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Office of Inspector General
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**'*' | Final Report
EPA Region Ill's Management
of Tranguch Gasoline Site,
Hazleton, Pennsylvania
Tranguch
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Report No. 2001-P-00015
August 29, 2001
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Region Covered:
Region III
Program Office Involved:
Hazardous Site Cleanup Division
Resource Center
Conducting the Audit:
Mid-Atlantic Division,
Philadelphia, PA
Contributors:
Mark S. Phillips (Team Leader)
Michelle Brown
Kevin S. Good
Stephen R. Schanamann, CIH
Abbreviations
EPA: U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
OIG: Office of Inspector General
PADOH: Pennsylvania Department of Health
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UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
MID-ATLANTIC DIVISION
1650 Arch Street
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19103-2029
(215) 814-5800
August 29, 2001
MEMORANDUM
Final Report:
EPA Region Ill's Management of Tranguch Gasoline Site,
Hazleton, Pennsylvania
Report Number 2001-P-00015
Carl A. Jannetti
Divisional Inspector General for Audit
Mid-Atlantic Division (3AI00)
TO: Thomas C. Voltaggio
Deputy Regional Administrator
Region III (3RA00)
SUBJECT:
FROM:
In December 2000, the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA's) Office of
Inspector General (OIG) received a Hotline complaint alleging Region Ill's
mismanagement of the Tranguch Gasoline Site, in Hazleton, Pennsylvania. There
were numerous issues raised, the most serious an allegation that EPA had been
untimely in addressing hazards in residents' homes. We found that, overall,
remediation efforts taken by EPA appeared adequate and sufficient to ensure the
safety of residents. However, we concluded that EPA Region III did not adequately
communicate with the residents and Pennsylvania Department of Health, and
could make improvements in that area.
This report contains findings that describe problems the OIG has identified and
corrective actions the OIG recommends. This report represents the opinion of the
OIG. Final determinations on matters in this report will be made by EPA
managers in accordance with established EPA resolution procedures.
ACTION REQUIRED
In accordance with EPA Manual 2750, you are requested to provide a written
response to this final report by November 27, 2001. Also, please submit an
electronic copy of your response to r)hillir)s.mark@epa.gov. For corrective actions
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planned but not completed by the response date, reference to specific milestone
dates will assist in deciding whether to close this review. Your response should
address all recommendations, and include milestone dates for corrective actions.
We have no objection to further release of this report to the public. If you or your
staff have any questions regarding this report, please contact me or Mark S.
Phillips at (215) 814-5800. For your convenience, this report will be available at
http://www.ep a. gov/oigearth/eroom .htm.
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Executive Summary
Background and Purpose
We conducted this review as a result of a hotline complaint alleging
that the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA's) Region III
mismanaged the Tranguch Gasoline Site, in Hazleton, Pennsylvania.
EPA had become involved in the site in 1996, following preliminary
measures taken by Pennsylvania's Department of Environmental
Protection after concerns arose in 1993 regarding gasoline spills
stemming from corroded underground storage tanks. Our overall
objective was to determine whether EPA had been timely and effective
in addressing hazards in residents' homes.
Results of Review
We determined that the remediation efforts taken by EPA appeared
sufficient to ensure the safety of residents of the Tranguch site.
EPA took timely and effective actions to address hazards in residents'
homes. In particular, we noted that:
• Homes sampled in 1996 were representative of the spill area.
• EPA's decisions on taking remediation were sufficient.
• A federal buyout of residents' homes was not warranted.
However, we found that EPA should have communicated better with
residents and the Pennsylvania Department of Health. EPA's poor
communication resulted in many residents not trusting EPA, and EPA
may have overcompensated by taking extra actions that may not have
been needed. These actions may result in as much as $2.8 million in
unnecessary costs.
Recommendations
We recommend that the Region III Administrator, to ensure better
communication with the public at future sites, provide additional
training to appropriate EPA personnel on risk communication, and
develop a risk communication reference guide.
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Report No. 2001-P-00015
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Region III Response and OIG Comment
Region III officials stated they were pleased with the overall OIG
conclusion that the Region's remediation efforts were sufficient to
ensure the safety of residents. The Region acknowledged that their
early communication efforts with residents were insufficient, and has
taken a number of steps in the past six months, subsequent to our
initial comments, to improve communication. Region III agreed to
increase training on risk communication and to develop a risk
communication reference guide. We consider those actions
appropriate, pending our review of the reference guide that is
developed.
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Report No. 2001-P-00015
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Table of Contents
Executive Summary i
Introduction 1
Purpose 1
Background 1
Scope and Methodology 2
Remediation Efforts for Homes Found to Be Sufficient 5
Homes Sampled in 1996 Representative of Spill Area 6
EPA Decisions on Remediation Actions Sufficient 7
Federal Buyout Not Warranted 8
EPA Should Have Communicated Better 9
Unnecessary Remediation Actions May Have Been Taken 11
Recommendations 12
Region III Response 12
OIG Evaluation 13
Other Matters 15
No Inappropriate EPA Discharge Into Sewer System 15
"Point-in-Time" Test Sampling Was Appropriate 15
State Provided With Enough EPA Information 15
Response to Odor Complaints Was Appropriate 16
"Tranguch" Was Not a Misleading Name for Cleanup Site 16
Other Responsible Parties Pursued 17
Appendix 1 - Region III Response 19
Appendix 2 - Distribution
25
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Introduction
Purpose
In December 2000, the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA's)
Office of Inspector General (OIG) received a Hotline complaint alleging
EPA Region III mismanagement of the Tranguch Gasoline Site, in
Hazleton, Pennsylvania. The overall objective of our review was to
determine whether EPA had been timely and effective in addressing
hazards in residents' homes. While we looked into all allegations
raised, this report focuses on the following allegations we considered
most serious:
• Homes sampled in 1996 were not representative of the spill area.
• EPA's decisions on taking remediation were inappropriate.
• A federal buyout of residents' homes was warranted.
• EPA should have communicated better with residents and the
Pennsylvania Department of Health (PADOH).
Background
Between September 1993 and January 1994, a gasoline spill stemming
from corroded underground storage tanks at the Tranguch Tire and
Auto Service Center, as well as from four other nearby businesses,
caused major concern for residents in the area. Evacuation of several
homes in this Laurel Gardens neighborhood occurred due to gasoline
vapors. The vapors entered homes largely through the sanitary sewer
system. During this time period, the Pennsylvania Department of
Environmental Protection installed ventilation systems in 13 of the
affected homes.
The main chemical of concern was benzene, which is a component of
gasoline and a known human carcinogen. Benzene is a colorless to
light-yellow liquid with an aromatic odor, noticeable when
concentrations are in the low parts per million range.
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Report No. 2001-P-00015
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In March 1996, EPA took responsibility for the site at the request of
the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection. Visible
petroleum sheen was observed by EPA's On-Scene Coordinator in the
Black Creek, which is in the remediation area. Consequently, EPA
obtained Coast Guard funding from the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund
of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 to conduct an extensive contamination
study, and began efforts to remove the gasoline from the subsurface.
These Coast Guard funds were sought because problems related to
petroleum are not covered by Superfund.
Because the residential vapor problem was believed to have been
controlled and stabilized, EPA sought to follow the Oil Pollution Act
mandate of protecting surface waters. Also, EPA collected subsurface
data and evaluated cleanup options, which resulted in the installation
of a Soil Vapor Extraction System at the Tranguch property in 1999.
In the Summer of 2000, a group of residents requested sampling, and
benzene was detected in several homes at levels representing a
concern for chronic exposure. At the time EPA was following an action
level for benzene contamination of 32 //g/m3 (micrograms per cubic
meter), which was PADOH's action level. When testing at homes
yielded some results above that action level, EPA began taking steps to
make those homes safe.
The total estimated Tranguch project cost was $26 million.
Scope and Methodology
This review was conducted by OIG in response to a Hotline complaint
alleging Region Ill's mismanagement of the Tranguch Gasoline Site.
Subsequently, we met with the complainant, a local citizens' group
(Group Against Gas), and staffers for Pennsylvania's two U.S.
Senators, and arrived at numerous issues that we should review. This
report presents our conclusions on what we considered the major
issues. We had numerous interviews, including with: Region III
Removal managers, a Senior PADOH representative, Region III Office
of Regional Counsel personnel, various On-Scene Coordinators,
Greater Hazleton Sewer Authority personnel, Pennsylvania
Department of Environmental Protection personnel, EPA contractors,
and residents.
We collected various documents from the initial complainant and
Group Against Gas members. We reviewed the National Contingency
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Report No. 2001-P-00015
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Plan and the Oil Pollution Act. In addition, we reviewed Region Ill's
Tranguch site files, Pollution Reports, site maps, an EPA Tranguch
web site, a Group Against Gas web site, and lab results. We
participated in a site tour.
We addressed each of the issues by:
• Reviewing the source documentation.
• Interviewing parties/officials most knowledgeable about the
concern, to compile all of the facts.
• Determining whether the concern had any merit or was based on
miscommunication or misunderstanding between parties involved.
An OIG Environmental Scientist was a member of the review team to
provide assistance with all technical issues.
We performed our review in accordance with the Government Auditing
Standards (1994 revision), issued by the Comptroller General of the
United States. However, we did not follow all of the elements of the
planning standards in Chapter 6, because our review emphasis was on
evaluating EPA's actions in regard to issues raised by the
complainant, local citizens, and staffers for Pennsylvania's two U.S.
Senators.
We began our field work on January 4, 2001, and concluded it on
May 30, 2001. We issued our draft report to Region III on July 12,
2001. In addition, we briefed Group Against Gas members on the
draft report on August 2, 2001. The group's members involved in the
briefing said they basically agreed with our findings. We had also
offered to brief the complainant and staffers for Pennsylvania's two
U.S. Senators, but they declined. Region III responded to the draft
report on August 14, 2001. The Region generally agreed with our
findings. We include all of Region Ill's response as Appendix 1 to this
report. We made changes in the report as a result of those comments
whenever deemed appropriate. We had an exit conference with Region
III on August 27, 2001.
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Report No. 2001-P-00015
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Remediation Efforts for Homes
Found to Be Sufficient
The remediation efforts taken by EPA appeared sufficient to ensure
the safety of residents of the Tranguch site. EPA took timely and
effective action to address hazards in residents' homes. Homes
sampled were representative of the spill area, remediation decisions
were sufficient, and a federal buyout was not warranted. However, we
found that EPA did not adequately communicate with the residents
and PADOH. EPA's poor communication resulted in many residents
not trusting EPA, and EPA may have overcompensated by taking
extra actions that may not have been needed. These actions may
result in as much as $2.8 million in unnecessary costs.
Our review of actions taken by EPA since taking over the Tranguch
site in 1996 indicated that EPA took timely and effective actions. Of
the 362 homes considered part of the site, EPA sampled 53 homes in
August 1996, shortly after becoming responsible for the site. EPA
determined that the benzene levels for 52 of the 53 homes sampled
were below EPA's standard removal action level of 21.5 |~ig/m3, which
was below the Pennsylvania level of 32 |ig/m3 at that time. (The 53rd
home, while above 21.5 ng/m3, was below 32 ng/m3.) Based on those
results, EPA did not think remediation in the homes was necessary.
EPA then took monitoring actions to keep track of the groundwater
pollution levels, installed a Soil Vapor Extraction Unit to remove
benzene from the ground, and took cleanup action at Black Creek.
In addition to the initial testings in August 1996, EPA did retests at
30 of the 53 homes in November-December 1996. However, we noted
that the sampling instrument used for the second set of tests was not
capable of measuring down to the 32 ng/m3 action level. While such an
instrument is useful at other sites, it was not of use in this instance,
and the retest results were not of value. Nonetheless, we do not
believe that diminishes the conclusion from the initial testings in the
summer of 1996 - that remediation in the homes was unnecessary.
Our specific reviews regarding the representativeness of samples,
remediation decisions, the need for federal buyouts, and the adequacy
of communication disclosed the following.
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Report No. 2001-P-00015
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Homes Sampled in 1996 Representative of Spill Area
The homes sampled by EPA in 1996 were representative of the site. Of
the 362 homes in the affected area, we concluded that the homes EPA
chose for testing were either directly over the plume (the area of
contamination) or in close proximity. Specifically, of the 53 homes
chosen for testing by EPA, we researched the locations of each and
were able to determine the precise location for 50 of the homes. Based
on our research, we concluded that:
12 homes were directly over the plume (out of a possible 16)
14 homes were in very close proximity to the plume
(the house was adjacent to but not actually within the plume)
24 homes were within 3 blocks of the plume
Therefore, we concluded that EPA's sample of the 53 homes was
representative of the site area. (See map below.)
53 Homes Sampled
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Report No. 2001-P-00015
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EPA Decisions on Remediation Actions Sufficient
Benzene Levels in 1996
We found that the benzene levels in 1996 at the Tranguch site did not
require remediation in the homes. In 1996, the EPA action level for
benzene during sampling was 21.5 ng/m3, and, as already noted, the
levels were under that amount for 52 of the 53 homes sampled.
Therefore, we considered the decision not to take remediation action in
the homes to be appropriate.
PADOH's action level for benzene in 1996 of 32 |j,g/m3 was higher than
EPA's 21.5 ng/m3. However, in January 2001, PADOH recommended
to EPA that there should be a "non-detect" level of benzene at the
Tranguch site. When EPA indicated that was too vague, EPA and
PADOH agreed that a "non-detect" level could be 8.3 ng/m3, since that
was the lowest reading of benzene that could accurately be read using
the laboratory instruments available to the Region.
We noted that while EPA and PADOH agreed that 8.3 ng/m3 should be
the action level for benzene for the Tranguch site, PADOH did not
apply that level anywhere else in Pennsylvania - the action level
remained at 32 ng/m3. While we agree that the ideal safe level for
benzene would be zero, that is an unattainable goal because of the
widespread presence of benzene in everyone's daily lives. For example,
anyone who pumps their own gasoline is exposed. Benzene is a
solvent used in cosmetics and to clean metal parts in industrial
settings, and there are trace amounts present in some household
items. Moreover, national studies show that benzene can normally be
found in homes at up to 60 |j,g/m3. Background levels of benzene exist
almost universally in any home that has an attached garage with an
automobile, gas cans, and lawn mowers.
Based on scientific evidence, we believe that both the 21.5 and
32 ng/m3 actions levels are extremely low levels and protective of
human health. While having a level of 8.3 |_ig/m3 is desirable, we do
not believe it is appropriate to strive for such a level, particularly
when such a low level is not applied anywhere else in Pennsylvania or
the United States. We researched that this level is not used
elsewhere.
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Report No. 2001-P-00015
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Benzene Levels in 2000
In the summer of 2000, residents expressed concerns and asked for
testing, which was conducted. Also, EPA contracted to have sewer
vents installed starting in September 2000. The levels of benzene
following vent installations at 267 homes as of June 2001 were:
Post-Vent Benzene Levels
Action
Level
No. of Homes
Below Action
Level
No. of Homes
Above Action Level
% of Homes
Above Action Level
32 ^g/m3
260
7
2.62%
21.5 /ig/m3
252
15
5.62%
8.3 /ig/m3
202
65
24.34%
Concern had been expressed that EPA initially promised remediation
for all homes above the 8.3 ng/m3 level but, subsequently, started using
the 8.3 |ig/m3 level to only consider whether a home was a candidate
for remediation. Specifically, if a home tested at above 8.3 |~ig/m3, EPA
first would perform an inspection to determine whether anything
within the home other than the Tranguch spill was causing the
reading (such as gas cans, gasoline fumes from cars, paints, solvents,
and other household goods). Only after EPA determined that the
reading was not caused by such substances would remedial action be
initiated. We consider such a procedure to be appropriate.
Federal Buyout Not Warranted
The complainant and many in the Group Against Gas residents'
organization stated they thought government officials should declare
the neighborhood a disaster zone and issue a buyout. EPA and
PADOH had never characterized the health concerns of chemical
exposure at the Tranguch site as "very serious," and have indicated
that any potential problems can be remediated. EPA and PADOH
agreed that there was no health-based cause for consideration of
permanent relocation, and we determined that their positions were
valid. It appears that residents were asking for buyouts because of an
inaccurate perception of the risks posed by the gasoline spill.
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Report No. 2001-P-00015
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EPA Should Have Communicated Better
We found EPA did not effectively communicate with residents of the
Tranguch site or with PADOH. We believe many of the complaints
and the general mistrust occurred because of this poor risk
communication.
Communication with Residents
To build trust, the Agency needs to involve the public and be credible.
However, EPA did not:
• Contact residents who had their homes tested in 1996 to disclose
the results of the tests.
• Effectively communicate to residents tested in particular and the
community in general that the levels of benzene in the community
were low and did not present health risks.
• Effectively communicate why the estimate for the size of the spill,
initially placed at 900,000 gallons based on a best guess estimate,
was reduced to 50,000
gallons after performing
calculations on some
limited records.
• Ensure that the
numbers in the
Pollution Reports
prepared by EPA's
On-Scene Coordinator
were accurate.
• Initially involve the
community regarding
the type of carbon
filters that would be
installed in their homes
(various options were
available).
• Effectively explain the
meaning of the various
9
Report No. 2001-P-00015
A University of Texas study,
Communicating about
Environmental Risk with
Stakeholders, reached the following
conclusions after conducting focus
groups in several communities near
gasoline stations:
• Most people want to be informed
about a potential chemical-
release problem even before there
is a known problem (as soon as
the sampling phase of
investigation begins).
• Overwhelmingly, people want to
be informed through face-to-face
meetings. Their second choice is
written materials.
• People . .. want access to as much
information as possible, they
want to know how to compare
their situation with other similar
ones, and they want to have their
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action levels (32, 21.5, and 8.3 ng/m3), as well as other technical
information.
EPA should have foreseen concerns and potential fears in the
community, knowing that the residents were aware that: (1) EPA was
in the area performing a cleanup; and (2) EPA came into their homes
(or their neighbors' homes) and performed sampling. These concerns
and fears may have been allayed if EPA had communicated with them
better. Having the community's trust and support greatly helps
diminish the chances a community will oppose an agency's action.
EPA officials, in hindsight, acknowledged they should have
communicated better with residents.
If EPA had used the report Improving Dialogue with Communities:
A Risk Communication Manual for Government, which had been
Some uuvncy represent:) lives Tool
Mini ihe best inlernclion willi llie
public is no inlernclion. Tliev
ferven 11 v hope ill ill the risk
coiiimunicnlion techniques will
ninke tlit* public go nwnv mid lenve
the ngency lo mnke decisions in
pence1. However, lliere is n strong
consensus nniong experienced
prnclitioners llml the solution lo the
problems described is more, rnllier
llinn less, inlernclion.
Improving Dialogue willi
Communities: .1 llisl;
Communication Manual for
(iorernmenl
Communication with PADOH
Although EPA believed the involvement of PADOH was not necessary
in 1996, we think communication with PADOH would have been
beneficial. EPA had knowledge that a potential health threat existed
in 1996, and had even written in a 1996 Pollution Report that,
potentially, "the gasoline poses an imminent and substantial threat to
the public health of the residents . . . ." PADOH officials indicated
they should have been involved, stating that a health agency should be
prepared for the New
Jersey Department of
Environmental Protection,
many of the problems at
the Tranguch site could
have been avoided. EPA
would have better known
to account for intense
citizen concerns and seek
to build trust with the
community by informing it
about the spill and
involving the community in
the decision making. This
has worked well for the
New York Department of
Health as well as the New
Jersey Department of
Environmental Protection.
10
Report No. 2001-P-00015
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called in to assess a situation and decide from a health perspective
whether any risks exist. EPA officials agreed that health officials from
either the state or federal level should have been involved at some
point.
Further, the inadequate communication helped result in the revision
of the action level for benzene at Tranguch to the excessively
conservative 8.3 //g/m3. When PADOH had made the recommendation
for the 8.3 //g/m3 action level, EPA was caught off guard, stating that
PADOH never consulted them about this change. Up to this point,
EPA had relied on PADOH recommendations for setting action levels,
and believed there was a need to continue to do so. If EPA had
maintained more effective communication with PADOH, perhaps they
would have known of PADOH's recommendation far enough in
advance so that they could have discussed not making the change to
8.3 fj.g/m3. However, because EPA allowed the lines of communication
to slip, they had little recourse but to follow the recommendation of 8.3
IMgl m3.
Unnecessary Remediation Actions May Have Been Taken
It appears inappropriate that homes are being remediated to 8.3 //g/m3
at this site while at any other site in the country, including those in
Pennsylvania, EPA would only remediate to 21.5 //g/m3. The
conservative sampling level resulted in the following actions that we
believe may have been excessive:
• Placing sewer vent traps in all homes. In our opinion, sewer
vent traps are only justified in homes with readings over EPA's
action level of 21.5 //g/m3 or Pennsylvania's level of 32 //g/m3. If
these levels had been used, EPA would have only installed between
10 and 20 sewer vent traps, as opposed to more than 360. We
consider the decision to install vents in homes below the 21.5 //g/m3
level to be questionable. The cost for sewer vents at homes below
the 21.5 //g/m3 action level totaled approximately $850,000.
• Followup sampling in homes with levels below 21.5 /^g/m3.
Even though EPA's normal protocol is to wait for odor complaints
before taking air samples, we agree that sampling all the homes in
the area was a reasonable and proactive step. However, using the
overly conservative action level of 8.3 //g/m3 as the criterion for
followup air sampling resulted in increased costs of about $200,000.
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Report No. 2001-P-00015
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• Remediation in homes with levels below 21.5 /^g/m3. The
questionable remediation in homes with levels below 21.5 //g/m3
will cost approximately $1.7 milhon.
In conclusion, if EPA had communicated more effectively with
residents and PADOH, as much as $2.8 milhon in potentially excessive
expenditures may have been avoided.
Recommendations
We recommend that the Region III Administrator take the following
actions to ensure better communication with the public at future sites:
1. Provide all On-Scene Coordinators and their managers with
additional training in risk communication.
2. Develop a risk communication reference guide or adapt an existing
guide to their needs.
Region III Response
Region III officials stated they were pleased with the overall OIG
conclusion that the Region's remediation efforts were sufficient to
ensure the safety of residents. The Region acknowledged that their
early communication efforts with residents were insufficient, and has
taken a number of steps in the past six months, subsequent to our
initial comments, to improve communication.
Despite the general agreement with our draft report, there were a few
points of disagreement:
• The Region thinks that improved communications with PADOH
would not have avoided the PADOH shift in the benzene action
level to 8.3 //g/m3. The Region contends they had regular
communications with PADOH, and the shift in the benzene
standard should be recognized as a reaction to deal with intense
public pressure and criticism.
• The Region contends that the additional costs predicted in the
audit for in-home remediation systems ($1.7 million estimated) are
not materializing due to EPA's extensive efforts to screen for
household sources of benzene.
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Report No. 2001-P-00015
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Regarding Recommendation 1, the Region stated it will place more
emphasis on communication in the training currently provided to
On-Scene Coordinators. Regarding Recommendation 2, the Region
stated it will consider adapting an existing EPA communication guide,
developed in August 2000 for classic emergency responses, to satisfy
the recommendation.
OIG Evaluation
Region III generally agreed with our conclusions and the general need
to better communicate with residents when implementing future
remediation efforts. We consider Region Ill's planned actions to
provide increased risk management training and develop a risk
communication reference guide to be appropriate, pending our review
of the guide prior to its implementation.
The Region agreed with most of the specific points we raised in our
report. Regarding the few points of disagreement:
• We did not claim that improved communications with PADOH
would have avoided the benzene action level shift to 8.3 //g/m3 -
we only stated it was a possibility. We do not think it really
matters whether the change to 8.3 //g/m3 was a result of poor
communication (as we contend) or a reaction to deal with intense
public pressure (as the Region contends) - the change took place
and was inappropriate.
• We do agree that the $1.7 million in costs from unnecessary
remediation in the homes may not have materialized at this time.
The $1.7 million was only an estimate; only after all the in-home
remediation efforts are completed will there be an accurate
number.
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Report No. 2001-P-00015
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Other Matters
In addition to the issues already discussed, we looked into numerous
other concerns of the complainant, Group Against Gas, and staffers for
Pennsylvania's two U.S. Senators. Some of these issues are discussed
below.
No Inappropriate EPA Discharge Into Sewer System
There was an allegation of inappropriate discharges into the local
sewer system. However, according to the Greater Hazleton Sewer
Authority, their engineer contractor, and all the applicable
documentation that we reviewed, EPA had never placed any
inappropriate discharges into the Greater Hazleton Sewer Authority's
conveyance and treatment facility.
"Point-in-Time" Test Sampling Was Appropriate
There was concern that the sampling done by EPA was flawed because
it was "point-in-time" test data. One of EPA's main sampling
instruments were "SUMMA" canisters, which are used to sample air in
a home over an 8-hour period. EPA contends this method has the
highest confidence level of any air sampling method available. In
addition, EPA knew of no continuous monitoring devices that could
have been placed in each home that would have provided the same low
level of detection required. Because EPA had chosen to take action on
the basis of very conservative action levels, the SUMMA canisters
were the most appropriate sampling instruments to use. Our
engineering staff confirmed the validity and appropriateness of EPA's
test procedures.
State Provided With Enough EPA Information
There was an allegation that EPA had not provided enough data for
PADOH to analyze.
EPA stated, and PADOH confirmed, that EPA had been collecting
indoor air samples at the frequency and quantity requested by PADOH
for the determination of remediation recommendations. Both EPA and
PADOH explained that the statement that there was not enough data
only related to research data nationwide on the direct human health
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Report No. 2001-P-00015
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effects of benzene. Scientific studies where humans might be exposed
to benzene in a controlled manner and then observed for health effects
were not available.
Our engineering staff believed the expectations of the complainant
were unrealistic. Except for long-term studies in which test animals
were subjected to very low doses of benzene over their lifetime, there
were no realistic means to determine the amount of risk, if any, to
which residents were exposed. The concentrations of benzene to which
some residents may be exposed were at the limit of measurement of
the most sophisticated testing available.
Response to Odor Complaints Was Appropriate
The complainant asserted that it was wrong for EPA to respond only to
gasoline odor complaints. The complaint pointed out that the odor
threshold for benzene is much higher than the danger level; thus, you
may not smell benzene while being unsafely exposed to it.
EPA explained that the standard methodology for investigation of a
gasoline spill is to respond to odor complaints in homes nearby and
perform an investigation with a hand-held, direct reading instrument
that detects the presence of gasoline chemicals. According to our
engineering staff, EPA's standard methodology to investigate in
response to odor complaints, rather than testing homes that had no
complaints, is logical.
Despite this standard methodology, in January 2001, in an effort to be
more proactive, EPA started to test all homes within the site area with
SUMMA canisters and not just those where there were odor
complaints.
"Tranguch" Was Not a Misleading Name for Cleanup Site
The complainant asserted that "Tranguch" was an intentionally
misleading name for the spill site, since other parties were also
responsible. According to the complainant, people who lived near
those unnamed responsible parties would not know they lived in a
potentially dangerous area.
EPA contended that in 1996, when the Pennsylvania Department of
Environmental Protection requested their assistance at Tranguch, the
State had referred to the site as the "Tranguch Site." Thus, for
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consistency's sake, EPA adopted the name Tranguch Gasoline Site,
even though there were three other facilities in addition to Tranguch
that contributed to the spill. Regardless of the site's name, EPA
determined the site boundaries based on contamination from all
potential contributors. Therefore, residents should have known
whether they lived within the boundaries of a gasoline spill.
Other Responsible Parties Pursued
The complainant asserted that other "politically connected" responsible
parties were not named or pursued along with Tranguch.
As noted, EPA found that three other facilities in addition to
Tranguch, contributed to the gasoline spill. They were Orloski's Shell
(now Choice, owned by UniMart); Sam's Amoco (tanks and pipelines
owned by Pipeline Petroleum); and Hazleton Standard Oil. These
facilities were investigated in 1996 by EPA and found to have leaks at
that time. The Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection
had focused on Tranguch because, in their opinion, it had contributed
the most to the spill.
We reviewed Region Ill's responsible party records and found EPA had
pursued the other three responsible parties as well as Tranguch. We
found that Tranguch was bankrupt. According to EPA personnel, EPA
had offered Administrative Consent Orders to the other responsible
parties, but none had agreed to participate in the cleanup. EPA had
subsequently decided not to pursue Unilateral Administrative Orders
because staff were still in the process of gathering evidence of who was
actually responsible for the spill, and at the time it appeared that the
other responsible parties might be "de minimis" (minimal) contributors
to the contamination. Thus, the Tranguch project became a
"government lead," meaning that the government would pay for the
cleanup and then seek cost recovery from the responsible parties. EPA
contended these decisions were not politically influenced, and we
found no evidence to the contrary.
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APPENDIX 1 - REGION III RESPONSE
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UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY
REGION III
1650 Arch Street
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19103-2029
AUG 14, 2001
SUBJECT: Draft Report - EPA Region's Management of
Tranguch Gasoline Site, Hazleton, PA
Assignment #2001-000"^
(3 RAO'
FROM: Thomas C. Voltaggio '"V
Acting Regional Administrator (3 RAO1
TO:
Carl A. Jannetti
Divisional Inspector General for Audit
Mid-Atlantic Division (3AI00)
Thank you for the opportunity to review and comment on your draft report regarding
EPA Region Ill's management of the Tranguch Spill site. We are pleased with your overall
conclusion that the Region's remediation efforts have been adequate and sufficient to ensure the
safety of residents. We also acknowledge that our early communication efforts with residents
were insufficient. As you are well aware we have taken a number of steps in the past 6 months to
improve our communications.
Outlined below per your request are our comments on the report's specific findings and
recommendations.
Findings
A) Homes Sampled in 1996 Representative of Spill Area (page 6)
- We agree with the OIG's opinion that given the benzene data available in 1996
that a decision at that time not to remediate in the homes was appropriate;
- We agree with the OIG's opinion that the revised benzene action level of 8.3
ug/m3 as established by the PA Department of Health (PADOH) for Tranguch is
not consistent with the PADOH action level for benzene used elsewhere in
Pennsylvania. Furthermore we agree that the level is so low that it is in the range
of benzene levels routinely found as background in homes in Pennsylvania and
across the United States.
- We agree with the OIG's conclusion that the homes sampled in 1996 were
representative of the site area.
B) EPA Decisions on Remediation Actions Sufficient (pages 7-8)
Printed on 100% recycled/recyclable paper with 100% post-consumer fiber and process chlorine free.
Customer Service Hotline: 1-800-438-2474
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- We agree with the OIG's position that a screening of homes for internal sources
of benzene is appropriate before further remediation in the home (i.e., an air filter)
is performed.
C) Federal Buyout Not Warranted (page 7)
- We agree with the OIG's opinion that buyouts are not warranted based on the
health risks in the community. We also agree that in many cases residents are
seeking a buyout because of a misunderstanding over the risks posed by the spill.
D) EPA Should Have Communicated Better (pages 8-11)
- We agree that overall our communications with the residents have not been as
effective as they needed to be, and that as a consequence a general mistrust has
developed which has hampered our response.
- We disagree that we did not communicate with residents and the community
early on about the potential health risks. We also believe that we communicated
with the community regarding the change in the estimate of the spill size. We
would however, acknowledge that our efforts in those regards generally proved
ineffective.
- We agree that PADOH involvement in 1996 may have been appropriate from a
coordination perspective but we emphasize that from a remediation decision-
making standpoint it did not matter as the benzene action level (21.5ug/m3) used
by EPA was more conservative than the statewide standard (32ug/m3) used by
PADOH.
- We disagree with the suggestion that improved communications in late 2000 -
early 2001 with PADOH could have avoided the PADOH shift in the benzene
action level to 8.3ug/m3. During this period we had regular communications with
PADOH, sometimes daily, regarding site conditions and citizen health concerns.
The shift in the benzene standard should be recognized for what it was - a reaction
to deal with the intense public pressure and criticism that the 32ug/m3 cleanup level
was insufficient to protect public health.
- We agree that EPA had little recourse but to implement actions to meet the new
PADOH recommendation of 8.3ug/m3 but we disagree that doing so resulted
because the lines of communication had slipped. Rather EPA decided to
implement the recommendation because of our previous publicly stated
commitment to the community; that we would implement measures to protect
public health based on the recommendations of the lead health agency, PADOH.
Furthermore, it should be noted that EPA did seek advice from ATSDR evaluating
the cleanup action level after PADOH lowered the level to 8.3ug/m3. ATSDR in
their April 17, 2001 Health Consultation supported the 8.3ug/m3 standard saying it
would be protective of public health.
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E) Unnecessary Remediation Actions May Have Been Taken (pages 11-12)
- We agree that some additional costs have been incurred by using the more
stringent benzene action level of 8.3mg/m3 although we should note that even
before the PADOH recommended action level was lowered to 8.3ug/m3, EPA had
committed to provide each home with a sewer vent trap. That commitment was
based on the initial PADOH health consultation. Furthermore, while increased air
sampling costs will result because of the 8.3 ug/m3 action level, the additional costs
predicted in the audit for in-home remediation systems ($1.7M estimated) are not
materializing at this time due to EPA's extensive efforts to screen for household
sources of benzene.
- The report leaves a perception that all of the additional sewer work announced
in late May 2001 is not based on technical merit. We disagree with such a
suggestion. We would acknowledge that further investigations as originally
planned could have helped EPA better define additional sewer locations.
However, the reality is that the time to complete those studies would have pushed
the actual remediation past the current construction season, likely resulting in cost
escalation. Ultimately additional sewer work was expected; we had even outlined
such in our February 27, 2001 Response and Cleanup Plan. Furthermore, we had
already been investigating the groundwater conditions for over 3 years and the
incremental increase in information from further investigations may have only
marginally modified (decreased) the scope of the additional sewer work. Given the
Agency's responsibility to protect public health and the environment, we
determined that it was prudent to act sooner on the additional sewer replacement
work.
Recommendations
1) All of the Region III OSCs and their managers receive formal and informal (primarily on-
the-job) training during their careers on communications and risk management. However,
given our experiences with the Tranguch site, we would agree that additional training
focusing on risk communications would be appropriate and valuable. In particular we see
a need to especially focus on those situations where our investigations and response
actions take us directly into the houses of a multi-home community.
2) We would agree that a reference guide on risk communications would also be appropriate
and we will consider the adaption of an existing communication guide developed in
August 2000 for classic emergency responses. That guide outlines a structure, roles and
responsibilities for communicating with the public, media and elected officials during an
emergency incident.
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APPENDIX 2 - DISTRIBUTION
EPA HEADQUARTERS
Assistant Administrator for Solid Waste and Emergency Response (5101)
Associate Administrator for Congressional and Intergovernmental
Relations (1301A)
Associate Administrator for Communications, Education, and Media
Relations (1101A)
Director, Office of Regional Operations (1108A)
Comptroller (2731A)
Agency Followup Official (2 710A)
Agency Audit Followup Coordinator (2724A)
Office of Inspector General (2410)
EPA REGION III
Regional Administrator (3RA00)
Assistant Regional Administrator, Office of Policy and Management (3PM00)
Director, Hazardous Site Cleanup Division (3HS00)
Director, Office of Communications and Government Relations (3CG00)
Chief, Grants and Audit Management Branch (3PM70)
Region III Library (3PM50)
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