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                   U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
                   Office of Inspector General

                   At  a   Glance
                                                            11-P-0534
                                                        August 25, 2011
Why We Did This Review

The U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA),
Office of Inspector General
(OIG), received two Hotline
complaints on the use of
dispersants in response to the
Deepwater Horizon oil spill in
the Gulf of Mexico. We
reviewed the steps EPA took
to analyze the dispersant
Corexit for inclusion on the
National Contingency Plan
(NCP) Product Schedule. We
also determined EPA's role in
the decision to use Corexit in
the response. The OIG Office
of Counsel addressed a perjury
allegation in one  complaint.

Background

The NCP establishes national
response capability and
coordination for oil spills. The
NCP Product Schedule lists
spill-mitigating chemicals that
responders can use in carrying
out the NCP, including
dispersants that emulsify,
disperse, or solubilize oil into
the water column.


For further information,
contact our Office of
Congressional, Public Affairs,
and Management at
(202)566-2391.

The full report is at:
www.epa.gov/oiq/reports/2011/
20110825-11-P-0534.pdf
                                                                 Catalyst for Improving the Environment
Revisions Needed to National Contingency Plan
Based on Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill
 What We Found
EPA and the manufacturer of Corexit completed required steps to include Corexit
products on the NCP Product Schedule. However, EPA has not updated the NCP
since 1994 to include the most appropriate efficacy testing protocol. Subpart J of
the NCP identifies requirements a manufacturer must meet to include a product on
the Product Schedule, including efficacy results using the Swirling Flask Test.
EPA has considered revising Subpart J to change efficacy testing procedures to the
more reproducible Baffled Flask Test. However, EPA had not finalized the
rulemaking before the Deepwater Horizon oil spill occurred because of competing
priorities and changes in management. If EPA had updated Subpart J, more
reliable efficacy data may have been available during the oil spill.

Responders to the Deepwater Horizon oil spill could have used other dispersants,
but not within the applicable window of time designated by Addendum 2 to a
directive issued by EPA and the Coast Guard. EPA's involvement in the response
included issuing Joint Directives to BP, making operational decisions, and
conducting additional dispersant testing. EPA involved senior officials in the
response because (a) the Agency was not prepared for the unprecedented volume
and duration of dispersant use and subsea application, and (b) additional clarity
was needed on roles and responsibilities in responding to a Spill of National
Significance. The involvement of senior EPA officials created confusion as to who
at EPA led response efforts for dispersant use.

The OIG Office of Counsel  did not find evidence supporting the perjury
allegation.

We  noted that EPA took proactive actions to make health and environmental data
available on the Agency's website throughout the  spill response. Also, EPA
demonstrated proactive efforts to improve emergency response plans.
                                What We Recommend
We recommend that the Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response establish
policies to review and update contingency plans incorporating lessons learned
during the Deepwater Horizon oil spill, and clarify roles and responsibilities for
Spills of National Significance. We also recommend that the office take steps to
revise Subpart J to incorporate the most appropriate efficacy testing protocol and
capture dispersant information. We recommend that the Office of Research and
Development develop a research plan on long-term health and environmental
effects of dispersants. The Agency generally agreed with our recommendations.

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