SP4 OJQ
United Kingdom
*Bruce Clements
Senior Scientist
Life Sciences
Clean Earth Technologies, LLC
13378 Lakefront Drive
Earth City, MO 63045-1513
Gordon Cleveland
Program Analyst/RAD Advisory Team
Veterinary Services
NCAHEM
U.S. Department of Agriculture - APHIS
4700 River Road - Unit 41
Riverdale, MD 20737
*Anthony Contino
Sr. Vice President
Biokinetics, Inc.
1635 Market Street
Philadelphia, PA 19103
Carmen Costable
Senior Development Specialist
Genencor International
1700 Lexington Avenue
Rochester, NY 14514
Katie Crockett
Senior Analyst
Defense Threat Reduction Agency A&AS
6363 Walker Lane - Suite 300
Alexandria, VA 22310
*Mark Czarneski
Director of Technology
ClorDiSys Solutions Inc.
PO Box 549
Lebanon, NJ 08833
*Wendy Davis-Hoover
NHSRC/DCMD
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
26 West Martin Luther King Drive (421)
Cincinnati, OH 45268
*Timothy Dean
Microbiologist
Indoor Environment Management Branch
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
129 TW Alexander Drive (E305-03)
Research Triangle Park, NC 27711
*Darrell Dechant
Director of Regulatory Affairs and Technology
Development
Sabre Technical Services, LLC
1891 New Scotland Road
Slingerlands, NY 12159
Robert Dellinger
Director
Generator and Characterization Branch
Hazardous Waste Identification Division
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
1200 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW (5304P)
Washington, DC 20460
Betsy Devlin
Associate Director
Office of Solid Waste
Hazardous Waste Identification Division
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
1200 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW (5304-P)
Washington, DC 20460
*John Drake
NHSRC/DCMD/ORD
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
26 West Martin Luther King Drive
Cincinnati, OH 45268
*Thomas P. Dunne
Associate Administrator
Office of Homeland Security
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
1200 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW(MC-1109A)
Washington, DC 20460
Mark Durno
Section Chief
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
25089 Center Ridge Road (ME-W)
Westlake, OH 44145
Wayne Einfeld
Project Manager
Sandia National Laboratories
PO Box 5800 (MS-0734)
Albuquerque, NM 87185-0734
Jay Ellenberger
Associate Director
FEAD
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
1200 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW (7506P)
Washington, DC 20460-0001
*Speaker
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Victor Engleman
President
EAI
3129 Carnegie Place
San Diego, CA 92122-3241
Hiba Ernst
Associate Director
WIPD/NHSRC
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
26 West Martin Luther King Drive (NG-16)
Cincinnati, OH 45268
Othon Estrada
Mechanical Engineer
Mechanical Engineering
Design Engineering
U.S. Department of State
OBO-PE-DE-MEB
Washington, DC 20522-0611
Scott Faller
Chemist
Center for Indoor Environments
Radiation and Indoor Environments
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
PO Box98517
Las Vegas, NV 89193-8517
Richard Fitzpatrick
Senior Research Scientist
CUBRC
4455 Genesee Street
Buffalo, NY 14221
*Karin Foarde
Director, Microbial and Molecular Biology
Research Triangle Institute
3040 Cornwallis Road
Research Triangle Park, NC 27709
* Robert Focht
Program Manager
Science Applications International
Corporation
60 Queen Street - Suite 1516
Ottawa, ON KIP 5Y7
Canada
Julie Fruetel
Sandia National Laboratories
PO Box 969 (MS 9292)
Livermore, CA 94551-0969
Michel Gagne
Department of Chemistry
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
Chapel Hill, NC 27599
Michael Gemelli
System Safety Specialist
Security
WMD Detection & Countermeasures
MTA New York City Transit
130 Livingston Avenue - Room 5004D
Brooklyn, NY 11201
Susan Elizabeth George
Director, Science and Technology Directorate
Chemical and Biological
U.S. Department of Homeland Security
245 Murray Lane, SW (MS 2100)
Washington, DC 20528
Nicole Griffin
Microbiologist
ARCADIS
4915 Prospectus Drive - Suite F
Durham, NC 27713
Barbara Grimm-Crawford
Special Assistant
Office of Homeland Security
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
1200 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW (MC-1109A)
Washington, DC 20460
Matthew Hankins
Sandia National Laboratories
PO Box 5800 (MS 0734)
Albuquerque, NM 87185
Donell Marvin
Radiation IH
Evironmental Emergency
Preparedness and Response
All-Hazards Unit
NYC Department of Health
2 Lafayette Street - llth Floor
New York, NY 10007
Jonathan Herrmann
Director
National Homeland Security Research Center
26 West Martin Luther King Drive (NG31)
Cincinnati, OH 45268
Dudley Hewlett
Government Decontamination Service
MOD Stafford, Beacon Barracks
Beaconside
Stafford, Staffs ST18 OAQ
United Kingdom
Lynnann Hitchens
Chemical Engineer
NHSRC
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
26 West Martin Luther King Drive (NG-16)
Cincinnati, OH 45268
Daniel Holcomb
Environmental Health Scientist
CDC - NCEH/ATSDR
4770 Buford Highway - Building 106
Room 02112.2
Atlanta, GA 30341
Chuck Hosn
Senior Mechanical Engineer
MEB/DE
U.S. Department of State - OBO
1701 North Fort Myer Drive
(OBO/PE/DE/MEB)
4th Floor-405.A
Rosslyn, VA 20522
Mario lerardi
Homeland Security Team Leader
Hazardous Waste Generator and
Characterization
Hazardous Waste Identification
Office of Solid Waste
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
1200 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW (5304P)
Washington, DC 20460
Peter Jutro
Deputy Director
NHSRC
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
1200 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW (8801R)
Washington, DC 20460
Tetsuro Kagao
LTC
Bureau of Defense
Defense Policy Division
Ministory of Defense
5-1 Ichigaya Honmuracho
Shinjuku, Tokyo 162-8805
Japan
*Carlton (Jeff) Kempter
Senior Advisor
Antimicrobials Division
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
1200 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW (7510P)
Washington, DC 20460
Eric Koglin
TTEP Program Manager
NHSRC
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
PO Box 93478
Las Vegas, NV 89193-3478
Diane Kotras
Director, Biodefense Policy
Homeland Defense
Defense Support to Civil Authorities
U.S. Department of Defense
2600 Defense Pentagon
Washington, DC 20301-2600
Paula Krauter
Environmental Engineer
Chemical and Biological Technologies
Sandia National Laboratories
P.O. Box 969 (9406)
Livermore, CA 94551
Jay Krishnan
Biologist
Infectious Disease and Emergency
Preparedness
National Microbiology Laboratory
Public Health Agency of Canada
Canadian Science Center
1015-Arlington Street
Winnipeg, MB R3E 3P6
Canada
Lindsey Kurnath
Presidential Management Fellow
Office of Homeland Security
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
1200 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW (MC-1109A)
Washington, DC 20460
*Brian Ladman
Associate Scientist
Department of Animal and Food Sciences
Avian Biosciences Center
University of Delaware
531 South College Avenue
44 Townsend Hall
Newark, DE 19711
*Speaker
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*Teri Lalain
Decontamination Sciences Team
Edgewood Chemical Biological Center
5183 Blackhawk Road
Attn: AMSRD-ECB-RT-PD (Dr. Teri Lalain)
Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD 21010-5424
*Patrick Lambert
Manager, Field and Response Section
Science and Technology
Emergencies Science and Technology
Environment Canada
335 River Road
Ottawa, ON K1AOH3
Canada
David Langfitt
Mechanical Engineer
U.S. Department of State
125 Henrico Road
Front Royal, VA 22630
*Sang Don Lee
NHSRC/DCMD
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
109 TW Alexander Drive (E343-06)
Research Triangle Park, NC 27711
Stephen Lee
Chief Scientist
U.S. Army Research Office
PO Box 12211
4300 South Miami Boulevard
Research Triangle Park, NC 27709
Johannes Lee
Group Leader
ARCADIS-US
424 Brookcliff Lane - Suite F
Gary, NC 27511
Nancy Lee
Senior Member of Technical Staff
DSO National Laboratories
20 Science Park Drive
Singapore 118230
*Paul Lemieux
Chemical Engineer
Decontamination and Consequence
Management Division
National Homeland Security Research Center
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
109 TW Alexander Drive - E343-06
Research Triangle Park, NC 27711
Kwai Yin Leong
Senior Engineer
Pollution Control Department
National Environment Agency - Singapore
40 Scotts Road #12-00
Environment Building
Singapore 228231
Shee Yin Leow
Defence Science & Technology Agency
71 Science Park Drive
#02-05 Singapore 118253
Singapore 118253
Alan Lindquist
Microbiologist
WIPD/NHSRC
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
26 West Martin Luther King Drive
Cincinnati, OH 45268
Paul Lorcheim
Director of Operations
ClorDiSys Solutions Inc.
PO Box 549
Lebanon, NJ 08833
*Adam Love
Forensic Science Center
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
PO Box 808, L-097
Livermore, CA 94550
Ryan Madden
Defense Threat Reduction Agency
U.S. Department of Defense
8725 John J. Kingman Road (Stop 6201)
Fort Belvoir, VA 22060
Kunapuli T. Madhusudhan
Clean Earth Technologies, LLC
101 North Chestnut Street - Suite 101
Winston-Salem, NC 27101
*Mary Mandich
CTO Reliability Engineering
Alcatel-Lucent
600-700 Mountain Avenue - Room 1E-347
Murray Hill, NJ 07974
Brent Mantooth
Research Chemist
U.S. Army - Edgewood Chemical
Biological Center
5183 Blackhawk Road (MSRD-ECB-RT-PD)
E3400 - Room 104
Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD 21010
Marsha Marsh
Health Scientist
NHSRC - Homeland Security
Office of Research and Development
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
24 Martin Luther King Boulevard
Cincinnati, OH 45268
*G. Blair Martin
Associate Director
ORD/NRMRL/APPCD
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
109 TW Alexander Drive (E340-04)
Research Triangle Park, NC 27711
John Mason
President, CEO
Sabre Technical Services, LLC
1891 New Scotland Road
Slingerlands, NY 12159
Katrina McConkey
Scientist
Cubic Applications, Inc.
5695 King Centre Drive - Suite 300
Alexandria, VA 22315
Michael Metz
Manager
Security
WMD Detection & Countermeasures
MTA New York City Transit
130 Livingston Avenue - Room 5003E
Brooklyn, NY 11201
James Michael
Environmental Protection Specialist
Generator and Characterization
Hazardous Waste Identification
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
1200 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW (5304P)
Washington, DC 20460
Leroy Mickelsen
Engineer
Office of Solid Waste & Emergency Response
NOT
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
109 TW Alexander Drive (E343-06)
Durham, NC 27711
*David Mickunas
Chemist
OSRTI
Environmental Response Team
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
109 TW Alexander Drive (E343-04)
Research Triangle Park, NC 27711
*Lori Miller
Senior Staff Officer
Interagency Coordination
National Center for Animal Health &
Emergency Management
U.S. Department of Agriculture - APHIS VS
4700 River Road - Unit 41 - Room 5D-03.3
Riverdale, MD 21108
Scott Minamyer
Environmental Scientist
NHSRC/Water Infrastructure
Protection Division
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
26 West Martin Luther King Drive (NG-15)
Cincinnati, OH 45268
Stephen Morse
Associate Director for
Environmental Microbiology
Centers for Disease Control
1600 Clifton Road (MS C-18)
Atlanta, GA 30333
Jennifer Mosser
Environmental Engineer
Radiation Protection Division
Center for Radiological Emergency
Management/OAR/ORIA
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
1200 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW (6608J)
Washington, DC 20460
Deborah Motz
Director of Logistics/Life Cycle Management
JPM Decon
JPEOCBD
50 Tech Parkway - Suite 301
Stafford, VA 22556
Andreas Mueller
Optek
N118W18748 Bunsen Drive
Germantown, Wl 53022
*Speaker
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Cynthia Mullin
Division Director
Immediate Office
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
26 West Martin Luther King Drive (NG-32)
Cincinnati, OH 45268
David Musick
Director
ORIA/R&IE/OAR
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
944 East Harmon Avenue (CRQA)
Las Vegas, NV89119
*Michael Nalipinski
Federal OSC
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
One Congress Street (HBR)
Boston, MA 02203
Sean Nolan
DTRA (Bull and Associates)
9006 Stratford Lane
Alexandria, VA 22308
Laurel O'Connor
Associate Manager
Battelle
1204 Technology Drive
Aberdeen Proving Groun, MD 21001
* Kristin Omberg
Group Leader
Systems Engineering & Integration
Decision Applications
Los Alamos National Laboratory
PO Box 1663 (MS K551)
Los Alamos, NM 87545
Sadaharu Ono
Bureau of Personnel and Education
Health and Medical Division
Ministry of Defense
5-1 Ichigaya Honmuracho
Shinjuku, Tokyo 162-8805
Japan
Michael Ottlinger
Toxicologist
OEM/NOT
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
4900 Olympic Boulevard - Building A
Cincinnati, OH 41018
Lukas Oudejans
ARCADIS
4915 Prospectus Drive - Suite F
Durham, NC 27713
Bruno Pagnani
HVAC Engineer
Dynamac
1445 Heritage Links Drive
Wake Forest, NC 27587
Cayce Parrish
Senior Advisor
Office of the Administrator
Office of Homeland Security
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
1200 Pennsylvania Avenue (1109A)
Washington, DC 20460
Brooke Pearson
Threat Technologies Division
Cubic Applications, Inc.
5695 King Centre Drive - Suite 300
Alexandria, VA 22315
Kate Perry
Senior Policy Advisor, Homeland Security
Office of Homeland Security
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
1200 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW(1109A)
Washington, DC 20460
*Vipin Rastogi
Research & Technology Director
Biosciences
U.S. Army- ECBC
E-3150 Kingscreek Street, N
(AMSRD-ECB-RT-BD)
Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD 21010
Matthew Redinbo
Professor
University of North Carolina - Chapel Hill
Department of Chemistry - CB#3290
Chapel Hill, NC 27599
William Reents
Manager, Reliability Physics
CTO Reliability Engineering
Alcatel-Lucent
600 Mountain Avenue - Room 1F-206
Murray Hill, NJ 07974
David Rees
On Scene Coordinator
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
1200 Sixth Avenue - Suite 900 (ECL-116)
Seattle, WA 98101
Katie Reid
CBRN Analyst
J-8
Joint Requirements Office for CBRN Defense
Joint Chiefs of Staff
Pentagon
Washington, DC 20318-8000
Melissa Rodriguez
Health and Safety Coordinator
Department of Citywide
Administrative Services
One Centre Street - 17th Floor South
New York City, NY 10007
*Major James Rohrbough
U.S. Air Force
Defense Threat Reduction Agency
1680 Texas Street, SE
Kirtland AFB, NM 87117-5669
Jacky Rosati
Environmental Scientist
Decontamination and Consequence
Management Division
National Homeland Security Research Center
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
109 TW Alexander Drive (E343-06)
Research Triangle Park, NC 27711
Richard Rupert
On Scene Coordinator
OEM
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
701 Mapes Road
Ft. Meade, MD 20755-5350
*Shawn Ryan
Associate Division Director
National Homeland Security Research Center
Decontamination and Consequence
Management Division
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
109 TW Alexander Drive (E-343-06)
Research Triangle Park, NC 27711
Ramanathan Sakhubai
AD Certification and Enforcement
Certification and Enforcement Branch
Fire Safety and Shelter Department
Singapore Civil Defence Force
91 UBI Avenue 4 408827
Singapore 408827
James Salkeld
BIOQUELL
101 Witmer Road - Suite 400
Horsham, PA 19044
Catherine Salsman
Advisory Scientist
ARO/SA
4075 Wilson Boulevard - Suite 200
Arlington, VA 22042
Gregory Sayles
Associate Director
National Homeland Security Research Center
Office of Research and Development
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
26 West Martin Luther King Drive (NG-16)
Cincinnati, OH 45268
*Landon Sego
Scientist
Pacific Northwest National Laboratory
PO Box 999 (MSIN K6-08)
Richland, WA 99352
Jimmy Seidel
Senior Science Advisor
OCEFT/Homeland Security Division
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
Building 25 - P.O. Box 25227
Denver Federal Center
Denver, CO 80401
Shannon Serre
TTEP/NHSRC
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
109 TW Alexander Drive (E343-06)
Research Triangle Park, NC 27711
Susan Shahin
Capability and Operational Coordination
Emergency Management Australia
PO Box 1020
Dickson, ACT 2602
Australia
*Speaker
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Eunice Sim
DMERI
DSO National Laboratories
20 Science Park Drive
Singapore, SG 118230
Raj Singhvi
Chemist
ERT/OSRTI
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
2890 Woodbridge Avenue (MS101)
Edison, NJ 08820
Markham Smith
Joint Science & Technology Office for
Chemical Biological Defense
Chemical-Biological Technologies
Defense Threat Reduction Agency
8725 John J. Kingman Road (6201)
Ft. Belvoir, VA 22060
*Curtis Snook
Medical Officer
OEM/NOT
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
4900 Olympic Boulevard - Building A
Erlanger, KY 41018
*Emily Snyder
Research Chemist
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
109 TW Alexander Drive (E343-06)
Research Triangle Park, NC 27613
Robert Spencer
South West Regional Laboratory
Health Protection Agency
Floor 8 - Bristol Royal Infirmary
Marlborough Street
Bristol, BS2 8HW
United Kingdom
Joan Stader
Director of Life Sciences
Clean Earth Technologies, LLC
13378 Lakefront Drive
Earth City, MO 63045
Sharron Stewart
Director,Emergency Programs Division
North Carolina Department of Agriculture .
Consumer Services
2 West Edenton Street
1035 Mail Service Center
Raleigh, NC 27699
Terry Stilman
OSC/HS Lead Region Coordinator
ERRB
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
61 Forsyth Street
Atlanta, GA 30303
Harry Stone
Project Manager
Battelle
10300 Alliance Road - Suite 155
Cincinnati, OH 45242
Terry Sullivan
Deputy Division Head
Environmental Sciences
Environmental Research and
Technology Division
Brookhaven National Laboratory
34 North Railroad Avenue - Building 830
Upton, NY 11973
Mark Sullivan
Capability & Operational Coordination
Capability Development
Emergency Management Australia
PO Box 1020
Dickson, ACT 2602
Australia
Yoke Cheng Tan
Human Sciences
Directorata of Research & Development
Defense Science & Technology Agency
71 Science Park Drive - #02-05
Singapore 118253
Stephen Treado
Project Leader
National Institute of Standards and
Technology
226, B114
Gaithersburg, MD 20899
*Mark Tucker
Chemical and Biological Technologies
Sandia National Laboratories
1515 Eubank, SE (MS0734)
Albuquerque, NM 87123
Joseph Vescio
Environmental Scientist
Office of Emergency Management
National Planning and Preparedness
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
1200 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW (5104A)
Washington, DC 20460
Claire Wells
Chemical Engineer
Naval Surface Warfare Center
4045 Higley Road - Suite 345
Dahlgren, VA 22448
*Russ Wiener
Physical Scientist
NHSRC
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
(D205-03)
Durham, NC 27711
Steven Wilkinson
Emergency Response & Environmental
Health
Chemistry Centre WA
125 Hay Street
East Perth, WA 6004
Australia
Dana Williams
NHSRC/DCMD
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
413 West Cameron Avenue
Chapel Hill, NC 27516
*Joseph Wood
Environmental Engineer
Decontamination & Consequence
Management Division
National Homeland Security Research Center
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
109 TW Alexander Drive
Research Triangle Park, NC 27711
Scott Wright
Senior Emergency Response Coordinator
Prevention Response & Medical
Support Branch
Division of Toxicology &
Environmental Medicine
CDC-HHS/ATSDR
4770 Buford Highway, NE (MS F32)
Room 3217
Atlanta, GA 30341-3717
*Lynn Yang
Systems Analyst
Sandia National Laboratories
PO Box 969 (MS9406)
Livermore, CA 94551
Norman Yanofsky
CSS Portfolio Manager Chemistry,
Biology Defence R&D Canada Centre
for Security Science
222 Nepean Street
Ottawa, Ontario K1AOK2
Canada
*Mark Zimmerman
Deputy Joint Project Managment
Joint Program Management -
Decontamination
50 Tech Parkway - Suite 301
Stafford, VA 22556
Julie Zobel
Executive Director of Environmental
Health and Safety
George Mason Unviersity
4400 University Drive (MS 4E7)
Fairfax, VA 22030
Donn Zuroski
OSC/Emergency Response - Superfund
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
75 Hawthorne (SFD 9-2)
San Francisco, CA 94105
*Speaker
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Support Provided by
Sarah Dun
Technical Writer
ERG
110 Hartwell Avenue
Lexington, MA 02421
Mark Grady
Conference Coordinator (Onsite)
ERG
110 Hartwell Avenue
Lexington, MA 02421
Katelyn Huminick
Junior Conference Coordinator
ERG
110 Hartwell Avenue
Lexington, MA 02421
Laurie Stamatatos
Workshop Coordinator
ERG
110 Hartwell Avenue
Lexington, MA 02421
*Speaker
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Martin
Appendix C
Presentation Slides
The Role of a Technical Working Group in
Fumigation of a Large Building
National Risk Management Research Laboratory
Air Pollution Prevention and Control Divisioi
resented at: Decontamination Workshop 2008
Research Triangle Park, NC
September 24 -26, 2008
INTRODUCTION
St Johns Regional Medical Center (SJRMC), Oxnard, CA
• Chronic mold issues over 15 year period
• Extensive retrofit, reconstruction and remediation
• Sections of the hospital out of service on a rolling basis
• Potential for another 5 years of reconstruction
SJRMC management decided to fumigate with chlorine dioxide
The project was intended to form the basis for a NIMS response plan
A Technical Working Group (TWG) has assisted the Incident
Commander in several of the 2001 B.a. responses
The hospital invited participation in a Technical Working Group
• Individuals with previous experience with CIO2 fumigation
• Provide technical advice
• Review documents
• Monitor fumigation
• Provide consultation to hospital on critical issues
INTRODUCTION
Membership of the TWG
G. Blair Martin, U.S. EPA, NRMRL
Shawn Ryan and Paul Lemieux, U.S. EPA, NHSRC
Dino Mattorano and Tony Zimmer, U.S. EPA, NOT
Donn Zuroski, U.S. EPA , Region 9 OSC
Scott Fredericks and Dave Mickunas, U.S. EPA, ERT
Terrance Leighton, Children's Hospital Oakland Research
Institute
John Kowalski, Microgamma, LLC
Lance Brooks, U.S. Department of Homeland Security
Tony Intrepido, LLNL
John Mason, Karen Cavanagh and Darrell Dechant, Sabre
Technical Services LLC
Maureen Malone, SJRMC
INTRODUCTION
St Johns Regional Medical Center (SJRMC), Oxnard, CA
• 265 bed hospital
• 344,000 square feet over 5 floors
• 5,000,000 cubic feet
Project Goals
• SJRMC scheduled to minimize down time
• 5 - day period for fumigation
• Minimize material damage
• Effective remediation of the entire facility
• Necessary regulatory approvals
• Minimize need for further reconstruction
• Minimum closure of attached Medical Office Building (MOB)
St. Johns Regional Medical Center
ROLE OF THE TWG
The TWG provided advice in four ways
• Periodic meetings and teleconferences
• Document review
• Special studies
• On site observation of the fumigation
Meetings and teleconferences
• April 27 - Oxnard, CA for hospital tour and meeting
• June 11 - RTP, NC for initial document review
• July 23 - Washington, DC for final plan review
• August16to21 -Oxnard, CA for fumigation
• October 19 - Erlanger, KY for lessons learned
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Martin
ROLE OF THE TWO
Document review
• Federal Insecticide Fungicide and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA)
• Remediation Action Plan (RAP)
• Sampling and Analysis Plan (SAP)
• Ambient Air Monitoring Plan (AAMP)
• RAP describes process and treatment conditions
• Mold contamination was relatively light
• Process conditions to minimize materials impacts
• TWG recommended conditions
- Minimum CT of 600 ppm-hrs (50 ppm for 12 hours)
- Maximum CT of 1200 ppm-hrs (100 ppm for 12 hours)
- 70'F and 70%RH
• Special study recommended
• Mold was inaccessible for sampling
• Wall cavity penetration study
ROLE OF THE TWG
Document review (continued)
• Sampling and Analysis Plan (SAP)
• Point sampling for CIO2, T and RH at 38 points
• Using indirect indicators for efficacy at 880 points
- Biological indicators
- Concentration time dosimeter strips (CTDS)
• Special studies recommended
• Validate biological indicators as a surrogate for mold
- Sabre fume trailer test
- Representative samples of contaminated and clean
materials
- Efficacy as a function of CT
- Photographic documentation
• Calibration of CDTS versus titration
- EPA chamber test
ROLE OF THE TWG
Document review (continued)
• AAMP
• Ambient CIO2 to ensure community safety - TAGA van
• Building CIO2 level for worker reentry - 100 ppb
• Special studies recommended
• TAGA Cart to clear building
• Comment on Department of Pesticides Registration (DPR) review
• Fumigation process conditions - RAP
- Concentration - time (CT) of 2000 ppm-hrs
- 167 ppm for 12 hours
- 70% Relative Humidity (RH)
-70'F
• Establish CIO2 level for worker re-entry - SAP
- 3 ppb required
- Clearance time was an issue
ROLE OF THE TWG
On site support during fumigation
Pre-fumigation assessment of facility
Observation of process installation
Evaluation of California DPR comments on RAP and SAP
Establish routes for TAGA cart for clearance
Monitored progress of fumigation
Provided advice to hospital on issue resolution
• Humidification
• CT for problem zones
Consultation with the on site DPR representative
TAGA cart clearance monitoring
Post-fumigation assessment of facility
PROCESS MONITORING CENTER
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Martin
TWO OBSERVATIONS
Process improvements for response
• Fumigation is labor intensive (over 200 people)
• The HVAC system is a key component
• Alternative arrangements are desirable
• T and RH study with HOBOs to determine distribution
• External system to provide flow, T and RH control
• Titration for CIO2 monitoring is a limiting step
• Labor intensive - installation and execution
• Limits ability to react to distribution issues
• Real time monitoring with remote access would enhance process
• JPL Sensor Web prototype has potential
• With preplanning, even a complex building can be tented quickly
• Aeration and CIO2 decomposition can expedite clearance
• TAGA cart can expedite clearance for reentry
TWG OBSERVATIONS
Role of the TWG
• Whole is greater than the parts
• Diverse backgrounds provide innovative thinking
• However, challenge to forge a working solution
• Compromise and creativity necessary
• But don't try to think too far outside the box
• Communication is a key
• Face to Face meetings are ideal, but present challenges
• Direct orientation on building characteristics is essential
• Teleconferences can resolve some issues
• Onsite document review would expedite communications
• On site TWG provides many benefits
• Understanding of process implementation
• Ability to advise Incident Commander on technical issues
• Advice on response to regulatory issues
• Direct interface with regulators
CONCLUSIONS
TWG Role
• Provide relevant expertise in 8 to 12 members
• Prior TWG experience desirable
• Evaluation of documents
• Provide expertise and advice
• Scientific and technical support for clients
• Response expertise essential
Onsite TWG could expedite remediation
• Provide rapid review of documents
• Respond to issues raised by regulatory authorities
• Ability to adjust actions when process conditions difficult
For an Incident of National Significance a permanent
TWG could provide valuable assistance
• DHS MOA with Australian to convene bilateral TWG
• May expand to Quadrilateral Consequence Management Group
Ideally TWG should be on site for the duration of the
event - or at critical periods
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Snook
Objectives
1. Discuss medical experience with illness
caused by naturally occurring B. anthracis
2. Consider the implications of this
information with respect to
decontamination decision-making
Zoonosis in agricultural settings- i.e. primarily in
animals and secondarily in humans
- Endemic in many parts of the world, rare in the U.S.,
since the advent of animal vaccinations and improved
industrial hygiene in processing animal hides
- Outbreaks still occur in animals in Midwest and
Western U.S.
Occupational: "woolsorter's" or "ragpicker's"
disease
Herbivores ingest spores which germinate
into the vegetative form in the spleen and
lymph nodes
Spores can survive months or even
decades in soil depending on pH,
temperature and nutrients
Vegetative organisms are deposited in the
soil and sporulation occurs, completing the
cycle
Anthrax from Natural Sources
Pre-2001
Summary of CDC investigations 1950-
2001
>40 investigations over 50 years
>24 in agricultural settings
>11 at textile mills
>4 involved contaminated consumer products
Four forms of human disease:
1. Cutaneous
• 81% of cases in the CDC investigations
2. Inhalational
• 19% of cases in the CDC investigations (9/48, 8/9 or
89% of cases fatal)
3. Gastrointestinal
• no U.S. cases
4. Oropharyngeal
• no U.S. cases
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Snook
CDC Anthrax Investigations 1950-2001
• Salient Points
- All agricultural cases were cutaneous
• Associated with handling, performing necropsy on, or
disposing of dead, contaminated animals
- Typical responses to agricultural cases included:
• Immunization of animals at risk
• Education of farm workers on anthrax diagnosis and control
• Thorough destruction by burning of infected animals
• Prevention of infected livestock from reaching the market
• Improved supervision of slaughter and meat inspection
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Snook
CDC Anthrax Investigations 1950-2001
Salient Points (cont.)
- Of the 27 human cases which occurred at
textile mills:
• 21 (78%) were cutaneous
- People working with raw, unprocessed contaminatec
materials at greatest risk
6 (22%) were inhalational, 5/6 were fatal
3 inhalational deaths in non-textile workers
1957, Manchester, NH — 5 cases of inhalational
anthrax, 4/5 or 80% fatal, and 4 cases of
cutaneous anthrax among 600 workers in a
textile mill.
- Employees noted increased dust in air after initiating
a new scouring technique
1961, Philadelphia, PA — 50 year-old female, a
secretary in a textile mill who had little direct
contact with goat hair in her routine duties,
developed fatal inhalational anthrax
Decontamination Decision-Making
Textile Mills
- Decontamination of the source not held to be
"practical"
-Vaccination with annual scheduled boosters
for workers at risk
- Personal Protective Equipment (PPE):
- Specific work clothing and respirators
- Shower facilities
- Separate lockers for work and street clothing
- Antibiotics - Used for 4 cutaneous cases
Decontamination Decision-Making
Textile Mills (cont.)
• Improved Industrial Hygiene Measures:
- Physical separation of raw and finished materials to
prevent cross-contamination
tWork areas designed for easy cleaning
Air-exhaust systems designed to prevent the spread
of spores
• One report recommended "thorough
indoctrination" on the cause, nature and control
of anthrax (Epi-Aid 1953-14)
1 Secondary Contamination - spores found in
vacuum cleaner at worker's home - not deemed
clinically significant
Inhalational Anthrax in Other Settings
Inhalational Anthrax in Other Settings
1957, Philadelphia — fatal inhalation anthrax in
a 29 year-old man with sarcoidosis
- exposed to glue made from animal hides
- walked daily past a goatskin tannery contaminated
with B. anthracis spores
Another fatal inhalational case was reported in a
person near this same tannery making a total of
2 over an 8-year period.
1966, Manchester, NH — metal shop employee
with "smoker's cough" diabetes, alcoholism, and
chronic pancreatitis developed inhalation
anthrax after working for 4-5 hours opposite a
goat hair-processing mill
Dust from neighboring goat hair mill identified as
source
Incidence of anthrax at plant decreased with
mandatory vaccination
-------
Snook
Inhalational Anthrax in Other Settings
1976, Morro Bay, CA — 32 year-old man,
a self-employed weaver, developed fatal
inhalational anthrax due to 8. anthracis-
contaminated yarn imported from
Pakistan.
Multiple samples of yarn tested positive for
8. anthracis
Subsequent CPSC warning on imported
yarn.
Risks for Natural Anthrax
Cutaneous
- Direct physical contact with infected animals
or commercial products
• Includes in one case contact with finished goatskin
drums from Haiti
Inhalational
1. Presence during activities which can aerosol
particles in a location where spores are
present
2. Underlying illness which increases
susceptibility
- Decontamination of the source not practical
-Vaccination with boosters for workers at risk
-Personal Protective Equipment (PPE):
- Specific work clothing and respirators
-Shower facilities
- Separate lockers for work and street clothing
-Antibiotics
Improved Industrial Hygiene
Physical separation of raw and finished
materials to prevent cross-contamination
Work areas designed for easy cleaning
Air-exhaust systems designed to prevent
the spread of spores
Worker education
Drum Making With Imported Hides
• Recent fad — How do these cases compare to
this previous experience?
- New York Citv. NY. 2/06 — Inhalation case in a man
who scrapes hair off imported, contaminated hides in
an enclosed space — 0
- Scotland. 7/06 — Inhalation case in a man with acute
lyeloid leukemia in remission who plays finished
rums with imported, contaminated hide heads —
Danburv. CT. 7/07 — Cutaneous case in a drum
maker who works with contaminated hides to make
drums - fails on day of symptom onset to wear proper
PPE — 0Son gets cutaneous disease on scapula —
unclear what source — from direct contact with index
-------
Snook
Medical History of Natural Anthrax
• Implications for Decontamination
- Cutaneous disease requires direct contact
with spores
- Inhalational disease is uncommon
• Risks for inhalational disease are:
- Generation of an aerosol where spores are present
- Lunq disease or other immunocompromise
Medical History of Natural Anthrax
• Implications for Decontamination
- In areas (e.g. textile mill, agricultural) where
ongoing contamination is expected, proper
work practices can be used with worker
education and vaccination of workers at risk
- Both surface methods and fumigation have
successfully been used to remediate indoor
areas contaminated with naturally occurring
B. anthracis spores
-------
Bettley-Smith
GDS: An Update for 2008
USEPA 2008 Workshop
Decontamination and Associated Issues for Sites Contaminated with
Chemical, Biological, or Radiological Materials
Robert Bettley-Smith FRICS
Chief Executive
Structure of Presentation
• Specialist Supplier Framework Overview
• Supplier Development and Evaluation
Update on recent Operations
• Anthrax Decon
• Anthrax Decon
• Chem/Rad Contamination
General Decontamination issues
- Communal Facility (Scotland)
- Domestic Premises (England)
- Domestic Premises (England)
Specialist Supplier Framework : Overview
• Established under EU procurement regulations
• Gives immediate access to known suppliers (who respond routinely to
hazardous situations - HAZMAT)
• Framework speeds up decontamination process
• Agreed Prices, terms and conditions (model contracts)
• Suppliers regularly evaluated and exercised by GDS
• Facilitates testing and evaluation of decontamination methodologies
and decontaminants
Supplier Development and Evaluation
To move contractors from their normal civilian working environments and
HAZMAT to CBRN environment
Method
To assess effectiveness of existing techniques, capabilities and capacity
against scientific threat assessments, intelligence reports, planning
assumptions and planning scenarios.
Identify
•Existing viable technologies
•Existing technologies requiring limited adaptation
•Useful technologies requiring major adaptation/development
Residual Issue
Approach identifies capability gaps but does not always fill them.,
Approach to Supplier Evaluation
Five stage process:-
1. Scientific and technical assessment of Specialist Suppliers during
tendering process (to join framework)
2. Response to case studies based on a scenario/case study
within the experience of the supplier (within 12 months)
3. Response to case studies outside the experience of the supplier
based on briefing provided by GDS at venue
4. Participation in exercises and tests
5. Evaluation during and after an actual CBRN event.
Stage 3 Evaluation Approach
Approach
• Develop a viable scenario at an i
enueforthe r
• Plot likely consequences (fatalities, contamination zone, waste, materials for
disposal)
• Set a case study based on the scenario for specialist suppliers
Method
• Suppliers visit actual venue
• Briefing (logistical, technical, scientific) provided on scenario by GDS
• Standard report template (provided by GDS)
• Suppliers produce report on recommended decontamination strateg
-------
Bettley-Smith
Stage 3 Evaluation Approach
Development Strategy
Suppliers report assessed by GDS and others.
[Reports produced are
arenotshs '
—. confidential and for these reasons they
or between suppliers.]
lared outside
Identify issues, strengths and weaknesses
Dialogue between GDS and supplier to resolve issues,
identify capability gaps and agree future work.
Develop improvement plans (backed with exercises)
GDS identifies significant critical unresolved (or irresolvable)
residual issues for consideration elsewhere.
Anthrax (Scotland, July 2006 - April 2007)
(Contamination in remote rural area)
Timeline - Scotland
08/07/06 Death of individual
10/08/06 Confirmation of anthrax as cause of death
Sept 2006 Sampling completed at Black Lodge
Nov 2006 Sampling completed at Smailholm Hall
17/11/2006 Black Lodge test results are negative
Smailholm test results are positive
02/02/07 Decontamination method agreed and GDS
specialist supplier selected
01/03/07 Equipment shipped in from USA
10 -13/03/07 Smailholm sites successfully decontaminated
12/04/07 Smailholm sites cleared (by clearance committee)
as fit to be returned to owners
Decontamination Method
• Chlorine Dioxide (Clo2) used as a gaseous fumigant
• Optimal temperature (75degrees F) and humidity (RH 75%)
• CT of 9000 was used on 2 sites where structures were tented and
subject to internal fumigation. A time count of 6 hours was
maintained on village hall and 4 hours on private outbuilding.
• All contents left in hall, apart from a tapestry (which was autoclaved)
• All contents left in private out building apart from some tools
• Biological indicators (spore strips) used
• A kill efficiency of Zero detectable spores was achieved
[ Some blue chairs turned orange and some rusting on steel tools]
Anthrax (Scotland, 2006): Key points
• Successful test of - GDS Specialist Supplier Framework
- GDS Specialist Supplier
• Successful support mechanisms and advisors (GDS, USEPA etc)
• Communications (lack of mobile phone coverage)
• Early consideration of decontamination issues
• Decontamination Issues
emotive and social aspects
logistics and timeframes
transport and storage of decontamination equipment
compatibility of equipment
weather conditions!
Anthrax (England Sept 2006 - Nov 2007)
(Contaminated cottage in remote rural area)
-------
Bettley-Smith
Timeline - Belford
Sept 2006 Further sites suspected in England
Then... A long period of consultation, discussions on
responsibility agreement on the way forward
[A problem that is familiar in the US!?!]
31/08/07 Decontamination Strategy agreed
06/09/07 GDS Supplier engaged
2 - 5/10/07 Decontamination undertaken 25/10/07
Analysis of samples show no detectible spores
Nov 2007 Clearance Committee meet and clear building
for return to owners
Decontamination Method
• HEPA vacuum and wet dry clean of the premises
• Soft fabrics bagged and removed for incineration
• Each room was pre-cleaned with disinfectant to remove dirt and dust
in order to reduce the bio-burden level
• VHP chemical and biological indicators placed in specific locations
• Biological indicators (10e population of geobacillus stearothermophilus
spores)
• Relative humidity in both rooms ranged during the decontamination
cycles from 45-45% and the temperature between 18-25c
• Vapourised hydrogen peroxide used 250ppm during the
decontamination phase cycle
G
Other Operations
The GDS was set up to deal with CBRN (extended
to major HAZMAT incidents) has utility in other situations!
Assisting responsible authorities to deal with:
- Crystal Meths laboratories
- Other clandestine laboratories
- Unusual substances in vehicles
- Premises containing unusual substances
- Remediation and/or advise in unusual situations
Premises containing unusual substances!
Chem/Rad Contamination (March 2008 - July 2008)
Premises containing unusual substances!
Chem/Rad Contamination (March 2008 - July 2008)
Chem/Rad Contamination - Back ground
• Domestic property owned by retired scientist
• Concern from executor (immediately after scientist's death) over a
'number of experiments' (at the property) and material found on site
• Experiments, thought to be chemical and radiation related
• Chemicals and radioactive materials present
• Local Council unable to resolve - requested GDS assistance
Scope of work (sampling then decontamination) submitted byGDS
specialist supplier and agreed with Council
-------
Bettley-Smith
Chem/Rad Contamination - Materials found:
Total of 120 different chemicals in various conditions including:-
sodium metal
potassium permanganate, sodium chlorate, chloral hydrate,
potassium cyanide, mercuric chloride
Plus nitric acid and residues
Total of 3 radiological substances
radium
thorium
uranium
Chem/Rad Contamination - Findings
• Extensive contamination following sampling internally and externally
(garden and shed area).
• Known areas of soil contamination excavated (principally under
collapsed shed)
• 17 radiological sources found, 11 to be subjected to further lab
analysis - then be disposed of as lab samples.
• 10 radiological sources taken to Winfrith (low level waste disposal
site)
Asbestos sheets and materials also found on site
G
General Decontamination Issues
Irrespective, the following issues always come up>
• Who will pay?
• Lack of (adequate) insurance cover
• Waste management, ownership, consignment and final disposal
• Multi-agency information sharing
• Media handling
• Tolerability of residual hazards (clearance standards)
• Management of expectations (cost and timescale)
• Logistics including communications
• Staffing resources
General Decontamination Issues
Requirements for Success -before an event!
• Base plans on known events (and realistic scenarios)
[Hypothetical questions guaranteed to give hypothetical answers!]
• Agreed Policy framework with defined responsibilities
• Agreed remediation arrangements
• Agreed process to define clean-up standards
• Identified capability and capacity
G
General Recovery Issues
Requirements for Success -after an event!
• Early planning of remediation phase
• Early definition of clean-up standards
• Separate clean up and regulatory responsibility
• Partnership working and regular co-ordination
• Flexibility, pragmatism and realism
• Good communications
Government Decontamination Service
MOD Stafford
Beaconside
Stafford
Staffordshire
ST180AQ
England
For Information
08458501323
www.gds.gov.uk
-------
Kempter
EPA's Regulation of
Sterilants/Sporicides and
Sporicidal Decontaniinants
2008 Workshop on Decontamination and
Associated Issues for Sites Contaminated with
Chemical, Biological, or Radiological Materials
EPA Approvals Under FIFRA
EPA approval for an antimicrobial pesticide under
FIFRA is by:
Registration ft.e.. licensing
FIFRA Registration
Section 3 Registration: Manufacturer submits an
application with labeling and the following data:
• New Active Ingredient product:
• product chemistry
an application to EPA along with required data
and product labeling
To obtain an exemption, a state or federal agency
must submit a request to EPA along with pertinent
information
Old Active Ingredient product:
• product chemistry
-------
Kempter
FIFRA Exemption
federal agency requests EPA to issue an
exemption.
Crisis exemotions: Issued if there is not
enough time to process normal exemptions
• EPA issued exemptions for sites related to 2001
anthrax bioterrorism attacks via the mail
• States issued exemptions for accidental
contamination (e.g., New York, NY, and
Danbury, CT)
Antimicrobial Efficacy Data
Current FIFRA efficacy test
methods include:
Sterilants/ sporicide
Adding a B. anthracis Claim
to a Sterilant/Sporicide
To claim inactivation of B.
anthracis spores, a
sterilant/sporicide should be
tested:
• On the virulent agent— B.
anthracis spores
• On porcelain penicylinders and
silk suture loops
TT~—AOAC 966.04 as a
_v,u...matory test (120 c"™*™^
Sporicidal Decontaminant—
A New Product Designation
At a FIFRA Scientific Advisory Panel meeting in
July 2007, EPA proposed a new product category-
Sporicidal Decontaminant
• This product is intended to inactivate virulent B.
anthracis spores, but would be supported by either:
• AOAC 966.04 Method II (180 carriers/surface) or
• A well developed, quantitative sporicidaltest
• Key parameters:
Must pass the AOAG test (no growth on any c
show at least a six (6\ lo^ reduction based on
-------
Kempter
Quantitative Sporicidal Test
With virulent B. an/hra
surrogate spores.
Porous surface and/or
Nonporous surface
(number and types of
oupons will vary)
AOAC Method 966.04
with B. subtilis
and C, spomgenes,
surface - 360 Carriers
AOAC Method 966.04
With virulent B. an/hracisor
surrogate spores.
Porous surface -180 Carriers
and/or
Nonporous surface -180 Carriers
(180 or 360 total carriers)
Nonporous surface - 360 Carriers
(720 carriers total)
No growth on any carrier
No growth on any carrier
Confirmatory Test
With virulent B, an/hr.
acceptable surrogate.
Porous and nonporous surfaces
(120 Carriers total)
Simulated Use Test
Room or Large Space
•Gases and Vapors
Guidance on Registration of
Anthrax-Related Products
PR Notice 2008-2 was issued final on 8/26/08
(http: / /www.epa.gov/PR Notices /pr2008-2.
Limits sale/distribution of anthrax-related products to:
• Federal On-Scene Coordinators
• U.S. Military personnel
• Persons trained and certified competent by registrants
Terms and conditions of registration
Registrant must train and give competency exams to
applicators; EPA will help develop exams/training.
Registrant must keep books and records as to who is
trained and who buys the product
Products should be labeled according to the PR Notice
Guidance on Efficacy Data to
Support Anthrax-Related Claims
EPA will issue draft guidance on efficacy
test methods to support anthrax-related
claims in 2009
EPA will issue draft Pesticide Assessment
Guidelines (810.2100) for sterilants/sporicides
and sporicidal decontaminants and provide an
opportunity for public comment
Registrants should meet/consult with EPA
about their proposed efficacy test protocols
before conducting tests
EPA/OPP Sporicidal Efficacy
Test Method Research—Completed
1. Qualitative Method Improvement & Validation: AOAC
966.04, Method II validation for liquids used on B.
subtilis on porcelain penicylinders
2. Quantitative Method Selection: Side-by-side method
comparison study of AOAC 966.04, ASTM E2111-05
(QCT-1) and Three Step Method (TSM)
3. Quantitative Method Validation: TSM validation for
liquids used on B. subtilis on glass carriers
4. Surrogate Study: Comparative efficacy studies with
liquid sporicides using virulent B. anthracis spores and
surrogates.
Acknowledgement to Dr. Stephen Tomasino, EPA
Microbiology Lab for extensive input to this section.
1. Qualitative Method (AOAC 966.04)
Improvement & Validation
Official AOAC Method Modificatk
Process
AOAC General Refe
Collaborative study
-------
Kempter
AOAC 966.04 Methods I & II
AOAC Method I
• Original method
Uses Bacillus subt&sand
Clostridium sporogenes
Uses porcelain penicylin.de
and suture loop carriers
AOAC Method II
Bacillus subtilis and
porcelain components
Granted First Action
status—i.e., method is
official but AOAC is
years. After that, it will
Collaborative Comparison Study
3 labs conducted each of the 3 test procedures on each of 3
chemicals
Log reduction (LR) of surviving spores was determined and
statistically analyzed
Both quantitative methods performed in a similar fashion
Additional test method attributes were assessed
Protocols - use and clarity
Test Set-up - preparing for the test
• Testing - performing the method, resources
• Results - recording, compiling, and interpretation
TSM selected for surrogate studies and validation testing
For results of collaborative study see: Tomasino, S.F. and
Hamilton, M.A. (2007) LAOAClnt. vol. 90: 456-464
3. Quantitative Method Validation-
Three Step Method (TSM)
Three fractions — A, B and C
• Fraction A (loosely releases spores by washing)
• Fraction B (sonication to dislodge spores)
• Fraction C (agitation/germination of spores)
TSM Validation Study
AOACI was contracted to facilitate validation study
OPP Microbiology Lab was the lead lab
10 lab validation study - mainly volunteers
One microbe — Bacillus subtilis
Three liquid chemicals—bleach, peroxide/peracetic acid <
glutaraldehyde
Carrier type: glass
Three replications per laboratory; nine total test days
AOAC Method 966.04 (Method II) was used as the
reference method to provide baseline data to assess TSM
Method performance data strongly supported validation
See: Tomasino et al., (2008) J.AOAC Int. 91, 833-851.
TSM assigned "First Action" status (AOAC — Method
2008.05)
Video clips are available on the AOACI website
4. Surrogate Stud
Surrogate Studies
Control Carriers for Test Microbes
Microbes
1. B. subtilis
2.B. xnthnzcis - Ames
3. B. artthrocis - ?; Sterne
Mean leg density
(repeatability SD)
7.K0.13)
7.1 (0.18)
7.2 (0.17)
Par-wise Comparisons
(p values;
Microbe 1 to Microbe 2 (0.96)
Microbe 2 to Microbe 3 <0.32)
Microbe 1 to Microbe 3 (0.045)*
nee; howjver, differrc = (0.14
Treated Carriers - Log Reduction
Microbes
B. subtilis
B. aittwacis - Ames
B. inttwacis- fiSteme
LR (repeatability SD) per Test Chemical
Bleach
Unadjusted pH
46(1.18)
Bleach
adjusted pH
4.9 (0.71)
5.8 (0.92)
6.1 (0.28)
Peracetfc acid/
hydrogen peroxide
5.5 (0.18)
5.1(1.0)
5.9 (0.53)
-------
Kempter
Surrogate Study
B. subtilis LR < B. anthracis Sterne (always)
B. subtilis LR < B. anthracis Ames LR (7 of 9 experiments)
B. subtilis LR statistically = Ames & Sterne LR (p<.05)*
[*One exception: B. subtilis LR < Ames LR for low cone, of
NaOCl (p<04)]
Overall, B. subtilis was shown to be as resistant or more
stant to the test che
ains on a hard,
ed to B. a. Ames
rface. This findi
supports use of B. subtilis in TSM validation study.
For results of surrogate study see: Tomasino et al., (2008)
J.AOAC Int. 91, 833-851
Three Step Method—
New Initiatives
Shorten the Method—combine fractions B & C
Other Formulations — Gases
Chlorine Dioxide
Vaporized Hydrogen Peroxide
Additional Microorganisms
Vegetative Bacteria
Bio-threat agents
Clostridium
Applications of TSM
(AOAC Method 2008-05)
ORD - NHSR
Interagency Biological Restoration Demonstration
(IBRD) — Evaluation of decontamination
chemicals for outdoor use
Sponsored by Defense Threat Reduction A
(DTRA) and DHS
4 year program
ORD/NHSRC & OPP Collaboration with Battelle
on Test Methods
Battelle —Surrogate Verification Study
Other OPP Efficacy
Research Initiatives
Evaluation of media and growth conditions for
culturing virulent and avirulent strains of Y. pes
and F. tularensis
Spore distribution on various coupon materials
using scanning electron microscopy (SEM)
Battelle labs will run tightly controlled studies in
surrogates to several sporicides
Summary
EPA has issued new guidance for registration of
anthrax-related products (PR Notice 2008-2) and is
actively guiding interested companies towards
registrations.
Draft guidance on efficacy testing for anthrax-
related claims was vetted with the FIFRA SAI
2007 and will be published in draft for public
comment in 2009.
Upcoming research emphasizes development and
validation of quantitative efficacy test methods for
different surfaces, spore surrogates, and «+!-••"*•
pathogens.
-------
Bass
Toward a Systems-of-Systems
Approach to Hazard Mitigation
EPA Decontamination Workshop
Chapel Hill, North Carolina
September 24, 2008
Charles A. Bass, Jr., Ph.D., P.E.
Agenda
Chemical and Biological Defense Program (CBDP)
overview
Hazard Mitigation Needs and Challenges
- Near-Term
- System-of-Systems
- Far-Term
General technology development approach
CBDP Overview
Jam Rt9uacm«n Otnci
OFFICE OF'
KHHOUKI QfFKl
irr/vE DEVEL
Delivering Joint Wartighting Capabilities
CBRN Doctrinal Elements
Collective Protect Io
- Mobile
- Transportable
- Fixed
Decontamination
- Individual I
- Equipment
- Fixed Site
Hazard
Mitigation
Battle Analysis
Modeling
Simulation - Traininc
Integrated Early War
Medical Surveillance
Mod-Sim &
Battlespace
Awareness
1
The Low-Burden Imperative
Like Improvised Explosive Devices (lEDs), future threat
use of CB weapons will probably be immediate, intense,
and local. Thus, to have their greatest impact, protective
and hazard mitigation measures must be constantly
available. This necessitates low-burden equipment.
Sources of burden:
• Physiological
• Cognitive
• Logistical
• Operational
The Self-Leveling Effect
"/ see Comp'ny E got th' new-style gas masks"
Bill Mauldin, © United Feature Syndicate, Inc., 1944
-------
Bass
UNCLASSIFIED
.Needsand Challenges
Endstate Goals:
Hazard Reduction Lower MOPP Level
Balancing Effectiveness and Suitability:
Material Compatibility Hazardous Materials Shipping/Storagi
Rethinking Life-Cycle Management (Early in Development):
Dispose
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
, Decontamination DoD Joint Doctrine
Immediate
• Individual and operator
• Skin decon; Operator spray-down
• Minimize causalities; save lives
• Limits spread of contamination
Operational
MOPP gear exchange; Operator wash-down
Limitscontamination spread and exposure
Temporary relief from MOPP
Thorough
Jjfl
• Specialized units
• Detailed personnel, equipment dec
• Reduces MOPP level
• Reconstitutes combat power
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
Near-Term Challenge
Challenge: Transition general purpose formulations
Objective: Effective, broad-spectrum, environmentally safe,
formulations that are dual-use and logistically sustainable
Approaches:
"Green"
surfactant/ solvent
~i% systems
%y
Nano-materials
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
.Balancing Needs
Oxidizers that are stable for shipping
and storage
Reactive/ catalytic materials with
sufficient shelf-life and pot-life
Formulations with dual-use potential
Reactants/ solvents that are "green1
and do not harm military materials
Unreasonable to expect this achievable with a single approach!
UNCLASSIFIED
Surfactant Wash - "Super Soap"
Technology Benefits:
* Effective and complete
surface removal of
contamination
* Compatible with
commercial application
equipment
* Consumed during day-
to-day operations
Challenges:
* Run-off containment
* Achieving MIL-PRF-
87937D standards
% Remaining on CARC alter Surfactant Wash
DBBP and CEPS
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
M Electrochemical Chlorine Dioxide
Technology Benefits:
* Decon device is
lightweight and man-
portable
* Stable chemical
precursors are easily
shipped and stored
* Weight reduction and
reduced logistics burden
Challenge:
* Developing Data Set for
TRA panel
[ NaCIO2 ] ( NaBr
Electrochemical cell
(^e> r^n
Oxidant Nucleophile
I Logical I G-agents
Polycarb + eCIO2 (Br) Solution 15 minute contract time
1 OOE+07 B. Anthracis Delta Sterne
OOE+06
OOE+05
OOE+04
.OOE+03
OOE+02
OOE+01
OOE+00
UNCLASSIFIED 12
-------
Bass
UNCLASSIFIED
Enzymatic Decontamination
',••* .. '•'• ji iH^sHp
Approach:
* Single enzyme-based
formulation to detoxify V
and G-series nerve
agents, HD, and
biological weapons
Technology Benefits: am
* Reduced logistical "^
burden | ;*™
* Formulation material 1 BMai>
compatibility | 8Ch
* Weight reduction and 4»
reduced logistics 2°
burden
Challenge:
* Chemical Efficacy (HD)
GD decon with VX decon with
hydrolases oxidases
*IBD™ T™,»» *^ ~££
iT3"^" ( ./T^3
J iV
// j :/
/ i^__ "y_^
" "-^C K.Mi,,,^-^"M ° "
controls
UNCLASSIFIED 13
UNCLASSIFIED
Hazard Mitigation Systems-of-
Systems (HMSoS)
Self-Detoxifying/ Anti-
Microbial Surfaces
Directed Energy
Approaches
Decon System-of-Systems
(DSoS)
J^
^m^r
Strippable Coatings
Agent Disclosure
I Combination of synergistic processes to: (1) more rapidly reduce hazard closer
to the point of contamination; (2) enable a more rapid reduction of MOPP
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
Possible Operational Vignette
4 6
time (hours) ->
Thon
yugh
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
.Agent Disclosure Spray
Spot Test
• VX in 50 pL IPA in single spot on
ceramic tiles
• Detection limit: 0.05 Lig VX
Area Test
• VX in 1 ml IPA in 10 cm x 10 cm
area on ceramic tiles
• Detection limit: 0.5 Lig VX
• Represents amount left on a 10 g/m2 contaminated surface after >
99.999% efficient decon process
Surface Compatibility
• VX in 1 ml IPA on plastic, aluminum, glass, stainless steel
• Detected 2.5 ug VX/100 cm2 on glass, stainless steel, acrylic plastic, and
aluminum
• Surface had no discernable impact on spray performance
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
Far-Term Challenge
Challenge: "Smart" Hazard Mitigation
Objective: Develop Technologies that Activate in
Specific Response to a Targeted Agent and Signal
Activation/ Completion - Sense, Respond and Signal
Approaches:
p.*
tt.
Self-Amplifying
Molecular Switches
Encapsulate and
Delivery
UNCLASSIFIED
Self-Amplifying Active
Sites
UNCLASSIFIED
HMSoS Technology Development
Decon Assurance Spray
Dial-a-Decon Study
Microwave Decon
Strippable Coating
UNCLASSIFIED
-------
Bass
Technology Development Process
Technical Readiness Levels (TRL)
Applied Research
Program Milestones /A\ /B\ /C\ FRP
Technology Development Process
Relevant environment
Feasibility ~\ "Breadboard"
~\
±
Operational
environment
Component "Brassboard"
integration lncreasing fidelity
Effectiveness (agent & simulant work)
Scalability factors
Materials compatibility
Environmental safety / occupational health
UNCLASSIFIED
Surface Chemistry Analysis Tools
-
Spectrometer: L j—. Nanoparticle
V,poran,l,,i, |nDMaory Preparation
Experimental Set-up
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
Recent Discoveries: Catalytic Decomposition
? DMMP on Nanoparticulate Au/TiO2
350q! 3000 2500 2000 l ^500 1000
Pure 25 nm TiO2 particles show limited reactivity toward the simulant DMMP;
however, significant oxidation to CO is observed for 3nm Au particles on a TiO2
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
Summary
Synergy achieved by a combination
of treatments applied together
Some treatments achieve value
only as a part system-of-systems
Goal is to enable reduction of
MOPP earlier
Delivering Best Technology to the Warfighter!
UNCLASSIFIED
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Yang
Wide Area Restoration Following Biological
Contamination
Systems Analysis for Interagency Biological Restoration
Demonstration (IBRD) Program
September 24, 2008
Wilthea Hibbard
Bob Greenwalt IL
Robin Miles
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
Lynn Yang
Julie Fruetel *—
Dave Franco tn\
Donna Edwards *••
Ben Wu
Sandia National Laboratories
The restoration process for an indoor bio-
release has been established...
...what has not been established is the restoration
strategy for a wide area urban bio-release
For example:
Given limited resources, what should be restored first?
What are appropriate methods for large-scale outdoor venues?
What technologies would reduce timelines and cost?
IBRD Program Overview
Objective: to develop technologies,
methods, plans and policies necessary to
restore a wide area, including military
installations and critical infrastructures, in
the event of a large outdoor aerosol release
of anthrax
IBRD partner and pilot city is the Seattle
Urban Area to include Fort Lewis, WA and
McChord Air Force Base
Four-year program, started in 2007, collaboratively sponsored and managed by
the Department of Homeland Security and the Department of Defense.
IBRD Tasks
Task 1: Front-end systems analysis to:
- Assess existing technologies and processes for wide area
restoration- the "as-is" state;
- Develop an as-is decision framework for wide area restoration
- Identify and prioritize capability gaps
Task 2: Development of Consequence Management
Plan
Task 3: Technology Development and Demonstration
Task 4: Workshops and Exercises
Scenario for Systems Analysis
Problem:
Two surreptitious releases of Bacillus
anthracis spores in downtown Seattle and at
Fort Lewis (based on National Planning
Scenario Number 2)
Initial conditions:
BioWatch positives for Bacillus anthracis
Confirmatory tests have been made
Emergency response has been activated and
is underway
Mass prophylaxis distribution has begun
Hospitals are in surge mode and
overwhelmed with sick and worried well
People who were contaminated live in other
communities as well
Some contaminant has been tracked into
surrounding areas
Area for restoration is on the order of tens of square miles.
Systems Analysis Process
Is Decision Framework
Step 2: Walk through Decision Framework
to develop a plausible Baseline Example
Tim
Baseline
Example
Step 3: Parameterize baseline scenario in
spreadsheet and expand decision framework
layers to identify Critical Parameters
Step 4: Conduct qualitative and quantitative
analyses to prioritize Gaps. Chokepoints
Many unknowns and uncertainties:
methodology must be flexible!
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Yang
Data was gathered from interviews and workshops with
decision makers, technical advisors, resource providers,
and restoration experts
Local
City of Seattle Emergency
Management
King County Office of Emergency
Management
U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency- Region 10
• FEMA-Region 10
Pierce County Department of
Emergency Management
• Seattle & King County Public
Health
• Pierce County Public Health
• Port of Seattle
Pierce County Executive
Fort Lewis Emergency
Management
Madigan Army Medical Center
Law enforcement
• Fire
• Washington Mutual
• West Point Waste Treatment
Center
State
• Washington National Guard 10th Civil
Support Team (WMD)
• Washington State Department of Health
Washington Department of Transportation
Pacific Northwest Economic Region
Federal
EPA National Decon Team
• US EPA-HQ
• Center for Disease Control, NIOSH
• USNORTHCOM
• USARNORTH
• Air Staff and Army Staff
Army Corps of Engineers
• CHPPM
• Coast Guard
• U.S. Postal Service
Other
Subject Matter Experts
Sabre and Steris
1
Data was also gathered through
Literature Reviews
OAL: Find references that apply to or provide guidance foi
wide-area remediation, and that can provide basis or justificatioi
for IBRD plans.
?
ication
* Plans and Protocols .
* Policy and Legislation .
* Other Studies, Reports, Lessons
Learned
... complementary to Subject
Matter Expert areas
Over 300 documents were reviewed.
One-Page Summaries
* Abstract
. Citation information
. Sections relevant to IBRD
Bottom Line for As-ls State
If incident happened today, the organizations and individuals
involved would basically understand their roles and responsibilities
However, plans, policies, procedures and technologies are
Significant knowledge gaps exist; for example:
- Health risk levels
- Outdoor environmental fate and transport
- Outdoor characterization and cleanup
This scenario would be "overwhelming"; processes would be "ad
hoc" and developed in real time
High-level framework and strategic guidance exists, but not tactical
Therefore, to be able to analyze gaps, we developed a plausible
decision framework-this underlies our baseline scenario example
and gaps analysis
- This framework builds on an existing Federal decision framework
'—""^-.Developed Expanded Decision
f Framework for Wide-Area Restoration
As-ls Decision Framework
- Started with and Interagency Draft Clean-up Decisi
- Expanded in areas where many decisi
- Color-coded based on issues
- Doubled the number of tasks in framework
Used in Baseline Example
Systems Analysis Process
Step 2: Walk through Decision Framework
to develop a plausible Baseline Example
Baseline
Example
First step is characterization:
Establish contamination zones
Strategy to establish Hot Zone and
contaminated buildings
• Low-density sampling
• Grid surface sampling outdoors
• Targeted indoor sampling: HVAC
inlets and building entrances
• High-density sampling
• Directed surface sampling outdoors
• Surface sampling in buildings
identified by low-density sampling
• Air samplers measure level of re-
suspension
Strategy to establish Warm Zone
• IMAAC plume, possible
epidemiological data (human and
animal)
• Air sampling outdoors and in
critical infrastructure finds hot spots
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Yang
Areas for restoration must be prioritized
^- J—• Local officials set priorities. For example:
National/regional Minimal Essential Infrastructure (restore socb-economics)
"Critical organizatbns, personnel, systems and facilities essential to natbnal economic success
and national security"
Substantial impact of local infrastructure on regbn/natbn
Scenario includes regbnal MEI:
1-5 :200,000 vehicles/day
Port of Se : 60% of goods transported to regions outside of Seattle area; 1 millbn
transportainers/year
Port of Tacoma: 2 millbn tranportainers/year
• Fort Lewis
Hot zone: outdoor areas with unacceptable contamination levels (human safety, stabilize
situatbn): becomes Priority 1 if area is not evacuated
Warm zone: outdoor areas with unacceptable contamination levels (hot spots) (human
safety)
Facilities: indoor (restore socb-economics)
A. Key lifeline critical infrastructure (hospitals, police headquarters, power statbns, etc.)
B. Key economic critical infrastructure (military assets, key industry, etc.)
C. Other critical infrastructure
D. Other business
E. Residences 13
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Contaminated
Areas (Outdoors &
Indoors)
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strategy: Critical outdoor
Dtential source: min mize health risk
bility to pr oritize bu Idings for remed ation
ill el restoration of bu Idings (private and publ c funding)
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Assumptions: Outdoor/indoor remediation
Outdoors: Wash down building exterior surfaces to
ground and decon ground
• Spray: > 1 /8" of water on surfaces
• Seattle produces 187 million gal/day water
• Sewage Treatment up to 440 million gal/day
• Bleach on asphalt, Virkon S on soil
• Firemen perform decon, supertanker on highways
• Potential contaminated waste (vehicles, etc.)
Indoors: Decon with chlorine dioxide or vaporous
hydrogen peroxide - limited units available
• Downtown Seattle buildings
• 3800 buildings total
• 200 high and bw rise buildings (>240K sq ft)
• Assume 15% buildings will be contaminated
• Limited vapor generators available (<10 for ClOj)
• Sensitive equipment decon separately (computers, etc.)
• Potentially significant waste products (carpet etc.)
St John's Hospital: Oxnard,CA
• Mold
• 350,000 sq ft
• $24 millbn
Clearance sampling should be done before
reoccupation
Clearance strategy
• Establish clearance methods for outdoor and indoor areas that are
consistent with the establishment of hot and warm zones
Clearance criteria
• Indoor: zero growth on any sample taken (culture samples)
• Outdoor: no standard; risk-based approach is needed
• Above natural background
• Health risk-based
Baseline example assumptions for indoor clearance:
• 120 samples/floor
• 4 samples/hour/team (1200 samples/day)
• Culture analysis for all samples
• Rapid viability method in development
• 200 samples analyzed/day
• 15%-20% of building interiors may not pass clearance
Systems Analysis Process
Step 3: Parameterize baseline scenario in
spreadsheet and expand decision framework
layers to identify Critical Parameters
Step 4: Conduct qualitative and quantitative
analyses to prioritize Gaps. Chokepoints
Baseline Uy Analysis/ \_N,
Scenarb PA Spread sheet l=^=i/
Many unknowns and uncertainties:
methodology must be flexible!
Methodology for Prioritizing Gaps
Analysis was done in two parts, with two approaches, for robustness:
Part 1: Qualitative analysis of decision framework to determine gaps
and their priority
- Analyzed each action/decision in decision framework (layers)
- Ranked each task according to current ability to accomplish it
- Prioritized resulting gaps
Part 2: Quantitative analysis of critical path using timeline, Monte Carlo
and case study analyses to determine priority of gaps based on:
- Impact on timeline (Chokepoints)
- Uncertainty
- Impact on restoration effectiveness and public health
Results from these analyses were cross-checked, then merged into
a single priority list.
-------
Yang
Qualitative Analysis of Decision Framework
Analyzed each action and decision
- Who's involved
- Tools used
- Information required
- Resulting gaps
- Color coded tasks: Can it be done?
How hard is it to do?
Color coding results:
- 124 tasks & „
decisions overall
- 41 green
- 39 yellow
- 44 red
I 80 gaps were identified and prioritized.
Spreadsheet model was developed to conduct
Quantitative Analyses
Timeline Analysis identified chokepoints
Characterization
time is dominated
by lab analysis and
high density indoor
sampling time.
Monte Carlo Analysis identified critical
parameters across a range of assumptions
Monte Carlo identifies parameters with greatest impact on outcomes
Takes into account uncertainty by varying all parameters across defined ranges and
distributions.
Area of suspected
contamination has
downstream effects
on all phases of
restoration.
Rank Correlation
Factor
Case Studies were analyzed to prioritize gaps
identified in Timeline and Monte Carlo Analyses
Oil Critical Path
mple lab throughput (#/day)
Example: Minimize
impact of the highest
priority gap, and then
rerun cases to identify
the next highest
priority gap
Results from all analyses approaches were
combined to generate the gap priority list
TOP: These scope the restoration effort and have downstream effects
Lack of risk-based approach for determination of inhalation hazard
(indoor and outdoor)
Lack of validated methods for outdoor characterization
Lack of validated outdoor decontamination strategy, methods,
materials and technologies
SECOND: These reflect high multiplier or uncertainty effects
Current indoor clearance standard may be impractical for wide area
Lack of validated methods and standards for outdoor clearance
THIRD: Some experience, but need to apply to wide area
Limited resources for indoor decontamination
Lack of validated method to identify building decontamination
requirements
-------
Yang
Additional Issues Identified in
.
'• ' Qualitative Analysis
• Prioritization of areas for restoration
- Important to all phases of restoration
• Solid waste issue
• Self Remediation
- People will do something
- Will reduce subsequent exposure
- Need to have guidance
- Significantly reduces decontamination load
• Knowledge
- The overarching deficiency is lack of knowledge in many areas
* Affects every major area of restoration
Conclusion/Next Steps
The IBRD front end systems analysis guides the strategy for
addressing wide area bio-restoration
- Developed and applied a systematic, robust methodology for
evaluating wide area restoration capabilities and processes
- Prioritized gaps
Results from the systems analysis are supporting the next IBRD
tasks: development of consequence management plans and
restoration technologies
Gaps most effectively addressed
through multi-tiered approach
Lack of risk-based approach for determination of inhalation hazard
(indoor and outdoor)
- Technology: means to measure reaerosolization; health risk
uoocooiVient tools; rapid agent viability test; long-term monitoring
technology
- Science: particle-surface interactions and reaerosolization rates;
correlation between surface contamination, reaerosolization and
hearth risk; infectivity of agent
- Policy: risk-based health standards
Lack of validated methods for outdoor characterization
- Technology: characterization database tool, smart sampling tools.
alternate sampling technologies that are better correlated to health
risk
- Methods: validated methods (e.g., overall strategy, where to sample?,
how many? air monitors + surface sampling?)
- Science: agent fate and transport models
- Policy: risk-based standards on how clean is safe
- Capacity: lab throughput
-------
Nalipinski
HOW IT STARTED
ker & son diagnosed
le FBI, CT Department of Health sample hide
>m the work shed & detect live anthrax spore:
CT Department
Department of Public Health request EPA
INITIAL RESPONSE
Unified Command was established includinc
• CT Department of Env. Protection
US EPA
Initial FBI/CST characterization depict wide
spread contamination in shed, spores in car
trunk, and limited detects along path in house.
-------
Nalipinski
DECONTAMINATION RESPONSE
Members of the UC were recei
CDC/NIOSH did not support usii
re were differences betwei
DECONTAMINATION RESPONSE
The wooden work shed and its contents, the c:
and parts of the house that tested positive for
anthrax were all vacuumed, and then treated
with bleach.
Following treatment, sampling was extended to
other areas in the house to evaluate the entire
house.
-------
Nalipinski
CONTINUED RESPONSE
ISSUES
September extensive sampling results showed that the
vacuuming/bleaching were successful in the shed &
car. No live spores in any of the samples taken.
However, the 'newlv1 sampled areas of the house
Decontamination
National Decontar
UC clarified their initial objec
ccupanc
ATIO
OCCUPATION"
ecember 2007
FUMIGATION DECISION
PREPARATION TO FUMIG
Bleaching successfully resulted in NO LIVE
SPOREs in extensive sampling in the shed, car,
majority of personal goods and parts of the
house.
Unified Command concluded that porous items
(house and personal items) needed to be
fumigated to ensure no live spores.
Fumigation conducted for the house and
personal items December 2007.
Find a 'qualified' fumigation contractor.
Fund the contract
Enter into a contract
Mobilize
-------
Nalipinski
FUMIGATION HURDLES
Clarify SOW: decon, shipping, timing of field
Safety Issues
Logistical Responsibilities
Financial Resonsibilities
CONCLUSIONS
Unified Command representatives need to agree
on and stick to objectives that are made.
HEPA vacuuming and washing with amended
bleach resulted in no live Ba spores on any
samples taken from porous shed materials.
National Decon Team procured fumigation
contractor. Regional ERRS couldn't.
RECOMMEDATIONS
POLICY QUESTIONS
Coordination
CDC/NIOSH
, during responses.
• All response organizations i
Research:
ite using ICS.
Coordinate NHSRCs research with practical fiel
Should EPA respond to 'naturally occurring'
anthrax in residences?
What is EPA's role in coordinating with other
agencies who are conducting anthrax responses
E.G., CDC/NIOSH, Customs Border Patrol,
USDA.
Should other types of decontamination besides
fumigation be aggressively evaluated?
-------
Nalipinski
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
EPA Region 2
National Homeland Security Research Center
USCG Atlantic Strike Team
Region One OSCs Bazenas, Young, & Gardner
-------
Dechant
Expedited Fumigation of a
Large Hospital as Related to
Biological Contamination
Scenarios
Project Objective
• Determine feasibility of rapidly decontaminating a large
healthcare facility with C1O2 gas in the event a biological
agent is released within and disseminated throughout the
facility:
Logistical feasibility: Can it be done safely in a timely
manner?
• Technical feasibility: Can it be done successfully with
a single C1O2 gas application?
Project Rationale
Capacity of US hospital system is such that the loss of a
major medical center for an extended period of time due
to contamination by a biological agent could have very
serious consequences.
It is therefore imperative that:
• a viable decontamination technology be demonstrated
in such an environment.
a plan be developed to deploy this technology quickly
should a contamination event result in a facility
closure.
Cooperating Agencies
• United States Environmental Protection Agency
Office of Research and Development
Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response
Office of Pesticide Programs
• Environmental Response Team
National Decontamination Team
• Various state and local regulatory authorities
History of CIO2 Fumigation Process
Developed in response to the 2001 Bacillus anthracis
(anthrax) attacks because of properties of ClO2 gas:
True gas at standard conditions
Free radical molecule that decays rapidly
Decay products are harmless salts
Powerfiil antimicrobial agent
Highly penetrating into porous materials
Used successfully to decontaminate the Hart Senate Office
Building and large-scale postal centers in Washington, DC
and Trenton, NJ.
Large projects took more than one year each to complete
-------
Dechant
History (continued)
Following completion of the anthrax cleanup projects, ClO2
technology was named the "standard" for bio-weapon
decontamination by the National Academy of Sciences.
This technology has since been transformed into a mobile
system that can be deployed quickly to any location.
This transformation has allowed the technology to be
tested in a variety of applications:
Pharmaceutical manufacturing
Large-scale animal husbandry
Mold and mildew treatment
• Bio-terrorism response preparedness
Project Facility
Five-story regional medical center with 345,000 square
feet (ft2) of floor space, 5.2 million cubic feet of volume,
and hundreds of rooms and spaces.
• Garden Level - 68,000 ft1
Mall Level -140,000 ft1
Second Level - 71,000 ft1
Third Level - 33,000 ft1
Fourth Level - 33,000 ft1
Eighteen air handling units (AHUs) serving 22 functional
zones within the building.
-------
Dechant
Project Challenge
Conduct entire project as if being done in response to
widespread biological contamination in a large hospital
facility:
• Complete mobilization and site preparations in a matter of weeks
rather than months or years as has been the case for other large-scale
projects .
Perform fumigation within a matter of hours following completion of
site preparation activities.
• Re-open facility for public use within a matter of hours following
completion of fumigation.
Fumigation Component Systems
ClO2 generation system
ClO2 delivery system
• Process monitoring system
Efficacy monitoring system
* ClO2 containment system
CIO2 Generation System
ClO2 may not be transported in commerce because of its
potential explosivity. It must be generated at the point of
use.
Reported LEL for ClO^ gas is 100,000 ppm
ClO2 for this project was generated using a portable three-
chemical generation system :
Sodium hypochlorite
• Hydrochloric acid
Sodium chlorite
CIO2 Generation System
Generation process utilizes a two-stage reaction in a series
of columns:
NaOCl + 2HC1 + 2NaClOz -> 2C1OZ + 3NaCl + Hfl
Once formed, the C1O2 gas is immediately educted into a
flowing water stream at a safe dissolved concentration
level and sent to a nearby storage tank.
-------
Dechant
CIO2 Delivery System
When the fumigation process begins, generated liquid
C1O2 solution is pumped from the storage tank to a series
of gas "emitters" that strip the gas back out of solution.
• The C1O2 gas is then directed into the intakes for each
building AHU via external ducting.
18 separate rooftop AHU intakes
AHUs are operational throughout the fumigation process
and are controlled externally to maintain proper
distribution of C1O2 throughout the facility.
-------
Dechant
CIO2 Delivery System
• ClO2 is added to building intermittently throughout the
fumigation process to maintain the desired concentration
level within the facility.
Must continually overcome natural "decay rate" of the structure
and its contents due to free radical nature of ClO2,
After it passes through the emitters, depleted solution
returns to a second storage tank to become feed-water for
the generator in a 100% recycling process flow loop.
Process Monitoring System
Process monitoring devices were placed at 38 locations
throughout all five levels of the facility in order to monitor:
• Temperature
Relative humidity
ClO^ Concentration
• ClOj CT (concentration x time) dose
At least two process monitoring points were located in
each AHU zone.
-------
Dechant
Process Monitoring System
Fumigation process monitoring is conducted in a
series of mobile laboratories:
Data Laboratory: Collection and management of electronic
data from temperature/RH sensors throughout building.
Air Sampling Laboratory: Collection of ClO2 gas samples
from remote locations throughout building.
Analytical Laboratory: Analysis of ClO2 gas samples from
remote locations throughout building and liquid samples
from ClO2 generation system.
Efficacy Monitoring System
Paired Bis were placed within occupied spaces and above
false ceilings throughout the five level facility:
660 pairs placed on a computer-generated random-stratified basis
200 pairs placed on a "hard-to-reach" basis
Each BI contained a 1.9 x io6 titer of Bacillus atrophaeus
spores (formerly known as B. subtilis, var. niger).
B. atrophaeus spores are known to be the most difficult life
form to inactive with ClO2 gas.
-------
Dechant
CIO2 Containment System
A tenting system was constructed of polyethylene
sheeting, a material known to be impervious to C1O2
gas-
Polyethylene sheets were sealed together with clamps
and affixed to the ground with sand "snakes."
A slight negative pressure was maintained on the
inside of the tent to improve the seal and prevent gas
leakage.
-------
Dechant
CIO2 Containment System
Tent system performance was monitored throughout the
fumigation by USEPA's Trace Atmospheric Gas Analyzer
(TAGA) bus to ensure compliance with applicable ambient
ClO2 exposure standards.
Bus moves throughout the surrounding neighborhood monitoring
ambient ClO^ levels.
• Positioning of the bus is guided by on-board weather monitoring
station.
TAGAhas part-per-trillion measurement sensitivity for ClO^ gas.
-------
Dechant
Fumigation Operation
The actual fumigation operation was conducted on a
weekend, starting shortly after midnight, for several
reasons:
Smallest number of people "out and about" in community:
Minimizes public "curiosity" factor.
• Minimizes potential for ambient ClO^ exposures.
Minimizes traffic interference for USEPA TAGA bus.
Best possible coverage time for emerge
personnel in the event of a ClO3 release.
•ncy response agency
Results - Logistical
All site preparations including mobilization, equipment set-
up, HVAC system assessment, monitor installation, tenting
and testing were completed in a period of only five weeks.
Actual fumigation operation including RH conditioning,
ClO2 introduction, ClO2 maintenance and ClO2 removal was
completed in a period of less than 48 hours.
Facility was re-opened to the public within five days of
initial closure.
Results -Technical
All fumigation systems functioned precisely as designed.
Pervasive sporicidal conditions were achieved throughout
the facility during treatment:
• 856 of 860 BI pairs placed throughout facility showed sterility
Remaining four Bis showed < 100 spores left out of initial 1.9 x io6
Ambient ClO2 exposure standards not exceeded at any
time.
ClO2 levels inside the building were near background
within 12 hours of completing the fumigation.
Difficulties Encountered
Extensive maintenance work was required to bring the
HVAC system into conformance with its design
specifications.
The desired RH level was difficult to achieve and maintain
throughout the facility during fumigation.
Target level of 75 percent RH proved very challenging in a hospital
environment in a dry climate.
Difficulties were encountered in clearing personnel from the
building so the fumigation process could begin.
-------
Dechant
-------
Mickunas
2008 Workshop on Decontamination and Associated Issues
for Sites Contaminated with Chemical, Biological, or
Radiological Materials
Utilizing a Trace Atmospheric Gas Analyzer (TAGA) Triple
Quadrupole Mass Spectrometer Technology Mounted on a
Moveable Platform to Provide Indoor Air Concentrations
throughout a Structure before and after a Chlorine Dioxide
Fumigation
September 2008
David B. Mickunas
US EPA/ERT
-------
Mickunas
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Mickunas
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Ryan
Decontamination of Surfaces Contaminated
with Biological Agents using Fumigant
Technologies
Shawn P. Ryan and Joseph P. Wood
EPA/National Homeland Security Research Center
Vipin Rastogi, Lalena Wallace, and Lisa Smith
US Army — Edgewood Chemical Biological Center
Harry Stone, James V. Rogers, William Richter, Young Choi,
Andrew Phipps, Morgan Shaw, and Kim Weber
Battelle Memorial Institute
• Office of Research and Development
^y£PA NHSRC Decontamination
Research Program
• Provide information on technologies to support remediation and restoration
strategy development and implementation
-Technology efficacy as a function of practical application conditions
(e.g., temperature, RH) and scenarios (e.g., agents, materials)
-Application and generation considerations (e.g., does the technology have
the generation capacity or application procedures to achieve effective
conditions at the scale or geometry required)
-Material/equipment compatibility
-Optimize the in situ decontamination
vs. disposal paradigm
Office of Research and Development
Decon Method Development
Outline
Purpose: provide information on potential fumigant options tor biological
agent contamination of complex surfaces
Bacillus anthracis spores
- Vapor-phase hydrogen peroxide
- Methyl bromide gas
- Chlorine dioxide gas
Non-spore forming pathogens
(Brucella suis~} Francisella tularensis; Yersinia pesf/s; vaccinia virus)
- Chlorine dioxide gas
Kl Vapor-phase Hydrogen Peroxide (VPHP)
• STERIS VHP®:M-100S
- <35% RH at start of run
- (1) 300 ppmv H2O2 up to 7 hours; or
- (2) 500 ppmv H2O2 up to 9 hours
• Agents:
-B. antorac/sNNRIAI spores
• Materials:
-Carpet; wood; ceiling tile; concrete block
- Latex-painted wallboard
- Painted I-beam steel
• Biological indicators/spore strips
- -1E6 Geobacillus stearothermophilus
on stainless steel in breathable Tyvek
VPHP: Sample Analysis
• Test Coupons (TC): samples of materials inoculated with -1 E7 B. anthracis NNR1A1 treated at
specified fumigation conditions (concentration, temperature, RH, time); coupons dried overnight
after inoculation, before fumigation
• Positive Control Coupons (PC): samples of materials inoculated with -1E7 B. artfftrac/sNNR1A1
not exposed to fumigant; coupons inoculated at the same time as test coupons, dried overnight,
stored in the BSC, and analyzed at the same time as the test/blank coupons
• Negative Control (Blank) Coupons: samples of materials not inoculated; treated as Test Coupons
(QC)
• Extraction procedure:
- Coupons put in 50 ml_ conical vials
- 10 ml BPW with 0.01%Tween-80
- Sonicated (10 min) and vortexed (2 min)
- Dilution plating (spread and pour plating)
Inactivation of B. anthracis spores on
Complex surfaces with VPHP
Log of the number of colony forming units recovered from the materials
(Log10 CPU Recovered) after treatment for a specified time at a constant
H2O2 concentration (concentration x time = CT)
Concrete
Carpet ; ^™ ^
M
CT(ppmV-hrs) CT (ppmv-hrs)
CT to achieve a six log reduction (6-LR) reduction in CPUs observed to be a
strong function of material type
- Painted wallboard >4500 ppmv-hrs; wood >3000 ppmv-hrs;
painted I-beam steel >2500 ppmv-hrs; ceiling tile >1000 ppmv-hrs
-------
Ryan
Inactivation of Bacillus spores with VPHP:
Summary of Results
• Substrate material significantly impacts the kill kinetics; effectiveness needs to be
discussed in terms of materials to be decontaminated
- Inactivation of B. anthracis Ames on carpet at -1000 ppmv-hours
-All other materials (sealed or porous) required significantly higher CTs than
past-use requirement (1000 ppmv-hrs)
- No effectiveness on concrete, a material exhibiting extremely high demand for
thefumigant
• Equivalent CT values seems to yield consistent results for the two concentrations
(300 and 500 ppmv) included in the test matrix
• [Results not shown here] Inactivation of Bis (-1E6 G. stearothermophilus on
stainless steel in breathable Tyvek®) did not correlate to inactivation of
B. anthracis spores on building surfaces
- Bis show no growth well before success condition is met for environmental
contamination
^B Office of Research and Development
vvEPA
Methyl Bromide
Methyl bromide (99.5%; 0.5% chloropicrin)
- Concentrations: 53, 105, 211 mg/L
- Times out to 36 hours
- RH =75%; T= 37 °C
Agents:
- B. anthracis Ames spores ENDOS
- B. subtilis ATCC 19659
Materials (1.6x7.5 cm):
- Decorative laminate; Ceiling tile;
Galvanized metal ductwork;
Industrial carpet; Latex-painted concrete
- Cellulose insulation (13 mm dia.)
- Silk suture loops (Presque Isle Cultures)
- Glass (5x5 mm)
Biological indicators/spore strips
- -1E6 Bacillus atrophaeus ATCC on stainle:
; steel in breathable Tyvek
__ Methyl Bromide: Sample Analysis
• Test Coupons (TC): samples of materials inoculated with -1E8 B. anthracis or B. subtilus
treated at specified fumigation conditions (concentration, temperature, RH, time); coupons
dried overnight after inoculation, before fumigation
• Positive Control Coupons (PC): samples of materials inoculated with -1 E8 B. anthracis or
B. subtilus not exposed to fumigant; coupons inoculated at the same time as test coupons,
dried overnight, stored in the BSC, and analyzed at the same time as the test/blank coupons
• Negative Control (Blank) Coupons: samples of materials not inoculated; treated as Test
Coupons (QC)
Methyl Bromide: Experimental Set-up
Methyl Bromide: Parameter Control
Methyl Bromide Trial #15
4>EPA Inactivation of Bacillus anthracis
spores with MeBr
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1 200 1 300 1 400 1 500 1 600 1 700 1 800 1 900 2000
CT, mg/L-hr
@ C = [MeBr] = 1 05 mg/L; except last data point (21 1 mg/L)
-------
Ryan
SEPA
Inactivation of Bacillus anthracis
spores with MeBr
105mg/L, 18hrs
211 mg/L, 9 hrs
>-Painted Concrete
h Cellulose
Laminate
Galvanized Metal
'- Carpet
1870 1875 18
• Office of Research and Development
1885 1890
CT, mg/L-hr
6 LR) for the decontamination of B. anthracis Ames from a
broad range of materials
• Substrate material significantly impacts the kill kinetics; effectiveness should be
discussed in terms of materials to be decontaminated
- Inactivation of B. anthracis Ames on silk suture loops was easier than on any
other materials tested except galvanized metal
• Equivalent CT values seem to yield consistent results for the highest two
concentrations (105 and 211 mg/L) included in the test matrix; results may not be
generalized to other concentration -time combinations (53 mg/L seems less
effective as equivalent CT values)
• B. subtilis was very resistant compared to B. anthracis Ames, significantly
underestimating the log reduction if used as a surrogate
• A small, but significant, difference observed at 40% (less effective) compared to
75% RH; the difference was too small to have a practical significance.
Inactivation of Biological Agents
on Contaminated Materials with CIO2
• Agents:
- Bacillus anthracis Ames
- Brucella suis
- Yersinia pestis
- Franscicella tularensis
-Vaccinia virus
• Materials:
- Matte-finish aluminum
- Plastic (keyboard keys)
- Carpet
- Latex-painted wallboard (joint tape)
• Attenuation:
- "Natural"
-CIO2(testing completed -this presentation) [Sabre Technologies]
-BIOQUELL HPV (testing underway)
-STERIS VHP® (planning)
Inactivation of Biological Agents
on Contaminated Materials with CIO2
• Inoculation:
- 1 0OuL added to each coupon as 1 0-1 OuL droplets; except keyboard keys (1 OOuL droplet)
- -1 x1 08 CPUs or PFUs per coupon
• Drying:
-Spores: overnight
- Non-spores: 2 hours; except 4 hours on keyboard keys
• Time zero
- Recovered CPUs or PFUs after the drying time
• Treatment:
-Control: at temperature (-22 °C) and RH of the decon; nofumigant
-Decon: at target temperature (-22 °C), RH, and fumigant concentration
-------
Ryan
c pp- Inactivation of Bacillus anthracis Ames:
Impact of Materials and RH (3000 ppmv CIO2)
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-------
Ryan
vvEPA
Inactivation of Biological Agents
with CIO2: Summary of Results
• CIO2 was effective at reducing contamination against all agent/material
combinations used in this study
- Low concentration (~75ppmv) for short contact time (<2 hours) at 75% RH was
effective for complete inactivation of all non-spore agents/material combinations
tested (except B. suis and vaccinia virus on keyboard keys)
- B. suis and vaccinia virus on plastic keyboard keys required longer contact
times; perhaps effect of inoculation method (single 100 uL droplet vs.
10 x 10 uL droplets for other materials)
• Relative humidity is a critical parameter for effectiveness for all agents tested
except Y. pestis.
- Effectiveness dropped off very significantly at 60% and 40% RH for all other
agent/material combinations
• Persistence of agents (or natural attenuation) is a function of material and
conditions
^H Office of Research and Development
SER*
EPA On-going Efforts
Completion of study on multiple agents with BIOQUELL HPV and STERIS VHP®
Comparison of decontamination of Bacillus spores on materials as a function of
inoculation method
1. Loading and droplet concentration (titer) (w/ECBC)
2. Aerosol vs. liquid (EPA, RTP, NC)
- Concentration - time (CT) study to clarify CT requirements as a function of time at
low (100 ppmv) to high (3000 ppmv) concentrations
Comparison of efficacy test methods
(1) AOAC Official Method 966.04: Sporicidal Activity of Disinfectants Test
(2) AOAC Official Method 2008.05: Determining the Efficacy of Liquid Sporicides against
Spores of Bacillus subtiUs on a Hard Nonporous Surface Using the Quantitative Three
Step Method
(3) Methods used in these studies with building materials
Development of a chamber facility at EPA (RTP,NC) for decontamination studies
- Initial studies include low-tech, liquid methods
Summary of Results
• Effectiveness of a decontaminant is critically dependent upon the contaminated
material type
- High efficacy on one surface type does not equate to high efficacy on a
different surface type
- Decontaminant - material interactions are a critical factor affecting efficacy
• Measurement of process parameters during fumigation is essential to ensure
effectiveness of the decontamination (i.e., confirmation that effectiveness
conditions are achieved and maintained for the required duration)
• Selection of decontamination methods should consider:
- Efficacy for the agent on the contaminated materials
-Ability to achieve effective conditions in the field (e.g., can the target
concentration or relative humidity be achieved at the scale/env. required?)
- Impact of the decontamination procedure on equipment/materials at the target
use conditions
-Waste generation (i.e., incompatible materials)
-------
Mandich
Alcatel-Lucent (LGS Innovations, Decon Study USMMM235W9 )
Project sponsored by EPA and DHS through CBRTA
EPA Workshop, September 2008
Outline
1. Project overview and justification
2. Test matrix and test vehicles
3. Results of exposure
4. Failure modes
5. Repairability/recoverability from damage
6. Impact of COTS components
7. Summary and conclusions
Alcatel-Lucent DECON team
Development of Strategies, Guidelines and Plans to Decontaminate
Equipment following a Biological Weapons Attack
• Response to Homeland Security Presidential Directive 10: to develop
comprehensive and coordinated responses to biological weapons attack
• Goal: acquire specific data about impact of biodecontamination agents on
electronic equipment
• Fumigant selection: C102 in high humidity environment
— C102 used successfully to decontaminate multiple US Postal Service facilities
and American Media Inc. facility following "anthrax letter attacks" in 2001
- Substantial data now available on efficacy and practicality of C102 fumigation
for high-threat biological agents
• Test Vehicle: Dell desktop computers (prototypical electronic equipment)
• Objectives of testing are to determine:
— impact of C102 fumigation at different exposure conditions
— effect of high relative humidity during fumigation
— impact of computer power state (ON vs. OFF) during and after fumigation
-------
Mandich
Test Vehicles: Dell Optiplex 745 Mini-Tower Computers
• Contain typical electrical, optical and mechanical components
• Wide range of possible corrosion-susceptible materials
[Plastics used for cables, chip packages, connector bodies, printed
circuit board laminates and CPU cooler housing
Aluminum fins on CPU
and video chip heat sinks
Chopper heat pipes and base
)f CPU Cooler
Copper metal in all connectors
even when gold-plated
Copper Planes and
Transmission Lines
Immersion Silver Board Finish
Sheet metal chassis
Additional Test Vehicles
Pure Cu, Ag, and Al metal coupons - used as "corrosion gas monitors"
IPC boards - used to measure surface resistance changes
Biological indicators for 6. anthrads
Test Matrix Conditions
Test
Condition
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Equipment Power
State During
Fumigation
On
Off
On
On
On
On
On
Treatment
(all performed at EPA NHSRC)
High RH fumigation
Standard fumigation conditions
Standard fumigation conditions
Low C102 concentration
fumigation
Low C102 concentration and
low RH fumigation
High RH only (no C102 exposure)
Ambient (control)
Treatment Conditions
cioz
ppmv
3000
3000
3000
75
75
0
0
RH%
90
75
75
75
40
90
40
Temp DF
75
75
75
75
75
75
75
Time
(hrs)
3
3
3
12
12
3
Note: Three computers were exposed simultaneously in theMEC chamber for each
test condition. ALL) team received one exposed computer from each of the seven
tests for analysis in a blind study. Other two computers/exposure remained at EPA
NHSRC for assessment of post-fumigation performance over a one year period.
Results Following Exposure to C102
Assessment of Damage following C102 Exposure
1) Computer diagnostics (used PC Doctor™)
• Diagnoses failures for all key subsystems
• Performed immediately pre- and post-exposure,
then monthly at EPA NHSRC lab
2) Visual Inspection
3) Pure metal coupon weight gain, compositional analysis
Degradation of Computers: Results from Post-Exposure
Monitoring at EPA NHSRC (Information supplied by S. Ryan, EPA)
• Some failures intermittent. Overall, number of failures increases over time
* High failure rates seen for both 3000 ppm and 75 ppm CIO2
* High humidity promotes failure at both 3000 ppm and 75 ppm CIO2
* Power Off condition promotes failure relative to same exposure, Power On
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75 ppm, 75% RH, ON
75 ppm, 40% RH.ON
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-------
Mandich
Assessment of Damage Using Visual Inspection
• Corrosion observed in multiple materials
including aluminum, steel, silver, and
plated copper
• Different types of corrosion observed
- extensive particulate formation
from CPU Al alloy heat sink fins
- pore corrosion of plated copper
- corrosion of plated steel parts
— bleaching of cables
- hygroscopic salt generation
• Static Intercept™ packaging observed to
protect against further corrosion under
ambient environmental conditions
• Corrosion only occurred in computers exposed to 3000 and 75 ppm C102
— Extent of corrosion observed at 3000 ppm C102 greater than for 75 ppm
- Corrosion worse at higher %RH for both 3000 and 75 ppm Cl02
— Lowest amount of corrosion observed for 75 ppm C102 at 40% RH
Pure Metal Coupon Mean Weight Gain Correlates Well with
Total Exposure: [C102] x RH x Time
Average Weight Gain and RH-Adjusted Exposure
' 3000 ppm C107S
DECON Test Condition (per Test Matrix #s)
Hygroscopic corrosion products
Gold plated connectors
Optics in DVD/CD drive
Copious Quantities of Hygroscopic Corrosion Products Formed
AI-CI and AI-Ni
particles from
CPU heat sink
Note how dust sits between pins on 1C chips,
connectors, transistors, capacitors, etc. The
conductivity of this dust is highly dependent on
humidity and poses a long term reliability problem.
Many Gold Plated Connectors Heavily Corroded by C102 Exposure
Contact Plating
Structure
Au Thickness
Ni Thickness
Au Coverage
Au Layer?
DIMM Module
Connector on
DIMM
1 pm
3 urn
complete
NO
Connector on
motherboard
0.5 pm
2 urn
selective
YES
Hard Drive
Connector on
the drive
0.5 pm
2 urn
complete
YES
Connector on
the cable
0.1 pm
4 urn
selective
YES
>0.5 jim thick Au plating over Ni is required for connector to
survive the corrosive environment during CIO2 decontamination.
Corrosion Products Generated on One Connector
Transfer Readily to Another Mating Connector
Uncorroded
Edge Connector
1^ Au overall
I I I 1 I
Corroded
Socket Connector
O.Sji Au selective
Unforseen Consequence: Corrosion transfer occurred
between computers via the PC Doctor™ power tester
-------
Mandich
Many Dual DVD-CD Drive Failures Occurred in Exposed Computers
Location of Damage: Passive Optics in Optical Pickup Assembly
• Optics labeled in red fabricated with plastic optical materials. All of
these exhibit extensive laser damage, especially the quarter-wave plate
which also uses organic materials to achieve birefringent properties
• Optics labeled in blue are fabricated with CD
inorganic materials (silica, titania). Only one , DVD
of these has laser damage and then only on the
side facing the heavily damaged lens stack.
Beamsplitter
Objective Lens
1/4-Wave Plate
Focusing Lens
90° Turning mirror
Repairability and Recoverability
from Damage Caused by Exposure
Subsystem vulnerability
Corrosion progression
Repair/cleaning attempts
Corrosion migration
Overview of Subsystem Vulnerability to C102 Exposure
Most vulnerable subsystems
• Failures detected using PC Doctor™
- SDRAM DIMM module
- DVD/CD optical drive
- ICH8 chipset
- Graphics controller chipset
- ROM BIOS
- Audio CODEC chipset
- Monitor
• Damage detected by visual inspection
- Connectors of various types, especially SDRAM DIMM moduli
- Aluminum alloy CPU heat sink
More robust subsystems
• Passed PC Doctor™
- CPU pads, however, show onset of
- Hard drive
— LAN on motherboard chipsets
- Various DC-DC converter devices on motherboard
- Floppy drive and SuperlO controller
— Various frequency timing generators (oscillators and chipset;
- Keyboard and mouse
• OK by visual inspection
— Aluminum alloy graphics controller heat
Corrosion Progresses Long After Initial Exposure. Example:
Cut-Edge Corrosion of Plated Sheet Metal Screens
• Sheet metal is plated with organic coating/Zn/Fe stack then stamped
> Cut edges are not plated and are sites for corrosion
> Traditional Cr(VI)/Zn/Fe plating stack in these computers not used — Cr(VI) is
replaced with organic coating probably for RoHS compliance
• Corrosive residues overwhelm protection of sacrificial Zn layer and Fe is corroding
Subsystem Repair and Cleaning Are Not Effective Means to
Mitigate Corrosion and Failure
1. Monthly cleaning of hygroscopic dust particles
• Palliative only, new dust particles form in ambient room air
• Possible safety hazard: dust has particles with sizes in sub-Lim
range that disperse easily and contain Al, Ni, Cl, Fe, P, Cu
2. Memory failures caused by corrosion of DIMM connectors
• Typically occurs during reboot after longer term shutdown
• Reinsertion of DIMM card usually effective-wipes corrosion
off contact surfaces
• Reliable solution requires replacing both DIMM and
motherboard socket connector
3. Performed reflow to simulate circuit board repair
• ICs on control motherboard survived
• Observed 1C detachment on exposed motherboard,
indicates hidden damage to solder
Corrosion Products are Mobile and Easily Transferred
1. Observed corrosion transfer when plug devices into connectors
of exposed computers
• Corrosion transfer vector: highly mobile particulates
• Examples: DIMM cards, USB devices, LAN connections, monitors, etc.
2. Corrosion transfer can occur via test equipment,
e.g. PC Doctor™ power supply tester
• Observed corrosive particle transfer on both Au and Sn
connector surfaces
• Corrosion attacked flash gold on tester connectors
• Caused intermittent failures on exposed and unexposed computers
• Cleaning not practical
3. Hygroscopic dust readily migrated out of computers into environment
All exposed computers and associated test equipment
cables/connectors need to be quarantined to prevent corrosion
transfer to unexposed computers and components.
-------
Mandich
RoHS (Removal of Hazardous Substances)
Cost reduction in gold use
Plastic optics
Dell Optiplex Computers Comply with EU RoHS Directive
1. Motherboard has immersion Ag finish replacing traditional Pb-Sn HASL
• Ag-Ct corrosion products observed presenting long term reliability issue
2. Component attachment to motherboard uses SAC (Sn-Ag-Cu) solder
replacing traditional Pb-Sn solder
• SAC solder reliability relatively unknown in harsh environments
• Recent salt-fog study shows SAC degrades much more rapidly than Sn-Pb
• SAC solder may have contributed to 1C detachment during reftow
3. Organic coating replaces Cr(VI) as a non-reactive corrosion barrier on
plated steel
• Does not appear to afford much protection in Ct02 environment
Impact of these large-scale material replacements on electronics
robustness in harsh environments needs evaluation—particularly for
specialized fumigations used in bioremediation
Cost Reduction in Gold Use in COTS Components
1. >0.5 urn thick gold required to survi
• In late 1980's, 0.76 pm Au became s
finishes in the commercial electronic
2. Flash gold finishes afford little prot
• Consumer electronics increasingly u
that are only 0.1 -0.25 pm thick
3. Where selective Au plating used,
more corrosion occurs in Au-
plated areas due to galvanic
corrosion and Au film porosity
• Selective plating of Au only on
the contact wipe area also used
ve C102 fumigation
tandard for connector
s market
action against C102 exposure
>ing "flash Au" finishes
Hard Drive Cable Connector Pin
Exposed to CIO2
Use of thinner gold and selective plating is a disaster
where robustness in harsh environments is required
27 ™-™-,«™
RY2C08 WOHW LlKCfK fo
Use of Optical Plastics in Commercial COTS components
• Optical plastics are playing an increasing role in COTS components
- Can be engineered to perform complex linear and nonlinear optical functions
— Integrated with precision mounting components possible
- Amenable to low cost, high volume manufacturing
— Offer considerable savings over inorganic glass-based
optical elements in high volume applications
• Commercial optical plastics applications are expanding
— Digital cameras
- CD/DVD players, optical sensors, optical mice
— LED optics for lighting
- Optical scanners (fingerprint and retinal scanners) and sensors
Use of optical plastics poses major robustness problem since
these materials are highly susceptible to damage when exposed
to high humidity, oxidizing and other corrosive environments
Significant, In-depth Data Now Available on Impact of C102
Fumigation on Electronic Equipment
• Material choices used in test computers a significant reason for extent of damage
- Examples used by COTS commercial market for cost saving:
<• thinner gold plating on connectors
<• plastic optical components
•:• cut plated steel
- Many materials chosen with assumption of short service life
- Little consideration given to ability to repair or rework components
• Overall damage summary
- Corrosion of many different metals, e.g. Al, Ag, Ni, plated Cu, steel
- Bleaching of plastic coating on cables
- Variety of subsystems damaged, e.g. Au-plated connectors and CD/DVD drives
• Damage progresses in time
- Post exposure, corrosion processes continue
- Static Intercept™ bags arrest corrosion processes caused by ambient environment
• Extent of C102 corrosion quantified using pure metal coupons
- Excellent quantitative corrosion monitors
- Show that C102 corrosion highly sensitive to local relative humidity. Powered-On
computers have local hot zones with lower RH (Will this affect bioagent deactivation?)
-------
Mandich
Significant, In-depth Data Now Available on Impact of C102
Fumigation on Electronic Equipment, contd.
• C102 fumigation forms copious quantities of corrosive dust
- Easily transferred around making it a vector for further corrosion
- Dust is hygroscopic which leads to intermittent failures
- Submicron particle size and composition (e.g. Ni, Cl) suggests dust is safety hazard
• C102 fumigation causes extensive corrosion of many connectors in computers
- Only connectors that survived had gold plating thickness of >1u on both mating surfaces
- Other connectors had thinner gold and were heavily damaged, leading to failures
- Corroded connectors can transfer corrosion products to other unexposed connectors,
e.g. in replacement modules and test equipment, causing latent failures
• Most computers exposed to CIO- suffered DVD/CD disk drive failures
- Pointof failure: plastic optical components
- Both 3000 ppm and 75 ppm C102 exposures caused DVD/CD disk drive failures
- Worst failures in both BOOOppm and 75 ppm C102 exposures occurred at higher %RH
Overall results:
C102 exposures in study caused both intermittent and permanent failures in
multiple components within the Optiplex computers. Increased robustness
of electronic equipment to C102 fumigation is possible but will require strict
attention to corrosion resistance in materials, design, and fabrication.
-------
Rohrbough
UNCLASSIFIED
Laboratory-Scale Decontamination
Testing in Support of the
Interagency Biological Restoration
Demonstration (IBRD) Program
Major James G. Rohrbough, USAF, PhD
Defense Threat Reduction Agency
2008 Decontamination Workshop
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
Overview
DTRA Testing
The IBRD Program
Lab-Scale Surface Decon Testing
Future Testing
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
The Defense Threat Reduction Agency
DTRA Mission:
To safeguard the United States and its allies from weapons of
mass destruction, (chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear
and high-yield explosives) by providing capabilities to reduce,
eliminate and counter the threat and mitigate its effects.
Test Support Division (DTRA/CXT) Mission:
To provide end-to-end test event planning, management, safe
execution and results analysis supporting DoD, Federal
Agencies, and friendly nations' programs to counter
proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
CXT: DTRA's T&E Arm of RDT&E
CXT provides a rigorous, repeatable test
process, including end-to-end test planning,
execution, analysis and reporting
Types of tests: Test and Evaluation,
Demonstration, Experimentation, and Field
Test
Structural Survivability & Forensics
Scaled Testing
Weapons effects
Chem/Bio agent defeat demonstrations
Radionuclide defense/detection technologies
Underground test readiness
Technical support to 1C and CTR
Phenomenology
• Nuclear weapons effects simulations
• Materials penetrations
• Conventional munitions explosive effects
• Advanced energetics weapons fills
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
Interagency Biological Restoration
Demonstration (IBRD) Program
DHS/DOD Program
Aimed at developing policies, methods, plans and applied
technologies to remediate and restore large urban areas, military
installations, and critical infrastructure that have been
contaminated as a result of the release of a biological agent.
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
DTRA Testing in Support of IBRD
Laboratory testing (Currently underway)
• Crisis exemption determination using FIFRA (Federal Insecticide,
Fungicide, Rodenticide Act) guidelines. (EPA NHSRC TTEP)
• Laboratory testing of decon product to B. anthracls surrogate on
porous and non-porous surfaces using Three Step Method
Field testing (FY 2009)
• Identify and challenge multiple surfaces
Panels/swatches of predetermined size/characteristics
Surface porosity, permeability, reactivity, weathering,
oxidation, UV exposure, etc.
Final test location- TBD.
Wide area Decontamination event (FY 2010)
• Investigate simulated urban area test sites for demonstrating
decon technology/application on wide area.
UNCLASSIFIED
-------
Rohrbough
UNCLASSIFIED
Laboratory Testing Overview
• Study performed under EPA GLP guidelines
• (40CFR Part 160)
• Protocol based on Quantitative Three Step Method
• (ASTM E 2414-05 and AOAC method 2008.05)
• Analysis details
• B. atrophaeus (FKA B. globigii, B. subtilisvar. Niger) spores
• ATCC*9372
• >95% spore/vegetative cells
• Spore viability: 0-3 Log Reduction after 2 min in 2.5N HCI
• Positive control
• pH adjusted (7.0) bleach (6000 ppm)
• Negative control
• water
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
Laboratory Testing Overview
Two surfaces tested
• Porous - Porcelain Tile (0.5 cm cube)
• Non-porous - Stainless Steel (0.5 cm square)
• Six commercially-available decon agents
• CASCAD (Allen-Vanguard): dichloroisocyanurate
• Decon Green (ECBC): H2O2
• Peridox (Clean Earth Technologies): H2O2
• Sporklenz(Steris): H2O2
• EasyDECON 200 (Envirofoam Technologies): H2O2
• MDF-200 (Modec): H2O2
• Each surface/decon agent combination tested in
triplicate
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
Three Step Method
Quantitative Method to Determine Sporicidal Efficacy
on Contaminated Carrier Surfaces
In \ Md wT \
stonlf V LB B dh J/ u U X
Xf Aglaton N>^
k A
Centriluge
Spores I
CentrlugeB
Spores I .'
Sample B Sample C
k A
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
DTRA Field Testing
Field testing (FY 2009)
Medium scale, multiple surfaces, utilizing manufacturer's
dissemination devices (1-2 decon agents)
Concrete
Aluminum Panel
Composite panel
Glass
Coated Glass (Safety glass)
Brick
Limestone
Granite
Concrete block
Wood - treated
Asphalt paving
Shingles -root
Steel
Aluminum window tram
Steel
Painted surface
Wide area Decontamination event (FY 2010)
• Full scale, fewer surfaces, explosive release
• Utilizing dissemination devices
• Environmental impact considerations
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
Acknowledgements
DTRA
- Bruce Hinds, CXT
• Ryan Madden, CBT
EPA
• Dr. Stephen Tomasino
• Joe Wood
• Jeff Kempter
Lovelace Respiratory Research Institute
• Hammad Irshad
• Dr. Yung Sung Cheng
UNCLASSIFIED
-------
Burton
Field Evaluation of Gaseous
Chlorine Dioxide Treatment
for Microbial Contamination
Nancy Clark Burton, PhD, MPH, CIH
Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention
National Institute for Occupational
Safety and Health
SAFER* HEALTHIER* PEOPLE"
Legislative Authorization for NIOSH
Health Hazard Evaluations (HHEs)
1970 OSHAct, Section 20(a)(6) and 1977
MSHAct
NIOSH to conduct on-site toxicity determinations
• Respond to written request by employer or
authorized representative of employees
Determine whether any substance found in the
place of employment has potentially toxic effects
Submit determination to employers and affected
employees
Submit data to OSHA/MSHA if the substance is
not covered by a standard
NIOSH HHE
n Respond to requests for assistance
Provide current health hazard data to
employers and employees
n Identify problems and offer workplace
solutions
n Generate exposure and human toxicity
data
Precipitate research and development
HHE Request
Management of non-profit group
House to be used for women's shelter
Located in residential area near other
social service offices in remodeled
Victorian houses
Had roof leak that was not discovered for
several months which resulted in high
levels of microbial growth
n Roof leak repaired before site visit
Other Parties Involved
n Remediation company volunteered
treatment of microbial contamination
n Other parties
• U.S. EPA- TAGA
• City Government
-------
Burton
Chlorine Dioxide
n U.S. EPA approved as liquid disinfectant in
drinking water since 1967
n Exemption granted to use as gaseous
treatment for anthrax contaminated
buildings
Registered for use in Louisiana and Texas
for mold treatment after 2005 hurricanes
Chlorine Dioxide
Flammable
n Exposure symptoms are respiratory-based
Occupational exposure limits
-NIOSH IDLH 5 ppm
OSHA PEL, NIOSH REL, ACGIH TLV®
n 0.1 ppm as TWA
.NIOSH STEL0.3 ppm
Treatment Conditions
Tent under positive pressure
Continual monitoring of temperature and
relative humidity
Heated using portable units
n CIO2 concentrations monitored every 15
minutes
• inside the house on each floor
• outside the house
Sampling Strategy
Walk-through of house
n Stationary sampling locations
• 2 on each floor and basement (N = 8)
• Outside
n Intervention-type study
• Comparison of before and after treatment
-------
Burton
Microbial Samples Collected Before
and After C1O2 Treatment
Andersen N-6
• TSA for bacteria
• MEA for fungi
(l->3)-|3-D-glucan
Endotoxin
n Air-o-Cell spore traps
n PCR for airborne fungi using PTFE filter
n Sticky tape for surface contamination with
microscopic analysis
Statistics
nSAS
Paired t-tests for total count comparison
Statistical significance < 0.05
-------
Burton
Chlorine Dioxide Exposure Level
n Average total exposure level of 10,351
parts per million hours (ppm-hrs)
12.5-hour treatment period
Temperature - 75°F
RH - 70%
n 48 hours clearance period
Geometric Mean (Range)
Before After
Culturable fungi
(CFU/m3)
Total fungi
(S/m3)
PCR fungi
(SE/m3)
(1-3)-p-D-glucan
oncentrations
Geometric Mean (Range)
Before
7.3 X104
(16,311-195,289)
5.5 X103
(943-23,598)
<125(LOD)
2.5 X102*
(129^35)
1.6 X 103*
(978-2,267)
3.3 X102*
(118-706)
7.4 X102
(580-1,100)
Geometric Mean (Range)
Before After
-------
Burton
Geometric Mean (Range)
Before After
Geometric Mean (Range)
Before After
Geometric Mean (Range)
Before After
Predominant Fungal Species in House
n Aspergillus versicolor
Cladosporium *
Penicillium brevicompactum
Stachybotrys chartarum
Other Sampling Results and
Observations
Sticky tape
• Visible fungal structures before and after CI02
treatment
n Wood glue was weakened
n Materials appeared to be bleached
-------
Burton
-------
Burton
Results Summary
n Cultivable bacteria and fungi
concentrations and total fungal spore
counts (as determined by spore trap and
PCR) decreased significantly after the CIO2
treatment
n Microscopic analyses of tape samples
showed that fungal structures were still
present on surfaces after CIO2 treatment
No significant differences in airborne
endotoxin and (1—>3)-|3-D-glucan
concentrations
Conclusions
Need to fix underlying moisture incursion
first
n Chlorine dioxide treatment was effective in
reducing airborne microbial contamination
n HEPA vacuuming and the use of portable
air cleaners are needed to remove residual
contamination from surfaces and in the air
Recommendations
n Additional monitoring to see if PCR
analysis is affected by treatment process
n Need to determine if bioaerosols
remaining after the CIO2 treatment are
still capable of producing health effects
Acknowledgements
n Thank you to Donnie Booher, Chad
Dowell, Kevin L. Dunn, Ron Sollberger,
and Ken Wallingford for their assistance
Disclaimer: The findings and conclusions in this presentation are those of
the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the National
Institute for Occupational Safety and Health.
-------
Contino
Presenfaf/b/7
US EPA Decon Conference, septi4,2oos
Decontamination of a Railcar Using a Portable and Economical System
Long Island Rail Road
Biokmetics
Background
Funding: Funds from Department of Homeland Security via the
Federal Rail Administration (FRA). William Fagan, Director of Security
Program Management: The Metropolitan Transit Authority (MTA) and
Long Island Railroad (LIRR)
Facility: The Nassau County Fire Service Academy
System Design, On-Site Erection, Contract Management:
Biokinetics, Inc., a Foster Wheeler Company
Chlorine Dioxide Micro-Reactor Technology: Selective Micro
Technologies, LLC
Chlorine Dioxide Sensors: Optek-Danulat, Inc.
Program Goals
Demonstrate
• Ability to kill a bioterrorism agent
• Mobility and portability
• Short deployment time
Meet environmental and safety standards
Accommodate wide ranging site conditions
Minimize damage to railcar, electronics, infrastructure
Why Chlorine Dioxide?
Considered highly effective
agent for addressing robust
biological hazards (e.g. anthrax)
Successful at Kensington Post
Office and Hart Senate Bldg.
Can be evacuated quickly
Success parameters established
Gaseous and aqueous
capabilities
Generation/Delivery System
Must support project objectives
• Easily transported
• Short deployment
• Minimally corrosive
• Safety and environmental
Economical
Require minimal support resources
Personnel
• Power
• Water
• Environmental monitoring
• Technical expertise
• Logistics (storage, shipment, start-up)
Biological Indicators
Anthrax surrogate, at least as hard to
as anthrax spores
• G. stearothermphilus
Safe for humans
Several types used
-------
Contino
Test Set-up (Onsite)
Tented enclosure erected around car
Bl installation
* In stringed matrix format inside car
* Attached to exterior surface
Leased box truck
* Chlorine Dioxide generation/distribution system
- PVC tank and circulation pump
- Sparge air injection subsystem
- Distribution tubing
- CD concentration/humidity monitoring/recording
systems
- Environmental monitoring
- Internal gas distribution fans
Simplified System Operation Description
Begin tent erection around "contaminated" railcar
Drive box truck to any source of water
Fill PVC tank with water
Load tank with CD generating sachets
Install PVC line within space to be
decontaminated
Start air sparge flow through aqueous CD
Continuously monitor CD concentration and
humidity within space
Frequent monitoring for safety and environmental
purposes
Evacuate tented space through a carbon absorber
after decon criteria (9000 ppm-hr) are met.
Disassemble tent
Demobilize
Site Conditions
Nassau County Fire Service
Academy: Optimal situation
for test
• Real railcar(s)
• Somewhat confined space
• Outdoors
Weather
• Day 1: Moderate wind
• Day 2: Temperatures in mid-90s
• Day3: 40 MPH gusts; 2.5" of rain in 4 hrs /
(2007 Brooklyn tornado)
Results
Successful kill
* 98% of Bis tested positive (100% of
spores killed)
* Met and exceeded target of 9,000+ ppm-
hr for CD concentration-time
* Generally met temperature (above 70 F)
and relative humidity (>70%) targets
Environmental/Safety
* CD concentrations adjacent to tent never
exceeded the safety plan action level of 5
ppm.
* Controlled TWA exposure levels by
minimizing personnel presence in the
operating areas.
Results (cont'd)
Equipment condition
* No physical damage apparent in car,
neither immediately following test nor
after six months following test.
* Electronics equipment
- Laptop computers ran successfully
throughout and immediately followini
test, and were re-started successfully
after a year.
- Typical railcar electronics modules, left
exposed for the duration of the test, had
no visible damage. Microscopic
investigation after a year showed no
damage significant enough to preclude
from functioning correctly.
Results (cont'd)
Mobility and portability
• Entire generation/distribution/testing capability
contained in a standard box truck
• Tenting arrived in a separate truck
• Mobile power and lighting resources used
Deployment time
• On-site mobilization, set-up and total decon accomplished in less than 48 hours
• Estimate: additional 24 hours required to safely vent and scrub tent contents and
demobilize.
Accommodate wide ranging conditions
• Successfully adapted to temperature range from chilly to mid-90s temperatures
• Successful early in heavy rains and 40 MPH gusts; weight of rain water eventually
resulted in failure
-------
Contino
Results (cont'd)
Economical
• Cost for test program: less than $100,000
- Process development and engineering
- Consulting support
- CD sachets
- Generation-distribution system
- Tent rental and erection
- Tenting material
- On-site team
- Travel and lodging
- Vehicle rental
Simultaneous internal/external decontamination
Conclusions
We have a working methodology
Lessons learned analyses provide significant future
improvement potential
Systems and tenting can be "kitted-up" for delivery
anywhere in world (i.e. deliver in a single overseas
shipping container)
Technology can accommodate larger scale/additional
decon applications
-------
Czarneski
Contaminated with Chemical, Biological,
Radiological Materials
Economical Facility
Decontamination with Gaseous
and Liquid Chlorine Dioxide
-V'
- ( —u
••
Mark A. Czarneski
Director of Technology
DSI ClorDiSys Solutions, Inc.
esi
ClorDiSys Solutions, Inc.
Overview
1. Registration Background
2. Requirements - Decontamination Options
3. Equipment Setup
4. Concerns
5. Pictures - Results
e. Conclusions
CSI
ClorDiSys Solutions, ini
Why is Antimicrobial Sterilant Registration
Important?
CFR - Code of Federal Regulation
EPA regulates sale and use of pesticides and antimicrobial pesticides
under the statutory authority of the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide,
and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA).
r Regulation 40CFR Subchapter E - Pesticide Programs (Parts
150-189)
> 40CFR Part 152 & Part 156 Antimicrobial Registration
Requirements
http://www.epa.gov/oppad001/
CSI ClorDiSys Solutions, inc.
Types Antimicrobial Pesticides
Sterilizers (Spc Used to destroy or eliminate all forms of microbial
life including fungi, viruses, and all forms of bacteria and their spores.
Spores are considered to be the most difficult form of microorganism to
destroy. Therefore, EPA considers the term Sporicide to be synonymous
with "Sterilizer."
Disinfectants: Used on hard inanimate surfaces and objects to destroy or
irreversibly inactivate infectious fungi and bacteria but NOT necessarily
their spores. Disinfectant products are divided into two major types:
hospital and general use.
Sanitizers: Used to reduce, but not necessarily eliminate, microorganisms
from the inanimate environment to levels considered safe as determined
by public health codes or regulations.
Antiseptics and Germicides: Used to prevent infection and decay by
inhibiting the growth of microorganisms. Because these products are
used in or on living humans or animals, they are considered drugs and
are thus approved and regulated by the Food and Drug Administration
(FDA).
http://www.epa.gov/oppad001/ad info.htm
DSI
ClorDiSys Solutions, Inc.
Current Sterilizer (Sppricides)
Registration with
US-EPA as of January 2008
More than 5000 antimicrobial products are
currently registered with the US-EPA.
Only 41 agents are registered as a Sterilant.
Agent
Ethylene Oxide
Sodium Chlorite (chlorine dioxide)
Hydrogen Peroxide Based
Total
Quantity
27
5
9
41
http://www.epa.gov/oppad001/chemregindex.htm
CS/a
olutions, Inc.
Current Sodium Chlorite
(Chlorine Dioxide) Sterilizer Registration
Company
Afcide Corp
Biocide International
Inc.
Produce Name
Alcide Exspor
4:1:1 -Base
Oxine
Registration
1677-216
9804-1
Ingredient
1.520%
2.0%
Sterilization Use
Immerse in solution for 10
hours @ 20deg C
Immerse in2000ppm solution
for min 2 hours @ 65-80 deg F
ClorDiSys solutions, csi CD 80802-1 72.8% Follow System operations
Inc. Cartridge Guide Chlorine Dioxide
gas @ 1 0 mg/L for 1 5 min
Englehard Corp
Pharmacal Research
Laboratories Inc
Aseptrol S10-
Tab
CLIDOX-S
BASE
70060-19
8714-8
20.8%
0.85%
Immerse or soak in 1000 ppm
solution for min 1 hour
1 :3:1 Dilution for 5 hours @
25 deg C
For Anthrax cleanup Under Section 18 of FIFRA, EPA exempted Sabre Technologies
from any provision of EPA registration requirement for sale or use. 6
http://www.epa.gov/oppad001/chemregindex.htm
-------
Czarneski
ftfff http://www.epa.gov/oppad001/chemregindex.htm
ifiU ClorDiSys Solutions, Inc.
Current Hydrogen Peroxide Based
Sterilizer Registration
Company
Arkema Inc
Clean Earth
Techno log ie
Ecolab Inc
Ecolab Inc
Minntech
Corp
Minntech
Corp
Steris Corp
Steris Corp
Steris Corp
Steris Corp
Prepuce Nen,e
PeroxalTOBIo
Pertdox
Oxon la Active
Vortexx
Actrll Cold Sterllant
Mlnncare Cold
Sterls-Hydrogen
Peroxide Sterllant
Sppr-Klenz RTU Cold
GW002TertlaryHend
Vaprox Hydroqen
Peroxide Stertlant
Registration #
335-233
S1073-1
1677-129
1677-1 SB
K252-7
52252-4
5S779-3
1043-119
1043-121
5S779-4
HP%
70%
24%
27.5%
6.9%
0.8K
22%
31%
1.0%
35%
35%
Other
None
1.2% Peroxyacetlc
5B% Peroxyacetlc
44% Peroxyacetlc
acid and 3.3%
OMK Peroxyacetlc
4.5% Peroxyacetlc
0.03% Peroxyacetlc
none
Use
Not listed on label
Immerse In 4% solution for 45 minutes
soMoTforThours'if 20 deg C, 20
mln @50degCor5mln @SOdegC
Immerse In solution for 5.5 hours® 20
degC
houlrs'@20d^XCd"Ut'0nSOlUtl0nfOM1
gssssSSSsB*
Hold In sterilizing solution for minimum
of55hrs
Hold In sterilizing solution for minimum
seeequlpmentmanual(Dec2002) (May
esi
ClorDiSys Solutions, Inc.
Reason for Decontamination
Vacate Leased Building and turning back over to landlord
4 Labs with possible contamination
> HIV - Human Immunodeficiency Virus
HEP - Hepatitis
> CMV - cytomegalovirus (aka HCMV or Human Herpes virus 5
(HHV-5))
VZV - Varicella Zoster Virus (aka - chickenpox virus, varicella
virus, zoster virus, and human herpes virus type 3 (HHV-3))
Other Areas possible contamination - Negligible
if Si ClorDiSys Solutions, Inc.
Scenario 1 (Gas Level 1 & 3)
Gas Entire Floor
> Decide NOT to gas Entire Floor
> Gassing whole floors too costly
> Not Necessary
Level 1
> 800,000 cu ft
• 25 generators
<- 80 chlorine cylinders
> 200 fans
> $147,602
Total Cost $ 238,624
Entire Floor Gassing
Level 3
> 370,000 cu ft
• 12 generators
39 chlorine cylinders
> 120 fans
; $91,022
ESl
ClorDiSys Solutions, inc
Scenario 2 (Gas 4 areas + Fogging)
Level 3 Gassing
> 2 Areas A & B
>A = 10,800
, B = 43,200 cu ft
> Total 54,000 cu ft
Level 1 Gassing
> 2 Areas C & D
>•• C = 60,000 cu ft
> D = 112,520 cu ft
> Total 172,520 cu ft
;• Gassing Cost $89,000
', Fogging Cost $27,500
Fogging
> Balance of Area
> Total 316,000 cu ft
Fogging
> Balance of Area
> Total 627,480 cu ft
Less than 1/2 the Entire Gassing Cost
Total Cost $116,500
Gassing & Fogging
CSl ClorDiSys Solutions, Inc.
Level 3 Area
CIO2 Gas Decon
CIO2 Surface Fogging Decon
G Standard Cleaning - General Publ
*tp/'B
'
F
c and Support Spaces
'V-i Is-*' • ' ' I--!,/
-
11
CSl Cio,OiS,,Sola,,onHnc. LCVCl 1 AfCd
W \
CIO2 Gas Decon
CIO2 Surface Fogging Decon
G Standard Cleaning - General Public and Support Spaces
°
' 3
~-:j
^ - ' '
-------
Czarneski
ESI
ClorDiSys Solutions, Inc.
'utjons, Inc.
Total Equipment on Site
> 8 Chlorine Dioxide Generators
> 45 Chlorine cylinders shipped
> 26 theoretical required
29 actual used (leakage)
> 16 not used
> 2 EMS Chlorine Dioxide Gas Sensor Modules
> 27 Steam Fast Humidity Generators
> 33 12" Distribution Fans
; Extension Cords
> Duct Tape
; 3/8" gas inject tubing
; 1/4" gas sample tubing
5 Foggers
Exterm Liquid Chlorine Dioxide Tablets
ESI ClorDiSys Solutions, inc.
CD Gas Generation Technology
> Performed in solid phase (no liquids)
> Gas generated on demand
> Self-Contained reagents
> Simple to replace consumables
Small portable generators
;- Photometric measurement of
concentration
> Real Time
r Repeatable
r Accurate
> Validated
Itm 1 Generator for every 10.800 cu ft
if Of ClotOiSys Solutions, Inc.
Equipment Locations Area A
5 Rooms
Volume-
10,800 cu ft
> Fans
2 Sample Points
• Gas Injection Points || LflfiffifiJLC]
3 Bl Locations
g»Ci 1 Generator for every 21,600 cu ft
if Of ClorDiSys Solutions, Inc.
Equipment Locations Area B
4 Injection Points
4 Sample Points
s Fans
5 Bl Loc tions
1 Generator for every 20,000 cu ft
Equipment Locations Area C
* ClorDiSys Solutions, Inc.
Injection Points
1 Generator for every 22,504 cu ft
Equipment Locations Area D
f ClorDiSys Solutions, Inc.
10 Injection Points
5 Sample Points
• Fans
5 Bl Locations
16 Rooms
Volume-
112,520 cu ft i
40 ft
112m)
LJS
bfe I : .
,&!
(20ft
(36m)
46ft
(Urn)
-------
Czarneski
esi
ClorDiSys Solutions, Inc.
Concerns
Area B
/ Windows on outside walls - Decon Performed Evening (5pm Start)
Area C & D
- Windows on outside walls - Decon performed Evening (5pm Start)
Distance of Generators to Area D Target Decon Space (375ft)
> Safety (Leakage)
Drop Ceilings
> Many unsealed penetration
> Solution for Leakage and Drop Ceilings
> Contain Leakage through segregation and air flow 19
esi
ClorDiSys Solutions, Inc.
Create Air Flow
> Setup Air Flow away from personnel
> Setup Equipment remote from target area
•
I ClorDiSys Solutions, Inc.
Fogging
I ClorDiSys Solutions, Inc.
NO Material Effects
Post Exposure
Copper piping &
Brass Regulator
DSI
ClorDiSys Solutions, Inc.
Area D
mm
5MPM 8
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CK'PM
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btit v
rxiPV
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m PM 09
5WPM 0
500PM
1BPM
BOJPM
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-------
Czarneski
1.7 1W.
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15AM
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Conclusions
Complete kill of all Biological Indicators
No physical residue observed
> No visible indication of material degradation on any of the metal
containing equipment left within the building
> No visible indication of material degradation on any electronics
> Low Chlorine Dioxide Concentrations (Less than 468 ppm)
1188 Lowest PPM-Hrs
1872 Highest PPM-Hrs
Readings Result
evel 3 Area A
> 10,800 cu ft
> 1 generators
Calculated Charge 75 min
• Actual Charge 30 min
• Room smaller than
estimated (lower ceiling
height)
Level 1 Area C
60,000 cu ft
3 generators
• Calculated Charge 140 min
Actual Charge 120 min
Good
Level 3 Area B
> 43,200 cu ft
> 2 generators
• Calculated Charge 150 min
Actual Charge 130 min
» Good
Level 1 Area D
> 112,520 cu ft
> 5 generators
> Calculated Charge 155 min
Actual Charge 240 min
> Leakage - Gas loss through
drop ceilings 26
esi
ClorDiSys Solutions, Ini
For more information contact:
Mark A. Czarneski
PO Box 549
Lebanon, NJ 08833
Phone:908-236-4100
Fax: 908-236-2222
e-mail:
markczarneski@cloridsys.com
-------
Rastogi
, Assessment
Biological lndi<
Building Interior Dec
RastoqM. Shawn Ryan2 Lalena Wai lac
Lisa S. Smith1, and Amber Prugh3
Branch, R&T Directorate, US Army - ECBC
icy, Offi
wood, MD
- •
Presented at the 2008 Decon Workshop on September 25, 2008
Biological Indicators - Background
Rationale and Objectives
Experimental Methodologies
Results
- Efficacy of CD Gas for Spore Kill on Different Surfaces
- CT Required depends on the Type of Surface - Bl vs. Wood/Carpet
- D-values on Bl vs. Wood
Designing Bl Appropriate for Building Interior Decontamination
- Backing Material
- Spore Type
Conclusions
Backgroun
i|,
Biological Indicators (Bis) are defined as "A standardized preparation of
bacterial spores on or in a carrier serving to demonstrate whether sterilizing
conditions have been met. Spores of different organisms are used for
different methods of sterilization" (Fifth Edition "Disinfection, Sterilization, and
Preservation - The Essential, by Seymor S. Block)
Most commonly, Bis are used for validating sporicidal gassing cycles and/or
steam-sterilization processes in pharmaceutical or medical device industry
In the fall of 2001, a number of buildings were contaminated
with spores of Bacillus anthracis
Three buildings, ranging from 700,000 - 14,000,000 cubic feet, were
decontaminated via chlorine dioxide (CD) fumigation
Building clearance was based on "no growth" of any
environmental samples
- Over 10,000 clearance samples taken (no positive results)
In all fumigation decontamination events for B. anthracisto date,
biological indicator/spore strips (Bis) have been used extensively to indicate
that target fumigant concentrations were reached "throughout" the building
Sampling plan designed to locate placement of Bl
- Random/stratified locations
- Biased in locations of known contamination
- "Hard to reach places"
Criterion was one per 100 square feet, but up to three per
100 square feet were required to cover sampling plan
Few positive Bl returns from some locations (spot cleaning performed)
On-going debate regarding sampling strategies
- Number and intended use of Bl
- Appropriateness of spore type (B. atrophaeus) and steel-backing
- Risk-based clearance vs. "zero" positives from sampling
Background
SEM Pictures of Four Bis (courtesy PDA Bl Task Force
Objectives
1. Determine and compare the efficacy of CD gas on six building interior
surfaces and Bis as a function of CT values (cone, in ppmv x time in hours)
Spore suspension inoculated and dried on carpet, ceiling tile, cinder block,
I-beam steel, wallboard, and pine wood materials (107 spores/coupon)
Coupons (1.3x1.3-cm) of non-uniform porosity
2. Estimation of D (decimal reduction) value comparison for spore kill on Bis
vs building interior
106 (6 log) spores/BI with steel backing
Evenly dispersed
3. Evaluation of surrogate spore type and Bl backing for developing
appropriate Bis for use in building fumigation efforts
-------
Rastogi
Experimental Methodologies
13x13 mm coupons (5 reps per dish)
-raw wood, unpainted cinder block,
carpet, painted I-beam steel,
ceiling tile, painted wallboard
Inoculated with ~107 spores of avirulent B. anthracis
(NNR1A1) in 7x7.1 jiL drops
Inclusion of 0.5 % fetal bovine serum
as organic bioburden
Biological Indicator spores strips
B. atrophaeus (>1x10e) on stainless steel backing
in Tyvek pouches (APEX lab Inc.)
Experimental Methodologie
5 plates, each containing:
-1 Bl + 30 test coupons + 6 control
(blanks) in the chamber
- one plate withdrawn per time point
CIO2 generation by:
ClorDiSys GMP generator
CI2 + 2NaCIO2 -» 2NaCI + 2CIO2
Sabre Technolo
stripping CD from solution
Constant CIO2 concentrations maintained
@ 500, 1000, 1500 or 3000 ppm
Temperature and RH maintained at
~75°F and -75% RH throughout th
fumigation
Resul
1. CT Required for Building Materials
Carpet
"No growth" achieved with 6000 - 9000 ppm-hr dose on acoustic ceiling tile,
painted wallboard, or unpainted pine wood
"No growth" on carpet achieved with a dose of 3000 - 5000 ppm-hr
CT (pprn-hr)
• ZERO positive Bl with a dose of 5000 ppm-hr (variability is evident)
- not consistent with results of B. anthracison materials, except carpet
- Conventional Bis can not be used to indicate a CT of 9000 ppm-hr
• Bl results are independent of CD generation method
3. Correlation of Spore Kill on Bis with that on Wood?
Kill kinetics were
performed; time for a 1-
LR was determined from
the slope (D-value)
1 D-value for Bis 7-8 min,
compared to 21-24 min
for wood
1 Extrapolated time for six
log reduction (D6) less
than observed values
1 No agreement between
kinetics of spore kill on
Bis vs. on wood
CT required for all spore
kill on Bis < than on wood
Why?
- Coupon material
- Spore type
Results
4a. Bl Development for Building Interior Decon
•Bis developed (by APEX Lab) with B. atrophaeus spores at three loading
levels, 1E6,1E7, and 1E8 on steel and nitrocellulose membrane backing
-Qualitative results indicated that steel backed Bis appeared to be 'hard-
to-kill'
-A spore loading of 1E7 was selected based on the qualitative results on
CT required for 'zero growth'
•Bis prepared with 1E7 spores of B. atrophaeus, B. subtilis, B. cereus, and G.
stearothermophiluswere used in fumigation runs along with two building
materials, ceiling tile and pine wood, inoculated with B. anthracis spores
-------
Rastogi
Results
4b. Kill Profile of Surrogates Spores on Stainless Steel Backing
' - • - *
n"T""
;"25,,™»»,« r
stssi™ss""
I
(I
1
±—
1500
I
~
_ I
1
fl
Km
Jl
-L
45
1
J rv
"1 t
f
1
1 h
• While B. cereus spores
appears to be most
stearothermophilus
spores appears to be
CD gas
• G.s. spore type most
anthracis spore kill on
• Both spore type and
backing material
the behavior of Bis
Results
5. Spore and Surface Type Interaction for CD Efficacy
• B. anthracis spores on
carpet, ceiling tile, and I
beam steel require a CT
of 3000-5000 ppmv-hr for
complete kill
• B. anthracis spores on
wood require a CT value
of 7000-9000 ppmv- hr for
complete kill
• G, stearothermophilus
spores on steel require a
CT value of 7000 ppmv-hr
for complete kill
Conclusio.
Decontamination of conventional Bis (e.g., stainless steel
backing) require significantly less CT values (3000 - 5000
ppmv-hr) than those (7000 - 9000 ppmv-hr) required for
decontamination of building interior surfaces
- Gold standard
Both, the spore type and the material surface, are
important in predicting the behavior of Bis
- Wood is one of the most difficult surfaces to decon
G. stearothermophilus spores appear to be the most
appropriate surrogate in the context of building interior
decontamination with CD gas
Acknowledgemen
FUNDING
• USEPA-NHSRC
Personnel
•Saumil Shah and Jonathan
Sabol for CD measurements
• Becky Wiza for laboratory
prep work
•Dr, Joe Delmasso, APEX Lab
Inc. for Bl
The Crazy, Happy, and
Productive Bunch
-------
Dean
Reduction and Elimination of Biological
Contamination Using Bacteriophage
SEPA
What is a phage?
Simply put a phage is a virus that infects bacteria
-highly specific for host (no cross infectivity)
-phage for every bacteria searched to date
Divided into those with RNA genomes, small DNA genomes,
and those with medium to large DNA genomes
Highly diverse in shape and size
Lytic phage kill their host upon infection
P2
Phage Facts....
There are probably more individual bacteriophages in the
biosphere than there are of any other group of organisms
In coastal sea water there are typically as many as 10 7 (ten
million) tailed phages per milliliter
In some fresh water sources there are up to 10 9 (a billion) per
milliliter
There may be as many as 10 30 tailed phage globally
-They would outweigh the world population of elephants
by a thousand-fold or more
W Future Importance of Phage
Antibiotic resistance is an increasing threat in hospitals and both
morbidity and mortality from infections are greater when caused
by drug-resistant organisms.
Caused in part by the unchecked use of antibiotics
Resistant organisms include:
1. methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus
2. vancomycin-resistant enterococci
3. multi-drug resistance in Mycobacterium tuberculosis
4. multi-drug-resistant (MDR) gram-negative bacteria
SEPA
Objective: Utilize bacteriophage to decontaminate
bacterially contaminated building materials
Why Phage?
• Phage are highly specific
• Phage are non-toxic to animals and plants
• Phage increase in titre as they infect
• Phage kill their target microbes
• Phage are self limiting
-------
Dean
x=,EPA
Lytic Life Cycle
-SEPA
ATTACK!!
I Ul_l I Illafrmms
Phage and the Bio-Contaminant Lab
Work with Intralytix to develop proof in principle
bacteriophage decontamination
Approach : The goal of the Phase I activities was to
prepare E. coli O157:H7 phage preparation with strong lytic
potency against E. coli O157:H7 strains, and to rigorously
characterize each component monophage included in the
candidate phage cocktail.
Phase II studies included tasks to examine the efficacy of
the ECP-100TM preparation in reducing the numbers of
E. coli 0157:H7 on hard, inanimate surfaces
(glass and gypsum board).
SEFA
Host Range
S.EPA
Cocktail Comparison
Phase I Conclusions
• ECML-134, ECML-117, and ECML-4 were subjected to
molecular analysis to confirm that they were three separate
bacteriophage and not duplicate organisms. Pulse Field Gel
Electrophoresis (PFGE), Restriction Fragment Length
Polymorphism (RFLP) and SDS-PAGE
• In addition, three "Indicator Strains" or "Challenge Strains"
were chosen for Phase II studies, based on their susceptibility
to E. co//monophages included in ECP-100.
-------
Dean
SEPA
Decon Trials
MMI*
Reduction in E. coli counts on glass surfaces (based on
triplicate samples)
SEPA
Decon Trials
Reduction in E. coli counts on gypsum board surfaces
(based on triplicate samples)
1
Data Summary
Glass Cover Slides
1010 PFU/ml: ca. 8,333-fold reduction or 99.99% reduction
10' PFU/ml: ca. 52-fold reduction or 98% reduction
108 PFU/ml: ca. 16-fold reduction or 94% reduction
Gypsum Wallboard
1010 PFU/ml: ca. 3567-fold reduction or 100% reduction
10' PFU/ml: ca. 20-fold reduction or 95% reduction
108 PFU/ml: ca. 7-fold reduction or 85% reduction
**Note: 5 Minute Contact Time
Future Direction
• Develop phage cocktail active against Yersinia pestis
• Show activity on various building materials
• Application studies (particle size, pressure, etc.)
• Storage and Use
AEPA Collaborators
Intralytix
Alexander Sulakvelidze
Tamar Abuladze
World authority on applied bacteriophage technology
-
-------
Wood
Presented to:
US EPA Decontamination Workshop
Chapel Hill, NC
September 25, 2008
Wet Scrubbing and Adsorption for the
Capture of Chlorine Dioxide Gas During
Fumigation Events
Joseph Wood, USEPA
• Office of Research and Development
Outline of Talk
• Background
• Purpose
• Mobile Decontamination Trailer (MDT) test description
• MDT test results
• Sorbent adsorption experiments
• Sorbent results
• Conclusions
• Contact info
• Office of Research and Development
Background - CI02 efficacy
• CIO2 is one of the fumigants of choice to inactivate B.
anthracis spores in structures.
• CIO2 has been found to be effective in inactivating other
BWA, ricin, and mold as well
• Used for decon of agricultural products
• In laboratory tests, found to be effective for VX, somewhat
effective on TGD.
• Office of Research and Development
Background - CI02 hazards
• However, CIO2 is a severe respiratory and eye irritant
• Unstable at concentrations > 10% (decomposes, may be
explosive)
-Must be generated at point of use
• Occupational Safety and Health Administration permissible
exposure limit 0.1 ppmv over 8 hours
• Due to hazards, CIO2 must be tightly controlled and
monitored
• Keeping building under negative air pressure during decon
helps to minimize risk of leakage to atmosphere
• Office of Research and Development
n-
-WX
Other Chlorine Dioxide
Exposure Limits
Limit
Odor threshold
Immediately Dangerous to
Life and Health (I DLH)
Short term exposure limit (15
minutes)
Time Weighted Average
Exposure Limit (8-hour)
Value
0.1 to 0.3 ppm
5ppm
0.3 ppm
0.1 ppm
From NIOSH and OSHA
Background - CI02 control
• During a fumigation event, CIO2-laden air may be withdrawn
from the building to maintain negative pressure, and routed to
a scrubbing unit to remove the CIO2 prior to emission to the
atmosphere.
-Activated carbon used by one vendor
-In a demonstration test of the MDT, a wet scrubber was
used
-Wet scrubbing and carbon adsorption were used in decon
of buildings from 2001 anthrax attacks
-However, some small fumigations conducted with facility at
atmospheric pressure and sealed, and CIO2 is not
scrubbed
-------
Wood
Purpose of Research
• There are no data available to quantify and compare the
performance of scrubbing technologies for the removal of CIO2
from gas streams
• A field test was conducted to demonstrate a mobile chlorine
dioxide generation and scrubbing system (aka MDT). A
description of this technology and data on the performance of
the wet scrubbing system will be presented.
• In a separate project, controlled laboratory experiments were
conducted to determine the adsorption capacity of various
sorbents, and the impact adsorption operating parameters
have on performance. A description of this technology and test
results will be presented.
• Offlceof Research and Development
Wet Scrubber Field Test Description
• A mobile CIO2 generation and scrubbing system was field
tested in June 2006.
• 12-hour demonstration test conducted with the oversight and
funding of EPA, DHS, DoD
• Scrubber description
-Packed adsorption tower, countercurrent flow, with mist
elimination system
-Liquid scrubbing solution:
• 15 % sodium thiosulfate, 15% NaOH
• Recirculation flow rate = 55 gpm
• 5 tanks, each 550 gallons
Office of Research and Development
Back View of MDT
SERft
Wet Scrubber Field Test Description
(cont.)
• Scrubber inlet conditions:
- CIO2 generation gas diluted, routed directly to scrubber
• Expected flow ~ 3000 acfm, 2300 ppmv, 73 Ibs/hr
• Scrubber outlet required to be less than 0.5 ppmv CIO2
- 99.98 % removal efficiency
• CIO2 gas measured by wet chemistry (titration) and
electrochemical sensors (outlet only)
• Office of Research and Development
Wet Scrubber Field Test Results
• Actual average scrubber inlet CIO2 level 900 - 1600 ppm
• Scrubber air flow was measured to be 2600 - 3300 ACFM,
with 2.5 inches pressure drop across scrubber.
• A little over 4 tanks scrubber solution used during 12 hr test
• Average outlet level was ~ 0.3 ppmv
• Outlet level was below 0.5 ppmv for whole test, except
toward end of test, outlet level was measured at 0.7 ppmv
-Switched to new tank of scrubber solution, and level
dropped to 0.1 ppmv
• MDT was to have 2 scrubbers functioning, but only 1 working
at time of test
Wet Scrubber Field Test Conclusions
• Performance adequate for the one scrubber that was demonstrated
• Caveats:
- Inlet CIO2 levels lower than expected/required
- One scrubber did not perform during preliminary tests, was not used during
demo test
-A pump failed, but another pump was rapidly brought online
• Drawbacks to wet scrubbing
- Extra equipment
• Pumps, demisters, tanks
-Spill containment
- Hazardous materials
- Hazardous waste disposal
-------
Wood
Sorbent Tests - Background
• Determine adsorption capacity as a function of sorbent type
and CIO2 concentration and other parameters
• Also determine sorbent bed temp, increase, spent sorbent
characteristics
• Sorbents tested
-Activated carbon, coal based, 4 mm pellet
-Granular Activated carbon, coconut shell based
-Activated alumina and carbon mixture, impregnated with
KOH
-Activated carbon impregnated with KOH
-Activated carbon impregnated with Kl
^H Office of Research and Development
Sorbent Bed Test Diagram
Sorbent Test Methods
• Measurement methods
-Photometric instruments (Clordisys EMS® and GMP) for
inlet and outlet levels
-Checked/verified with titration method
-Inlet RH and T measured with Vaisala thermistor
• Office of Research and Development
Sorbent Test Methods
• Experimental set up and test procedures
-GMP® generator, mixing chamber
-750, 1500, and 3000 ppm CIO2
-Temperature ~ 23 °C, RH ~ 75%, flow 5 liter/minute
-3 replicates per test condition
-Sorbent moisture content - measured, tested as received
• Adsorption capacity isotherms
-Mass CIO2 adsorbed/mass sorbent
-Mass adsorbed based on the difference in inlet and outlet
CIO2 levels, integrated over time.
^H Office of Research and Development
Breakthrough Curves
for Coal-Based Carbon
Run time (minutes)
Test Runs
•1 1 1 1 1 • • •
ov
Adsorption capacity mg CIO2/g sorbent
3A Isotherm for Coal-based Carbon
__-— -
^^~
./"
/Blue diamonds are mean of
3 replicates (pink squares)
CIO2 concentration mg/l
17
-------
Wood
Sorbent Test Program - Conclusions
• Some chemical breakdown of CIO2 may be occurring in
sorbent bed, since outlet concentration of CIO2 plateaued but
never reached inlet level
• Coal-based carbon performed best (highest adsorption
capacity, and lowest cost), followed by coconut-shell based
carbon
-Alumina-based sorbent and impregnated carbons
performed worse
• Offlceof Research and Development
Acknowledgements
• Mobile Decon Trailer team
- NSWC, HSARPA, JPEO, DARPA
-SAIC,CDG
• ARCADIS
-Dahman Touati, Matt Clayton, Craig Williams, Stella Payne
• Offlceof Research and Development
Sorbent Test Program - Conclusions
• Toxicity Characteristic Leaching Procedure for coal based
carbon - passed for organics (i.e., not a hazardous waste for
this criterion)
• Desorption
-Warm air (60 2C) passed over bed, then sampled/analyzed
-Chlorine and chlorine dioxide gas detected using OSHA
method ID-202
• chlorine was predominant
-Effect of adsorption on carbon bed temperature
• Minimal rise in temperature
• Office of Research and Development
-------
Attwood
Background
• This research is being conducted as part of the NHSRC's
systematic decontamination technology evaluation program
• Under the program, several fumigation technologies are
evaluated for:
-Decontamination efficacy
-Impact on building materials and contents
-Impact of building materials and contents on efficacy
• In this particular project, the effect of two different hydrogen
peroxide vapor technologies on several building materials is
being evaluated
Background
• Since there currently are no technologies registered for use in
decontaminating anthrax under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide,
and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) the specific requirements for a sterilization
process in any future event are unclear
• The vendor of any technology would be required to reach and
maintain a particular vapor phase concentration for a specified
length of time
• The building materials and contents of the space to be
decontaminated would influence how easily this can be
accomplished
Objective
• Determine the material demand of several common building
materials using the hydrogen peroxide vapor decontamination
technologies of two vendors: BIOQUELL, Inc. and STERIS Corp.
• Develop a tool to help on scene coordinators, building owners,
and other responsible parties estimate the capacity needed for a
particular application and evaluate vendor bids for feasibility of a
proposed decontamination approach
Material Demand
• Hydrogen peroxide gas phase concentration can be reduced by
several different processes:
-Homogeneous decomposition
-Catalytic decomposition
-Reactive decomposition
- Reversible adsorption
-Irreversible adsorption
• Determining the degree to which each of these processes acts is
beyond the scope of this work
Hydrogen peroxide decontamination technologies
• BIOQUELL, Inc.
-ClarusL
- Increases the concentration of
hydrogen peroxide vapor until
"micro-condensation" is reached
- Bis are used to confirm conditions
sufficient to achieve kill
- Presence of hydrogen peroxide rich
condensate is believed to enhance
kill
- High relative humidity limits the
vapor phase peroxide concentration
at condensation
•
-------
Attwood
SERA
Hydrogen peroxide decontamination technologies
• STERIS, Corp.
-VHP1000ED
- Maintains a steady peroxide
concentration at non-condensing
conditions
- Under their registration as a sterilant,
may be used in non-validated cycles
of 250 ppm/90 min or 400 ppm/30
min under certain conditions
- Relies on gas phase hydrogen
peroxide to effect a kill
-Also limited in achievable gas phase
peroxide concentration at high
relative humidity
SERA
Materials Tested
• Commercial floor tile
• Nylon carpet
• Galvanized metal
ductwork
• Ceiling tile
• Latex painted wallboard
Test chamber
• 317 liter glove box
• Lined with aluminum foil to reduci
adsorption
• Test materials placed on four
shelves
• An electrochemical HP sensor and
a VAISALA temperature/humidity
sensor log experimental conditions
Test Method
• Clarus L (testing underway)
- Introduce sufficient hydrogen peroxide at one time to induce "micro-
condensation" within the test chamber
- Monitor the peak concentration as well as the rate of hydrogen
peroxide concentration decline to determine material demand
• VHP 1000 ED (testing to start soon)
- Introduce sufficient hydrogen peroxide at a continuous rate to maintain
the desired concentration within the test chamber
- Monitor the difference between the VHP concentration introduced and
that within the chamber to determine the material demand
SERA
Preliminary Results - BIOOUELL
5 ml ol Hydrogen Peroxide Injected at Initial RH ol 35%
SERA
Preliminary Results - BIOOUELL
5 mL ol Hydrogen Peroxide Injected at Initial RH ol 35%
-------
Attwood
Preliminary Results - BIOOUELL
1 5 ml ol Hydrogen Peroxide Injected at Initial RH ol 70%
Data Analysis
• Determine the flux of hydrogen peroxide to the surface of the
materials as follows:
• Develop a tool to calculate the total rate of
adsorption/decomposition expected in a given space based on
the surface area of each material within that space
Preliminary Results - BIOOUELL
1 5 ml ol Hydrogen Peroxide Injected at Initial RH ol 70%
• Evaluate and refine the tool based on trials in a more realistic setting, i.e.,
larger scale, greater volume to surface ratio
• Examine hydrogen peroxide vapor efficacy on different materials
- Material demand should reduce local concentration of hydrogen
peroxide -^ less efficacious
- Bis on steel discs or paper strips may not adequately represent spores
deposited onto fibrous or porous materials
• Determine material demand of other potential fumigants, such as methyl
bromide
-------
Kristin M.jOmberg, PhD
ystems Engineering and Integration Group
Los Alamos National Laboratory
komberg@lanl.gov
September12, 2008
-Los Alamos
Gypsy Moths
The culprit...
. looks pretty harmless.
Consequences of gypsy moths
Biological warfare (... on gypsy moths)
Bacillus thuringiensis
var. kurstaki (8ft)
Bt toxin crystals
k* Atoms
JVWS*
Btk spraying provides a unique opportunity to study
environmental fate following a biological release
Btk shares many physical and biological properties with
Bacillus anthracis
Bounding scenario—other agents likely less persistent
May not be an ideal release scenario. . .
• Droplets are very large
• Droplet size distribution estimated (log-normal assumed)
• Clumping is desirable
• Wind speed, direction only known at regional scale; conditions
unstable; local wind fields and turbulence not known
... but adequate for evaluating environmental fate
LANL is using spraying in Seattle, WA and Fairfax, VA to
characterize long-term fate of Btk in urban environments
Questions
• How long does the agent remain viable at detectable levels?
• What is the approximate magnitude and duration of resuspension?
• Does the agent transport into buildings?
Methods
• Surface (swipes), bulk (soil, water, vegetation), air sampling
• Culture, DMA-based analysis (PCR)
• Urban transport and dispersion modeling
Lm Alamos
-------
Previous studies: Fairfax County, VA
• LANL and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory used
gypsy moth spraying in 2006 and 2007 to answer
questions relevant to the BioWatch program
• No background Btk detected
• Viable agent detected at least two weeks after spraying
• Weather events (e.g., wind, rain) had little effect on viability results
• Fairfax blocks studied heavily canopied; not "urban"
• Experiment duration: two weeks
• Literature indicates Btk may persist several years
IciAbmos
0«,,., „ L. .,_ _,_.,, LLO ,.,..,. /W.S*
Washington State gypsy moth eradication efforts
• Most years since 1981, the
Washington Department of
Agriculture has sprayed
Btk
m Spraying typically April,
May
• Spray blocks ranged in
size from 0.5 to 1 16,000
acres
• Smaller blocks sprayed
from ground; larger blocks
sprayed aerially
LotAtaflncc
Year
2007
2006
2006
2005
2005
2004
2004
2004
2002
2002
Area
Kent (King County)
Rosemont (Bellevue)
Madison (Seattle)
Evergreen Ridge (Kitsap County)
Eastlake (Seattle)
Mayfield (Lewis County)
Bellevue
Port Ludlow (Jefferson County)
Vader (Lewis County)
Crown Hill (Seattle)
Size
(acres)
25
5.5
100
160
12
7.5
11
12
560
16.5
agr.wa.gov/Plantslnsects/lnsectPests/GypsyMoth/default.htm
0««, „ L..,,_ .„_„ _„, LLO ,., .... M&H
Sample locations in Seattle area
Kent 2007
• 25 acres
Madison 2006
• 100 acres
Rosemont 2006
• 5.5 acres
Eastlake 2005
• 12 acres
Bellevue 2004
• 11 acres
Control area
• 12 acres
U» Atone*
Sampling plan design (I)
Impossible to design a plan to statistically determine
that viable Btk does not exist in a large area
Plans designed to produce a 99% confidence that at
least 95% of the area is without detectable spores
• 99% confidence ensures that multiple years' data can be
aggregated while still retaining greater than 95% confidence
- i.e. "Data from 2007 AND 2006 indicate. . ."
Three sampling schemes*
• Probabilistic
• Close
• Targeted
* Gilbert, RO, 1987: Statistical Methods for Environmental
Pollution Monitoring. New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold.
Sampling plan design (II)
Probabilistic: assumes uniform distribution
• Grid or transect technique will be employed
• Spray areas are not uniform in land use; vegetation tends to be less
homogeneous than parking lots or roads
• Areas will be divided into vegetative and non-vegetative areas, with more
samples collected in vegetative areas
Uniform distribution assumption may be incorrect
• "Close" samples will be collected for 10% of the probabilistic samples
— 10% of the probabilistic samples will have a second sample taken
within one foot of the first
• If close samples give a different result than probabilistic, assumption is
incorrect
Targeted samples will be collected in locations where Btk is likely to
persist
• Based on literature data, previous sampling results
-------
Kent, 2007, 25 acres
~20 miles from Pike Place Market
Zoned commercial; ~30 businesses
Canopy coverage less than 10%
Kent 2007 sampling plan
Kent 2007 non-vegetative area sampling plan
U*Ator
: • m'~ ' I
:*»•* y <*^ /
= 1* '-li
'." '.^M. "
ii: iHisr
Kent 2007 vegetative area sampling plan
Eastlake, 2005,12 acres
-2.5 miles from Pike Place Market
Zoned commercial and residential
Canopy coverage less than 15%
Eastlake 2005 sampling plan
NCSA
-------
Control site, 25 acres
1.5 miles from Pike Place Market
Zoned residential
Canopy coverage less than 10%
Control site sampling plan
LM
Sample analysis
• Initial analysis via PCR
• PCR-pass samples are cultured
• 10 percent of PCR-fail samples also cultured
• Colonies are analyzed by PCR to confirm Btk
fl.
Analysis results to date
• All field blanks negative
• Results of lab duplicates are comparable
• Lab control sample results as expected
Let Marat
IVJSft
2007, 2006, Control Site PCR results
I
• • L
Control
I Kent 2007
I Madison 2006
Rosemont 2006
PCR Results: Seattle Kent 2007, Madison 2006,
Rosemont 2006 and control area swipes
25
Percent PCR "pass" (BTK2 or BTK6|
Swipe
n
=43
n=44
n=42 n=43
Kent 2007 Madison 2006 Rosemont 2006 Control
LosAtorros
-------
Culture Results: Seattle Kent 2007, Madison 2006,
Rosemont 2006 and control area swipes
L«A*~*
Viable Samples-Swipe
H-9 | • Percent Viable (all samples)
• Percent Viable (PCFT'pass")
n=44 n=2 n=42 n=0 n=43 n=
Kent2007 Madison 2006 Rosemont2006 Control
PCR Results: Seattle Kent 2007, Madison 2006,
Rosemont 2006 and control area soils
Percent PCR "pass" (BTK2 or BTK6)
Culture Results: Seattle Kent 2007, Madison 2006,
Rosemont 2006 and control area soils
LosAiwros
-------
Fairfax Block 35, 2008,182 acres
~2 miles from Tyson's Corner
Largely residential
Fairfax 2008 sampling plan
Fairfax 2008 preliminary results (I)
Outdoor
background
Outdoor T0
# pools
tested by
PCR
137
140
# pools
PCR-pass
2
42
# pools
cultured
14
55
# pools
viable
0
22
% viable of
PCR-pass
pools
0
52.4
% viable
of all
pools
0
21.4
JV.'S*
Fairfax 2008 preliminary results (II)
Ongoing analyses of results
• Comparing results from different sample types, locations
%soil
Fairfax T0
Kent 2007
Madison 2006
Rosemont 2006
Control
viable % swipe viable
85 2.5
65 2
21 0
12 0
0 0
% water viable
15
0
-
-
0
• Comparing results from "close" samples
• Preliminary results indicate distribution is probably not uniform
• Comparing PCR results (number of genome copies) with viability
results
A
UuAtemos
o,,,,,,,.,^.,,-.,,.,,,.,,,,,^,.,..,. Itfl'S*
Acknowledgments
• Defense Threat Reduction Agency, Chemical and
Biological Defense Applied Technologies Division
. LANLTeam
• W. Brent Daniel
• Alina Deshpande
• LaVerne Gallegos-Graves
• Beverley Simpson
• Larry Ticknor
• Sheila Van Cuyk
• Lee Ann Veal
• P. Scott White
• Lo* Alamo*
pffSA
-------
Canter
Comparing and Contrasting
Fumigations of Very Large
Facilities for Biothreat Agents
and Other Microorganisms
EPA CBR Decontamination Workshop
Chapel Hill, NC
September 25, 2008
Presentation
• Fumigations of facilities since 2001 anthrax
attacks
• Remediation process for biological agents
• Comparing remediation processes of two
large-scale, complex facilities fumigated with
CIO2 gas
• Key similarities and differences
• Research needs
A?L
Contamination of Facilities Following 2001
Anthrax Attacks
Contaminated facilities
• Postal facilities
• Office buildings (e.g., Hart Senate Office building,
NBC offices, AMI Building)
• Residences
Cleanups
• Surface cleanups only at most facilities
• Fumigation of certain portions of buildings/surface
cleanup in remaining portions (3 facilities)
• Fumigation of entire building (4 facilities)
Seven Remediations with Fumigations
She
Hart Senate Office
Building (Daschle
suite)"
Brentwood P&DC
Trenton P&DC
AMI Bldg
DOJ mail room
GSA Bldg 410
DOS Annex-32
Fumkjant*
CI02
CI02
CI02
CI02
pHCHO
VHP
VHP
Volume
fumigated
(ft3)
~90K
>14M
GM
675K
8.3K
1.6M
1.4M
Fumigation Approach
Fumigate office suite
in one step
Fumigate entire facility
Tent and fumigate
equipment in one step
Subdivide facility and
fumigate each portion
separately
Duration of
closure of
facility
>3 months
>2 years
>2 years
>4 years
>4 months
~3 years
>3 years
Cost
~$28M
~$200Mfor
both
cleanups
<$5M
S464K
~$6M
S9M
** Separate fumigations In Daschle Suite and two air handling units *F.I
Subsequent Fumigations with CI02for
Bacillus anthracis (B.a.) Contamination
All associated with persons who contracted some
form of naturally-occurring anthrax from drum-
making/using activities with imported skins
• New York City, February 2006
Scotland, February 2007
• Buildings tented for fumigation
Danbury, CT, December 2007
- House tented for fumigation
All fumigations performed by Sabre Technical Services
Fumigations with CIO2for Mold
• Big box department store in Kingsbury, NY,
June 2005
• Post-Katrina Hurricane (Fall 2005 onward)
• Popular restaurant
• Post office
• Large school
• Multiple homes
• St John's Hospital, Oxnard, CA, August 2007
All fumigations performed by Sabre
-------
Canter
Other CIO2 Fumigations
1 Large animal hospital in New Bolton Center, PA
• Performed in Summer 2004 after surface treatments
were shown not to be effective at eliminating multi-
strain resistant Salmonella contamination
• Conducted by Cloi DiSys
1 Pharmaceutical labs
• Performed by Cloi DiSys Sabre
1 Research fumigations
• Performed by Cloi DiSys Sabre
Response and Recovery Activities At Site
Following Biological Attack
Response
Notification/
First
Response
Activities
-Site Control
relevant parties
-Initial site
sampling and
assessment
investigation
Recovery
Remediation
Characterization
-Incident Specific
Health and Safety
Plan (HASP)
worker training
-Characterization
environmental
sampling
Decontamination
strategy
Preparation of needed
-Final site containment /
control
-She preparation
Equipment Staging
-Source reduction
Essential/non-essential
item removal
Hot spot treatment
-Main decontamination
process
-Waste disposal
Clearance
environmental
sampling
decision
-Final report
Incident Command/Unified Command Direction
-She
Refurbishment
-Upgrading of
Site Owner
Direction
Comparing and Contrasting Remediations of
Two Very Large Facilities Fumigated with CI02
Brentwood Processing and
Distribution Center (PSDC)
Washington, DC
St. John's Hospital
Catholic Healthcare West
Oxnard, CA
API
Background on Facilities
Factor
Interior volume (ft3)
Physical layout
Nature of
contamination
Reason for
fumigating entire
building
Area surrounding
she
Reason for using
CICySabre Technical
Services
Dates of fumigation
Management of
cleanup
Brentwood P&DC
>14M
Two story, mostly open work area with
catwalks; limited office space; very
large parking lot
Two source letters containing B.a.
spores passed through facilhy in
October 2001
4 postal workers contracted inhalation
anthrax, whh 2 deaths; high levels of
re-aerosolizable spores throughout
facilhy
Commercial; subway stop about 1 +
block away
Employed previously for fumigations
in Hart Senate Office Building; only
company that could fumigate entire
building at one time
December 12 -16, 2002
Incident Command System; Sabre was
subcontractor to primary contractor
St. John's Hospital
>4M
265 bed community hospital whh 4
story patient tower; adjoining medical
office building; very large parking lot
Longstanding mold contamination
from previous leaks
Continuation of traditional de-
contamination methods would have
been more costly and taken much
longer
Residential areason two sides/
commercial elsewhere
Previous experience in fumigating
entire buildings for B.a. spore sand
mold
August 17 -20, 2007
Hosphal hired Sabre to conduct all
aspects of remediation process
4DI
Remediation Process
Remediation
Characterization
-Incident Specific Health
and Safety PI an (HASP)
preparation / worker
training
-Characterization
environmental sampling
Decontamination
-Decontamination strategy
plans
-Final site containment/
control
-Site preparation
Equipment Staging
-Source reduction
•Essential item removal for
treatment
•Non-essential removal for
disposal
•Hot spot treatment
-Main decontamination
process
-Waste disposal
Clearance
-Clearance environmental
sampling
— «* *DI
Rerr
Chan
ediation of the Two Facilities
acterization
Activity
HASP/worker training
Characterization
environmental
sampling
Brentwood P&DC" St John's Hospital
Yes; required under Yes
OSHA regulations
Multiple rounds of None - longstanding
surface sampling mold problem
(wipes, swabs, HEPA
vacuum samples)
* Currently remedial ions ol facilities contaminated with specific bbthreat agents must
be in compliance wiih federal select agent reporting requirements
„ 4DI
-------
Canter
R
DC
emediation of the Two Facilities
contamination
Activity
Decontamination strategy
Final site
containment/control
Brentwood P&DC
•Preliminary testing
-Fumigation of 3 most
-Tracer gas study
-Low level performance test
•Preparation of Remediation
Action Plan, Sampling &
Analysis Plan, Ambient Air
Monhoring Plan
•Access to entire site
controlled from confirmation of
attack through clearance for re-
use
•Increased security of entire
site and surrounding area in
advance of fumigation
St John's Hospital
•Multiple trips to hospital to
assess variables
•Assessment of HVAC
system for gas distribution
•Tenting material/design
needs
•Off-site materials
compatibility testing
•Preparation of plans
required by California
•Access to entire site
controlled after closure of
hospital 2+ days prior to
start of fumigation until
completion of fumigation
process
•Badging of workers and
approved visitors /
increased security day for
fumigation process
API
R(
^mediation of the Two Facilities
Decontamination - Site Preparation
Activity
Facility containment
Deployment of
equipment and
precursor chemicals
to site / Equipment
staging
Utilization of experts
Brentwood P&DC
Sealing of all openings-
re sea ling at various intervals
due to long time frame between
building closure and fumigation
Constructed two large CIO2 gas
generation plants and air
pollution control systems in
parking lot - at site for months
Yes: EPAformed Technical
Working Group (TWG) to advise
Off ice of Pesticides Programs;
Postal Service had its own
St. John's Hospital
Tenting of entire hospital in 3+
days
Gas generation equipment /
precursor chemicals / hot oiler
staged in parking lot - arrived
days before/left shortly after
fumigation
Yes; formed TWG
dPL
Facility Containment - Brentwood P&DC
Facility Containment - St John's Hospital
API
Facility Containment - St John's Hospital
Facility Containment - St John's Hospital
-------
Canter
Deployment of Equipment/Chemicals
Brentwood
— dPL
Deployment of Equipment/Chemicals -
St. John's Hospital
Remediation of the Two Facilities
Decontamination - Source Reduction
Activity
Handling of essential
herns
Removal of non-
essential items
Treatment of hot
spots
Worker protection
Brentwood P&DC
Mail sent off-she for gamma
irradiation
Surface treatment / packaging in
accordance with DOT / State / local
regulations for off-she disposal -on
site storage for various time periods
Multiple treatments of highly
contaminated surfaceswhh pH-
adjusted bleach
In Level C PPE during all activities
St. John's Hospital
-High value mobile medical equipment
shrink wrapped, removed from hospital
and stored on- site in refrigerated trucks
-Sterilized medical products packaged
in Tyvek® also removed / stored on site
-Non-mobile high-value equipment
wrapped in tenting material; CT scan
suite isolated / placed under positive
pressure
Not relevant
Not relevant
Normal working attire
Source Reduction - St. John's Hospital
Remediation of the Two Facilities
Decontamination - Fumigation
Activity
Building preparation
for fumigation
Fumigation process
goals
Regulatory
requirements
Brentwood P&DC
-Coupling of emhter with HVAC
system for distribution of CIO2
through air handling units
-Opening of room and cabinet
doors, drawers, etc.
-Pre-positioning of fans,
temperature and relative humidity
monitors, and biological indicators
-Set up of mobile chemistry lab to
monhor [CIOJ in building
-750 ppm CIO, for 12 hours
exposure (9,000 ppm-hrs CxT)
-Temperature >75°F
-Relative humidity>75%
Crisis exemption for use of CIO? to
treat B.a. spores required under
Federal Insecticide Fungicide and
Rodentkide Act (FIFRA)
St. John's Hospital
-Coupling of emitterwhh HVAC system
for distribution of CIO,throughair
handling units
-Opening of room and cabinet doors,
drawers, etc.
-Pre-poshioning of fans, temperature
and relative humidity monitors, and
biological indicators
-Set up of mobile chemistry lab to
monitor [CIOJ in building
-167 ppm CIO2for 12 hours exposure
(2,000 ppm-hrs CxT)
-Temperature >70°F
-Relative humidhy>70%
Special local needs registration for use
of CIO, to treat mold under FIFRA
Section 24(c) required by CA
Remediation of the Two Facilities
Decontamination - Fumigation
Activity
Ambient air monitoring
Process outcome
Biological indicator (Bl)
results
Brentwood P&DC
EPA Trace Atmospheric Gas
Analyzer (TAGA) mobile van
monitored ambient environment
forCKyCI;,
CxT > 16,000 ppm-hrs at all
sampling points
Of 3,772 Bis positioned prior to
fumigation
•73 positive
•Most positives in locations where
relative humidity low
St. John's Hospital
EPA TAGA van monitored for CIO2/
CL: mobile version deployed to she
for interior readings post-fumigation
Problemsattaining / maintaining
relative humidity at certain locations
•Introduction of CIG5 into building delayed
24 hour
CxT ranged from 303 to 5,446 ppm-hr
•CxT less than 2,000 ppm-hrs at a number
of sampling locations
2 Bis pre- positioned at 860 separate
locations
•4 positives
- - • 4DI
-------
Canter
Monitoring the St. Johns Fumigation
Process
Remediation of the Two Facilities
Decontamination -Waste Disposal
Activity
Types of waste
Nature of regulation
Waste disposal facilities
Brentwood P&DC
•Disposable PPE
•Decontamination liquids
•She debris
Designated as infectious
substances under DOT
•Medical waste incinerator
•Steam sterilization
St. John's Hospital
•Scrubber liquids
•Materials affected byfumigation
RCRA* solid waste
Solid waste facility
-•- M
On-Site Waste Processing after Anthrax
Attacks
API
F
c
Remediation of the Two Facilities
Clearance
Activity
Clearance environmental
sampling
Clearance decision
Brentwood P&DC
Most extensive round of
environmental sampling
•4833 samples collected, including 601
air samples
•All negative
-Postal Service formed
Environmental Clearance
Committee (ECC) which reviewed
data and recommended re-
opening facility
-DC Department of Health granted
approval to re-open
St. John's Hospital
None
-No ECC formed
-Approval to re-open hospital
granted by State of California
PL
Differences between Cleanups for B.a.
Spores and Mold at Very Large Facilities
1 Time criticality
• Remediation of critical infrastructure following B.a.
attack will probably be performed on 24 / 7 basis
1 Extent of overall security at site
• Degree of treatment needed for effective
decontamination
1 Level of PPE for remediation workers / use of
decontamination units
• Environmental sampling
• Characterization and clearance sampling
1 Waste generation / processing /disposal
Similarities between Cleanups for B.a.
Spores and Mold at Very Large Facilities
• Need to implement effective containment of
facility prior to fumigation
• Tenting is current preferred means, whenever possible
• Need to assess / modify(?) HVAC system prior to
fumigation
• Need for large staging area for equipment /
chemicals
• Need to remove mobile essential items from
facility / protect non-mobile essential items
• Fumigation process is the same, except
(perhaps) for CxT goal
• Value added from TWG
• Need for ongoing risk communication with
regulatory agencies / stakeholders / media
• Systems approach needed for both types of
-------
Canter
Potential Deleterious Effects from
Exposure to Fumigants
1 Deleterious effects on sensitive electronic
equipment / high value items is an issue
• At Brentwood and Trenton P&DCs, corrosive effects
observed on certain metals similar to effects seen
after exposure to salt air
• Bleach used for pre-treatment of surfaces at Brentwood -
a confounder
• At St John's Hospital, some effects on
- Operating room lights, sterilizers, washer / disinfector
replaced on expedited basis so that hospital could re-
open as scheduled
• Patient TVs, moving parts of hospital beds also affected
to some extent
1 EPA sponsoring research on effects of CIO2 on
electronic equipment
dPL
Conclusions
1 In spite of improvements since 2001,
signjficant time frame will be needed to plan for
and implement fumigations of large-scale
complex facilities
• Time critical fumigations will still take weeks to
months to perform even if being conducted on 24 / 7
basis
1 Significantly more resources needed to be able
to respond in timely manner to multiple,
simultaneous high level bioattacks on critical
infrastructure
dPL
Research Needs
1 Reliable real-time monitoring of CIO2
concentration throughout facility
1 In-depth research into materials compatibility
effects of CIO2 gas and other fumigants on
multiple materials at multiple CxTs
1 More work on gas distribution through HVAC
systems
API
Contact Information
Dorothy A. Canter
1-240-228-2616
The Johns Hopkins University
Applied Physics Laboratory
dorothv.canterOihuapI.edu
Questions
-------
Miller
Animal Disease Outbreak Response -
Tools, Status and Trends
Lori P. Miller, PE
USDA APHIS
September 25, 200!
Animal Health
In accordance with the National Response Framework
Emergency Support Function Annex 11 (ESF #11),
USDA/APHIS provides for an integrated Federal,
State, tribal, and local response to an outbreak of a
highly contagious or economically devastating
animal/zoonotic disease, or an outbreak of a harmful
or economically significant plant pest or disease
deemed of Federal regulatory significance.
Safeguarding Animal Health
Decontaminate
Dispose _^* — Depopulate
Safeguarding Animal Health
-------
Miller
1. Be protective of animal, human, and environmental
health
• Minimize disease spread
• Minimize adverse environmental impacts
2. Be the right size for the job
• Applicable to specific location
3. Be cost effective
• Minimize need for resources (funding, labor,
chemicals, utilities, fuel)
-------
Miller
-------
Miller
If so, see onsite treatment/ If not, see secure transport
Burial training module I Training module
Is site suitable tor composting?
Located away from neighbors anc'' «-«-•->.*
Located downwind from neighbois aim;oi nouses
Located away from environmentally-sensitive areas
Located close to the livestock facility or have clear
access for transport
Clear of overhead utility lines
Void of excess water
Located on a gentle slope so there will be no water
ponding
Sufficient supply of carbon source such as wood
chips (3 pounds carbon source per pound of meat)
Animal Health
Is site suitable for
on -site composting?
If so, see composting
training modules
If not, is site suitable
For onsite burial?
If so, see onsite treatment/ ^H If not, are mobile treatment
Burial training module I I Technologies available?
If so, see onsite treatment/ If not, see secure transpor
Burial training module I Training module
See offsite treatment/
Burial training module
-------
Miller
If so, see onsite treatment/ ^H If not, are mobile treatment
Burial training module I I Technologies available?
If so, see onsite treatment/ If not, see secure transport
Burial training module I ' Training module
Is the burial site at least 10 feet from the groundwate
table? If not, consider a lined excavation.
Evaluate the potential for the carcasses to rise to the
ground surface after burial due to fluctuating
Excavation Chart).
Is burial permitted by applicable regulatory
authorities? Can permit requirements be met?
Will land owner allow on-site burial?
Safeguarding Animal Health
-------
Miller
Is site suitable for
on-site composting?
If so, see onsite treatment/ ^H If not, are mobile treatment
Burial training module I I Technologies available?
If so, see onsite treatment/ If not, see secure transpot
Burial training module I ' Training module
See offsite treatment/
Burial training module
Disposal Trends
Research on disease agent fate, transport and
persistence in various disposal technologies
Identification and risks of potentially contaminated air
emissions and leachate from disposal processes
Research and development of new/improved
disposal processes
Analysis of costs and benefits of disposal
technologies, including potential long-term societal
costs
Animal Health
-------
Miller
• «r
•
v r
Emergency Preparedness and Response
USIM
.
IMbi -Jt
«T
Z^
Emergency Preparedness and Response
n Safety D*ta Sheet • Highly P«tti=»fl«ni< AVI
Influenza (HPA1)
SECTION I DISEASE / INFECTIOUS AGENT
• . - ••- . ,
-------
Miller
unregistered, common household products such as
bleach solution, citric acid, and household detergents
on several pathogens of concern under various
environmental conditions
Assessing risk of releasing used disinfectant
solutions to the environment
Investigating methods of applying disinfectants, such
as foam, fumigation, spray, and electrostatic
Bio security/Health and Safety Status
• Working with USAID to develop/deploy response kits
to developing countries with HPAI outbreaks
• Recent response experience through NVS
contractors
• Health and Safety Plan Template
Animal Health
-------
Miller
Biosecuritv
-------
Miller
OSHA
Secure Transport training module (available)
Off-site Treatment/Disposal training module (available)
On-site Treatment/Disposal training module (available)
Cleaning and Disinfection training module (available)
Depopulation training module (future)
On-line Disposal Support Tool (Oct 08)
Health and Safety Plan Template (available)
HPAI Worker Protection Guidance (available)
Coming Soon:
Access tools online at www.aphis.usda.gov
More Tools Available
For information, contact:
Lori Miller at lori.p.miller@aphis.usda.gov
Animal Health
-------
Ladman
"Meat" Chicken Industry Statistics
2007
Number
us
8.9 billion
Delmarva
566 million
Value
US
$21.5
billion
Delmarva
$2.0 billion
Introduction
Inacm/alion of AIV using common soaps and chemicals
Poultry houses are,
constructed of
porous and non-
porous surfaces
Porous
- Concrete
-Wood
Nonporous
- Galvanized steel
- Plastics
mm
Introduction
Inacm/alion of AIV using common soaps and chemicals
Avian influenza virus (AIV)
-Viruses are characterized as either low
path (LP) or high path (HP)
- LPAIV's are commonly found in wild
birds
- In commercial poultry, outbreaks of
LPAIV (currently only H5 and H7
viruses) have the potential to become
HPAIV outbreaks
- HPAIV have "jumped" species barrier
• Destroy flocks and clean up
Introduction
Inacm/alion of AIV using common soaps and chemicals
Approved disinfecting agents in the
United States have many limitations
Approximately 90 approved agents
-Limited availability
- Expensive
-Corrosive
- Environmental concerns
1.1 WflR
Introduction
Inactivation of AIV using common soaps and chemicals
Approval is needed for more
economical and environmentally
friendly disinfecting agents against
AIV
- Criteria for the ideal agent
• Effective inactivation of AIV
• Highly available
• Biodegradable
• Inexpensive
• Antimicrobial
Introduction
Inactivation of AIV using common soaps and chemicals
-------
Ladman
Evaluate the effectiveness of commercially
available disinfectants and common
chemicals to inactivate avian influenza
virus (AIV)
NMKSTYg
Objective
Inactivation of AIV using common soaps and chemicals
0.1 ml per coupon
- H7N2LPAIV
• Titerof 107eEID50/mL
6-well plate test
- Coupons (2.2 x 2.2x0.2 cm)
- Hard water (400 ppm CaCO3)
- 5% Organic matter (bovine serum)
Coupons with dried virus were
placed into 6-well plates
- 6 wells= 1 sample
- Run in duplicate
2.0 ml of prepared disinfecting
chemical applied to each well
Plates agitated for 10 minutes
Fluid from each plate collected
and pooled
- 0.2ml inoculated into four, 9-11
day old SPF eggs per sample
Test Plate with Metal Coupons
Experimental Method
Inactivation of AIV using common soaps and chemicals
Experimental Controls
• Dried virus on coupons
• Drop in liter during drying
• Rehydrated with sterile
saline
• Wet virus
• Drop in titer during room
temperature incubation
• Liquid left in tube at room
temperature
• Cytotoxic control
• Test to insure chemicals
not killing embryos or
responsible for false
positive result
Control Plate with Coupons
IFIAWARE
Experimental Method
Inactivation of AIV using common soaps and chemicals
Evaluation of Viral Inactivation
Eggs incubated for 5
days post inoculation
- Fluid collected from
each egg
- Examined for
hemmaglutination
activity (HA) of 25%
chicken red blood cells
Positive* Negative
•Positive HA Is Indicative of
disinfectant failure
EMJAWR]
Experimental Method
Inactivation of AIV using common soaps and chemicals
bxpenmenr
Group A
Group B
Materials Tested
| Plastic, Wood, Galvanized Steel Galvanized Steel
Compounds Tested
I Acetic add (C2H4O2) 5% Acetic acid (C2HtO2j 1%&3%
I Citric acid (C6H8O7) 1%&3% Calcium hydroxide (Ca(OH)2) 1%
Calcium hypochlorite (Ca(CIO)2j 750ppm Sodium carbonate (Na2CO,J 4%
I Sodium hypochlorite (NaOC!) 750ppm Sodium hydroxide (NaOH) 1% & 2°/
I Laundry detergent w/peroxygen bleach Laundry detergent w/o bleach
| (powdered) 2 g/L, 4 g/L, and e g/L (powdered) 2 g/L, 4 g/L, and 6 g/L
USDA HIGH PRIORITY CHEMICALS
Chemicals & Detergents Tested
Inactivation of AIV using common soaps and chemicals
I Inactivation of AIV was considered effective when:
• liter of dried positive control virus recovered
> 1040EID50/ml_ (via Reed & Miiench)
• No HA activity = no virus detected
- virus titer recovered from coupon is <1012EID;!!/rnL
Putting it all together...Calculating a Neutralizing
Index
Titer of positive control virus recovered > 4.0 minus the
titer of virus recovery from tested coupon <1.2
- Neutralizing Index 2 2.8
Experimental Method
Inactivation of AIV using common soaps and chemicals
-------
Ladman
Low Path Avian Influenza Virus
Group A
Low Path Avian Influenza Virus
* J
i I
1 l
J 1 !
Group B
H fr * *
IMS
? I
\ f
/_cw Paf/7 Avian Influenza Virus
Laundry Detergent with Bleach
Low Path Avian Influenza Virus
m
u
L
30
to
M
i
1
• UKIIA
•UMlIB
Transparent
Colors
HL *6t »•*
Laundry Detergent w/o Bleach
/.oiv Path Avian Influenza Virus
•
IM
Porous versus Nonporous
bxpenmenr 2
One material
- Galvanized steel (aka Metal)
Four chemical disinfectants
-Citric Acid 1%
- Sodium Hypochlorite 350 ppm
- Commercial peroxygen disinfectant
- Commercial quaternary disinfectant
Three different influenza type A viruses
- LPAIV- A/H7N2/Chick/MinhMa/04
- HPAIV- A/H5N2/Chick/PA/1983
-Humanlike- A/H1 Ml/Puerto Rico/8/34
I \\Y\lil
Chemicals & Detergents Tested
Inactivation of AIV using common soaps and chemicals
-------
Ladman
Avian Influenza Viruses
Comparing 3 Different Influenza Viruses
Experiment 1
Acetic acid (1%, 3% and 5%), citric
acid (1% and 3%), sodium hydroxide
(2%), calcium hydroxide (1%),
calcium hypochlorite (750 ppm), and
sodium hypochlorite (750 ppm)
inactivated LPAIV on hard, non-
porous surface.
Laundry detergent with bleach was
only effective at 6 g/L.
Conclusions
Inactivation of AIV using common soaps and chemicals
Experiment 2
In general all 3 influenza viruses
reacted similar to the chemicals and
disinfectants
Citric Acid and the commercial
peroxygen disinfectant were effective
inactivating the 3 influenza viruses
Sodium hypochlorite 350 ppm was
ineffective at inactivating the 3
viruses
Conclusions
Inactivation of AIV using common soaps and chemicals
IFIAWARE
This experiment was supported by:
USD A-APHIS Cooperative Agreement Award 06-
9100-1044-CA
USDA
EMJAWR]
Acknowledgements
Inactivation of AIV using common soaps and chemicals
Brian Ladman, MS, MBA
Associate Scientist
Allen Laboratory
University of Delaware
Newark, DE 19716 USA
(302)831-8734
bladman® udel.edu
Questions?
Inactivation of AIV using common soaps and chemicals
-------
Stone-Choi
PERSISTENCE TESTING OF HIGHLY
PATHOGENIC AVIAN INFLUENZA
(HPAI) ON OUTDOOR MATERIALS
US EPA Decontamination Workshop, September 24-26, 2008, Chapel
Hill, NC
Young Choi, James Rogers, Dan Chappie
Battelle, Columbus, OH
Joseph Wood
US EPA Office of Research and Development
National Homeland Security Research Center
Decontamination and Consequence Management Division, Research Triangle Park, NC
PERSISTENCE TESTING OF HPAI ON
OUTDOOR MATERIALS
• Background
• Motive
• Purpose
• Methods
• Results
• Conclusions
BACKGROUND
• H5N1 HPAI, influenza A sub-type.
• Highly contagious and lethal to birds.
• Human infections with H5N1 have occurred,
but most cases were from people having close
contact with infected poultry or contaminated
surfaces (CDC).
- Of the human H5N1 cases world-wide, 60% have
resulted in death (WHO).
• Human-to-human transmission of H5N1 has
been limited, but flu virus mutation a concern.
- If the H5N1 becomes easily transmitted from person-
to person, a world-wide pandemic could result (CDC).
MOTIVE
• Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD-9)
- Defense of US Agriculture and Food: Directs EPA to work
with DHS and other agencies to enhance response
capability, including decontamination following a terrorist
attackthat affects the agriculture and food infrastructure.
• National Response Plan: Directs EPA to provide
technical expertise and assistance to US Department
of Agriculture when an agricultural facility is
contaminated with CBR.
• In its Agricultural Bioterrorism Select Agent and Toxin
List, APHIS (Animal and Plant Health Inspection
Service) has included the HPAI virus among its list of
select agents and toxins that have the potential to
pose a severe threat to animal or plant health or to
animal or plant products.
PURPOSE
• Assess how long HPAI virus remains infective under various
environmental conditions and on different types of materials.
• Very few data available on persistence of HPAI on environmental
surfaces.
- Role of environment in spread of virus
has not been adequately documented.
• These tests will provide information
about which conditions and materials
decontamination may be warranted.
• Following persistence tests, generic, low cost chemicals will be
tested to determine efficacy in inactivating virus.
• In event of outbreak of H5N1 virus in poultry, large quantities of
liquid decontaminants may be needed and applied.
- Effective, less-costly decontaminants that have minimal impact on
environment are desired.
PURPOSE
• Many decon chemicals already registered with EPA under FIFRA
(Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act) for bird flu,
but these are for clean, hard, non-porous surfaces.
- Efficacy unknown on porous or outdoor surfaces; may be costly and
potentially have an environmental impact if used in large quantities
outdoors.
• Few data available on decon efficacy of generic chemicals.
- Overlap APHIS/Univ. Delaware studies.
- Some generic chemicals have been approved for use by APH IS or
states under FIFRA, although efficacy data are unavailable.
• Effective decontamination will help to limit the available reservoir of
the virus and lower the risk of human infection.
• Compare low path to high path strains.
-------
Stone-Choi
MATERIALS & METHODS
• Testing conducted at Battelle's Biomedical Research Center.
• Coupon Materials:
- Chicken Feces - Basswood*
- Galvanized Metal - Bare Concrete*
- Glass - Pine Wood*
-Soil
* These materials not tested further due to
low virus recovery.
- Coupons generally 1.9 cm x 7.5 cm.
- Chicken Feces and Soil "coupons"
placed in 3.5 cm diameter Petri dish
lined with Parafilm® and filled with
uncompacted material.
MATERIALS & METHODS
• Assessment of Cytotoxicity
- Virus quantified using cytopathic effects on MDCK (Madin-Darby
Canine Kidney) cells to determine TCID50 (Tissue Culture Infectious
Dose 50).
- Must also assess whether material extracts or neutralized decon liquids
cause cytotoxicity.
- MTT Assay (3-[4,5-dimethylthiazol-2-y1]-2, 5,-diphenyltetrazolium
bromide):
- MDCK cells exposed to diluted extracts
(from materials) or neutralized decon
liquids in the presence of MTT.
- Viable cells convert the yellow MTT to a
purple formazan salt.
- Absorbance (optical density) of the
purple reaction is used to determine
the percentage of control cell viability.
YELLOW
Cells Dead
Increasing
Dilution
PURPLE
Cells Alive
MATERIALS & METHODS
• Viruses
- Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza, H5N1 virus, A/Vietnam/1203/04.
- Low Pathogenic Avian Influenza, H7N2 virus,
A/H7N2/chick/MinhMah/04.
• Spiking the Coupons
- 1 x 10e TCID50 of virus spiked per coupon.
- Allowed to dry 1 hour before treatment.
• Extraction of Coupons
- Coupons transferred into vials with PBS.
- Vials agitated on orbital shaker.
- Virus extracts serially diluted.
- Chicken Feces and Soil underwent special processing.
MATERIALS & METHODS
Quantification of Virus
- From each 10-fold serial dilution of material extract, 0.1 ml aliquots
transferred to MDCK cells in each of 5 wells.
- MDCK cells incubated then microscopically evaluated for the presence
or absence of cytopathic effects (CPE).
- TCID50 is calculated using the Spearman-Karber method.
- The assay's limit of quantitation is 131 TCID50/ml_.
MATERIALS & METHODS
Log Reduction of Virus
- Log reductions of virus will be determined by comparing the TCID50 of
test coupons and positive controls, as follows:
R = log reduction for an individual test coupon
]v= mean TCID50 for the 5 associated positive controls
ff= TCID50 recovered from the individual test coupon
- The mean log reduction (R) is calculated as the sum of the associated
R values for each of the 5 individual test coupons divided by 5.
MATERIALS & METHODS
• Environmental Test Conditions
- Room temp (~ 23°C), low RH (~ 30%), UV lamps-off *
- Room temp, high RH (~ 90%), UV lamps-off
- Cold temp (~ 5°C), low RH, UV lamps-off *
- Cold temp, high RH, UV lamps-off
- Cold temp, low RH, UV lamps-on (~ 70 uW/cm2)
* Environmental conditions for decon testing
-------
Stone-Choi
MATERIALS & METHODS
Environmental Test Conditions
- Testing conducted in a glove-box
(room temp), refrigerated plastic
containers with positive seals
(cold temp without UV), and a
modified mini-refrigerator with
UV lamps (cold temp with UV).
- RH controlled with Drierite
desiccant (low RH) and an
ultrasonic fogger (high RH) as
necessary.
MATERIALS & METHODS
• Decontamination Testing
- Decon Liquids (all prepared with 400 ppm hard-water):
- 1% Citric Acid
- 8% Sodium Carbonate
- pH-Amended Bleach (undiluted)
- Quat 256 from Essential Industries, Inc. (732 ppm active quat)
MATERIALS & METHODS
• Decontamination Testing
- Spiked coupons (Only galvanized metal and soil used for decon tests)
inverted and placed in troughs with decon liquid (vials are used for
Soil).
- 10 min contact.
- Neutralized (stop decon activity) by diluting with cell culture media or
Dey/Engley broth.
- Extracted for virus recovery and quantification.
RESULTS
• H5N1 Initial Assessments
- Cytotoxicity:
- Acceptable MTT assay results for all materials.
- > 90% cell viability observed with minimal dilution (<1:16).
- H5N1 virus recovery (time-zero):
- Acceptable recovery (> 5%) for...
Chicken Faces, Galvanized Metal, Glass, Soil
- Unacceptable recovery (< 0.5%) for...
Basswood, Bare Concrete, Bare Pine Wood.
RESULTS
• Demonstration of porous materials and their affects on
inoculated, colored liquid:
RESULTS
• H5N1 at lowtemp (6°C), low RH (30%), UV lamps-OFF
Material
Chicken Feces
Galvanized Metal
Glass
Soil
Longest duration with
detected virus
8 Days*
13 Days
1 3 Days
13 Days
Shortest duration with
non-detected virus
1 3 Days
NA
NA
NA
H5N1 at lowtemp (1 °C), low RH (28%), UV lamps-ON (71 uW/cm2)
Material
Chicken Feces
Galvanized Metal
Glass
Soil
Longest duration with
detected virus
4 Days*
1 Day
1 Day
4 Days
Shortest duration with
non-detected virus
NA
2 Days
2 Days
NA
* Detected but at a level < the procedural blank (CPE may be attributed
to endogenous sources of the test material rather than H5N1)
-------
Stone-Choi
RESULTS
• H7N2 (Low Pathogenic Avian Influenza)
- H7N2 propagated in eggs yielded low liters as compared to H5N1.
- H7N2 virus was not amenable to quantification with MDCK cells.
- Preliminary attempts to determine the TCID50 using another cell-
based assay (Chicken Embryo Kidney [CEK] cells); additional work
is needed to develop a CEK assay for H7N2.
- An egg-based assay excluded from consideration.
Acknowledgments
• Battelle conducted this work under the direction of the EPA
National Homeland Security Center (NHSRC) through the
Technology Testing and Evaluation Program (TTEP) via
GSA contract number GS-23F-0011L.
• All testing was conducted at the Battelle Biomedical
Research Center (BBRC) located in West Jefferson, Ohio.
Conclusions
• H5N1 virus can remain viable on environmental surfaces
for several days, especially under cold environmental
conditions in the absence of UV radiation.
- However, on soil, in the presence of UV-A and UV-B, the virus
remains viable after 4 days
• Efforts are underway to study the efficacy of liquid
decontamination technologies under warm and cold
environmental conditions.
-------
Love
Understanding CWA Interactions with Surfaces
and the Implications for Decontamination
2008 US EPA Decontamination Workshop
Adam H. Love, M. Leslie Hanna, Carolyn J. Koester,
Armando Alcaraz, John G. Reynolds, Dennis Reutter, Ellen Raber
PAD Name - Directorate/Department NameGlobal Security Principal
m&t&%£$£££%&
CWA Fate on Indoor Surfaces
OS-
Objective: Improve current understanding of CWA
interactions with indoor surfaces to enable a more
rapid and economical facility remediation after
CWA dissemination
3 Agents: HD, GB, VX
2. Stainless Steel
3. Vinyl Fbor Tile
4. Latex Painted Wallboard
5. Concrete
6. Rubber Handrail
7. Thermoplastic Urethane Handrail
8. Polyester Flexible Duct
9. Galvanized Steel HVAC Duct
10. Bakelite Paneling
11. Siliconized Acrylic Caulk
PAD Name - Directorate/Department NameL
National Laboratory
Enabling Better Decisions
OS-
First responders phase:
• mitigate any subsequent spread of contamination
Characterization phase:
• more quickly determine the extent of contamination
Decontamination phase:
• identifying materials that are easily decontaminated
• identify materials that should be removed
• understand what is necessary for waste disposal
Understanding contamination distribution and
magnitude focuses remediation efforts
PAD Name - Directorate/Department NameLawrence Livt
National Laboratory
Contamination Spread
OS-
Liquid Deposition
Reduced spread
Greater magnitude
m
Vapor Deposition
Greater spread
Reduced magnitude
HD
GB
Water Gasoline
Volatility impacts the dominant form of contaminant deposition
PAD Name - Directorate/Department NameLawrence Livt
National Laboratory
Overall Contamination Persistence
OS-
Bulk properties of agents
dominate when surface
coverage is high
Limited number ot
parameters to characterize
Surface interactions
dominate when surface
coverage is low
Complex array ot
parameters to characterize
Amount of CWA contamination impacts the persistence and
potential for surface self-decontamination
PAD Name - Directorate/Department NameLawrence Live
National Laboratory
Agent Interactions
Persistence:
Liquid - Driving force high
time likely short
Vapor - Driving force low
time likely great
If surface pen
Ifevapora
PAD Name - Directorate/:
National Laboratory
, but exposure
3t
but exposure .,,
sr f
Surface
Imbibition 1
Absorption ^
,9s',
/Vapor
Evaporation » Diffusion
Atmospheric ReacMt^y^
D \ Vapor
AGENT \ A^"°"
Surface Reactivity
Liquid Adsorption
Diffusion ^
SURFACE
etration > evaporation: Sign if icant residual
ion > surface penetration: Low residual
«to- i
-------
Love
N
1
2
3.
Vapor Affinity Results
1 Week CWA Vapor Exposures
Glass
Stainless Steel
Vinyl Floor Tile
Latex Painted Wai Iboard
Concrete
Rubber Handrail
Thermoplastic Urethane Handrail
Polyester Flexible Duct
Galvanized Steel HVAC Duct
Bakelite Paneling
Siliconized Acrylic Caulk
jtes:
OS-
GlobalSecuriiy
GB HD VX
X X
X X
X X
X X
X X
X X
X X
Oils, grease, and grime on surfaces also have affinity lor GB and HD
Vapor accumulates at a constant rate over 1 week on polymeric surfaces
Observed affinity with broad classes of organic surfaces indicate non-specific interactions
National Laboratory
^ 1
Liquid HD Persistence
OS-
HD droplets volatilize
within 10 hours on
impermeable surfaces
HD droplets persists for
over 1 week on some of
the polymeric surfaces
-0.1 |iL Evaporation/Hoi
PAD Name - Directorate/Department NameLai
National Laboratory
Liquid GB Persistence
GB droplets volatilize with 2 hours on impermeable
surfaces
GB droplets persist for over 1 week on some of the
polymeric surfaces
PAD Name - Directorate/Department NameLawrence Livi
National Laboratory
Liquid VX Persistence
OS-
VX can decline slowly over
time on some surfaces -
but significant residual
after 1 week
No observed reduction in
persistence on some
polymeric surfaces
PAD Name - Directorate/Department NameLawrence Livi
National Laboratory
OS
HD Vapor Persistence s*-®^
• HD vapor loaded for
1 week
• Initial contamination
was ~ 1 000 Lig/cm2
• Significant
persistence for over
1 week on
polymeric surfaces
PAD Name - Directorate/Depart me
National Laboratory
120
100
i1 80
1
| 60
cr
# 40
20
0
rubber
urethane
latex
x • acrylic
•
;
50 100 150 200
Hours, 150 mL/min
^ ,
GB Vapor Persistence
OS
GB vapor loaded for 48
hours
Significant persistence
for over 1 week on
some of the polymeric
surfaces - especially
latex paint
£
o
•
• latex
rubber
urethane
A caulk
A
* *
»
0 50 100 150
Hours, 150 mL/min
2
DO
PAD Name - Directorate/Department NameLawr<
National Laboratory
^
-------
Love
Next Steps
OS-
Hot air impact on HD and GB persistence
Hot humid air impact on GB and HD persistence
Longer term persistence in polymeric materials
Potentially "steaming" of residual CWA from concrete
hotspots
Identifying degradation products
Characterization of materials in order to create a
method to group similar agents/material interaction
properties
PAD Name - Directorate/Department Namely
National Laboratory
Enacting Better Decisions
OS-
Understanding CWA fate improves the efficiency of the
time and effort spent on remediation
1. Rapid CWA source control is critical for minimizing secondary
contamination from volatile agents
2. Some polymeric surfaces will be useful for characterization
sampling
3. Persistence will be determined by understanding interplay of agent
properties, agent surface interaction properties, and exposure
type/duration - no one-size-fits-all CONORS
4. Heavily contaminated permeable polymeric surfaces will be
challenging to decontaminate without destroying the material and
thus may require removal
Implementing this understanding will result in more rapid and
less expensive facility restoration
PAD Name - Directorate/Department N
National Laboratory
-------
Tucker
Restoration of Major Transportation
Facilities Following a Chemical Agent
'Release: The Facility Restoration OTD
Mark D. Tucker, Ph.D.
Sandia National Laboratories
Ellen Raber
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
Presentation Outline
Background and Project Overview
Project Activities
- Remediation Guidance Development
- Technology Development
- Experimental Studies to Address Data
and Capability Gaps
- Workshops, Exercises and
Demonstrations
Summary
€?fA chemical or biological agent release may result in.
High Casualties
- Office Buildings
- Indoor Stadiums
- Transportation Hubs
Loss of National Prestige
- National Monuments
- Government Buildings
Large Economic Impact
- Transportation Hubs
- Wide Area Releases
- Agricultural Diseases
Eoonomlo Impact IB the moat Important factor In selecting a
facility or area that needs to be restored quickly and efficiently.
= A chemical agent release in a key transportation
facility would present many challenges
Highly vulnerable to chemical terrorism
Easily accessible to the public
Wide range of decontamination and
remediation challenges
Lack of understanding among stakeholders
on the time, cost, and process to restore
facility
Fundamental technology and capability
gaps will make efficient recovery difficult
These challenges will make it difficult to re-open a transportation facility
quickly which may result in a large economic impact to the nation.
The project is utilizing a systems approach with the
^r" objective of minimizing the time required for recovery
• Threat agents
• Dissemination methods
• Likely contamination levels
• Clean-up guidelines
Develop Plans and
Develop Specific CflpflbjIlIlM
• Technologies
• Resources
• Intormation
and data
The Facility Restoration OTD builds on the previously
completed Biological Restoration DDAP
Biological Restoration DDAP
A pliiwy consideration
binutlbiminyerthc
flittd
during the Biological
Restoration DDAP
-------
Tucker
= The Facility Restoration OTD is utilizing experts from the
~ National Laboratories and other federal agencies
Project Performers
Sandia National Laboratories - PI
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory - PI
Pacific Northwest National Laboratory
Oak Ridge National Laboratory
DHS Program Manager
Don Bansleben
External Advisory Panel
Larry Kaelin, US EPA
Oba Vincent, US EPA
Emily Snyder, US EPA
Veronique Hauschild, US DoD
William Billotte, US DHS (FEMA)
Partner Airport
Los Angeles International (LAX)
Presentation Outline
Background and Project Overview
Project Activities
- Remediation Guidance Development
- Technology Development
- Experimental Studies to Address Data
and Capability Gaps
- Workshops, Exercises and
Demonstrations
Summary
s— The Facility Restoration OTD is focusing on four tasks
•jiBiEEEHEimnn.EiiiinraCTn.Ea
Technology
Evaluation and
evaluation of
technologies for
remediation including
tools to collect,
manage, visualize,
and analyze the large
generated during an
event
Exercises and Demonstrations
Pre-planning restoration and recovery
operations is essential
Pre-planning to \
enhance the \
rapid recovery )
of critical /
infrastructure /
Key issues can be addressed
before an incident occurs
Roles and responsibilities can
be determined
Technologies and capabilities
can be identified
Planning templates can speed
the process and help all
stakeholders better understand
the issues
- Identity necessary resources
(personnel, equipment, and
consumables)
- Make key decisions (e.g., decon
versus replacement)
- Determine sampling protocols
and methods
^— A draft of the Remediation Guidance Document has
^&^ been completed and is undergoing review
Draft completed in FY07 - reviewed and revised in FY08
General Appendices (continued)
Remediation Plan D Annex. Review of available
1. Introduction instruments
2. Characterization E.. Statistical Sampling
3. Remediation Approaches
4 Clearance F- Decon Technologies
5. Recommendations G- Exposure Estimates
for pre-planning 01. Restoration Guidelines
H. Sample Unit Forms
Appendices , Characterization Template
A. Notification Phase J. Remediation Action Plan
B. First Responder Template
Phase K. Clearance Sampling and
C. Sampling Design Analysis Plan Template
D. Collection and L. Restoration Contact List
analysis of samples M. Waste Management
for chemical agents
Draft to be completed in FY08
LAX Data Supplements
A. Facility Command
Structure
B. Facility Description
C. Facility Ventilation
D. Sampling Units
E. Sampling Zones
F. Remediation Pre-
planning
_ The major unfinished portion of the Remediation Guidance
'ST— document is the section related to the development of
15= clean-up guidelines for a critical transportation facility
Example civilian airborne (inhalation, ocular) exposure guide
TypE.ofStn.fcrd or Exposure
Ctcucetbrel
«u
[J&«n
Transit cessengers
gS,i,
EIX..MX
£»x '
et*
Shr
-------
Tucker
Sr—• The Facility Restoration OTD is focusing on four tasks
Address Data/Capability Gaps
DwdopmMit and
evaluation of
technologies for
remediation including
tools to collect,
and analyze the large
amount of data
generated during an
event
Exercises and Demonstrations
The project is adapting the BROOM decision
support tool for chemical use
BROOM can be usedtbt
ming and port-event o
BROOM: Data collection, management, visualization, and analysis.
= BROOM is undergoing a number of enhancements
as part of the OTD and other projects
Chemical sampling and analysis
Laboratory tracking module
Enhanced sampling hardware
Geo-statistical analysis capabilities
. „ .
Enhanced CIS engine (for mapping)
Capability to handle real-time analysis
Trimble Nomad 800LE
. oust prooi and submersible
• Better screen resoiu on
• Better barcode scanner
. GPS
Within the Mobile Laboratory
PDA's used to record data at each step in the
analysis process
BROOM Server
Lab re suits wirelessly
transmitted to trie
BROOM server for
immediate display
Evaluation and Enhancement of the
CBMS-II Surface Sampler
System Description
Porous metal (SS) sample membrane
Sulfinert® treated stainless steel
sample line
Rapid (30-120 second) in situ sample
analysis
On site analysis, no sample collection,
no Chain-Of-Custody, etc.
Sensitive and selective, using ion trap
MS
Membrane Sampling Head
System Testing
Analysis of surface
concentration of
VX, GB, and HD on
various materials
• Detected 100 ng/cm2 HD on all
surfaces
• Detected 300 ng/cm2 VX on SS
• Detected 800-2000 ng/cm2 GB on £
surfaces
^_ The Facility Restoration OTD is focusing on four tasks
Address Data/Capability Gaps
Evaluation and
Development
Exercises and Demonstrations
i= The Project is also addressing critical data and
~~ capability gaps
Surface Sample Collection Efficiency and Detection Limits for CW Agents
(Koester, LLNLand Hankins, SNL)
- Objective: To determine the collection etticiency and detection limits of the surface sampling
methods on porous and non-porous surfaces that would be typically found in the interior of a
transportation facility. Experimental work is being conducted using relatively low concentrations
relevant to civilian terrorist release scenarios.
Interaction of Chemical Agents on Interior Surfaces and Natural
Attenuation/Decay Rates (Love, LLNLand Hankins, SNL)
- Objective: To determine adsorption/desorption and decay rates for chemical agents on interior
surfaces. Experimental work is being conducted using low concentrations relevant to civilian
terrorist release scenarios since there is data available for very high concentrations.
Gas/Vapor Decontamination Method Evaluation (Tucker, SNL and Smith,
LLNL)
- Objective: To evaluate the potential to utilize hot air plus high humidity to rapidly decontaminate
transportation facilities contaminated with chemical agents with high volatility and low
persistency properties.
Statistical Sampling Algorithm Validation (Knowlton, SNL, MacQueen, LLNL,
and Pulsipher, PNNL)
- Objective: To validate potential statistical sampling algorithms against data from actual release
sites. In addition, we are integrating the validated methods into BROOM and VSP.
-------
Tucker
& The objective of the OTD project is to quickly verify
^ that, after CWA exposure, facility is safe to use
Response and Recovery Activities
Crisis Management
Notilication
Phase
First
Response
Phase
t Consequence Management
^^m — -m. Remediation/Clean-up ^_^ ^_^
Characterization ' Decontamination
I Phase | Phase
ACIearance\
V Phase J
Restoration
Phase
Where is the contamination?
What items are contaminated?
1 Speed of analysis is
important
1 Explore new, rapid
detection techniques
(CBMS-II)
Is it safe for the general public
to return to the facility?
• Optimal detection limits &
legally-defensible data is
important
• Demonstrate that existing
technology & methods can
be used to detect CWAs, at
concentrations of interest,
on relevant materials
Sampling and analysis during characterization and clearance phases provide
data for decision making
The project is investigating if existing and emerging methods
z— can detect CWAs at concentrations protective of human health
Extraction of GBf-o-nsurfac*
1
8
::::::;.
-^
wipes steel diyvoll
_
Conventional sampling
chromato graphic/mass sp
analysis can easily detec
certain surfaces at levels re
protection of public health
and gas
ectro metric
t CWA on
evant to the
300 ng/cm2)
Real-time mass spectrometric
techniques, such as the CBMS II,
show promise for rapid detection
of CWAs at low concentrations
A= The persistency and interaction of chemical
^w^" agents on interior surfaces is being investigated
Results of Persistency Experiments 1!0 Non-porous surfaces
4
Eva oration ^
^k vapor a:
*<***/ AGENT Vd^on ^
Ab»rpton ^ q * MS^on^
SURFACE
If surface penetration > evaporation: 1 °°
Significant residual m so
(Rubber Handrail, Vinyl Tile, Latex) 1
1
If evaporation > surface penetration: '°s 40
Low residual 20
(Glass, SS, Liquid Exposed Flex Duct) 0
•\ -0.1 |iL Evaporation/Hour
Porous and Permeable Surfaces
1nL Droplet Desorptk>n
5-6 Exchange Volumes per Hour
I " o al 20%
\ nJRem
::
40%
ini"a
Decontamination of complex infrastructure
will require a set of technologies
Volumetric Decon (Gas, vapor, or aerosol to reach
/ all surfaces in a contaminated space)
Contaminated
Space
Surface or 'Hot Spot' Decon
(Liquid, foam, or gel)
Sensitive Equipment Decon
(Gas, vapor, or aerosol)
Waste Decon
(Liquid, foam, or gel)
Potential decontamination technologies exist for each of these areas.
Volumetric decontamination technologies can be selected
~^BK^' based on the persistency of the agent
Agent
Persistency
Decon
Technology
Technology
Status
G agents (Sarin, M
' '1
ustard VX
^^^
Agent Persistency (Less Volatile, More Persistent)
Hot Humid Air
This approach has not
been evaluated for
volumetric decon of
facilities with low
persistency agents
} mVHP
I/ ' '
Considerable work
has been conducted
by the DoD to
evaluate the mVHP
technology
• Objective: Reduce the time for decontamination and eliminate the need to 1
use more time-consuming processes (i.e., mVHP) for low persistency agents. I
Evaluation of hot, humid air for decontamination of non-
?^* persistent, volatile CW agents In transportation hubs
Stainless Steel
Vinyl Tile
Painted Wallboard
Flex-Duct (Plastic)
LAX Plastic Paneling
Silicon Sealant
Fire-retardant Insulatioi
Fiberglass Insulation
Unsealed Concrete
Sealed Concrete
cTile
zed Ste«
Rubberized Railing
Urethane Railing
Porous Wall Paper
Coated Glass
II I I
-------
Tucker
A need exists to validate probability-based sampling design
methods to assure they provide the confidence prescribed for
characterization and/or clearance metrics
Synthetic data sets
were generated as
baseline data from
existing simulated
release tests and
modeling results.
Statistical methods for hot-spot delineation,
acceptance sampling, and UTL confidence
methods are being validated.
Geostatistical techniques
for adaptive sampling
methods are being
validated.
This work is addressing the sampling validation issues raised by the GAO (2005).
Sr— The Facility Restoration OTD is focusing on four tasks
Address Data/Capability Gaps
ind
of
lochnotegiosfor
remediation including
manage, visualize,
and analyze the large
amount of data
generated during an
event
Exercises and Demonstrations
The Remediation Guidance Document will be
utilized in a Table Top Exercise (TTX)
Date: November 3-4, 2008
Location: Los Angeles Area Hotel - near LAX
Format: TTX will use plenary sessions and breakout sessions.
- Players will be grouped by ICS function: Unified Command, Operation
Section, and Planning Section
- The plenary session will be used to brief all participants on the purpose,
scope and objectives of the TTX, present scenario information, allow players
to report back on results from break out sessions.
- The breakout sessions will be used to allow each of the ICS Sections and
Groups to develop a Sample Action Plan and Remediation Action Plan to
address the scenario.
Scenario: Use two scenarios - Sarin (nonpersistent agent) and
Mustard (persistent agent)
Players: EPA (OSC, NOT), FBI, Public Health Dept., Fire Dept.,
Los Angeles World Airports, National Guard CST, Cal. DTSC
The project will conclude with a final demonstration tentatively
~ scheduled at the Ontario, CA airport in September 2009
The event will incorporate a variety of presentation formats including platform
presentations, video presentations, panel discussions, and live demonstrations.
Presentation Outline
Background and Project Overview
Project Activities
- Remediation Guidance Development
- Technology Development
- Experimental Studies to Address Data
and Capability Gaps
- Workshops, Exercises and
Demonstrations
Summary
The OTD is part of a larger strategy to enhance our ability to rapidly
recover from the release of a CBW agent in critical facilities or areas
2001
Present
(DHSiunded Restoration Demonstration
Projects, Work in other Agencies)
No pre-planning for
recovery
Lack of knowledge in
many areas of the
recovery process
Large capability gaps
1 Development ot Site-specitic
recovery plans tor SFO, LAX and
template tor other tacilities
1 Improved knowledge ot the recovery
process
1 Specitic capabilities (BROOM,
sample collection etticiency, rapid
viability analysis, decon)
1 Workshops and exercises to
transter processes to other tacilities
Remediation plans tor
other airports and tacilities
based on DHS templates
Recovery process
improvements and
enabling technologies
provided to other agencies
Other applications
(additional contaminants,
other types of facilities,
wide area releases)
id applicati
remediation plan template, demonetraflone, exaroleee, and products.
-------
Snyder
Bairelle
The Bnainess of Innovation
%ERG
Systematic Decontamination of
CWAs and TICs
EPA Decontamination Workshop 2008
Chapel Hill, NC
Shawn Ryan, Emily Snyder
Harry Stone, Ian MacGregor, Donald Kenny, Tim
Hayes, James Rogers
Joe Cappello, Rich Fitzpatrick, Meg Stapleton
Lukas Oudejans, Bill Preston, Matt Clayton
-r/ERft
Outline of Presentation
• Chemical Warfare Agent (CWA) Systematic Decontamination
Studies - Chlorine Based Decontaminants (Liquid and Fumigant)
-Persistence
-Decontamination
• CWA Systematic Decontamination Studies Using Fumigants
(mVHP and Steam)
-Method Development
-Persistence
• Toxic Industrial Chemicals (TIC) Decontamination Studies
-Decontamination Studies
-By-product Determinations
Systematic Decontamination Studies
Promising technologies are investigated to determine efficacy and
decontamination kinetics as a function of:
Technology operating conditions (concentration, time, temperature, RH)
- Materials (actual building materials)
- Agents
• Chemical agents and TICs
Two-phased approach:
1. Environmental persistence
2. Decontamination kinetics
Decontamination of Materials for CWAs and
TICs Using Chlorine Based Decontaminants
• Investigation of persistence of chemical warfare agents (CWAs)
on building material surfaces
-CWAs: sarin (GB), thickened soman (TGD), VX
-Materials: galvanized metal, decorative laminate, carpet, ceiling
tile
• Decontamination of materials contaminated
with CWAs using Sabre CIO2 fumigation, liquid CIO2,
or bleach
Experimental Approach
• Coupons are dosed with 1 mg of the
TIC or CWA
• Positive controls and one
procedural blank coupon are placed
in hood
• Test coupons are placed in test
chamber (relative humidity,
temperature, and air exchange rate
controlled)
• Decontamination technology is
applied (coupons soak in liquid
decontaminant)
• Air monitoring is conducted inside
the test chamber throughout the
decontamination (off gassing of
CWA, TIC, or by-product)
• Coupons are analyzed for remaining
CWA or TIC
• Coupons are analyzed for by-
products**
* funding did not permit completion of by-product analysis for CWAs
-r/ERft
Persistence on Materials: VX (22 9C and 40%RH)
-------
Snyder
Persistence on Materials: Sarin (GB) (22 9C and 40%RH)
Persistence on Materials: Thickened Soman
(GD) (22 5C and 40%RH)
3BW
Decontamination of Materials: CWAs
Sabre CIO2 (-3000 ppmv, 75°F, 79% RH)
VX on Industrial Carpet
100 ^_
1
i
1
c
1
T
1
.—'1
— ™JL~..,JL.. "L,m.n,;,6i.m,nu,r
SEP
D
100
80
y /o
10
0
A
^contamination of Materials: CWAs
Sabre CIO2 (-3000 ppmv, 75°F, 79% RH)
VX on Galvanized Metal
i i
control
l*ds=nj
Treatment time - minutes
Decontamination of Materials: CWAs
Sabre CIO2 (-3000 ppmv, 75°F, 79% RH)
VX on Laminate
Treatment time - minutes
ft
=pft Summary of Chlorine Dioxide Fumigant Results:
55
CWA Material
Combination
GB Carpet
TOD Carpet
TGD Laminate
TOD Ductwork
Exposure
Time
0 h (n=l)
1 h (n=5)
4 h (n=5)
Oh(n=l)
1 h (n=5)
2 h (n=5)
Oh(n=l)
1 h (n=5)
2 h (n=5)
Oh(n=l)
1 h (n=5)
2 h (n=5)
Mean Recovery in Percent + SD
Positive Control
Coupons
87
5.1 ±0.9
4. 9 ±0.2
52
40 ± 8.7
30 ±3. 2
89
73
16 ±5.5
4.3 ±1.9
Decontaminated
Test Coupons
NA
3. 6 ±1.8
2. 8 ±0.9
NA
15 ± 2.7
19 ±8. 8
NA
5.4 ±6.1
<0.1
NA
10 ±7. 9
5.4 ±6.5
^H NA = Not determined Indicates a non-detect in set of replicates
-------
Snyder
»E
:FW
Summary of Chlorine Dioxide Fumigant Results
Continued:
CWA Material
Combination
VX Carpet
VX Laminate
VX Ductwork
Exposure
Time
Oh(n=l)
1 h (n=5)
4 h (n=5)
Oh(n=l)
1 h (n=5)
4 h (n=5)
Oh(n=l)
1 h (n=5)
4 h (n=5)
Mean Recovery in Percent + SD
Positive Control
Coupons
74
77 ±23
72 ±7.1
94
81 ±7.6
88 ±5.1
84
84 ±2.6
85 ±7.6
Decontaminated
Test Coupons
NA
<0.7
<0.7
NA
<0.7
<0.7
NA
<0.7
<0.7
NA = Not determined 12
£
ERA Bleach Decontamination Results
CWA
GB
TGD
VX
Material
Carpet
Carpet
Laminate
Ductwork
Carpet
Laminate
Ductwork
Time
10 min
10 min
10 min
10 min
30 min
30 min
30 min
Mean Recovery, % of Mass Recovered at Time 0
±SD
Without Decontamination
(in air in a sealed vial)
93 ± 7
121 ± 33
90 ± 10
130 ± 39
107 ± 7
102 ± 6
95 ± 11
With Bleach
Decontamination
ND, <0.1
ND, <0.1
3.7 ± 1.9
3.2 ± 1.9
ND, <0.7
ND, <0.7
ND, <0.7
ND = not detected
wERft
^••^i™^.
Chlorine Dioxide Liquid Decontamination Results
CWA
VX
Material
Carpet
Laminate
Ductwork
Time
10 min
10 min
10 min
Mean Recovery, % of Mass Recovered
Without
Decontamination
(in acidified water)
5.0
1.9
ND, <0.7
ND = not detected
With C1O2 (Liquid)
Decontamination
ND, <0.7
ND, <0.7
ND, <0.7
14
.SERA
Decontamination of Materials for CWAs and TICs
Using Fumigants
• Investigation of persistence of toxic industrial
chemicals (TICs) and chemical warfare agents
(CWAs) on building material surfaces
-TICs: methyl parathion
-CWAs: sarin (GB), thickened soman (TGD),
VX, mustard (HD)
-Materials: galvanized metal, decorative
laminate, carpet, ceiling tile
• Decontamination of materials contaminated
with CWAs using Steam and Steris modified
Vaporous Hydrogen Peroxide (mVHP)
mVHP generator
steam generator
-SERft
Extraction Efficiency on Ceiling Tile - Agent
Comparison:
Agent Material
Combination
VX - Ceiling Tile
HD - Ceiling Tile
Hexane
mean % recovery
79(CoV - 8.4%)
108 (CoV- 1.3%)
Ethyl Acetate
mean % recovery
99 (CoV -7.5%)
109 (CoV- 0.7%)
Methylene Chloride
mean % recovery
75 (CoV -8.5%)
1 09 (CoV - 3.5%)
1:1 Hexane:Acetone
mean% recovery
99 (CoV- 7.1 %)
109(CoV - 6.6%)
CoV = coefficient of variance
Ir
P/ERft
Vrimtll^*
Method Detection Limit Studies- Hexane
Extraction:
Material
Decorative Laminate
Galvanized Steel
Industrial Carpet
Ceilinq Tile
Method Detection Limits, |jg (10 m extract)
GB
2.8
4.4
2.8
5.9
litial Amount Applied: 2.54 mg
TGD HD
4.8 1.8
1.0 2.5
1.1 2.7
4.9 14.6
HD, 2.04 mg TGD, 2.02 mg VX
-------
Snyder
AEPA Persistence of Mustard (229C, 40 %RH):
Decorative Laminate
Galvanized Metal
Method Detection Limit
(translates to <0.22 %
recovery) -
vvEPA Persistence of Mustard (229C, 40 %RH):
Industrial Grade Carpet
Ceiling Tile
*>EF¥V Experiments Underway:
• Fumigant chamber
constructed - steam and
mVHP generators installed
• Steam and modified
Vaporous Hydrogen Peroxide
(mVHP):
-Test each fumigant at 2
different conditions
-Determine decontamination
efficacy and identify
decontamination by-
products
Setup for steam
-SB*
Decontamination of Methyl Parathion by Chlorine
Dioxide Experimental Details:
• 10 mL of 100 mg/mL methyl
parathion MP in dichloromethane
was spiked onto coupons (98%
purity, 980 mg is deposited onto
each 2x5 cm coupon)
• Fumigation was done at 21 - C and
75 %RH
• Positive controls were also held at
same conditions
• Procedural blanks were taken
through the same process as test
coupons
• Two fumigation conditions were
tested: 2000 ppmv CIO2 and 3000
ppmv CIO2 (Chlorodysis)
• Three different exposure times wer
studies (1,4,7 hrs)
Methyl Parathion Decontamination Results:
Fumigation time (h)
Formation of Methyl Paraoxon
-------
Snyder
Experiments Underway:
• Systematic decontamination
studies tor Tetramethylene
Disulfotetramine (TETS)
• Determination of reaction
kinetics of halt mustard with
chlorine dioxide fumigant
using Single Photon lonization
Time of Flight Mass
Spectrometry (SPI-TOFMS)
Measurement of CIO2 Concentration with the
SPI-TOFMS during fumigation
-------
Mantooth
ROEcan
Small Item Vapor Hazard
Determinations in Interior
Spaces:
t, Where, When, Why
and How Many.
TECHNOLOGY DMVEN,
Dr. Teri Lalain and Dr. Brent Mantooth
September 2008
Ji£D.
Most fundamental question does this technology fulfill
a need as identified by my requirement?
A with most questions, there is a process that
enables generating the answer.
UNCLASSIFIED -APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
TECHOtOGf DfOVEH.
'contamination Technology
Performance Testing
All emerging Hazard
Mitigation technologies are
required to demonstrate
the ability to meet a
specified set of key
performance parameters
(KPPs) per the intended
acquisition program
requirements.
Data generated from S&T
and DT testing must be
defensible and comparable
in order to identify the next
generation technologies
and support acquisition
transition tasks such as
TRAs, milestone reviews,
and third party data
evaluations.
Method needs to be robust
to evaluate the technology
not the test method.
Representation of panel test process.
UNCLASSIFIED -APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
TBCHiOLOGY DM/EN. U6WKHTER
Need Documented Process for Requirement Comp
Test data provides a measure of mass. A mathematical approach is
needed to go from the measured mass to a requirement value.
UNCLASSIFIED -APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
TECHNOLOGY DRiVEN. WMFKHTER FOOBED.
Vapor Testing and Calculation Method I7
Vapor source (coupon / item) effect in the environment (scenario)
DM/EN UOUtOGHTBt FOCUSED.
J) Mass Transport is Fundamental
Basis of Decon Testing
Contamination
lEv
-------
Mantooth
inFrnivi it /jHj{E^L
1 : Vapor Sampling Requires a Dynamic S^k\
Vapor Chamber l^fii&|
Dynamic Vapor
Chamber
Mixing can bt- eva!^-^-c: :y
D5116-06 (tracer gas decay)
POOR MIX WELL MIXED
, • ..:'-. ' - ••: inen 'ioaitf-J' to
unprotected pe-soni^l may bc-
exposed
System is des
emission sour
cribed by mass balance equation using an
:e and resulting vapor concentration.
— — E(t} — —C(t) —
^ **~», *S _^T£^r
l|H^^Vf
C(t) = time dependent chamber vapor concentration (mg/m3)
V = chamber volume (m3)
Q = chamber air flow rate (m3/min)
A = contaminated surface area of test article (m2)
E(t) = time dependent emission factor (mg nr2 min-1)
UNCLASSIFIED -APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
TtCI»K3iOGV a*-, WMFKSHTER FOCUSED.
-^•Execute a Vapor Test /jjS\
3. Calculate Vapor Chamber Concentration
Function of Time l^flKla
Vapor Test
The vapor test requires a significant
schedules AND sample analysis
procedures
The Chamber Vapor Conceniratkn
f'ma/m3) is calculated nom the
"If GO MS :• Ihs :.:':-; lii-'U -.ii tlrw
vapor concentration
The term chamber vapor
concent: alien applies specifically to
iheconcentiati-jn - which ui exposed
:;er^T:ir:a would Lie exposed
1-
Example Sampling Schedule n_
Sample over period of interest
H I 1 T HT
90 tOt 190 3M »e MB re
Calculate Chamber ; ;^lj C = vapor
Concentration • P— *-j concentration (mg/m3)
c m m ll;^9™380"
V IF/ 1,000,000
T ' V = sampled air
volumefm3)
t = total tube pull time
1 »
* F = sampling airflow
9 £•)»£? *
UNCLASSIFIED -APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE tNQtOGV DfUV&t VOUtFKSHTER FOCUSED.
alculate the Emission Facto
Calculating the
Emission Factor
Air change Rate.n, (min-
•-•„•-''..'- , " . .'.v ••• )i
Emission Factor Equation
dC
+ nC(t}
The emission factor model is the best fit equation that represents the
data (i.e. an empirical model).
Q = chamber air flow rate (m3 min~1)
V = free air volume (m3)
Loading Factor, /
A»norn = contaminated su'1-;•-;*, areaal test article (m2),
V = chamber volume - test item volume (m3).
UNCLASSIFIED -APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
VWUKHTER FOCUSED.
57PT8ci?the Emission Source in a Scenario
Determine if a "
Scenario Calculations
Parameters and
Conditions
The following scenarios will illustrate the impact that
the scenario has on determining if a hazard is present.
The test data can be scaled to a scenario if the scenario
volume and air change rates are known.
UNCLASSIFIED -APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
VMRFKHTER FOCUSED.
late Scenario Vapor Concentration
Scenario Concentration
Calculation
Prevbus steps were ex-?:i«.."J
profile. These profiles
OiiffrtSpDlKi !» ;:i^.i(>ij .( I |,-5
panel with RSC of 15% into
each scenario. Relative
Surface Coverage (RSC) is
>i;.^r-.vi as the ratio of the
'Vfj';.--!• lli::.r'!.:» I 3UM30& •>!•-.••' U"i
the total surface area of the
COUP°n" RSC= '4contam
Aloupon
Calculatbn has flexibility to
address as tested and other
contain, coverages.
The scenario has a
significant impact on
The same approach used to calculate the scenario vapor
cone, using scenario loading factor and air change rates.
Cs (t) =
t - C(t - Atft + C(t - At)
Starting from mass on tube - now have scenario based
vaoor concentration. So is there a vapor hazard?
UNCLASSIFIED -APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
to get to Vapor Hazard Determin
Starting from mass on tube - now have lab and scenario based vapor
concentration profiles.
Mass on
tubes (ng
Note for this particular case, the vapor chamber produces a concentration
profile greater than scenarios. This is not always the case.
UNCLASSIFIED -APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
TECHNOLOGY
-------
Mantooth
Vapor Requirements
Vapor requirements are specified in concentration with exposure duration.
Vapor concentration requirements are determined using toxic load models (ten
Berge equation).
Toxic load modeling is used because vapor concentration, and fluctuations in vapor
concentrations may have nonlinear effect on toxicological response.
Time weighted average (TWA) vapor concentrations do not capture this affect
(example later).
Using methods presented here, the experimental toxic load is compared to the
toxic load used to generate the requirements.
UNCLASSIFIED -APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
WUflGHIER FOCUSED.
DoD Gui
DoD accepted method to calculate vapor exposure: Toxic Load
* Used to by USACHPPM to calculate requirements (47-EM-5863-04)
* Specified in FM 3-11.9
* Accounts for fluctuations in concentration and exposure time
Toxic Load is determined using the ten Berge equation:
TL = toxic load (mgn min/m3")
C(t) = the concentration as a
function of time (mg/m3)
n = toxic load exponent
(unitless, agent specific)
UNCLASSIFIED -APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
UMffiGOTER FOCUSED.
GM&Study: GD Exposure Evaluated Using
Load and TWA - Would Miosis be Observe*.
GD Case Study Facts
tern: GD contamination that
was decontaminated and
moved to a garage. The
vapor concentration decayed
itionof time.
The FM 3.11-9 toxic load exp.
= 1.4. (Note,
CHPPMn=2forthiscalc.)
TL=\C(f)"dt
TWA best suhed for constant
emission monitoring, such as
demil operations; TWA not
inded when n*1.
1M r*0 MO
_
(2) Calculated Toxic Load is between the TL1(! and TLW,
miosis would be observed in >16%of the military pop.
(3) High concentration early in the scenario presents mo:
of the 'hazard.' Allowing the item 2 hours to off-gas,
reduces the Toxic load (for 2-12 hr) to below TL01.
(1) Calculated TWA and average concentration are less
than requirement (for 12 hr EC01) -- HOWEVER
Would Miosis be Observed - Yes
UNCLASSIFIED -APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
U6WKHTER FOCUSED.
7,-Mettiodology Update uses Concentration ajgi
Toxic Load to Improve Data Scientific Value and-
Hazard Determination
UNCLASSIFIED -APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
TKNNQIQGY DIWEM WMFKHTER
Consideration: Item Movement and
Secondary Hazards
A single item may test
below a hazard, am I
worried about multiple
item hazard?
The multiple item concept
shown here is an
educational concept for
determining risk.
Concepts such as rinsing
relocating and presenting a
secondary hazard are fairly
understood. Are there
cases and situations where
data extrapolation to a
scenario may require further
consideration?
Vapor Testjng Methodology
Where we were and where we are
Vapor test where we are
Methodology approach for calculating emission factors (rates) for test materials (hems) to determine
vapor emission factors that can be scaled to scenarios and enable scenario based vapor
concentration and toxic load calculations. Methods also accommodate for vapor test chamber
differences in the calculations.
Test Method Updates:
• Identification and management of key vari
chamber volume, V; contaminated area, A
experiment duration (new).
s. What needs to be measured including
^ chamber flow rate, Q; sampling parameters,
Enhanced calculation power
• Updated data analysis methods for determining material (hem) emission factors (rates) (new)
• Ability to calculate and report laboratory data and data scaled to scenarios for vapor
concentration and toxic load (new).
• If new scenarios are identified, vapor concentrations may be calculated from the existing data
without new testing provided certain key parameters are met. (new)
INCLASSIFIED -APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
TECWOtOGV DM/EM WMFKSHTER FOCUSED.
-------
Mantooth
Approach Emphasizes Data Scientific Value:
Context, Interpretation and Utilization
Full data context may indicate
the scenario is hazardous
A single piece of information
may indicate "safe" scenario
UNCLASSIFIED -APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
When you are conducting a test to support
R&D / test objectives - encourage
everyone to ask "what question am I trying
to answer?" and "how does the selected
test support or limit ability to achieve that
answer?"
Any single piece of data can provide a
very different perception and potentially
misleading conclusion when taken out of
context from the entire evaluation and
even the specific test capabilities.
In the end, the goal is to determine risk.
TEfJWOLOGY DRIVEN. WUtFKHTER FOCUSED.
t DTRA Support, Fred Crowson, Dr.
i Charles Bass, Dr. John Weimaster,
' Mark Mueller, Mark Morgan, Dr.
Glenn Lawson
Decon Sciences: Dr. Teri Lalain, Dr.
1 Brent Mantooth, Tom Lynn, Larry
Procell, Zoe Hess, Dave Gehring.
Engineering: Corey Piepenburg
ECBC Experimental Fabrication Shop
Toxicology: Dr. Sharon Reutter-
Christy
MS&A: Doug Sommerville
Dr. Stephen Channel
UNCLASSIFIED -APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
CAtf~ Zach Zander, Matt Shue, Pam
-3™*- Humphreys, Missy Waller,
Joe Myers, Michelle Hover,
Morgan Hall, Michelle Sheahy
JPEO-CBD JPM Decon Support,
Mike Diederen, Kevin Gray
The over 60+ references used
to generate this brief, and the
+ references used to build
this program.
mOLOGY DRIVEN WUtFKHTER FOCUSED.
-------
Clements
r*
The Development of Safe and Highly Effective
Chemical and Radiological Agent Simulants
By
Bruce Clements
Senior Scientist
Clean Earth Technologies, LLC.
13378 Lakefront Drive
St. Louis, MO 63045
314-222-4640
www.cleanearthtech.com
An ISO9OO1: 2OOO Registered c
September 2008
GET Proprietaiy
' HM I
-Improvised simulants
Simulants
••
Hli J
Simulants
-Fluorescing simulants
• GloGerm
• Glitterbug
• Germ Juice
m
E
Simulants
Fluorescing + Physical Properties
including adjusting viscosity and color
I
The Technical Solutions Group
International, "CB Simulant Kit"
All Safe Industries, Inc
"TAGGER" Product line.
_
KM J
CONORS
Identification, demarcation, characterization,
monitoring and decontamination requires
training with the tools used in a real event.
Dispersion of the simulants agents in a
manner that mimics the actual agent
dispersion.
Simulants be applied by trainers and trainees
will use their detection equipment and/or a
UV light to determine where the simulant
agents are located before and after
decontamination.
Criteria
Mimic the physical properties of agents
Readily visible by the individuals being
trained in their use
Safe for use in unrestricted areas by
individuals in training
GRASE
Listed in the International Dictionary of
Cosmetic Ingredients
Non-irritating to human skin and mucous
membranes.
-------
Clements
Chemical Simulant
Selection
Two chemical classes of compounds
considered:
- Salicylate ester series
- Triacetin series
Both met the criteria, but Triacetin is less
irritating to human skin and mucous
membranes
Considerable amount of characterization was
performed on the salicylate ester series for the
purpose of having a 'backup' to minimize the
risk to the project. No such deficiency was
found.
Hli i
Triacetin
Atriglyceride, 1,2,3-triacetoxypropane
Artificial chemical compound
Common food and cosmetic additive "'
- A solvent in flavorings
- Humectant function "
• Retains moisture in food and cosmetics
- Component of casting liquor with TG
A "simple fat"
- Considered a possible source of food energy in artificial food
regeneration systems on long space missions
Fuel additive that improves cold weather and biodiesel viscosity
A plasticizer in cigarette filters
J
Methods and Procedures
Viscosity
- Measurement - Haake Falling Ball Viscometer Type C. ^fa^
• Official reference instrument *»*.
• Used for low viscosity substances .^~-
• Temperature equilibrium at 24 "Celsius (C).
- Multiple sample data points collected with repeat rotation.
- Dynamic viscosity results given in absolute units of milli
Pascal-seconds (mPa-s)
• Note: 1 Pa-s = 1 cP (centipoise). cP was converted to centistokes (cST)
Kinematic Viscosity (cST)
SIMULANTS
Gs HD
4.65 14.45
VX
16.74
AGENTS
GB HD
1.28 650
VX
12.26
Surface Tension
HM J
Surface Tension
- Fisher Scientific DuNuoy Tensiometer
• Using ambient temperature and pressure
- Liquid placed in a cup with a stirrup or ring in contact j
with the surface
• Measurement of the maximum force exerted
vertically to separate the stirrup or ring from the
liquid surface
- Surface tension reading
• Dynes/centimeter (cm)
• Determined by the position of calibrated wheel
PROPERTY
Surface Tensioi
SIMULANTS AGENTS
Gs HD VX GB HD
29.2 32.8 33.2 26.5 43.2
VX
32.01
'-
<
_, „
19
Relative Density
Gravimetric Determination
- The gravimetric/volumetric method:
• Based on established standards
• Certified by the American Society of Clinical Pathologists
- Determine density and relative density: Eppendorf MLA
precision volumetric pipette:
• Delivers 1.0ml repetitive aliquots of water to a 20ml vial
• Weight of the vial determined gravimetrically by
difference using a Toledo Metier PB303-S electronic
analytical balance
• Calibration liquid - Quality 2 Water (DIN ISO 3696) '
PROPERTY SIMULANTS
G-s HD
Density (g/cm3) 1.102 1.159
AGENTS
GB HD
1.102 1.270
VX
1.012
---
""
-------
Clements
Water Solubility
Water Solubility
- Empirical gravimetric and volumetric method
- Volumetric aliquots of the chemical simulants added dropwise
to 10.0 ml of ultra pure water
- Contents mixed and set aside to clarify
- Solubility endpoint
• When the partitioning mixture of simulant and water
required an extended time to reach clarification of a turbid
into two clear phases
- Water solubility of the simulants determined by weighing the
test vial on an analytical balance
PROPERTY
Solubility (ml/100 ml DIW)
SIMULANTS
Gs HD
15.0 6.70
AGENTS
HD
0.092
CHEMICAL
AGENT /
SIMULANT
t J
Property
Comparisons
MOL.
WEIGHT
.' Hli J
Surface
Fluorescence
Surface Fluorescence Measurement - 3 Methods
1. Standard, surface fluorescence using a Luminescence
Sensor UVX-300 accompanied by photo documentation
using a digital camera
2. Effect of interferants measured by placing coupons of
materials inside 6-well microtiter plates, measuring the
fluorescence without interferant and comparing to the
fluorescence in the presence of the interferant
3. Surface luminescence of the radiological simulants excited
by a "black" light was measured using a photometer
Hli J
Surface
Fluorescence
Fluorescence: Luminescence Sensor UVX-300
- Tests the simulant fluorescence brightness
- Light emitting diode (LED) ultraviolet (UV)
light source in the sensor is directed to a
surface target and visible fluorescence light
is reflected back to the UVX-300 photo
sensors I
- UVX sensor coupled to a HP3850A analogue
recording integrator for data recording.
.
i.
Surface
Fluorescence
• Fluorescence: Victor2 plate reader
• An alternative method of estimating
luminescence
- Samples of different materials (1-inch
diameter disks) placed in a 6-well plate
reader dish.
- Simulants disseminated onto sample disks.
- Victor2 plate reader measures relative
fluorescence.
• Used to measure the effects of interferants
mixed with the disseminated chemical and
radiological simulants.
GET Proprietaly
Surface
Fluorescence
Luminescence
- UV flashlight
• 6 inches from the material sample.
- 3 M 14XE Photodyne photometer
• 4 1/z inches from the material sample.
- Both the UV light and the photometer are at 45
degree angles
• Material sample was placed where the two
meet.
- One gram of radiological simulant was
measured and spread evenly across the
material samples.
- A glass rod was used to spread the simulant.
GET Proprietary
-------
Clements
Surface
Fluorescence
Painted Drywall (White)
Background = 8 mV
Simulant % of Background =
750 to 1700%
Firefighter Turnout Suit
Background = 6 mV
Simulant % of Background =
233 to 883%
Surface
Fluorescence
Personal Protective Equipment
- Chemical Protective Suit (Blue)
• 23 (222 to 247%)
- Chemical Protective Suit (Yellow)
• 57 (137 to 221%)
- Firefighter Turnout Suit
• 6 (233 to 883%)
Civilian Clothing
- 100% Cotton Blue Jeans
• 173 (-16610-157%)
- 65/35 Polyester/Cotton Shirt
• 41 (-13710-154%)
- 100% Silk Scarf
• 67 (61 to 142%)
- 90/10 Cotton/Polyester T-Shirt
• 615 (-14610-173%)
- Khaki Trousers
• 135 (10 to 20%)
Construction Materials
- Wood
• 24 (146 to 442%)
- Concrete
• 9 (378 to 1711%)
- Aluminum
• 92 (13 to 63%)
- Vinyl Floor Tile
• 14 (536 to 600%)
- Ceramic Floor Tile
• 12 (567 to 608%)
- Painted Drywall (White)
• 8 (750 to 1700%)
- Painted Drywall (Blue)
• 12 (1400 to 1750%)
Biological
- Porcine Skin
• 31 (265 to 645%)
•Background Fluorescence in mV (Range of 3 simulants as the percent of Background Fluorescence)
HM J
Vapor
Response
Vapor Response of the Chemical Simulants
using a MiniRae PID
Vapor Character*!;;;, -, • KM
K i.ieltctable by PID
f>. HM i
Skin & Eye
Sensitivity
Skin & Eye Sensitivity Testing
- Performed by Batts Laboratories
- Used the Ocular and Dermal Irritection®.
- Standardized and quantitative in vitro acute ocular and dermal
irritation tests.
• Utilize changes of relevant macromolecules to predict acute
ocular and dermal irritancy of chemicals and chemical
formulations.
- Irritancy Potentials:
• Compares increase in optical density (OD405/450) produced by
test material to a standard curve constructed by measuring the
increase in OD produced by a set of calibration substances.
• Ocular irritancy potential: Irritection® Draize Equivalent (IDE).
• Dermal irritancy potential: Human Irritancy Equivalent (HIE).
GET Proprietary 22
HM J
Summary of Ocular Irritection® Results
16.8
18.4
20.7
22.9
23.8 a
17.0
25 6
28.4
125 ul 31.0 a
a Maximum Qualified Score
25 |ll
50 ul
75 ul
100 |il
125 |il
25 |il
50 |il
75 |il
100 |il
Skin & Eye
Sensitivity
Mild
Mild
Mild
Mild
Mild
Mild
Mild
Mild
Mild/Moderate
Mild/Moderate
iry of the Dermal Irritectioi
25 ul
50 ul
75 ul
100 ul
125 ul
25 ul
50 ul
75 ul
100 ul
125 ul
urn Qualified Scoi
Predicted Dermal
'-
I.
HM i
Human Subjects
Testing
Experimental group
- Twenty (20) male and female volunteers
- Various ages, skin tones and skin types.
Two metrics
- (1) fluorescence, measured qualitatively by
visualization and photo-documentation, and
- (2) vaporization, measured quantitatively using a
photoionization detector (PID).
PID shows all three simulants were present after a
twenty minute contact time and removed with soap
and water.
Removal percentages for the simulants were 98.43%,
98.07% and 82.07% for G-s, H-s and V-s
respectively.
No adverse responses
-------
Clements
Final Products
www.TrainSaf.com
-------
Campagna
:RCURY VAPOR EMISSION MEASUREMENT STUDL
AND EVALUATION OF CLEANUP TECHNOLOGIES
Raj Singhvi
USEPA/1""
HOMELAND SECURITY FO
»Response
attacks h
I terrorist
in WMD am
some industrial chemicals/ e,g, C\
IERCU.
» Readily available
+ Toxic: potential act
effects
SUa
EMISSIONS RATES
information
ions rates.
iredict h
3 public
lake inl
>ted to health,-
ccupant
following
•M;
re
iase 1: Determine Hci
- Effect or oeaa size/surrace ai
Effect of source disturbance
»Phase 2: Eva
'roducts
Effectiveness
Cost
Fase of use
inorr-csrrn irnpacc
_ong-terrn impact
-------
Campagna
RESEARCH PROTOCOLS.
PHASE 1
» Experiment 1: Surface An
» Hypothesis: increased si
in increased Hg emission
- Use Hg beads with five different
using spot plat
- Three replicate
- Stagnant air fli
- Measure concei
time
- A sin
:ace area results
FiESEr
,, PROTOCOLS:
PHASE 1
ent 2: Terrmerature
Hypothesis : Hg vapor emissions
increase with increased temnerat
•Two ternp^^^^^H
•Three replicsites per temperature
•Uniform airflow/ bead surface area
;ARCH PROTOCO
PHASE 1
» Experiment 3: Air Flow
» Hypothesis : Air movement across bead
will increase Hg emissions.
- Uniform temperature, bead sur
- 3a: Fan close to bead, turned on then ol
- 3b: Fan further away, turned on then of
- 3c: Fan turned on and off at various
distance based on 3a/3b results.
lon-linear regression moc
nlesults: relative importai
magnitude
' \RCH PROTC
PHAS1
»ExDeriment 4: Bead Disturbance
+ Hypothesis : Bead disturba
•ease Hg emissio
de-to-side shaker
nulate disturbance fro
- Ur
flow,
-4a; Device turned on/ then off,
-4b: De/ice on continuous!/.
Hg SPILL CONTROL PRODUCTS
» Mercury Magnet Amalgamation Spill
Powder (OMNI/Ajax)
»HgX Mercury Decontaminant Powder
fACTON Technologies)
:rconVAP Mercury Vapo
ppressant (EPS Chemic
fur Su
entific
RESEARCH PROTOCOLS:
PHASE 2
» Evaluate Ha soill control oroducts,
-Test 3 floor t/pes (hard/ two carpet)
•Determine appropriate contact time for
rerncffll
line appropri
I of Hq
-------
Campagna
inclusion
+ The technologies developed will sa-
and COSt in rlpaninn nn fhp mprnir
I also assist in cleaning up
The study wi
the broken C
» Respons'
using mei
» Phas° 1 • '
co potential terrorist attacks
.irb daily life
00,000
lase 2: $250,000
-------
Focht
Development of Standards for
Decontamination of Structures Affected by
Chemical and Biological Terrorism
Robert Focht
Science Applications International Corporation
(SAIC Canada)
5ML
Presentation Overview
Introduction
Objectives
Relevance
Overview
Testing Results and Discussion
Biological Agents
Chemical Agents
Next Steps
Acknowledgements
Participants
• Project Program
i Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and Explosives (CBRNE)
Research and Technology Initiative (CRTI)
• Project Lead
• Environment Canada (EC)
• Participants
Research Institute of Hygiene, Toxicology, and Occupational Pathology
(RIHTOP), Russia
Public Health Agency Canada (PHAC)
University of Ottawa (CREM)
Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC Canada)
Defence Research and Development Canada (DRDC)
University of Leeds
United States Environmental Protection Agency (US EPA)
Introduction to the Standards Project
Decontamination of facilities following acts of
biological or chemical terrorism is designed to
reduce health hazards to the extent that the
facilities can be reoccupied.
No suitable standards currently exist for
determining "safe" surface contamination levels.
Introduction to the Standards Project
What is a decontamination standard?
For the purpose of building decontamination following a
CBRN terrorist event, a standard is:
An agent-specific level that must be achieved
before a building or facility can be repopulated.
Standards should be:
Useful on all levels, from first response to
remediation decision matrices, with the focus on
later stages
Useful as an heuristic tool in determining
building/facility fate, i.e., repopulation or
destruction (some decon still required, but how
much?)
Useful as target levels where repopulation of a
building/facility has been predetermined and/or
destruction is not possible (e.g., sensitive
buildings)
-------
Focht
Steps in developing decon standards:
• Assess threat potential for a number of identified
agents;
• Assess the toxicity and likely exposure pathways;
and,
• Develop a method for determining "safe" levels of
contaminants or "how clean is clean"
_
Objectives of the Standards Project
• To develop methods to establish decon standards:
Establishing the relationship between magnitude of
exposure and expected health effects;
• Assessing real and potential exposure risks through the
identification of individuals at risk of exposure and
consideration of all routes of exposure (dermal contact,
inhalation, and ingestion); and,
• Characterizing the risk to determine potential for toxicity
or infectivity.
Relevance
Pertinent laboratory data, derived from
experiments performed by project partners, is
being used to generate models which will help set
clean-up standards and to determine:
Whether levels necessary for rehabilitation are
practically attainable;
• The likely cost of decontaminating buildings to
acceptable levels, and whether the cost is justifiable;
Whether use restrictions will need to be in place based
on expected facility use; and,
• The predicted associated lexicological/pathogenic risk.
Overview
• Experiments are currently underway in Canada
and abroad to establish the link between surface
concentrations of selected compounds on building
materials and their ultimate impact on human
health.
• Physical behaviours of compounds of concern and
toxicological profiles are being established.
Overview
Test Results and Discussion - Biological
Experiments on the biological side have focussed
on determining the effectiveness of
decontamination methods and the use of
surrogates for distinct threats.
Work continues on optimizing sampling
procedures to provide a more accurate
determination of contaminated surface
concentration.
-------
Focht
Biological Experiments - Sampling
Experiments were performed to investigate sampling
methodologies with the goal of determining practical limits
of detection of bacterial pathogens.
Greater than 10e CPU was inoculated into 5 control tubes
and onto 10 test swabs for each trial (results of E. coli
ATCC 25404 inoculated onto polyester swabs)
Three elutions in PBS + Tween 80 from each swab were
combined to determine the total recovery for each swab.
The mean recovery relative to the mean control was
calculated.
Biological Experiments - Sampling
Mean % Recovery of E.coli (High Concentration)
from Polyester Swabs After 3 Elutions
The mean recovery of Escherichia coli on the first elution
varied from 27.7% to 37.0%. The second elution added
approximately 2.5% to the recovery, and the third elution a
further 0.6% to 1%. After three elutions, 60% to 70%
remained.
Biological Experiments - Results
Hepatitis A virus is a good
surrogate for testing the virucidal
» activity of chemicals. This non-
enveloped virus is relatively
resistant to many microbicides.
Agarose (1%) gel electrophoresis
analysis of the timed VHP-exposed
DMA (shown at left) revealed a
typical dose vs. response of
degradation of DMA. VHP
treatment for a period of 45
minutes almost completely
degraded the DMA.
Testing Results and Discussion - Chemical
• Experiments on the chemical side have focussed
on two areas: desorption and toxicity.
• Desorption studies are building on previous work
to determine the relationship between
contamination levels on building materials and
contamination levels detected in the air.
Testing Results and Discussion - Chemical
coupon 10-Lbag
Ttiermodesorption
unit
Desorption study schematic
Chemical Desorption Experiments - Lindane 1
Concentration at 20°C
|
I
z
C |
1
0
'•
,-"•"" *
;;
ft^::::\::::::---
i
L^conJloM™,™"
;:::::=rrs :: ™£™r»P.
-------
Focht
Chemical Desorption Experiments - Lindane
Concentration at 40°C
_
*-•
e Concentration (mg/cm')
Chemical Desorption Experiments - Lindane
Concentration at 20°C
Chemical Desorption Experiments - Lindane
Concentration at 20°C
D Lindane
I a-HBC
DPCCH
Toxicological Experiments
Toxicity studies using animal models determine
levels of concern for residual contaminants
following decontamination of building materials.
Reiterate: Ultimate goal of determining
permissible concentrations of the substance on
surfaces and in various materials
Toxicological Experiments
Da =Da +Da
Utot U inli U cut
Da - total dose at multi - route exposure
Da , - dose, inhalation (ms/ks)
Jn h • ° o/
D — dose, percutaneous (mg/kg)
Toxicological Experiments
Safe Exposure Levels
PDtot (Permissible total dose) - is a dose of a substance
(mg/kg) that does not cause any noticeable discomfort,
or produce irritant effects in the mucous membranes of
eyes or skin, or incapacitate human beings after single
or repeated multi-route exposure (inhalation and
through skin) during an 8-h working day
-------
Focht
Toxicological Experiments
• Calculation steps
« Determine experimentally the values of "decrease coefficients" of
the toxic substance in the air and on the surface of a construction
material
• Predict the air and surface concentration of the agent for a period
of several days
• Calculate the values of Relative Value Units (RVUinh and RVUOU1 for
acute and chronic exposure) to quantify inhalation and
percutaneous constituents of a complex human dose
Determine inhalation and percutaneous constituents of the
complex dose (Uinh and Uoul) for each day
Sum up Uinh and Ucut values for each day
• Decide if further decontamination is required
Toxicological Experiments
• Actual testing is performed:
• Eight rats are used per test, including controls and replicates
• A portion of the back is shaved exposing skin surface
• Test animals are retained in a test cell, contaminated surface
material mounted on a moulded bracket is strapped to the
exposed skin surface
Subjects are exposed to the contaminant for a range of
predetermined durations
• Small sublingual blood specimens are extracted and
analysed for 18 parameters including the contaminant, red
and white blood cells, and liver enzymes to determine if
there are any short term physiological effects
Toxicological Experiments
Mounting subjects in test cells
Test subjects during dermal
exposure testing
Next Steps
• Link desorption test results to theoretical values
from RIHTOP's toxicity formulas
• Enhance a costing model to determine the break-
even point for decontamination versus tear/down
and rebuild
• Identify further areas of study to support first
responders in decontaminating buildings
• Compile and document all experimental findings
into a report for distribution
Acknowledgements - Participants
Acknowledgement
• Supported by the Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and
Explosives (CBRNE) Research and Technology Initiative (CRTI),
under project # CRTI-04-0013RD.
Participants
• Environment Canada - K. Volchek, K. Li, and C.E. Brown
• Public Health Agency Canada - J. Krishnan and J. Peeke
• Defence Research and Development Canada - G. Purdon, A.
Burczyk, and M. Meyer
• Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC Canada) - R.
Focht, D. Cooper, S. Harrison, G. Thouin, W. Kuang, and D.
Velicogna
• University of Ottawa - S. Sattar, S. Springthorpe, and S. Sabbah
• University of Leeds - A. Hay
• United States Environmental Protection Agency - D. Mickunas
• Research Institute of Hygiene, Toxicology, and Occupational
Pathology- B. Filatov and N. Britanov
-------
Cardarelli
EPA Airborne Spectral Photom
Environmental Collection Technology
Gamma Emergency Mapper Project
Decontamination Workshop
Chapel Hill, NC
September 26, 2008
Outline
Background: ASPECT Aircraft & Program
ASPECT GEM Purpose and Goal
GEM Team
Proposed Radiation
Detection Technology
Future Work
ASPECT
Airborne Spectral Photometric Environmental
Collection Technology
The primary mission of
ASPECT is to provide
information to the first
responder in a form that is
timely, useful, and
compatible with existing
infrastructures.
ASPECT can provide
infrared & photographic
images with geospatial
chemical and radiological
information.
Methanol plumi
ASPECT
OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS
-1—
Rapid Response —
Wheels-up within one hour
Direct Integration into the
Local Incident Commander
Standoff Detection of
Chemical Plumes
Automatic Processing
Real (or Near Real) Time
Collection of Data
Aerial Photography Capability
Basic Data Communication
-------
Cardarelli
41 Emergency
Responses
6 DHSSEAR
Deployments
9 DHSNSSE
Deployments
4 FEMA Activations
ASPECT
CURRENT SYSTEMS
I~ASPECT Uses Three
Primary Sensors:
- An Infrared Line Scanner
to image the plume
- A High Speed Infrared
Spectrometer to identify
and quantify the
composition of the plume
- A Gamma-Ray
Spectrometer for
Radiological Detection
Bomem
MR-254AB FTS
4x4x16 Nal
Gamma-ray
Detector with
Spectrometry
software
ASPECT
Current Gamma-ray Detector
Scionix 4"x4"xl6" sodium
iodide gamma-ray detector
coupled to a photomultiplier
tube
Berkeley Nucleonic SAM 935
software.
Integration every 0.5 seconds
and binned every 3.5 seconds
to provide a raw data stream
for subsequent data analysis.
This permits an airborne data
point to be generated at 200
meter ground spacing.
«.^
1
ta
Separator constantly moved
during the data collection
process.
Image processed and
transmitted via on-board
satellite communications
system to Command Center
five m/nutes after last pass.
Can send images to secure
FTP and Blackberry.
-------
Cardarelli
ASPECT GEM Project
EPA Homeland Security
Purpose: To improve the US EPA airborne
gamma-screening and mapping capability of
ground-based gamma contamination
following a wide-area radiological dispersal
device (ROD) or improvised nuclear
detonation (IND) attack.
Goal: To develop the most advanced gamma-
radiation detection capability mountable
within an Aero Command 680 FL airframe.
ASPECT GEM project directly supports
the EPA Office of Homeland Security
focal area that directs the agency to:
"Develop appropriate/effective
technologies to lessen the time frame
for characterization and
decontamination of contaminated
widespread and populated areas
following an ROD."
EPA
H NOT
•I RERT
H ERT
-1 ORIA
-| NHSRC
ASPECT GEM Project
Univ. of Cincinnati
| ASPECT Pilots
}
i
\ ^^
DOE FRMAC
DT: Nati . ontamiri on 3m
iiERT: f
— , ERT: Er
1 ORIA: C
NHSRC
LANL: L
DOE:D
:' • , y Rej ;;am
• -
md Indooi Air
(•'/«.. i -<::: ..<••'.':;>.-••<'•}•
" • ; ' 1 " •
• ttipj •_.' 1
^ \ : • . ' \ •'-::;'
ASPECT Open Houses
March '08: Cincinnati
July'08: Las Vegas
National Capitol Region '09
-------
Cardarelli
Purchase and install proposed technology
Cross calibrate ASPECT GEM with DOE,
Accelerated data exchange products (e.q.
real-time contour mapping)
On-board automation with QA/QC
Communicating uncertainties with maps
Determine Minimum Detectable Activity for
various operating conditions, and
Create or improve similar ground-based
systems to be consistent with ASPECT GEM
capabilities
-------
Drake
Evaluation of Commercially-Available
Radiological Decontamination
Technologies on Concrete Surfaces
John Drake, U.S. EPA National Homeland Security Research Center
Ryan James, Battelle Memorial Lab
2008 Decontamination Workshop
Sept 24-26, 2008
Chapel Hill, NC
Batteile
. EPA's Technology Testing
and Evaluation Program
Purpose is to test, evaluate, and
report on the performance of
homeland security-related
technologies
Specializes in testing with live agents'
and simulated field conditions
Applied R&D testing
Technology information source for
emergency responders
Batteile
Background and Objective
• Background: U.S. EPA responsible
for decontamination of accidental and
intentional releases of radiological
material
• NHSRC is conducting technology
evaluations for decontamination
of urban building materials
1 Objective: Develop approach and
then evaluate commercially available
radiological decontamination
technologies applicable to urban
building materials
- This evaluation was conducted at Idaho
National Laboratory (Robert V. Fox)
ABRft
m Decontamination Technologies
Strippable Coating #1
- Radionuclide bound physically in cured
material
- Wet coating provided "ready to apply"
- Applied as paint
Strippable Coating #2
- Affinity shifting and binding chemistries
extract and bind radionuclide
- Radionuclide also bound physically in
cured material
- Two-part concentrate that requires
mixing with water
- Applied as paint
Baltelle
Concrete Coupons
Type II Portland cement
(structural concrete)
-Single batch of Redi-mix poured
into 0.9 m2 forms and cured for 21 L
days
- 15 cm x 15 cm x 4 cm unpainted
concrete coupons cut from forms
with laser saw
Concrete shown to be typical of
concrete from around U.S.
Battelle
_ Cesium (Cs)-137 Application
• Applied as mist of 2.5 ml of
aqueous solution
- Coupon edges taped so only
surfaces contaminated
• Target activity of 53 uCi + 5 uCi
• Perfect homogeneity not critical
because total surface activity
measured
• Activity measured with intrinsic
germanium detectors
Battelle
-------
Drake
Coupon Placement and Test Stand
Each strippable coating tested
on separate test stands
Coupons placed vertically and
horizontally in 60 cm x 90 cm
arrays within radiological hood
- Coupons placed throughout test
stand (marked by "x")
Surface was uneven with
millimeters gaps between
coupons
Baltelle
Use of Strippable Coatings
Strippable coatings applied 7
days and 30 days after Cs-137
application
- Tested importance of the timing of
decontamination response
Vendors suggested three
successive application and
removal cycles
- Day 1: application, cure overnight
- Day 2: removal, application, cure
- Day 3: removal, application, cure
- Day 4: removal, activity measurement
Measured activity of several
coupons after each application
and removal cycle
Batteiie
S.. Results Calculations
1 Calculated Percent Removal (%R) and
Decontamination Factor (DF)
%R = (1 -A,/A0) x 100% and DF = A0/A,
Af - activity after application of strippable coatings
A0 - activity before
• 7 day and 30 day results for both strippable coating
technologies
• Progressive decontamination results with each
application and removal cycle
• Results at various surface locations
Batteiie
ABft
SC
«
*2
7 Day
Orientation
Horizontal
Vertical
Avg.±SD
Horizontal
Vertical
Avg.±SD
Strippable Coating (SC) Results
Pre-Decon
Activity
fiCi/Coupon
56.8 ± .7
53 .5 ± .7
55.2 ±2.4
55.7 ± .3
53 .6 ± .5
54.6 ± .7
• No significant difference between
vertical and horizontal %Rs for either SC
• Significant difference between %R for
SC #1 and #2
Post-Decon
Activity
fiCi/Coupon %
38.3 ±4.5 32.5
38.5 ±5.3 28.0
38.4 ±4.7 30.3
11. 3 ±2.3 79.7
12.0 ±2.6 77.5
11. 7 ±2.3 78.6
100
20
R DF
t8.5 1.5 ±1.2
t9.8 1.4 ±1.2
t9.0 1.5 ±0.2
t41 5.1 ±0.9
t5.2 4.6 ±0.9
t4.6 4.9 ±0.9
I I
1
Horizontal Ver
H
leal Average
Batteiie
SBRft
30 Day Strippable Coating (SC) Results
Pre-Decon Post-Decon
Activity Activity
SC Orientation fiCi/Coupon fiCi/Coupon
Horizontal 53.2 ±3.0 34.3 ± 5.8
#1 Vertical 55.6 ± 1 .4 37.8 ±7.0
Avg. ±SD 54.4 ±2.6 36.0 ± 6.4
Horizontal 53.6±1.8 12.9±6.5
*2 Vertical 53.3 ±1.9 15.3 ±3.8
Avg.±SD 53.5±1.8 14.1 ±5.2
%R DF
35.8 ±8.7 1.6 ±0.2
31 .9 ±13.0 1.5 ±0.3
33.8 ±10. 7 1.5 ±0.2
76.2 ±11. 2 4.8 ±1.6
71 .5 ±6.3 3.7 ±0.8
73. 8 ±9.0 4.2 ±
• No significant difference between
*'vt
• Significant difference between %R for _T
SC#1 and #2 1
• ••
H H t
fflfflF
.4
• SC#2
lllp
.lie
°|P?L Progressive Decontamination
Strippable Coating #1
Application
First
Second
Third
Total
7 Day Results
Coupon 1 Coupon 2
61 % 62%
1 7% 26%
22% 12%
1 00% 1 00%
30 Day Results
Coupon 1 Coupon 2 Coupon 3
54% 51% 66%
12% 22% 16%
34% 27% 18%
1 00% 1 00% 1 00%
Average
59% ± 6%
19% ±5%
23% ± 8%
1 00%
Strippable Coating #2
Application
First
Second
Third
Total
7 Day Results
Coupon 1 Coupon 2
83% 92%
12% 6%
5% 2%
1 00% 1 00%
30 Day Results
Coupon 1 Coupon 2 Coupon 3
81% 73% 81%
1 3% 20% 1 4%
6% 7% 5%
1 00% 1 00% 1 00%
Average
82% ± 7%
1 3% ± 5%
5% ± 2%
1 00%
* Across both strippable coatings, most removal of Cs-1 37 was during first application
^^ °^j^«*j^£™tc8nbr Batteiie
-------
Drake
*i[?L Operational Factors
Decon. Rate
Irregular surfaces
Skilled labor
Power
Portability
Secondary waste
Surface damage
Cost of material
Strippable Coating #1
Application: 12 ma/hr Removal: 4.9 ma/hr
Very conducive
No specialized training
II sprayer used, 1 1 0 v; otherwise none
portable
Solid waste production: -0.26 kg/m2
Solid waste volume: -0.1 45 g/cm3
Minimal, only loose particles removed
$1 6.66/ma tor one application
Strippable Coating #2
Application: 4.6 ma/hr Removal: 1 .6 ma/hr
May extend removal time
No specialized training
It sprayer used, 1 1 0 v; otherwise none
portable
Solid waste production: -0.5 kg/m2
Solid waste volume: -0.188 g/cm3
Minimal, only bose particles removed
$58.84/m2 tor one application
* Strippable Coating #1 solidified in sprayer following incomplete cleaning
- mineral spirit cleaning required
* Strippable Coating #2 solidified in sprayer following freezing during shipment
^^O^-^-^^u^Srcenbr 83116116
Conclusions
Strippable coating #1 removed ~32%
Cs-137 from unpainted concrete
Strippable coating #2 removed ~76%
Cs-137 from unpainted concrete
For both coatings, days following
contaminant application and
orientation did not significantly impact
results
Material cost $17/m2 and $59/m2; labor
and equipment would increase the
cost of decontamination
Next step...larger scale physical
removal technologies
Battelle
-------
Lemieux
Thermomicrobiological Techniques for
Incinerator Performance Assessment
while Burning Contaminated Debris
Paul Lemieux and Joe Wood
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
Office of Research and Development
National Homeland Security Research Center
Decontamination and Consequence Management Division
It's called fire... It recycles wood.
SER*
Outline of Presentation
• Background
• Characterization of Behavior of Spore-Containing Material in Thermal
Incinerators
• Use of Thermomicrobiological Techniques to Assess Incinerator
Performance
• Agricultural Biomass Gasifier
Disposal Roles and Responsibilities
• As per NRF, EPA is lead agency for consequence management following
CBRN event of national significance
- Decontamination
- Disposal
• Assumption is made that disposal will be performed under spirit of existing
environmental regulations, if not under the letter of the law
• Several key stakeholders for disposal
- EPA (OSW, ERT, NOT, OSCs)
-State/local regulators
-Waste disposal industry
Potential Waste Composition
• Porous building materials and furnishings (possibly wet)
• Office equipment (computers, desks, file cabinets, etc.)
• Indirect residue from cleanup activities (e.g., rags, PPE, decontamination
agents)
• Contaminated HVAC system residues (e.g., spent filter cartridges,
contaminated HEPA filters)
• Aqueous residues
• Residues from cleanup of contaminated water systems
• Outdoor materials
• Agricultural residues/biomass
• Animal Carcasses
• Construction/Demolition Debris
Incinerators: Roles and Issues
• Large amount of potentially contaminated building materials may need to be
disposed of by incineration after a bioterrorist attack occurring in a public
building/space
• Issues for Incinerators
- Prevention of further contamination
-Compliance with permits
-Operational issues
- Sizing of material prior to shipment to disposal facility
-Residue management
- Selection of appropriate facilities
- Minimization of failure modes
• Office of Research and Development
SEFA
MWI Spore Survivability Tests
• Commercial hospital waste incinerators tested in early 1990s by EPA
• Doped with large quantities of Geobacillus stearothermophilus spores
• Spore survival measured in stack and ash
• > 6 Log reduction in most cases
• < 3 Log reduction in a few cases
• Primary chamber T and secondary chamber RT were most significant
variables
Wood et al , 2004
• Office of Research and Development
-------
Lemieux
SERft
Pilot-Scale Thermal Destruction Studies
• Investigate thermal destruction issues
- Time / temperature / material size requirements for destruction
- Emissions of conventional pollutants from combustion of building decontamination waste
- Effects of decon methods on disposal (e.g., dioxin emissions due to chlorinated decon
solutions)
- Incinerator performance assessment
• BWA simulants
- GeobaciHus stearothermophHus
- Bacillus atropheus
- Bacillus anthracis (Sterne)
• Substrate materials
- Carpet
- Ceiling tile
- Wall board
AERft
EPA Rotary Kiln Incinerator Simulator (RKIS)
Secondary Combustion Chamber Afterburner
-SERA
Spore Feed System
Thermomicrobiological Approach
• The D-value = "decimal reduction time"
- Time required at a given T to reduce a microbial population to one tenth of its
original population, i.e., to achieve a 90% reduction, or a LR of 1
• The F-value = "thermal death time"
- Time required to completely destroy the microbial population at a given T
• The Z-value = temperature change required for the D or F value to change
by a factor of 10
• At a given T
SERft
Ceiling Tile: Time vs Spore Count
&EPA
•miriKB
Source Woodet al , 20
_ Office of Resea
10000000
ai
8.
6
•
*5
»
•
"',";
\^_^
ch and Development
-------
Lemieux
LR of G. stearothermophilus Bl vs. Max. T in
material bundle
t \
• WMCMogTM
A Df>w*it»art
T Wei WdUKurd
4 DtiC*p«t
» WMCIQII
* lurxM (Dtpm CJ
G. stearothermophilus Bl survival vs. equivalent
exposure time (model-calculated F1 value) in RKIS.
&EFW
% of Bis showing growth at the maximum internal T
reached inside a wallboard bundle
so w i» an 2So ju jw
InlDroal bundle maxvnum \orrwatuio. dupaw C
Conclusions
• Spores survive longer in incineration environments than is expected based
on classical thermomicrobiological theory
• The use of thermomicrobiological concepts to assess incinerator
performance while processing building materials containing embedded
spores identifies necessary conditions to achieve spore destruction, as
opposed to proving sufficient conditions to assure spore destruction
• G. stearothermophilus or B. atropheus may be suitably conservative
indicator organisms for confirming complete inactivation of B. anthracis
spores via incineration of building decontamination residue.
Update on Prototype Transportable
Animal Carcass Gasifier Tests
• Office of Research and Development
SEFA
Background
• In the event of a foreign animal disease (FAD) outbreak, large quantities of animal
carcasses will need to be disposed
- HSPD 9, Defense of US Agriculture and Food, directs EPA to work with DHS and other
agencies to enhance response capability, including decontamination following a terrorist
attack affecting the agriculture and food infrastructure
- National Response Plan directs EPA to provide technical expertise and assistance to US
Department of Agriculture when an agricultural facility is contaminated with CBR.
- In its Agricultural Bioterrorism Select Agent and Toxin List, APH IS has included the highly
pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) virus, FMD, and other FAD agents among its list of
select agents and toxins that have the potential to pose a severe threat to animal or plant
health, or to animal or plant products.
• "Toolbox" approach - no single technology is seen as the "silver bullet"
• On-site disposal is preferred for extremely contagious FADs
- Foot and Mouth Disease
- Avian Influenza
- Exotic Newcastle Disease
• Office of Research and Development
-------
Lemieux
Gasification as Transportable Technology
• Lower flue gas flow rates
• Smaller equipment for same throughput
• High water content feed may improve efficiency
• Simpler design compared to incineration
• Potential for energy recovery (maybe)
• Potentially lower auxiliary fuel usage than incineration (maybe)
Gasifier Specifications
• 25 tons/day throughput in prototype gasifier (scaleable to 150 tons/day with
multiple gasifiers)
• 150 tons/day throughput in macerator
• Operate on all primary and secondary roads in US
• Deploy within 24 hours after arrival on site
• Batch fed
• Nominal 850 °C operating temperature
• Operates under natural draft
SERA
Gasifier Concept
-SERA
Macerator
SERA
Telescoping Stack
-------
Lemieux
Feed Material
Feeding the Unit
Gasifying Carcasses
Test Description
> Feed Materials
-Swine and poultry
-Wheat Straw
• Stack gas target analytes
- Fixed gases: O2, CO2, CO, THC, NOX, SO2
- Metals
-PM
-Acid gases
- Dioxins/furans
• Ash analysis
-TCLP
- Amino acids (surrogate for prions)
SB*
« II C«*Jrvi'at«/lJ
_ Office of Research and Development
Total Filterable Particulate
PM10
:/!•< "J:H Condensable Particulate
:>•.<-; v-.-t.ii? Condensable Particulate
Total Particular
Hydrogen Chloride
Chlorine as C12
Antimony
Arsenic
Barium
Beryllium
Cadmium
Chromium
Cobalt
Lead
Manganese
Mercury
Nickel
Selenium
Silver
PCDD/F Total
PCDD/FTEQ
ination and Consequence Management Div
Aver elb/hr
0.297
0.120
0.173
ND
: . .j . : :
N
6. '•'• ':' -
N )
1 .
N )
. ... •..
/ 2'-j ••
' .'•>. • •
1.75 Ml
sion
Average Ib/ton
of care ass
O.i'J
0.37
1.37
0,54
ND
'_• ; • •
.-•;
N
••.. _-- >.
1 . ' •
N )
; , ' : •
... • .
N )
1 '. -. •
'•:.- •
• ..-• •
5.47 ;-1
Conclusions
< Successful test of transportable gasifier in spite of truncated schedule
• Positives
- Transported over roads without damage
- Rapidly deployed
- Feed prep/transport system worked well
- Preliminary data suggest low emissions and good ash quality
- Redundant burners overcame burner damage during startup due to bad generator
- Simple design
• Negatives
- Throughput lower than planned
• Distribution of material on hearth not efficient
• Doors needed to be opened too many times to push ash back
- Ash removal system failure during startup
- Unable to repair or replace burners while operating
- Feed system cleanout problematic
- Need to address feed system biosecurity
^H Office of Research and Development
-------
Davis-Hoover
Survivability of Several Years
of Recalcitrant Biological and
Chemical Agents in Landfill
Leachates
Sheraton Chapel Hill, NC
September 24-26, 2008
Wendy Davis-Hoover, Ph. D.
Homeland Security Research
Contaminated Building Debris
Example: 2001 Anthrax Letters
> 5 letters mailed
> 23 confirmed cases of anthrax
• 11 inhalation, 5 fatal
• 12 cutaneous
> Contaminated 56 buildings in 10
States and Washington DC
Hart Senate Office Building
i Cleanup
Liquid waste
Steel drums
15000 gallons
Ft. Detrick
(Imineratbn)
Ft. Detrick
(Sterilizatbn)
Micro-Med
(Autoclave)
GCL Use in Covers
-------
Davis-Hoover
Project Purpose
> Can Agent contaminated building debris
be safely stored or detoxified in Municipal
Solid Waste Landfill?
• Will Agents survive in leachate?
• How long?
Planned Sampling of Agents
1-2
3-7
8-12
Frequency
Every 7 Days
Every 14 Days
Every 30 Days
. Sampling will be altered if statistical analysis of the data show
merit in more or less frequency.
. Sampling is terminated when two consecutive sampling periods
result in no detects in all replicates.
-lH
Bacterial Methods n|!
Bacillus
anthracis
Spores
Yersinia pestis
Francisella
tularensis
Clostridium
botulinum
Polymyxin Lysozyme EDTA
Th all ous- Acetate
Yersinia Selective
Chocolate
Phenylethanol
Anaerobically
Incut
Temperature
37°C
28°C
35°C
37°C
24 hours
48 hours
3-5 days
48 hours
A
,••*
Assumptions Made
> Triplicate microcosms will allow us to understand the
world.
> 3 ml microcosms will mimic anaerobic conditions of
landfills.
> Incubate at 12 degrees C with bacteria also run at body
temperature.
> Agents will always encounter undiluted leachate before
release.
Hypotheses
> Bacterial Spore formers will survive.
> Facultative Anaerobic Bacteria will
survive longer than Aerobic Bacteria.
> Viruses will survive.
Biological Agents
Bacteria
-------
Davis-Hoover
Bacterial Weapons Summary
Little Effect between 12 and 37° C
Franclsella
tularensls
Yersinia pestis
Clostridium
botulinum
Bacillus anthracis
Hypothesis
Persist
Persist
Persist
Persist
Data
< 20 Days
< 20 Days
Persist >368 Days
Persist > 368 Days
Viruses in Landfills ?
1-2
3-7
8-12
Planned Sampling
of Agents
Every 7 Days
Every 1 4 Days
Every 30 Days
. Sampling will be altered if statistical analysis of the data show
merit in more or less frequency.
. Sampling is terminated when two consecutive sampling periods
result in no detects in all replicates.
Chemical Agents
Chemical Analytical Methods ($j§
All extracted by USEPA 3500 series method ''\¥*«s"
Analyte
Lewisite (L)
Mustard (HD)
Sarin (GB)
Soman (GD)
Tabun (GA)
VX
Primary
ATT-005 (HPLC)
USEPA 8270D*
USEPA 8270D*
USEPA 8270D*
USEPA 8270D*
USEPA 8270D*
Secondary
USEPA200.8(ICP-MS)
ATT101*/ATT-003"
ATT 101*/ATT-001 ™
ATT 101*/ATT-002™
ATT101*/ATT-006"
ATT101*/ATT-004"
Name of Chemical
Agent
GA
GB
GD
HD
L
VX
Minimum Detection is
Limit \JjlE
in MSW Leachate
(ppm)
0.004
0.005
0.005
0.004
Derivative CVAA
5.3 ug/mL
0.010
t
-------
Davis-Hoover
Hypotheses
>Chemicals will mostly dissipate
before arrival or hydrolyze in
landfill except for Mustard Gas
and VX.
Thank you.
Questions ?
Chemical Weapons Summary
Hypothesis
Data
Tabun (GA)
<14 Days
Sarin (GB)
Moderate
Persistence
Low but Persist >182 Days
Soman (GD)
Moderate
Persistence
Low but Persist >168 Days
Mustard Gas
(HD)
Persist
< 7 Days
Lewisite
Not Persist
Derivative
Unknown
Derivative Persists >168 Days
Persist
-------
Lambert
1*1
Canada
An Assessment of the Performance of Portable Instruments
to Monitor Air Quality During Structural Decontamination
Operations
Participants
Project lead: Environment Canada
Federal Partners: DRDC Ottawa,
Counter-Terrorism Technology Centre,
DRDC Suttield, Public Health Agency
ot Canada
Industry Partners: Allen-Vanguard
Corporation, SAIC Canada
Other Participants: US Environmental
Protection Agency
Canada
Objective and Presentation Outline
... to critique the selection and performance of a wide range of air monitoring
and sampling equipment and methodologies used in the field trial.
Introduction
Project overview
Instrument selection
Case study 1: Real-time monitoring of VOCs
Case study 2: Sampling and laboratory analysis of VOCs
Instrument performance and critique
Summary
Canada
Introduction
EC and our partners have been involved in many meso-scale R&D projects
This set the groundwork for the selection and use of portable instruments in the
subsequent air monitoring plans
During the 80's
and 90's more
than 60 in-situ oil
burning trials
were conducted
Mobile, AB, trials in 91, 92, 94, 97, 98
19 individual sampling stations
Various air monitoring and sampling
equipment
10 transects lines of instrumentation extending
out from test tank
3-dimensional profiling
11*1
Canada
Project Overview: aerial view of trial site
-------
Lambert
Project Overview
Chemical trial: agents and simulants
• Mixture of diethyl malonate (DEM) and malathion to be sprayed using a
commercial air sprayer
• DEM was selected since it is a simulant for the "G" series nerve agents and the
Chemical Agent Monitor (CAM) reacts to it and identifies it as a nerve agent.
Malathion was selected since it is very persistent, techniques for sampling and
analysis are well known and previous faboral ' " ' ' """"" '
0067RD).
analysis are well known and previous laboratory studies were carried out (CRTI-02-
DEM and malathion react with decontaminants used to destroy chemical warfare
agents. They are "reactive simulants" for CW agents.
1*1 car
Canada
Project Overview: test structures for chemical decontamination trials
Project Overview: building sampling ports
Instrument Selection
1*1 S?
Canada
Instrument Selection
Building Station
Instrument
AreaRA PID
S Tm9etermeta
Tapem er
AP4C
CAMIM
'..-•: ,.•. ,-r
,„-.,., „., :.,, ,.;.-:pl|mp
;,"•> ,„.,,,«. .alpump
,-:,[,,;'.<-, •, • ••-, v ,-.:
:'''-:'' '" :" ''.-- —
Canada Canada
Parameter
VOCs.CI.eal-time
'".',1-1 ,S. itUO; real-time
H C . ..._•, real-time
CW, TICs real-time
CW
".". -,=,:,8 .->
•>•>, .riC sampling
!!• -,ro. :,.,,,•-,
O..,.,/ «,V,.. ,„..,......, .--.H.nj
• •^•'-<-!-'
Canada
-------
Lambert
Instrument Selection
11*1
Canada
Case study 1: Real-time monitoring of VOCs
PID mostly, with some FID
At all building stations, all perimeter stations, and mobile with teams
Good response to DEM, limited response to commercial malathion
Canada
Case study 1: Real-time monitoring of VOCs
Multi-Component Data from AreaRAE
~^ T\~
I _J i/^s
Canada
Case study 1: Real-time monitoring of VOCs
Remote Monitoring
' Wireless transmission of some
instrument data streaming to
command table
• Oxygen, LEL, VOC, Chlorine,
SO2
Canada
Case study 1: Real-time monitoring of VOCs
PID vs. FID
Canada
Case study 1: Real-time monitoring of VOCs
Mobile Monitoring
11*1
Canada
-------
Lambert
Case study 1: Real-time monitoring of VOCs
VOC at Perimeter
m • Only station to register response was downwind station -when door blew
open during trial
I • More relevant fugitive emission monitoring from EPA TAGA unit
1*1 c™
Canada
Case study 2: Sampling and laboratory analysis of VOCs
Instrumentation and VOCs
10 summa canister samples collected
2 backgroui!' I ;j>'if •}.<-.•• o Elected prbr to tt
- 1 inside structure, 1 outside
8 trials samples collected
•', a? !JM;H:<\; " \*x ~Jw-\'.\\?r»'1\l>-~>*<.
- 4 around building, 1 per sampling
station
Tygon tubing used to connect summas to
building ports
Sampling rate ot 20 mL/min to obtain
approximately 4.5 L over 4 hours
Laboratory analysis tor >150 VOCs
Canada
Case study 2: Sampling and laboratory analysis of VOCs
General Observations Related to Summa Canister Data
• Concentratbnottour
perimeter samples less than
indoor air sample
• Perimeter samples, the
concentratbnStatbnl «2
<4<3
• Wind was 11-22 km/h, 350
to 1 degrees trom N
;-Oii-;!. ii-1
mples but concentrations higher in trial sample;
arger chbrinated compounds - e.g. Freon
:3Band48(ceilingisameas2B
istructbn material and decon solution
Concentration distributbn 1E
Source ot chlorinated VOCs
Partitbning ot VOCs observed.
Light BTEX and alkanes cone, higher at ceiling than wall ports
Heavier MW compounds cone, higher at bwer wall ports
Perimeter chlorinated VOCs near background with tew light BTEX/alkanes detected
Canada
Instrument performance and critique
Real-time monitoring instruments
- 43 data streams from 25 instruments
- 100,000 data points recorded
- Real-time data monitored continuously for health and safety
- Good presumptive vapour patterns
Air sampling and laboratory analysis
- Summa canister - high value, range of VOC, but suite can't be adjusted,
expensive
- tenax- best of the tube-type samplers, thermal desorption improved feature
over extraction, 6 to 87 ng DEM and 419 to 2355 ng malathion detected in
building, 32 to 210 ng DEM and 6 to 19 ng malathion detected at downwind
perimeter station during trial
- XAD tube- nd to 10 ug DEM and 0.4 to3.6ug malathion detected in building,
0.9 ug DEM and nd malathion at 1 downwind perimeter station
- PS-1 HiVol (PUF) - 6.6 ug DEM, nd malathion at 1 downwind perimeter station
- Anasorb tube - nd for semi-VOC
- MCE filters (metals) and silica tubes (inorganic acids) pending
1*1
Canada
-------
Lambert
Case study 1: Real-time monitoring of VOCs
Chemical trial: air monitoring results (3B)
Summary
Real-time monitoring instruments, despite well documented limitations,
provide valuable information in an efficient timeframe
- Continuous data displays real-time trends and insight into fate and
behaviour
- Useful for health and safety of personnel
- Robust construction suitable for on-site operations
Standardized air sampling and laboratory analysis has both advantages
and limitations in this type of application
- Provides accepted results to the scientific community and credible
information for public use
- Non-detectable measurements or comparison to a suite of chemical
intended for other purposes such as air quality guidelines is valuable
- NIOSH or other methods must be modified to meet the requirements of
a unique circumstances
Questions ?
Canada
Instrument performance and critique
CWA Detectors
Smiths Sabre 2000 IMS
- DEM provokes a "GA agent'1
response
• Proengin AP4C
- DEM provokes an
organophosphate
response
Canada
-------
Brooks
Evaluation of Sampling Methods and
Strategies in an Operational
Environment
EPA 2008 Workshop on Decontamination and
Associated Issues for Sites Contaminated with
Chemical, Biological, or Radiological Materials
September 26, 2008
DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A. ApproM
Michael V. Walter, Ph.D.
Senior Staff Scientist
Joint Program Executive Office
for Chemical and Biological Defense
michael. walter@ipeocDct.osct.mil
(703)681-0844
I for public release
Validated Sampling Plan WorkGroup
Memorandum of Understanding for an Interagency Plan for
Environmental Microbiology Sampling: DHS, DOD, EPA, NIST,
FBI/DOJ, CDC/HHS
- "validation" consensus definition
Interagency Strategic Plan for Validation of Environmental Sampling
Methods Used in Detection of Anthrax Contamination in Facilities
- Evaluate & validate key steps of the end-to-end sampling process
- Define key milestones & track progress against those milestones
- Define, identify, and work with agency partners to provide appropriate
investments in methods development and empirical validation studies
- Focus initially on Bacillus anthracis (anthrax) spores, but once complete,
examine additional biological agents of concern
- Working with partners to incorporate the results of these studies into future
policies and guidelines
Laboratory Tests - JHU APL
Multi-Phased Testing Methodology Established Baseline
...... .,:.... -'"•..i.-bilityS Effectiveness of Various
ollection Methods
.TRIBUTION STATEMENT A Approval for pr
Idaho National Laboratory Test Activities
Managed by JPEO-CBD
Funded by DHS S&T and JPEO-CBD
Experimental design and sample collection plans created by EPA,
NIST, and PNNL
Onsite sample analysis conducted by the 9th Area Medical
Laboratory (AMI) using a JPM Guardian mobile laboratory,
operations managed by JHU APL
Sample collection conducted by:
- National Guard Bureau Civil Support Teams (NGB CST)
- EPA Emergency Response personnel
- HazMat first responders from Miami Dade County, Florida
Cooperative efforts of federal and local agencies
ION STATEMENT A Approve* for PI
Idaho National Laboratory:
Test Objectives
Compare sampling strategies (judgmental and
probabilistic) against concentration gradient to
characterize and clear a building
Gather baseline data on efficiency of sample collection
methods to detect contamination in operational
environment across concentration gradient
Gather baseline data on rapid detection methods such
as Hand Held Assays, Rapid Viability PCR using
operational samples
Apply test data to assist in validation of different
dispersal and sampling models
.TRIBUTION STATEMENT A Approval for pr
INL Test Facility
.
!
'
:
• "
.TRIBUTION STATEMENT A Approval mi puum. r<
-------
Brooks
EPATAGA JPM Guardian Lab Admin Trailers
........ DISTRIBUTION ST.TEME.T . «,,..^ „ .ubli. ,Jm.
Laboratory Testing Model Successfully Employed in Operational
Environment Using First Responders for Sample Collection
and Lab Analysis
.STRIBUTION STATEMENT.. .„...„„»
Visual Sample Plan
V5P
A DQO-Based Statistical Sampling
Design and Analysis Toolkit
• How Many Samples Required?
• Where Samples Located?
• Decision Confidence Achieved?
Within Building Modules
• Import Maps and Floor Plans
• 3-D Setup of Rooms/Buildings
• Many Possible Sampling Design
Approaches
• Realistic Furniture/Shelving
Overlays
• Surface-Type Stratification (carpets,
vinyl, wallboard, etc.)
>5000 Users Worldwide
Sponsored by DHS, EPA, DOE, DoD,
CDC/NIOSH, UK
Building Restoration Operations
Optimization Model - BROOM
A decision-support tool to
collect, manage, and analyze
sample data
- Secure SQL database
- GIS mapping
- Geostatistical analysis tools
- Uncertainty analysis
- Interfaces with VSP for
statistical sampling design
Data collection
- Hand-held wireless PDAs with
barcode readers and laser
rangefinders
- Paperless data transfer
- Secure transmission of data
- Chain of custody
Sand la
National
Laboratories
Test Event #2
Cumulative Particle Distribution
. ~ V* v» —
-_,..-
*
- ' T -
• JJ^
_ tH **,
T.,tE..nl.2 I"—-
Onsite Analytical Facilities-
JPM Guardian Mobile Laboratory
-------
Brooks
Sample Collection Activities
In Briefing From Incident Command
Dry Run Practice with Methodology
Prior to Entry Teams In Building Broom Decontamination
OSTRBUTiON STATEMENT, ,„,„-,„„„,„„,«
Sample Collection Map
."
Test Event #2
Characterization Sampling Results
_____ '_•••-•• • "
Characterization Results
(by Sampling Method)
SOCK SWAB WIPE
SAMPLING METHOD
Wipe Significant (p < 0.05)
Both laboratory and field studies
iTRIBUTIONST.TMeg,.,^,..,
Field Study M^B
Results
111
SOCK SWAB WIPE
SAMPLING METHOD
Overall Recovery (Characterization)
too
I..
1 " r_" _ '' '
100-
E 60
5 40-
•1
HHA vs. Culture
Positive Results
'Characterization:
>Culture: 89% significant (p<0.05)
> HHA: 60%
Clearance
>HHA: 61% significant (p<0.05)
>Culture: 24%
iu;m an
CHARACTERIZATION CLEARANCE
AOI......II.X,,O...L,
-------
Brooks
RV-PCR vs. Culture
Positive Results
1.0-
fo.6
Characterization
.Culture (63+/-1.7%)
>RVPCR (73 +/- 2.8%)
significant (p<0.05)
Clearance
>Culture(33+/-12.2%).
>RVPCR (34 +/-11.2%)
.NST.TEME.L..„...„„»
Overall Recovery (Clearance)
Data Synopsis-
Key Findings
Sampling methods (vacuum, wipe, swab) demonstrated
equivalent efficiency for recovery of Bacillus atrophaeus
spores in both laboratory and field environments
- Wipe Sampling Methods Demonstrated Highest and most
consistent recovery
Rapid Viability PCR successfully demonstrated effective
detection of Bacillus atrophaeus spores in comparison to
traditional culture
• Potential application to decrease sample detection time while
maintaining sensitivity associated with traditional culture.
Data Suggest that Hand Held Assays may be of use in
rapidly mapping high levels of contamination
Special Thanks To Sample Collection Teams
101stCST(ID)
32nd CST (MD)
44th CST (FL)
31st CST (DE)
Palm Beach County Hazmat Unit
-------
Sego
The Use of a Sampling Design
Strategy to Direct Decontamination
Activities Following a WMD Event
Brent Pulsipher, PNNL
Landon Sego, PNNL
Robert Knowlton, SNL
Don MacQueen, LLNL
Acknowledgements
Much of the material in this presentation is a product of
work on the following two projects:
Facility Restoration OTD
- Funded by DHS S&T, Don Bansleban, program
manager
- Multi-lab effort with SNL, LLNL, PNNL, ORNL, and
LANL
U.S. EPA National Decontamination Team document
- "EPA Sampling Strategy for Bacillus anthracis"
- Effort led by Dino Mattorano
- Technical support provided by PNNL and SNL
Sampling facilitates the decon process
and enables good decision-making
• Appropriate sampling supports good decision-making
- Reduces time and cost
- Protects workers
- Ensures public confidence
• Preplanning can save time
• Software tools are available to
- Develop optimal sampling strategies
- Provide quantitative confidence in decisions
- Manage the collection and statistical analysis of samples
Sampling has a role throughout
Response and Recovery Activities
Crisis Management
Notification
Receive and
assess
Identify suspect
release sites
Relay key
potential risks
to appropriate
agencies
First Response
HAZMAT and
emergency
*•*" Forensic^
'^investigation,'
Public health
'Screening \
v sampling J
Lietermination
of agent type
Concentration/
Risk
Consequence Management
Re med i at i on/ Clea n u p
Characterization
Detailed
characterization of
CWA or TIC
/^haracterizatioiT^
of affected site
Continue risk
communication
Characterization
sampling and
_
Initial risk
assessment
Clearance goals
Decontamination
Worker health and
safety
Source reduction
Decontamination
strategy
y^RemediationX
^*""-- - •— ""^
Waste disposal
of sites, items, or
both
^^ — ^^^
parameters
Clearance
Clearanct
sampling
analysis
Clearance
^decision
Restoration
(Recovery)
Renovation
Reoccupation
decision
/Long-term\
and public
health
\^^^if/
Source: Adapted from LLNL 2006
The Conceptual Site Model is critical
Courtesy ol Deana Crumbling, U.S. EPA, Office of Superiund Remediation and Technology Innovation
Preliminary
CSM predicts^
contaminant
distributions
Prediction guides
development of Sampling
C& Analysis Plan .^
Data confirms or J
modifies predictions as^r
CSM gradually matures
Mature CSM
_is the basis for
'decisions & all
subsequent
activities
// We iteratively \,
./ develop a better and better \.
^/understanding of the condition of the facility/^
Sampling to improve the CSM
Is the release location known?
- If "yes": In what directions has contamination mostly likely
spread?
- If "no": How precisely do we need to know the release location
to plan decon strategy?
Has agent absorbed into materials from which it will later be
emitted?
Has essential equipment that is difficult to remove or replace
become contaminated?
There are many other questions like these, that need
answers in order to decide how (and where) to
decontaminate.
Sampling is needed most in places where we
know the least, where uncertainty is greatest
-------
Sego
GAO Testimony - April 5, 2005
GAO Finding:
"Agencies need to validate sampling activities in order to Increase
confidence in negative results." "Agencies did not use
probability sampling in their initial sampling strategy. Probability
sampling would have allowed agencies to determine, with some
defined level of confidence, when all results are negative, whether
a building is contaminated."
GAO Recommendation:
"The DHS Secretary should also ensure that... appropriate investments
are made to explore improved sampling strategies;" "DHS said that
it would coordinate with EPA to ensure that appropriate investments
are made to explore improved sampling."
Developing a sampling plan
What are my sampling objectives?
- Characterization?
- Assess effectiveness of decon?
- Plume boundary delineation?
- Clearance?
Where should samples be located?
Targeted? Randomly located? Both?
Adaptive locations?
Developing a sampling plan
1 Do I have prior information that can be
used in the sampling design?
1 How many samples do I need?
1 What type (and level) of confidence do I
need to make defensible conclusions?
- X% confident of detecting hotspots of
radius R
- X% confident that Y% of the area does not
contain detectable contamination
- Confidence bands for plume boundary
Ov
Basis for
strategy
Basis for
confidence
erview of sampling strategies
Targeted
Professional
experience and
judgment
Info about specific,
targeted locations
answers specific
questions
Statistical
Some form of
random placement
of samples
Representative,
Reproducible,
based on a
probability model
Geostatistical
Uses spatial
correlation and
typically some type
of random placement
Representative,
Reproducible,
Improved
interpolation, based
on a probabilty
model
Can combine
Need to make good decisions with confidence
Some decisions require statistical inference
Decision Support Tools
Decision Support Tools
Two decision support tools exist that can aid the
sampling design, data management, and mapping
contaminant dispersion
- Visual Sample Plan (VSP) from Pacific Northwest National
Laboratory
- Building Restoration Operations Optimization Model (BROOM)
from Sandia National Laboratories
VHUQ| Sompw Plan
BROOM
-------
Sego
Visual Sample Plan
A DQO-Based Statistical
Sampling Design and
Analysis Toolkit
• How many samples required?
• Where samples located?
• Decision confidence achieved?
Within Building Modules
• Import maps and floorplans
• 3-D setup of rooms/buildings
• many possible sampling design
approaches
• Realistic furniture/shelving
overlays
• Surface type stratification
(carpets, vinyl, wallboard, etc)
>5000 Users Worldwide
Sponsored by DHS, EPA, DOE,
DoD, CDC/NIOSH, UK.
Validated Sampling Strategy and Tools
Response to GAO: 3 Tiered Approach
Building Restoration Opera
Optimization Model - BRO
^^^^™
• A decision support tool
to collect, manage, and
analyze sample data
- Secure SQL database -
- GIS mapping <^i^^
- Geostatistical analysis
tools
- Uncertainty analysis . .^^
• Data collection ^J
- Hand-held wireless PDAs ^x^^s. IT^
with barcode readers and X js^j
laser rangefinders \ ^^^ /^* ~~
- Paperless data transfer ^j
- Secure transmission of 7™
data
- Chain of custody
Sponsored by DHS
tions /
OM m
Y:rf
^-
^
;.
k
;
,;
33]
LJ
Integration of BROOM & VSP
PNNL and SNL are currently funded by DHS-S&T to integrate
BROOM and VSP
Goal:
- Create a software environment where both tools can "talk" to
one another—passing back and forth floor plans, data, etc.
- Better support the decontamination and recovery process
• DQO
• Targeted and/or statistical
sampling designs
• Statistical analysis
VSP
"TJ i*1 rift ~r
Data acquisition &
management
\ Geostatistical design 8
analysis
BROOM
BROOM-VSP
Decision Logic for Utilizing VSP and
BROOM in a Sampling Process
| 1 BROOM Functbns
| | VSPFunnum
Sampling Zone Designations
and Strategies
-------
Sego
Example Scenario
Release location assumed on
the ticketing level
Gaseous dispersion of CWA
that will likely spread
throughout the area
Air handling units will
influence the distribution of
contamination
Prior knowledge of facility
layout and air handling units
can greatly aid conceptual
model of the release
Statistical-based sampling
design concentrates on
surface sampling
Zone Classifications
Assess our knowledge of the release and the facility layout, then
assign zone classifications to guide sampling design
- Class 1 - Zone is definitely contaminated
- Class 2 - Highly likely that the zone is contaminated
- Class 3 - Likely that the zone is uncontaminated, but uncertainty
exists
- Class 4 - Highly unlikely that the zone is contaminated
Zone Classifications (Example)
nClass 1: Definitely Contaminated • Class 3: Unlikely Contaminated
DCIass2: High Likely Contaminated • Class 4: High Likely Uncontaminated
Use CSM, best
available
information,
and expertise
to guide zone
classification
Class 1 Area Sampling Strategy
Class 1: Definitely
contaminated area.
Targeted sampling only to
determine contaminant
magnitude for decon
planning purposes.
No probabilistic sampling
recommended unless small
area "hotspot" is realistic
and small area decon is
feasible.
! Judgment/Targeted Samples
Class 2 Area Sampling Strategy
Class 2 = Highly likely to be
contaminated
1. Take targeted samples in most
likely contaminated locations.
2. If targeted samples detect
contamination, no further
samples needed; Classify
area as Class 1 and Decon.
3. If no contamination detected in
targeted samples, take more
samples using hotspot
sampling design.
(If unable to do targeted first, mayjust
want to do hotspot sampling)
Class 2 Area Sampling Strategy
No contamination
detected in targeted
samples.
Augment with hotspot
sampling.
Desire high probability of
detecting hotspot of given
size and shape.
Chem release
characteristic hotspot
expected to be quite
large.
Detecting smaller hotspot
requires more samples.
16 Samples needed to detect 50' diameter circular h
56 Samples needed to detect 25' diameter circular h
-------
Sego
Class 3 Area Sampling Strategy
Class 3: Unlikely to be
contaminated.
Develop sampling scheme to
show X% confident that at least
Y% of the surface area is
un contaminated.
95% confident that at least 90%
of surface area is
un contaminated if all 29 samples
are not contaminated.
In this case, equivalent to 44'
hotspot design.
More confidence or >% surface
area clean requires more
samples (298 for 95/99 vs. 29 for
95/90)
Clearance Sampling or Class 4 Area
Strategy
Use a combined targeted
and probabilistic approach;
15 targeted.
Assume target samples 1.5
times more likely to be
contaminated than
probabilistic samples.
Strong prior belief that area
is clean.
Potential for significantly
reducing number of samples
needed (89 vs. 298
samples).
95% confidence that at least
99% of surface area is
un contaminated if no
samples show
contamination.
I.
Confidence vs Number of Samples
With statistical sampling designs, greater confidence means more
samples need to be collected
The number of samples taken may add time to the decon/restoration
process
The table below assumes 200 samples can be taken and analyzed
per day
% Confidence
Desired
90
95
99
% Area not
Contaminated
90
95
99
Number of
Samples
Required
22
59
457
Number of Days
for Sample
Collection
1
1
3
Note: Based on example from Class 3 sampling strategy;
Using prior information and/or combining judgment and
probabilistic sampling can significantly reduce number of samples
required.
Accounting for Spatial Variability
in Sampling Design
Spatial Design Considerations
Traditional statistical design methods only indirectly
account tor spatial variability on a very coarse scale.
Geostatistical techniques developed for the
mineral/oil/gas industries have been used successfully
in the environmental arena to address the spatial
distribution of contaminants
Coupled with optimization routines, these techniques
offer a potential to decrease the number of samples
needed to characterize or clear an area compared to
traditional statistical methods
Spatial Variability
Geostatistics accounts for spatial variability
Sample locations, color-coded
for concentration
Data fit to a variogram model,
which describes the spatial variability
-------
Sego
Mapping Contamination
• Geostatistics provides mapping
capability
- Concentration map
- Uncertainty map
• This approach is well suited to
an adaptive sampling
procedure
- multiple rounds of sampling,
with each round based on
reducing uncertainty in
knowledge of the contaminant
distribution
• This approach may reduce the
number of samples and
therefore the time necessary
develop a decon plan
Summary
Validated tools exist for sample design,
sample collection, and data management
Goal is to help decision makers arrive at
defensible conclusions and reduce sampling
time in order to:
- Direct decontamination strategy
- Assess the effectiveness of decontamination
- Clear facilities for reoccupation
Summary
Preplanning can save time if an event occurs
Conceptual model development is important
Classification of sampling zones makes it easier to
create sampling design decisions in a timely manner
Recommended sampling design methods:
- Targeted sampling
- Probability-based statistical design methods
- Combined targeted and probability-based approaches Provide
\. confidence
- Geostatistical methods that account for spatial variability, statements
and are well suited to adaptive sampling
Contact Info
Landon Sego
Brent Pulsipher
Robert Knowlton
Don MacQueen
landon.sego@pnl.gov
brent.pulsipher@pnl.gov
rgknowl@sandia.gov
macq@llnl.gov
-------
Wiener
SRC Aerosol Test Facility (ATF) a
the Study of the Measurement and
Mechanisms of Exposure to CBR Agents
08 Workshop on Decontamination and Associated Issues Foi Si
Russell W. Wiener, Ph.D.
National Homeland Security Research Center
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
September 26, 2008
USEPA's Aerosol Test Facility at
Research Triangle Park
• The Aerosol Test Facility (ATF) is located
in Research Triangle Park, North Carolina.
The ATF is composed of two large wind
tunnels, several aerosol research
chambers, and a number of additional
laboratories for bench scale aerosol
testing.
• Over 10,000 sq. ft. of high bay laboratory
space.
Aerosol Wind Tunnel
(top view)
SMALL WIND TUNNEL
US EPA's Aerosol Test Facility at
Research Triangle Park
j Aerosol Test Facility Research Areas
Particle sampler/monitor research and design
• Concept/prototype verification
• Sampling efficiency studies
-------
Wiener
US EPA's Aerosol Test Facility at
Research Triangle Park
Aerosol Test Facility Research Areas
• Aerosol and Fluid Dynamics
• Velocimetry and Anemometry
• Aerosol and gas dispersion analysis
• CFD, Non-dimensional, and Dispersion Modeling
US EPA's Aerosol Test Facility at
Research Triangle Park
Aerosol Test Facility Research Areas
• Human exposure measurement
• Indoor Air Studies
• Ambient Air and Field Studies
• Exposure Simulation
• Aerosol infiltration and penetration studies
.-o
I
Human Exposure Test
Dummies
• V a
Field Study Site - Brooklyn, NY
Partnership Opportunities
The ATF allows the study of fluid and aerosol
motion under extremely well controlled conditions
and produces highly accurate data on which to base
scientific decisions.
• The EPA wind tunnel is one of the only large aerosol wind
tunnels in the US.
• The wind tunnel is scaled tor adult human exposure testing.
Heated-breathing manikins are available.
Ability to
• design and test aerosol monitors and sampling
technologies.
• perf9rm dispersion analysis, modeling, field and laboratory
studies.
Resuspension of Particles by
Evacuating Personnel
An ATF project
Alfred Eisner, Alion Science and Technology,
Russell Wiener and Jacky Rosati U.S. EPA,
-------
Wiener
ffrjEamw a.
The ricin attack on Capitol Hill on February 2, 2004,
revealed the need to develop quantitative methods to
estimate risk from exposure of rapidly evacuating
occupants to agents resuspended from surfaces in offices.
Little is understood about the process of resuspension of
particles from floors during an evacuation, in spite of its
significant contribution to the movement of materials inside
an offi™
To investigate the process of a foot stepping on a surface
contaminated with particulate matter, an automated
prosthetic foot controlled by electric actuators was
developed. Further, an articulated, heated, breathing
manikin was used in this study to investigate the potential
exposure of escaping individuals.
The mechanicaj foot (MF) and
articulated manikin were placed in a
wind tunnel. Three Aerodynamic
Particle Sizers (APSs) were used to
monitor aerosol concentration along
the manikin's body in real time,
following execution of a step motion.
Double-pulse particle image
velocimetry (PIV) was used to study
particle-laden airflow under the foot.
Three APSs were used to measure
aerosol concentration along the
manikin's body.
.
During the uplift stage of the foot step, an aerosol bolus develops that
moves rapidly toward the toes.
RESULTS
Average Particle Size of Ovalbumin Powder
• the average particle size was determined to be 2.7
microns, which is similar in size to ricin.
Exposure Assessment
• The concentration found in the respiratory zone following
a single step agitation of 0.5 g of ricin simulant was found
to be 5 ug/m3.
• The typical bolus temporal length was found to be
approximately 15 s.
• Assuming that the respiratory tidal volume is 500 cm3 and
that an individual can execute approximately four
inhalations during the bolus length of 15 s, it is possible to
assess pulmonary exposure as O.OIug.
• Resulting in the assessed dose of 0.001 ug assuming
alveolar deposition efficiency of 10%,
Wind Tunnel Performance
Testing of the Radnet Sampler
An ATF project
Zora Drake and Lydia Brouwer, Alton Science and
Technology, Russell Wiener, U.S. EPA,
-------
Wiener
RadNet Sampler
Inside Radnet Sampler
Radnet - filter and
detectors
ATF Wind Tunnel
Performance
Wind Speed 2 kph
ATF Wind Tunnel Performance
Wind Speed 8 kph
ATF Wind Tunnel
Performance
Wind Speed 24 kph
-------
Wiener
ATF Wind Tunnel Test
RadNet Sampler Efficiency
SORT Stokes No.
RadNet Testing
The Aerosol Wind tunnel has
been determined to meet PM10
wind tunnel performance criteria.
• Less than 10% imprecision in wind
speed across the test area.
• Less than 10% coefficient of
variation for aerosol concentration in
the test area.
ATF Wind Tunnel Test
RadNet Sampler Efficiency
RadNet Testing
The RadNet sampler has had a
preliminary evaluation in the
tunnel and has shown
• a significant non-uniformity of
particle deposition on the filter.
• a decrease in sampling efficiency for
particles greater than 7.5 microns at
higher wind speeds.
-------
Foarde
Collective Protection Technology Testing
of Bioaerosol Air Purification Devices
Karin Foarde, James Hanley, Douglas VanOsdell, Keith Esch
RTI International
and
Amy Maxwell and Chris Karwacki
US Army Edgewood Chemical Biological Center
9/26/08
HRTI
Public Release - Unclassified
www.rti.org
Overview
Framework and background of method
Brief review of the method, including key issues, QA
requirements, test battery and apparatuses
Results of the method verification
www.rti.org
Public Release - Unclassified
RRTI
Framework
Part of an overarching series of Collective Protection
Air Purification Test and Evaluation Methods
Assess the efficacy of technologies for protection
against chemical, nuclear, and biological threats
Air Purification Test Methodologies
Chemical
Single-Pass
• Catox
• Regen
• Biological
Particulate
www.rti.org
Public Release - Unclassified
Background
Method For Evaluating Air Purification Technologies
For Collective Protection Using Viable Microbial
Aerosols (T&E Bioaerosol Purification Method)
Developed in collaboration with ECBC, Dahlgren
NSWC, Dugway Proving Ground, Air Force Research
Laboratory and others
Draft method extensively reviewed by community
(including users, testers, microbiologists, aerosol
scientists, etc. from DHS, internal and external DOD)
www.rti.org
Public Release - Unclassified
Scope of the Method
Test devices and technologies that eliminate viable
microorganisms from the airstream
Active/reactive technologies
Removal devices
Combination technologies
Tests to include design-limiting conditions for the device
Small-scale test
TRL1 - 3
Large-scale test
TRL4-6
ww rti ora Public Release - Unclassified RRT1
Types of Devices and Technologies
High-intensity UVC
UVC systems
Pulsed UV broad spectrum
Compressive heating
Hydroxyl radicals - modification of surface decon technology
Iodine - modification of surface decon technology
• HEPA and ULPAfilters
Standard Ventilation filter
Photo Catalytic Oxidation
Combinations
Public Release - Unclassified
RRTI
-------
Foarde
Measurements
Percent bioaerosol inactivation
Purification Efficiency (%) = 100(1 -P)
Where:
P is the survival (penetration) computed as:
P = D/U
D = Bioaerosol concentration downstream of the device
(downstream survivors)
U = Bioaerosol concentration upstream of the device
Power consumption, temperature rise
Observe and note other relevant operational aspects of the device as
applicable (e.g., size, weight, and noise)
www.rti.org
Public Release - Unclassified
RRTI
Key Issues Addressed in the Method
Safety
Environmental Considerations
Protective Factors
Simulant Selection
Particle Size Distribution of Bioaerosol Challenge
Data Quality Objectives
Considerations for Agent Testing
www.rti.org
Public Release - Unclassified
RRTI
Protective Factors
1. Directly protect the BWA itself from full effect of the
inactivation method used by the technology or,
Neutralize or interfere with some component of the
technology making it less available to inactivate BWA.
Agglomerates
Relative Humidity
"Organic Matter"
Weaponization process
• Atmospheric aerosol components m
Dirt (organic matter)
Background bioaerosol
www.rti.org
Public Release - Unclassified
Recommended Types of Protective Factors
Generate some of the organisms as both singlets
and as agglomerates
Perform some tests at high or low RH, and
3. Include a small amount of protein in the nebulizing
fluid to mimic, at least partially, a degree of protection
provided by the dirt in an atmospheric aerosol and
some type of weaponization process.
www.rti.org
Public Release - Unclassified
i'RFT
Simulant Selection Criteria
1. Bracket the susceptibilities of the BWA to the
technologies,
Have appropriate physiological characteristics of
BWA,
Have appropriate physical characteristics of the
BWA, and
4. Permit laboratory containment compatible with
biohazard level of simulant.
www.rti.org
Public Release - Unclassified
RRTI
Inactivation Efficiency
(Overall Susceptibility of Microbe Groups to Some Antimicrobial Agents)
Enveloped lipid viruses
Vegetative (Gram-negative)
bacteria
Large non-enveloped viruses
Non-enveloped non-lipid vi
Mycobacteria
Bacterial spores
www.rti.org
most resistant
Public Release - Unclassified
RRTI
-------
Foarde
Bioaerosol Simulants
BWA Category
Bacillus
anthracis
Vegetative
Bacteria
BWA
Virus BWA
Simulant
B. thuringiensis (Bt)
B. atrophaeus (Bg)'
Staphy/ococcus
epidenridis
Yersinia rohdei
MS2 bacterbphage/
bacterial virus
Justification/Role
Physiological and
physical
characteristics
Historical simulant
Gram-positive
slightly more resistant
Gram-negative
Slightly less resistant
Non-enveloped virus
Size Range as Aerosolized
Singlets, 0.7 to 0.8 by 1 .3 to 1 .5 urn.
Aggbmerates, polydisperse, multiple
organisms per particle. ~3 um
Singlets, 0.7 - 0.8 x 1 - 1 .5 um.
Singlets, 0.5-1 .5 um spheres.
Sing lets, 0.5-0.8x1.0-3.0 um.
Agglomerates, polydisperse, multiple
organisms per particle. ~3 um
Polydispersed micron-sized aerosol.
www.rti.org Public Release - Unclassified RRTI 13
Test Apparatus
Adapted from particulate tests
Performance based
Flexible - form and dimensions adapted to fit test
device
Apparatus must be capable of meeting quality control
parameters for air velocity uniformity, inert aerosol
uniformity, inert downstream mixing, aerosol neutralizer
activity, temperature, RH, test airflow rate, etc.
www.rti.org
Public Release - Unclassified
RRTI
RTI Small Scale TRL 1-3 Test Apparatus
www.rti.org
Public Release - Unclassified
Rim
RTFs Large Scale TRL 4-6 Test Apparatus
www.rti.org
Test Series Including Required Control Tests
Public Release - Unclassified
RRTI
Quality Control Parameters for Bioaerosols
Parameter
Minimum upstream counts
for samplers
Maximum counts for
samplers
100% Transmission
(correlation test)
Upstream CPUs
Upstream PFUs
Frequency and
Description
Each efficiency test.
Each efficiency test.
Performed at least once
per test sequence per
organism
Each test. Statistical
check of data quality.
Each test. Statistical
check of data quality.
Control Limits
Minimum of 10 CPU/plate or
PFU/plate
Maximum of 400 CPU/plate or 400
PFU/plate
Test Acceptable
Organism Transmission Range
spores 0.85 to 1.15
vegetative bacteria 0.80 to 1.20
bacterial virus 0.75 to 1.25
CV<0.25
CV<0.35
www.rti.org Public Release - Unclassified ^.R~TE
-------
Foarde
Typical Data - Example 1
Effective Device
B. thuringensis (Bt)
(Bacterial spore as singlets)
B. thuringensis (Bt)
(Bacterial spore as agglomerates)
B. atrophaeus (Bg)
(Bacterial spore as singlets)
Staphylococcus epidermidis
(Vegetative bacteria as singlets)
MS2 virus
(Bacteriophage/ bacterial virus)
Purification Efficiency (%)
95% lower
confidence limit
99.99951
99.99959
99.99973
99.99974
99.99981
Observed
Value*
> 99. 99997
99.99996
> 99. 99995
> 99. 99998
> 99.99993
www.rti.org
used when no downsi
Public Release •
'•earn counts were detected.
Unclassified
Method Verification
Task 1 Evaluate T & E Method Usability
• Staff with all levels of experience served as
"independent testers" evaluated the document for
usability and provided feedback
Task 2 Using the Test Method
• Test devices using the method
Task 3 Verification of Method
Compared verification test data to existing data
www.rti.org
Public Release - Unclassified
BRTI
Typical Data - Example 2
Ineffective Device
B. thuringensis (Bt)
(Bacterial spore as singlets)
B. thuringensis (Bt)
(Bacterial spore as agglomerates)
B. atrophaeus (Bg)
(Bacterial spore as singlets)
Staphylococcus epidermidis
(Vegetative bacteria as singlets)
MS2 virus
(Bacteriophage/ bacterial virus)
Purification Efficiency (%)
95% lower
confidence limit
0
0
0
99.991
99.93
Observed
Value
10.5
1.0
0
99.997
99.98
www.rti.org
Public Release - Unclassified
Verification Conclusion and Recommendations
• Usability is good; few recommendations
Method is robust
Both small scale and large scale tests went well; data
is high quality
Unresolved issues
Specification of chemical neutralizers for residual
chemical
Composition of nebulizing fluid - "protective factors"
www.rti.org
Public Release - Unclassified
MRTI
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&EPA
United States
Environmental Protection
Agency
PRESORTED STANDARD
POSTAGES FEES PAID
EPA
PERMIT NO. G-35
Office of Research and Development
National Homeland Security Research Center
Cincinnati, OH 45268
Official Business
Penalty for Private Use
$300
Recycled/Recyclable
Printed with vegetable-based ink on
paper that contains a minimum of
50% post-consumer fiber content
processed chlorine free
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