&EPA
United States
Environmental Protection
Agency
Enhanced Security Monitoring Primer
For Water Quality Surveillance and Response Systems
f
Office of Water (MC 140)
EPA817-B-15-002B
May 2015
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Enhanced Security Monitoring Primer
Introduction
A Water Quality Surveillance and Response System (SRS) provides a systematic framework for
enhancing distribution system monitoring activities to detect emerging water quality issues and respond
before they become problems. An SRS consists of six components grouped into two operational phases,
surveillance and response. The surveillance components are designed to provide timely detection of
water quality incidents in drinking water distribution systems and include: Online Water Quality
Monitoring, Enhanced Security Monitoring, Customer Complaint Surveillance and Public Health
Surveillance. The response components include Consequence Management and Sampling & Analysis,
which support timely response actions that minimize the consequences of a contamination incident. The
Water Quality Surveillance and Response System Primer provides a complete overview (USEPA, 2015).
This document provides an overview of Enhanced Security Monitoring (ESM),
a surveillance component of an SRS. It presents basic information about the
goals and objectives of ESM in the context of an SRS. This primer covers the
following four topics:
• Topic 1: What is ESM?
• Topic 2: What are the major design elements of ESM?
• Topic 3: What are common design goals and performance objectives
for ESM?
• Topic 4: What are cost-effective approaches for ESM?
Topic 1: What is ESM?
ESM utilizes physical security equipment at key distribution system facilities to detect unauthorized
entries that could lead to a contamination incident. ESM equipment can also be effective for detecting
vandalism and theft. Furthermore, video monitoring systems used for ESM can provide operational
benefits by allowing utility staff to view process equipment and conditions at remote facilities without a
site visit.
Figure 1 is a schematic representation of ESM. Intrusion detection is provided by equipment
strategically located at a utility facility. Alerts generated are transmitted by a reliable communication
system, and personnel are notified of the alerts through emails, mobile devices or display at a central
control facility. ESM investigations are guided by documented procedures and coordinated with external
agencies such as local law enforcement.
Intrusion
Detected
* Contact Switches
* M otion Detectors
• Video Cameras
Alert
Transmitted
• SCADA
* Wired Network
* Wireless
Operator
Action
* View Alerts
Investigate Alerts
Figure 1. Schematic Representation of ESM
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Enhanced Security Monitoring Primer
Topic 2: What are the major design elements of ESM?
The major design elements for ESM are shown in Figure 2 and described under the remainder of this
topic.
Contact
Switch
Motion
Detector
PTZ
Camera
Fixed
Camera
Network/Digital
Video Recorder
Communication
SCADA
Digital
Cellular
Radio
High Speed
Wired Data Line
Information
Management
Alert
Investigation
Procedures
Mobile Device
Central Control
Center
Other Remote
Locations
Figure 2. ESM Design Elements
Intrusion Detection Equipment
The Intrusion Detection Equipment design element focuses on selecting facilities for security
enhancements and proposing equipment for each selected facility. The facility and equipment selection
process can use a risk-based methodology such as the Vulnerability Self-Assessment Tool, which is
compliant with the J100 industry standard. This process assesses the threat of, vulnerability to and
consequence of attacks at each facility under consideration and evaluates the overall reduction in risk
provided by ESM enhancements. This analysis provides a quantitative basis for selecting facilities and
equipment for ESM.
The deployment of intrusion detection equipment is
at the core of the ESM component. The ability of
ESM equipment to detect intrusions depends on the
placement, number and types of intrusion detection
sensors and video cameras. Physical security
equipment is continuously improving as sensing
technology advances, with equipment becoming
less expensive, more reliable and more
configurable. These advances provide for broader
coverage with fewer invalid alerts and have allowed
utilities with limited resources to implement real-
time security monitoring at remote utility facilities.
DID You KNOW?
The EPA's Vulnerability Self-Assessment Tool
(VSAT) is a J100 standard compliant risk
assessment software tool for water, wastewater
and combined utilities of all sizes.
The tool assists drinking water and wastewater
facility owners and operators in performing
security threat and natural hazard risk
assessments, as well as updating utility
Emergency Response Plans. (EPA, 2013).
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Enhanced Security Monitoring Primer
ESM equipment can be divided into two general categories: Intrusion Detection and Video Surveillance.
Examples of each category are illustrated in Table 1.
Table 1. ESM Equipment
Equipment Types
Intrusion Detection
Video Surveillance
Door and hatch sensors
Motion sensors
Fence-mounted sensors
Buried-line sensors
Internet protocol cameras
Infrared cameras
Event-based network or digital video recorders
Video analytics
Description
Contact switches such as magnetic proximity and
mechanical limit types
Used at site access points (for example, on doors,
windows or hatches)
Used for site or interior area coverage (for example, along
a row of windows)
Used for disturbance sensing (for example, taut wires and
magnetic field sensors)
Used for perimeter security (for example, near fencing)
Converts images into digital data
Used for outdoor or low light conditions
Transmits video clips on demand and stores video data
Algorithms embedded in video software to detect static
(loitering or unattended items) or dynamic (walking or
running) situations captured by monitoring cameras
Communications
The Communications design element consists of systems that transmit ESM alert information from
facility intrusion detection equipment to a central control facility. The communications infrastructure
must be capable of supporting the required data speed (bandwidth) such that ESM alert information can
be transmitted to the central control facility in a timely manner. Data speed requirements will vary
greatly depending on whether the system includes
video data and how the video monitoring system is
configured to transmit data.
Information Management
Once the data is delivered to the central control
facility, it should be displayed on a user interface
that allows utility staff to quickly recognize and
respond to the alert. Furthermore, ESM alert
information must be stored and accessible for post-
incident analysis. Information technology
architecture configurable by system administrators
is a standard approach.
DID You KNOW?
A useful resource for ESM is the Guidelines for
the Physical Security of Water Utilities /
Guidelines for the Physical Security of
Wastewater/Stormwater Utilities (ASCE/AWWA,
2011), a collaborative publication from the
American National Standards Institute, American
Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE), American
Waterworks Association (AWWA), and Water
Environment Federation. This document is
available for purchase from ASCE.
For both the Communications and Information Management design elements, leveraging existing network
and communications infrastructure can reduce the cost of equipment and installation. When designing
these elements of the system, consideration should also be given to in-house capabilities and
compatibility with existing equipment.
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Enhanced Security Monitoring Primer
Alert Investigation Procedures
ESM alerts need to be promptly investigated by utility personnel to determine whether or not the potential
intrusion might be related to drinking water contamination. The following are basic example steps that
may be performed during ESM alert investigations.
1. An ESM investigation begins after utility staff receives an intrusion alert.
2. Utility personnel use a checklist to guide them through a predetermined investigation procedure
to determine whether the intrusion could disrupt utility operations or present a risk of
contamination. The checklist may guide actions such as:
a. Assessing known activity at the facility, such as maintenance by utility personnel or
contractors
b. Assessing video, if available, to verify the intrusion incident
c. Notifying and dispatching investigators to physically inspect the facility where the alert
originated
3. If definitive video evidence is not available, an investigation is conducted to verify or rule out the
intrusion and determine whether there was
access to the finished water supply.
If the investigation determines that the alert , ,., , . . . , ... , ,
Invalid alerts associated with procedural errors
was not caused by unauthorized activity, the
investigation is closed and logged.
If the investigation verifies an intrusion with
access to the finished water, the investigation
Equipment and environmentally-caused invalid
'-. \\J l_/± V/^/^/W-LJ-A ^/kJ ±±± II. I. W
ty's Consequence
Management Plan.
continues according to procedures in the
.... . ..,:; , „ alerts are less common.
drinking water utility s Consequence
DID You KNOW?
are common and often caused by employees
who forget to call in when accessing a
monitored facility or forget to completely close
all monitored doors when leaving the facility.
Topic 3: What are common design goals and performance objectives
for ESM?
The design goals and performance objectives established for ESM by the utility provide the basis for the
design of an effective component.
ESM Design Goals
Design goals are the specific benefits that utilities expect to achieve by implementing ESM. A
fundamental design goal of an SRS is the ability to detect and respond to possible distribution system
contamination incidents. In addition to this fundamental SRS design goal, other ESM-specific design
goals such as detecting theft, vandalism and sabotage incidents can be realized. Examples of common
ESM design goals are listed in Table 2.
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Enhanced Security Monitoring Primer
Table 2. Examples of Common ESM Design Goals
Design Goal
Description
Identify intrusion incidents that
could lead to water contamination
ESM can provide early warning of contamination incidents that could harm
public health or utility infrastructure, which can trigger response actions to
minimize consequences. In some cases, ESM may even preempt water
contamination if the perpetrator is caught in the act.
Deter, detect and respond to theft,
vandalism and sabotage
ESM systems can detect all types of intrusion incidents including those
where contamination is not the intent of the intruder. Such criminal activity
may not have a significant impact on public health, but can place utility
staff at-risk and impact a utility's operating budget and day-to-day
maintenance activities.
Remote monitoring of process
equipment
If ESM includes video monitoring, operational benefits can be realized if the
ESM cameras can also be used to monitor process equipment at unstaffed
facilities. For example, pumps can be observed for malfunctions and
intake structures can be monitored for the build-up of debris. Video
monitoring can reduce the amount of travel time and on-site inspections
required, thus reducing utility labor costs.
Increased collaboration within the
utility and with local law
enforcement
Collaboration with law enforcement during water utility drills and exercises
can lead to improved coordination during response to real-world
emergencies. Also, an ESM camera with a field of view of a public area
can support law enforcement investigations unrelated to a water incident.
Improved response decision
making
Developing ESM procedures can streamline and standardize a utility's
decision-making process when investigating an intrusion incident. Thus,
procedural improvements can enhance a utility's overall preparedness and
responsiveness to physical security alerts.
ESM Performance Objectives
Performance objectives are measurable indicators of how well the SRS meets the design goals established
by the utility. Throughout design, implementation and operation of the SRS or its components, the utility
can use performance objectives to evaluate the added value of each capability, procedure or partnership.
While specific performance objectives should be developed by each utility in the context of its unique
design goals, general performance objectives for an SRS are defined in the Water Quality Surveillance
and Response System Primer (USEPA, 2015) and are further described in the context of ESM as follows.
• Incident coverage: Detect and respond to abroad spectrum of water quality incidents. One of
the primary focuses of ESM is deploying intrusion detection sensors and video monitoring
equipment to reduce the risk of contamination at select sites. The intent of such equipment is to
monitor all areas that provide access to finished water, and detect all intrusions that could lead to
a contamination incident. ESM design goals may also include detection of vandalism and theft,
which could require monitoring of areas that do not provide access to finished water.
• Spatial coverage: Achieve spatial coverage of the entire distribution system. ESM is limited in
its ability to detect contamination incidents throughout the distribution system because only
specific utility facilities are monitored for intrusions. However, utility facilities are chosen for
ESM equipment based on their overall risk of contamination and the amount of risk reduction that
would result from such enhancements. Thus the sites selected for enhancements can have the
potential to impact a large portion of the distribution system and general population.
• Timeliness of detection: Detect water quality incidents in sufficient time for an effective
response. Utility staff must be immediately alerted of intrusions and investigate alerts in a timely
manner. To meet this objective, alerts from remote facilities must be transmitted to the central
control facility without delay. ESM also includes procedures for initiating and conducting an
investigation in a timely manner. With a rapid response, it may be possible for the ESM
component to prevent a contamination incident from occurring.
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Enhanced Security Monitoring Primer
Operational reliability: Minimize downtime for equipment, personnel and other support
functions necessary for the component to meet the other performance objectives. One of the
criteria for selecting intrusion detection equipment and information management systems should
be reliability. In many cases, selecting a more reliable device that is more expensive can save
money over its lifecycle when compared to a less expensive device requiring more maintenance.
Alert occurrence: Reliably indicate unauthorized intrusions with a minimum number of invalid
alerts. When implementing ESM enhancements, proper commissioning is recommended to
ensure that each intrusion sensor is sensitive enough to detect intrusions with at least a 95 percent
confidence level, but not overly sensitive and prone to an unacceptable number of invalid alerts.
Sustainability: Realize benefits that justify
the costs and level of effort required to DID You KNOW?
Utilities may be able to make modest changes or
additions to existing physical security
capabilities to implement their ESM component.
implement and operate ESM. Benefits are
realized through attainment of the design
goals for ESM. The AWWA's J100 Risk
Analysis and Management for Critical Asset
Protection Standard can be consulted for quantifying non-quantifiable benefits of security
enhancements (ANSI/ASME-ITI/AWWA, 2010). Costs should be considered over the lifecycle
of the component, including implementation costs, operation and maintenance costs, and renewal
and replacement costs.
Topic 4: What are cost-effective approaches for ESM?
Utilities can take the following simple steps to develop the foundation for ESM:
• Rank maj or utility facilities with respect to the risk of contamination.
• At the facilities determined to have the greatest risk, add simple, inexpensive intrusion sensors,
such as contact alarms on doors and hatches. Use existing communications to transmit ESM
alerts if possible.
• Establish procedures for the j oint utility and law enforcement investigation of ESM alerts that
might be indicative of contaminated drinking water.
Next Steps
Visit the Water Quality Surveillance and Response Website at http://water.epa.gov/infrastructure
/watersecurity/lawsregs/initiative.cfm for more information about SRS practices. The Website contains
guidance and tools that will help a utility to enhance surveillance and response capabilities, as well as
case studies that share utility experiences with SRS implementation and operation.
References
ANSI, ASME-ITI and AWWA. (2010). Risk Analysis and Management for Critical Asset Protection
(RAMCAP®) Standard for Risk and Resilience Management of Water and Wastewater Systems.
AWWAJ100-10. Denver, CO.
ASCE and AWWA. (2011). Guidelines for the Physical Security of Water Utilities (56-10) and
Guidelines for the Physical Security ofWastewater/Stormwater Utilities (57-10). Denver, CO.
USEPA. (2013). Vulnerability Self Assessment Tool (VSAT). Retrieved from
http://yosemite.epa.gov/ow/SReg.nsf/description/VSAT.
USEPA. (2015). Water Quality Surveillance and Response System Primer, 817-B-15-002.
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