EPA 600/R-13/159 | August 2013 | www.epa.gov/ord
United States
Environmental Protection
Agency
Report on the
Workshop on Radionuclides in
Wastewater Infrastructure Resulting
from Emergency Situations
Office of Research and Development
National Homeland Security Research Center
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Disclaimer
The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency through its Office of Research and Development
created this report. It has been subject to an administrative review but does not necessarily
reflect the views of the Agency. EPA does not endorse the purchase or sale of any commercial
products or services. No official endorsement should be inferred.
Questions concerning this document or its application should be addressed to:
Matthew Magnuson, Ph.D.
National Homeland Security Research Center
Office of Research and Development (NG-16)
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
26 W. Martin Luther King Dr.
Cincinnati, OH 45268
magnu son, matthew@epa.gov
Emily Snyder, Ph.D.
National Homeland Security Research Center
Office of Research and Development (E-343-06)
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
109 T.W.Alexander Dr.
Research Triangle Park, NC 27711
(919)541-1006
snyder.emilv@epa.gov
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Acknowledgements
The Water Environment Research Foundation (WERF) conducted the workshop described in this
document under EPA contract EP-12-C-000104 and WERF Project Number WERF1W12. The
workshop report is the basis of the majority of this document.
The workshop participants, listed in Appendix A, provided critical input into the discussions and
are gratefully acknowledged. In addition to their contributions to the discussion during the
workshop, many made presentations that covered the breadth of topics important to elucidating
workshop outcomes.
WERF, a not-for-profit organization, funds and manages water quality research for its
subscribers through diverse public-private partnerships between municipal utilities, corporations,
academia, industry, and the federal government. WERF subscribers include municipal and
regional water and wastewater utilities, industrial corporations, environmental engineering firms,
and others that share a commitment to cost-effective water quality solutions. WERF is dedicated
to advancing science and technology addressing water quality issues as they impact water
resources, the atmosphere, the lands, and quality of life. Neither WERF, members of WERF, nor
any person acting on their behalf: (a) makes any warranty, express or implied, with respect to the
use of any information, apparatus, method, or process disclosed in this report or that such use
may not infringe on privately owned rights; or (b) assumes any liabilities with respect to the use
of, or for damages resulting from the use of, any information, apparatus, method, or process
disclosed in this report.
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Foreword
The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) Homeland Security Research Program
(HSRP) is helping to protect human health and the environment from adverse impacts following
chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear (CBRN) contamination; whether it involves an
intentional act such as terrorism, a natural disaster, or an industrial accident. Information about
HSRP is found at http://www.epa.gov/nhsrc.
An important focus of HSRP research is improved detection, response, and recovery capabilities
related to radiological contamination of the nation's drinking water and wastewater
infrastructures. HSRP is currently investigating data gaps in these areas that, if filled, could
assist wastewater plant operators in making decisions about whether and how to accept
wastewater contaminated with radionuclides during an emergency situation. This work is being
performed with input from key water sector and security stakeholders.
The HSRP is pleased to make this publication available to assist the drinking water and
wastewater communities in preparing for and recovering from disasters involving radiological
contamination.
Gregory D. Sayles
Acting Director, National Homeland Security Research Center
in
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Executive Summary
The Water Environment Research
Foundation (WERF), in partnership with the
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (U.S.
EPA) National Homeland Security Research
Center (NHSRC), hosted an expert
workshop December 3-4, 2012, in
Alexandria, Virginia, to engage with subject
matter experts and wastewater utility
stakeholders on a number of topics
surrounding radionuclides in wastewater
collection and treatment systems, should the
radionuclides enter the systems as a result of
an emergency situation. The workshop
included presentations and discussion on
topics such as:
How radioactive materials may
contaminate water entering municipal
wastewater treatment plants. These
include naturally occurring sources,
medical sources, regulated wastewater
discharges from U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory commission (NRC)
licensed facilities, accidents, criminal
acts, and response and
decontamination activities following a
radiological incident.
Impact of radioactive materials on the
operation of wastewater collection
and treatment plants. The
consequences of wastewater plant
failure to continue operation during
major disasters was vividly
demonstrated recently by Super Storm
Sandy.
Fate and transport of radiological
material in collection systems and
treatment. Wastewater collection
systems are complex, highly
engineered, and composed of many
locations and materials that may
potentially serve as sinks for
radioactive materials.
Past projects related to the release of
radiological contaminants by
emergency situations. Department of
Homeland Security and EPA have
conducted exercises and research and
development projects related to the
catastrophic release of radiological
contaminants.
Past projects relevant to the
introduction of radiological
contaminants by non-emergency
situations. The Interagency Steering
Committee on Radiation Standards
undertook a survey of radioactivity in
sewage sludge (biosolids) at the
request of the Government
Accountability Office following
discovery of radioactive materials in
sewage plants resulting from regulated
activities.
Case studies of actual radiological
contamination. This includes not only
the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power
plant catastrophe, a number of
domestic incidents, and hydrofracking
that provide valuable insights.
Worker Health and Safety. Because
wastewater treatment plants are critical
infrastructure, treatment plant workers
may be considered part of the
emergency response team in the event
of an RDD incident. Most treatment
plant workers have not had training
and experience dealing with radiation.
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Risk communication and
management. Public perception of
radiation is fatalistic. Risk
communication is therefore extremely
important. Part of the workshop
included a participatory exercise
during which attendees created
message maps, i.e., pre-planned
messages for crisis communication, for
several audience types.
The key objective of this workshop was to
provide EPA NHRSC recommendations and
technical information in the area of
radionuclides in wastewater infrastructure
resulting from emergency situations, as well
as related needs and concerns of, and
potential solutions for, the wastewater
industry. Workshop participants considered
several key questions regarding
radionuclides in the wastewater treatment
process. Theses questions helped guide and
focus the discussions and define and
prioritize key next steps, including:
What is needed / required for utilities
to accept radioactive contaminated
wastewaters?
What sorts of tests, protocols, and
regulatory guidance are needed?
What is needed for permit authorities
to guide / allow utilities to accept
these wastes?
How should these be designed or
implemented? Who should design and
evaluate these? Are there other
"simpler" tests and protocols?
What is needed to address concerns
and issues raised by the public,
wastewater workers, and operators?
What are the data gaps and what type
of research is needed?
The discussion included overarching issues,
criteria for wastewater plants' acceptance of
wastewater, impact of contamination on
collection systems, and impact on biosolids.
Potential solutions and needs discussed
included pre-planning, sampling and
analysis, worker safety and training, crisis
communication for multiple audiences,
application of regulations, and funding.
The discussion phase of the workshop
defined six general categories for further
investigation. The workshop developed
consensus about prioritizing key next
steps/needs, summarized in the table below.
The table includes only the most important
needs; in addition, other needs were
identified.
VI
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Category
Worker Health
and Safety
Identification,
Characterization,
and Containment
Communications
Regulatory and
Permitting
Scientific and
Engineering
Highest Priorities
RAD safety and training for workers that is available based on need.
Scenario-based, generic response plan that wastewater utilities could
incorporate into their existing emergency response plans.
Decision tree for plant managers to help them provide guidance to first
responders on the criteria for the acceptance of radionuclide contaminated
wastewater. This would include guidance on when first responders can
discharge contaminated wastewater, the best places in the collection system or
headworks for discharge, and acceptable chemical limits for discharge water.
Guidance on how utilities should work with first responders and the Joint
Information Center of the Incident Command Center.
Clarification on regulatory relief during emergency situations for both
potential quality violations and how these violations are logged into the
online OECA database. The hope is that there is a way to label the
violations as linked to an emergency situation.
Research on fate, transport, and remediation of radiologicals in
wastewater treatment plants. Remediation research should also include
potential legacy scenarios resulting from deposition in pump stations,
pipes, and plants.
Generic sampling plans that can be included in generic emergency response plans.
Increased capacity for sample analysis, perhaps via more rapid analysis.
Vll
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Introduction 4
Background 5
Radiological Dispersion Device (ROD) Exercises 5
Non-RDD Case Studies 7
Radiological Contamination Pathways 9
Fate and Transport of Radiological Material in Collection Systems and Treatment 11
Working with Key Stakeholders 12
Risk Communication and Management 14
Message Mapping 101 Exercise 14
Workshop Outcomes 17
General Discussion 17
Discussion of Potential Solutions and Needs 18
Table of Prioritized Needs 21
Appendix A: Workshop Participant Contact List A-l
Appendix B: Workshop Agenda B-l
Appendix C: Additional Resources C-l
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INTRODUCTION
The Water Environment Research Foundation
(WERF), in partnership with the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency (U.S. EPA)
National Homeland Security Research Center
(NHSRC) hosted an expert workshop December
3-4, 2012, in Alexandria, Virginia, to engage
with subject matter experts and wastewater
utility stakeholders on radionuclides in
wastewater collection and treatment systems.
The key objective of this workshop was to
provide EPANHRSC with recommendations
and technical information in the topic area
(radionuclides in wastewater infrastructure
resulting from emergency situations), as well as
related needs and concerns of, and potential
solutions for, the wastewater industry.
The NHSRC conducts research to detect,
respond to, and recover from terrorist attacks on
the nation's water and wastewater infrastructure.
The U.S. EPA has been conducting research on
ways to prevent, detect, contain, and treat
contaminants in water and wastewater, and is
also producing tools and procedures for
decontamination. All of this work is being
performed with input from U.S. EPA's primary
water security stakeholders. NHSRC is currently
investigating what research gaps exist in order to
help guide wastewater plant operators to decide
whether and how to accept some or all
wastewater contaminated with radionuclides as a
result of an emergency situation. More
information on U.S. EPA's homeland security
research program can be found at
www. epa. gov/nhsrc.
Participants considered several key questions
regarding radionuclides in the wastewater
treatment process. These questions guided the
discussions throughout the workshop:
What concerns need to be addressed?
What is needed / required for utilities
to accept radioactive contaminated
wastewaters?
What sorts of tests, protocols, and
regulatory guidance are needed?
How should these be designed or
implemented?
Who should design and test these?
Are there other "simpler" tests and
protocols?
Other questions or concerns?
In addition the following questions were used on
the second day to help define and prioritize key
next steps:
What is needed for utilities to accept
radionuclide contaminated waters?
What types of tests and protocols are
needed (and what is the design for
such tests) by Stakeholders?
What is needed for permit authorities
to guide / allow utilities to accept
these wastes?
What is needed to address concerns
and issues raised by the public, by
workers, and operators?
What are the gaps and what types of
research is needed?
This report summarizes key points of the
discussion that took place during the workshop.
It also outlines future needs and steps.
Additional meeting materials such as the
participant list and agenda are included in the
Appendices.
2 Collaborative Workshop on Radionuclides in Wastewater Infrastructure Resulting from Emergency Situations
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BACKGROUND
The workshop provided an opportunity for
wastewater and drinking water representatives,
subject matter experts, and regulatory
representatives to discuss scenarios where
radionuclides could be introduced into the
treatment system. The scenarios included
radionuclides that may be bound or unbound to
other substances and may have entered the
wastewater system in a number of ways,
including: (1) after radiological dispersion
device detonation, (2) detonation of an
improvised nuclear device, (3) via an incident at
a nuclear power plant, (4) intentional
introduction, (5) unintentional introduction, or
(6) enhanced natural background sources,
among other pathways.
Radiological Dispersion Device
(ROD) Exercises
During the workshop, two exercises were
described to inform participants' thinking about
what might happen during a radiological
dispersion device (RDD) or dirty bomb scenario.
These were the scenarios of the Wide Area
Recovery and Resiliency Program (WARRP) in
Denver, Colorado and the Liberty Radiological
Exercise (LibertyRadEx) in Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania. The assumption for both exercises
is that the RDD would contain the radioactive
isotope Cesium 137.
Wide Area Recovery and Resiliency Program
(WARRP) Overview, Denver, Colorado
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
and the Denver Urban Area Security Initiative
(UASI) initiated a collaborative program aimed
at enhancing wide area recovery capabilities of
large urban areas, military installations, and
critical infrastructure following a large-scale
chemical, biological, or radiological (CBR)
incident. The goal of the WARRP was to work
with interagency partners to enhance recovery
capabilities in the Denver metropolitan area and
other regions across the nation. The exercise
focused on developing key capability areas in:
Front end systems study and gap
analysis
Wide area recovery framework
Science and technology development
Workshops exercises and
demonstrations
Transition to end users
The WARRP developed a number of products
that are available on the website,
www.warrp.org. These products include:
Response and Recovery Knowledge
Products (RRKP) that include key
planning factors for recovery from a
radiological terrorism incident.
Interim cleanup strategy that
documents a sample approach for
state and local recovery managers to
develop guidance on determining
cleanup levels. This is useful to aid
in defining goals for site and incident
specific recovery. This strategy does
not represent a specific policy.
Waste screening and segregation
methods for waste minimization that
identifies high-priority waste streams
from the radiological event and also
waste streams that have potential to
be minimized.
Cesium (Cs) RDD Wash-Aid
technology that is designed to
decontaminate key infrastructure.
Lessons Learned for Wastewater Treatment
from WARRP
WARRP revealed a need to focus on developing
scalable technologies for radiological sampling
and decontamination. Some of these, especially
those for decontamination, are water-based
technologies that will generate significant
quantities of wastewater. Treatment plants need
3 Collaborative Workshop on Radionuclides in Wastewater Infrastructure Resulting from Emergency Situations
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to consider the role they will play in the
treatment of this wastewater. A waste estimation
tool developed for WARRP showed that several
billion gallons of radiologically contaminated
wastewater could result from decontamination
activities. It may therefore be necessary that the
wastewater utility deal with a sizeable fraction
of this decontamination water.
WARRP also revealed unexpected consequences
for wastewater treatment. For example, the
Denver Urban Area includes agricultural areas
which may generate significant amounts of
livestock and agricultural waste. This may
include livestock that may be rendered
unsuitable for consumption, that may die due to
the blast, or that may have to be euthanized
because of animal welfare concerns. It may also
include contaminated dairy products - millions
of gallons of milk that may have to be disposed
of through wastewater treatment plants. It is
important to educate dairy farmers, perhaps
through agricultural extension county agents,
about treatment plant limitations - these farmers
may just pour this milk down the drain without
considering the implications on the collections
or treatment systems. Until such education,
perhaps enabled by communication plans,
wastewater plants may need to assume they will
be receiving large quantities of contaminated
milk.
Liberty Radiological Exercise (Liberty
RadEx), Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
Liberty RadEx was a national exercise
sponsored and designed by the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency (U.S. EPA) to
practice and test federal, state, and local
assessment and cleanup capabilities in the
aftermath of an RDD incident in an urban
environment. Liberty RadEx was unique in that
participants practiced their "post-emergency"
phase responsibilities and coordination, and
worked with stakeholders and the public to plan
for community recovery. Liberty RadEx also
provided the opportunity to share information
and procedures while strengthening relationships
among federal, state, and local partners in
Pennsylvania and adjoining states.
As part of the exercise, a community advisory
forum was established that included members of
the public and organizations that would have
been directly affected by the radiological plume.
Their focus was to prioritize cleanup scenarios
either based on highest concentration of
radiological materials, highest population, or a
combination of concentration and population.
The community advisory forum decided against
starting at the most highly contaminated area or
the most populated area in the evacuated zone
and instead decided to start cleanup at the outer
perimeter of the contaminated area and work
towards the middle.
The community advisory forum was also asked
to identify temporary waste staging areas for the
contaminated waste. The advisory forum chose
one area from the three options given to them
and then picked other additional sites beyond the
options presented to them that included an
abandoned super fund site. A good lesson
learned from this exercise was that when faced
with important decisions, the public did not
show a great deal of not-in-my-back-yard, or
"NIMBY" (not in my backyard), behavior and
they were dedicated to finding solutions.
Lesson Learned for Wastewater Treatment
from Liberty RadEx
There will be much waste generated from an
RDD event and the community will have to
handle it. Projected costs of shipping waste and
gaining acceptance at a nuclear disposal landfill
were estimated at close to one billion dollars.
Because of the high cost, Pennsylvania would
consider local or regional solutions to waste
disposal in the event of an RDD event.
The radiological plume is large - in this exercise
it extended almost 50 miles. There will be
people living with levels of radiation that are
higher than typically observed background
levels. Their daily activities (washing clothes,
flushing toilets, etc.) will introduce radiation
into the collection and treatment systems.
Weather will play a role in the dispersal of the
radionuclides. For areas with a high likelihood
of rain, stormwater and wastewater systems will
4 Collaborative Workshop on Radionuclides in Wastewater Infrastructure Resulting from Emergency Situations
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receive radioactive runoff and will need to both
treat this water and also become one of the sites
of the cleanup effort.
Aqueous decontamination will most likely be
limited to within a few blocks of the detonation
site within the first few days. This means that
collection and treatment systems will most likely
see the largest concentration of radioactive
material and the largest volumes of water in
those first few days.
There may be wastewater treatment plants
within the 'hot zone' whose treatment operations
will need to be maintained as critical
infrastructure. They will need to receive supplies
of chemicals and have workers who are trained
in radiological disasters to maintain plant
operations.
Effectively remove Cs and reduce
salinity
Create recycled water that can be
used for reactor cooling
A system was designed that includes a selective
Cs removal media and a reverse osmosis system
for desalination. The introduction of the Cs
removal media significantly reduced waste
volumes. Future needs include the treatment of
the reverse osmosis brine, treatment of the sub-
drain water to remove Cs from dilute seawater,
and strontium removal from the recycled cooling
water.
While there has been a great deal of local
support for the cleanup, the issue of long-term
waste disposal needs has not been resolved.
Non-RDD Case Studies
Also discussed were non-RDD case studies
where treatment plants were affected by
radiological materials.
Fukushima Dai-ichi
The events at Fukushima produced millions of
gallons of contaminated wastewater, containing
both radioactive isotopes and salts. This
wastewater was primarily a result of the
introduction of sea water, either from the
tsunami or from the deliberate decision to
introduce sea water into the core cooling system
Efforts were made to try to contain the
contamination; however, radioactive isotopes
were found in local water channels, on foliage,
and in the ocean. Iodine 131 from Fukushima
was detected in Pennsylvania two weeks after
the meltdown event.
Quickly after the event, Japanese officials
requested a treatment system that would recycle
water to eliminate the need to introduce new
water to the cooling system The requirements of
the treatment system were:
Must avoid ocean release of
wastewater and radioactive materials
Royersford Nuclear Laundry
A laundry that served nuclear power plants in
Pennsylvania was discharging its wastewater to
the Royersford wastewater treatment plant.
Radioactivity was concentrating in the plant's
reed beds, in its digesters, and in the biosolids
that the plant was land applying. Since the
laundry was licensed by the NRC, they argued
that the cleanup was not their responsibility, but
rather, that it was the responsibility of the
treatment plant. The utility ended up paying for
cleaning the reed beds and digesters.
Kiski Ash Lagoon
In March 1977, the Kiski Water Reclamation
Authority received wastewater that consisted of
sanitary and sewage water from a U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission licensed laundry. The
sewage treatment process included a collection
of solid wastes from both primary and secondary
treatment, followed dewatering and onsite
incineration. The ash was sent to the ash lagoon
for disposal. The authority stopped sending ash
to the facility in 1993, when it reached its
capacity. In the early 2000s, the Pennsylvania
Department of Environmental Protection
(PADEP) and Kiski Water Reclamation
Authority worked with NRC to develop a
decommissioning plan for the ash lagoon. In
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2006, the ash was shipped to a RCRA subtitle C
disposal site.
Hydraulic Fracturing Water
Hydraulic fracturing practices create millions of
gallons of wastewater. This wastewater contains
significant amounts of organic compounds, salts,
and naturally occurring radioactive material
(NORM). A number of vendors offer mobile
treatment units to hold, transport, treat, and store
hydraulic fracturing wastewater for the natural
gas and ancillary support industry. An internet
search of "mobile fracking water treatment
systems" reveals technologies with claims about
performance that might prove useful, but have
not necessarily been rigorous investigated, for
holding and treating wastewater from nuclear
decontamination activities.
According to some workshop participants, the
acceptance of wastewater from hydraulic
fracturing provides a cautionary tale to the
wastewater treatment industry. Namely, some
treatment plants have accepted this wastewater
in the past without fully understanding how the
high salinity, radioactivity, and concentration of
organic compounds may affect treatment
systems. This can pose a threat to receiving
waters due to plant upset, failures, and
inadequate treatment for salts, radionuclides, and
organic compounds.
Iodine 131
In Pennsylvania, elevated levels of Iodine 131 (I-
131) in drinking source waters are being observed
independent of the Fukushima Dai-ichi incident
(the half-life of 1-131 is about 8 days). It is
hypothesized that the source of the 1-131 are
medical patients who are receiving it as a thyroid
treatment. Wastewater from hospitals is
monitored; however, patients may be leaving the
hospital with 0.005 to 0.2 curies of 1-131 in their
bodies and eliminating quantities into the sewer
system via urination. This poses a problem
because drinking water MCLs are measured in
pico curies/liter. While the elevated
concentrations of 1-131 in source waters may not
pose a human health risk, they will affect
drinking water providers who must treat
drinking water to the low MCLs. Thus, it is
important to consider the impacts of wastewater
utility acceptance of radionuclides on drinking
source waters when making decisions.
Tritium Exit Signs
Standard exit signs used in many buildings use
tritium that is enclosed in glass tubes lined with
a compound that emits light in response to the
low-energy beta radiation from the tritium
These signs are prevalent, their use is not
licensed, and the distribution and disposal are
not well controlled. For this reason, over 90% of
the landfills in Pennsylvania show tritium
concentrations above background levels.
PADEP put monitoring protocols in place for
landfills and have not found any situations
where tritium is posing a human health risk from
landfill leachate.
Radiological Contamination
Pathways
During the workshop, many potential avenues of
radiological contamination of wastewater
treatment plants were discussed including, but
not limited to, large-scale decontamination
efforts, wash water from contaminated clothing,
as well as run-off from rain events. Participants
presented different scenarios for comment as
outlined below.
Release of Radionuclides from Contaminated
Clothing during Laundering
The study looked at the implications of washing
contaminated clothing after, for instance, a
radiological dispersion device (RDD) or an
accident at a nuclear reactor facility. The data
would be used to make recommendations for
handling radioactively contaminated clothing.
The assumption is that people living outside of
exclusion zone are likely to wash clothing and
other soft porous items. The goal was to be able
to provide a scientifically based answer to the
question, "Should I wash contaminated
clothing?"
6 Collaborative Workshop on Radionuclides in Wastewater Infrastructure Resulting from Emergency Situations
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The project was designed to answer two
questions:
How effective is washing to remove
radioactive contamination from
swatches of soft porous materials?
What is the impact of washing
uncontaminated clothing with
contaminated swatches percentage
removal and the fate of the
contamination in the wastewater and
within the washing machine?
Results:
Washing with detergent removed more than
95% of the contamination under the different
test cases. Washing with detergent was
marginally more effective than washing without
detergent. Most of the Cs removed from the
clothing ends up in the wastewater. There is a
small amount of contamination left in washer
with detergent. In addition, uncontaminated
clothing washed with contaminated clothing
became contaminated.
In summary, it was noted that washing
contaminated clothing will likely occur outside
of the exclusion zone; however, this will
introduce radioactive contamination into
wastewater streams, which will impact
wastewater treatment plants.
This study is published under the following
citation: Assessment of the Fate ofRDD
Contamination after Laundering of Soft Porous
Materials EPA/600/R-12/053.
Wash-Aid Program
The goal of this program is to develop a cost-
effective means of decontaminating an urban
setting for the purpose of restoring critical
infrastructure and operational activities after a
radiological release. The decontamination
system will focus specifically on removing
cesium from building materials, brick, concrete,
tile, asphalt, vehicle surfaces and other surfaces
important for rapid restoration of public services
and critical infrastructure. All methods will use
commercial, off-the-shelf technologies, common
reagents, and familiar unit operations to decrease
response time and expense.
In addition, these technologies may require the
use of massive amounts of water.
The project explored various decontamination
approaches:
Cover contamination zone with agent
(e.g., film) to control re-suspension
and perform decontamination
operations at a later date
Wash down contamination zone,
divert water and dilute in local,
natural reservoir
Wash down contamination zone,
allow water to travel through sewer
system and treat at downstream
location
Wash down contamination zone,
introduce sequestering agents, allow
water to travel through sewers and
treat downstream
Wash down contamination zone,
contain water locally and dispose
Wash down contamination zone,
introduce sequestering agents and
contain water locally and dispose
Wash down contamination zone,
introduce sequestering agents,
contain water locally and treat water
to free release or reuse and dispose
of sequestering agents
The project focused on this final scenario
because of the water reuse potential.
Research has demonstrated the effectiveness of
salt brines for the release of radioactive ions
from rocks and clays. The use of salt brines also
eliminates the need to use harsh acids or redox
agents. In addition salts are commonly available
in large quantities. Salt brines must be very
concentrated in order to remove radionuclides
from porous surfaces; brines of 0.5M were able
to achieve removal rates of 60%, even from
certain aged surfaces. For some un-aged
surfaces, removals can reach close to 90%.
7 Collaborative Workshop on Radionuclides in Wastewater Infrastructure Resulting from Emergency Situations
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The research also looked at how to effectively
create and deliver the brines. One method was to
use firefighter technologies, including temporary
reservoirs and foam eductors that can deliver
massive amounts of brine-containing water per
day.
Clays are then used as sequestering agents in the
decontamination water. Sequestration is highly
dependent on the structure of the clay. Different
clays work better for different radioactive salts
and concentrations. The clayslurry can achieve
up to a 90% sequestration of Cs ions in water.
Of note is that some synthetic materials also
work very well; however, the cost and
availability of these materials is likely
prohibitive for this application.
The project also explored containment of the
decontamination wastewater through a variety of
methods. Use of the existing wastewater
collection system (sewers) as a reservoir was
explored; however, because of the large amounts
of wastewater that may be generated, it was
thought that there would not be enough capacity
in the collections systems for storage.
A more viable solution was to store at street level
with methods to minimize infiltration into the
sewers. Berms that are filled with clay were
employed. HESCO brand Concertainersฎ, which
can be rapidly deployed in basic military ballistic
protection and flood control applications, were
also found to be effective in building bermed
enclosures for wastewater containment.
Various options were explored in order to filter
the wastewater slurry for recycle, storage, or
disposal. A viable option is filtration trucks that
are designed to generate potable water during
emergencies. These trucks rely on membrane
filtration. However, for the Wash-Aid system,
centrifugal filtration units are preferred to
membrane filtration because of their continuous
output, high flow-through rates, and avoidance
of membrane fouling. The centrifugal filters are
readily obtained and can be configured in series
to increase efficiency.
The centrifugal filter produces concentrated
solids that can be stored in bladders or tanker
trucks for transportation to the final treatment or
disposal center.
Fate and Transport of Radiological
Material in Collection Systems and
Treatment
There was much discussion during the workshop
on the fate and transport of radiological material
in wastewater treatment plants. Radioactive
materials may be present in water entering
municipal wastewater treatment plants due to
various factors. These include:
Regulated wastewater discharges
from NRC licensed facilities (e.g.,
utilities, laboratories, universities,
medical institutions, nuclear
laundries, and industrial users of
radioactive materials)
Medical isotopes discharged from
patients' homes
Naturally occurring radioactive
materials, such as radium and
uranium in the community water
supply, water infiltrating into the
sewer system, residuals from water
purification systems, and/or runoff of
global radioactive fallout into storm
sewers.
Wastewater treatment plant processes have the
potential to concentrate these radioactive
materials in biosolids. In addition, treatment
plant operations may lead to worker radioisotope
exposure.
Assessment of Radioactivity in Sewage Sludge
In 1991, during an aerial radiological survey of a
licensee's site, NRC inadvertently discovered
Cobalt-60 in the Southerly Sewage Treatment
plant in Cleveland, Ohio
(archive, gao. gov/t2pbat3/l51920.pdf). This
prompted the Government Accountability Office
(GAO) to issue a statement on the need for
action with regards to radioactive contamination
at sewage treatment plants. In response, the
Interagency Steering Committee on Radiation
8 Collaborative Workshop on Radionuclides in Wastewater Infrastructure Resulting from Emergency Situations
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Standards (ISCORS) was formed, and it
undertook a survey of radioactivity in sewage
sludge (biosolids).
The voluntary survey had two components: a
questionnaire and a program for sampling and
analyzing sewage sludge and incinerator ash.
Questionnaires were sent to 631 publicly owned
treatment works (POTWs), requesting
information regarding wastewater sources,
wastewater and sludge treatment processes, and
sewage sludge disposal practices. Using the
information from the 420 returned questionnaires;
NRC and EPA selected 313 POTWs to be
sampled. The selection emphasized POTWs with
the greatest potential to receive waste from
licensees and in areas with higher levels of
naturally occurring radioactive material (NORM).
Altogether, 311 sewage sludge samples and 35
ash samples were taken. Approximately half of
the samples were analyzed by the U.S.
Department of Energy's Oak Ridge Institute for
Science and Education (ORISE) in Oak Ridge,
Tennessee, under contract to NRC, and the
remainder were analyzed by the EPA's National
Air and Radiation Environmental Laboratory
(NAREL) in Montgomery, Alabama This study
utilized about half the lab capacity of these
facilities for several months.
Results:
45 radionuclides detected in biosolids
or ash at treatment plants
Six were reported only once (Cel41,
Csl34, Eul54, Fe59, Lal38, Sml53)
Eight were reported in more than 200
samples (Be7, B1214,1131, K40,
Pb212, Pb214, Ra226, Ra228)
Short-lived medi cal i sotopes (1131,
Sr89, T1201) were found in the highest
concentrations
Samples from areas using
groundwater as a source of drinking
water had higher Ra228, Th232,
Bi214,Pb214,Ra226
Samples from areas using surface
water as a source of drinking water
had higher Csl37, Be7, Th232
POTWs with combined sewers had
higher radiation levels than POTWs
with separate sewers
No unexpected correlations were
found
In addition, ISCORS conducted dose modeling
to calculate potential human exposure. Pathway
analysis approach used standard computer code
(RESRAD) with uncertainty analyses. ISCORS
calculated dose-to-source ratios (mrem/y per
pCi/g) and summed doses from all important
radionuclides.
The study did not identify any cases in which
radioactive materials in biosolids are a threat to the
health and safety of POTW workers or to the
general public. Estimated doses to potentially
exposed individuals are generally well below
levels requiring radiation protection actions.
However, for limited POTW Worker and Onsite
Resident scenarios, doses above protective
standards could occur, primarily due to indoor
radon generated as a decay product from NORM
(e.g., Ra226 and Th228). In addition, for both the
POTW Worker and Onsite Resident, exposures
can be decreased significantly through the use of
readily available radon testing and mitigation
technologies. The final reports can be found at
www.iscors.org
Working with Key Stakeholders
Due to the general perception of radionuclides as
'high-risk' contaminants, much time was spent
during the workshop discussing methods to
work with both plant workers and the public.
Worker Health and Safety
Because wastewater treatment plants are critical
infrastructure, treatment plant workers may be
considered part of the emergency response team
in the event of an RDD. Most treatment plant
workers will not have training and experience
dealing with radiation.
The water infrastructure role in the emergency
response will happen quickly - most likely
workers will need to be onsite immediately
9 Collaborative Workshop on Radionuclides in Wastewater Infrastructure Resulting from Emergency Situations
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where there may be exposures to radiation. This
means that there may initially be little awareness
of levels of contamination. It will be important
to preemptively identify radiation exposure risks
for certain situations and develop an emergency
response plan (ERP) related to RDD. A model
ERP would be very beneficial to POTWs
seeking to either prepare one, or to use, in the
event of an incident. It will be essential to
provide advance warning to workers regarding
exposure risk, as well as messaging (see next
section) that management can use to respond to
the incident.
Some considerations when preparing this plan
include:
What is their role in the response?
Do they need to be there? For
example, POTWs have been
identified as being critical to
response and recovery during and
after recent hurricanes; wastewater
treatment plant workers were
identified as among the first
responders; and the same would hold
true for a radiological emergency.
Controlling worker exposure to
radiation is the most important
concept. In all decisions, use the "As
Low as Reasonably Achievable
(ALARA)" standard. Ask yourself,
"What are all the ways to minimize
exposure while they are doing the
most important tasks?"
Define what detection methods will
work best. There is highly sensitive
equipment; however, it is important
to know how to interpret what the
measurement is telling you.
Workers need information and
training in order to make informed
personal decisions. They will want to
know the potential long- and short-
term impacts of radiation exposure.
If workers are expected to come into
contact with contaminated media,
they will need personal protection
equipment (PPE) and training on
how to wear it properly.
The need to consider
decontamination for the utility and
workers.
Do not forget other safety risks.
Slips, trips, and falls cause more
worker deaths than radiation
exposure every year.
In addition, a decision maker may need to
consider key OSHA regulations that pertain to
worker safety when dealing with radionuclide
contamination.
HAZWOPER; 29 CFR 1910.120
o If the employer anticipates
that an employee will be
exposed to radiation, the
employer must comply with a
list of requirements in this
regulation designed to protect
the employee. This may not
apply since treatment plant
workers have no 'anticipated'
risk of exposure.
Ionizing Radiation Standard; 29 CFR
1910.1096
o This standard describes the
maximum worker exposure
level of 1.25 rem per quarter.
Respiratory Protection Standard; 29
CFR 1910.134
o This standard is always
applied if an employee has to
wear a respirator.
10 Collaborative Workshop on Radionuclides in Wastewater Infrastructure Resulting from Emergency Situations
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RISK COMMUNICATION AND MANAGEMENT
Public perception of radiation is fatalistic. Risk
communication is therefore extremely important.
Focus group results in risk communication for
other topic areas provide important guidelines to
follow when communicating during an RDD
situation:
Check for contradicting statements
Provide prioritized instructions
Say, "Instructions will be updated"
instead of, "Instructions will
change." The last statement was
often interpreted to mean that they
were given the wrong instructions
Tailor messages to specific
audiences
Message Mapping 101 Exercise
Part of the workshop included a participatory
exercise during which attendees went through
the steps of creating their own message maps,
i.e., pre-planned messages for crisis
communication. This exercise was useful, not
only to educate participants on risk
communications, but also to help identify
knowledge gaps with regard to the utility's
ability to accept and treat for radiological
contamination. The process for message
mapping and the results of the exercise are
summarized below.
There are four primary steps used to create a
message map:
1. Define your situation or issue
2. Identify audiences who will need
information
3. Anticipate a list of questions for each
audience type. Think about the
following question categories:
a. Overarching - these are
broad questions
b. Informational - these are
questions that help inform the
public's personal decisions
c. Challenge - these are
questions that try to 'catch'
you in a situation and may
stem from the public's
distrust of the subject matter
and/or spokesperson
4. Create answers to those questions
following the formula below:
a. Three key messages
b. 27 words in total
c. Nine seconds long when
spoken
Scientific studies have found that up to 95% of
questions that will be asked during an
emergency situation can be predicted in
advance.
Message Map Results
1. Define Issue/Topic: Scenario: A dirty bomb contaminates wastewater infrastructure.
2. List of Identified Audiences:
Residential Customers
General Public
Public Officials
Media
Police Department/
Security Officials
Professional Associations
Local City Emergency
Operations Center Staff
Social Media
Staff and Operators
Downstream Facilities
Downstream Government
Landfills
Farmers Who Take Biosolids
Agricultural Extension County
Agents
Commercial/Industrial Customers
Medical Professionals
Regulators
Other WWTPs, Partner
Organizations
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3. Table of Anticipated Questions by Audience Type;
Customers and
General Public
What happened? How is it affecting the facility?
How is the situation at the facility affecting me?
What is my risk?
What can I do? What should I do?
What am I allowed to do - flush, shower, launder, drink?
How long will this last?
What makes you an expert?
Who is in charge?
Who is going to fix it? How will it be fixed? How soon?
Where can I find more information?
Farmers
Is the sludge contaminated?
Can I apply the sludge?
When will I start getting sludge again (that is not contaminated)?
What should I do with my milk?
Should I decontaminate my cows?
Can I use the treated effluent?
Downstream
Organizations
Is our source water contaminated?
Are there procedures in place to minimize contamination?
Drinking water treatment plants will ask is there anything they can do onsite
to reduce contamination to drinking water?
What can we expect with regards to concentrations and duration of
exposure?
What are the ecological impacts?
What is being done to assess ecological impact?
What is being done for remediation?
Is it safe to fish? Is it safe to walk along the riverbank?
Is it safe to conduct recreational activities?
Is the mud safe?
How can you still be putting this stuff in my river?
Will you be testing my private well water?
Will you be providing alternative water sources if my well is contaminated?
Who does testing?
Workers
What happened?
What is the extent of the contamination?
Do I have to stay and keep working?
What are the risks to my family? What can I tell my family?
Will it make me sick?
Are we set up to deal with this? Do we have the right equipment?
Is there a SOP?
How long will we be in emergency mode?
Why do we have to deal with this?
How do you expect us to do our job without adequate resources?
Public Officials
What's going on?
Impact on workers?
Impact on facility? Do we have to shut plant down?
High-level impact on plant users?
Impact on environment?
Can we help POTWs?
Do we have a plan?
How long and cost of cleanup?
12 Collaborative Workshop on Radionuclides in Wastewater Infrastructure Resulting from Emergency Situations
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4. Sample Message Maps by Audience Type:
Fanners
Is the sludge contaminated?
1. The sludge you have now is safe.
2. We have stopped shipping sludge and
are testing sludge now.
3. Please contact your extension officer
for more information.
Downstream Community
What can we expect with
regards to surface water
contamination?
1. We are monitoring our facility's
discharge.
2. We are monitoring the river levels.
3. We will update you on the results.
Follow-up question: What are you
seeing? What does that mean for the
downstream community?
Public
(Media Proxy)
The media asks,
"Contaminated facility,
what are you doing?"
1. We are continuing to operate.
2. Our primary concerns are worker
health and safety and containing the
contamination.
3. We are implementing our emergency
response plan.
Workers
What happened and what
do we need to do?
1. We are receiving decontamination
water from the RDD event.
2. Wear your personal protective
equipment and follow SOPs [these
need developed for radiological
events].
3. As we get more information we will
keep you updated.
Supporting point: Until we have more
information, we are taking every
precaution possible.
Public Officials
What is going to happen to
POTWs?
1. The POTW will be contaminated.
2. We will develop a cleanup plan when
we know the extent of contamination.
3. The cleanup will be costly and will
take considerable time.
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WORKSHOP OUTCOMES
During the workshop discussion, questions were
used to help focus participant's thinking with
regard to the issue of radionuclides in
wastewater. Key points from the discussion, as
well as a table of prioritized needs, are
summarized below.
General Discussion
Overarching Issues
Workshop participants acknowledged that
sewers and POTWs may not be best place to
dispose of RDD decontaminated water. There
are two main issues when POTWs consider
whether or not to accept radioactively
contaminated wastewaters. The first is the
viability for treatment and much greater
understanding of how the radioactive
decontamination water containing radionuclides,
as well as salts, surfactants, and other chemicals,
introduced during response activities, will affect
plant treatment system operations. The second is
the volume of treatment water and how it will
affect the hydraulics of the treatment system
Criteria for POTW Acceptance of
Wastewater
It is important to remember that the local POTW
primary responsibility under the presented
scenario is to protect treatment plant operations.
POTWs must consider, at a minimum, the
following criteria when deciding whether or not,
as well as how, to accept wastewater that may
contain radionuclides or residuals from
decontamination:
What is the level of total dissolved
solids?
What is the expected radiological
level?
What are the chemicals present and
in what concentrations?
What is the timeframe needed for
disposal of the radioactively
contaminated water to the POTW
(and whether this can be introduced
over a period of time)?
What i s the time of year?
What is the volume (how many
gallons) of wastewater?
What is the ratio of
monovalent/divalent cations in the
salt solutions? Changes in this ratio
affect settling within the plant,
negatively influencing plant
performance.
Based on its consideration of these criteria, and
in consultation with other relevant organizations
(e.g., EPA, radiological experts, POTW
operators, elected and appointed decision
makers), the POTW could provide guidelines for
the time acceptable for discharge, the place in
the collections system best suited for such
discharge, and the flow rate for the discharge
that will cause the least issues for plant
performance. In formulating these guidelines,
larger POTWs have a reasonably good model of
how the treatment system performs; however,
there is great variability in POTWs across the
country and there are many extremes. This
means that not every wastewater system
performs the same. In fact, sometimes plant
operators do not have sufficient information or
understanding about the plant to know how it
will perform under a specific situation.
POTW personnel must be educated so they can
make informed decisions on the implications on
their treatment plant, the environment, and
human health of accepting decontamination
wastewater. As decision-makers (including plant
operators) are not typically aware of the unusual
conditions presented by radionuclide
contamination and subsequent decontamination
activities that will affect the plant, they have to
be conservative with their estimations until they
have more data on how these conditions will
affect plant performance. The kinds of tests
needed for plant acceptance would include a
SOUR (Specific
Oxygen Uptake Rate) test, TDS measurement,
and nitrification inhibition studies. These tests
are fairly standard and are used to understand
the impact of many types of contaminants, not
just those resulting from radionuclide
decontamination.
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There was much discussion during the workshop
about the criteria for POTWs to accept
radioactive decontamination water; however,
workshop participations also understood that
even if the POTW does not accept this
wastewater, contamination will probably occur
anyway by other means, including:
Precipitation carrying runoff into
sewers
Decontamination water infiltrating
manholes and sewer systems
Human activity, including showering
and washing clothes
Political decisions to use sewers for
disposal
Impact of Contamination on Collection
Systems
Collection system remediation plans for POTWs
were also discussed. There is a large gap in
understanding both radiological transportation
and deposition in the collection systems. Pump
stations could have deposition of radioactive
contaminants due to potential adherence of
materials to the pipes and pumps. In addition,
there may be accumulation in wet wells, and
radiologically contaminated solids may be
released from the walls. The timescale of this
release might range from slow (e.g., a gradual
release) to fast (e.g., dislodgement of a
contaminated solid).
Impact on Biosolids
Radioisotopes tend to concentrate in biosolids,
which may then be considered a low-level
radioactive waste. Further, some
decontamination approaches may affect the
ability of POTWs to utilize their regular routes
of biosolids disposal, e.g., land application or
disposal at a landfill. If the POTW is
contractually obligated to supply quality
biosolids to certain farmers, the POTW may
become in breach of contract should they not be
able to comply for an indeterminate time. Thus it
is important that the impact of biosolids-related
issues be considered prior to acceptance by the
POTW of wastewater associated with a
radiological release or subsequent
decontamination activities.
Discussion of Potential Solutions and
Needs
Pre-Planning
There is a need for a generic emergency
response plan (ERP) for radiological
emergencies (i.e., RDDs, nuclear plant failures,
etc.) that utilities could use to update their ERPs.
A scenario planning exercise for a generic RDD
event using a 'typical' POTW could be
conducted to assist in drafting this plan. This
plan would include solutions to the biosolids
issues discussed above; including identifying
potential waste disposal sites, obtaining permits,
or providing a regulatory mechanism to obtain
quick permits, as well as defining up front who
will be responsible for disposal costs. Some
wastewater utilities located near nuclear power
plants may have similar plans, but the possibility
of unexpected widespread transport of
radiological contamination during radiological
emergencies suggests that it may be prudent for
all POTWs to have such plans.
In terms of understanding impacts of
radiological decontamination of collection
systems, cataloging legacy scenarios for certain
contaminants may be useful for understanding
radiological contamination. For example, it was
noted that PCBs, because of their persistence
and toxicity, would be a good proxy for
radionuclides to study when looking at these
legacy issues. Another relevant example may be
Los Angeles, which had DDT buildup in large
pipes that became apparent 15-20 years after this
pesticide was banned.
15 Collaborative Workshop on Radionuclides in Wastewater Infrastructure Resulting from Emergency Situations
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Sampling and Analysis
As critical infrastructure, it is important that
POTWs receive priority for radioactivity
sampling and analysis in order to protect worker
health and safety, as well as safeguard receiving
waters. POTWs would need to know as soon as
possible the concentration and idendiy of
radionuclides (or radiation type if the exact
radionuclide cannot be verified) would be
coming into the system. Lab capacity is a critical
issue, as illustrated in the study of non-
emergency radiological contamination in which
the study alone consumed much of the lab
capacity of both DOE and EPA. An emergency
contamination incident could generate far more
samples and completely overwhelm the existing
capacity. Capacity can be increased through the
use of more rapid analytical methods. Finally,
there may need to be an ongoing, long-term,
monitoring plan in place to deal with the issues
of radioactive contaminants deposited onto
collection system and treatment plant
construction materials. As mentioned above,
these could be released over a timescale
potentially ranging from slow (e.g., a gradual
release over years to decades) to fast (e.g.,
dislodgement of a contaminated solid over days
to weeks).
Worker Safety and Training
Training and preparing workers for radiological
events can be difficult, expensive, and time
consuming. The threat has to be credible and
compelling for the utility to invest in worker
safety and training. However, it was recognized
that it is extremely important that POTW
workers have sufficient training and adequate
protections in case they are exposed to
radioactive wastes. These preparations include
SOPs (standard operating plans/procedures), on-
time training, sufficient personal protective
equipment, and plans for communicating
accurate information to workers about potential
hazards. This type of communication is a subset
of a more general need for crisis
communications by the POTW, and it can be
included in a radiological emergency response
plan or as an annex to the a general emergency
response plan. Considerations for developing a
worker health and safety plan are provided
above in the "working with key stakeholders'
section.
Crisis Communication and Multiple
Audiences
Communication is critical during the crisis phase
and for many months after the event. One
critical need is for the key people at POTWs to
be able to access the emergency response team
(incident command) and to be included in
discussions at the Joint Information Center. In
the past, it has been difficult for utility personnel
to gain access to the emergency response team.
In addition, the utility representative and the
emergency response team may not use the same
vocabulary. It is advised that the utility establish
relationships with emergency responders who
will staff and operate the Emergency Operations
Center before an incident. In addition, there is a
need to identify a credible spokesperson from
the POTW and develop or formalize
communications support. Some utilities do not
have the capacity or expertise to handle the
emergency communication needs.
The workshop included a message mapping
exercise, and the questions developed during
that exercise (presented above) can be used as a
starting point for creating communication
materials, including appropriate training for
POTW personnel. EPA's Office of Radiation
and Indoor Air has worked to develop
communications approaches related to various
aspects of radiation; some are available at
www. epa. gov/rpdwebOO/pubs.html#accidents-
emergencies These resources may also serve as
a useful resource although may need to be
tailored to the POTW.
Application of Regulations
It is understood that standard clean water and
drinking water regulations will apply even in
emergency situations; however there is room for
enforcement discretion, as has occurred during
major natural disasters, such as in floods and
hurricanes. One of the issues with enforcement
discretion is that the violations are still recorded
in the online OECA database and they are
entered into the POTW compliance history
without explanation of the extenuating
circumstances. A policy change is recommended
that would allow OECA to designate certain
non-compliance events as a product of a natural
or man-made disaster, thus the violation was due
to force majeure.
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Funding
The economic effects of a radiological event,
including waste disposal, collections and
treatment systems cleanup, potential economic
hardship payments to farmers who will not be
receiving biosolids, and short and long-term
monitoring, will result in massive expenditures
for POTWs. It is important for POTWs to
understand outside funding and compensation
mechanisms (under what circumstances do they
apply, how to apply for funding, etc.) or these
costs will get passed on to the rate payers. There
was a general understanding that for an RDD
event, the Stafford Act would eventually be used
to pay for the response. The high visibility of a
radiological emergency may help ensure rapid
use of the Stafford Act. The wastewater utility
will need to communicate to officials
responsible for providing disaster funding that
POTWs are critical infrastructure and that the
cleanup efforts will be both necessary and
costly.
Table of Prioritized Needs
During the discussion phase of the workshop, six
general categories were defined for further
investigation. The final afternoon of the
workshop was dedicated to consensus about
prioritizing key next steps. These are summarized
in the table below. The bullet points in bold were
identified as the most important needs.
17 Collaborative Workshop on Radionuclides in Wastewater Infrastructure Resulting from Emergency Situations
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Category
Prioritized Needs
Worker Health
and Safety
RAD safety and training for workers that is available based on need
Standard operating procedures (SOPs)
Criteria for defining when workers cross the "RAD worker" threshold(i.e., 100
millirem or above)
Educational handouts on radionuclides
Badges and dosimetry for workers to monitor exposure
Stock of personal protective gear (PPE)
Decision of whether normal PPE will suffice for workers
Identification,
Characterization,
and Containment
Scenario-based, generic response plan that wastewater utilities could
incorporate into their emergency response plan
Decision tree for plant managers to help them provide guidance to first
responders on the criteria for the acceptance of radionuclide contaminated
wastewater. This would include guidance on when first responders can
discharge, the best places in the collection system or headworks for
discharging, and the acceptable chemical limits for discharge water
Increased ability to test at plants/develop lab networks to help with testing
Sampling protocols and tests for emergency and non-emergency situations
Communications
Guidance on how utilities should work with first responders and Joint
Information Center
Guidance on what it means for a utility to be "critical infrastructure" to aid in
communications with political decision makers during an emergency
Online resource with key messages for an emergency situation
Communications strategy and identify a credible spokesperson in the
community
Regulatory and
Permitting
Clarification on regulatory relief during emergency situations for both
potential quality violations and how these violations are logged into the
online OECA database. The hope is that there is a way to label the violations
as linked to an emergency situation.
Clarification on who will pay for storage, cleanup, disposal, and economic
hardship to farmers during an emergency situation
Assistance in getting emergency landfill permits for the disposal of
contaminated biosolids
Scientific and
Engineering
Research on fate, transport, and remediation of radiological contmainants
in wastewater treatment plants. Remediation research should also include
potential legacy scenarios resulting from deposition in pump stations, pipes,
and plants.
Generic sampling plans that can be included in the generic emergency
response plan
Increased capacity for sample analysis, perhaps through more rapid
analysis methods
Treatability studies for conventional wastewater treatment plants
Investigation of applying to radiologically-impacted water mobile treatment
units commercially offered to hold, transport, treat, and store hydraulic
fracturing wastewater for the natural gas and ancillary support industry
Study of the effect of radionuclide contamination and subsequent
decontamination activities on tests routinely used to assess treatment plant
18 Collaborative Workshop on Radionuclides in Wastewater Infrastructure Resulting from Emergency Situations
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Category
Prioritized Needs
performance, e.g. specific oxygen uptake rate test, total dissolved solids
measurement, and nitrification inhibition.
Best judgment on if all the pathways are mapped for worker exposure to
radiologicals at the plant
A one-pager to the Federal Radiological Preparedness Coordinating Committee on
the prioritization of sampling needs for wastewater treatment plants for the
continuity of plant operations with bulleted list of priority sampling sites
19 Collaborative Workshop on Radionuclides in Wastewater Infrastructure Resulting from Emergency Situations
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APPENDIX A
Workshop Participant Contact List
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency National Homeland Security Research Center (NHSRC)
Water Environment Research Foundation (WERF)
WERF1W12, Collaborative Workshop on Radionuclides
PARTICIPANT LIST
David J. Allard, CHP
Director, Bureau of Radiation Protection
PA Dept. of Environmental Protection
PO Box 8469
Harrisburg, PA 17105-8469
Phone: 717-787-2480
Fax: 717-783-8965
Email: djallard(g),pa.gov
Tim Bartrand
Environmental Engineer
Tetra Tech Inc.
109LlanfairRoad
BalaCymvyd, PA 19004
Phone: 610-668-9227
Cell: 610-639-7039
E-mail: Timothy.bartrand(g),tetratech.com
Robert K. Bastian
Office of Wastewater Management
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
Headquarters
Room 7329K EPA East
1200 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20460
Phone: 202-564-0653
Fax: 202-501-2397
E-mail: bastian.robert(g),epagov
Rajendra (Raj) P. Bhattarai, Ph.D., P.E., BCEE
Division Manager
Environmental & Regulatory Services Division
Austin Water Utility
City of Austin
625 East 10th Street, Suite 615
Austin, TX 78701
Phone: 512-972-0075
Fax: 512-972-0138
E-mail: rai.bhattarai@austintexas.gov
Gordon S. Cleveland
Radiological Program Analyst
Advisory Team for Environment Food & Health
USDA APHIS VS NCAHEM
4700 River Road, Unit 41
Riverdale, MD 20737
Phone: 301-851-3597
Cell: 240-508-9999
Cell: 240-271-5305-iPhone
E-mail: gordon.s.cleveland(g),aphis. usda.gov
John A. Consolvo
Supervisor, Research Unit
Philadelphia Water Department
Bureau of Laboratory Services
1500 E. Hunting Park Ave.
Philadelphia, PA 19124-4941
Phone: 215-685-1409
Fax: 215-743-5594
E-mail: John.Consolvo@phila.gov
John Ferris
Environmental Engineer
Office of Homeland Security
Office of the Administrator
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
Ariel Rios Room 6426, Mail Code 1109A
1200 Pennsylvania Ave. NW
Washington DC 20460
Phone: 202-564-1347
Fax: 202-501-0026
E-mail: ferris.john@epa.gov
Jamie S. Heisig-Mitchell
Hampton Roads Sanitation District
1436 Air Rail Ave
Virginia Beach, VA 23455
Phone: 757-460-4220
E-mail: JmitchellfSjhrsd.com
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Abigail Holmquist, PE
Sr. Strategic Marketing Specialist
Catalysts, Adsorbents, & Specialist
UOP LLC (A Honeywell Company)
555 Zang Street, Suite 200
Lakewood, CA 80228
Phone: 303-722-2658
Cell: 847-224-5739
Fax: 303-722-2658
E-mail: Abigail.Holmquist(g),Honevwell.com
Chris Hornback
National Assn of Clean Water Agencies (NACWA)
1816 Jefferson Place, NW
Washington, DC 20036-2505
Phone: 202-833-9106
E-mail: chornback@nacwa.ore
Michael D. Kaminski
Leader, Nuclear Forensics & Nanoscale
Engineering
Argonne National Laboratory
9700 South Cass Avenue, Bldg 900
Argonne, IL 60439
Phone: 630-252-4777
E-mail: Kaminski(g),anl. go v
Marissa C. Lynch
Environmental Engineer
Office of Water
Office of Ground water/Drinking Water
Water Security Division
US Environmental Protection Agency
1200 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW, Mail Code
4608T
Washington, DC 20460
Phone: 202-564-2761
Email: lynch, marissafgiepa. gov
Lori P. Miller, PE
3D Project Manager, Agricultural Defense Branch
Department of Homeland Security
Science and Technology Directorate
Mailstop 0201 245 Murray Lane, SW
Washington, DC 20538
Office: 202254-5743
Cell: 202731-5538
E-mail: Lori.miller@,hqdhs.gov
Scott Minamyer
Acting Associate Director
US Environmental Protection Agency
National Homeland Security Research Center
Water Infrastructure Protection Division
26 W. Martin Luther King Dr. (MS NG-16)
Cincinnati, OH 45268
Phone: 513-569-7175
Email: Minamyer.scott(g),epa. gov
Theresa Pfeifer
Regulatory Compliance Officer
Metro Wastewater Reclamation District
6450 York Street
Denver, CO 80229
Phone: 303-286-3340
Cell: 303-916-1004
E-mail: tpfeifer@,mwrd.dst.co.us
Jan Pickrel
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
Headquarters
EPA East Building, Room 7329H
1200 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW.
Mail Code: 4203M
Washington, DC 20460
Phone: 202-564-7904
E-mail: Pickrel.jan(g),epa.gov
Antonio Quintanilla
Assistant Director of Maintenance & Operations
Metropolitan Water Reclamation District of
Greater Chicago (MWRDCG)
100 E.Erie Street
Chicago, IL 60611
Phone: 847-568-8311
Fax: 312-751-5194
E-Mail: Antonio.QuintanillafSimwrd.org
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Chris Rayburn
Director, Subscriber and Research Services
Water Research Foundation (WaterRF)
6666 W Quincy Avenue
Denver, CO 80235
Phone: 303-347-6188
Fax: 303-730-0851
E-mail: cravburn@WaterRF.ore
Emily Snyder, Ph.D.
EPA/ORD/NHSRC/DCMD
E343-06
109 TW Alexander Dr.
Research Triangle Park, NC 27711
Phone: 919-541-1006
Fax: 919-541-0496
E-mail: Snyder.Emilyfgiepamail.epagov
Bill Steuteville
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency REGION
3
1650 Arch Street
Mail Code: 3HS30
Philadelphia, PA 19103-2029
Phone: 215-814-3264
E-mail: Steuteville.william(g),Epa.gov
Jessica Wieder
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
Radiation Protection Division
Center for Radiation Information
1200 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
Mail code: 6608J
Washington, DC 20460
Phone: 202-343-9201
Cell: 202-420-9353
Email: wieder.iessica@,epa. gov
EPA Project Officer
Matthew L. Magnuson, Ph.D.
Research Chemist
US Environmental Protection Agency
National Homeland Security Research Center
Water Infrastructure Protection Division
26 W. Martin Luther King Dr. (MS NG-16)
Cincinnati, OH 45268
Phone: 513-569-7321
Email: magnuson.matthew(g),epa. gov
WERF Staff
Amit Pramanik, Ph.D., BCEEM
Senior Program Director
Water Environment Research Foundation
635 Slaters Lane
Suite G-l 10
Alexandria, VA 22314-1177
Phone: 571-384-2101
E-mail: apramanik@werforg
Allison Deines
Director, Special Projects
Water Environment Research Foundation
635 Slaters Lane
Suite G-l 10
Alexandria, VA 22314-1177
Phone: 571-384-2116
E-mail: adeines(g),werf.org
PamPrott
Program Assistant
Water Environment Research Foundation
635 Slaters Lane
Suite G-l 10
Alexandria, VA 22314-1177
Phone: 571-384-2113
E-mail: pprottfSiwerforg
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APPENDIX B
Workshop Agenda
Collaborative Workshop on Radionuclides in Waste Water Infrastructure
Resulting from Emergency Situations
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency/ National Homeland Security Research Center (NHSRC)
Water Environment Research Foundation (WERF)
Dates: Tuesday and Wednesday, December 4 & 5, 2012
Location: WEF Conference Room 3rd Floor 601 Wythe Street, Alexandria, VA 22314
Agenda
Tuesday, December 4, 2012
8:00 AM Continental Breakfast
8:45 AM Welcome and Workshop Objectives
Matthew Magnuson and Emily Snyder, EPA NHRSC
9:00 AM Workshop Protocol, Ground Rules, and Round Robin Introductions
Amit Pramanik, WERF
9:15 AM WARRP Program Overview
Lori Miller, Department of Homeland Security
9:30 AM Release of Radionuclides from Contaminated Clothing During Laundering
Emily Snyder, E P A N H RSC
9:45 AM Wash-aid Program Overview and Its Implication on Wastewater Systems
Mike Kaminski, Argonne National Laboratory
10:15 AM Coffee Break
10:30 AM Overview of Assessment of Radioactivity in Sewage Sludge (non-emergency situations)
Bob Bastion, EPA OW
11:00 AM Overview of the ROD Scenario and Implications on Wastewater
BillSteuteville, EPA Region 3
11:30 AM Worker Health and Safety (radiation focused)
John Ferris, Office of Homeland Security
12:00 PM Working Lunch
(Includes 30 min personal break for participants to check emails /voicemails, etc.)
1:00 PM Pennsylvania's Experience with Radionuclides
David Allard, Director, Bureau of Radiation Protection, PA Dept. of Environmental Protection
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PA experience and lessons-learned with the EPA LibRadEx
Applicable national DW Standards with a ROD, IND or NPP accident
Rad contaminated PA POTW case studies (i.e., Royersford and Kiski Valley)
Philadelphia 1-131 in DW issue and EPA & NRC regulatory gaps
Tritium in landfill leachate and potential impact on DW, and,
NORM / TENORM issues related to oil & gas production
1:45 PM Afternoon Break
2:00 PM Utilities and S&T perspectives - Speakers from confirmed attendees
Antonio Quintanilla - MWRD of Greater Chicago, IL
Theresa Pfeifer - MWRD, Denver, CO
Raj Bhattarai - City of Austin, TX
John Consolvo - Philadelphia Water Department, PA
Jamie S. Heisig-Mitchell- Hampton Roads Sanitation District, VA
Chris Hornback- National Association of Clean Water Agencies (NACWA)
Chris Rayburn - Water Research Foundation (WaterRF)
Others-TBD
4:30 PM Overview of Radionuclide Removal from Water Technologies (Fukushima
Experience)
Abigail Holmquist, UOP LLC (A Honeywell Corporation)
4:45 PM Question & Answer Session
5:15 PM Recap of Day One
Amit and Matthew
5:30 PM Adjourn
6:30 PM Group Dinner (Villa D' Este, 818 N StAsaph St., Alexandria, VA 2231)
Wednesday, December 5, 2012
8:00 AM Continental Breakfast
8:30 AM Risk Communication and Messaging
Jessica Wieder, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
9:30 AM Coffee Break
9:45 AM Risk Communication and Messaging (continued)
11:15 AM Brainstorming Session (Facilitated by Amit Pramanik, WERF)
Initial list of questions for group discussion:
What other concerns need to be addressed?
What is needed / required for utilities to accept radioactive contaminated
wastewaters?
What sorts of tests & protocols & regulatory guidance are needed?
How should these be designed or implemented?
Who should design and test these?
B-2 Collaborative Workshop on Radionuclides in Wastewater Infrastructure Resulting from Emergency Situations
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Are there other "simpler" tests & protocols?
Other questions or concerns?
12:00 PM Working Lunch
1:00 PM Brainstorming Continued
2:15 PM Afternoon Break
2:30 PM Group consensus on Key Questions:
What is needed for utilities to accept radionuclide contaminated waters?
What types of tests & protocols are needed (and what is the design for such tests)
by Stakeholders?
What is needed for permit authorities to guide / allow utilities to accept these
wastes?
What is needed to address concerns and issues raised by the public, by workers &
operators?
What are the gaps and what types of research is needed?
4:00 PM Summary Consensus Statements
4:30 PM Closing and Adjourn
Matthew Magnuson & Amit Pramanik
5:00 PM Adjourn
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APPENDIX C
References and Additional Resources
1. Containment and Disposal of Large
Amounts of Contaminated Water: A
Support Guide for Utilities. EPA 817-B-
12-002. United States Environmental
Protection Agency, Sept. 2012.
http ://water. epa. gov/infra structure/water
security/em erplan/upload/epa817b 12002
.pdf
2. U.S. EPA Water Security website:
http://www.epa.gov/watersecurity.
3. "Resources & Stats." Nuclear Energy
Institute. N.p., n.d. Web. 11 Feb. 2013.
www.nei.org/resourcesandstats/documen
tlibrarv/safetvandsecuritv/audio/flex-
program-media-briefing-jan-11 -20127.
4. ISCORS Assessment of Radioactivity in
Sewage Sludge: Recommendations on
Management of Radioactive Materials in
Sewage Sludge and Ash at Publicly
Owned Treatment Works. Rep. no. EPA
832-R-03-002B. N.p.: n.p., n.d.
Interagency Steering Committee on
Radiation Standards, Feb. 2005. Web.
www.iscors.org.
5. Parrotta, Marc J. "Radioactivity in Water
Treatment Wastes: A U.S. EPA
Perspective." Journal of A WWA (1991):
135-40. Print.
6. Planning for Decontamination
Wastewater: A Guide for Utilities. Rep.
National Association of Clean Water
Agencies, 2005. Web.
www.nacwa.org/images/stories/public/2
005-
1 Odecon.pdf?phpMyAdmin=PM8UfvM
mlxx8xqqtLrO9xEOmDgO.
7. Punt, A., M. Wood, and D. Rose. Rep.
no. SC020150/SR2. Environment
Agency, Sept. 2007. Web.
www.environment-agency.gov.uk.
8. Radioactive Waste. NRC:. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, n.d. Web. 11
Feb. 2013.
http://www.nrc.gov/waste.html.
9. Shelton, Patricia T. and Don Broussard.
Recommendations and Proposed
Strategic Plan for Water Sector
Decontamination Priorities. Rep.
Critical Infrastructure Partnership
Advisory Council, 30 June 2008. Web.
www.nawc.org/government-
affairs/water-security-and-safety/water-
sector-coordinating-council.aspx.
10. Suggested Guidelines for the Disposal of
Drinking Water Treatment Wastes
Containing Naturally Occurring
Radionuclides. Rep. Washington, D.C.:
United States Environmental Protection
Agency, 1990. Web.
11. TOKYO ELECTRIC POWER
COMPANY. TEPCO: Press Room.
Tokyo Electric Power Company, n.d.
Web. 11 Feb. 2013.
www.tepco.co.jp/en/press/corp-
com/release/index-e.html.
12. United State Environmental Protection
Agency. Communicating Radiation
Risks. Washington, D.C. U.S. EPA,
2008. EPA-402-F-07-008
13. United States Environmental Protection
Agency. Office of Solid Waste and
Emergency Response. First Responder's
Environmental Liability Due to Mass
Decontamination Runoff. Washington,
D.C.: Chemical Emergency
Preparedness and Prevention Office,
1999. Print.
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14. Water Research Foundation.
Radionuclides in Drinking Water: FAQ.
N.p.: Water Research Foundation, 2011.
Print.
15. Water Sector Coordinating Council
(WSCC). NAWC: Water Sector
Coordinating Council. National
Association of Water Companies, n.d.
Web. 11 Feb. 2013.
www.nawc.org/government-affairs/water-
securitv-and-safetv/water-sector-
coordinating-council. aspx.
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United States
Environmental Protection
Agency
PRESORTED STANDARD
POSTAGE & FEES PAID
EPA
PERMIT NO. G-35
Office of Research and Development (8101R)
Washington, DC 20460
Official Business
Penalty for Private Use
$300
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