UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20460
OFFICE OF THE ADMINISTRATOR
SCIENCE ADVISORY BOARD
March 20, 2006
EPA-SAB-CON-06-005
The Honorable Stephen L. Johnson
Administrator
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
1200 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20460
Subject: EPA Science Advisory Board's Homeland Security Advisory Committee Consultation
on the WaterSentinel Program and Standard Analytical Methods
Dear Administrator Johnson:
On January 30 and 31, 2006, the Homeland Security Advisory Committee of the Science
Advisory Board held its second meeting for the purpose of providing initial thoughts on the Agency's
WaterSentinel Program and Standard Analytical Methods. This is a brief report on our activities.
The Committee is a remarkably diverse and accomplished group of experts. Their willingness to
serve and the intensity of their involvement is a tribute to the Agency and the importance of the
missions that it has undertaken for our national security. The committee includes natural, social, and
engineering scientists; basic researchers, applied researchers, and practitioners; and representatives of
the public and private sector. Indeed, many have served in multiple roles during their careers. I am
honored to be their Chair.
Our first meeting, in July 2005, was devoted to a general introduction to the program. At the
second meeting, we responded to requests for consultations from the EPA offices that manage the
WaterSentinel and Standard Analytical Methods programs. The former was conducted in closed
session, while the latter was open to the public. Because similar themes arose in both discussions, this
letter conveys the Committee Chair's observation in a non-confidential form.
The Committee was impressed by the hard, thoughtful work done by EPA's staff, working on
challenging problems, under time pressure. We were grateful that they had sought us out at a
formative stage in their work and actively engaged us in discussing possible future directions. A
number of committee members described it as one of the better meetings that they had attended. We
hope that the staff felt the same.
Both programs had done good jobs of giving form to some central aspects of their respective
tasks. The work was clear enough that committee members were able to identify many of its
limitations (often raising comments that had arisen previously among the staff).
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The following are some themes from our discussion. As mentioned, the meeting was a
consultation, not a review. No formal recommendations were made. As a result, this is informal
feedback, based on my general observations, reviewed after informal consultation with committee
members. Many comments on specific issues were conveyed during the meeting and, subsequently,
through the SAB Designated Federal Officer (DFO).
The Committee was not asked to comment on the overall strategy, in terms of choice of
approaches (e.g., WaterSentinel) and allocation of resources to them. Hence, it only considered issues
of validity, completeness, integration, and cost-effectiveness.
Systems integration. Staff clearly conceptualized their work in systems terms, including a
formal model for some aspects of WaterSentinel, with placeholders for some currently missing
functions. It is important that this integration be seen through to its fruition, allowing at least rough
estimates of the likely efficacy and cost effectiveness of alternative system designs. It will be
particularly challenging to treat behavioral aspects of system performance realistically (e.g., how well
equipment will be maintained and operated, how clearly and efficiently test results will be
communicated).
Sustainability. Homeland security activities come on top of water managers' heavy routine
responsibilities, with few additional resources. It is important to have an implementation plan that
ensures that programs like WaterSentinel are mastered and maintained. To that end, an all-hazards
strategy is, arguably, essential. If, homeland security activities include functions that are an integral
part of routine operations, there may be unrealistic expectations for a generally dormant system to
spring into action, in a crisis.
Decision making. It is not clear how the information produced by these technologies will be
used. Various institutions and individuals need specific information about the present and future
quality of water, in order to make effective decisions. Both analytical and empirical research is
needed to identify their information needs, ensure that the system addresses them, and communicates
with them effectively. Those needs assessments were not obvious in the system design. On the other
hand, there is an opportunity for properly designed and tested communications to increase users' trust
and public resilience.
Transition. Agency staff has consulted with many parties during the development process,
creating a general understanding of potential users' circumstances. However, there do not seem to be
formal analyses for the operational implications of system rollout (e.g., capital costs, training,
maintenance). As a result, it is unclear what performance can be expected in real-world
circumstances. Those plans could also help protect the Agency from ending up with long-term
operational responsibility for the systems that it is developing. That could only be justified, as part of
its science budget, if we could assume that no new technologies will be developed and no new threats
will arise. Otherwise, the Agency's science should be forward looking.
In summary, we believe the Agency's devoted staff has made great progress toward
implementing a research strategy that is weighted toward threat-based technological solutions. In that
regard, it resembles efforts elsewhere in the federal government. Gen. Larry Welch, Chair of the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Technology Advisory Committee underscored the need for
a national strategy for public preparedness at the November 2005 meeting. An excerpt from the
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transcript of that meeting is attached to this letter. It captures our own beliefs about the challenges
facing us and directions that the Agency should pursue.
Thank you for your attention and the opportunity to serve the Agency and its mission.
Sincerely,
/signed/ /signed/
Dr. Granger Morgan, Chair Dr. Baruch Fischhoff, Chair
Science Advisory Board Science Advisory Board
Homeland Security Advisory Committee
Attachment
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U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
Science Advisory Board
Homeland Security Advisory Committee WaterSentinel Program and Standard
Analytical Methods Consultative Panel
CHAIR
Dr. Baruch Fischhoff, Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PA
MEMBERS
Dr. Vicki Bier, University of Wisconsin, Madison, WI
Dr. Mark Borchardt, Marshfield Clinic Research Foundation, Marshfield, WI
Dr. Mary Durfee, Michigan Technological University, Houghton, MI
Dr. David S. Ensor, RTI International, Research Triangle Park, NC
Dr. Lynda Knobeloch, Wisconsin Department of Health & Family Services, Madison, WI
Dr. Paul J. Lioy, UMDNJ - Robert Wood Johnson Medical School, Piscataway, NJ
Dr. Lee D. McMullen, Des Moines Water Works, Des Moines, IA
Dr. Christine Owen, Tampa Bay Water, Clearwater, FL
Dr. Robert E. Pitt, University of Alabama, Tuscaloosa, AL
Dr. Robert Snyder, Rutgers University, Piscataway, NJ
Dr. Linda Stetzenbach, University of Nevada, Las Vegas, NV
Dr. Richard C. Sustich, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Urbana, IL
Dr. Michael Trehy, US Food and Drug Administration, St. Louis, MO
Dr. Daniel C. Walsh, Columbia University, Long Island City, NY
Dr. James E. Watson, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, NC
Dr. Rae Zimmerman, New York University, New York, NY
SCIENCE ADVISORY BOARD STAFF
Ms. Vivian Turner, Designated Federal Officer, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency,
Washington, DC
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Attachment
On November 8, 2005, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) held a meeting of
the Homeland Security Science and Technology Advisory Committee (HSSTAC). In an open
session, the Chair, General Larry Welch, expressed the need for a national strategy for public
preparedness. The following is an excerpted transcript of that session. Information on this
meeting and the transcript can be found at the following DHS sites:
http://www.dhs.qov/dhspublic/interapp/editorial/editorial O427.xml and
www.dhs.qov/dhspublic/interweb/assetlibrarv/Minutes Nov 8 05.pdf.
Open Session (excerpt)
GENERAL WELCH: Welcome to the open session of our fourth plenary of the year. I
will take a few minutes to explain what we are about and what we have done in 2005. The main
purpose of this session is to relate the area and kinds of recommendations we will be making to
the Department...
There are three principal areas of focus that will characterize this year's
recommendations. They are: (1) strategic goals and output-oriented objectives, (2) public
interface and public resilience, and (3) the transition of S&T output to operating agencies...
The first area is to examine DHS strategic goals... A recurring theme, again one repeated
from last year, which still requires work is expanding a "threat-based" analysis to a "risk-based"
or "vulnerability-based" analysis. The difficulty with using only "threat-based" analysis is you
will almost always be wrong. We are simply not good at predicting where the next threat will
actually be or what the consequences will be...
Turning to public interface and public resilience, we think it is enormously important
because it is naive to think that you will prevent all damage or you will prevent all of the
incidents that one seeks to prevent. While we would certainly give prevention a very high
priority, the fact is that if the overall strategic objective is to preserve the American way of life
(that is, to ensure that no set of threats can fundamentally change the U.S. as we know it), then
you need a very resilient public. We need a public that can react to a wide range of things that
can happen, much of which we will never predict in advance, and to sustain that which we all
believe in.
We give a very high importance to preparedness, realistic expectations and public
understanding that lead to confidence. We will have some things to say about the responsibility
to ensure that expectations are realistic. We will recommend that there be a major thrust to make
DHS the "trusted source" for information in emergencies. That does not mean that all the
expertise will come from DHS, but the public needs to know in an emergency that there's one
communication channel that they can use to get the information and help they require. It needs
to be a consistent source; it needs to be trustworthy.
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