EPA/600/R-09/098 February 2010
United States
Environmental Protection
Agency
Final Report - Assessment of All
Hazards Receipt Facility (AHRF)
Screening Protocol
Office of Research and Development
National Homeland Security Research Center
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EPA/600/R-09/098 | February 2010 | www.epa.gov/ord
FINAL REPORT
Assessment of All Hazards Receipt Facility
(AHRF) Screening Protocol
UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY
Cincinnati, OH 45268
Office of Research and Development
National Homeland Security Research Center
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AHRF Protocol Assessment Report
Acknowledgments
This report presents results of four assessments of sample screening procedures in All Hazards Receipt
Facilities (AHRFs) located at the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Region 1 and New York
State Public Health laboratories. The assessments were funded by the EPA National Homeland Security
Research Center (NHSRC), and involved representatives from EPA, the U.S. Department of Homeland
Security (DHS), Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI), Association of Public Health Laboratories
(APHL), Eastern Research Group, and the New York State Department of Health (NYSDOH) in Albany,
New York. This report was prepared by Computer Sciences Corporation (CSC) under Contract EP-W-
06-046. CSC also provided technical support throughout the assessments.
Disclaimer
This document has been subjected to the Agency's review and has been approved for publication. Note
that approval does not signify that the contents necessarily reflect the views of the Agency. EPA does not
endorse the purchase or sale of any commercial products or services.
Questions concerning this document or its application should be addressed to:
Erin Silvestri, MPH
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
National Homeland Security Research Center
26 W. Martin Luther King Drive, MS NG16
Cincinnati, OH 45268
513-569-7619
Email: silvestri.erin@epa.gov
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Foreword
Following the events of September 11, 2001, EPA's mission was expanded to account for critical needs
related to homeland security. Presidential Directives identified EPA as the primary federal agency
responsible for the country's water supplies and for decontamination following a chemical, biological,
and/or radiological (CBR) attack. To provide scientific and technical support to help EPA meet this
expanded role, EPA's National Homeland Security Research Center (NHSRC) was established. The
NHSRC research program is focused on conducting research and delivering products that improve the
capability of the Agency to carry out its homeland security responsibilities.
As a part of this mission, NHSRC provides support to the Environmental Response Laboratory Network
(ERLN): a nationwide network of federal and state laboratories responsible for the analysis of
environmental samples. The goal of NHSRC's research in this area is to support the technical capabilities
of these laboratories in their ability to provide an effective response. The information provided in this
publication summarizes a critical step in providing a screening protocol to help protect laboratory
staff, and their facilities, in carrying out their missions.
In 2005, NHSRC embarked on a collaborative effort to develop, construct, and implement All Hazards
Receipt Facilities (AHRFs) for screening samples of unknown and potentially hazardous character, prior
to laboratory analysis. In September 2008, EPA and DHS co-published an All Hazards Receipt Facility
Screening Protocol, recommending a step-by-step approach to use when screening samples that have been
presented to an AHRF. The process of developing this protocol incorporates an EPA field assessment to
test and verify the protocol. This report documents the results of four such field assessments and provides
recommendations for AHRFs or "AHRF-like" operations.
NHSRC works with partners to achieve results and has conducted this research cooperatively and in
partnership with EPA's Program Offices; across the federal government, working with the U.S.
Department of Homeland Security (DHS), U.S. Department of Defense, (DoD), and the Federal Bureau
of Investigation (FBI); and outside the federal government, working with the Association of Public Health
Laboratories (APHL).
This report represents an important next step in developing an All Hazards Receipt Facility Screening
Protocol. We value your comments as we move toward the development of an efficient process to screen
environmental samples presented to an AHRF and move one step closer to achieving our homeland
security mission and our overall mission of protecting human health and the environment.
Cynthia Sonich-Mullin, Acting Director
National Homeland Security Research Center
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Acronyms and Abbreviations
AHRF All Hazards Receipt Facility
APHL Association of Public Health Laboratories
ATP Adenosine Triphosphate
C-4 Cyclonite - Plastic Explosive
CAD Chemical Warfare Agent Detector
CAM Chemical Agent Monitor
CAFA Celite® Analytical Filter Aid
CEES 2-Chloroethyl ethyl sulfide
CGI Combustible Gas Indicator
COC Chain-of-custody
cpm Counts per minute
CSC Computer Sciences Corporation
CWA Chemical Warfare Agent
DEQ Oregon Department of Environmental Quality
DHS U.S. Department of Homeland Security
DMMP Dimethyl methylphosphonate
DoD U.S. Department of Defense
DOT U.S. Department of Transportation
ECBC Edgewood Chemical and Biological Center
ELITE™ Easy Livermore Inspection Test for Explosives
EMT Emergency Medical Technician
EPA U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation
FSP Flame Spectrophotometer Detector
GB Sarin
G G-series nerve agents
H Blister agent - nitrogen mustard
H2O2 Hydrogen peroxide
HAZCAT Hazardous Characterization
HAZMAT Hazardous Materials
HC1 Hydrogen chloride
HD Sulfur mustard - blister agent
HMRU Hazardous Materials Response Unit
HVAC Heating, Ventilation, and Air Conditioning
IMS Ion Mobility Spectrometer
IPA Isopropanol
L Blister agent - lewisite
LRN Laboratory Response Network
M8 Detector Paper for Chemical Agents
LEL Lower Explosive Limit
(iR Microroentgens
ng Nanograms
NAV Nerve agent vapor
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NEIC National Enforcement Investigation Center
NHSRC National Homeland Security Research Center
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NYSDOH New York State Department of Health
ORIA Office of Radiation and Indoor Air
PID Photoionization Detector
PPE Personal Protective Equipment
ppm Parts per million
Rad Radiation
TIC Toxic industrial compound
TNT Trinitrotoluene
VOC Volatile Organic Compounds
VHP Vaporized hydrogen peroxide
V V-series nerve agents
VX O-ethyl-S-(2-diisopropylaminoethyl)methylphophonothiolate
WMD Weapons of mass destruction
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Table of Contents
Acknowledgments ii
Disclaimer ii
Acronyms and Abbreviations iii
1.0 Background 1
1.1 History and Purpose of the All Hazards Receipt Facilities 1
1.2 Purpose of this Report 1
2.0 Description of Assessments 1
2.1 Purpose of the Assessments 1
2.2 Agenda 2
2.3 Assessment Participants 3
2.4 Assessment Samples 4
2.5 AHRF Screening Equipment and Reagents 4
2.6 Assessment Process 7
2.7 Assessment Forms 8
3.0 Results of Sample Screening 8
4.0 Recommendations 15
4.1 Facilities 19
4.1.1 Major Recommendations and Upgrades 19
4.1.2 Minor Recommendations 20
4.1.3 Additional Suggestions 21
4.1.4 Recommended Activities 21
4.2 Equipment 21
4.2.1 Major Recommendations & Upgrades 21
4.2.2 Minor Recommendations 22
4.2.3 Additional Suggestions 22
4.2.4 Recommended Activities 22
4.3 Protocol 23
4.3.1 Major Recommendations and Upgrades 23
4.3.2 Minor Recommendations 25
4.3.3 Additional Suggestions 25
4.3.4 Recommended Activities 25
5.0 Conclusions 26
Attachments
Attachment 1: Flowchart (Obsolete) - Sample Screening Procedures from the October 2006
AHRF Protocol
Attachment 2: Flowchart (Final) - Recommended Modifications to AHRF Sample Screening
Procedures Based on Assessments
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1.0 Background
1.1 History and Purpose of the All Hazards Receipt Facilities
During 2005 through 2007, several federal agencies and organizations, including the U.S. Department of
Homeland Security (DHS), U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), U.S. Department of Defense
(DoD), Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and the Association of Public Health Laboratories (APHL)
combined efforts to develop, construct, and implement All Hazards Receipt Facilities (AHRFs) for
prescreening unknown and potentially hazardous samples collected under unusual or suspicious
circumstances. Towards this goal, draft AHRF sample receipt and screening procedures were developed
and documented in a Draft Interim All Hazards Receipt Facility Protocol, Standard Operating
Procedures (Guidance), October 4, 2006. In 2007, DoD completed construction and deployment of two
prototype AHRFs: one located at the EPA Region 1 Laboratory in North Chelmsford, Massachusetts, and
the second located at the New York State Public Health Laboratory, New York State Department of
Health (NYSDOH) in Albany, New York. During 2007, EPA performed assessments of the AHRF
protocol using staff and equipment at each of the prototype AHRFs, for the purpose of evaluating the
procedures in terms of protecting laboratory facilities and staff from hazardous samples. Two
assessments were performed at each of the two facilities. Initial assessments were performed on May 8
and 9, 2007 and June 12 and 13, 2007, at the EPA and New York State Public Health Laboratory AHRF
sites, respectively; follow-up assessments were performed at the EPA and New York Public Health sites
on September 11 and 12, 2007 and October 2 and 3, 2007, respectively.
1.2 Purpose of this Report
Detailed results of each of the four assessments are described and presented in the following individual
assessment reports:
• Draft Report: Initial Assessment of Draft All Hazards Receipt Facility (AHRF) Protocol at
USEPA Region 1 Facility (May 25, 2007)
• Draft Report: Follow-Up Assessment of Draft All Hazards Receipt Facility (AHRF) Protocol at
USEPA Region 1 Facility (October 5, 2007)
• Draft Report: Initial Assessment of Draft All Hazards Receipt Facility (AHRF) Protocol at the
New York State Department of Health, Wadsworth Center Facility (June 29, 2007)
• Draft Report: Follow-Up Assessment of Draft All Hazards Receipt Facility (AHRF) Protocol at
the New York State Department of Health, Wadsworth Center Facility (October 19, 2007)
This final assessment report is intended to provide overall recommendations and suggestions for revising
or improving the AHRF facilities and protocol, based on the results of all four assessments, along with a
summary of the rationale for the recommendations and suggestions.
2.0 Description of Assessments
2.1 Purpose of the Assessments
The goal of the AHRF protocol is to protect laboratory facilities and staff, and to support laboratory
decisions concerning samples containing potentially hazardous unknowns. The purpose of the
assessments was to evaluate the AHRF screening protocol and, if necessary, use the results of the
evaluation to suggest modifications to the protocol described in a Draft Interim All Hazards Receipt
Facility Protocol, Standard Operating Procedures (Guidance), October 4, 2006. A flowchart diagram of
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AHRF Protocol Assessment Report
the protocol is included in the Draft Interim Procedures and as Attachment 1 of this report. The flowchart
in this attachment is marked as obsolete, to distinguish it from the final flowchart resulting from the
assessments. Recommended modifications to the protocol, based on results of each assessment, are
included in the individual reports for each of the four assessments. A final modified flowchart (based on
the results of all four assessments) is provided as Attachment 2 to this final report.
In addition to evaluating the AHRF screening procedures, the assessments also provided observations
regarding the facility design, reliability of screening equipment, and the usefulness of the paperwork and
documentation associated with sample receipt and subsequent sample screening. Details regarding the
approach to assessment of the AHRF protocol are described in Assessment Plan for Evaluation of All
Hazards Receipt Facility Screening Protocols, Draft, 03/26/2007.
2.2 Agenda
An example of the agendas used during the assessments is provided in Table 1. A goal of each
assessment was to complete screening of up to 26 samples in a two-day period. When all samples could
not be screened during this period due to time constraints (as was the case during assessments at the EPA
Region 1 facility), remaining samples were screened within one to two weeks of the assessment.
Discussions took place throughout each assessment, with a debriefing session following the completion of
sample screening. All assessment participants were provided the opportunity to witness the processing of
samples over the two-day sample screening period. A general outline of assessment agenda is provided in
Table 1.
Table 1: AHRF Protocol Assessment Agenda
FIRST DAY
8:30-9:00 OVERVIEW AND INTRODUCTIONS
1. Introductions
2. Orient Assessment Panel members in AHRF (15 minutes)
3. Overview of the purpose of the assessment
4. Roles:
• Sample collector/transporter
• Radiation Specialist
• FBI Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Coordinator
• Observers (Assessment Panel members)
• Laboratory Director
5. Explanation of checklists/forms
6. Explanation of Assessment Samples (Assessment Panel members only)
9:15 - 12:00 SAMPLE SCREENING
12:00-1:00 LUNCH
1:15 - 5:00 SAMPLE SCREENING
5:00 - 5:30 PAPERWORK
SECOND DAY
8:00-8:30
8:45-12:00
12:00-1:00
1:15-3:00
3:00-5:30
SETTLE IN
SAMPLE SCREENING
LUNCH
SAMPLE SCREENING
DISCUSSION AND PAPERWORK (DEBRIEF)
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2.3 Assessment Participants
At a minimum, assessment participants consisted of five AHRF staff responsible for receiving and
screening samples using the equipment available in the AHRF and following the procedures described in
the October 2006 AHRF protocol; five Assessment Panel members responsible for observing protocol
activities, documenting observations, and providing follow-on discussion and recommendations; and one
EPA and two EPA-contracted Facilitators responsible for providing assessment samples, establishing
schedules, developing and distributing Assessment Checklists and Questionnaires, and documenting
discussions and observations. Additional participants from various organizations participated in
observing and documenting aspects related to the facility and the equipment and sample handling
procedures. A list of individuals participating at one or more of the assessments and their corresponding
roles is provided in Table 2.
Table 2: AHRF Assessment Participants
Affiliation
EPA Region 1
Tech Law Consulting Services
(EPA Region 1 AHRF)
Wadsworth Center, NYSDOH
Eastern Research Group, Inc.
(EPA Region 1)
EPA National Homeland Security
Research Center (NHSRC)
EPA National Enforcement
Investigation Center (NEIC)
FBI Hazardous Materials Response
Unit (HMRU)
Edgewood Chemical and Biological
Center (ECBC)
DHS, Science and Technology
Program
Computer Sciences Corporation
(CSC)
Name
Inna Germansderfer
Jeremy O' Kelly
Rob Maxfield
Doris Guzman
Matthew Hein
Lou Macri
Robert Perry
Ken Aldous
Cassandra Kelly
Stephen Davis
Anthony Bucciferro
Beata Clark
Nick Cirino
Christina Egan
Janet Kaczenski
Rob Rothman
Matthew Magnuson
Scott Minamyer
Erin Silvestri
Don Smith
Brian White
Sheri Bettis
Michael Newell
Stephen Lawhorne
Eric Stevens
Don Bansleben
Eric Boring
Caryn Wojtowicz
Role
AHRF Chemist
AHRF Lead Chemist
Observer
AHRF Sample Receipt
AHRF Chemist
AHRF Chemist
AHRF Chemist
AHRF Chemist
AHRF Biologist
AHRF Biologist
AHRF Chemist
AHRF Scribe
Observer
Observer
Health and Safety Evaluation,
Observer
Project Manager, Observer
Panel Member
Panel Member
Facilitator
Panel Member
Panel Member
Panel Member
Observer
Panel Member
Observer
Observer
Facilitator, Team Leader
Facilitator
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2.4 Assessment Samples
Each assessment was preceded by preparation of simulant samples and accompanying paperwork to
provide scenarios for testing the AHRF protocol. Samples were designed to simulate potential chemical,
radiochemical, and biological hazards. Twenty-six samples were prepared for the initial assessments. As
this number of samples proved overly ambitious for the two-day assessment period, eighteen samples
were prepared for the follow-up assessments. Chemical simulant samples were prepared and provided by
the Oregon Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ), and two radiological samples were provided by
the EPA Office of Radiation and Indoor Air (ORIA). Chemical simulant samples were tested prior to the
assessments to ensure the simulants and concentration levels were sufficient to produce a response using
the AHRF equipment and to document expected results for comparison with results obtained during the
assessment.
Samples were shipped overnight for receipt at the AHRF laboratory three days prior to each assessment.
The day before the assessments, the CSC Team Leader repackaged the samples to mimic possible sample
receipt scenarios and attached a mock sample report package to each sample. Sample report packages
varied from containing a single chain-of-custody (COC) form to containing field reports along with the
COC form. All samples were packaged in a transport container, and some were combined on a single
COC form and in the same transport container to provide a multi-sample scenario. Repackaged samples
were transferred to the AHRF the day after repackaging, for use during the assessment.
2.5 AHRF Screening Equipment and Reagents
The sample screening equipment used at each assessment is listed in Table 3. Descriptions of each piece
of equipment used are provided below the table.
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Table 3: AHRF Assessment Sample Screening Equipment
Target Analytes
Gamma
Radiation
Alpha/beta
Radiation
G-, H-, and V-
agents
(phosphorous or
sulfur
compounds)
G-, H-, L-, and V-
agents
H-agents
Volatile Organic
Compounds
Organic or
Aqueous
Determination
Explosives
Oxidizers
Peroxide-based
oxidizers
Assessment 1
EPA Region 1
SAM 935™ Model
935-2B-G (Serial
number 30857)
Ludlum2360
(portable) (Serial
number 227428)
Ludlum 2929 (wipe
counter) (Serial
number 216261)
AP2Ce (Serial
number 00810)
LCD 3.2 (Serial
number HH00358)
M256A1 kit
DB-3 dye test
MultiRAE model
PGM50-5P (Serial
number 095-51 9099)
M8 paper (Lot
number 96-1)
ELITE™ card
Starch iodide paper
—
Assessment 1
NYSDOH
SAM 935™ Model
935-2B-G (Serial
number 30858)
Ludlum 2360
(portable) (Serial
number 2251 78)
Ludlum 2929 (wipe
counter) (Serial
number 216254)
AP2Ce (Serial
number
0081 1/1 001 9/F6538)
LCD 3.2 (Serial
number HH00357)
M256A1 kit
DB-3 dye test
MultiRAE model
PGM50-5P (Serial
number 095-51 91 00)
M8 paper (Lot
number 96-1)
ELITE™ card
Starch iodide paper
Quantofix® Peroxide
paper
Assessment 2
EPA Region 1
SAM 935™ Model
935-2B-G (Serial
number 30857)
Ludlum 2360
(portable) (Serial
number 227428)
Ludlum 2929 (wipe
counter) (Serial
number 216261)
AP2Ce (Serial
number 00810)
LCD 3.2 (Serial
number HH00358)
M256A1 kit
DB-3 dye test
MultiRAE model
PGM50-5P (Serial
number 095-51 9099)
M8 paper (Lot
number 96-1)
ELITE™ card
Starch iodide paper
—
Assessment 2
NYSDOH
SAM 935™ Model
935-2B-G (Serial
number 30858)
Ludlum 2360
(portable) (Serial
numbers 2251 78
and 227428)
Ludlum 2929 (wipe
counter) (Serial
number 216254)
AP2Ce (Serial
number
0081 1/1 001 9/F6538)
LCD 3.2 (Serial
number HH00357)
M256A1 kit
Chemical Agent
Monitor (CAM™),
Type: 0482-0301 L,
Serial number 17003
DB-3 dye test
MultiRAE model
PGM50-5P (Serial
numbers 095-
51 9099 and 095-
519100)
M8 paper (Lot
number 96-1)
ELITE™ card
Starch iodide paper
Quantofix® Peroxide
paper
• Flame Spectrophotometric (FSP) Detector - The AP2Ce, manufactured by Proengin, is a version
of the AP2C designed to be used in an explosive atmosphere. An FSP detector is used to detect
volatile compounds containing phosphorus or sulfur. The response time listed by the vendor is two
seconds; sensitivity is listed at 10 mg/m3 (1.5 ppb) for G-agents and 420 (ig/m3 (60 ppb) for mustard
(HD).
• Ion Mobility Spectrometer (IMS) - The LCD 3.2, manufactured by Smiths Detection, is a
continuous, real-time detector of chemical warfare agents (CWAs) and toxic chemicals that uses
enhanced ion mobility spectroscopy technology with a non-radioactive source. Vapor detection limits
are reported as approximately 0.2 mg/m3 for G-agents, and 10 mg/m3 for mustard and lewisite [ref
"Detection Performance of Portable Colona Discharge lonization Type Ion Mobility Spectrometer for
Chemical Warfare Agents," Bunseki Kagaku. 56(2): 117-124. Annual Report].
• IMS - The Chemical Agent Monitor (CAM™) manufactured by Smiths Detection uses IMS
principles to respond selectively to toxic chemical agent vapors. CAM™ will detect nerve and blister
agents to specified North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) requirements. Additional
programming can be included to extend the range to cover other agents.
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• Photoionization Detector (PID) - The MultiRAE model PGM50-5P, manufactured by RAE
Systems, combines a PID with the standard four gases of a confined space monitor (O2, lower
explosive limit [LEL], and two toxic gas sensors) in one compact monitor with a sampling pump.
This instrument measures volatile organic compounds (VOCs) in the range of 0 to 2,000 ppm with
0.1 ppm resolution.
• Gamma Spectrometer - SAM 935™ Model 935-2B-G, manufactured by Berkeley Nucleonics
Corporation (BNC), uses advanced gamma-spectroscopy technology and a Quadratic Compression
Conversion algorithm within the system's firmware to identify isotopes within one second. It is
reported to ensure minimal false alarms and confidence levels above 97% even when detecting and
identifying weak sources below background levels of intensity.
• Alpha/Beta Counter - The Ludlum 2929 (wipe counter), manufactured by Ludlum Measurements,
Inc., performs alpha/beta sample counting. Efficiencies (4pi geometry) for alpha emitters are
reported as: 37% for 230Thorium; 39% for 238Uranium; and 37% for 239Plutonium. Efficiencies for
beta emitters are: 8% for 14Carbon; 27% for "Technetium; 29% for 137Cesium; 26% for
90Strontium/90Yttrium. Reported background (baseline) levels for alpha radiation is three counts per
minute (cpm) or less; background for beta radiation is typically 80 cpm or less (10 (iR/hr field).
• Alpha/Beta Counter - The Ludlum 2360 (portable), manufactured by Ludlum Measurements, Inc.,
performs alpha/beta discrimination and data logging. Typical efficiencies (4pi geometry) are reported
as 30% for 239Plutonium; 30% for 90Strontium/90Yttrium; and 5% for 14Carbon. Reported background
(baseline) level for alpha radiation is < 3 cpm; background for beta radiation is typically 300 cpm or
less (10 (iR/hr field). This model is compatible with the Ludlum 2929.
• Colorimetric Paper - M8 paper is used for determining whether a liquid substance is organic or
aqueous. It will turn specific colors in the presence of CWAs (G-agents turn the paper yellow, V-
agents turn the paper green, and mustard turns the paper red). It is not specific for CWAs, however,
and will turn color in the presence of toxic industrial chemicals and solvents.
• Colorimetric Explosives Test - The Easy Livermore Inspection Test for Explosives (ELITE™) card,
developed by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, will detect more than 30 types of explosives,
including Cyclonite (C-4), Semtex, Trinitrotoluene (TNT) and derivatives, ammonium nitrate, and
black powder. The card was independently verified down to 25 nanograms (ng).
• Colorimetric Starch Iodide Paper - Detects oxidizing compounds, which convert iodide ions to
elemental iodine to form triiodide and pentaiodide ions. These ions react with starch to produce a
blue complex.
• Colorimetric Nerve agent, Mustard, and Lewisite Test - Ticket from M256A1 kit developed by
Anachemia Sciences, that can be used to detect nerve agents (G-series, V-series), blood agents
(hydrogen cyanide, cyanogen chloride, HD), and lewisite. Sensitivities for HD, sarin (GB), and nerve
agent: O-ethyl-S-(2-diisopropylaminoethyl)methylphophonothiolate (VX) vapor are 0.001, 0.0008,
and 0.002 ppm (v), respectively. The test will also detect other acetylcholine esterase inhibitors such
as organophosphorus pesticides.
• Colorimetric DB-3 Dye Test - Detects alkylating agents. Consists of two solutions [(4-(4-
nitrobenzyl) pyridine (11.25 mg/mL) in methanol and potassium carbonate (600 mg/mL) in water)]
and chromatography-grade silica paper, which turns an intense blue/purple in the presence of
mustard. The reported detection level for HD vapor is 0.31 ppm (v).
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• Colorimetric pH Paper - Measures pH range of 0 to 14. pH is determined by observing the color of
several squares on the paper after an aqueous sample has been applied.
• Quantofix® Colorimetric Peroxide Test - Quantofix® Peroxide test determines peroxide
concentrations in the range of 0 to 25 mg/L. It can also be used for the determination of peracetic
acid and other organic and inorganic hydroperoxides.
2.6 Assessment Process
Samples were received and screened by the AHRF staff during each two-day assessment period. A
variety of simulants and matrices (neat, aqueous, oil, sand, and building materials) were used to evaluate
various pathways through the original draft AHRF screening protocol presented in Attachment 1. Some
samples were designed to follow the AHRF protocol through to completion (e.g., blanks and low-level
hazards), while others were designed to stop screening early in the process due to early identification of a
hazard (e.g., gamma radiation).
AHRF staff received and screened the samples following procedures included in the October 2006 AHRF
protocols. Some modifications to this protocol were adopted for subsequent assessments based on lessons
learned and comments and observations from the discussions during the earlier assessments. Protocol
modifications that were used and evaluated during each assessment are described in the individual
assessment reports. During discussions at the first assessment, for example, panel members and observers
noted that the water solubility test (as written in the Step 4b of the October 2006 protocol), can potentially
lead to an incorrect hazard determination.1 For this reason, during the water solubility test in subsequent
assessments, the aqueous portions of samples were evaluated for oxidizers and nerve agents using the pH,
starch iodide, and nerve agent ticket tests. If an organic layer was present, it was tested with starch iodide
paper and the nerve agent ticket. This approach allows for the screening of a wider variety of unknown
samples, including samples comprising environmental matrices such as water, soil, and waste fuel/oil.
The criterion of pH <4 for continued screening also was removed, because the presence of lewisite could
potentially lower the pH of the sample. Removing this criterion allows continued screening for the
presence of lewisite. Both of these changes are included in the recommended modifications to the
protocol described in Section 4 of this report.
The EPA NHSRC facilitator served as the sample courier transporting samples to the AHRF. CSC
facilitators acted as radiation and explosive experts and as the laboratory director to facilitate decisions
regarding positive screening hits for the hazard classes.
Throughout each two-day assessment period, panelists and observers discussed their observations.
Facilitators took notes of the ongoing discussions. Following completion of all sample screening,
assessment participants (AHRF staff, panelists, observers, and facilitators) met for debriefings of the
results. Following each assessment, AHRF staff and panelists also completed questionnaires and
checklists designed to document and collect feedback regarding the assessment and the AHRF protocol.
1 Although the test would work for many pure substances, many of these substances are only partially soluble in
water and AHRF technicians would have difficulty determining solubility. This is particularly true for
environmental samples where, even though a matrix is not water soluble, the contaminants present may be water
soluble.
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2.7 Assessment Forms
Throughout the assessments, the following forms were used to document results of sample receipt,
sample screening, and assessment observations:
• Sample Receipt (Attachment 2 of October 2006 AHRF Protocol)
• Sample Transport Container Screening Results (Attachment 4 of October 2006 AHRF Protocol)
• Primary Sample Container Screening Results (Attachment 4 of October 2006 AHRF Protocol)
• Sample Screening Results (Attachment 4 of October 2006 AHRF Protocol)
• Assessment Checklist (for completion by Panelists, Observers, and Facilitators)
• Assessment Staff and Panel Questionnaire
Sample receipt and screening results forms are included as attachments to the October 2006 AHRF
Protocols. Responses to the assessment checklist and questionnaires are provided in each assessment
report (See Section 1.2).
3.0 Results of Sample Screening
Simulant samples were prepared and evaluated at the DEQ and ORIA prior to the assessments to
determine the compounds and concentration levels needed to produce expected responses from the AHRF
screening equipment during the assessments. Results of this evaluation are presented and discussed in
Attachment 1 of the March 2007 AHRF Assessment Plan. Once adequate simulants and concentration
levels were determined, samples were prepared at these facilities and used to evaluate the AHRF protocol
during the assessments. Based on results and time constraints observed during the initial assessments, the
number and type of assessment samples were revised slightly to evaluate recommended changes to the
protocol during the follow-up assessments. Table 4 lists samples that were prepared and screened during
the initial and follow-up assessments at each AHRF site. The types of hazards expected to be addressed
by these simulants are provided in Table 5, along with a summary of screening results.
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AHRF Protocol Assessment Report
Table 4: Samples Used during AHRF Assessments
Initial Assessment
EPA Region 1
(May 2007)
Dimethyl methylphosphonate (DMMP),
neat
Not analyzed
DMMP in soybean oil (19.12 mg/g)
DMMP in sand (19.02 mg/g)
Dimethoate, neat
Dimethoate in water (20.56 mg/g,
dissolved first in unknown solvent)
Dimethoate in water (1 1 .47 mg/g,
dissolved first in unknown solvent)
Dimethoate in sand (21.49 mg/g)
Dimethoate in soybean oil (18.78 mg/g)
2-Chloroethyl ethyl sulfide (GEES),
neat
GEES in sand (11.27 mg/g)
GEES in sand (10.14 mg/g)
GEES in soybean oil (11.49 mg/g)
Hydrogen peroxide (H202) (35% by
weight in water)
H2O2 (1 .78% by weight in water)
H2O2 (1 .83% by weight in water)
Nitrocellulose (70% by weight in
Isopropanol [IPA])
Nitrocellulose (7.6% in sand/lPA)
Arsenic trichloride, neat
Arsenic trichloride in sand (18.71 mg/g)
Arsenic trichloride in soybean oil
(18.78 mg/g)
Gamma emitter, calibration disk
Beta/gamma emitter, calibration disk
Celite® Analytical Filter Aid (CAFA) *
Blank, water
Blank, sand
Blank, soybean oil
Total = 26 Samples
Initial Assessment
NYSDOH
(September 2007)
DMMP, neat
Not analyzed
DMMP in soybean oil (20.3 mg/g)
DMMP in sand (22.8 mg/g)
Dimethoate, neat
Dimethoate in water (21.6 mg/g,
dissolved first in methylene chloride)
Dimethoate in water (21.9 mg/g,
dissolved first in methylene chloride)
Dimethoate in sand (39.8 mg/g)
Dimethoate in soybean oil (23.7 mg/g)
GEES, neat
GEES in sand (11.5 mg/g)
GEES in sand (11.6 mg/g)
GEES in soybean oil (9.90 mg/g)
H202 (35% by weight in water)
H2O2 (3.3% by weight in water)
H2O2 (2.9% by weight in water)
Nitrocellulose (70% by weight in IPA)
Nitrocellulose (3.4% in sand/lPA)
Arsenic trichloride, neat
Arsenic trichloride in sand (20.1 mg/g)
Arsenic trichloride in soybean oil
(20.2 mg/g)
Gamma emitter, calibration disk
Beta/gamma emitter, calibration disk
Bacillus thuringiensis
Blank, water
Blank, sand
Blank, soybean oil
Total = 26 Samples
Follow-up Assessment
EPA Region 1
(September 2007)
Not analyzed
DMMP in water (23.45 mg/g)
DMMP in soybean oil (23.73 mg/g)
DMMP in sand (22.07 mg/g)
Not analyzed
Dimethoate in water (24.16 mg/g)
Not analyzed
Dimethoate in sand (19.91 mg/g)
Dimethoate in soybean oil (21.87 mg/g)
Not analyzed
GEES in sand (11.75 mg/g)
Not analyzed
GEES in soybean oil (10.00 mg/g)
Not analyzed
H2O2 (1 .30% by weight in water)
Not analyzed
Not analyzed
Nitrocellulose (4.1% in sand/lPA)
Not analyzed
Arsenic trichloride in sand (28.76 mg/g)
Arsenic trichloride in soybean oil
(30.94 mg/g applied to ceramic tile)
Gamma emitter, calibration disk
Beta emitter, calibration disk
Aerosil®
Blank, water
Blank, sand
Blank, soybean oil
Total = 18 Samples
Follow-up Assessment
NYSDOH
(October 2007)
DMMP, neat (applied to carpet)
DMMP in water (18.5 mg/g)
DMMP in soybean oil (21.4 mg/g)
DMMP in sand (20.8 mg/g)
Not analyzed
Not analyzed
Not analyzed
Dimethoate in sand (17.9 mg/g)
Dimethoate in soybean oil (20.1 mg/g)
Not analyzed
GEES in sand (11.6 mg/g)
Not analyzed
GEES in soybean oil (11.8 mg/g)
Not analyzed
H2O2 (1.8% by weight in water)
Not analyzed
Not analyzed
Nitrocellulose (2.3% in sand/lPA)
Not analyzed
Arsenic trichloride in sand (31.4 mg/g)
Arsenic trichloride in soybean oil (28.6
mg/g)
Gamma emitter, calibration disk
Beta emitter, calibration disk
Aerosil®
Blank, water
Blank, sand
Blank, soybean oil
Total = 18 Samples
* CAFA was determined to be a poor simulant during the first assessment; Bacillus thuringiensis and Aerosil® were selected and used as a replacement during
the remaining assessments.
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AHRF Protocol Assessment Report
Table 5 presents assessment screening results in terms of ability of the AHRF screening protocol to detect
hazards posed by the assessment samples listed in Table 4. Correct hazard detection is indicated by
"positive" (for a sample) or "no hazards found" (for a blank). Incorrect hazard detection is indicated by
"false positives" (if a hazard was falsely detected) or "false negative" (if a hazard was not detected and
should have been). A total of 76 simulant samples and 12 blank samples were evaluated over the course
of four assessments.
Correct hazards were detected in 78 of the 88 assessment samples. False negative results (in terms of
hazard detection based on AHRF suite of sample screening tests), were obtained from six samples. Four
of these false negative results were obtained from samples containing dimethoate, and are most likely due
to the low stability of this compound. One false negative was for a sample containing DMMP in soybean
oil, and could have been caused by the low volatility of DMMP in this matrix (making it difficult to
detect using headspace detectors such as the FSP and PID) and a non-optimal application of the nerve
agent enzyme test strip, which was cut away from the M256A1 kit. The remaining false negative resulted
from a sample containing arsenic trichloride in soybean oil that was added to a ceramic tile. It is believed
that the arsenic trichloride either reacted with or dissipated from the tile prior to sample screening. For
the 76 total samples screened, there were 13 false positives (ten for mustard and three for nerve agent)
associated with a correct detection of agent, but an incorrect identification of the agent type. Nine of the
twelve blank samples were correctly categorized, with two false positives for nerve agent and one false
positive for mustard. It is believed that most of the false positives for nerve agent in samples and blanks
were due to incorrect use and interpretation of the nerve agent enzyme tests. The cause of the false
positive DB-3 test results is unclear, although it is important to note that false positives were not observed
during the follow-up assessments.
Table 5: Hazard Detection Results
Simulant
DMMP
Dimethoate
GEES
Matrix
Neat
Water
Soybean oil
Sand
Carpet
Neat
Water
Soybean oil
Sand
Neat
Soybean oil
Sand
Hazard Type
G-Nerve agent
G-Nerve agent
G-Nerve agent
G-Nerve agent
G-Nerve agent
V-Nerve agent
V-Nerve agent
V-Nerve agent
V-Nerve agent
Mustard
Mustard
Mustard
Number of
Samples
2
2
4
4
1
2
5
4
4
2
4
6
Results Summary
2 positives for nerve agent
1 false positive for mustard
2 positives for nerve agent
3 positives for nerve agent
1 false negative
2 false positives for mustard
4 positives for nerve agent
1 false positive for mustard
1 positive for CWA
2 positives for nerve agent
1 false positive for mustard
3 positives for nerve agent
2 false positives for mustard
2 false negatives for nerve agent
3 positives for nerve agent
1 false negative
1 false positive for mustard
3 positives for nerve agent
1 false positive for mustard
1 false negative
2 positives for CWA
4 positives for mustard
3 positives for mustard
3 positives for CWA
1 false positive for nerve agent
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AHRF Protocol Assessment Report
Simulant
Arsenic Trichloride
Nitrocellulose
Hydrogen peroxide
CAFA*
Bacillus
thuringiensis
Aerosil®
Gamma emitter
Beta emitter
Blank
Matrix
Neat
Soybean oil
Sand
Soybean oil on
tile
Neat
Sand
Neat
Water
Neat
Neat
Neat
Calibration disk
Calibration disk
Water
Soybean Oil
Sand
Hazard Type
Lewisite
Lewisite
Lewisite
Lewisite
Explosive
Explosive
Oxidizer
Oxidizer
Biological
Biological
Biological
Gamma radiation
Beta radiation
None
None
None
Number of
Samples
2
3
4
1
2
4
2
6
1
1
2
4
4
4
4
4
Results Summary
2 positives for lewisite
1 false positive for mustard
1 false positive for nerve agent
2 positives for lewisite
1 positive for CWA
1 positive for lewisite
3 positives for CWA
1 false negative for lewisite
2 positives for explosives
1 false positive for nerve agent
4 positives for explosive
2 positives for oxidizer
6 positives for oxidizer
(3 of these confirmed for peroxide)
1 false negative for biologicals
1 positive for biologicals
2 positives for biologicals
4 positives for gamma
2 positives for beta
3 positives for gamma
3 no hazards found
1 false positive for nerve agent
2 no hazards found
1 false positive for mustard
1 false positive for nerve agent
4 no hazards found
* CAFA was determined to be a poor simulant during the first assessment;
selected and used as a replacement during the remaining assessments.
Bacillus thuringiensis and Aerosil® were
Table 6 presents compiled results of the AHRF sample screening equipment from all four assessments.
The results are organized by sample type and compare the frequency of expected results (based on
preliminary testing of samples) and results that were not expected. A detailed description of some of the
results and possible rationale for the unexpected results are described in each assessment report and are
summarized below Table 6 in this report.
Table 6: Sample Screening Results
Test
Gamma Radiation
Screening
Alpha/Beta Radiation
Screening
Sample Type
Package
Water
Soybean Oil
Sand
Ceramic Tile
Carpet
Neat
Package
Water
Soybean Oil
Sand
Ceramic Tile
Carpet
Neat
Number of Tests
Performed
8
18
19
26
1
1
15
4
18
19
26
1
1
15
Number of
Expected
Results
6
18
19
26
1
1
15
4
18
18
26
1
1
15
Number of
Results Not
Expected
2
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
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Test
M8 Paper
PH
PID Screen
FSP Screen
IMS Screen
ELITE™ card
DB-3 Dye Test
Starch Iodide Test
Nerve Agent Enzyme
Test
Thermal Susceptibility
Test
Sample Type
Water
Soybean Oil
Sand
Neat
Water
Soybean Oil
Sand
Neat
Water
Soybean Oil
Sand
Ceramic Tile
Carpet
Neat
Water
Soybean Oil
Sand
Ceramic Tile
Carpet
Neat
Water
Soybean Oil
Sand
Ceramic Tile
Carpet
Neat
Water
Soybean Oil
Sand
Ceramic Tile
Neat
Water
Soybean Oil
Sand
Neat
Water
Soybean Oil
Sand
Neat
Water
Soybean Oil
Sand
Neat
Sand
TOTAL
Number of Tests
Performed
16
18
13
10
17
11
9
12
17
19
26
1
1
15
17
18
24
1
1
14
17
19
25
1
1
14
16
13
14
1
8
5
16
12
6
18
10
13
8
11
9
11
6
7
Total Number of
Tests Performed
693
Number of
Expected
Results
16
2
9
10
17
11
7
12
15
16
23
0
1
14
15
11
21
1
1
13
17
14
20
0
0
12
16
13
13
1
8
3
12
10
3
18
10
13
7
8
8
8
3
7
Expected Results
608
Number of
Results Not
Expected
0
16
4
0
0
0
2
0
2
3
3
1
0
1
2
7
3
0
0
1
0
5
5
1
1
2
0
0
1
0
0
2
4
2
3
0
0
0
1
3
1
3
3
0
Unexpected
Results
85
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• Gamma radiation screening (using the SAM 935™ Model 935-2B-G) resulted in expected
responses in all but two samples. These two samples (packages) were screened during the round-
one assessments and gave a positive result for gamma radiation, even though they contained
calibration disks intended to emit only beta radiation. This result was determined to be a
deficiency in the simulant choice, rather than the protocol. Expected results were obtained when
different gamma calibration sources were used during the round-two assessments.
• Alpha/beta radiation screening (using the Ludlum 2929 and 2360) resulted in expected responses
in all but one sample. This sample was composed of CEES in soybean oil, and it is unclear why
it produced a positive response using this equipment. It should be noted that beta radiation was
detected during transport container screening, and was not detected during direct screening of the
sample. The other three CEES/soybean oil samples were negative when screened for this hazard.
• The M8 paper test produced expected results for all water samples. Although this test produced
expected results for soybean oil samples, these took a long time to dry on the paper and a color
change was observed only after five minutes. Four of the simulant/sand samples produced
unexpected M8 paper test results and did not change the color of the M8 paper. Assessment
participants noted that although M8 paper is effective in determining sample matrix type (i.e.,
organic or aqueous based), it is not as effective in identifying agents. During the assessments, for
example, samples produced unexpected color changes (e.g., arsenic trichloride produced a blue
color; neat simulants produced various colors).
• The pH test behaved as expected for all samples except for two sand samples. These two samples
contained CEES. When the aqueous portion of the samples from the water solubility test was
tested for pH, a very low pH was observed. A possible explanation for this may have been due to
the formation of acidic degradation products such as hydrogen chloride (HC1).
• The PID screen using the MultiRAE model PGM50-5P produced expected results for 69 of 79
samples screened (see Table 6). The following exceptions were noted in the 10 remaining
samples:
- One water sample containing H2O2 produced an unexpected positive for VOC, but the level
was below the instrument threshold. A possible explanation may have been contamination of
the glove box atmosphere from other samples.
One water sample containing dimethoate gave an unexpected negative result, which could be
explained by the low volatility of this compound in water.
- Two arsenic trichloride/soybean oil samples produced unexpected negative readings. The
soybean oil matrix, having low volatility, was not expected to interfere with the PID reading.
However, this matrix may have inhibited the volatility of the arsenic trichloride. In sand
matrices, it was observed that arsenic trichloride always produced a positive response.
One of three dimethoate/soybean oil samples produced an unexpected negative result, which
could be explained by the low volatility of this compound. Positive results produced by the
other dimethoate/soybean oil samples may have been caused by the organic solvent carrier
used to dissolve the dimethoate during sample preparation.
- Two sand samples containing nitrocellulose/isopropanol (70/30 by weight) gave an
unexpected negative result, which is surprising particularly because of the volatility of
isopropanol. A possible explanation is that the isopropanol may have evaporated during
preparation, shipping, and handling of the sample.
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AHRF Protocol Assessment Report
- One blank sand sample gave a positive reading. This result was very low, however, and may
have been due to contamination.
- The ceramic tile sample containing arsenic trichloride in soybean oil produced an unexpected
negative reading. Due to the nature of the sample and time limitations, this sample type was
not tested prior to use during the assessment. It is suspected that the arsenic trichloride could
have reacted with the tile prior to assessment sample screening.
- All but one of the neat samples resulted in expected PID response. The positive response
produced by the Aerosil® sample may have been due to contamination of the glove box
atmosphere from other samples.
• The FSP screen (using the AP2Ce) produced expected results for 62 of 75 samples screened (see
Table 6). The following exceptions were noted in the 13 remaining samples:
One dimethoate/water sample produced a negative response, which could be a result of the
low volatility of this compound. It is also worth noting that the FSP scraper feature for direct
sample screening was not used to screen this sample.
One blank water sample produced a positive response, which could be the result of
contamination from previous samples. Again, the scraper feature of the FSP was not used to
test this sample.
- Five soybean oil samples produced unexpected negative responses during the FSP screen:
three dimethoate samples, one DMMP sample, and one CEES sample. It is important to note
that, for samples producing negative responses, the scraper feature of the FSP was not used.
Sample screening results indicate that many of the simulants used during the assessments
exhibited low volatility in the soybean oil matrix.
- Two arsenic trichloride/soybean oil samples, three arsenic trichloride/sand samples, and one
neat arsenic trichloride sample produced unexpected positive responses. All of these samples
contained arsenic trichloride, which does not contain sulfur or nitrogen and should not
produce a positive result. A possible explanation for the FSP response is that arsenic atoms
are in the same family of elements as sulfur.
• The IMS screen (using the LCD 3.2) produced expected results for 63 of 77 samples screened
(see Table 6). The following exceptions were noted in the 14 remaining samples:
- All four CEES/soybean oil samples gave negative results, while CEES in other matrices gave
positive results. A possible explanation is that the volatility of CEES was not high enough to
illicit a response when the headspace of the soybean oil samples was tested.
- One arsenic trichloride sample in soybean oil produced an unexpected negative result. Low
volatility or decomposition of the arsenic trichloride is a possible explanation.
- All five CEES/sand samples gave unexpected results. One of these samples produced a
negative result, while the other four gave positive results. Although the positive results were
expected, the results were positive for G-agent rather than the expected H-agent. CEES is a
mustard simulant; therefore, a positive for H was expected. An explanation may be that the
IMS is calibrated for specific CWA ions and not the simulants.
- The ceramic tile sample containing arsenic trichloride in soybean oil. It is suspected that the
arsenic trichloride reacted with the tile surface or decomposed in the soybean oil prior to
assessment screening.
- The carpet sample containing DMMP produced an unexpected positive response. It is
believed that the IMS is not calibrated for DMMP-specific ions, thus this positive result is
puzzling. The IMS screen resulted in negative responses for all other DMMP samples.
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- Two of the neat CEES samples gave unexpected positive results for G-agent rather than the
expected positive H-agent results. Although the positive results were expected, the results
were positive for G-agent rather than the expected H-agent.
• The ELITE™ card test for explosives performed as expected for all but one, out of 52 samples.
A DMMP/sand sample produced a positive response; however, the response was a slight pink
(rather than a deep purple) color change. All other positive results using this test (i.e., samples
containing nitrocellulose) exhibited a more pronounced color change.
• The DBS-test for alkylating agents (e.g., mustard) produced the expected results for 28 of 39
samples screened (see Table 6), with the following exceptions noted in the remaining 11 samples:
- Two dimethoate/water samples produced unexpected positive responses. One possible
explanation is that the test color change was misinterpreted.
- Four soybean oil samples (two containing DMMP, one containing dimethoate, and one
blank), two sand samples (one containing DMMP and one containing dimethoate), three neat
samples (DMMP, dimethoate, and arsenic trichloride) produced unexpected positive results.
The cause of these positive results is uncertain.
• The starch iodide test performed as expected for all but one neat nitrocellulose sample, which
produced an unexpected positive response. However, only a slight color change was observed.
• The nerve agent enzyme test produced expected responses for 34 of the 44 samples screened (see
Table 6). The following exceptions were noted for the remaining 10 samples:
- Two dimethoate/water samples and one dimethoate/sand sample, gave unexpected negative
results. Two CEES/sand samples, one blank water sample, one neat nitrocellulose sample,
and one blank soybean sample gave unexpected positive results. There are several possible
explanations for these results, including 1) the interpretation of the test results proved to be
problematic and further training may be required and 2) the tickets were separated from the
complete M256A1 kit, which may have impacted their effectiveness.
- Two neat samples (hydrogen peroxide and arsenic trichloride) gave unexpected positive
results. The pH of these samples was lower than the recommended working range of this test
(4 to 7) and it is possible that the low pH of the samples could have deactivated the enzyme.
• The thermal susceptibility test was used to test only solid samples and produced the expected
results for all solid samples tested.
Along with observations made during the assessments, results of the sample screening during each of the
four assessments were evaluated and used to provide the recommended modifications; the results
prompted changes to the AHRF protocol described in Section 4.2.4. In summary, recommended changes
based on assessment sample results emphasize the need for evaluation of alternative sample screening
technologies (particularly to address screening and identification of chemical warfare agents), as well as
increased training and instruction in the use of colorimetric test kits.
4.0 Recommendations
In general, the protocol demonstrated the ability to protect laboratory facilities and staff from the types of
hazards presented or simulated by the samples screened during the assessments. AHRF staff successfully
Final Report 15 February 2010
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AHRF Protocol Assessment Report
completed sample receipt and screening procedures, making appropriate decisions regarding additional
screening or sample dissemination. This section presents recommended modifications to the AHRF
facilities, equipment, and protocol based on the results of the four assessments. An overview of a new
AHRF protocol, designed to address the recommended modifications, is presented in the flowchart in
Attachment 2.
In all, there are nine major and three minor recommended changes to the AHRF screening protocols and
equipment. These recommendations result in seven changes to the AHRF protocol flowchart (see
Attachment 1 for original draft protocol, and Attachment 2 for revised final protocol). A brief summary
of changes to the flowchart is provided in Table 7, along with the step of the protocol that is affected by
the change. Table 7 also includes a column indicating whether each change was evaluated during one or
more of the assessments.
Table 7: Summary of Flowchart Changes
Number
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Recommended Change
Perform gamma radiation screen prior
to sample acceptance
Add "Stop and Consult" points
Add ELITE™ test to transport
container screening
Replace nerve agent vapor (NAV)
ticket with M256A nerve agent test
Add ELITE™ test to initial sample
screening
Add arsenic test from M256A1 kit to
sample screening
Test all sample fractions formed
during water solubility test with pH,
peroxides, alkylating agents, nerve
agents, and arsenic (as appropriate to
matrix and pH)
Step
(see Attachment 2)
Step 1
Throughout flowchart
Step 2
Step 5*
Step 4**
Step 5*
Step 5*
Assessment including
evaluation of
recommended change
Follow-up assessment at
each facility
Follow-up assessment at
each facility
Follow-up assessment at
each facility
Change incorporated prior
to all assessments
Follow-up assessment at
each facility
Follow-up assessment at
each facility
Follow-up assessment at
each facility
Formerly Step 4b
* Formerly Step 4a
A summary of all recommended modifications to the AHRF facility, equipment, and protocol is presented
in Table 8; descriptions of each recommendation are provided below the table. Recommendations are
ranked by relative importance, i.e., a major recommendation, a minor recommendation, or a suggestion.
These rankings were determined by the Assessment Panel, based on a number of considerations including
cost, the impact of the recommendation on facilitating sample screening, and the feasibility of applying
the recommendation in the short-term versus long-term. The last row of the table describes activities that
are recommended to improve and enhance the AHRF facilities, equipment, protocols, and future AHRF
development.
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Table 8: Recommendations and Suggestions for AHRF Protocol
Facility
Equipment
Protocol
Major
Recommendations
& Upgrades
• Purchase a second set of equipment to allow
use of the equipment in both the bleaching
station and glove box areas. At a minimum, have
a second IMS and FSP. (A second PID and Rad
detector would also be beneficial.)
• Add wall clocks/timers to assist in monitoring
test times and glove changes.
• Have antidote for nerve agents readily
available (training required for acquisition,
storage, and use).
• Supply appropriate, secure, and weather-
protected radiation/explosives containment for
samples refused entry to AHRF.
• Include weather protection (shelter) for sample
delivery personnel.
• Have a readily available "reach-back" list
posted in the AHRF.
• Have a communication system between AHRF
staff and decision makers, equipped with video
and audio feed.
• Place a camera in the bleaching station to
allow viewing of the sample screening by
personnel outside AHRF.
• Replace NAV tickets with
M256A1 nerve ticket (already
incorporated into procedures
used during assessments).
• Include more detailed procedures for receipt and
handling of suspicious powders (e.g., overpacking,
contacting FBI WMD Coordinator, etc.).
• Rearrange order of sample receipt interview
questions to address safety concerns first.
• Perform gamma screening prior to the sample receipt
interview.
• Change the water solubility testing portion of the
protocol to include testing of all phases; include
information regarding how to handle questionable
density samples and the formation of precipitates.
• Add additional decision points to seek assistance
from FBI WMD Coordinator and/or others.
• Incorporate arsenic test from M256A1 (Step 5 of
Attachment 2).
• Clarify levels of radioactivity acceptable for sample
receipt.
• Add ELITE™ card test to Step 2 (Transport Container
Screening) and Step 4 (Initial Sample Screening) as an
additional test for explosives.
• Revise protocol to ensure it is consistent with
flowchart (e.g., include float test for biologicals).
Minor
Recommendations
• Provide additional storage space, writing
surfaces, and magnetic surfaces for affixing
paperwork or protocol flowchart.
• Adjust intercom position for clearer
communication at sample receipt.
• Use larger volume waste storage containers.
• Design a separate pass-through for
documentation to avoid contamination from
samples.
• Adapt/streamline reporting forms to be more useful
and less redundant. Consider adding start/stop times.
• Provide procedures needed if the AHRF is not in the
ambient temperature range.
• Include more "hints" / "cautions" to the protocol (e.g.,
regarding false positives, hotplate settings, use of the
FSP scraper feature, etc.).
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Facility
Equipment
Protocol
Additional
Suggestions
• Have blunt, round-tip scissors available in
glove box for cutting sample containers.
• Choose different colors for outer and inner
gloves to better monitor proper glove use.
• Use a high-quality butane
lighter for a cleaner burn and
improved observation during
thermal susceptibility test.
• Use platinum wire in place of
spatula to improve observation
during thermal susceptibility
test.
• Use plastic tongs when
adding waste to bleach
containers.
• Guidelines should be provided regarding how to
proceed if ambiguous results are obtained.
Recommended
Activities
• Develop guidelines for installing and
implementing future AHRF sites including waste
management, safety concerns, recommended
staffing (including time on duty
recommendations), site-specific guidelines.
• Perform vulnerability assessments to
determine AHRF vulnerability and prevent the
impact of possible threats.
• Build relationships with HAZMAT, EMT,
hospitals, laboratories, etc.
• Explore use of vaporized hydrogen peroxide
(VHP) or modified VHP for decontamination.
• Continue evaluation of new
and alternative technologies,
such as Sabre 4000, 3-way
paper, Hazardous
Characterization (HAZCAT)
kits, Agentase™ CAD-kits,
bioscreening, peroxide paper,
water-finding paper, entire
M256A1 kit, etc.
• Develop booklet showing
visual results for colorimetric
tests.
• Provide additional training
for equipment use, especially
radioactivity testing and paper
test kits.
• Develop training programs for AHRF operations,
including resources and requirements.
• Address evidentiary, preservation, and shipping
issues.
• Provide instructions for handling packages that are
too large for the sample pass-through or radioactive
samples that are refused entry.
• Discuss how to handle samples requiring
redirection/repackaging.
• Perform additional assessments of protocol using a
greater variety of samples (e.g., multiple contaminants
in a sample, additional toxic industrial compounds
[TICs], variety of matrices, "device" sample, etc.) and
including local decision makers in the assessment
exercise.
• Develop procedures for periodic proficiency testing of
facilities, equipment, and protocols.
Final Report
18
February 2010
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AHRF Protocol Assessment Report
4.1 Facilities
4.1.1 Major Recommendations and Upgrades
• Second Set of Equipment: Currently, each AHRF is equipped with only one IMS,
FSP, PID, and alpha-/beta-radiation detector. To use a single set of this equipment in
both the bleaching station and glove box sides of the AHRF, the equipment must be
thoroughly decontaminated and passed back and forth. This is not only time
consuming, but poses the risk of spreading contamination if the equipment is not
sufficiently decontaminated. With the use of two sets of equipment, the AHRF staff
was able to reduce the average time for sample screening from approximately one
hour to 35 to 40 minutes per sample, resulting in more sample throughput and
reduced hours in the AHRF for the staff wearing personal protective equipment
(PPE). At a minimum, purchase of a second IMS and FSP is seen as a necessity. A
second PID and radiation detector also would be beneficial, but is not as critical. A
second set of equipment provides a backup in case of equipment failure (e.g., battery
failure, calibration failure, is dropped, etc.).
• Wall Clocks and Timers: Synchronized wall clocks and timers designed to be used
while wearing gloves or other personal protective gear should be located at various
locations throughout the AHRF. This would provide the staff with easily visible
assistance in monitoring test timing and proper frequency of glove changes.
Currently, staff are forced to estimate time or risk contamination to view their
watches.
• Nerve Agent Antidote: From a health and safety standpoint, it is extremely important
to have nerve agent antidote readily available to AHRF staff who might be exposed
to fast-acting nerve agents present in unknown samples. It is important to note,
however, that use of the antidote requires training. Antidotes, and training on the use
of the antidotes, should be provided to all AHRF staff working with samples that
potentially contain these agents.
• Radiation and Explosives Containment: The protocol currently directs AHRF staff to
refuse samples containing high levels of radiation and to place these samples in a
steel- or lead-lined box or other appropriate containment. Appropriate, secure, and
weather-protected radiation and explosives containment for samples that are refused
entry should be supplied at each facility. Ideally, a lead-lined box or cement bunker
outside the AHRF, but within the line of vision, should be available. Requirements
for design and type of containment may vary from site to site, and consultation with
local regulators is recommended. Containment also is needed for samples awaiting
removal by the bomb squad.
• Shelter for Sample Delivery Personnel: Although the NYSDOH AHRF included
some facility adaptations for inclement weather, such as metal-grated steps and roll-
down awnings, there is currently no shelter or weather protection for sample delivery
personnel faced with lengthy interviews (approximately 15 to 20 minutes) when
dropping off samples at the AHRF.
Final Report 19 February 2010
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AHRF Protocol Assessment Report
• Call/Contact List: Many of the AHRF screening results and decisions require AHRF
staff to contact various technical experts and/or decision makers. Each AHRF should
be equipped with a posted "reach-back" list containing the name and telephone
numbers of contacts who may be needed to respond to questions or emergencies at
the AHRF. At a minimum, the posting should contain the numbers of the Laboratory
Director, HAZMAT contacts, and local FBI WMD Coordinator. All AHRF staff
should be familiar with the location of the list and when to use it.
• Communication System: AHRF sites participating in the assessments provided a
"command center," equipped with video feed from four locations within and outside
the AHRF for assessment panelists to observe the activities taking place in the
AHRF. The ability to teleconference between the AHRF and the center also was
provided, although limited to one staff member on each side of the AHRF. This
ability proved extremely useful during the assessments and would also facilitate
communication with technical experts and decision makers during an actual scenario.
Communication systems providing the ability for all AHRF staff to communicate via
both video and audio is recommended for each facility. Audio systems that do not
require manipulation by AHRF staff (e.g., manual manipulation of off/on switch) are
recommended to avoid contamination and activity disruption.
• Video Camera in Bleaching Station: Neither of the AHRFs used during the
assessments contained a camera in the bleaching station, and transport container
screening was not visible to personnel outside the AHRF. If a camera were placed in
this area, decision makers would be able to observe and comment regarding the
sample transport container, primary sample container, container labeling,
contamination, and/or results of screening tests.
4.1.2 Minor Recommendations
• Storage space: AHRFs at each site participating in the assessments had limited
storage space and writing surfaces. Spaces were expanded using rolling carts and by
affixing paperwork and flowcharts to horizontal surfaces. The addition of magnetic
surfaces (e.g., magnetic boards), storage areas, and writing surfaces would be
beneficial in reducing clutter and working more safely in confined areas.
• Adjust intercom position: Currently, the intercom used by the sample delivery person
is located approximately waist high. This results in unclear and sometimes garbled
communication. Adjusting the speakers to a more natural height for speaking will
improve communication and protect delivery personnel.
• Larger volume waste storage containers: During the assessments, the sample waste
did not always fit conveniently in the (approximately one liter) waste containers used
at the AHRF. The availability of larger waste containers would be helpful.
• Provide a document pass-through port: Currently, both the sample and the sample
paperwork enter the AHRF through the same pass-through portal. A separate pass-
through for documentation would avoid contamination from samples.
Final Report 20 February 2010
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AHRF Protocol Assessment Report
4.1.3 Additional Suggestions
• Scissors: Blunt, round-tip scissors should be available in the glove box for easy
removal of sample packaging and container materials.
• Different Colored Gloves: Different colors for inner and outer gloves are
recommended to facilitate the monitoring of proper glove use.
4.7.4 Recommended Activities
• Considerations and Guidelines for Future AHRF Installations: Laboratories and
other facilities that are considering installing and using an AHRF would benefit from
information regarding issues that should be considered, and possibly resolved, prior
to installation. The guidelines should address site-specific issues such as waste
management, safety concerns, costs, maintenance, recommended staffing levels
(including time on duty recommendations), and other site-specific guidelines.
• Vulnerability Assessments: Assessment panel members expressed some concern
regarding the possibility of AHRFs becoming targets of vandalism and/or terrorist
activity. Assessing the vulnerability of each AHRF, particularly prior to AHRF
installation, could mitigate or prevent the impact of possible threats. Incident
response plans also would be useful.
• Build Relationships: Personnel at AHRF sites should build relationships with local
decision makers, first responders, hospitals, and laboratories. These relationships
would prove invaluable during an incident. Suggestions for establishing and/or
maintaining these relationships include participation in periodic AHRF assessments,
training exercises, work sessions, and presentations.
• Vaporized Hydrogen Peroxide: VHP has proven to be an effective decontaminating
agent and is used routinely by biosafety level-3 (BSL-3) laboratories. Modified VHP
(e.g., via ammonia addition) can be used also for chemical decontamination.
Incorporation of this technology in the AHRF might be an improvement or beneficial
addition to the manual bleach washes currently being recommended and used. The
VHP system is capable of getting into all crevices and hard-to-reach areas.
4.2 Equipment
4.2.7 Major Recommendations & Upgrades
M256A1 Nerve Agent Ticket: During the evaluation of simulants prior to the
assessments, it was discovered that the NAV tickets used to detect nerve agents were
problematic and subject to substantial false positive and false negative results. As a
result, an alternative test (the nerve agent ticket from the M256A1 kit) was incorporated
into the AHRF screening protocol used during the assessments. This alternative test is
recommended for use in the AHRF screening protocol.
Final Report 21 February 2010
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AHRF Protocol Assessment Report
4.2.2 Minor Recommendations
There are no minor recommendations for equipment modifications.
4.2.3 A dditional Suggestions
• High-Quality Butane Lighter: Assessments demonstrated that the use of low-quality
lighters or flame sources during the thermal susceptibility test result in cooler flames
and soot deposits that make interpretation of results difficult. Using a high-quality
butane lighter will provide for a cleaner burn and improved observation during this
test.
• Platinum Wire: Stainless steel spatulas used during the assessments were
occasionally overloaded with material causing an uneven burn and difficult
observation of results. Use of a platinum wire in place of a stainless steel spatula
provided for improved visuals during thermal susceptibility testing.
• Plastic Tongs: During the assessments, observers noted occasional discoloration of
metal tongs, which could be an indication of corrosion that could cause sample
screening interferences or contamination. Plastic tongs are recommended to mitigate
this concern.
4.2.4 Recommended Activities
• Evaluate New and Alternative Technologies: Since the availability of the October
2006 draft AHRF protocol, new technologies have been developed for testing the
presence of nerve agents and explosives. Instrumentation continues to be improved,
providing more specificity and sensitivity. Continued evaluation of new and
alternative technologies (e.g., Sabre 4000, 3-way paper, HAZCAT kits, Agentase™
CAD-kits, bioscreening, peroxide paper, water-finding paper, the entire M256A1 kit,
etc.) would ensure that the AHRFs are optimized to provide reliable information.
• Colorimetric Test Results Booklet: During the assessments, AHRF staff experienced
some difficulty in determining positive and negative results from colorimetric paper
tests used in the screening procedures. For example, staff was uncertain regarding
the intensity of the pink color needed to indicate a positive result with the ELITE™
test card. Although the ELITE™ test includes an example positive result,
development of a booklet or other easy-reference documentation showing visual
results (both positive and negative) for colorimetric tests would be helpful in training
AHRF staff and in providing a quick reference during sample screening.
• Equipment Training: In all assessments, AHRF staff felt additional training was
required regarding proper use the equipment and interpretation of the colorimetric
tests. Of particular concern was the need for training regarding the proper use and
interpretation of the radiation detectors. Additional training materials for equipment
use, particularly in the use of radioactivity testing equipment and paper test kits,
should be developed and training should be provided.
Final Report 22 February 2010
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AHRF Protocol Assessment Report
4.3 Protocol
4.3.1 Major Recommendations and Upgrades
• Handling Suspicious Powder. The protocol should include more detailed procedures
for receipt and handling of suspicious powders. The AHRF protocol currently
provides minimum direction on how to handle suspicious powders, and the
assessment demonstrated some confusion when the AHRF staff encountered white
powders in envelopes or suspicious packages. The AHRF protocol should include
details regarding how these samples should be handled, for example, instructions
regarding overpacking (e.g., placing a suspicious envelope inside a plastic bag), when
to contact the local FBI WMD Coordinator, etc.
• Sample Receipt Forms: The sample receipt forms included in the October 2006
protocol are lengthy and time consuming. As a result, the sample delivery person
and the sample receiver may be exposing themselves to a dangerous situation before
some critical safety questions are asked. The sample receipt forms should be
streamlined, and rearranged so that the more critical safety questions (e.g., initial
screening for radiation or explosive hazards) are addressed earlier in the process.
• Immediate Gamma Screening: The AHRF sample receipt process involves a lengthy
interview process prior to initial sample screening. The protocol instructs the AHRF
staff not to accept samples exceeding a specific gamma radiation limit. It is
recommended that the protocol be modified so that a gamma radiation screen of the
sample transport container is performed through the AHRF sample receipt window,
prior to the interview process. This would minimize exposure and allow for a more
timely call to local FBI WMD Coordinators or radiation experts, if necessary.
• Water Solubility Test (See Step 5 of Attachment 2): The protocol does not include
continued testing of all the sample phases created during the water solubility test
(only the water-soluble portions are tested). As it may be possible for hazards to be
present in any of the phases, all phases should be tested. Additionally, many
substances are only partially soluble in water and the technician might have difficulty
determining solubility, particularly for environmental samples. During the water
solubility test in the last three assessments, the aqueous portion was evaluated for
oxidizers and nerve agents using the pH, starch iodide, and nerve agent ticket tests.
If an organic layer was present, it was tested with starch iodide paper, nerve agent
ticket, DB-3 test, and M256A1 arsenic test strip.
This approach allows for the screening of a wider variety of unknown samples,
including samples comprising environmental matrices such as water, soil, and waste
fuel/oil. The criterion of pH <4 for continued screening also was removed because
samples containing lewisite could potentially have a low pH and should be screened
using the M256A1 arsenic test. Clarification also is needed concerning how to
handle samples with questionable density or precipitation.
Final Report 23 February 2010
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AHRF Protocol Assessment Report
• Add Decision Points: Additional decision points should be added throughout the
protocol to require consultation with the Laboratory Director, FBI WMD
Coordinator, and/or other technical experts. In many cases, sufficient information
may be available to stop testing and direct the sample elsewhere. Specific new
decision points should include (also refer to Attachment 2):
- Step 2: If the response to the question "Was there a communicated threat?" is
yes, stop and consult.
Step 2: If the response to the question "Is either screen positive?" is yes, stop
and consult.
- Step 3: If there is a positive response to the colorimetric explosive screen, stop
and consult.
- Step 4 (formerly Step 4a): Direct the analyst to stop and consult if the ELITE™
test or the thermal susceptibility test is positive.
Step 5 (formerly Step 4b): If the aqueous portion gives a positive starch iodide
test or has a pH greater than 8 or less than 4, stop and consult.
• M256A1 Arsenic Test (See Step 5 of Attachment 2): The formation of a precipitate
during the water solubility test, combined with a pH < 4, did not prove to be a
reliable test for lewisite, as the formation of a precipitate is not always easily visible
when dealing with small amounts of sample. By incorporating the arsenic test from
the M256A1 test kit, another means of detecting lewisite would be available. The
M256A1 test is already used in the AHRF protocol as the nerve agent test; therefore,
addition of the arsenic test does not require additional equipment. Training in the use
of the M256 test tickets is also highly recommended (see Section 4.2.4).
• Clarify Radioactivity Levels: Some confusion arose during one assessment regarding
the levels of radioactivity used to determine whether or not to continue AHRF testing
or refuse the sample. A specific threshold level is listed in the protocol, however, a
statement saying each facility should set its own threshold (i.e., based on site
background levels) also is listed. The levels of radioactivity that are acceptable for
sample receipt at the AHRF should be more clearly defined.
• Add ELITE?™ Card Test to Steps 2 and 4: The ELITE™ card test proved to be a
user-friendly and reliable test for detecting explosives during the assessments. Use of
this test is recommended for detection of explosives on the transport container during
Step 2, along with the M8 paper already being used. The test also is recommended
for use prior to the thermal susceptibility test in Step 4, particularly because liquids
are not tested during thermal susceptibility testing.
• Revise protocol to ensure it is consistent with the flowchart: The protocol includes a
figure that presents the flow of samples through the screening process; it is important
that the protocol describes the tests that are included in the figure. For example, the
protocol should describe the float test used to screen for biological hazards. A
revised flowchart is provided as Attachment 2 to this report. The AHRF protocol
should be revised for consistency with this flowchart.
Final Report 24 February 2010
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AHRF Protocol Assessment Report
4.3.2 Minor Recommendations
• Reporting Forms: Assessment observers and AHRF staff noted some redundancy in
the AHRF Sample Receipt and Screening Results forms. Removing some of this
redundancy would expedite sample processing and decision making. The addition of
start and stop times for some of the sample screening tests on these forms is
recommended for documentation and verification of proper test times.
• AHRF Temperature: Both AHRFs used during the assessments are located in the
Northeastern United States, where temperatures can fall below 0 °F in the winter or
above 90 °F in the summer. Guidelines regarding temperature ranges that would be
considered appropriate for AHRF functioning in cases when there are heating,
ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC) problems should be provided. The protocol
documentation should include guidelines regarding required temperatures for testing
and actions to take if the AHRF is not in this range.
• Hints and Cautions: ARHF staff and the assessment panelists agreed that the "Note"
and "Warning" text boxes included throughout the protocol were helpful. Additional
"hints" and "cautions" (such as what might cause false positives to occur, appropriate
hot plate settings, how to use the FSP scraper feature) also would be beneficial.
4.3.3 A dditional Suggestions
Overarching Procedures: Assessment participants noted that the protocol does not
adequately address "overarching" procedures, such as decisions regarding how samples
should be handled when screening tests are indicative, but not confirmatory (e.g.,
negative M8, positive alkylation test). The protocol should describe how to proceed in
these situations.
4.3.4 Recommended Activities
• Training Resources and Requirements: Training programs should be developed for
AHRF operations, including recommended training requirements and frequencies. It
is recommended that a list of training resources be prepared and included as an
attachment to the AHRF Protocol. This list should include instrument and
colorimetric test training resources from vendors and others. The protocol also does
not provide guidelines regarding training that would be required for AHRF
technicians/chemists. A required minimum frequency of training and what the
training should include should be specified. AHRF staff should be trained in the
proper use of AHRF equipment and tests, the AHRF protocol, the proper use of PPE,
proper handling of CWAs and other hazards, and other health and safety procedures.
• Evidentiary, Preservation, and Shipping Issues: The protocol does not provide
sufficient guidelines regarding how to handle evidentiary samples or preserve
evidence. Guidelines should be developed in consultation with the FBI, and provided
in the protocol. Sample shipment to other facilities or locations also is not adequately
addressed. Issues such as proper packaging, labeling, and U.S. Department of
Transportation (DOT) requirements should be addressed or, at a minimum, a
reference supplied as to where that information can be obtained.
Final Report 25 February 2010
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AHRF Protocol Assessment Report
• Large Packages: The pass-through for samples into the AHRF is not adequate for
receipt of samples that do not fit through the sample receipt portal. The protocol
does not address how these samples should be handled. The EPA Region 1 and
NYSDOH AHRFs faced this problem in an assessment scenario, and each handled
the situation differently. Instructions for handling these packages should be
developed and provided. Instructions also are needed regarding how to handle
radioactive samples that are refused entry. Because these procedures may be
dependent on local requirements or practices, the protocol should, at a minimum,
provide instructions to follow the site's standard operating procedure for handling
these samples.
• Redirection/Repackaging: Guidelines or instructions regarding the handling of
samples that are redirected to another laboratory should be developed and provided.
The guidelines should address how AHRF staff should determine which laboratory
will receive the sample, what preservation (if any) is required, and how the sample
should be packaged. Currently, the protocol directs specific decontamination of
sample containers and references DOT shipping regulations, but does not address
sample preservation. The protocol also mentions the possibility of sending sample
aliquots to a laboratory, but does not adequately address what to do with the
remaining sample. Because the biosafety cabinet does not provide adequate space for
long-term sample storage, sample storage in the AHRF is not an option.
• Additional Assessments: Additional assessments of the AHRF protocol, using a
greater variety of samples (e.g., multiple contaminants in a sample, additional
contaminants, a greater variety of matrices, addition of an explosive "device" sample,
etc.) and including local decision makers (local FBI, first responders, public health
laboratory, etc.) should be performed on a regular basis.
• Proficiency Testing: To determine that AHRFs are maintained, performing
optimally, and are able to support correct decision making in evaluating the potential
threat of unknown samples, routine (e.g., at least annual) proficiency testing should
be planned. Procedures for periodic proficiency testing of facilities, equipment, and
protocols should be developed and implemented. These procedures, for example,
could be similar to proficiency testing procedures under which the laboratory
currently operates.
5.0 Conclusions
All AHRF staff, panelists, and observers participating in the AHRF protocol assessments agreed that the
AHRFs meet the purpose of protecting laboratory facilities and staff, and can support decisions
concerning samples containing potentially hazardous unknowns. The modifications described in Section
4.0 of this report are recommended as improvements to ensure that the AHRFs perform optimally to meet
this purpose. The existing AHRF prototypes provide the engineering controls required to allow the
operators to handle samples safely and efficiently. AHRF staff at each facility was well trained and
experienced with the protocol. During the assessments, excellent communication also was observed
between staff performing activities in both the bleaching station and glove box areas, and between the
bleaching station team and the sample delivery person. This level of communication was critical to
appropriate decision making and safety.
Final Report 26 February 2010
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AHRF Protocol Assessment Report
Recommendations and suggestions resulting from the assessments that could be immediately incorporated
into the AHRF protocol were included in the final AHRF Protocol published September 2008
(EPA/600/R-08/105). Those directly impacting the sample screening procedures are reflected in the final
flowchart, which is included in the final Protocol and as Attachment 2 to this report. Incorporated
recommendations include the following:
• Replace NAV tickets with M256A1 nerve ticket (already incorporated into procedures used during
assessments).
• Rearrange order of sample receipt interview questions to address safety concerns first.
• Perform gamma screening prior to the sample receipt interview.
• Change the water solubility testing portion of the protocol to include testing of all phases; include
information regarding how to handle questionable density samples and the formation of precipitates.
• Add additional decision points to seek assistance from the FBI WMD Coordinator and/or others.
• Incorporate arsenic test from M256A1 (Step 5 of Attachment 2).
• Clarify levels of radioactivity acceptable for sample receipt.
• Add ELITE™ card test to Step 2 (Transport Container Screening) and Step 4 (Initial Sample
Screening) as an additional test for explosives.
• Revise protocol to ensure it is consistent with flowchart (e.g., include float test for biologicals).
• Include more "hints'V'cautions" to the protocol (e.g., regarding false positives, hotplate settings, use
of the FSP scraper feature, etc.).
• Use a high-quality butane lighter for a cleaner burn and improved observation during thermal
susceptibility test.
• Use platinum wire in place of spatula to improve observation during thermal susceptibility test.
• Use plastic tongs when adding waste to bleach containers.
Additional recommendations and suggestions resulting from the assessments were not incorporated into
the protocols because they either required site-specific considerations or time for development. The
existing AHRF prototype host sites have since addressed several of these recommendations by initiating
staff training and equipment testing activities, purchasing additional sets of equipment, and preparing
modified reporting forms.
Final Report 27 February 2010
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AHRF Protocol Assessment Report
Attachment 1
Flowchart (Obsolete) - Sample Screening Procedures from
the October 2006 AHRF Protocol
Final Report-Attachment 1 28 February 2010
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AHRF Protocol Assessment Report
AHRF Sample Screening Procedures (Obsolete)
STEP 1: Sample Receipt
It is assumed that a sample will be collected by first
responders and packaged in a primary sample container.
It is also assumed that primary sample containers will be
further packaged into a transport container. If a
suspicious package is encountered, it also will be
packaged in a transport container.
Review chain-of-custody and field report information.
Interview sample transport technician.
STEP 2: Transport Container Screening
Alpha, beta, gamma
(direct measurement,
wipe test only if
positive)
STOP
Consult supervising lab director,
appropriate local agency,
and the FBI WMD Coordinator
to determine whether it safe
to continue AHRF screening
Collect surface sample and remove
remaining contamination with a
diluted bleach solution
Final Report - Attachment 1
29
February 2010
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AHRF Protocol Assessment Report
AHRF Sample Screening Procedures (Obsolete)
(Continued)
STEP 3: Primary Sample Container Screening
Place the transport/secondary container in
fume hood or equivalent enclosure
Note: If the container is a
piece of evidence, the
container should be
handled minimally to protect
forensics evidence. Wipe
samples should occur only
at the container seal.
OPTIONAL
Screen air inside the transport/secondary container for CWAs with an FSP
and/or IMS. Then unpack the transport/secondary container and
individually screen each primary container with the FSP and/or IMS.
Note: During the visual
inspection, it may be helpful
to photograph the primary
sample containers or
otherwise document their
condition
Visually inspect primary container(s)
Move the primary sample
containers to the glove
box immediately
Perform radiation screen
STOP
Consult supervising lab director,
appropriate local agency, and the
FBI WMD Coordinator
to determine whether it is safe to
continue AHRF screening
Alpha, beta, gamma
(direct measurement,
wipe test only if positive)
Note: If immediate color change
sample is leaking. Take
immediate precautions.
Move the primary sample
containers to the glove
box immediately
f STOP
/Consult supervising lab director,
appropriate local agency, and the
FBI WMD Coordinator
yto determine whether it is safe to
V^ continue AHRF screening
Collect surface sample
Explosive screen (colorimetnc)
If M8 was positive, remove
remaining contamination
with a diluted bleach
solution before continuing
Is the field and AHRF
information considered to be
sufficient to protect receiving
laboratory?
Prepare sample for
shipment to appropriate
aboratory
Final Report - Attachment 1
30
February 2010
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AHRF Protocol Assessment Report
AHRF Sample Screening Procedures (Obsolete)
(Continued)
STEP 4a: Initial Sample Screening
Ensure that glove box has been certified as clean
Transfer primary sample container to all-hazards glove box
Open primary sample container
Immediately screen with Combustible Gas Indicator (CGI) or
Photoionization Detector (PID)
Is the sample
explosive or
flammable?
/ Take precaution to \
S—M mitigate flammable I
\ hazard IL
\ /
Perform radiation screen M-
STOP
Consult supervising lab director,
appropriate local agency,
and the FBI WMD Coordinator
to determine whether it is safe to
continue AHRF screening
I Direct measurement
_L for alpha and beta
Is sufficient sample available
2g or 2ml_) to obtain a sa
ot for scree
STOP \
Consult supervising lab I
director, appropriate I
local agency /
OPTIONAL
Screen sub-aliquot with a FSP and/or IMS
prior to thermal susceptibility test
Remove a sub-aliquot for
explosive screen and
transfer to the Class II A2
biosafety cabinet
Explosive Screen
(thermal susceptibility test)
- POSITIVE—'
Final Report - Attachment 1
31
February 2010
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AHRF Protocol Assessment Report
AHRF Sample Screening Procedures (Obsolete)
(Continued)
STEP 4b: CWA Screening
Record physical properties of sample (state, color, etc.)
Note: If sample
reacts with water,
immediately halt
screening. Contact
lab director and FBI
WMD Coordinator.
i
r^^
Perform water
solubility/miscibility
test
r 1
r i f
•NO-
Does the sample
form a precipitate?
NON-WET
•POS-
-NEC-
4 < pH < 8
Record physical properties of
sample
:epare sample fo
shipment to I
iropriate laboratory /
Final Report - Attachment _/
32
February 2010
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AHRF Protocol Assessment Report
AHRF Sample Screening Procedures (Obsolete)
(Continued)
STEP 4c: Additional Screening of Sample
Test with indicator papers for
chlorine, fluoride, cyanide,
sulfide, and arsenic
YES
Send to appropriate
laboratory for
biological screening
and further analysis
Note: This Interim All Hazards Receipt Facility Protocol currently does not include a
biological screening process. Potential "low tech" and low cost screening methods
are being assessed and may be added at a later date.
Some interested parties have suggested that it may be more practical to screen
unknown samples for radiological, explosive, and chemical threats and then send
the sample directly to a Laboratory Response Network (LRN) lab. This suggestion
is based on concerns related to the amount of available sample material, timing
(urgency), and qualified expertise. Others, however, have suggested that using
minimal biological screening (e.g., immunoassay or ATP bioluminescence) to
detect the presence of biological activity may be warranted under some conditions.
These techniques may be reasonable and appropriate depending on a given
facility's capabilities. EPA is continuing to assess the feasibility of biological
screens for the purposes of this project.
Final Report - Attachment 1
33
February 2010
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AHRF Protocol Assessment Report
Attachment 2
Flowchart (Final) - Recommended Modifications to AHRF
Sample Screening Procedures Based on Assessments
Final Report - Attachment 2 34 February 2010
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AHRF Protocol Assessment Report
Recommended Modifications to AHRF Sample Screening Procedures
STEP 1: Sample Receipt
It is assumed that a sample will be collected by first
responders and packaged in a primary sample
container. It is also assumed that primary sample
containers will be further packaged into a transport
container. If a suspicious package is encountered, it
also will be packaged in a transport container.
Note: If transport container
is larger than the AHRF
portal, contact HAZMAT for
instruction
Review chain-of-custody and field report
information. Interview sample transport technician.
(Section 2.1)
STEP 2: Transport Container
Screening
Collect surface sample and
remove remaining contamination
with a diluted bleach solution
STOP! Consult
supervising lab
director, FBI WMD
coordinator, and
any appropriate
local agency to
determine whether
it is safe to
continue AHRF
screening and at
which point to
resume testing
Final Report - Attachment 2
35
February 2010
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AHRF Protocol Assessment Report
Recommended Modifications to AHRF Sample Screening Procedures
(Continued)
STEP 3: Primary Sample Container Screening
Place the transport/secondary container in
fume hood or equivalent enclosure
(Section 4.0)
IF EQUIPMENT AVAILABLE
Screen air inside the transport/secondary container for CWAs with an FSP
and/or IMS. Then unpack the transport/secondary container and
individually screen each primary container with the FSP and IMS.
(Section 4.1)
Note: If the container is a
piece of evidence, the
container should be
handled minimally to protect
forensics evidence. Wipe
samples should occur only
at the container seal.
Visually inspect primary container(s)
(Section 4.2)
Note: During the visual
inspection, it may be helpful
to photograph the primary
sample containers or
otherwise document their
condition
Note: If immediate color
change, sample is leaking.
Move to glove box immediately.
Inspect container for leakage. Wipe
seam with MS paper
(Section 4.5)
INTACT (Not leaking)
Prepare sam
shipment to appropriate)^ YE
laboratory
s the field and AHRF information
considered to be sufficient to protect
receiving laboratory?
Collect surface s
ample
If MS was positive and explosive
screen negative, remove
remaining contamination with a
diluted bleach solution before
continuing
•YES—^
Final Report - Attachment 2
36
February 2010
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AHRF Protocol Assessment Report
Recommended Modifications to AHRF Sample Screening Procedures
(Continued)
STEP 4: Initial Sample Screening
Ensure that glove box has been certified as clean
(Section 5.0)
I Transfer primary sample container to all-hazards glove box I
(Section 5.1)
Open primary sample container
(Section 5.3)
Immediately screen with Combustible Gas Indicator (CGI) or
Photoionization Detector (PID)
(Section 5.4)
Perform radiation screen
(direct measurement for alpha and beta)
(Section 5.5)
IF EQUIPMENT AVAILABLE
Screen sub-aliquot with an FSP and/or IMS
prior to thermal susceptibility test
Remove a sub-aliquot for
explosive screen and
transferto the Class II A2
biosafety cabinet
Explosive Screen
(thermal susceptibility test)
(Section 5.7)
Note: Proceed with sample
screening using the remainder of
the 1a or 1mL sample aliquot
Final Report - Attachment 2
37
February 2010
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AHRF Protocol Assessment Report
Recommended Modifications to AHRF Sample Screening Procedures
(Continued)
STEP 5: Continued Sample [
Screening
Record physical properties of sample (state, color, etc.)
Perform water solubility/
miscibility test
(Section 5.8.3)
STOP! Consult
supervising lab
director, FBI
WMD
coordinator, and
any appropriate
local agency to
determine
whether it is safe
to continue AHRF
screening and at
wh ch point to
resume testing
Final Report - Attachment 2
38
February 2010
-------
AHRF Protocol Assessment Report
Recommended Modifications to AHRF Sample Screening Procedures
(Continued)
Note: This Interim All Hazards Receipt Facility Protocol currently does not include a
biological screening process. Potential "low tech" and low cost screening methods
are being assessed and may be added at a later date.
Some interested parties have suggested that it may be more practical to screen
unknown samples for radiological, explosive, and chemical threats and then send
the sample directly to a Laboratory Response Network (LRN) lab. This suggestion is
based on concerns related to the amount of available sample material, timing
(urgency), and qualified expertise. Others, however, have suggested that using
minimal biological screening (e.g., immunoassay or ATP bioluminescence) to detect
the presence of biological activity may be warranted under some conditions. These
techniques may be reasonable and appropriate depending on a given facility's
capabilities. EPA is continuing to assess the feasibility of biological screens for the
purposes of this project.
Final Report - Attachment 2
39
February 2010
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vvEPA
United States
Environmental Protection
Agency
PRESORTED STANDARD
POSTAGE & FEES PAID
EPA
PERMIT NO. G-35
Office of Research and Development
National Homeland Security Research Center
Cincinnati, OH 45268
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