&EPA
United States
Environmental Protection
Agency
Water Security Initiative: Evaluation of the Sampling
and Analysis Component of the Cincinnati
Contamination Warning System Pilot
Monitoring and Surveillance
Water Quality Monitoring
Enhanced Security Monitoring
Customer Complaint Surveillance
ublic Health Surveillance
Possible Contamination
Consequence Management
Sampling and Analysis
Response
Office of Water (MC-140)
EPA-817-R-14-001G
April 2014
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Disclaimer
The Water Security Division of the Office of Ground Water and Drinking Water has reviewed and
approved this document for publication. This document does not impose legally binding requirements on
any party. The findings in this report are intended solely to recommend or suggest and do not imply any
requirements. Neither the U.S. Government nor any of its employees, contractors or their employees
make any warranty, expressed or implied, or assumes any legal liability or responsibility for any third
party's use of or the results of such use of any information, apparatus, product, or process discussed in
this report or represents that its use by such party would not infringe on privately owned rights. Mention
of trade names or commercial products does not constitute endorsement or recommendation for use.
Questions concerning this document should be addressed to:
Elizabeth Hedrick
U.S. EPA Water Security Division
26 West Martin Luther King Drive
Mail Code 140
Cincinnati, OH 45268
(513)569-7296
Hedrick.Elizabeth@epa.gov
or
Steve Allgeier
U.S. EPA Water Security Division
26 West Martin Luther King Drive
Mail Code 140
Cincinnati, OH 45268
(513)569-7131
Allgeier.Steve@epa.gov
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Acknowledgements
The Water Security Division of the Office of Ground Water and Drinking Water would like to recognize
the following individuals and organizations for their assistance, contributions, and review during the
development of this document.
• Jeff Swertfeger, Greater Cincinnati Water Works
• Mike Tyree, Greater Cincinnati Water Works
• Matthew Magnuson, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
• Jennifer Calles, City of Phoenix Water Services Laboratory, Environmental Services Division
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Executive Summary
The goal of the Water Security Initiative (WSI) is to design and demonstrate an effective multi-
component warning system for timely detection and response to drinking water contamination threats and
incidents. A contamination warning system (CWS) integrates information from multiple monitoring and
surveillance components to alert the water utility to possible contamination, and uses a consequence
management plan to guide response actions. The first CWS pilot under WSI was deployed in Cincinnati,
Ohio, in partnership with the Greater Cincinnati Water Works (GCWW).
System design objectives for an effective CWS are: spatial coverage, contaminant coverage, alert
occurrence, timeliness of detection and response, operational reliability and sustainability. Metrics for the
sampling and analysis (S&A) component are defined relative to the system metrics common to all four
monitoring and surveillance components of the CWS, but the component definition provides an additional
level of detail relevant to the S&A component. Evaluation techniques used to quantitatively or
qualitatively evaluate each of the metrics include analysis of empirical data from routine operations, drills
and exercises, modeling and simulations, forums and an analysis of lifecycle costs. This report describes
the evaluation of data collected from the S&A component from the period of March 2008 - June 2010.
The major outputs from the evaluation of the Cincinnati pilot include:
1. Cincinnati Pilot System Status, which describes the post-implementation status of the Cincinnati
pilot following the installation of all monitoring and surveillance components.
2. Component Evaluations, which include analysis of performance metrics for each component of
the Cincinnati pilot.
3. System Evaluation, which integrates the results of the component evaluations, the simulation
study, and the benefit-cost analysis.
The reports that present the results from the evaluation of the system and each of its six components are
available in an Adobe portfolio, Water Security Initiative: Comprehensive Evaluation of the Cincinnati
Contamination Warning System Pilot (USEPA 2014a).
Sampling and Analysis Component Design
Although not an early detection component, S&A plays a critical role in the CWS due to the potential to
confirm or rule out contaminants in drinking water samples collected throughout the pilot utility's
distribution system during investigation of validated CWS component alerts as part of the credibility
determination process. Unlike other CWS monitoring and surveillance components, the S&A component
affords the potential to identify specific contaminants and, in many instances, determine the concentration
of these contaminants in drinking water. For the Cincinnati pilot, baseline methods were selected for their
ability to detect and confirm contaminants which EPA has identified as being of particular concern in
drinking water.
During a potential contamination incident, drinking water samples are collected and analyzed with the
goal of identifying and confirming, or ruling out the presence of specific contaminants (i.e., incident
response sampling and analysis). Field response personnel perform site characterization activities
including site safety screening and rapid field testing of water samples. These activities can provide
information rapidly to assist decisions regarding site safety and potential contaminants, and can inform or
focus subsequent sample collection and analysis. Upon completion of sample collection and field
analyses, samples are packaged and transported to the utility laboratory and/or partner laboratories;
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analytical results are used to supplement investigation of validated alerts from other components of the
system.
The design elements of the S&A component include 1) field and laboratory capabilities, 2) routine
sampling and analysis and 3) incident response procedures. Field and laboratory capabilities
(instrumentation, methods and laboratories) are those that would be used to perform screening and
confirmatory analyses for a wide range of contaminants in a Possible contamination incident. Routine
sampling and analysis is performed to establish baseline data for contaminant occurrence in the
distribution system and to evaluate method performance for the field and laboratory methods
implemented for the S&A component. Incident response sampling and analysis occurs when an alert
from one of the monitoring and surveillance components is determined to be Possible water
contamination. Procedures and protocols are developed in the incident response procedures design
element
The following subsections describe the five design objectives that provided a basis for evaluation of the
S&A component, including spatial coverage, contaminant coverage, timeliness of response, operational
reliability and sustainability. Each subsection includes a description of the design objective, and a
summary of the data that was used to determine how well the component met the design objective. S&A
data was collected from GCWW and their laboratory and emergency response partners. The design
objectives of contaminant coverage and timeliness of response were evaluated using both empirical data
and results from a computer model simulating the Cincinnati pilot. The simulation study allowed pilot
performance to be evaluated in more than 2,000 different contamination scenarios. A scenario is defined
as a simulation of a contamination incident using a specified contaminant at a pre-determined location,
time, and injection rate. Contaminant coverage, operational reliability and sustainability for S&A were
evaluated using empirical data from the Cincinnati pilot. For more information on this topic, see Section
2.0.
Methodology
Several methods were used to evaluate S&A performance. Data was tracked over time to illustrate the
change in performance as the component evolved during the evaluation period. Statistical methods were
also used to summarize large volumes of data collected over either the entire or various segments of the
evaluation period. Data was also evaluated and summarized for each reporting period over the evaluation
period. In this evaluation, the term reporting period is used to refer to one month of data that spans from
the 16th of the indicated month to the 15th of the following month. Thus, the January 2008 reporting
period refers to the data collected between January 16th 2008 and February 15th 2008. Additionally, six
drills and two full-scale exercises designed around mock contamination incidents were used to practice
and evaluate the full range of procedures, from initial detection through response.
Because there were no contamination incidents during the evaluation period, there is no empirical data to
fully evaluate the detection capabilities of the component. To fill this gap, a computer model of the
Cincinnati CWS was developed and challenged with a large ensemble of simulated contamination
incidents in a simulation study. An ensemble of 2,015 contamination scenarios representing a broad range
of contaminants and injection locations throughout the distribution system was used to evaluate the
effectiveness of the CWS in minimizing public health and utility infrastructure consequences. The
simulations were also used for a benefit-cost analysis, which compares the monetized value of costs and
benefits and calculates the net present value of the CWS. Costs include implementation costs and routine
operation and maintenance labor and expenses, which were assumed over a 20 year lifecycle of the CWS.
Benefits included reduction in consequences (illness, fatalities and infrastructure damage) and dual-use
benefits from routine operations.
IV
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Design Objective: Spatial Coverage
Spatial coverage includes the spatially diverse and hydraulically significant area of the GCWW
distribution system covered through routine and incident response sampling and analysis. During a
Possible contamination incident, samples can be collected from any location within the GCWW service
area. To establish baseline contaminant occurrence and evaluate method performance throughout the
distribution system, samples were routinely collected from 23 pre-identified sampling locations over a
one-year period. The pre-identified locations were selected to be representative of different pressure and
mixing zones, different source waters and extremes in water age. Many of the routine sampling locations
were selected because they were locations equipped with water quality monitors or enhanced security
surveillance equipment, and thus, could be the site of a water quality monitoring (WQM) or enhanced
security monitoring component alert. Other locations were of strategic interest (tanks, reservoirs, etc).
Additionally, a survey study of 54 different locations was performed over a two-month period. Following
completion of baseline monitoring, the utility transitioned to maintenance monitoring and is continuing to
collect samples from 31 strategic locations throughout the distribution system to maintain proficiency in
field and laboratory methods and to update contaminant baseline data. For more information on this
topic, see Section 4.0.
Design Objective: Contaminant Coverage
Contaminant coverage is the ability to detect a wide range of contaminants of concern to water security
and to be able to detect these contaminants under a wide range of contamination scenarios. GCWW
established baseline occurrence data for 32 different targeted priority contaminants using in-house field
and laboratory capabilities or partner laboratories. Twelve contaminants for which GCWW had detection
capabilities were evaluated in the simulation study in addition to five contaminants for which methods
and laboratory partners were identified, but no baseline data was collected.
The simulation study allowed evaluation of more than 2,000 different contamination scenarios to
determine contamination scenario coverage. Contamination scenario coverage was calculated as the
percent of simulated contamination scenarios that were detected either through analysis during site
characterization (water quality parameter or rapid field testing) or laboratory analysis. Fiigher detection
rates were observed for scenarios involving toxic chemicals with rapid symptom onset (>88% for site
characterization analysis and >98% for laboratory analysis). Lower detection rates were observed for
scenarios involving biological agents with delayed symptom onset (ranging from 12% to 72% for site
characterization analyses and 23% to 72% for laboratory analyses). This is explained by the fact that
sampling and analysis was never initiated for some scenarios, as the threat level never advanced to a
Possible contamination determination, so by default no detection occurred. Other scenarios which
involved biological agents with delayed symptom onset were first detected by the public health
surveillance component, and sampling did not occur soon enough to capture a water sample containing
the contaminant.
This finding underscores the importance of a multi-component CWS which does not rely solely on public
health surveillance for detection of drinking water contamination incidents, but involves multiple
monitoring and surveillance components. For example, in many scenarios involving biological agents
with delayed symptom onset, WQM detected contaminated water while it was still in the distribution
system, allowing for the automated sampling devices at each WQM location to capture a sample that did
contain detectable concentrations of the biological agent. In these scenarios, the contaminant was also
detected during site characterization and/or laboratory analysis. For more information on this topic, see
Section 5.0.
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Design Objective: Timeliness of Response
For the S&A component, timeliness of response is defined as a portion of the incident timeline that begins
with the recognition of a Possible contamination incident and ends with a determination regarding
whether or not the contamination is detected or confirmed by field or laboratory analyses. Based on data
gathered during drills and exercises, it is estimated that the timeline for escalation of an incident, from
recognition of a Possible incident to Credible determination would be between 9 hours and 1.5 days
depending on the contaminant.
Empirical timeline data was used to parameterize the simulation model, and therefore timeline data output
closely matched the inputs. Simulation study results demonstrated a consistent timeline availability of
results from site characterization following a Possible contamination determination (-2.5 to 3 hours) as
the process is consistent regardless of the contaminant, though some time delays would occur if local
HazMat response was activated. More variability in the timeline from a Possible contamination
determination to availability of laboratory results was observed, and was expected due to differences in
transport time to the GCWW laboratory vs. partner laboratories, and the time differences involved in
analytical methods for toxic chemicals vs. biological agents. The time from the Possible contamination
determination to laboratory results for most of the toxic chemicals ranged from ~8 to 15 hours, whereas
for the biological agents, the time ranged from ~1 to 2 days. For more information on this topic, see
Section 6.0.
Design Objective: Operational Reliability
Operational reliability quantifies the percent of time that the S&A component is available and producing
complete and accurate data. Analysis of the operational reliability of the S&A component considers
metrics including component availability, data completeness, method accuracy, and method precision.
Empirical data collected during the evaluation period demonstrated the overall dependability of
component operations. During the course of 26 months of maintenance monitoring, only one short period
of downtime (13 hours) was experienced by the GCWW laboratory as a result of a severe weather
incident. Furthermore, high data completeness percentages were recorded for each of the S&A sub-
components (> 88% for one field and four laboratory sub-components). Finally, method accuracy and
method precision data were within established method limits/tolerances during baseline monitoring for
each of the methods and laboratories supporting the S&A component. For more information on this
topic, see Section 7.0.
Design Objective: Sustainability
Sustainability is defined in terms of the cost-benefit trade-off. Empirical data as well as feedback
documented during component forums were used to evaluate costs, benefits and ability of the utility to
comply with procedures and sampling plans. Costs were estimated over the lifecycle of the system to
provide an estimate of the total cost of ownership. Table ES-1 demonstrates the value of the major cost
elements used to calculate the total lifecycle cost of the S&A component. It is important to note that the
Cincinnati CWS was a pilot research project, and as such incurred higher costs than would be
expected for atypical large utility installation.
VI
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Table ES-1. Cost Elements used in the Calculation of Lifecycle Cost
Parameter
Implementation Costs
Annual O&M Costs
Renewal and Replacement Costs1
Salvage Value1
Value
$2,543,918
$42,795
$260,482
($11,269)
Calculated using major pieces of equipment.
To calculate the total lifecycle cost of the S&A component, all costs and monetized benefits were
adjusted to 2007 dollars using the change in the Consumer Price Index between 2007 and the year that the
cost or benefit was realized. Subsequently, the implementation costs, renewal and replacement costs and
annual operation and maintenance costs were combined to determine the total lifecycle cost:
S&A Total Lifecyde Cost: $3,436,060
A similar S&A component implementation at another utility should be less expensive when compared to
the Cincinnati pilot as it could benefit from lessons learned and would not incur research-related costs.
The benefits of the S&A component at the Cincinnati pilot include:
• Increased field and laboratory preparedness for responding to all hazard events
• Improved working relationship with emergency response partners (HazMat) and partner
laboratories (Ohio Department of Health and local contract laboratories)
• Increased in-house field and laboratory analytical capabilities, including volatile gas and radiation
meters, ultrafiltration concentration equipment, and a GC-MS for semi-volatile analyses
• Better characterization of the distribution system with respect to contaminants of concern to water
security
• Improved procedures for incident response S&A
The utility has absorbed the O&M cost for the component and has designated personnel to support
ongoing sampling and analysis efforts associated with maintenance monitoring. This has allowed the
utility to comply with the sample collection and analysis schedule designated for maintenance monitoring,
which demonstrates acceptance and suggests sustainability of the S&A component. For more information
on this topic, see Section 8.0.
VII
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Table of Contents
LIST OF FIGURES x
LIST OF TABLES x
SECTION 1.0: INTRODUCTION 1
1.1 CONTAMINATION WARNING SYSTEM DESIGN OBJECTIVES 1
1.2 ROLE OF SAMPLING AND ANALYSIS IN THE CINCINNATI CWS 2
1.3 OBJECTIVES 2
1.4 DOCUMENT ORGANIZATION 3
SECTION 2.0: OVERVIEW OF THE SAMPLING & ANALYSIS COMPONENT 4
2.1 FIELD AND LABORATORY CAPABILITIES 6
2.2 ROUTINE SAMPLING AND ANALYSIS 8
2.2.1 Baseline Monitoring 8
2.2.2 Maintenance Monitoring 9
2.3 INCIDENT RESPONSE PROCEDURES 10
2.4 SUMMARY OF SIGNIFICANT S&A COMPONENT MODIFICATIONS 11
2.5 TIMELINE OF S&A DEVELOPMENT PHASES AND EVALUATION-RELATED ACTIVITIES 13
SECTION 3.0: METHODOLOGY 14
3.1 ANALYSIS OF EMPIRICAL DATA FROM ROUTINE OPERATIONS 14
3.2 DRILLS AND EXERCISES 14
3.2.1 S&A Drill 1 (May 7, 2008) 14
3.2.2 S&A Drill: July 15, 2008 15
3.2.3 Full Scale Exercise 2: October 1, 2008 15
3.2.4 S&A Drill: March 31,2009 16
3.2.5 S&A Drill: April 23, 2009 16
3.2.6 CCS /S&A Drill: September 16, 2009 16
3.2.7 Full Scale Exercise 3: October 1, 2009 16
3.2.8 BT'Agent S&A Drill: May 10, 2010 17
3.3 SIMULATION STUDY 17
3.4 FORUMS 22
3.5 ANALYSIS OF LIFECYCLE COSTS 22
SECTION 4.0: DESIGN OBJECTIVE - SPATIAL COVERAGE 24
4.1 SPATIAL COVERAGE 24
4.2 SUMMARY 25
SECTION 5.0: DESIGN OBJECTIVE - CONTAMINANT COVERAGE 27
5.1 CONTAMINANT DETECTION POTENTIAL 27
5.2 CONTAMINANT DETECTION LIMIT 28
5.3 CONTAMINATION SCENARIO COVERAGE 28
5.4 SUMMARY 32
SECTION 6.0: DESIGN OBJECTIVE - TIMELINESS OF RESPONSE 33
6.1 TIMELINE OF INCIDENT RESPONSE SAMPLING AND ANALYSIS 33
6.2 SUMMARY 42
SECTION 7.0: DESIGN OBJECTIVE - OPERATIONAL RELIABILITY 43
7.1 AVAILABILITY 43
7.2 DATA COMPLETENESS 44
7.3 METHOD ACCURACY 44
7.4 METHOD PRECISION 49
VIM
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7.5 SUMMARY 50
SECTION 8.0: DESIGN OBJECTIVE - SUSTAINABILITY 52
8.1 COSTS 52
8.2 BENEFITS 54
8.3 COMPLIANCE 55
8.4 SUMMARY 56
SECTION 9.0: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 57
SECTION 10.0: REFERENCES 59
SECTION 11.0: ABBREVIATIONS 60
SECTION 12.0: GLOSSARY 61
IX
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List of Figures
FIGURE 2-1. TIMELINE OF S&A COMPONENT ACTIVITIES 13
FIGURE 4-1. SURVEY SAMPLE SITES 25
List of Tables
TABLE 2-1. SAMPLING AND ANALYSIS DESIGN ELEMENTS 4
TABLE 2-2. SAMPLING AND ANALYSIS ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES 5
TABLE 2-3. SAMPLING AND ANALYSIS - FIELD METHODS 7
TABLE 2-4. SAMPLING AND ANALYSIS - LABORATORY INSTRUMENTATION 7
TABLE 2-5. BASELINE MONITORING PHASES 8
TABLE 2-6. SIGNIFICANT S&A COMPONENT MODIFICATIONS 11
TABLE 3-1. S&A DRILL VARIATIONS 17
TABLE 3-2. FIELD TESTING CAPABILITIES 19
TABLE 3-3. LABORATORY TESTING CAPABILITIES 21
TABLE 4-1. STRATEGIC AND PRIORITY SAMPLE LOCATIONS FOR BASELINE MONITORING 24
TABLE 5-1. TARGET WATER QUALITY PARAMETERS FOR BASELINE MONITORING AT GCWW 27
TABLE 5-2. CONTAMINANT CLASSES FOR BASELINE MONITORING AT GCWW 28
TABLE 5-3. SITE CHARACTERIZATION DETECTION STATISTICS 29
TABLE 5-4. LABORATORY ANALYSIS DETECTION STATISTICS 31
TABLE 6-1. S&A TIMELINESS DURING DRILLS AND EXERCISES 35
TABLE 6-2. S&A TIMELINE ESTIMATES FOR INCIDENT RESPONSE 36
TABLE 6-3. S&A TIMELINE ANALYSIS (SIMULATION STUDY RESULTS) 36
TABLE 6-4. SCENARIOS WITH WATER QUALITY PARAMETER RESULTS AVAILABLE PRIOR TO CREDIBLE AND
CONFIRMED CONTAMINATION DETERMINATION (SIMULATION STUDY RESULTS) 37
TABLE 6-5. SCENARIOS WITH RAPID FIELD TEST RESULTS AVAILABLE PRIOR TO CREDIBLE AND CONFIRMED
CONTAMINATION DETERMINATION (SIMULATION STUDY RESULTS) 38
TABLE 6-6. SCENARIOS WITH LABORATORY RESULTS AVAILABLE PRIOR TO CREDIBLE AND CONFIRMED
CONTAMINATION DETERMINATION (SIMULATION STUDY RESULTS) 39
TABLE 6-7. SCENARIOS WITH WATER QUALITY PARAMETER RESULTS PRIOR TO PUBLIC HEALTH RESPONSE
(SIMULATION STUDY RESULTS) 40
TABLE 6-8. SCENARIOS WITH RAPID FIELD TEST RESULTS PRIOR TO PUBLIC HEALTH RESPONSE (SIMULATION STUDY
RESULTS) 40
TABLE 6-9. SCENARIOS WITH LABORATORY RESULTS PRIOR TO PUBLIC HEALTH RESPONSE (SIMULATION STUDY
RESULTS) 41
TABLE 7-1. S&A SUB-COMPONENT AVAILABILITY 44
TABLE 7-2. S&A SUB-COMPONENT DATA COMPLETENESS 44
TABLE 7-3. FIELD INSTRUMENT ACCURACY ESTIMATES AND QC CHECK FREQUENCY 45
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TABLE 7-4. 2007 PROFICIENCY TESTING SAMPLE RESULTS 46
TABLE 7-5. 2009 PROFICIENCY TESTING SAMPLE RESULTS 47
TABLE 7-6. SUMMARY OF GCWW FILTER CONCENTRATION RECOVERY TRIALS 48
TABLE 7-7. METHOD-SPECIFIC RECOVERY QC CRITERIA FOR EACH CONTAMINANT CLASS 49
TABLE 7-8. FIELD INSTRUMENT PRECISION ESTIMATES 50
TABLE 7-9. METHOD-SPECIFIC PRECISION QC CRITERIA FOR EACH CONTAMINANT CLASS 50
TABLE 8-1. COST ELEMENTS USED IN THE CALCULATION OF LIFECYCLE COST 52
TABLE 8-2. IMPLEMENTATION COSTS 53
TABLE 8-3. ANNUALO&M COSTS 54
XI
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Water Security Initiative: Evaluation of the Sampling and Analysis Component
of the Cincinnati Contamination Warning System
Section 1.0: Introduction
The purpose of this document is to present the results of evaluation of the sampling and analysis (S&A)
component of the Water Security Initiative (WSI) contamination warning system (CWS) pilot project at
the Greater Cincinnati Water Works (GCWW). The evaluation covers the period March 2008 to June
2010 when the S&A component was fully operational. This evaluation was implemented by examining
the performance of the S&A component relative to the design objectives established for the CWS.
1.1 Contamination Warning System Design Objectives
The goal of a CWS is to detect possible water contamination in a timely manner so that consequences can
be mitigated through operational responses. Early detection is accomplished by using an integrated
system of monitoring and surveillance components. S&A is not an early detection component; however,
it is critical to consequence management. To determine the efficacy of the Cincinnati CWS, performance
was evaluated against the following CWS design objectives as applied to the S&A component:
• Spatial Coverage. The objective for spatial coverage is to ensure that S&A response capabilities
extend throughout the distribution system and to the entire population served by the drinking
water utility. The degree of coverage depends on the location and density of potential sampling
points in the distribution system, and the hydraulic connectivity of each monitoring location to
downstream regions and populations. Spatial coverage includes the spatially diverse and
hydraulically significant area covered through routine sampling and analysis to establish
contaminant occurrence and method performance throughout the distribution system. Metrics
evaluated under this design objective include: number of samples collected at various locations
during baseline monitoring and the rationale for location selection. Potential sampling locations
during incident response may be anywhere in the distribution system, and are not limited to the
locations used for routine sampling and analysis.
• Contaminant Coverage. Prior to the Cincinnati CWS project, an interagency research and
analysis effort identified more than 200 contaminants that could cause serious harm if introduced
into a drinking water distribution system. These contaminants were prioritized based on their
toxic/infectious dose, stability in water, and availability. Contaminant selection for baseline
monitoring was designed to achieve broad coverage of the contaminant classes of concern that
these prioritized contaminants represented with a sub-set of chemicals, radiochemicals, pathogens
and biotoxins selected based upon availability of analytical methods for the drinking water
matrix. Metrics used to assess contaminant coverage of the S&A component include:
contaminant detection potential, contaminant detection limit, and contamination scenario
coverage.
• Timeliness of Response. A key objective of a CWS is to provide initial detection and validation
of a contamination incident in a timeframe that allows for the implementation of response actions
that result in a significant reduction in consequences. For the S&A component, timeliness of
response is defined as a portion of the incident timeline that begins with the recognition of a
Possible contamination incident and ends with a determination regarding whether or not the
contamination is detected or confirmed by field or laboratory analyses. This metric is only
applied to incident response S&A and not routine sampling. Metrics associated with timeliness
of response include: time for response partner notification, time for Site Characterization Team
mobilization and deployment, time for site approach and field safety screening, time for sample
collection, time for rapid field testing, time for sample preparation and transport, time for sample
disposition, time for laboratory mobilization, time for laboratory sample analysis and time for
data review and reporting. The metric 'time for response partner notification' is characterized in
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Water Security Initiative: Evaluation of the Sampling and Analysis Component
of the Cincinnati Contamination Warning System
a separate document, Water Security Initiative: Evaluation of the Consequence Management
Component of the Cincinnati Contamination Warning System Pilot (USEPA, 2014b), while the
remaining timeline metrics are discussed in this document.
• Operational Reliability. Analysis of the operational reliability of the S&A component considers
metrics that quantify the overall availability and functionality during routine operation of the
S&A component. Metrics used to assess the operational reliability of the S&A component
include: method/instrument/laboratory availability, data completeness, method accuracy and
method precision.
• Sustainability. Sustainability of the S&A component is dependent upon the overall acceptability
to the utility, which is a function of the perceived cost-benefit trade-off. Metrics used to assess
Sustainability of the S&A component include: lifecycle costs, benefits (primary and dual-use) and
compliance with component operational requirements.
The design objectives provide a basis for evaluation of each component as well as the entire integrated
system. Because the deployment of drinking water CWSs is a new concept, design standards or
benchmarks are unavailable. Thus, it is necessary to evaluate CWS components against the design
objectives on a relative scale. This includes evaluation of the deployed component relative to the baseline
state of the utility prior to deployment, as well as evaluation of the components relative to each other.
1.2 Role of Sampling and Analysis in the Cincinnati CWS
Under the WSI, a multi-component design was developed to meet the above CWS design objectives.
Specifically, the WSI CWS architecture utilizes four monitoring and surveillance components common to
the drinking water industry and public health sector: water quality monitoring (WQM), enhanced security
monitoring (ESM), customer complaint surveillance (CCS) and public health surveillance (PHS).
Information from these four components is integrated under the Cincinnati Pilot Consequence
Management Plan to establish the credibility of possible contamination incidents and to inform response
actions intended to mitigate consequences.
Although not an early detection component, S&A plays a critical role in the CWS due to the potential to
confirm or rule out contaminants in drinking water samples collected throughout the pilot utility's
distribution system during investigation of validated CWS component alerts as part of the credibility
determination process. Unlike the CWS monitoring and surveillance components, the S&A component
affords the potential to identify specific contaminants and, in many instances, determine the concentration
of these contaminants in drinking water. During a potential contamination incident, drinking water
samples are collected and analyzed with the goal of confirming or ruling out the presence of specific
contaminants or contaminant classes (i.e., incident response sampling and analysis). Even though results
from sample analyses may not be available until several hours or longer after sample collection, S&A is
critical for corroborating validated alerts from the monitoring and surveillance components and in
possible attribution of illness or other adverse consequences to drinking water contamination.
In addition to sample collection and laboratory analysis, the S&A component includes the site
characterization activities of site safety screening and rapid field testing of water samples. These S&A
activities provide site safety information for ensuring worker protection and can inform or focus
subsequent sample collection and analysis.
1.3 Objectives
The overall objective of this report is to evaluate how well the S&A component functioned as part of the
CWS deployed in Cincinnati (i.e., how effectively the component achieved the design objectives). It will
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Water Security Initiative: Evaluation of the Sampling and Analysis Component
of the Cincinnati Contamination Warning System
also characterize factors that impact the sustainability of S&A in a CWS. This evaluation will cover the
component as a whole, as well as the individual S&A design elements as described in Section 2.0. Data
collection during baseline monitoring, routine operation, drills and exercises and computer simulations
yielded sufficient data to evaluate performance of the S&A component for each of the stated design
objectives. The data sources used in the evaluation are presented in Section 3.0. In summary, this
document will discuss the approach for analysis of this information and present the results that
characterize the overall operation, performance, and sustainability of the S&A component as part of the
Cincinnati CWS.
1.4 Document Organization
This document contains the following sections:
• Section 2: Overview of the S&A Component. This section introduces the S&A component of
the Cincinnati CWS and describes each of the major design elements that make up the
component. A summary of significant modifications to the component, made as a result of
experience gained during the pilot which had a demonstrable impact on performance, is presented
at the end of this section.
• Section 3: Methodology. This section describes the data sources and techniques used to
evaluate the S&A component.
• Sections 4 through 8: Evaluation of S&A Performance against the Design Objectives. Each
of these sections addresses one of the design objectives listed in Section 1.1. Each section begins
with the definition of the subject design objective in the context of the S&A component and
introduces the metrics that will be used to evaluate the component against that design objective.
Each supporting evaluation metric is discussed in a dedicated subsection, including an overview
of the analysis methodology employed for that metric followed by presentation and discussion of
the results. Each section concludes with a summary of the evaluation of the subject design
objective.
• Section 9: Summary and Conclusions. This section provides a high-level assessment of how
well the S&A component of the Cincinnati CWS met the design objectives.
• Section 10: References. This section lists all sources and documents cited throughout this
report.
• Section 11: Abbreviations. This section lists all acronyms approved for use in the S&A
component evaluation.
• Section 12: Glossary. This section defines terms used throughout the S&A component
evaluation.
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Water Security Initiative: Evaluation of the Sampling and Analysis Component
of the Cincinnati Contamination Warning System
Section 2.0: Overview of the Sampling & Analysis
Component
The S&A component involves the collection, testing, and interpretation of results from GCWW water
samples collected as part of routine and incident response sampling and analysis. The sampling and
analysis activities were performed by qualified field and laboratory personnel at GCWW, the Cincinnati
Fire Department (CFD) and Greater Cincinnati Hazardous Materials (HazMat) units, the Ohio
Department of Health (ODH) State laboratory and contract laboratories. The S&A component, as
deployed, was a result of modifications and expansions to existing GCWW capabilities and protocols as
identified by a multifaceted evaluation and assessment process. A summary description of the pre- and
post-implementation status of the S&A component can be found in Water Security Initiative: Cincinnati
Pilot Post-Implementation System Status (USEPA, 2008).
Two types of sampling are performed as part of the S&A CWS component: routine (baseline and
maintenance monitoring phases) and incident response sampling and analysis. Routine sampling during
the baseline monitoring phase was designed to determine contaminant occurrence and method
performance under normal circumstances using a suite of methods that could be used during incident
response sampling and analysis (baseline methods). During the maintenance monitoring phase, routine
sampling confirms there are no changes in baseline contaminant occurrence or method performance
during normal (i.e., non-incident) sampling and analysis. Routine monitoring also allows for the practice
and refinement of sampling protocols. This process began during the initial phase of the Cincinnati pilot,
and continues as part of the ongoing CWS project. In contrast, incident response samples are collected in
response to validated alerts from the monitoring and surveillance components (WQM, ESM, CCS and
PHS) during consequence management as part of the credibility determination process. For methods with
previously established baseline data, incident response S&A results (contaminant occurrence and method
performance) are compared and results exceeding baseline data are reported for possible utility response
action.
A description of the three S&A design elements is shown in Table 2-1, though the design elements are
described more fully in Sections 2.1 through 2.3.
Table 2-1. Sampling and Analysis Design Elements
Design Element
1. Field and laboratory
capabilities
2. Routine sampling and
analysis
3. Incident response
procedures
Description
Build field and laboratory capability and capacity that would be necessary to
perform screening and confirmatory analyses for a wide range of contaminants
in a possible contamination incident.
Select sampling locations, frequencies, quality assurance, and data quality
objectives for routine sampling and analysis to establish baseline data for
contaminant occurrence in the distribution system and to evaluate method
performance.
Establish roles, responsibilities, and procedures that will be used by the utility
and others investigating a potential contamination incident.
It should be noted that the titles of these design elements are different than those used in the Water
Security Initiative: Cincinnati Pilot Post-Implementation System Status (USEPA, 2008). The design
elements were modified to more accurately present the approach used to design the S&A component.
Many users within different job functions are involved in building and operating the S&A component
with the above design elements. Table 2-2 describes the various job functions of those directly involved
in the operation of the S&A component of the Cincinnati CWS, including GCWW personnel, contract
laboratories and partner agencies. Although not involved directly with S&A activities, the GCWW Water
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Utility Emergency Response Manager (WUERM) initiates all S&A response actions following the
determination of Possible contamination.
Table 2-2. Sampling and Analysis Roles and Responsibilities
Personnel/Organization
Laboratory Program
Manager
Water Quality & Treatment
Chemist
Site Characterization Team
Leader
Site Characterization Team
Distribution Valve Operator
Cincinnati Fire Department
or Greater Cincinnati
HazMat Units
California Control Operator
Water Quality and
Treatment Shift Chemist
Ohio Department of Health
(ODH)
Role in Sampling and Analysis Component
• Coordinates sample flow and laboratory analysis of routine samples
• Informs the appropriate staff of any non-routine sampling needs
• Performs data review and updates baseline control charts
• Compares sample results to baseline control charts
• Provides advice regarding the chemical and microbiological analyses of
samples
• Coordinates the delivery of samples to external labs
• Receives lab data and reports it to the WUERM
• Maintains baseline and maintenance monitoring field method data
• Performs laboratory analysis as needed
• Reports field analysis results to the WUERM and Laboratory Program
Manager to help guide sample flow and laboratory analysis
• In conjunction with the WUERM develops and implements situation-specific
site characterization and sampling plan for sample collection and field
testing
• Manages and leads the site characterization and sampling teams
according to the Site Characterization Plan
• Implements the site characterization Standard Operating Procedures from
the GCWW manual titled Standard Operating Procedures for Site
Characterization and Sampling
• Reports site characterization results to WUERM and consults regarding
specific response needs
• Functions as on-site coordinator with HazMat and other emergency
responders
• Performs site characterization and sampling activities as directed by the
Site Characterization Team Leader
• Performs site characterization and sampling activities as directed by the
Site Characterization Team Leader
• Performs site characterization and sampling (as required)
• Monitors Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition alerts, and reviews
operational data to support the investigation of alerts
• Assumes CWS responsibilities of Water Quality and Treatment Chemist
during off-hours; support sample analysis
• Performs screening and confirmatory analyses for radiochemical analyses
per regulatory schedule and for bioterrorism threat (BT) agents during
incident response sampling and analysis
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Personnel/Organization
GCWW Laboratory
Contract Laboratory
Role in Sampling and Analysis Component
• Performs confirmatory analyses for semi-volatiles
• Performs semi-volatiles screening of routine samples
• Performs confirmatory analyses for volatile constituents of gasoline
fuel in routine samples
• Performs volatiles screening of routine samples
• Performs screening for metals
and
• Performs contingency or surge analyses of samples for volatiles, semi-
volatiles, metals, carbamates and total cyanide
2.1 Field and Laboratory Capabilities
Field and laboratory testing capabilities were built to provide analytical capabilities for a baseline suite of
contaminants and methods. Laboratories were selected to support baseline monitoring, maintenance
monitoring, and incident response sampling and analysis. Contaminants and methods were selected
during design of the S&A component to provide wide contaminant coverage using readily available
screening and confirmatory methods. The rationale for selection of contaminants and methods is
presented as guidance for utilities in the document Water Security Initiative: Guidance for Building
Laboratory Capabilities to Respond to Drinking Water Contamination (USEPA, 2013).
In order to build effective field and laboratory testing capabilities for response to a wide range of
contamination scenarios, enhancements of existing GCWW capabilities were implemented and new
capabilities were acquired. When possible, in-house enhancements were provided to GCWW in the form
of equipment and/or training opportunities. Through a combination of enhancements to GCWW's field
and laboratory capabilities, partnering with the CFD and Greater Cincinnati HazMat units and the ODH
laboratory, and contracting with commercial laboratories, a laboratory network was established with
broad detection capabilities for chemical, radiochemical and biological contaminants. A complete
description of equipment enhancements, laboratory capabilities, and agreements can be found in Water
Security Initiative: Cincinnati Pilot Post-Implementation System Status (USEPA, 2008).
Tables 2-3 and 2-4 present the field and laboratory testing capabilities used to support baseline and
maintenance monitoring and incident response sampling and analysis.
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Table 2-3. Sampling and Analysis - Field Methods
Safety Screening
Contaminant Class
Radioactivity (alpha, beta,
and gamma)
General hazards
Volatile organic compounds
(VOC) and combustible
gases
Methodology
Hand-held device
HazCat (explosives, oxidants, etc.)
Hand-held device
Comments
May be expanded to water testing with a
special probe and procedure
Should be performed by trained HazMat
responder
Detects chemicals in air
Rapid Field Testing
Contaminant Class
Cyanide
Chlorine residual
pH/conductivity/ORP
Turbidity
Chemical Warfare Agents
(VX, sarin, etc.)
General toxicity
Arsenic
Methodology
Portable colorimeter
Portable colorimeter
Portable electrochemical detector
Portable turbidimeter
Test Kit
Test Kit
Test Kit
Comments
Tests water for cyanide ion, but not
combined forms
Absence of residual may indicate a
problem
Abnormal pH or conductivity may indicate
a problem
High turbidity may indicate a problem
May also detect some pesticides and
common chemicals
Only used as an optional screening
procedure during incident response due
to poor interpretive value at GCWW
Rapid, easy to use
Table 2-4. Sampling and Anal)
Contaminant Class
VOCs indicative of gasoline (i.e.,
BTEX)
Semi-volatile organic compounds
(SVOCs)
Metals
Carbamate Pesticides
Total Cyanide*
Total Organic Carbon*
Radiochemicals
BT Agents: Select agents and
toxins
/sis - Laboratory Instrumentation
Instrumentation
Gas Chromatography with Mass Spectrometry
Detection (GC-MS) using purge and trap
Gas Chromatography with Mass Spectrometry
Detection using liquid-solid extraction
Inductively Coupled Plasma - Mass Spectrometry
(ICP-MS)
Direct injection + high-performance liquid
Chromatography (HPLC) with Post Column
Derivatization and Fluorescence Detection
Colorimetry with Reflux Distillation Extraction
Persulfate-ultraviolet Spectrophotometry
Alpha Beta Scintillation Sealer or Gas Flow Low-
Background Proportional Detector
High Purity Germanium Gamma Spectrometry
Real-time polymerase chain reaction (PCR) and
immunoassay
Not used during baseline monitoring, but is a current capability.
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2.2 Routine Sampling and Analysis
Routine S&A encompasses activities within both baseline and maintenance monitoring. GCWW's
distribution system is complex with two treatment plants: Richard Miller Treatment Plant (Miller) and the
Charles M. Bolton Treatment Plant (Bolton), which feed into a common distribution system. A baseline
monitoring program was initiated to address specific questions about water in the GCWW system
regarding differences in contaminant occurrence and method performance between GCWW's two water
treatment plants which have different source waters, differences between sampling locations in the
distribution system, temporal trends and water age, the effects of distribution system materials and other
factors.
Once initial contaminant baselines were established, ongoing maintenance monitoring was performed to
update and maintain baseline data, and to maintain incident response sampling and analysis capabilities.
Baseline and maintenance monitoring activities were accomplished using field and laboratory capabilities
as described in Section 2.1.
2.2.1 Baseline Monitoring
Baseline monitoring is a special purpose contaminant monitoring program that is intended to establish
baseline occurrence of contaminants in the distribution system using methods that would be used during
incident response sampling and analysis. The frequency of sample collection and the limited number of
samples collected made it unlikely that baseline monitoring would detect a transient, localized
contamination incident. The objectives of baseline monitoring at the Cincinnati pilot were to 1) establish
and ensure ongoing laboratory preparedness for incident response, 2) establish baseline contaminant
occurrence (levels and frequency of detections) and method performance (interferences, precision,
accuracy as percent recovery) in the distribution system and (3) provide information for developing a
long-term maintenance monitoring program. To accomplish these objectives, a phased approach to
sample collection and analysis was developed. An overview of these phases can be found in Table 2-5.
Table 2-5. Baseline Monitoring Phases
Phase
Sampling
Phases
Evaluation
and Data
Analysis
Phase 1
Phase 2
Phase 3
Phase 4
Phase 5
Phase 6
Title
Initial demonstration of capability
Comparison of finished water
from treatment plants
Monthly monitoring of strategic
sampling locations
Survey study of the distribution
system
Focused distribution system
studies
Data analysis and
recommendation for maintenance
monitoring
Description
Development of standard operating procedures,
establishment of precision, accuracy, and reporting
limits.
Analysis of spiked water samples from two treatment
plants over a one month period to establish initial
quality control (QC) limits for water not subjected to
distribution system conditions.
Regular sampling and analysis of strategic locations
for one year to monitor contaminant occurrence and
method performance overtime.
Sampling and analysis from 54 locations spatially
distributed and not previously sampled to determine if
contaminant occurrence and method performance is
different from treatment plants.
Based on previous phases of baseline monitoring,
determine if additional studies are needed and
perform them.
Perform exploratory data analysis, compile summary
statistics, and perform statistical analysis to detect
differences and trends.
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The focus of baseline monitoring at GCWW was to determine background concentrations of priority
contaminants in the drinking water during routine operation and performance of field and laboratory
instrumentation and methods. Additional discussion of targeted water quality parameters and priority
contaminants is presented in Section 5.1.
It should be noted that while baseline monitoring followed the general approach described in Table 2-5,
some contaminants were monitored at a different frequency because of practical limitations (e.g., analysis
costs, personnel limitations, etc.). A more detailed description of the phased approach is provided below.
Phase 1: Phase 1 results included the development of standard operating procedures and necessary
resource documents for critical activities related to baseline monitoring. An initial demonstration of
capability (IDC) was performed to establish analyst proficiency, method performance (precision,
accuracy, and recovery) and minimum reporting limits for each method, where applicable. Data reporting
requirements and protocols were also established.
Phase 2: Phase 2 monitoring was conducted to determine if the finished waters from the two treatment
plants and source waters are different with respect to contaminant occurrence or method performance.
During Phase 2 sampling and analysis, no SVOC or VOC priority contaminants and no BT agents were
detected in either of the two treatment plant waters. Significant differences in matrix spike recoveries
between treatment plants were observed for two of the carbamates and one metal analyte.
Phase 3: Regular surveillance monitoring of eighteen strategic locations and five priority locations was
conducted at regular intervals for one year to establish baseline data for these locations and to determine
if there were seasonal or regional trends. Long-term monitoring of strategic and priority sites revealed
some seasonal trends for detectable non-priority contaminants and water quality parameters; none of the
priority contaminants were detected above the minimum reporting limit or with sufficient frequency to
perform trend analysis.
Phase 4: Survey sampling of sites in the GCWW distribution system was performed during Phase 4 to
determine target analyte occurrence and to evaluate method performance in water collected from various
locations in the GCWW distribution system. Phase 4 survey samples for chemical analyses and field
screening were collected from 54 different sites throughout the distribution system between May 2007
and June 2007. Only a few samples were collected from each of two sites for radiochemical analyses
during Phase 4. Only two survey sites were monitored for BT agents during June 2007. None of the
priority contaminants were detected above the minimum reporting limit. Three priority contaminant
spikes were outside the recovery control limits established in Phase 2 but were within method QC limits.
Phase 5: No focused studies were performed as a result of lessons learned from baseline monitoring.
Phase 6: The final phase of baseline monitoring was the analysis of results from Phases 1 - 4 to establish
the management, interpretation and use of baseline data at the Cincinnati pilot and to establish a
maintenance monitoring program. Baseline monitoring results were used to construct a database of
priority and non-priority contaminant occurrence at numerous sites throughout the distribution system.
Control charts indicating site-specific contaminant levels and matrix-dependent analyte spike recoveries
were developed and will be maintained through long-term maintenance monitoring. This information will
be valuable for interpreting analytical results during incident response sampling and analysis.
2.2.2 Maintenance Monitoring
When the one-year baseline monitoring period concluded, GCWW implemented a maintenance
monitoring schedule that would allow them to maintain proficiency in methods and update contaminant
baseline data. The location and schedule for maintenance monitoring sampling was based on baseline
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results, historical data, regulatory requirements, and sustainability concerns. Maintenance monitoring
began in April 2008; because maintenance monitoring is based in part upon sustainability requirements, it
is planned to continue for the foreseeable future.
2.3 Incident Response Procedures
Incident response sampling and analysis encompasses activities associated with field safety screening,
sample collection, rapid field testing, sub-sampling, sample transport, chain-of-custody, laboratory
coordination, sample analysis, data review, and results reporting. Initiation of these activities is
contingent on a Possible contamination determination originating from one or more CWS validated
component alerts. Incident response involves GCWW personnel and emergency response partners (e.g.,
CFD HazMat) for site characterization as well as partner laboratories described in Section 2.1 for sample
analysis. Several activities conducted during incident response sampling and analysis drills and exercises
are discussed in more detail in the Water Security Initiative: Evaluation of the Consequence Management
Component of the Cincinnati Contamination Warning System Pilot (USEPA, 2014b).
Incident response sampling and analysis differs from routine monitoring in that the goal is to investigate
the nature of contamination and to confirm or rule out specific contaminants and contaminant classes
during Possible contamination incidents (i.e. those arising from validated CWS component alerts). Since
contamination incidents are rare, regular practice of procedures via drills and exercise serves to
familiarize personnel with protocols, identify potential procedural refinements and provide an opportunity
to collect performance metrics to evaluate timeliness of response.
As part of the S&A component implementation, standard operating procedures for field safety screening,
sampling and rapid field testing were developed, with input from local HazMat response teams. These
standard operating procedures are available to all utility and response partners in GCWW's manual,
Standard Operating Procedures for Site Characterization and Sampling. Procedures cover activities
including:
• Pre-sampling guidelines from drinking water sources
• Communications and results reporting
• Sample container labeling, packaging, and chain-of-custody
• Decontamination of personnel and equipment
• Sampling from accessible water taps
• Sampling from fire hydrants
• Sampling from water towers
• Sampling from underground tanks or reservoirs
• Sampling from WQM stations
• Sub-sampling from grab samples
• Use of field safety equipment
• Use of rapid field test kits
Following a Possible contamination determination, site characterization is performed to assess the safety
of the site where samples will be collected. There are two conditions under which the Site
Characterization Team operates: "low hazard", where sampling and rapid field testing can be conducted
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by GCWW, or "high hazard," where sampling and/or rapid field testing are better conducted by a HazMat
response team. Based on the hazard level assessment made by the WUERM, sampling by the appropriate
parties can be performed as outlined in GCWW's manual, Standard Operating Procedures for Site
Characterization and Sampling. A complimentary two-volume set titled, Field Guide for Water
Emergencies, was also developed. These guides contained point-of-use standard operating procedures for
sampling, water quality parameter and rapid field testing and were printed in large font and laminated to
be durable and field-friendly. They were designed to be used by GCWW field personnel and HazMat
partners during incident response sampling and analysis.
A Laboratory Response Plan (Laboratory Response Plan for Water Security Incidents at the Greater
Cincinnati Water Works} was also developed to ensure effective and efficient coordination of sampling,
sample analyses and reporting of results during incident response. The plan includes procedures for
notifying laboratory partners, description of the baseline suite of methods, chain-of-custody, shipping
samples to outside laboratories, analysis of samples, data review, and results reporting to the WUERM. It
also contains information on identifying laboratories for non-baseline suite methods.
Coordination of laboratory analyses is primarily the responsibility of the GCWW Laboratory Program
Manager. The Laboratory Program Manager is responsible for notifying the appropriate external
(contract) and GCWW laboratories, along with alerting response partners that sample analyses will be
required once informed by the WUERM. In situations where radiochemical or BT agent analyses are
requested, the Laboratory Program Manager notifies the Cincinnati Health Department (CHD), and CHD
then relays the information to the appropriate ODH Laboratory. The Laboratory Program Manager
ensures that proper chain-of-custody forms are utilized to keep track of samples as they are received from
the field and sent to the appropriate laboratories for analysis, and also verifies that samples were received
by the laboratories. The Laboratory Program Manager also ensures that any required sample submission
forms, analytical request forms or other sample information accompanies the samples.
Data review and reporting procedures for incident response are significantly different than those used for
routine and compliance monitoring. The Laboratory Program Manager is the primary contact for
receiving analytical results from in-house or external laboratories or through partner agencies (e.g.,
CHD). The Laboratory Program Manager reviews all analytical data to ensure that appropriate QC
supports the sample results prior to reporting to the WUERM. In the event a contaminant is detected, the
Laboratory Program Manager evaluates the results in comparison with the baseline database prior to
reporting to the WUERM.
2.4 Summary of Significant S&A Component Modifications
Component modifications were implemented to refine the S&A component (to field and laboratory
testing capabilities and to routine and incident response sampling and analysis procedures) during the
evaluation period. These modifications are summarized in Table 2-6 and will serve as a reference when
discussing the results of the evaluation presented in Sections 4.0 through 8.0. Additional description of
some of the modifications is provided below.
Table 2-6. Significant S&A Component Modifications
ID
Component Modification
Date
Field and Laboratory Capability Modifications
1.1
Modification
A contract was established by GCWW with Test America, Savannah
for volatiles, semi-volatiles, metals, carbamates and total cyanide
analyses as required to support maintenance monitoring or incident
response S&A.
August 2008
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ID
1.2
Component Modification
Cause
Modification
Cause
Contract with Mobile Analytical Services, Inc (MASI) for carbamate
pesticide analysis discontinued due to completion of baseline
monitoring.
The toxicity test kit was eliminated by GCWW during site
characterization and will only be used as an optional screening
procedure during incident response. Also, the test will only be
performed in the laboratory of the Richard Miller Treatment Plant,
instead of in the field.
During baseline monitoring, it was found that the assay response
when conducted in the field by various field personnel was high and
variable which made it an unreliable diagnostic indicator of potential
contaminants.
Date
November 2008
Routine Sampling and Analysis Modifications
2.1
2.2
Modification
Cause
Modification
Cause
Ultrafiltration of bulk samples for routine or incident response samples
was eliminated by GCWW. Instead, bulk samples (10-100 L samples)
will be transported to ODH for Ultrafiltration and analysis.
The GCWW laboratory does not have the appropriate biosafety level
to process samples potentially containing BT agents, and would not be
able to safely concentrate bulk samples for BT agent screening in an
emergency.
A shift from baseline monitoring to maintenance monitoring was
implemented as part of routine sampling activities. Maintenance
monitoring required less frequent sampling and analysis than baseline
monitoring.
GCWW and EPA agreed that baseline monitoring would only last for
one year, after which maintenance monitoring would commence.
February 2008
February 2008 -
April 2008
Incident Response Procedures Modifications
3.1
3.2
3.3
3.4
Modification
Cause
Modification
Cause
Modification
Cause
Modification
A change in the headspace VOCs standard operating procedure for
field analysis using the test instrument was implemented. As originally
described in the standard operating procedure, sub-samples should be
taken from large volume grab samples to perform headspace VOC
measurement and the subsamples are shaken to encourage
volatilization. In the modified standard operating procedure, a sub-
sample is not prepared, nor is the large volume sample shaken.
Instead the probe is used to measure VOCs immediately upon
opening of the large volume sample container.
GCWW adopted this alternative headspace VOCs procedure because
they believed it to be equally informative.
HazMat roles and responsibilities were modified such that HazMat
units will continue to provide support during high hazard incident
response but GCWW will maintain all water testing equipment and
supplies. GCWW may call on HazMat when a site and/or a water
sample are deemed hazardous. GCWW will conduct field screening
tests during low hazard incident response.
During drills and exercises conducted at GCWW, participants and
observers determined that high hazard situations would require the
support of trained HazMat units.
Multiple revisions were implemented to field safety screening, rapid
field testing, and sampling standard operating procedures.
Site characterization and sampling drills and exercises demonstrated
that the standard operating procedures required modifications to
reflect what was actually done in the field and that standard
operating procedures could be better written for use by HazMat
teams.
A Laboratory Response Plan was developed for GCWW to provide a
procedures manual to facilitate smooth laboratory operations during
incident response sampling events (e.g., sample receipt and
disposition, COC, results reporting).
May 2008
January 2009
November 2008
-June 2009
March - May
2009
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ID
3.5
3.6
Component Modification
Cause
Modification
Cause
Modification
Cause
Need for standardized procedures for the Laboratory Program
Manager and chemists at GCWW.
User-friendly (condensed) and field-friendly (laminated) standard
operating procedures (Field Guide for Water Emergencies) were
developed for site characterization and field screening and rapid field
testing (Volume 1) and sampling activities (Volume II).
Need for portable, point of use standard operating procedures that are
durable, and user friendly.
Sample volume collection was reduced for BT agent analysis from 100
L to 20 L to reflect practical feasibility of sample collection at multiple
GCWW sites.
It is not feasible for GCWW to collect 1 00 L per sample location when
it is anticipated that there would be multiple locations to collect from
during a Possible contamination incident.
Date
March -June
2009
March 2010
2.5 Timeline of S&A Development Phases and Evaluation-related Activities
Figure 2-1 presents a summary timeline for deployment of the S&A component, including milestone
dates indicating when significant component modifications and drill and exercise evaluation activities
took place. The timeline also shows the completion date for design and implementation, along with the
subsequent optimization and real-time monitoring phases of deployment.
Aug-08
External Analytical Services
Contract Established
Design &
Implementation
Complete
Jan-08
Jan-08
May-09
Laboratory Response Plan
Developed
I Jan-09 / Jun-09
HazMat Unit Roles and / User- and Field-Friendly
Responsibilities Modified / SOPs Developed
FSE2
Oct-08
Wind Storm
Sep-08
Jun-10
CCS/S&A Drill
Sep-09
FSE3
Oct-09
Drill 3
Mar-09
Drill 4
Apr-09
BT Agent Drill
May-10
Optimization
Jan-08 - Mar-08
Real-time Monitoring
Apr-OS -Jun-10
End of Data
Collection
Jun-10
Figure 2-1. Timeline of S&A Component Activities
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Section 3.0: Methodology
The following section describes the evaluation techniques that were applied to the S&A component. The
analysis of the S&A component was conducted using four evaluation techniques: empirical data from
routine operations, results from drills and exercises, a simulation study, findings from forums such as
lessons learned workshops and results of an analysis of lifecycle costs.
3.1 Analysis of Empirical Data from Routine Operations
This evaluation includes data on the performance, operation, and sustainability of the S&A component
from March 16, 2008 to June 15, 2010. In this evaluation, the term 'reporting period' is used to refer to a
month of data which spans from the 16th of one month to the 15th of the next month. Thus, the March
2008 reporting period refers to the data collected between March 16th, 2008 and April 15th, 2008.
Baseline monitoring data is another source of empirical data used within this component evaluation to
characterize the component, including contaminant detection potential, method accuracy, and method
precision for the target analytes and analytical methods identified for baseline monitoring.
3.2 Drills and Exercises
Drills and exercises were conducted to characterize key aspects of component performance for particular
activities that cannot be characterized via routine sampling activities. Findings from drills and exercises
were used to evaluate the incident response sampling and analysis process, as conducted by participant
personnel, and to determine whether procedures were followed correctly and in a timely manner. Drills
and exercises also provided an opportunity to identify component modifications required to be more
consistent with observed sampling and analysis procedures or to create more sustainable protocols. All of
the drills and exercises that were designed to test and evaluate the Cincinnati pilot were compliant with
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program guidelines (DHS, 2013), and performance data was
captured to allow documentation of improvements in the response timeline. The results from the drills
and exercises were used to evaluate the timeliness of response design objective. Brief descriptions of
eight drills and exercises conducted for the purpose of component evaluation are provided below:
• S&A Drill 1 (May 7, 2008)
• S&A Drill 2 (July 15,2008)
• CWS Full Scale Exercise 2 (October 1,2008)
• S&A Drill 3 (March 31,2009)
• S&A Drill 4 (April 23, 2009)
• CCS/S&A Drill (September 16, 2009)
• CWS Full Scale Exercise 3 (October 1, 2009)
• S&A BT Agent Drill (May 10, 2010)
3.2.1 S&A Drill 1 (May 7, 2008)
Description: GCWW personnel initiated a three-day drill (May 7th through 9th) designed to evaluate
incident response sampling and analysis, along with related consequence management activities. The
drill consisted of three phases, each with unique activities and objectives:
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• Phase 1: Site Characterization Team Deployment, Sampling, and Field Screening
o This phase was designed to exercise and evaluate GCWW's response to a simulated alert
originating from WQM, including site characterization practice of various activation and
deployment procedures.
• Phase 2: GCWW Sample Management and Disposition
o Phase 2 was designed to exercise and evaluate GCWW protocols for sample receipt and
distribution for in-house and external analyses.
• Phase 3: Sample Analysis, Data Management and Interpretation
o Phase 3 of the drill was designed to exercise and evaluate GCWW and contract laboratory
procedures for sample analyses, data reporting, and data interpretation.
Relevant Participants: S&A relevant participants are listed in Table 3-1.
3.2.2 S&A Drill: July 15, 2008
Description: The objective of this drill was to evaluate the site characterization procedures outlined in the
consequence management plan following a WQM alert. The drill was conducted in two parts: 1) a
morning session conducted by the GCWW Site Characterization Team working alone under simulated
low-hazard conditions, and 2) an afternoon session conducted jointly by the GCWW Site Characterization
Team and CFD HazMat under simulated possibly hazardous conditions.
During the morning session, the GCWW Site Characterization Team performed all of the site
characterization activities as outlined in the consequence management plan, except sub-sampling which
was conducted in the afternoon session. This included: 1) initial response/deployment, 2) site approach,
3) field safety screening, 4) sample collection, 5) rapid field testing and 6) sample preparation and
transport of the BT agent sample to the GCWW Richard Miller Treatment Plant laboratory. In addition,
the morning session tested procedures for laboratory analysis and reporting protocols, including
packaging, labeling and transporting a BT agent sample.
Relevant Participants: S&A relevant participants are listed in Table 3-1.
3.2.3 Full Scale Exercise 2: October 1, 2008
Description: A comprehensive full scale exercise was conducted on October 1, 2008 to test the overall
detection and response components of the Cincinnati CWS. The S&A component site characterization
and sample collection activities and procedures were coordinated with local emergency response partners
(HazMat and Cincinnati Police Department [CPD]). The exercise was designed to simulate events
requiring sampling and analysis support activities, including site characterization in response to a
simulated "hazard" situation. The exercise afforded the opportunity to evaluate labor hours and several
timelines) associated with site characterization activities that included safety screening, rapid field testing,
sample collection and sub-sampling for laboratory analyses.
Role of S&A: The Site Characterization Team was deployed to two separate sites to conduct rapid field
testing. The Site Characterization Team coordinated closely with the CPD to secure the site and
determined that contacting HazMat was necessary to safely conduct a perimeter search and collect field
samples.
Relevant Participants: Site Characterization Team Leader (GCWW), Site Characterization Team
(GCWW), Laboratory Program Manager (GCWW), GCWW WUERM, HazMat Unit (CFD)
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3.2.4 S&A Drill: March 31, 2009
Description: GCWW personnel conducted a Sample Analysis drill. The drill focused on four areas that
included procedures for 1) notification of appropriate contacts for requesting laboratory-based sample
analyses, 2) sample receipt, documentation, and disposition to appropriate laboratories for the baseline
contaminant suite of analyses, 3) analytical data review and 4) analytical results reporting following a
simulated Possible contamination incident. The purpose of this drill was to practice and evaluate
protocols and standard operating procedures rather than evaluate the performance of those personnel
engaged in the drill.
Relevant Participants: S&A relevant participants are listed in Table 3-1.
3.2.5 S&A Drill: April 23, 2009
Description: GCWW personnel conducted a site characterization drill to evaluate the implementation of
revised site characterization procedures outlined in the consequence management plan and the standard
operating procedures for site characterization and sampling. This objective was evaluated by observing
the response of GCWW Site Characterization Team to a simulated WQM alert. The drill was designed to
observe two Site Characterization Teams conducting identical field procedures simultaneously, but
independently of each other. Both teams were coordinated by a single Site Characterization Team
Leader.
Relevant Participants: S&A relevant participants are listed in Table 3-1.
3.2.6 CCS / S&A Drill: September 16, 2009
Description: GCWW personnel conducted a CCS/site characterization drill to evaluate the alert
recognition and investigative procedures associated with the CCS component and to evaluate
implementation of the site characterization procedures as they relate to field deployment and investigation
following a CCS alert. This was the first time the GCWW Site Characterization Team practiced their
protocols and field procedures for responding to a CCS alert.
Relevant Participants: S&A relevant participants are listed in Table 3-1.
3.2.7 Full Scale Exercise 3: October 1, 2009
Description: A comprehensive full scale exercise was conducted on October 1, 2009 to provide GCWW
Incident Command System (ICS) second-in-command personnel and local response partner agencies the
opportunity to exercise their protocols related to detection of and response to a drinking water
contamination incident. Procedures such as response partner integration, response time and time for
credibility determination were evaluated.
Role of S&A: The WUERM, Site Characterization Team Leader, and Site Characterization Team
conducted site characterization activities. Site characterization activities for this full scale exercise
differed from the previous full scale exercise based on the need to identify sampling points in public areas
of the distribution system due to the CCS alerts. The Site Characterization Team and Team Leader
deployed to the field, conducted a site investigation, performed rapid field tests and conducted sub-
sampling procedures. Samples were then transported back to the GCWW laboratory.
Relevant Participants: Site Characterization Team Leader (GCWW), Site Characterization Team
(GCWW), Laboratory Program Manager (GCWW), GCWW WUERM and HazMat Unit (CFD)
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3.2.8 BT Agent S&A Drill: May 10, 2010
Description: On May 10, 2010, GCWW and ODH personnel conducted a BT Agent S&A drill in order to
practice site characterization and partner laboratory capabilities, including internal notification procedures
to prepare to receive and analyze samples using the Laboratory Response Network (LRN) BT Agent
Screening Protocol. The Site Characterization Team collected and packaged two samples for BT agent
analysis and EPA transported the samples to the ODH Laboratory. The ODH Laboratory analyzed the
samples and reported both polymerase chain reaction (PCR) and culture results to CHD and GCWW.
Relevant Participants: S&A relevant participants are listed in Table 3-1.
Observed timelines from these drills and exercises will be discussed in Section 6.0. Labor hours
expended during drills and exercises will be discussed in Section 8.0.
Table 3-1. S&A Drill Variations
Variations
Time of Drill (N = Normal business
hours, A = After hours)
Drill Participants
WUERM, GCWW
Site Characterization Team Leader,
GCWW
Site Characterization Team,
GCWW
Laboratory Program Manager,
GCWW
Chemistry Laboratory Program
Manager, GCWW
Laboratory Analysts, GCWW
Program Manager (Test America,
Savannah)
Center for Public Health
Preparedness and ODH Laboratory
and CPD Liaison Director, CHD
Microbiology Laboratory
Supervisor, ODH Laboratory
Bioterrorism Coordinator, ODH
Laboratory
Drill 1
5/7/08
N
Drill 2
7/15/08
N
Drill 3
3/31/09
N
Drill 4
4/23/09
N
CCS/S&A
9/16/09
N
BT Drill1
5/10/10
N
Number of Participants
0
1
5
1
1
0
1
0
0
0
1
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
3
0
0
0
0
0
1
6
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
4
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
2
1
0
0
0
1
1
1
During this drill, one participant at GCWW served as the Site Characterization Team Leader as well as the
Laboratory Program Manager.
3.3 Simulation Study
Evaluation of certain design objectives relies on the occurrence of contamination incidents with known
and varied characteristics. Because contamination incidents are extremely rare, there is insufficient
empirical data to fully evaluate the detection and response capabilities of the Cincinnati CWS. To fill this
gap, a computer model was developed using Cincinnati pilot data. This allowed the model CWS to be
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challenged with a large ensemble of simulated contamination scenarios. For the S&A component,
simulation study data was used to evaluate the following design objectives:
• Contaminant Coverage: Analyses conducted for this design objective demonstrate the detection
statistics for site characterization (including water quality parameter and rapid field testing) and
laboratory analysis.
• Timeliness of Response: Analyses conducted to evaluate this design objective quantify the
number of scenarios in which field or laboratory results contributed to the determination that
contamination was Credible or Confirmed, and the number of scenarios in which field or
laboratory results were available prior to the public health response. Statistical analyses
characterize the various timeline metrics, such as the time that elapsed between determination that
contamination was Possible and the time that field or laboratory results were available.
A broad range of contaminant types, producing a range of symptoms, was utilized in the simulation study
to characterize the detection capabilities of the monitoring and surveillance components of a CWS. For
the purpose of the simulation study, a representative set of 17 contaminants was selected from the
comprehensive contaminant list that formed the basis for CWS design. These contaminants are grouped
into the broad categories listed below (the number in parentheses indicates the number of contaminants
from that category that were simulated during the study). A description of the manner in which the
critical concentration, which is the concentration that would produce adverse health effects (or aesthetic
problems in the case of the nuisance chemicals), was derived is also provided for each contaminant
category.
• Nuisance Chemicals (2): these chemical contaminants have a relatively low toxicity and thus
generally do not pose an immediate threat to public health. However, contamination with these
chemicals can make the drinking water supply unusable. The critical concentration for nuisance
chemicals was selected at levels that would make the water unacceptable to customers, e.g.,
concentrations that result in objectionable aesthetic characteristics.
• Toxic Chemicals (8): these chemicals are highly toxic and pose an acute risk to public health at
relatively low concentrations. The critical concentration for toxic chemicals was based on the
mass of contaminant that a 70 kg adult would need to consume in one liter of water to have a 10%
probability of dying (LD10).
• Biological Agents (7): these contaminants of biological origin include pathogens and toxins that
pose a risk to public health at relatively low concentrations. The critical concentration for
biological agents was based on the mass of contaminant that a 70 kg adult would need to
consume in one liter of water, or inhale during a showering event, to have a 10% probability of
dying (LD10).
Development of a detailed CWS model required extensive data collection and documentation of
assumptions regarding component and system operations. To the extent possible, model decision logic
and parameter values were developed from data generated through operation of the Cincinnati CWS,
although input from subject matter experts and available research was utilized as well.
The simulation study used several interrelated models, four of which are relevant to the evaluation of
S&A: EPANET, Health Impacts and Human Behavior (HI/HB), Site Characterization, and Laboratory
Analysis. Each model is further broken down into modules that simulate a particular process or attribute
of the model. The function of each of these models, and their relevance to the evaluation of S&A, is
discussed below.
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EPANET
EPANET is a common hydraulic and water quality modeling application widely used in the water
industry to simulate contaminant transport through a drinking water distribution system. In the simulation
study, it was used to produce contaminant concentration profiles at every node in the GCWW distribution
system model, based on the characteristics of each contamination scenario in the ensemble. The
concentration profiles were used to determine the number of miles of pipe contaminated during each
scenario, which is one measure of the consequences of that contamination scenario.
Health Impacts and Human Behavior Model
The HI/HB model used the concentration profiles generated by EPANET to simulate exposure of
customers in the GCWW service area to contaminated drinking water. Depending on the type of
contaminant, exposures occurred during one showering event in the morning (for the inhalation exposure
route), or during five consumption events spread throughout the day (for the ingestion exposure route).
The HI/HB model used the dose received during exposure events to predict infections, onset of
symptoms, health-seeking behaviors of symptomatic customers and fatalities.
The primary output from the HI/HB model was a case table of affected customers, which captured the
time at which each transitioned to mild, moderate and severe symptom categories. Additionally, the
HI/HB model outputted the times at which exposed individuals would pursue various health-seeking
behaviors, such as visiting their doctor or calling the poison control center. The case table was used to
determine the public health consequences of each scenario, specifically the total number of illnesses and
fatalities. Furthermore, EPANET and the HI/HB model were run twice for each scenario; once without
the CWS in operation and once with the CWS in operation. The paired results from these runs were used
to calculate the reduction in consequences due to CWS operations for each simulated contamination
scenario.
Site Characterization and Sampling Model
In the Cincinnati CWS model, the Site Characterization and Sampling model was developed based on
procedures GCWW uses to investigate sites in the distribution system associated with Possible
contamination incidents. This module encompasses Site Characterization Team mobilization, travel time,
deployment, site approach, field safety screening, sample retrieval, rapid field testing, grab and sub-
sampling for laboratory analyses, sample packaging in the field and transport to GCWW for disposition of
samples to partner laboratories. Table 3-2 depicts GCWW's field safety screening, rapid field testing,
and water quality parameter testing capabilities for the 17 contaminants evaluated in the simulation study.
Table 3-2. Field Testing Capabilities
Type1
Nuisance Chemical 1
Nuisance Chemical 2
Toxic Chemical 1
Toxic Chemical 2
Toxic Chemical 3
Toxic Chemical 4
Toxic Chemical 5
Toxic Chemical 6
Toxic Chemical 7
Toxic Chemical 8
Field Safety
Screening
•/
•/
Rapid Field
Testing
•/
•/
s
s
•/
Water Quality
Parameter
Testing
•/
S
•/
S
•/
S
•/
•/
S
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Water Security Initiative: Evaluation of the Sampling and Analysis Component
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Type1
Biological Agent 1
Biological Agent 2
Biological Agent 3
Biological Agent 4
Biological Agent 5
Biological Agent 6
Biological Agent 7
Field Safety
Screening
Rapid Field
Testing
Water Quality
Parameter
Testing
•/
S
•/
•/
S
•/
S
Note that the 17 contaminants modeled in the simulation study were assigned generic IDs for security purposes.
The Site Characterization and Sampling model is initiated in response to Possible contamination as
determined through the investigation of an alert from one or more of the monitoring and surveillance
components. Once the threat level reaches Possible, the WUERM has the responsibility for determining
sampling locations. The Site Characterization Team will begin mobilization and deploy to alert locations
identified by the WUERM. Samples retrieved from the sites are returned to the central GCWW
laboratory and/or partner laboratories for analysis.
Laboratory Analysis Model
The Laboratory Analysis model was based on procedures and methods GCWW and partner laboratories
use to process and analyze samples and report results from Possible contamination incidents. The
Laboratory Analysis model encompasses notification of laboratories to prepare for sample receipt and
analysis, sample disposition to method laboratories, sample analysis, data review and results reporting to
the WUERM.
In the Laboratory Analysis model, certain samples are transported directly from the field location to the
laboratory performing analyses, so no time delay is included in these instances for sample receipt and
disposition at the GCWW central laboratory. All other samples are transported to the GCWW central
laboratory for sample disposition and analysis. Laboratory mobilization begins at the time the WUERM
notifies the Laboratory Program Manager to mobilize, which includes assembling staff and calibrating
instrumentation.
In the model, laboratory analyses begin when the laboratory has mobilized and samples are received. The
model allows analyses to be performed concurrently once the two criteria above are met. Under special
conditions, "triggered" laboratories may be activated to analyze for contaminants outside of the baseline
suite. While these laboratories were not utilized during baseline monitoring, they were identified using a
variety of resources, including EPA's Laboratory Compendium, referral and direct telephone contact.
Through direct telephone contact with the performing laboratory, analytical methods, sample transport
times, laboratory mobilization times, sample analysis times, minimum concentration to detect and results
reporting protocols and times were established for use in the simulation study model. Analyses that these
laboratories would perform for the additional five contaminants are called "triggered" analyses.
While all 17 contaminants evaluated in the simulation study theoretically could be confirmed by the S&A
component, they can only be detected by S&A if the sample is sent to the laboratory that analyzes for that
specific contaminant, and if the contaminant concentration is above the minimum concentration to detect.
Table 3-3 indicates which of these contaminants would be detected via analyses performed as a part of
GCWW's baseline suite of analysis (conducted either in-house or at a partner laboratory), and which
would be detected through "triggered" analyses. This table also indicates the ratio of the critical
concentration to the minimum reporting limit for each contaminant. The ratio was calculated to
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determine whether the minimum reporting limit was sufficient to detect water contaminated at
concentrations equal to or greater than the critical concentration. Ratios greater than 1.0 demonstrate the
contaminants that can be detected at concentrations below the critical concentration. As can be seen from
the ratios in Table 3-3, all laboratory methods employed in the Cincinnati CWS could detect contaminants
at concentrations significantly smaller than the critical concentration.
Table 3-3. Laboratory Testing Capabilities
Type1
Nuisance Chemical 1
Nuisance Chemical 2
Toxic Chemical 1
Toxic Chemical 2
Toxic Chemical 3
Toxic Chemical 4
Toxic Chemical 5
Toxic Chemical 6
Toxic Chemical 7
Toxic Chemical 8
Biological Agent 1
Biological Agent 2
Biological Agent 3
Biological Agent 4
Biological Agent 5
Biological Agent 6
Biological Agent 7
Critical Concentration/
Minimum Reporting Limit
2.00 x 104
2.00 x 104
1,470
3.39 x 104
3.69 x 10s
5.80 x 104
6,680
4.08 x 104
57.0
6.60 x 107
2.25 x 104
4.93 x 105
2430
90.7
20.0
5.79 x 104
3.30 x 105
Baseline Suite or
Triggered Analysis
Baseline Suite
Baseline Suite
Baseline Suite
Baseline Suite
Baseline Suite
Baseline Suite
Baseline Suite
Baseline Suite
Triggered
Baseline Suite
Triggered
Baseline Suite
Triggered
Triggered
Triggered
Baseline Suite
Baseline Suite
Note that the 17 contaminants modeled in the simulation study were assigned generic IDs for security purposes.
The following assumptions used in the design of the S&A model are important to consider when
evaluating the simulation study results presented in this report:
• In order for a sample to be sent for "triggered" analyses, there must be some indication or
evidence of the contaminant from other components to prompt the analyses. This evidence may
come from site characterization results, water quality changes produced by the contaminant
and/or the symptoms reported by exposed individuals.
• Contaminant injection locations at utility facilities with enhanced security monitoring (ESM)
capabilities were the only sites that produced a positive field safety screening result for Nuisance
Chemical 1 or the Toxic Chemical 8. The implicit assumption is that neat material is present at
the injection location, which triggered a field safety screening hit.
• Special conditions exist for field analyses when the first alert that occurs in a scenario is either a
WQM or ESM alert. In these scenarios, personnel that are deployed for alert investigations
perform some site characterization activities as part of the investigation of the component alert.
Specifically, during the investigation of the first WQM alert, the following site characterization
activities were performed by the Water Quality and Treatment Technician who was deployed to
inspect the water quality monitoring station: Site Characterization Team mobilization,
deployment, site approach and field safety screening. During enhanced security monitoring alert
investigations, site approach and field safety screening was performed by enhanced security
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monitoring alert investigation personnel, who then communicated the screening results to the Site
Characterization Team upon the team's arrival at the site.
• The concentration in a sample was the concentration at the node to which the Site
Characterization Team is deployed at the time the sample was collected. This concentration was
obtained from the EPANET output.
• For CCS and PHS alerts, it is assumed that the Site Characterization Team will be deployed to the
residences of one of the individuals whose case is associated with the alert. If the contaminant
used in the scenario is a chemical, the sample concentration is assumed to be equal to the
concentration at the node at the time the person was exposed (i.e., contaminated water remains in
household plumbing for at least a few hours).
• Samples collected at a node associated with a PHS alert for scenarios involving some of the
biological agents had a concentration of zero. This assumption is based on the relatively long
delay between exposure to some biological agents and onset of symptoms followed by the health
seeking behavior that produced the alert.
• Samples containing a contaminant concentration above the minimum concentration to detect
always produced a positive result for rapid field tests and laboratory analyses. It was assumed
that there were no false negative results.
• There were no QA issues that would negate the results of laboratory analysis. However, it was
assumed that a QA review of the data was performed, resulting in a one-hour delay between
generation of results and reporting them to the WUERM.
3.4 Forums
Feedback and suggestions on all aspects of the S&A component were captured during monthly staff
interviews during the evaluation period (March 2008 - June 2010) as well as during a lessons learned
workshop (September 2009). Information gathered through these forums provided insight regarding
which pieces of the component were acceptable to the end-users and others that required modification or
enhancement.
• Monthly Interviews with Utility Staff: GCWW staff members were contacted monthly in order
to track maintenance monitoring efforts. These interviews were generally conducted by
telephone and the information was used to update and track S&A performance data.
• Lessons Learned Workshop: The purpose of the lessons learned workshop was to allow
GCWW and partner personnel (i.e., ODH, CHD, CFD) to provide feedback regarding the
performance, operation and sustainability of the S&A component during the evaluation period.
The group expressed specific feedback regarding the strengths and weaknesses of the S&A
component in the context of establishing an effective system for routine and incident response
sampling and analysis.
3.5 Analysis of Lifecycle Costs
A systematic process was used to evaluate the lifecycle cost of the S&A component, which represents the
overall cost of the S&A component over the lifecycle of the Cincinnati CWS, which is assumed to be 20
years for the purpose of this analysis. The analysis includes implementation costs, component
modification costs, annual operations and maintenance (O&M) costs renewal and replacement costs, and
the salvage value of major pieces of equipment.
Implementation costs include labor and other expenditures (equipment, supplies, and purchased services)
for installing the S&A component. Implementation costs were summarized in Water Security Initiative:
Cincinnati Pilot Post-Implementation System Status (USEPA, 2008), which was used as a primary data
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source for this analysis. In that report, overarching project management costs incurred during the
implementation process were captured as a separate line item. However, in this analysis, the project
management costs were equally distributed among the six components of the CWS, and are presented as a
separate line item for each component. Component modification costs include all labor and expenditures
incurred after the completion of major implementation activities in December 2007 that were not
attributable to O&M costs. These modification costs were tracked on a monthly basis, summed at the end
of the evaluation period and added to the overall implementation costs.
It should be noted that implementation costs for the Cincinnati CWS may be higher than those for other
utilities given that this project was the first comprehensive, large-scale CWS of its kind and had no
experience base to draw from. Costs that would not likely apply to future implementers (but which
were incurred for the Cincinnati CWS) include overhead for EPA and its contractors, cost associated
with deploying alternative designs and additional data collection and reporting requirements. Other
utilities planning for a similar large-scale CWS installation would have the benefit of lessons learned
and an experience base developed through implementation of the Cincinnati CWS.
Annual O&M costs include labor and other expenditures (supplies and purchased services) necessary to
operate and maintain the component and investigate alerts. O&M costs were obtained from procurement
records, maintenance logs, investigation checklists, and training logs. Procurement records provided the
cost of supplies, repairs, and replacement parts, while maintenance logs tracked the staff time spent
maintaining the S&A component. To account for the maintenance of documents, the cost incurred to
update documented procedures following drills and exercises conducted during the evaluation phase of
the pilot was used to estimate the annualized cost. Investigation checklists and training logs tracked the
staff hours spent on investigating alerts and training, respectively. The O&M costs were annualized by
calculating the sum of labor and other expenditures (supplies and purchased services).
Labor hours for both implementation and O&M were tracked over the entire evaluation period. Labor
hours were converted to dollars using estimated local labor rates for the different institutions involved in
the implementation or O&M of the S&A component.
The renewal and replacement costs are based on the cost of replacing these major pieces of equipment at
the end of their useful life. The useful life of S&A equipment was estimated using field experience,
manufacturer-provided data, and input from subject matter experts. Equipment was assumed to be
replaced at the end of its useful life over the 20-year lifecycle of the Cincinnati CWS. The salvage value
is based on the estimated value of each major piece of equipment at the end of the lifecycle of the
Cincinnati CWS. The salvage value was estimated for all equipment with an initial value greater than
~$1,000. Straight line depreciation was used to estimate the salvage value for all major pieces of S&A
equipment based on the lifespan of each item.
All of the cost parameters described above (implementation costs, enhancement costs, O&M costs,
renewal and replacement costs, and salvage value) were used to calculate the total lifecycle cost for the
S&A component, as discussed in Section 8.1.
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Section 4.0: Design Objective - Spatial Coverage
Analysis of spatial coverage of the S&A component describes the geographic scope of sampling locations
across the GCWW service area. A description of the rationale for location selection for each of the
phases of baseline monitoring and those that would be targeted during incident response is presented.
4.1 Spatial Coverage
Definition: Spatial coverage includes the spatially diverse and hydraulically significant area covered
through routine and incident response sampling and analysis, as determined by sampling locations
selected during Phase 1 and tested during Phases 2, 3, and 4 of baseline monitoring (described in Section
2.2.1). The objective of these sampling locations was to establish contaminant occurrence and method
performance throughout the distribution system.
Analysis Methodology: Empirical data of the number and types of samples collected at various locations.
Results: In theory, samples can be collected from any location within the GCWW service area.
However, for purposes of routine and maintenance monitoring, strategic locations were identified such
that samples could be collected in an efficient manner. These strategic locations were based on the
placement of online water quality monitors and enhanced security monitoring equipment.
These locations provided 18 strategic and 5 priority locations to conduct regular sample collection as part
of Phase 3 of baseline monitoring; the strategic and priority sampling locations may also be used as
incident response sampling sites in the event of a suspected contamination incident. Table 4-1 illustrates
the strategic and priority sampling locations and their associated treatment plants.
Table 4-1. Strategic and Priority Sample Locations for Baseline Monitoring
Sampling Location
Strategic Locations
Pump Station
Elevated Tank
Ground Tank
Reservoir
Fire Station
Tank
Treatment Plant
Priority Locations
Reservoir
Elevated Tank
Booster Station
Associated Treatment Plant
Miller
4
4
1
2
3
-
1
Miller
2
1
1
Bolton
-
-
-
-
-
-
1
Bolton
-
-
-
Interface
1
-
-
-
-
1
-
Interface
-
1
-
Due to logistical issues at some of the strategic locations (i.e., the large volume of water required for BT
agent testing), eleven alternate locations within the distribution system were also selected for routine
monitoring. However, all 18 of the strategic locations were sampled during the first year of baseline
monitoring to practice procedures associated with these sites. Phase 4 of baseline monitoring was a
survey study of 54 different sampling sites over a two month period. Sample collection locations were
selected primarily from GCWW's total coliform rule monitoring route. The goal of the survey study was
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to sample spatially diverse locations in a short period of time as well as to capture a range of conditions in
water age, pressure zones and pipe material. Figure 4-1, below, is a map of greater Cincinnati showing
the survey locations (red dots denote survey sampling locations). The colored shading in different areas
of this map demonstrates the various pressure zones and service areas in GCWW's distribution system.
Figure 4-1. Survey Sample Sites
Following baseline monitoring, a transition to maintenance monitoring occurred which involved
continued sampling at a total of 31 strategic locations. During incident response sampling and analysis,
sampling location will be determined using information gathered from other components of the CWS and
can include any locations covered by baseline monitoring as well as customer taps, fire hydrants and
tanks.
4.2 Summary
The spatial coverage design objective for the S&A component was achieved through routine sample
collection from strategic, priority, and survey sampling locations throughout GCWW's distribution
system. Baseline monitoring was performed to establish contaminant occurrence (levels and frequency),
method performance, seasonal trends and to establish laboratory preparedness for incident response.
Sampling locations were selected to leverage WQM and ESM locations, as well as existing GCWW
sampling plans (e.g., total coliform rule monitoring route, tank routes). It was important to characterize
baseline contaminant occurrence and method performance at locations that may be sampled during
incident response sampling and analysis. Following completion of baseline monitoring, the utility
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transitioned to maintenance monitoring and is continuing to collect samples from 31 strategic locations
throughout the distribution system to maintain proficiency in field and laboratory methods and to update
contaminant baseline data.
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Section 5.0: Design Objective - Contaminant Coverage
As described in Section 2.1, the S&A component was designed to enhance laboratory capability and
capacity to perform screening and confirmatory analyses for a wide range of contaminants under routine
and non-routine conditions. When possible, in-house capabilities at GCWW were used to build broad
contaminant detection capabilities. If GCWW did not have the capability in-house, field and laboratory
equipment or additional personnel training were acquired. For targeted priority contaminants outside of
GCWW's range of capabilities, a support laboratory network was established. Background levels of
priority contaminants were documented during baseline monitoring. During maintenance monitoring, a
reduced sampling and analysis schedule was established which allowed the utility and partner laboratories
to maintain proficiency in methods and to update contaminant baseline data. Three metrics were used to
assess contaminant coverage of the S&A component: contaminant detection potential, contaminant
detection limit and contaminant scenario coverage.
5.1 Contaminant Detection Potential
Definition: Contaminant detection potential is the ability to detect specific contaminants or contaminant
classes through field or laboratory analysis of water samples, as determined by the S&A design element
field and laboratory testing capabilities (Section 2.1).
Analysis Methodology: Description of field and laboratory methods deployed during baseline and
maintenance monitoring for the S&A component.
Results: Prior to implementation of the Cincinnati pilot, EPA compiled a list of high priority
contaminants of interest to water security. From the high priority contaminant list, EPA identified a
subset of chemical, radiochemical, and microbiological contaminants to monitor during the Cincinnati
pilot at GCWW. A suite of field and laboratory methods to detect these contaminants was devised.
Table 5-1 presents the target water quality parameters identified for analysis during baseline and
maintenance monitoring at GCWW. The instruments/test kits used to test for these parameters (see Table
2-3) provide screening capability, and are not considered confirmatory.
Table 5-1. Target Water Quality Parameters for Baseline Monitoring at GCWW
Target Parameters
Free cyanide
Free chlorine
pH, conductivity, ORP, turbidity
Chemical Warfare Agents
Radioactivity (alpha, beta, gamma)
VOCs and combustible gases
Toxicity*
Arsenic
* Field test performed during baseline monitoring, but discontinued during maintenance monitoring
Table 5-2 demonstrates the contaminant class analytical capabilities identified for baseline monitoring at
GCWW. Laboratory capabilities for each of these contaminant classes were successfully implemented,
either at GCWW or at external partner laboratories. These capabilities would be used during response to
Possible contamination incidents. The laboratory methods used for analytes in these contaminant classes
are considered confirmatory methods, with the exception of the BT Agent method. Subsequent culture
analysis would be needed to confirm PCR results.
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Table 5-2. Contaminant Classes for Baseline Monitoring at GCWW
Contaminant Classes
VOCs Carbamates
SVOCs Radiochemicals
Total cyanide BT Agents
Metals
In some instances, it may be necessary to seek analytical confirmation for contaminants outside of the
analytical capabilities described above. This process would only be performed if there was information
available from S&A or other CWS components indicating a suspected contaminant. While it may be
possible to utilize GCWW capabilities, support from partner laboratories would be required in some
cases; the process of identifying a capable support laboratory would take extra time. Depending on the
information available during the incident, existing methods could be used to target the suspected
contaminant. For example, the methods used to detect metals or SVOCs can expand beyond the target
analytes in the contaminant classes described above to detect hundreds of additional contaminants.
5.2 Contaminant Detection Limit
Definition: The S&A component metric for contaminant minimum reporting limits is defined as the
lowest concentration of a specific baseline contaminant that can be empirically measured and reliably
reported using a confirmatory method as determined by the performing laboratory. Method detection
limits and minimum reporting limits for targeted chemical contaminants were empirically determined by
each laboratory conducting analyses. An estimated detection limit based on information provided by the
manufacturer as well as published literature and field experience is used for contaminants detected by
screening methods.
Analysis Methodology: Minimum reporting limits for each baseline contaminant and analytical method,
both screening and confirmatory, were determined during Phase 1 of baseline monitoring based on
empirical laboratory results, published reports, and manufacturer information.
Results: Estimates of rapid field test screening detection limits were based on published literature,
manufacture information, and GCWW experience with field equipment. Empirical data from samples
collected during routine sampling was also compiled by analyte and method for each of the contaminants
targeted during baseline monitoring.
5.3 Contamination Scenario Coverage
Definition: Contamination scenario coverage is defined as the ratio of contamination incidents that are
actually detected to those that are theoretically detectable based on field and laboratory detection
capabilities of the component.
Analysis Methodology: Simulation study results were used to characterize contamination scenario
coverage of the S&A component, including both site characterization and laboratory analyses. Site
characterization detection is characterized by results from both water quality parameter testing and rapid
field testing. If either water quality parameter tests or rapid field tests indicated a deviation from the
established baseline, the site characterization component of S&A "detects" a scenario. Detection by
laboratory analysis of the 17 contaminants modeled in the simulation study may occur if 1) samples are
collected and analyzed as part of the baseline suite of analyses that GCWW performs in response to
Possible or Credible contamination incidents (total of 12 target contaminants), or 2) if there is sufficient
information in the scenario to "trigger" analyses for any of the five contaminants that were not part of the
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baseline suite but that were modeled for the simulation study. Refer to Section 3.3 for a description of the
assumptions used in the simulation study that are relevant to S&A results.
Results: Table 5-3 presents the site characterization detection statistics for each of the 17 contaminants
under evaluation in the simulation study. A total of 1,666 contamination scenarios out of a possible 2,015
(83%) were detected by either water quality parameter tests and/or rapid field tests in the simulation
model. All scenarios that could have been detected by rapid field tests (for Nuisance Chemical 1, Toxic
Chemical 1, Toxic Chemical 2, Toxic Chemical 7 and Toxic Chemical 8) were detected. The column
labeled "Non-Detect Description" indicates the reason for scenarios that were not detected by site
characterization for each contaminant, accompanied by the total number of scenarios that were not
detected (as presented in the column on the far right).
Many more contamination scenarios were detected which involved rapid symptom onset as compared to
the biological agents with delayed symptom onset. The GCWW Site Characterization Team is equipped
with field tests that can indicate the presence of Nuisance Chemical 1 and some of the toxic chemicals,
whereas that availability of verified technologies for field testing for biological agents in water samples is
limited. Of the 349 contamination scenarios that were not detected by site characterization activities, 224
were scenarios involving biological agents with delayed symptom onset, in which the first detection of the
contamination incident was made by the PHS component. For these scenarios, sampling did not occur
soon enough to capture a water sample containing the contaminant.
In 45 of the contamination scenarios that were not detected, a Possible water contamination determination
was not reached; in these instances, a Site Characterization Team would not have been deployed to collect
samples. Finally, the remaining 80 contamination scenarios were not detected by WATER QUALITY
parameter testing due to the simulated change in C12 or total organic carbon not deviating enough from
the normal range, or due to an inability to detect the contaminant via rapid field testing.
Table 5-3. Site Characterization Detection Statistics
Contaminant
Nuisance Chemical 1
Nuisance Chemical 2
Toxic Chemical 1
Toxic Chemical 2
Toxic Chemical 3
Toxic Chemical 4
Toxic Chemical 5
Toxic Chemical 6
Toxic Chemical 7
Toxic Chemical 8
Biological Agent 1
Total
Scenarios
119
119
119
119
119
119
119
119
119
119
119
Scenarios
Not
Detected
0
47
0
0
14
0
0
1
0
0
0
Percent
Detected
100%1
61%
100%1
100%1
88%
100%
100%
99%
100%1
100%1
100%
Non-Detect Description
N/A
Threat level did not reach
Possible
Contaminant concentration
below detection limit
N/A
N/A
Contaminant concentration
below detection limit
N/A
N/A
Contaminant concentration
below detection limit
N/A
N/A
N/A
Number of
Scenarios
N/A
39
8
N/A
N/A
14
N/A
N/A
1
N/A
N/A
N/A
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Contaminant
Biological Agent 2
Biological Agent 3
Biological Agent 4
Biological Agent 5
Biological Agent 6
Biological Agent 7
Total
Scenarios
119
119
119
119
113
117
Scenarios
Not
Detected
0
0
58
33
93
103
Percent
Detected
100%
100%
51%2
72%2
18%2
12%2
Non-Detect Description
N/A
N/A
PHS was first to detect and
scenario involved a biological
agent
Contaminant concentration
below detection limit
PHS was first to detect and
scenario involved a biological
agent
Contaminant concentration
below detection limit
PHS was first to detect and
scenario involved a biological
agent
Threat level did not reach
Possible
Contaminant concentration
below detection limit
PHS was first to detect and
scenario involved a biological
agent
Threat level did not reach
Possible
Contaminant concentration
below detection limit
Number of
Scenarios
N/A
N/A
40
18
31
2
71
3
19
82
3
18
100% contamination scenario detection by rapid field testing capability.
2 The detection statistics for these biological agents indicate the frequency at which a WATER QUALITY parameter
test showed a deviation in either free chlorine or total organic carbon in these contamination scenarios.
Table 5-4 presents the laboratory analysis detection statistics for each of the 17 contaminants under
evaluation in the simulation study. A total of 1,729 contamination scenarios out of a possible 2,015
(86%) were detected by laboratory analysis in the simulation study. The column labeled "Non-Detect
Description" indicates the reason for scenarios that were not detected by laboratory analysis for each
contaminant, accompanied by the total number of scenarios that were not detected (as presented in the
column on the far right).
Many more contamination scenarios were detected which involved toxic chemicals and biological agents
with rapid symptom onset (1 through 3) as compared to the biological agents with delayed symptom onset
(4 through 7). Similar to the site characterization detection results, for some of the scenarios involving
biological agents (223 scenarios), sampling was not initiated until PHS component alerts had occurred,
which did not occur in time to capture a sample containing the contaminant.
In 45 of the contamination scenarios that were not detected, a Possible water contamination determination
was not reached; in these instances, a Site Characterization Team would not have been deployed to collect
samples. Three of the contamination scenarios not detected were due to the fact that the scenario
involved a contaminant that was not part of the baseline suite of analyses and the scenario did not contain
sufficient information to prompt "triggered" analysis. Therefore, the contaminant was not detected in
these three scenarios because the contaminants were not detectable by the baseline suite of methods.
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Finally, in 13 of the contamination scenarios, the contaminant was not detected as it was present in a
concentration below the detection limit of the method (in some cases there was no contaminant in the
sample). Scenarios wherein the samples that were collected did not contain any of the contaminant were
characterized. For all these scenarios, it was determined that the WQM component was the first to
produce an alert. However, water quality parameters had not changed above a specified threshold;
therefore, the investigation was aborted. This logic was built into the model to be representative of
GCWW's investigation practices for WQM alerts; if there is only one WQM alert, and if that alert does
not "appreciably" change water quality, GCWW investigators will wait for more information to come in
from other WQM stations before proceeding with the investigation. If no additional information becomes
available, the WQM investigation is terminated before reaching Possible for that scenario. Therefore, in
the contamination scenarios where this logic applied, samples were not collected until subsequent alerts
were produced by other components. For the 13 scenarios where the contaminant was not detected, the
PHS component was the next to produce alerts. Because samples were collected from PHS alert locations
days after the first and only WQM alert in most cases, they did not contain the contaminant and thus
yielded a negative sample result.
Table 5-4. Laboratory Analysis Detection Statistics
Contaminant
Nuisance Chemical 1
Nuisance Chemical 2
Toxic Chemical 1
Toxic Chemical 2
Toxic Chemical 3
Toxic Chemical 4
Toxic Chemical 5
Toxic Chemical 6
Toxic Chemical 7
Toxic Chemical 8
Biological Agent 1
Biological Agent 2
Biological Agents
Biological Agent 4
Biological Agent 5
Total
Scenarios
119
119
119
119
119
119
119
119
119
119
119
119
119
119
119
Scenarios
Not Detected
0
39
0
0
0
2
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
42
33
Percent
Detected
100%
67%
100%
100%
100%
98%
100%
99%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
65%
72%
Non-Detect Description
N/A
Threat level did not reach
Possible
N/A
N/A
N/A
Contaminant not detectable by
the baseline suite of methods
and "triggered" analysis was not
initiated
N/A
Contaminant concentration
below detection limit
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
PHS was first to detect and
scenario involved a contaminant
with delayed symptom onset
Contaminant concentration
below detection limit
PHS was first to detect and
scenario involved a contaminant
with delayed symptom onset
Triggered laboratory analysis
not initiated; incorrect laboratory
Contaminant concentration
below detection limit
Number of
Scenarios
N/A
39
N/A
N/A
N/A
2
N/A
1
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
39
3
31
1
1
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Contaminant
Biological Agent 6
Biological Agent 7
Total
Scenarios
113
117
Scenarios
Not Detected
79
90
Percent
Detected
30%
23%
Non-Detect Description
PHS was first to detect and
scenario involved a contaminant
with delayed symptom onset
Threat level did not reach
Possible
Contaminant concentration
below detection limit
PHS was first to detect and
scenario involved a contaminant
with delayed symptom onset
Threat level did not reach
Possible
Contaminant concentration
below detection limit
Number of
Scenarios
71
3
5
82
3
5
5.4 Summary
The S&A component of the Cincinnati pilot met the contaminant coverage design objective through
successful implementation of field and laboratory methods for all target water quality parameters and
priority contaminants identified during design of the component. Though it is possible that a
contamination incident may involve a contaminant outside of the suite of baseline methods utilized by
GCWW, the utility is prepared to implement the process of identifying a capable support laboratory if
information is available from field screening or from other CWS components about the suspected
contaminant. Furthermore, approximate detection limits were identified using manufacturer information
for each of the field methods, and reporting limits were identified based on laboratory data for each of the
confirmatory methods included in GCWW's baseline suite of analyses.
Simulation study results demonstrated a contaminant scenario detection rate of 83% for site
characterization results (water quality parameter tests and rapid field tests) and 86% for laboratory
analysis results. The predominant reason that non-detects occurred was explained by scenarios in which
contamination by a biological agent was first detected by the PHS component. By the time that the Site
Characterization Team was deployed to collect samples, the contaminated water had already passed
through the system, leading to non-detects in field and laboratory analyses. This finding underscores the
importance of a multi-component CWS which does not rely solely on PHS for detection of drinking water
contamination incidents, but involves multiple monitoring and surveillance components. For example, in
many scenarios involving biological agents with delayed symptom onset, WQM detected contaminated
water while it was still in the distribution system, allowing for the automated sampling devices at each
WQM location to capture a sample that did contain detectable concentrations of the biological agent. In
these scenarios, the contaminant was also detected during site characterization and/or laboratory analysis.
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Section 6.0: Design Objective - Timeliness of Response
Analysis of the timeliness of response by the S&A component considers metrics that quantify the time for
field safety screening, sample collection, rapid field test procedures, sample packaging and transport,
laboratory analysis, data interpretation and results reporting. The timeline for incident response sampling
and analysis is used as the basis for analysis under this design objective. Results from drills and exercises
are used to evaluate this design objective.
6.1 Timeline of Incident Response Sampling and Analysis
Definition: This timeliness of contaminant detection is defined as a portion of the incident timeline that
begins with the recognition of a Possible contamination incident and ends with a determination regarding
whether or not the contamination is detected or confirmed by field or laboratory analyses. This metric is
meant to measure S&A activities during incident response to a contamination incident as opposed to
routine sampling. Timeliness is divided into discreet activities in order to capture and differentiate
specific processes that affect the overall time required to detect or confirm the presence of a baseline
contaminant using the baseline suite of analytical methods. These activities include:
1) Time to deploy to contamination site - a portion of the incident timeline that begins with notification
from the WUERM that the Site Characterization Team should deploy and proceeds through: Site
Characterization Team briefing and assignment of responsibilities; identifying equipment and
supplies needed for site characterization and field sampling; calibration of field instruments and
preparation of field reagents and standards; loading supplies and personnel into response vehicle;
departing the utility; and arrival at the perimeter of the sampling location.
2) Time for site approach and field safety screening - a portion of the incident timeline that begins after
the Site Characterization Team has arrived on scene and includes preparation of necessary equipment
and donning of appropriate personal protective equipment to begin site approach, continual visual
observation and reporting of site conditions and continual monitoring and reporting of radiation and
atmospheric gas levels to ensure site safety.
3) Time for sample collection - a portion of the incident timeline that begins with the initiation of
sampling and ends with retrieval of a sample(s) for rapid field testing and/or laboratory analysis.
4) Time for sample analysis
a) Time for rapid field testing - a portion of the incident timeline that begins with initiation of rapid
field testing and ends with reporting of results to the WUERM by the Site Characterization Team
Leader,
b) Time for laboratory sample analysis - a portion of the incident timeline that begins with receipt
and disposition of the sample(s) for laboratory-based analysis and ends with data reporting to the
GCWW Laboratory Program Manager.
5) Time for laboratory data review and results reporting - a portion of the incident timeline that begins
with the receipt of laboratory analytical results by the GCWW Laboratory Program Manager,
involves comparison of data to baseline contaminant occurrence and method performance and ends
with reporting of laboratory results to the WUERM.
Analysis Methodology: Data is derived from incident response sampling and analysis timelines as
measured during drills and exercises and data sources include field results forms, chain-of-custody forms
and after action reports. Results are reported (hrs:min) and are updated as appropriate. Furthermore, an
overall estimated timeline for sampling and analysis was estimated based on data gathered during drills
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and exercises. In some cases, partner laboratories would conduct sample analysis of analytes that had not
previously been targeted during baseline monitoring; these laboratories were contacted to gather time
estimates for sample analysis and results reporting.
Simulation study results were used to characterize the average time between a Possible water
contamination determination and availability of site characterization results/laboratory results to evaluate
the timeliness of S&A results for each contaminant. Furthermore, simulation study results were evaluated
to determine the number of contamination scenarios in which S&A results (site characterization and
laboratory results) had an impact on elevating the threat level to Credible or Confirmed. The time of
S&A results was compared to the time of Credible and Confirmed contamination. Simulation study
results were also used to evaluate the number of contamination scenarios in which S&A results played a
role in activating the public health response by comparing the time of S&A results to the time that the
public health response was initiated. Contamination scenarios included in the analyses described above
were those wherein field or laboratory results were available (which varied for each contaminant).
Results: Observed timelines were derived from S&A drills and exercises. These times reflect the
practical application of sample collection, laboratory analysis, and data interpretation as part of incident
response sampling and analysis performed in response to various practice contamination scenarios
representative of the baseline suite of contaminants. In the event that methods beyond the baseline suite
were needed during incident response, more time may be necessary to identify an appropriate method and
locate a capable facility. Depending on the method needed, this could add significant time onto the
overall S&A response timeline.
A summary of S&A times observed during drills and exercises at the Cincinnati pilot can be found in
Table 6-1. A range of time, from approximately 3.5 to 6 hours, was necessary to complete Phase 1
activities. In some instances, time to complete Phase 1 and Phase 2 was measured together. In most
instances, data interpretation and reporting (Phase 3) was simulated because there was no actual
contamination present. Therefore, assumptions based on laboratory and utility experience are necessary
to contrive estimates for this phase.
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Table 6-1. S&A Timeliness during Drills and Exercises
Drill Type
Date
Phase 1:
Site Characterization,
Sample Collection
and Transport
Phase 2:
Sample Analysis
Phase 3:
Data Interpretation
and Results
Reporting
S&A Drill
May 2008
375 min
23 hours
S&A Drill
July 2008
315 min
Not
applicable
(simulated)
Not
applicable
(simulated)
Full Scale Exercise 2
October 2008,
Location 1
225 min
Not applicable
(simulated)
October 2008,
Location 2
6 hours
Not applicable
(simulated)
S&A Drill
April 2009
Team A
189 min
Team B
206 min
NA
NA
S&A Drill
September
2009
159 min
NA
NA
Full Scale
Exercise 3
October 2009
224 min
17 min
(rapid field
test)
Not
applicable
(simulated)
S&A Drill
May 2010
268 min
103.5 hours
Not
applicable
(simulated)
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Timeline estimates for each of the S&A activities that would occur during incident response to a
contamination incident from the time of deployment of the Site Characterization Team through data
review and results reporting are presented in Table 6-2, and were based on observed timelines during
drills and exercises. A range of time estimates is listed for some of the S&A activities given that the
timeline varies between the samples that would be transported to and analyzed in-house at GCWW's
laboratory as compared to those that would be transported to and analyzed by partner laboratories.
Furthermore, the time for sample analysis varies for the different laboratory methods that would be
conducted. These estimates were used in the simulation study to represent the timeline for incident
response.
Table 6-2. S&A Timeline Estimates for Incident Response
S&A Activity
Site Characterization, Sample
Retrieval, and Sample Disposition
Sample Transport
Laboratory Mobilization
Sample Analysis
Data Review &
Results Reporting
Total
Time Estimate
(minutes)
180
30 - 240
30-120
240-1,680
60
540-2,040
Simulation study results are presented in Table 6-3 and demonstrate the average time that elapsed from
the Possible contamination determination to site characterization results and the time that elapsed before
laboratory results for each contaminant and overall. Based on the data, there is not much variation
between contaminants in the time that elapsed from a Possible determination to site characterization
results, which demonstrates that the site characterization process is consistent regardless of the
contaminant. The main factor that would delay availability of site characterization results would be
contamination scenarios that would require involvement of a HazMat unit to assist with sampling and
analysis. Time delays would occur while waiting for a HazMat unit to arrive on the scene, and HazMat
personnel would require more time to complete site characterization activities due to the difficulty of
handling samples and conducting field tests while wearing full-body personal protective equipment.
The average time from Possible to the availability of laboratory results varied as a function of analyte,
ranging from ~8 hours to almost 2 days. Variation in time to laboratory results exists due to differences
in transport time to the GCWW laboratory vs. partner laboratories and the time required to complete
analytical methods, which is typically longer for some biological agents as compared to chemical
contaminants.
Table 6-3. S&A Timeline Analysis (simulation study results)
Contaminant
Nuisance Chemical 1
Nuisance Chemical 2
Toxic Chemical 1
Toxic Chemical 2
Toxic Chemical 3
Toxic Chemical 4
Toxic Chemical 5
Average Time
Possible to Site
Characterization
Results (minutes)
194
148
176
171
150
153
150
Total
Scenarios
119
72
119
119
105
119
119
Average Time
Possible to
Laboratory
Results (minutes)
463
750
615
580
501
604
531
Total
Scenarios
119
80
119
119
119
119
119
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Contaminant
Toxic Chemical 6
Toxic Chemical 7
Toxic Chemical 8
Biological Agent 1
Biological Agent 2
Biological Agent 3
Biological Agent 4
Biological Agent 5
Biological Agent 6
Biological Agent 7
All Contaminants
Average Time
Possible to Site
Characterization
Results (minutes)
151
172
171
151
151
182
182
199
168
167
166
Total
Scenarios
118
119
119
119
119
119
61
86
20
14
1,666
Average Time
Possible to
Laboratory
Results (minutes)
553
917
1,870
558
832
928
2,471
2,404
1,715
1,903
1,072
Total
Scenarios
119
119
119
119
119
119
119
119
110
114
1,970
Tables 6-4 to 6-7 demonstrate the impact of water quality parameter results, rapid field test results, and
laboratory results on the threat level for all relevant contamination scenarios. Each table indicates the
number of scenarios (for each contaminant and overall) in which water quality parameter results, rapid
field test results or laboratory results were available prior to the time when Credible or Confirmed
contamination was reached.
Table 6-4 shows that on average, water quality parameter results played a role in elevating the threat level
to Credible in slightly less than half of scenarios. Results were available in more scenarios involving
biological agents compared to the toxic chemicals, due to the lengthier timeline involved when
investigating contamination by a biological agent. On average, slightly more than half of all scenarios
have water quality parameter results prior to a Confirmed determination, and therefore played a role in
elevating the threat level. Results were not available for Toxic Chemical 8 as it did not result in a change
in the water quality parameters under evaluation in the simulation model.
Table 6-4. Scenarios with Water Quality Parameter Results Available Prior to Credible and
Confirmed Contamination Determination (simulation study results)
Contaminant
Nuisance Chemical 1
Nuisance Chemical 2
Toxic Chemical 1
Toxic Chemical 2
Toxic Chemical 3
Toxic Chemical 4
Toxic Chemical 5
Toxic Chemical 6
Toxic Chemical 7
Toxic Chemical 8
Biological Agent 1
Biological Agent 2
Biological Agent 3
Biological Agent 4
Total
Scenarios
119
72
119
115
105
119
119
118
106
0
119
119
119
61
WQ Parameter
Results Prior
to Credible
77
48
3
4
3
1
92
77
89
0
2
95
72
30
Percent
(Prior to
Credible)
65%
67%
3%
3%
3%
1%
77%
65%
84%
-
2%
80%
61%
49%
WQ
Parameter
Results Prior
to Confirmed
90
48
5
70
52
3
93
83
90
0
4
95
81
36
Percent
(Prior to
Confirmed)
76%
67%
4%
61%
50%
3%
78%
70%
85%
-
3%
80%
68%
59%
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Contaminant
Biological Agent 5
Biological Agent 6
Biological Agent 7
All Contaminants
Total
Scenarios
86
20
14
1,530
WQ Parameter
Results Prior
to Credible
59
2
0
654
Percent
(Prior to
Credible)
69%
10%
0%
43%
WQ
Parameter
Results Prior
to Confirmed
61
2
0
813
Percent
(Prior to
Confirmed)
71%
10%
0%
53%
Table 6-5 displays the number of scenarios where rapid field test results played a role in elevating the
threat level to a Credible or Confirmed determination with five contaminants relevant to this analysis.
While there is not a wide availability of rapid field tests that have been verified for detection of specific
contaminants in water, the tests that are available can be very useful to investigators in terms of focusing
the follow-on laboratory analytics if field results suggest that a particular contaminant is present in the
samples, which can expedite the overall investigation. Results of rapid field tests suggesting the presence
of certain contaminants can also quickly elevate the credibility determination. Some of the tests are
considered reliable enough by GCWW to elevate the investigation to a Confirmed determination which
allows for rapid enactment of operational changes and public notification.
Table 6-5. Scenarios with Rapid Field Test Results Available Prior to Credible and Confirmed
Contamination Determination (simulation study results)
Contaminant
Nuisance Chemical 1
Nuisance Chemical 2
Toxic Chemical 1
Toxic Chemical 2
Toxic Chemical 3
Toxic Chemical 4
Toxic Chemical 5
Toxic Chemical 6
Toxic Chemical 7
Toxic Chemical 8
Biological Agent 1
Biological Agent 2
Biological Agent 3
Biological Agent 4
Biological Agent 5
Biological Agent 6
Biological Agent 7
All Contaminants
Total
Scenarios
119
-
119
119
-
-
-
-
119
119
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
595
RFT Results
Prior to
Credible
73
-
1
0
-
-
-
-
11
94
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
179
Percent
(Prior to
Credible)
61%
-
1%
0%
-
-
-
-
9%
79%
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
30%
RFT Results
Prior to
Confirmed
81
-
4
50
-
-
-
-
87
94
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
316
Percent
(Prior to
Confirmed)
68%
-
3%
42%
-
-
-
-
73%
79%
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
53%
Laboratory results were available prior to a Credible determination for relatively few scenarios as shown
in Table 6-6. It is likely the case that most scenarios were elevated to a Credible threat level based on
information from the monitoring and surveillance components, the public health sector or site
characterization. Laboratory results played a more noticeable role in elevating the threat level to
Confirmed for various contaminants.
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Water Security Initiative: Evaluation of the Sampling and Analysis Component
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Table 6-6. Scenarios with Laboratory Results Available Prior to Credible and Confirmed
Contamination Determination (simulation study results)
Contaminant
Nuisance Chemical 1
Nuisance Chemical 2
Toxic Chemical 1
Toxic Chemical 2
Toxic Chemical 3
Toxic Chemical 4
Toxic Chemical 5
Toxic Chemical 6
Toxic Chemical 7
Toxic Chemical 8
Biological Agent 1
Biological Agent 2
Biological Agent 3
Biological Agent 4
Biological Agent 5
Biological Agent 6
Biological Agent 7
All Contaminants
Total
Scenarios
119
80
119
119
119
119
119
119
119
119
119
119
119
81
88
34
27
1738
Laboratory
Results Prior
to Credible
3
47
0
0
0
0
0
5
0
0
0
3
0
0
16
10
3
87
Percent
(Prior to
Credible)
3%
59%
0%
0%
0%
0%
0%
4%
0%
0%
0%
3%
0%
0%
18%
29%
11%
5%
Laboratory
Results Prior
to Confirmed
56
55
0
0
12
0
46
29
0
0
0
89
39
1
61
10
3
401
Percent
(Prior to
Confirmed)
47%
69%
0%
0%
10%
0%
39%
24%
0%
0%
0%
75%
33%
1%
69%
29%
11%
23%
Results from S&A also play an important role in public health response. While public health agencies
will initiate some response actions before the identity of the contaminant is known, full public health
response, including issuance of prophylaxis and consistent treatment of the injured will typically be
implemented only after the identity of the contaminant is known. Results from either field testing or
laboratory analysis thus may provide information critical to public health response. Tables 6-7 to 6-9
present the number of scenarios (for each contaminant and overall) in which either water quality
parameter results, rapid field test results, or laboratory results were available prior to, and therefore played
a role in activating the public health response. In these tables, no results are presented for Nuisance
Chemicals 1 and 2 as these contaminants, while having the potential to render the water supply unusable,
have relatively low toxicity and were not assumed to produce public health consequences in the
simulation model.
Table 6-7 shows that slightly less than half of all scenarios overall have water quality parameter results
prior to public health response. However, there is a large difference between the toxic chemicals and
Biological Agent 1 and the remaining contaminants. While water quality parameter results were available
prior to the public health response in only 31% of scenarios or fewer for the toxic chemicals and
Biological Agent 1, results for Biological Agents 2 through 7 were available prior to public health
response in 98% to 100% of scenarios. Based on the simulation study results, it is more likely that water
quality parameter results would play a role in activating a public health response in scenarios involving
biological agents. Results were not available for the Toxic Chemical 8 as it did not result in a change in
the water quality parameters under evaluation in the simulation model.
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Table 6-7. Scenarios with Water Quality Parameter Results Prior to
Public Health Response (simulation study results)
Contaminant
Nuisance Chemical 1
Nuisance Chemical 2
Toxic Chemical 1
Toxic Chemical 2
Toxic Chemical 3
Toxic Chemical 4
Toxic Chemical 5
Toxic Chemical 6
Toxic Chemical 7
Toxic Chemical 8
Biological Agent 1
Biological Agent 2
Biological Agent 3
Biological Agent 4
Biological Agent 5
Biological Agent 6
Biological Agent 7
All Contaminants
WQ Parameter
Results before PH
Response
-
-
31
4
10
13
4
6
6
-
6
98
98
41
67
4
2
390
Total
Scenarios
-
-
99
98
92
99
98
99
96
-
100
98
100
42
67
4
2
1094
Percent
-
-
31%
4%
11%
13%
4%
6%
6%
-
6%
100%
98%
98%
100%
100%
100%
36%
Table 6-8 displays the number of scenarios where rapid field test results were available prior to public
health response with four contaminants relevant to this analysis (i.e., the contaminants which could be
detected by GCWW's rapid field test kits). While rapid field test results played a role in the public health
response in 23% of the contamination scenarios for Toxic Chemical 1, they were not as instrumental to
the response for scenarios involving contaminants Toxic Chemical 2, Toxic Chemical 7 and the Toxic
Chemical 8 with 5%, 8%, and 0%, respectively, of results available prior to public health response. It is
likely that information available from the other CWS components and from the public health community
had more of an impact in activating the public health response than rapid field testing results.
Table 6-8. Scenarios with Rapid Field Test Results Prior to Public Health
Response (simulation study results)
Contaminant
Nuisance Chemical 1
Nuisance Chemical 2
Toxic Chemical 1
Toxic Chemical 2
Toxic Chemical 3
Toxic Chemical 4
Toxic Chemical 5
Toxic Chemical 6
Toxic Chemical 7
Toxic Chemical 8
Biological Agent 1
Biological Agent 2
RFT Results before
PH Response
-
_
23
5
-
-
_
-
8
0
-
-
Total
Scenarios
-
_
99
99
-
-
_
-
98
99
-
-
Percent
-
_
23%
5%
-
-
_
-
8%
0%
-
-
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Water Security Initiative: Evaluation of the Sampling and Analysis Component
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Contaminant
Biological Agents
Biological Agent 4
Biological Agent 5
Biological Agent 6
Biological Agent 7
All Contaminants
RFT Results before
PH Response
-
_
-
-
-
36
Total
Scenarios
-
_
-
-
-
395
Percent
-
_
-
-
-
9%
Table 6-9 demonstrates that laboratory results did not play a large role in activating the public health
response in most contamination scenarios for the toxic chemicals and three of the biological agents.
Public health response was not modeled for the two nuisance chemicals so they are not included in Table
6-9. For two contaminants (Biological Agent 3 and Biological Agent 5), laboratory results clearly
contributed to activating the public health response, as the results were available prior to the response in a
high percentage of scenarios (100% and 83%, respectively). Due to differences in symptom onset time of
the toxic chemicals and biological agents, it is thought that the simulation study results are similar to what
may be expected in a real contamination incident. Laboratory results may not play a significant role in
chemical incidents where data from the CWS monitoring and surveillance components and public health
sector could result in initiating a public health response prior to the time that laboratory results are
available. Even though laboratory results may not play a significant role in initiating a public health
response, laboratory analysis of drinking water samples is critical in attributing illness to water
consumption, regardless of when the results become available. Conversely, with longer symptom onset
times, it may be that analytical results for biological agents are available prior to the time when a full
response is initiated and less information may be available from monitoring and surveillance components.
Table 6-9. Scenarios with Laboratory Results Prior to Public Health
Response (simulation study results)
Contaminant
Toxic Chemical 1
Toxic Chemical 2
Toxic Chemical 3
Toxic Chemical 4
Toxic Chemical 5
Toxic Chemical 6
Toxic Chemical 7
Toxic Chemical 8
Biological Agent 1
Biological Agent 2
Biological Agent 3
Biological Agent 4
Biological Agents
Biological Agent 6
Biological Agent 7
All Contaminants
Laboratory
Results before
PH Response
0
5
12
3
3
0
2
0
0
19
100
0
83
24
6
257
Total
Scenarios
99
99
97
99
98
100
98
99
100
98
100
100
100
87
93
1,467
Percent
0%
5%
12%
3%
3%
0%
2%
0%
0%
19%
100%
0%
83%
28%
6%
18%
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6.2 Summary
Based on drill and exercise data, the S&A component demonstrates effective timeliness for response to
possible contaminant incidents. In general, the time for response to a chemical contamination incident
from recognition of a Possible incident to a Credible determination would be approximately 9 to 14 hours,
depending on the contaminant. For a biological contamination incident, the estimated response timeline
would be between 9 hours and 1.5 days, depending on the contaminant. As described above, the response
timeline would increase if information was available from field sampling or from another CWS
component about the suspected contaminant, which suggested that identification of an external support
laboratory would be necessary.
The benefits of evaluating the S&A component during multiple drills and exercises were demonstrated as
utility personnel exhibited improved timeliness for certain key activities required for incident response
sampling and analysis. When comparing the first four drills, which were based on WQM alerts, the time
to pack up site characterization equipment and deploy to the contamination site decreased almost 50%
from the first two drills to the April 2009 drill. During the September and October 2009 drills this metric
increased in time, but this was likely due to a difference in drill scenarios. Full Scale Exercise 3 in
October 2009 was based on a CCS alert and the process for the WUERM determining a sampling location
may have increased the amount of time that the Site Characterization Team was required to wait between
initial notification that equipment should be prepared and receiving orders to depart for the sampling
location. Another metric, sample collection, can be dramatically decreased if only a grab sample is
required. During most drills, the time for sample collection was relatively consistent including sub-
sampling.
Simulation study results demonstrated a consistent timeline availability of results from site
characterization following a Possible contamination determination as the process is consistent regardless
of the contaminant, though some time delays would occur if HazMat response was activated. More
variability in the timeline from a Possible contamination determination to availability of laboratory results
was observed (ranging from ~8 hours to nearly 2 days), and was expected due to differences in transport
time to the GCWW laboratory vs. partner laboratories, and the time differences involved in analytical
methods for chemical contaminants vs. biological agents. Simulation results analyses demonstrated
variability among contaminants in terms of the role that water quality parameter results, rapid field tests
and laboratory results played in activating the public health response, or in elevating the threat level. In
general, results that are available sooner are more likely to have an impact on decisions to activate the
public health response or to elevate the threat level, which ultimately relates to the decision to enact
operational changes and issue public notification. Regardless of the timeliness of confirmatory laboratory
results, however, the intrinsic value of laboratory confirmation is in the ability to attribute illness to
contamination of drinking water in the distribution system.
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Section 7.0: Design Objective - Operational Reliability
Analysis of the operational reliability considers metrics that quantify the overall availability of the five
S&A sub-components (GCWW - field screening, GCWW - laboratory, ODH - radiochemistry
laboratory, ODH - BT agent screening, and Test America, Savannah [TAS]) during maintenance
monitoring, as well as the data completeness exhibited by the sub-components. Four metrics will be used
to assess the operational reliability of the S&A component: availability, data completeness, method
accuracy and method precision.
7.1 Availability
Definition: The availability of sampling and analysis activities (GCWW and support laboratory methods)
is defined as the percentage of time that sampling capabilities and all baseline analytical methods are
operational and functioning within the limits of pre-established standards for acceptable operation during
ongoing maintenance monitoring. These standards require full deployment potential and function of all
S&A sub-components as they are currently defined and implemented according to GCWW's Site
Characterization Plan. Data sources include laboratory inquiries (method and analyst availability),
maintenance logs (equipment and reagents, QC data), and after action reports (drills and exercises). For
performance evaluation purposes, 100% availability was assumed for any required emergency response
support including GCWW site characterization and sampling teams as well as local (CFD/HazMat, CPD,
CHD), state (Ohio EPA, ODH) and federal (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention [CDC], Federal
Bureau of Investigation, EPA) partners.
Analysis Methodology: Component availability was recorded through tracking of each sub-component
(GCWW - field screening, GCWW - laboratory, ODH - radiochemistry laboratory, ODH - BT agent
screening and TAS) on a monthly basis during the evaluation period. It was recorded as the percentage of
time that each sub-component was available per month/total hours per month. The cause of any sub-
component downtime was characterized and noted. For example, a data collection failure for the S&A
component could be the result of field testing equipment malfunction or operator error, sampling errors
(no sample collected or improperly collected), method or laboratory availability or analytical failure
(method or laboratory performance). Any period of time longer than one hour that any sub-component
was not available was considered downtime.
Results: Only one instance of downtime was reported for the GCWW laboratory sub-component during
the evaluation period due to a system event associated with the Hurricane Ike windstorm on September
14, 2008, which affected the entire GCWW service area with considerable damage and power outages
throughout the Cincinnati area. The GCWW laboratory sub-component experienced downtime because
Richard Miller Treatment Plant laboratory lost power for approximately 13 hours during the storm.
During the power outage, maintenance monitoring was not impacted as no samples were in the process of
being collected or analyzed. Utility personnel responded to the event by testing water samples throughout
the service area using portable pH and chlorine meters, and collecting/processing an increased number of
total coliform compliance monitoring samples. These sampling capabilities had been developed prior to
implementation of the Cincinnati pilot, and the field sampling instrumentation used during the windstorm
response had already been purchased by GCWW. No other S&A sub-components experienced any
downtime during the evaluation period. S&A sub-component availability results are presented below in
Table 7-1.
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Water Security Initiative: Evaluation of the Sampling and Analysis Component
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Table 7-1. S&A Sub-component Availability
S&A Sub-component
GCWW - field sampling
GCWW - laboratory
ODH - radiochemistry lab
ODH - BT agent screening
TAS
Availability
(March 2008 -June 2010)
100%
99.9%
100%
100%
100%
7.2 Data Completeness
Definition: Measurement of data completeness is based on the number of samples analyzed (per reporting
period) from each of the five S&A sub-components (GCWW - field screening, GCWW - laboratory,
ODH - radiochemistry laboratory, ODH - BT agent screening and TAS) including the samples prescribed
in the maintenance monitoring schedule and those requested during drills/exercises or possible
contamination incidents. Data is considered complete if received by the GCWW Laboratory Director or
WUERM in usable condition.
Analysis Methodology: Data completeness was tracked based on the amount of field- and laboratory-
based data requested from each S&A sub-component (GCWW - field screening, GCWW - laboratory,
ODH - radiochemistry laboratory, ODH - BT agent screening, and TAS) on a monthly basis during the
evaluation period. It was recorded as a percentage for each sub-component (number of samples analyzed
yielding usable sample results / number of samples requested) x 100%.
Results: The number of samples requested for field and laboratory testing, both at GCWW and contract
laboratories, varied by month, as per the maintenance monitoring schedule, and sample analysis required
for drills and exercises. Field samples were collected and analyzed by GCWW every month of the
evaluation period excluding one month (March 2009), resulting in 96% data completeness for field
sampling at GCWW. With the exception of three months (March through May 2009) when no laboratory
samples were collected or analyzed, all requested laboratory samples were completed by GCWW each
month during maintenance monitoring, resulting in 88% data completeness for GCWW laboratory
analysis. All maintenance monitoring samples collected for compliance monitoring requirements were
analyzed as per the required schedule, resulting in 100% data completeness for the ODH laboratory. All
sample analyses were completed by partner support laboratories for drills and exercises, resulting in
100% data completeness. These results are summarized in Table 7-2.
Table 7-2. S&A Sub-component Data Completeness
S&A Sub-component
GCWW - field sampling
GCWW - laboratory
ODH - radiochemistry lab
ODH - BT agent screening
TAS - carbamate
pesticides, total cyanide
Data Completeness
(March 2008 -June 2010)
96%
88%
100%
100%
100%
7.3 Method Accuracy
Definition: Accuracy is a measure of the overall agreement of a measurement to a known value. For the
S&A component, accuracy is defined as the extent [(measured concentration / nominal concentration) x
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Water Security Initiative: Evaluation of the Sampling and Analysis Component
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100] to which the measured concentration of a targeted contaminant in reagent water agrees with the true
or nominal concentration. This metric applies only to baseline sampling and analysis.
Analysis Methodology: Component metrics for field and laboratory method accuracy for all contaminant
classes identified for the Cincinnati pilot (Table 5-2) were documented during baseline monitoring.
Accuracy is determined as percent recovery of QC samples (proficiency test, IDC, initial precision and
recovery [IPR], Ongoing Precision and Recovery [OPR] and matrix spike samples) or performance
evaluation samples. Performance evaluation sample results are used when available however, in the
absence of commercially available performance evaluation samples, accuracy is determined by analysis
of QC samples.
Results: The method accuracy results presented below are separated into four sections: 1) field
instrument accuracy estimates and QC check frequency, 2) initial demonstration of capability conducted
by GCWW for SVOC and free cyanide analysis, 3) initial and ongoing precision and recovery conducted
by GCWW for the LRN filter concentration procedure for BT agents and 4) method-specific recovery QC
criteria.
Field instrument accuracy was checked before each use, according to the manufacturers' instructions.
Table 7-3 presents the field instrument accuracy estimates and GCWW's QC check frequency for all
target parameters measured during baseline monitoring. The accuracy estimates are based on
manufacturer information.
Table 7-3. Field Instrument Accuracy Estimates and QC Check Frequency
Instrument
Portable Colorimeter
Portable
Electrochemical
Detector
Portable Turbidimeter
Hand-held device
Hand-held Device
Test Kit
Test Kit
Text Kit
HazCat
Analyte
Chlorine
Cyanide
ORP
PH
Conductivity
Turbidity
VOCs and combustible gases
Radioactivity
Chemical warfare agents
General toxicity
Arsenic
Explosives, oxidants
Accuracy Estimate
+/-200 ug/L
+/-50 ug/L
+/- 1 mV
+/-0.1 pH unit
+/- 10 microsiemen
+/- 0.01 NTU
Semi-quantitative
+/- 1 count per minute
Detect/Non-detect
Not available
Semi-quantitative
Semi-quantitative
QC Check
Frequency
Daily
Daily
Daily
Daily
Daily
Daily
Daily
Daily
NA
Daily
Daily
Daily
Chemical Contaminants - Initial Demonstration of Capability
For the priority contaminants and analytical methods identified for baseline monitoring in the Cincinnati
pilot, an IDC was performed for each laboratory method that the laboratory had not yet been certified to
conduct on drinking water samples. For the methods that the laboratory had already been certified by
EPA for drinking water, no IDC was performed. For the targeted chemical analytes, this only included
the SVOC method and automated colorimeter analysis for free cyanide, both performed at GCWW. The
IDC established analyst proficiency, method performance (precision, accuracy and recovery) and
minimum reporting limits for each method. IDCs were not performed for the remainder of the targeted
chemical and radiochemical analytes/analytical methods, as the laboratories (GCWW, TAS, MASI, and
ODH) held drinking water certification for the analyses performed during the study.
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To demonstrate proficiency with the SVOC method and the automated colorimeter analysis for free
cyanide, two proficiency test studies were conducted by the GCWW laboratory. Wibby Environmental, a
National Environmental Laboratory Accreditation Conference (NELAC) accredited proficiency test
vendor, prepared PT samples in July of 2007 and March of 2009, and GCWW analyzed them in the same
months. Only the 2009 proficiency test study included samples for metals because GCWW did not have
ICP-MS capabilities in 2007. NELAC acceptance limits were used for the contaminants, which are 99%
confidence limits calculated using NELAC criteria. Three target analytes did not have established
NELAC acceptance criteria, so acceptance criteria listed by NELAC for other similar compounds were
used. The proficiency test recovery results from Wibby are summarized in Tables 7-4 and 7-5 below, for
2007 and 2009 respectively.
Table 7-4. 2007 Proficiency Testing Sample Results
Instrumentation
Automated
colorimeter
Gas
Chromatography
with Mass
Spectrometry
Detection using
liquid-solid
extraction,
multiple analytes
PT Sample
Concentration
0.424 mg/L
5.05 ug/L
10.8ug/L
8.9 ug/L
11. 7 ug/L
Laboratory
Result
0.074 mg/L
4.90 ug/L
10. 9 ug/L
14.3 ug/L
14.4 ug/L
Percent Recovery
17.45%
97.03%
100.93%
160.67%
123.07%
Acceptance
Criteria
75-125%
Correct
Identification
55-145%
55-145%
55-145%
Results for some of the analytes examined in the 2007 proficiency test tests did not show acceptable
recovery. The cause of these unacceptable recoveries was investigated, resulting in some method
improvements and also improvements in the specifications for and the handling of the proficiency test
samples. As a result, the 2009 proficiency testing showed marked improvements in recovery. Table 7-5
demonstrates that the proficiency testing results were within acceptance criteria for the 2009 proficiency
test samples.
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Table 7-5. 2009 Proficiency Testing Sample Results
Instrumentation
Automated
colorimeter
Gas
Chromatography
with Mass
Spectrometry
Detection using
liquid-solid
extraction,
multiple analytes
Inductively
Coupled Plasma
Spectrometry,
multiple analytes
PT Sample
Concentration
0.253 mg/L
1.69 ug/L
10.6 ug/L
9.80 ug/L
9.62 ug/L
24.5 ug/L
5.22 ug/L
Laboratory
Result
0.216 mg/L
1.84 ug/L
8.44 ug/L
5.54 ug/L
8.78 ug/L
24.2 ug/L
3.30 ug/L
Percent Recovery
85.38%
108.88%
79.62%
89.59%
57.59%
98.78%
63.22%
Acceptance
Criteria
75-125%
Correct
Identification
55-145%
55-145%
55-145%
55.1 -145%
60.0-145%
BT Agents - Initial and Ongoing Precision and Recovery
For the BT Agent Screening Protocol identified for baseline monitoring, GCWW performed initial and
ongoing proficiency tests to demonstrate and monitor proficiency using the LRN filter concentration
procedure. A protocol was established to determine recovery of a vegetative bacterial surrogate, which
involves spiking a phosphate buffered saline (PBS) reference matrix for the initial and ongoing precision
and recovery tests (IPR and OPR tests, respectively), or drinking water samples (matrix spikes) with
viable enterococci (Enterococcus faecalis) to achieve a known concentration of target analyte
(approximately 100 colony forming units [CPU]). The spiked sample was concentrated and target
recovery determined by enumeration of enterococci in the concentrated sample (retentate) according to
EPA Method 1600.
GCWW analysts completed initial and ongoing demonstration of capability by conducting a total of 25
reference matrix (PBS) recovery determinations (IPR and OPR sample analyses). In addition, GCWW
analysts analyzed a total of six (three duplicate sets) matrix spike samples. A summary of these results is
provided in Table 7-6.
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Table 7-6. Summary of GCWW Filter Concentration Recovery Trials
Sample Set
1 (IPR)
2(IPR)
3 (IPR)
4 (IPR)
5 (IPR)
6 (IPR)
7 (IPR)
8 (MS)
9 (MS)
10 (MS)
11 (OPR)
12(OPR)
13 (OPR)
Date
10/13/2006
10/26/2006
01/04/2007
01/09/20073
01/23/2007
01/25/2007
02/01/2007
02/06/2007
02/27/2007
06/26/2007
11/14/2007
12/05/2007
02/19/2008
Enterococci
Spike Recovery
(CPU/filter)
2
0
20
61
232
62
58
56
76
54
62
54
55
67
76
65
72
83
39
56
59
50
59
47
64
Positive Control
(CPU/filter)
32
27 (+ NaPP)
28 (- NaPP)
33
35
35
36
26
28
31
29
26
26
26
Negative
Control
(CPU/filter)
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Enterococci
% Recovery
(Spike/Pos Cont)
1-2%
21%
6%
25%2
69%
64%
62%
84%
60%
69%
60%
61%
74%
84%
72%
80%
92%
43%
62%
66%
56%
66%
52%
71%
Sample filtered without sodium polyphosphate (NaPP) amendment
2 Sample (> 50%) lost/spilled during membrane filtration
3 Sample concentration performed at slower rate (~ 0.4 L/min)
Initial recovery trials (sample sets 1 and 2, Table 7-6) resulted in low reference matrix (PBS) recoveries
of enterococci (2% to 20%). However, sample sets 3 through 13 indicated consistent enterococci
recoveries greater than 50% (52% to 92%) for both reference (PBS) and matrix samples processed.
Proficiency with the filter concentration procedure improved significantly during the course of these
recovery trials (~2% to > 80%). This may simply be a reflection of improved technique as a function of
practice and familiarity with the procedures. Consistent demonstration of enterococci recovery in excess
of 50% would provide a high level of confidence in the efficiency of the filter concentration procedure.
Target (enterococci) recoveries of 50% (lower limit) are considered acceptable, based on discussions with
CDC method developers, ODH Laboratory and EPA.
Duplicate matrix spike recovery determinations suggest that recovery of enterococci from GCWW
drinking water (43% to 92%) is not that different than recovery from PBS samples (52% to 84%) based
on a limited number of six available observations.
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Matrix Spike Samples
Recovery QC criteria for the methods used in baseline monitoring for each contaminant class is shown in
Table 7-7. The radiochemical laboratory (ODH) holds Ohio EPA drinking water certification for all of
the analyses performed by that laboratory during this study. The laboratory performs method QC and
regularly meets all QC acceptance criteria. Therefore, no matrix spike samples were specified or
analyzed for radiochemical parameters during any sampling phase.
The purpose of Phase 2 of baseline monitoring was to determine if the finished water from the two
treatment plants and source waters are different with respect to contaminant occurrence or method
performance; therefore, differences in mean recovery of spiked analytes between samples collected at the
Bolton and Miller treatment plants were statistically analyzed. No differences in analyte concentration
were observed between the treatment plants for SVOC or VOC matrix spike recoveries. A significant
difference in analyte concentration of two of the carbamates and one of the metals was observed for
matrix spike samples. These data sets were different at the 99% confidence level, indicating the impact of
the drinking water matrix (i.e., water composition) on the analytical results.
The objective of Phase 4 of baseline monitoring was to evaluate whether water within the piping of the
distribution system affected analytical recovery. This was investigated by comparing matrix spike
recoveries from Phase 4 samples with Phase 2 samples. Each plant was only compared to the Phase 4
sampling locations supplied by that plant. The matrix spike sample recoveries observed during Phase 4
differed from those observed during Phase 2 for one SVOC, one carbamate and one metal analyte,
indicating some potential change in the drinking water matrix. It is unclear whether the cause of the
differing matrix spike recoveries between Phases 2 and 4 was due to piping materials or some other factor
(such as changing water composition).
Table 7-7. Method-Specific Recovery QC Criteria for each Contaminant Class
Contaminant
Class
Metals
VOCs
SVOCs
Carbamates
Radiochemicals
BT Agents
Number of
Analytes
2
5
4
4
3
6
QC Specifications
70% to 130%
70% to 130%
70% to 130% and
Detect/Non-detect
80% to 120%
+/- 2 Std Deviations
NA
7.4 Method Precision
Definition: Precision is defined as the measure of agreement among repeated measurements of the same
property under identical or substantially similar conditions; expressed generally in terms of the standard
deviation. This metric applies only to baseline sampling and analysis.
Analysis Methodology: Method precision was evaluated during baseline monitoring for all chemical
priority contaminants (metals, volatiles, semi-volatiles and carbamate pesticides) identified for the
Cincinnati pilot. Precision is determined as the percent relative standard deviation of replicate
measurements [(standard deviation of replicate measurements / mean of measurements) * 100] at a mid-
calibration range for laboratory-based methods.
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Results: Precision estimates for each field instrument and target parameter used during baseline
monitoring are reported in Table 7-8 below. For some of the field instruments, precision was estimated
to be 20% RPD based on manufacturer's information.
Table 7-8. Field Instrument Precision Estimates
Instrument
Portable Colorimeter
Portable Electrochemical
Detector
Portable Turbidimeter
Hand-held device
Hand-held Device
Test Kit
Test Kit
Text Kit
HazCat
Analyte
Chlorine
Cyanide
ORP
PH
Conductivity
Turbidity
VOCs and combustible gases
Radioactivity
Chemical warfare agents
General toxicity
Arsenic
Explosives, oxidants
Precision Estimate
20% RPD
20% RPD
20% RPD
20% RPD
20% RPD
20% RPD
20% RPD
20% RPD
Detect/Non-detect
Detect/Non-detect
20% RPD
20% RPD
Precision QC criteria for the methods used in baseline monitoring for each contaminant class is shown in
Table 7-9.
Table 7-9. Method-Specific Precision QC Criteria for each Contaminant Class
Contaminant
Class
Metals
VOCs
SVOCs
Carbamates
Radiochemicals
BT Agents
Number of Analytes
2
5
4
4
3
6
Precision
(maximum RSD)
20% RSD
20% RSD
30% RSD and
Detect/Non-detect
20% RSD
+/- 2 Std
Deviations
NA
7.5 Summary
The S&A methods and laboratories effectively met the design objective of operational reliability, as data
collected during the evaluation period demonstrated overall availability, reliability and acceptable method
performance. During the course of 26 months of maintenance monitoring, only one S&A sub-component
(GCWW - laboratory) experienced a short period of downtime (13 hours) due to a highly unusual
windstorm and subsequent power outage in the Cincinnati area. Though this downtime occurred, the
GCWW laboratory sub-component demonstrated a high percentage of availability overall: 99.9%. The
remaining four sub-components (GCWW - field screening, ODH - radiochemistry laboratory, ODH - BT
agent screening and TAS) were continually available throughout the duration of the evaluation period
(100%).
The high data completeness percentages recorded for each of the S&A sub-components for the overall
evaluation period (Table 7-2) demonstrated GCWW's successful transition from baseline monitoring to
maintenance monitoring. The majority of samples that were prescribed by the maintenance monitoring
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schedule, or for drills and exercises, were collected and analyzed. Finally, method accuracy and method
precision data were within established method limits/tolerances during baseline monitoring for each of the
methods and laboratories supporting the S&A component.
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Section 8.0: Design Objective - Sustainability
Sustainability is a key objective in the design of a CWS and each of its components, which for the
purpose of this evaluation is defined in terms of the cost-benefit trade-off. Costs are estimated over the
lifecycle of the system to provide an estimate of the total cost of ownership, including the capital cost to
implement the system and the cost to operate and maintain the system. The benefits derived from the
system are defined in terms of primary and dual-use benefits. The primary benefit of a CWS is the
potential reduction in consequences in the event of a contamination incident; however, such a benefit may
be rarely, if ever, realized. Thus, dual-use benefits that provide value to routine utility operations are an
important driver for Sustainability of the system. Ultimately, the Sustainability of the system is also
reflected by the ability of utility and partner agencies to uphold and apply the protocols and procedures
necessary to operate and maintain the CWS. The three metrics that will be evaluated to assess how well
the Cincinnati CWS met the design objective of Sustainability are: costs, benefits, and compliance. The
following subsections define each metric, describe how it was evaluated, and present the results.
8.1 Costs
Definition: Costs are evaluated over the 20-year lifecycle of the Cincinnati CWS, and comprise costs
incurred to design, deploy, operate and maintain the S&A component since its inception.
Analysis Methodology: Parameters used to quantify the implementation cost of the S&A component
were extracted from the Water Security Initiative: Cincinnati Pilot Post-Implementation System Status
(USEPA, 2008). The cost of modifications to the S&A component made after the completion of
implementation activities were tracked as they were incurred. O&M costs were tracked on a monthly
basis over the duration of the evaluation period. Renewal and replacement costs, along with the salvage
value at the end of the Cincinnati CWS lifecycle were estimated using vendor supplied data, field
experience and expert judgment. Note that all costs reported in this section are rounded to the nearest
dollar. Section 3.5 provides additional details regarding the methodology used to estimate each of these
cost elements.
Results: The methodology described in Section 3.5, was applied to determine the value of the major cost
elements used to calculate the total lifecycle cost of the S&A component, which are presented in Table 8-
1. It is important to note that the Cincinnati CWS was a research effort, and as such incurred higher
costs than would be expected for a typical large utility installation. A similar S&A component
implementation at another utility should be less expensive as it could benefit from lessons learned and
would not incur research-related costs.
Table 8-1. Cost Elements used in the Calculation of Lifecycle Cost
Parameter
Implementation Costs
Annual O&M Costs
Renewal and Replacement Costs1
Salvage Value1
Value
$2,543,918
$42,795
$260,482
($11,269)
Calculated using major pieces of equipment as presented in Table 8-4.
Table 8-2 below presents the implementation cost for each S&A design element, with labor costs
presented separately from the cost of equipment, supplies and purchased services.
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Table 8-2. Implementation Costs
Design Element
Project Management
Field and Laboratory
Testing Capabilities
Routine Sampling and
Analysis
Incident Response
Sampling and Analysis
TOTAL:
Labor
$102,749
$366,817
$1,078,384
$412,790
$1,960,740
Equipment, Supplies,
Purchased Services
-
$135,876
$197,263
$319,539
$652,679
Component
Modifications
(deletions in
parentheses)
-
-
-
($69,500)
($69,500)
Total
Implementation
Costs
$102,749
$502,694
$1,275,647
$662,829
$2,543,918
1 Project management costs incurred during implementation were distributed evenly among the CWS components.
The first design element, project management, includes overhead activities necessary to design and
implement the component. The field and laboratory testing capabilities design element includes the
analytical equipment required for field screening and sampling kits were identified and provided to
GCWW. This also includes the process of establishing communication between GCWW and HazMat.
The third design element, routine sampling and analysis, includes design and execution of baseline
monitoring to achieve defined objectives. Based on the results of baseline monitoring, the follow-on
maintenance monitoring program was developed. The final design element, incident response sampling
and analysis, includes the cost of defining analytical requirements and addressing gaps by providing
GCWW the equipment needed to perform SVOC analysis, as well as ultrafiltration concentration. A
laboratory network capable of analyzing drinking water samples was established.
Overall, the routine sampling and analysis design element had the highest implementation costs (50%). A
significant amount of labor was involved in designing the baseline monitoring program, collecting and
analyzing samples, and conducting statistical analysis using analytical results. The total implementation
cost for field and laboratory testing capabilities and incident response sampling and analysis were lower
at 19% and 26%, respectively. Implementation costs for project management were significantly lower at
4%.
The component modification costs represent the labor, equipment, supplies, and purchased services
associated with enhancements to the S&A component after completion of major implementation activities
in December 2007. The cost associated with the SmartCycler PCR instrument was eliminated as the
equipment was not utilized and was transferred to an EPA laboratory. Similarly, the cost associated with
the toxicity test kits was eliminated as the utility decided to discontinue use of the toxicity testing
capability due to unacceptable variability in the assay response when conducted in the field by various
field personnel.
The annual labor hours and costs of operating and maintaining the S&A component, broken out by design
element, are shown in Table 8-3.
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Table 8-3. Annual O&M Costs
Design Element1
Field Test/Chemistry
Supplies
Procedures
TOTAL:
Total Labor
(hours/year)
-
615
615
Total Labor
Cost
($/year)
-
$23,795
$23,795
Supplies and
Purchased Services
($/year)
$19,000
-
$19,000
Total O&M Cost
($/year)
$19,000
$23,795
$42,795
1 Overarching project management costs were only incurred during implementation of the S&A component
and are not applicable for annual O&M costs.
Annual O&M costs for the field test and chemistry supplies include those costs related directly to ongoing
maintenance of field and laboratory equipment (i.e., Gas Chromatograph-Mass Spectrometer (GC-MS)
warranty, service and replacement costs [site characterization instruments], purchase of reagents and
standards). Most of the O&M labor hours reported under procedures are spent on maintenance
monitoring, in-house training and drills and exercises.
Two of the major cost elements presented in Table 8-1, the renewal and replacement costs and salvage
value, were based on costs associated with major pieces of equipment installed for the S&A component.
One of the biggest expenditures was a GC-MS for semi-volatile analyses. The utility also procured field
equipment, including volatile gas and radiation meters.
To calculate the total lifecycle cost of the S&A component, all costs and monetized benefits were
adjusted to 2007 dollars using the change in the Consumer Price Index between 2007 and the year that the
cost or benefit was realized. Subsequently, the implementation costs, renewal and replacement costs, and
annual O&M costs were combined, and the salvage value was subtracted to determine the total lifecycle
cost:
S&A Total Lifecycle Cost: $3,436,060
Note that in this calculation, the implementation costs and salvage value were treated as one-time balance
adjustments, the O&M costs recurred annually, and the renewal and replacement costs for major
equipment items were incurred at regular intervals based on the useful life of each item.
8.2 Benefits
Definition: The benefits of CWS deployment can be considered in two broad categories: primary and
dual-use. Primary benefits relate to the application of the CWS to detect contamination incidents, and can
be quantified in terms of a reduction in consequences. Primary benefits are evaluated at the system-level
and are thus discussed in the report titled Water Security Initiative: Evaluation of the Cincinnati
Contamination Warning System Pilot (USEPA, 2014c). Dual-use benefits are derived through
application of the CWS to any purpose other than detection of intentional and unintentional drinking
water contamination incidents. Dual-use benefits realized by the S&A component are presented in this
section.
Analysis Methodology: Information collected from forums, such as data review meetings, lessons
learned workshops and interviews were used to identify dual-use applications of the S&A component of
the CWS.
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Results: Operation of the S&A component of the CWS has resulted in benefits beyond providing field
and laboratory analytical response to contamination incidents. These key dual-use benefits and examples
identified by the utility include:
1. Ongoing practice of field and laboratory response protocols:
• Practice of standard protocols for site characterization, sample collection, sample analysis
and data interpretation in response to CWS alerts as part of drills and exercises afforded
GCWW an opportunity to fine-tune skills that may be beneficial to areas beyond
response to possible contamination incidents. In addition, these drills and exercises
improved partnerships with agencies involved in any hazard event, including CFD,
HazMat and partner laboratories.
2. Availability of field equipment and laboratory instrumentation for other projects:
• Acquisition of equipment for purposes of detecting priority contaminants can also be
utilized for other sampling procedures. For example, the purchase of GC-MS
instrumentation for SVOC analysis has enabled GCWW to perform in-house compliance
monitoring, and allows them to offer this analytical capability to other utilities. In
addition, utility personnel reported that the 800 MHz hand-held radios, procured under
the site characterization project area to enhance field communications, proved to be
extremely useful for communications between personnel deployed in the field and the
Incident Commander during response to the September 14, 2008 windstorm.
3. Improved water quality from expanded analytical capability:
• Expanded analytical ability during baseline monitoring allowed analysis of many samples
for metals which GCWW does not normally target. During this testing, it was discovered
that some areas of the distribution system contained significantly higher levels of iron
than others; these sites corresponded to sites where "water age" was greater than average.
When GCWW has knowledge of these areas, GCWW flushes hydrants in these areas
often. After flushing, iron concentrations in these areas were lowered to the same levels
as other service areas. GCWW had previous knowledge of some high iron areas, but this
program resulted in identification of more areas that would benefit from flushing.
Improved water quality in these areas was a direct result of baseline monitoring as part of
the CWS.
8.3 Compliance
Definition: Compliance captures the acceptability of the S&A component by measuring the willingness
of persons and organizations to monitor, maintain, and actively participate in the CWS. The use of each
S&A activity (sampling and laboratory analysis) during drills and exercises, maintenance monitoring and
during incident response is tracked to represent the acceptability of the CWS.
Analysis Methodology: This metric is measured by documenting the percentage of maintenance
monitoring samples collected per month by GCWW personnel and analyzed per month by GCWW and
partner support laboratories, as specified in the maintenance monitoring plan. Another measure of
compliance is the attendance of utility staff in drills and/or exercises (# staff in attendance / # staff
expected to attend).
Results: Overall, the S&A component demonstrated excellent compliance throughout the evaluation
period. 100% attendance was documented at all scheduled trainings, drills and exercises. In addition, a
high percentage of maintenance monitoring was completed; with the exception of one month for GCWW
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field sampling (March 2009) and three months for GCWW laboratory analysis (March through May
2009), 100% of all maintenance monitoring samples were collected and analyzed (Table 7-2). These
compliance measures bolster sustainability by providing a strong indicator that the utility was easily able
to comply with component procedures during the pilot, which bodes well for their continuing interest in
doing so. For instance, it is apparent that the utility has been able to incorporate maintenance monitoring
sample collection and analysis into routine sampling routes and laboratory analyses. This indicates that
the component procedures do not represent an excessive intrusion into routine activities, but rather
represent value-added.
8.4 Summary
While the total implementation cost of the S&A component was $2,543,918, the ongoing cost for O&M is
$42,795. This much lower annual cost required to maintain the component, which is a small fraction of
GCWW's overall O&M budget for its various operations, supports the long-term viability of the
component. While the O&M cost relates directly to maintenance monitoring for priority contaminants,
many of the samples collected for maintenance monitoring also support compliance monitoring for
regulated contaminants. During the evaluation period, the utility achieved a high compliance rate for
collecting and analyzing most samples required per the maintenance monitoring schedule, which
demonstrates overall ability of the utility to implement the component, as currently designed. The utility
has also derived many dual-use benefits from implementation of the S&A component including increased
preparedness for responding to all hazard incidents, improved familiarity towards working with
emergency response partners and partner laboratories and increased in-house field and laboratory
capabilities.
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Section 9.0: Summary and Conclusions
This document provides a comprehensive evaluation of how effectively the S&A component of the
Cincinnati pilot achieved the five applicable CWS design objectives used to characterize performance:
spatial coverage, contaminant coverage, timeliness of contaminant detection, operational reliability, and
sustainability. To conduct the evaluation, data sources including empirical data, drill and exercise data,
forums (including monthly staff interviews and a lessons-learned workshop), and cost data were utilized.
Overall, the personnel supporting the S&A component demonstrated exceptional performance with
respect to each of the design objectives. GCWW personnel, response partners, and contract laboratories
invested considerable time during design and implementation of the component to achieve the design
goals and to ensure acceptable performance of routine and incident response procedures. Furthermore,
the utility and response partners demonstrated dedication to the pilot study through regular attendance at
activities designed to evaluate the component including multiple component drills, full scale exercises,
and the lessons learned workshop.
For spatial coverage, the utility effectively collected and analyzed samples at designated strategic,
priority, and survey sampling locations throughout the distribution system during baseline monitoring.
Currently, ample baseline data for each location evaluated during baseline monitoring is available and is
stored in relevant locations in GCWW's laboratory including a pre-existing Water Quality and Treatment
database, spreadsheet databases (for field test data) or on instrumentation computers (e.g., GC-MS
library) for tentatively identified compound data and method performance data). This data can be
accessed for analysis by the utility, and will be utilized during incident response sampling and analysis.
During an incident, historical data would be needed to compare with incident response data. Following
completion of baseline monitoring, the utility transitioned to maintenance monitoring and is continuing to
collect samples from 31 strategic locations throughout the distribution system to maintain proficiency in
field and laboratory methods and to update contaminant baseline data.
For contaminant coverage, GCWW achieved successful implementation of field and laboratory methods
for all target water quality parameters and priority contaminants identified during design of the
component. Furthermore, through enhancement of field and laboratory capabilities, the utility is now able
to target a wide variety of possible water contaminants, and is familiar with the process of identifying a
capable support laboratory if necessary during a Possible contaminant incident. Simulation study results
demonstrated a contaminant scenario detection rate of 83% for site characterization results (water quality
parameter tests and rapid field tests) and 86% for laboratory analysis results.
For timeliness of contaminant detection, the utility exhibited improved response procedures during
subsequent component drills and exercises, and reduced the time required for certain key activities
required for sampling and analysis incident response. Based on data gathered during drills and exercises,
the timeline for incident response, from recognition of a Possible incident to a Credible determination
would be between 9 hours and 1.5 days, depending on the contaminant. Simulation study results
demonstrated an average availability of site characterization results (varied, but were within the
timeframe to take significant actions.) within ~3 hours of the Possible determination across all relevant
contamination scenarios, and an average availability of laboratory results within -18 hours across all
relevant contamination scenarios. Variability in the data from the simulation study was observed among
contaminants in terms of the role that water quality parameter results, rapid field tests and laboratory
results played in activating the public health response, or in elevating the threat level. In general, results
that are available sooner are more likely to have an impact on decisions to activate the public health
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response or to elevate the threat level, which ultimately relates to the decision to enact operational
changes and issue public notification.
The S&A component effectively met the design objective of operational reliability, as data collected
during the evaluation period demonstrated the overall stability of component operations. During the
course of 26 months of maintenance monitoring, only one short period of downtime (13 hours) was
experienced by the GCWW laboratory sub-component. The remaining four sub-components (GCWW -
field screening, ODH - radiochemistry laboratory, ODH - BT agent screening, and TAS) were
continually available throughout the duration of the evaluation period (100%). Furthermore, high data
completeness percentages were recorded for each of the five S&A sub-components (> 88%).
Metrics data used to characterize the sustainability of the S&A component exemplifies the long-term
viability of the component. During the evaluation period, the utility achieved a high compliance rate for
collecting and analyzing most samples required per the maintenance monitoring schedule, which
demonstrates overall acceptability of the component, as currently designed. Furthermore, the utility has
absorbed the cost for operation and maintenance of the component, and has designated personnel to
support ongoing sampling and analysis efforts associated with maintenance monitoring. The dual-use
benefits that have been afforded from implementation of the S&A component also support the long-term
stability of the component, including increased preparedness for responding to all hazard events,
improved familiarity towards working with emergency response partners and partner laboratories and
increased in-house field and laboratory capabilities.
One of the primary limitations of this analysis is the absence of data from an actual contamination
incident. While it is clearly not desirable that a contaminant incident occur, data from such an incident
would be useful to accurately characterize S&A component performance with respect to many of the
design objectives and their associated metrics. Though drills and exercises were extremely beneficial
towards improving GCWW and response partner familiarity with incident response procedures, and
improving overall timeliness of response, it is important to remember that these drills and exercises only
provide estimates of the times involved. For instance, these drills and exercises only occurred during
normal working hours; it is expected off-hour incidents would have different timelines.
In summary, the S&A component was effective in meeting each of the five design objectives established
for the pilot CWS in Cincinnati, and is adequately prepared to help implement the Cincinnati Pilot
Consequence Management Plan when any of the other early detection CWS components suggest Possible
contamination. As noted earlier, the component drills and full scale exercises were identified as one of
the most valuable aspects of the CWS. These events allow the utility to practice and refine response
procedures, become familiar with field test kits and equipment, understand roles and responsibilities when
working with emergency response partners, and to practice packing, shipping and proper documentation
for samples being shipped to external support laboratories. While this evaluation is specific to the S&A
component deployed in Cincinnati, it should aid other utilities in design and implementation of an S&A
component as part of a CWS or to simply improve their existing S&A program for responding to
contamination incidents.
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Section 10.0: References
U.S. Department of Homeland Security. 2013. Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program.
https://hseep.dhs.gov/support/HSEEP_Revision_Aprl3_Final.pdf
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. 2008. Water Security Initiative: Cincinnati Pilot Post-
Implementation System Status. EPA 817-R-08-004.
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. 2013. Water Security Initiative: Guidance for Building
Laboratory Capabilities to Respond to Drinking Water Contamination. EPA 817-R-13-001.
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. 2014a. Water Security Initiative: Comprehensive Evaluation of
the Cincinnati Contamination Warning System Pilot EPA 817-R-14-001.
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. 2014b. Water Security Initiative: Evaluation of the
Consequence Management Component of the Cincinnati Contamination Warning System Pilot.
EPA817-R-14-001F.
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. 2014c. Water Security Initiative: System Performance
Evaluation of the Cincinnati Contamination Warning System Pilot. EPA 817-R-14-001A.
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Section 11.0: Abbreviations
The list below includes acronyms approved for use in the S&A component evaluation. Acronyms are
defined at first use in the document
BT Bioterrorism-Threat
CCS Customer Complaint Surveillance
CDC Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
CFD Cincinnati Fire Department
CPU Colony-forming Unit
CHD Cincinnati Health Department
CPD Cincinnati Police Department
CWS Contamination Warning System
DHS Department of Homeland Security
EPA Environmental Protection Agency
ESM Enhanced Security Monitoring
GC-MS Gas Chromatograph-Mass Spectrometer
GCWW Greater Cincinnati Water Works
HazMat Hazardous Material Response
HPLC High Performance Liquid Chromatography
ICP-MS Inductively Coupled Plasma-Mass Spectrometer
IDC Initial Demonstration of Capacity
IPR Initial Precision and Recovery
LRN Laboratory Response Network
MASI Mobile Analytical Services, Inc
MS Matrix Spike
NELAC National Environmental Laboratory Accreditation Conference
ODH Ohio Department of Health
OPR Ongoing Precision and Recovery
ORP Oxygen Reduction Potential
PBS Phosphate Buffered Saline
PCB Polychlorinated biphenyls
PCR Polymerase Chain Reaction
PHS Public Health Surveillance
PT Proficiency Test
QC Quality Control
RFT Rapid Field Testing
S&A Sampling and Analysis
SVOC Semi-volatile Organic Compound
TAS Test America, Savannah
VOC Volatile Organic Compound
WQ Water Quality
WQM Water Quality Monitoring
WUERM Water Utility Emergency Response Manager
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Section 12.0: Glossary
Accuracy. Accuracy is a measure of the overall agreement of a measurement to a known value.
Alert. Information from a monitoring and surveillance component indicating an anomaly in the system,
which warrants further investigation to determine if the alert is valid.
Alert Investigation. A systematic process, documented in a standard operating procedure, for
determining whether or not an alert is valid, and identifying the cause of the alert. If an alert cause cannot
be identified, contamination is Possible.
Baseline. Normal conditions that result from typical system operation. The baseline includes predictable
fluctuations in measured parameters that result from known changes to the system. For example, a water
quality baseline includes the effects of draining and filling tanks, pump operation, and seasonal changes
in water demand, all of which may alter water quality in a somewhat predictable fashion.
Baseline analysis. In the simulation study, analytical methods performed by laboratories (GCWW and
its partners) capable of supporting analyses included in GCWW's baseline suite. These laboratory
partnerships were established during the evaluation period.
Benefit. An outcome associated with the implementation and operation of a contamination warning
system that promotes the welfare of the utility and the community it serves. Benefits are classified as
either primary or dual-use.
Benefit-cost analysis. An evaluation of the benefits and costs of a project or program, such as a
contamination warning system, to assess whether the investment is justifiable considering both financial
and qualitative factors.
Biotoxins. Toxic chemicals derived from biological materials that pose an acute risk to public health at
relatively low concentrations.
Bolton. The Greater Cincinnati Waterworks' Charles M. Bolton Treatment Plant.
Bulk volume (of contaminant). The total volume of a contaminant solution that is injected into the
distribution system during a contamination scenario.
Confirmed. In the context of the threat level determination process, contamination is Confirmed when
the analysis of all available information from the contamination warning system has provided definitive,
or nearly definitive, evidence of the presence of a specific contaminant or class of contaminant in the
distribution system. While positive results from laboratory analysis of a sample collected from the
distribution system can be a basis for confirming contamination, a preponderance of evidence, without the
benefit of laboratory results, can lead to this same determination.
Confirmatory methodology. A methodology that confirms, with high confidence, the presence of a
contaminant or suggests conclusively that it is absent.
Consequence management. Actions taken to plan for and respond to possible contamination incidents.
This includes the threat level determination process, which uses information from all monitoring and
surveillance components as well as sampling and analysis to determine if contamination is credible or
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confirmed. Response actions, including operational changes, public notification and public health
response, are implemented to minimize public health and economic impacts and ultimately return the
utility to normal operations.
Consequence management plan. Documentation that provides a decision-making framework to guide
investigative and response activities implemented in response to a Possible contamination incident.
Contamination incident. The introduction of a contaminant in the distribution system with the potential
to cause harm to the utility or the community served by the utility. A contamination incident may be
intentional or accidental.
Contamination scenario. Within the context of the simulation study, parameters that define a specific
contamination incident, including: injection location, injection rate, injection duration, time the injection
is initiated and the contaminant that is injected.
Contamination warning system. An integrated system of monitoring and surveillance components
designed to detect contamination in a drinking water distribution system. The system relies on integration
of information from these monitoring and surveillance activities along with timely investigative and
response actions during consequence management to minimize the consequences of a contamination
incident.
Costs, implementation. Installed cost of equipment, IT components, and subsystems necessary to
deploy an operational system. Implementation costs include labor and other expenditures (equipment,
supplies, and purchased services).
Cost, life cycle. The total cost of a system, component, or equipment over its useful or practical life.
Life cycle cost includes the cost of implementation, operation & maintenance and renewal & replacement.
Costs, operation & maintenance. Expenses incurred to sustain operation of a system at an acceptable
level of performance. Operational and maintenance costs are reported on an annual basis, and include
labor and other expenditures (supplies and purchased services).
Costs, renewal & replacement. Costs associated with refurbishing or replacing major pieces of
equipment (e.g., water quality sensors, laboratory instruments, IT hardware, etc.) that reach the end of
their useful life before the end of the contamination warning system lifecycle.
Coverage, contaminant. Specific contaminants that can potentially be detected by each monitoring and
surveillance component, including sampling & analysis, of a contamination warning system.
Coverage, spatial. The areas within the distribution system that are monitored by, or protected by, each
monitoring and surveillance component of a contamination warning system.
Credible. In the context of the threat level determination process, a water contamination threat is
characterized as Credible if information collected during the investigation of Possible contamination
corroborates information from the validated contamination warning system alert.
Data completeness. The amount of data that can be used to support system or component operations,
expressed as a percentage of all data generated by the system or component. Data may be lost due to QC
failures, data transmission errors and faulty equipment among other causes.
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Distribution system model. A mathematical representation of a drinking water distribution system,
including pipes, junctions, valves, pumps, tanks, reservoirs, etc. The model characterizes flow and
pressure of water through the system. Distribution system models may include a water quality model that
can predict the fate and transport of a material throughout the distribution system.
Dual-use benefit. A positive application of a piece of equipment, procedure, or capability that was
deployed as part of the contamination warning system, in the normal operations of the utility.
Ensemble. The comprehensive set of contamination scenarios evaluated during the simulation study.
Evaluation period. The period from January 16, 2008 to June 15, 2010 when data was actively collected
for the evaluation of the Cincinnati contamination warning system pilot. The evaluation period for S&A
was from March 2008 to June 2010.
Field results. Field results include information collected from Site Characterization activities including
the site hazard assessment, field safety screening, water quality testing and rapid field tests. This does not
include the results of the laboratory analysis conducted on samples collected at the end of the site
characterization process.
HazMat. A specially trained unit of professionals with the responsibility of containing incidents related
to hazardous materials. This organization plays a critical role in consequence management including site
characterization activities to support credibility determination.
Hydraulic connectivity. Points or areas within a distribution system that are on a common flow path.
Incident Commander. In the Incident Command System, the individual responsible for all aspects of an
emergency response; including quickly developing incident objectives, managing incident operations and
allocating resources.
Incident timeline. The cumulative time from the beginning of a contamination incident until response
actions are effectively implemented. Elements of the incident timeline include: time for detection, time
for alert validation; time for threat level determination and time to implement response actions.
Job function. A description of the duties and responsibilities of a specific job within an organization.
Maintenance monitoring. A phase of sampling and analysis which occurs after completion of baseline
monitoring. During maintenance monitoring, routine sampling confirms there are no changes in baseline
contaminant occurrence or method performance during normal (i.e., non-incident) sampling and analysis.
Metric. A standard or statistic for measuring or quantifying an attribute of the contamination warning
system or its components.
Miller. Greater Cincinnati Water Works' Richard Miller Treatment Plant
Model. A mathematical representation of a physical system.
Model parameters. Fixed values in a model that define important aspects of the physical system.
Module. A sub-component of a model that typically represents a specific function of the real-world
system being modeled.
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Monitoring & surveillance component. Element of a contamination warning system used to detect
unusual water quality conditions, potentially including contamination incidents. The four monitoring &
surveillance components of a contamination warning system include: 1) online water quality monitoring,
2) enhanced security monitoring, 3) customer complaint surveillance and 4) public health surveillance.
Nuisance chemicals. Chemical contaminants with a relatively low toxicity, which thus generally do not
pose an immediate threat to public health. However, contamination with these chemicals can make the
drinking water supply unusable.
Optimization phase. Period in the contamination warning system deployment timeline between the
completion of system installation and real-time monitoring. During this phase the system is operational,
but not expected to produce actionable alerts. Instead, this phase provides an opportunity to learn the
system and optimize performance (e.g., fix or replace malfunctioning equipment, eliminate software bugs,
test procedures and reduce occurrence of invalid alerts).
Pathogens. Microorganisms that cause infections and subsequent illness and mortality in the exposed
population.
Possible. In the context of the threat level determination process, a water contamination threat is
characterized as Possible if the cause of a validated contamination warning system alert is unknown.
Precision. Precision is defined as the measure of agreement among repeated measurements of the same
property under identical, or substantially similar conditions; expressed generally in terms of the standard
deviation.
Primary benefits. Benefits that are derived from the reduction in consequences associated with a
contamination incident due to deployment of a contamination warning system.
Priority contaminant. A contaminant that has been identified by the EPA for monitoring under the
Water Security Initiative. Priority contaminants may be initially detected through one of the monitoring
and surveillance components and confirmed through laboratory analysis of samples collected during the
investigation of a Possible contamination incident.
Public health incident. An occurrence of disease, illness, or injury within a population that is a
deviation from the disease baseline in the population.
Public health response. Actions taken by public health agencies and their partners to mitigate the
adverse effects of a public health incident, regardless of the cause of the incident. Potential response
actions include: administering prophylaxis, mobilizing additional healthcare resources, providing
treatment guidelines to healthcare providers, and/or providing information to the public.
Radiochemicals. Chemicals that emit alpha, beta, and/or gamma particles at a rate that could pose a
threat to public health.
Real-time monitoring phase. Period in the contamination warning system deployment timeline
following the optimization phase. During this phase, the system is fully operational and is producing
actionable alerts. Utility staff and partners now respond to alerts in real-time and in full accordance with
standard operating procedures documented in the operational strategy. Optimization of the system still
occurs as part of a continuous improvement process, however the system is no longer considered to be
developmental.
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Routine operation. The day-to-day monitoring and surveillance activities of the contamination warning
system that are guided by the operational strategy. To the extent possible, routine operation of the
contamination warning system is integrated into the routine operations of the drinking water utility.
Safety screening. Portable field screening methodologies (e.g., volatile gas detectors or radioactivity
meters) used by the Site Characterization Team during site approach to scan the area in the vicinity of the
sampling location for potential hazards such as toxic gases or radioactivity.
Salvage value. Estimated value of assets at the end of the useful life of the system.
Screening methodology. An analytical methodology that may identify a contaminant, but does not
provide a high level of confidence that a specific contaminant is present.
Select agents. Biological agents and toxins (as declared by the U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services) that have the potential to pose a severe threat to public health and safety and as such, their
possession, use, or transfer is regulated.
Simulation study. A study designed to systematically characterize the detection capabilities of the
Cincinnati drinking water contamination warning system. In this study, a computer model of the
contamination warning system is challenged with an ensemble of 2,023 simulated contamination
scenarios. The output from these simulations provides estimates of the consequences resulting from each
contamination scenario, including fatalities, illnesses, and extent of distribution system contamination.
Consequences are estimated under two cases, with and without the contamination warning system in
operation. The difference provides an estimate of the reduction in consequences.
Site characterization. The process of collecting information from an investigation site to support the
investigation of a contamination incident during consequence management.
Threat level. The results of the threat level determination process, indicating whether contamination is
Possible, Credible or Confirmed.
Threat level determination process. A systematic process in which all available and relevant
information available from a contamination warning system is evaluated to determine whether the threat
level is Possible, Credible or Confirmed. This is an iterative process in which the threat level is revised as
additional information becomes available. The conclusions from the threat evaluation process are
considered during consequence management when making response decisions.
Time for Confirmed determination. A portion of the incident timeline that begins with the
determination that contamination is Credible and ends with contamination either being Confirmed or
ruled out. This includes the time required to perform lab analyses, collect additional information, and
analyze the collective information to determine if the preponderance of evidence confirms the incident.
Time for contaminant detection. A portion of the incident timeline that begins with the start of
contamination injection and ends with the generation and recognition of an alert. The time for
contaminant detection may be subdivided for specific components to capture important elements of this
portion of the incident timeline (e.g., sample processing time, data transmission time, event detection
time, etc.).
Time for Credible determination. A portion of the incident timeline that begins with the recognition of
a Possible contamination incident and ends with a determination regarding whether contamination is
Credible. This includes the time required to perform multi-component investigation and data integration,
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implement field investigations (such as site characterization and sampling), and collect additional
information to support the investigation.
Toxic chemicals. Highly toxic chemicals that pose an acute risk to public health at relatively low
concentrations.
Triggered analysis. In the simulation study, certain analytical methods were performed by laboratories
who were capable of supporting analyses outside of GCWW's baseline suite. While these laboratory
partnerships had not been established during the evaluation period, telephone contact was made to
ascertain information regarding sample analysis turnaround time and shipping logistics to accurately
parameterize the process in the Cincinnati contamination warning system model.
Water Utility Emergency Response Manager. A role within the Cincinnati contamination warning
system filled by a mid-level manager from the drinking water utility. Responsibilities of this position
include: receiving notification of validated alerts, verifying that a valid alert indicates Possible
contamination, coordinating the threat level determination process, integrating information across the
different monitoring and surveillance components, and activating the consequence management plan. In
the early stages of responding to Possible contamination, the Water Utility Emergency Response Manager
may serve as Incident Commander.
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