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                  U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
                  Office of Inspector General

                  At  a  Glance
                                                             10-P-0017
                                                        October 27, 2009
                                                                 Catalyst for Improving the Environment
Why We Did This Review

The objective of this
evaluation was to determine
how well the U.S.
Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) can accomplish
its mission essential functions
in the event of a pandemic
influenza or equivalent
national emergency that
necessitates  Continuity of
Operations (COOP)
activation.

Background

Federal Continuity Directive 1
(FCD 1) requires EPA to
develop a continuity plan that
ensures its ability to
accomplish its mission
essential functions from an
alternative site with limited
staffing and  without access to
resources available during
normal activities.  EPA must
be prepared to continue to
function during an emergency
and to effectively resume
essential operations when they
are interrupted.
 EPA  Needs to Improve Continuity of
 Operations Planning
 What We Found
EPA has limited assurance that it can successfully maintain continuity of
operations and execute its mission essential functions during a significant national
event such as a pandemic influenza outbreak.  EPA's COOP policy does not
clearly define authorities and responsibilities for continuity planning at all levels
of the Agency and has not been updated to reflect current national directives and
guidance. EPA lacks internal management controls, including guidance and
systematic oversight, to ensure that regional offices have developed continuity
plans that meet the requirements of FCD 1. Regional plans generally lack
consistency, particularly in the area of mission essential functions, and there was
no evidence that EPA Headquarters had reviewed, approved, or commented on the
regional plans, their designation, or lack of essential functions.

EPA's continuity training and exercises have not prepared the Agency to provide
essential services during a significant national event. EPA has not held and does
not require any all-employee continuity training. Also, EPA's continuity exercises
do not test EPA's ability to execute its mission essential functions following
COOP activation.  Four out of six regions contacted and all but one program office
have not conducted internal exercises to test capabilities during a pandemic.
 What We Recommend
 EPA should establish a schedule to complete FCD 1 requirements, designate a
 lead office for COOP planning, and identify Headquarters and regional
 responsibilities and authorities. EPA should also develop consistent mission
 essential functions and COOP plan preparation and training guidance for all
 regions. Further, EPA Headquarters should review and approve all regional and
 program office COOP plans.  The Agency concurred with our recommendations.
For further information,
contact our Office of
Congressional, Public Affairs
and Management at
(202)566-2391.

To view the full report,
click on the following link:
www.epa.qov/oiq/reports/2010/
20091027-10-P-0017.pdf

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