RESOURCE CONSERVATION AND RECOVERY ACT
Report on the Tank Waste Remediation System (TWRS)
Program for the Hanford Federal Facility
Report No. WAD 99-000421-2000-P-00012
March 30, 2000
-------
Inspector General Division
Conducting the Audit
Region Covered
Western Audit Division
Seattle Branch Office
Region 10
Program Office Involved
Office of Waste and Chemicals Management
-------
March 30, 2000
MEMORANDUM
SUBJECT: Tank Waste Remediation System Program for the Hanford Federal Facility
Audit Report No. WAD 99-000421-2000-P-00012
FROM: Truman R. Beeler
Divisional Inspector General for Audits
Western Audit Division
TO: Chuck Clarke
Regional Administrator
EPA Region 10
Attached is our final report titled Tank Waste Remediation System (TWRS) Program for the
Hanford Federal Facility. The objective of the audit was to determine if the State of
Washington's Department of Ecology and EPA Region 10's oversight of the TWRS Program is
sufficient to ensure compliance with the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) and
provides adequate protection to human health and the environment.
We concluded that the Department of Ecology and Region 10 need to improve their oversight
and enforcement of RCRA requirements that apply to Hanford's TWRS Program. We believe
that improvements are necessary to prevent threats to public health and the environment.
This audit report contains findings that describe problems the Office of Inspector General has
identified and corrective actions the OIG recommends. This audit report represents the opinion
of the OIG and the findings contained in this audit report do not necessarily represent the final
EPA position. Final determinations on matters in this audit report will be made by EPA
managers in accordance with established EPA audit resolution procedures. Accordingly, the
findings described in this audit report are not binding upon EPA in any enforcement proceeding
brought by EPA or the Department of Justice.
ACTION REQUIRED
In accordance with EPA Order 2750, you, as the Action Official, are required to provide our
office with a written response to the audit report within 90 days of the report date. The response
should address all recommendations. For corrective actions planned but not completed by the
response date, reference to specific milestone dates will assist us in deciding whether to close
-------
this report. We have no objection to the release of this report to the public.
We appreciate the cooperation from your staff as well as the staff of the Washington
Department of Ecology during this audit. Should you or your staff have any questions about this
report, please call me at (415) 744-2445, or Mike Owen of our Seattle Office at (206) 553-2542.
Attachment
Distribution: Appendix C
-------
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
INTRODUCTION
The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), Subtitle C establishes a program for
managing hazardous waste from generation to disposal. The State of Washington's Hazardous
Waste Program was initially authorized by EPA in 1986 and was revised to include regulation of
radioactive mixed wastes in 1987. This authorization places primary responsibility for
implementation and enforcement of RCRA on the State's Department of Ecology (Ecology).
In May 1989, Ecology, Region 10 (the Region), and the United States Department of Energy
(DOE) signed the Hanford Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO). The
FFACO requires DOE to: (i) bring its Hanford Federal Facility into compliance with RCRA and
the State's Hazardous Waste Management Act; and (ii) establish a framework and schedule for
implementing response actions in accordance with the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act. Under the agreement, Hanford's single shell tanks (SSTs) and
double shell tanks (DSTs) containing hazardous and highly radioactive waste were designated as
RCRA units. DOE established the Tank Waste Remediation System (TWRS) Program for
Hanford to ensure that the tank waste is stored, treated, and immobilized in a safe,
environmentally sound, and cost-effective manner.
OBJECTIVE
The objective of the audit was to determine if Ecology's and the Region's oversight of DOE's
TWRS Program is sufficient to ensure compliance with RCRA and provides adequate protection
to human health and the environment.
RESULTS IN BRIEF
Ecology and the Region need to improve their oversight and enforcement of RCRA requirements
that apply to Hanford's TWRS Program. Significant improvement is needed because:
(i) progress with the TWRS Program has not been sufficient to ensure compliance with RCRA
and to provide adequate protection to human health and the environment; (ii) sufficient oversight
has not been provided for some safety issues involving the SSTs and DSTs; (iii) inspection
coverage for the SSTs and DSTs has not met RCRA and Performance Partnership Agreement
i
Report No. 2000-P-00012
-------
(PPA) requirements; and (iv) leak detection systems for some SSTs and leak investigation
procedures for the tanks do not provide adequate protection to the environment.
Major Delays Threaten The Environment
Progress with Hanford's TWRS Program has not been sufficient to ensure compliance with
RCRA and to provide adequate protection to human health and the environment. Although the
Hanford FFACO established major milestones for stabilizing SSTs, treating waste from SSTs
and DSTs, and closing the SSTs, Ecology has been unsuccessful in obtaining DOE's compliance
with the milestones. Specifically, milestones for: (i) interim stabilization of the SSTs have been
consistently missed and completion of interim stabilization will be delayed by 9 years; (ii) start of
treatment of tank wastes will be delayed at least 4 years and the completion of treatment may be
delayed up to 19 years; (iii) initiation of waste retrieval from SST C-106, a "Watch List" tank,
was not met and waste retrieval was delayed for over a year; and (iv) retrieval of waste from, and
the closure of all SSTs may be delayed at least 15 years and 9 years, respectively. In addition,
DOE's evaluation of DST storage capacity requirements was deficient and did not meet
milestone requirements.
At least 1 million gallons of highly toxic and radioactive waste from 67 of Hanford's 149 SSTs
has already leaked, and some of the waste has reached the groundwater. There are about 35
million gallons of high level radioactive waste remaining in the 149 SSTs and about 19 million
gallons of waste stored in 28 DSTs. Continued delays in interim stabilization and delays in
treatment and retrieval of the tank wastes could result in the use of both the SSTs and DSTs
significantly beyond the schedule established by the FFACO. These delays could significantly
increase the risks of releases into the environment.
We attribute the conditions to three principal causes. First, DOE has not demonstrated the ability
or sufficient commitment to manage the TWRS Program to meet FFACO milestones and to
provide adequate protection to human health and the environment. Second, DOE has not
sufficiently funded all TWRS Program activities. Third, Ecology and the Region have not
developed and implemented an effective oversight and enforcement strategy.
Oversight Of Tank Safety Issues Need Attention
DOE has responsibility for compliance with State and Federal hazardous waste regulatory
requirements. However, Ecology has not provided sufficient oversight of some safety issues
involving SSTs and DSTs. Specifically, Ecology: (i) has not ensured that DOE satisfactorily
met a September 1998 FFACO milestone for the resolution of a flammable gas safety question
for SSTs and DSTs; and (ii) was not timely in providing oversight on DOE's resolution of
serious waste level growth and gas retention safety issues involving DST SY-101.
Unresolved flammable gas safety issues have caused significant delays in stabilizing the SSTs,
and may cause additional delays in the TWRS Program and increased risks to human health and
ii
Report No. 2000-P-00012
-------
the environment. In addition, DST SY-101 may eventually lose double containment unless the
safety issues for the tank are adequately and timely resolved, and plans to transfer the waste to
another tank may create similar safety problems in the receiving tank. A loss of double
containment increases the risk of a release of hazardous and radioactive wastes into the soil and
groundwater.
Ecology was not able to effectively oversee and evaluate DOE's resolution of safety issues
mainly because it has not placed sufficient emphasis on filling a safety position supporting the
TWRS Program. This position became vacant during August 1998 and was not filled at the time
of our audit in September 1999.
Ecology Is Not Conducting Enough Tank Inspections
Although DOE is responsible for compliance with State and Federal hazardous waste regulations,
Ecology, as the lead regulator, did not conduct a sufficient number of tank inspections to assess
DOE compliance with RCRA.
Specifically, Ecology inspected only 22 percent of the tanks over a period of approximately 7
years even though RCRA, as amended by the Federal Facility Compliance Act, required
thorough annual inspections of Federal facilities. In addition, inspection coverage for the tanks
did not meet inspection commitments specified in PPA workplans for the State's fiscals 1998
and 1999. Ecology had not increased the number of inspections although 7 of the 8 inspections
conducted during the 7-year period ended February 1999 identified serious compliance issues.
These conditions occurred because: (i) Ecology was not placing a sufficiently high priority on
conducting tank inspections; and (ii) the Region was not monitoring PPA inspection
commitments for Hanford.
Leak Detection And Investigation Procedures Do Not Provide Adequate Protection To The
Environment
Effective leak detection systems have not been installed by DOE for all Hanford tanks. In
addition, DOE has not always conducted adequate, timely, or documented investigations of
suspected tank leaks. Specifically, we determined: (i) original leak detection systems installed in
58 of the 149 SSTs were no longer effective; (ii) an investigation had not been conducted into a
possible ongoing leak from one SST that leaked in the past; (iii) investigations were not
completed timely for suspected leaks from two SSTs that leaked in the past; and (iv) investigation
results of a suspected leak from one SST were not documented.
These conditions occurred mainly because Ecology has not placed sufficient emphasis on
ensuring that DOE has implemented an effective leak detection and investigation program.
Specifically, Ecology has not: (i) required DOE to establish a leak detection program for all SSTs
in
Report No. 2000-P-00012
-------
that meets State and Federal regulatory requirements; and (ii) has not provided sufficient
oversight and enforcement over DOE's leak assessment activities.
As noted in Chapter 2, at least 1 million gallons of highly toxic and radioactive waste has leaked
from 67 of Hanford's 149 SSTs, some of which has already reached the groundwater. Without
effective leak detection systems and an effective leak investigation process, there is no assurance
that tank leaks will be identified and remediated timely. Minimizing the extent of leaks and an
effective leak investigation process for the SSTs are critical to preventing additional groundwater
contamination.
RECOMMENDATIONS
Principal recommendations to the Regional Administrator are to:
1. Negotiate with Ecology to address oversight and enforcement responsibilities regarding
DOE compliance with FFACO and RCRA requirements as part of the fiscal 2000/2001
PPA process.
2. Consult with EPA National Program Managers to determine what actions can be taken at
the EPA Headquarters level to achieve a higher priority, including receiving funding, on
cleanup of the Hanford tanks.
3. Report the weaknesses in the Hanford TWRS Program as a management control
deficiency in the annual Federal Managers Financial Integrity Act assurance letter to the
EPA Administrator.
4. Negotiate fiscal 2000/2001 PPA commitments with Ecology as necessary to oversee
TWRS Program safety issues.
5. Establish annual EPA and Ecology inspection commitments through the fiscal 2000/2001
PPA process in accordance with the Compliance Assurance Agreement Between the
Washington Department of Ecology and the United States Environmental Protection
Agency for the Hazardous Waste Program (1997), including a mid-year and end-of-year
review of commitment.
6. Assist Ecology in preparing a strategy for addressing DOE actions for SSTs not currently
in compliance with interim status leak detection requirements.
7. Negotiate with Ecology appropriate inspection and enforcement responses to suspected
tank leaks under interim status requirements and document theses commitments through
the fiscal 2000/2001 PPA process.
iv
Report No. 2000-P-00012
-------
REGION 10 AND STATE DEPARTMENT OF ECOLOGY
COMMENTS AND OIG EVALUATION
A draft report was provided to the Region and Ecology on January 21, 2000. The Region and
Ecology submitted a joint response on February 22, 2000 and a revised implementation schedule
for the report recommendations on March 10, 2000. The response is included as APPENDIX B
to this report. As reflected in the following excerpts from the response, the Region and Ecology
concurred with the report facts and recommendations.
After review of the report and each of the recommendations, we concur in full
with both the facts as presented in each finding, and with the associated
recommendations. EPA and Ecology fully support the findings identified in the
audit report, particularly the lack of progress on the part of Department of Energy
(DOE) in addressing the significant threats posed by Hanford tank wastes. We
intend to move forward in a timely manner with each of the recommendations,
and believe our current activities, described below, demonstrate our resolve to
address delays in the TWRS program...
As documented in the audit report, Ecology and EPA have engaged in
negotiations with the Department of Energy (DOE) to establish milestones in the
Hanford Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (Tri-Party Agreement)
relating to tank waste retrieval, construction and operation of a tank waste
treatment system, and compliance concerns related with the RCRA Land Disposal
Restriction (LDR) program. Despite extensive efforts on the part of both agencies,
these negotiations concluded on January 31, 2000 with no agreement reached.
DOE's eleventh-hour proposals for both tank waste treatment milestones and LDR
dispute resolution served only to reinforce EPA's and Ecology's belief that DOE
remains unwilling to commit to necessary work and be accountable for progress
toward enforceable milestones. As a result, Ecology asked EPA to join in
development and issuance of a final dispute determination to resolve these issues.
EPA responded in a February 3, 2000 letter to Ecology strongly endorsing
Ecology's position, and stating in no uncertain terms EPA's concern with DOE
failures to complete work, fulfill milestone commitments, and demonstrate
accountability for progress with Hanford environmental cleanup. We believe that
these clear and decisive positions established by EPA and Ecology with respect to
tank waste and LDR compliance are fully consistent with recommendations in the
audit report, and reflect our commitment to implementing the audit
recommendations.
We agree with the corrective actions which have been initiated or planned by the Region and
Ecology. Their response to all of the report's recommendations reflect actions that should
v
Report No. 2000-P-00012
-------
improve oversight and enforcement of RCRA requirements that pertain to DOE's TWRS
Program.
vi
Report No. 2000-P-00012
-------
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY i
ABBREVIATIONS ix
1-INTRODUCTION 1
PURPOSE 1
BACKGROUND 1
AUDIT SCOPE & METHODOLOGY 7
PRIOR AUDIT COVERAGE 7
2 - MAJOR DELAYS THREATEN THE ENVIRONMENT 9
BACKGROUND 10
INTERIM STABILIZATION MILESTONES WERE MISSED
AND DELAYED BY 9 YEARS 12
START AND COMPLETION OF WASTE TREATMENT WAS DELAYED 16
MILESTONE FOR INITIATION OF WASTE RETRIEVAL
FOR SST C-106 WAS NOT MET 22
SST WASTE RETRIEVAL AND CLOSURE MAY BE DELAYED 24
ANNUAL DST OPERATIONAL WASTE VOLUME REPORT WAS DEFICIENT . 26
DELAYS INCREASE RISKS TO THE ENVIRONMENT 27
REASONS FOR LACK OF PROGRAM PROGRESS AND COMPLIANCE 29
CONCLUSION 33
RECOMMENDATIONS 35
REGIONS'S AND ECOLOGY'S COMMENTS 36
3 - OVERSIGHT OF TANK SAFETY ISSUES NEED ATTENTION 39
BACKGROUND 39
RESOLUTION OF FLAMMABLE GAS SAFETY ISSUE WAS NOT VERIFIED ... 40
OVERSIGHT OF SAFETY ISSUES FOR SY-101 WAS NOT TIMELY 41
UNRESOLVED SAFETY ISSUES INCREASE RISKS TO
TO THE ENVIRONMENT 44
ECOLOGY HAS NOT PLACED SUFFICIENT EMPHASIS ON FILLING
SAFETY POSITION 45
RECOMMENDATIONS 46
REGION'S AND ECOLOGY'S COMMENTS 47
vii Report No. 2000-P-00012
-------
4 - ECOLOGY IS NOT CONDUCTING ENOUGH TANK INSPECTIONS 49
BACKGROUND 49
INSPECTION COVERAGE WAS INADEQUATE 50
REASONS FOR INSUFFICIENT INSPECTION COVERAGE 54
DOE VIOLATIONS AND RELEASES OF HAZARDOUS WASTE MAY
GO UNDETECTED 55
RECOMMENDATION 55
REGION'S AND ECOLOGY'S COMMENTS 56
5 - LEAK DETECTION AND INVESTIGATION PROCEDURES DO NOT PROVIDE
ADEQUATE PROTECTION TO THE ENVIRONMENT 57
BACKGROUND 58
LEAK DETECTION SYSTEMS WERE NOT INSTALLED 58
LEAK INVESTIGATION WAS NOT CONDUCTED 60
INVESTIGATIONS WERE NOT TIMELY 61
LEAK INVESTIGATION WAS NOT DOCUMENTED 64
INSUFFICIENT EMPHASIS PLACED ON LEAK DETECTION AND
INVESTIGATION PROGRAM 66
CONCLUSION 66
RECOMMENDATIONS 67
REGION'S AND ECOLOGY'S COMMENTS 67
EXHIBITS
1 - TIMELINE OF SELECTED FFACO MILESTONES FOR THE TWRS PROGRAM
AND ACTUAL OR PROPOSED REVISIONS 69
APPENDICES
A - AUDIT SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY 71
B - REGION 10 AND STATE DEPARTMENT OF ECOLOGY RESPONSE TO
THE DRAFT REPORT 75
C - REPORT DISTRIBUTION 88
viii
Report No. 2000-P-00012
-------
ABBREVIATIONS
AIP
Agreement in Principle
DOE
Department of Energy
Ecology
Washington Department of Ecology
EPA
Environmental Protection Agency
CERCLA
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability
CFR
Act
DST
Code of Federal Regulations
FFACO
Double Shell Tank
FMFIA
Hanford Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order
GAO
Federal Managers' Financial Integrity Act
HLW
General Accounting Office
HTI
High Level (Radioactive) Waste
HWMA
Hanford Tanks Initiative
IAMIT
Washington's Hazardous Waste Management Act
LAW
Interagency Management Integration Team
MOU
Low Activity (Radioactive) Waste
OIG
Memorandum of Understanding
OSD
Office of Inspector General
OWCM
DOE Operating Specification Document
PCHB
EPA Region 10 Office of Waste and Chemicals Management
PPA
Washington Pollution Control Hearing Board
RCRA
Performance Partnership Agreement
SST
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
TAP
Single Shell Tank
TSD
Tank Advisory Panel
TWRS
RCRA Treatment Storage and Disposal Unit
USQ
Tank Waste Remediation System
WAC
Unreviewed Safety Question
Washington Administrative Code
IX
Report No. 2000-P-00012
-------
[This page was intentionally left blank]
x Report No. 2000-P-00012
-------
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
PURPOSE The objective of the audit was to determine if the State of
Washington's Department of Ecology (Ecology) and EPA Region
10's oversight of the Department of Energy's (DOE's) Tank Waste
Remediation System (TWRS) Program is sufficient to ensure
compliance with the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
(RCRA) and provides adequate protection to human health and the
environment.
BACKGROUND
The Site The Hanford Site is in southeastern Washington State and occupies
about 560 square miles. The Columbia River, one of the largest
rivers in the United States, runs through more than 50 miles of the
site. From 1943 to 1989 Hanford's principal mission was the
Hanford's First ("B") Reactor, Completed 1944
(Source: Phil Weihrouch, EPA OIG)
1
Report No. 2000-P-00012
-------
production of weapons-grade plutonium. To produce plutonium,
uranium metal was irradiated in a plutonium production reactor.
The irradiated uranium metal, also known as spent fuel, was cooled
and treated in a chemical separations plant where plutonium was
separated from uranium and many other radioactive by-products.
Large amounts of spent fuel were generated to produce enough
plutonium to make a nuclear weapon. The chemical separations
process resulted in several hundred thousand metric tons of
radioactive and hazardous waste. Hanford is said to be the world's
largest environmental cleanup project.
The Tank Farms The most dangerous radioactive, hazardous, and mixed waste is
stored in 177 large underground storage tanks in groups called tank
farms. The waste includes more than 177 million curies (a unit
quantity of radioactive nuclide) in approximately 54 million
gallons of liquid, sludge, and saltcake (generally a semi-solid
crusty material). These tanks contain about 60 percent of DOE's
nationwide inventory of high level liquid wastes. High level waste
is the most dangerous radioactive waste and requires radiation
shielding, special handling techniques, and when disposed of,
special measures to isolate it from humans and the environment.
The radioisotopes cesium-137 and strontium-90 account for
essentially all of the radioactivity in the tanks and will remain the
primary individual contributors to the total radioactivity over the
next 150 to 200 years.
In the 1940's through the early 1960's, 149 single-shell tanks
(SSTs) with capacities of 55,000 to 1 million gallons were built to
store high-level waste in a region near the center of the site referred
to as the 200 Areas. During the 1950's, uranium was extracted
from some of the tanks for reprocessing, an action that introduced
new chemicals into the tanks. Also, chemicals were added to the
tanks to settle radionuclides from the liquid to the bottom of the
tanks. The low-activity liquid waste that resulted was sent to
shallow subsurface drainfields where it percolated into the soil.
This process resulted in higher concentrations of heat-generating
cesium-137 and strontium-90 in the tanks, which threaten the
integrity of the tanks. The SSTs had a design life of approximately
20 years. Leakage from these tanks to the underlying soil was
suspected in 1956 and confirmed in 1961. Based on historical
data, one additional tank begins to leak each year.
2
Report No. 2000-P-00012
-------
By the late 1980's, 67 tanks were known or suspected leakers, and
an estimated 1 million gallons of high-level waste had been
released to the soil beneath the 200 Areas. To address concerns
with the design of the SSTs, 28 double-shell tanks (DSTs) with
capacities from 1 million gallons to 1.16 million gallons were
constructed between 1968 and 1986. Of the 54 million gallons of
waste stored in the 177 tanks, approximately 19 million gallons (35
percent) is stored in the DSTs. Therefore, the majority of the waste
is still stored in the deteriorating SSTs. In 1998 Ecology reported
that "There are two types of tanks at Hanford, those that have
leaked and those that will leak."
Some of the activities under DOE's TWRS Program include:
(i) interim stabilization, a process of pumping liquid mixed waste
from leaking SSTs to DSTs; (ii) waste treatment or vitrification, a
process of converting the tank wastes into a solid form for
permanent storage; (iii) waste retrieval; and (iv) tank closure. As of
September 1999, interim stabilization and pilot work on waste
retrieval were in process. Waste treatment, completion of waste
retrieval, and tank closure were still in the planning phases and
were yet to be completed.
Threats to Human
Health and the
Environment
DOE reported that the accident with the most severe potential
health impacts is hydrogen gas fire in a tank. At least 25 tanks are
estimated to be generating hydrogen gas in sufficient quantities to
cause a fire if ignited. If such a fire were to occur, DOE estimates
that there is the potential for up to 22 latent cancer fatalities from
direct radiation and inhalation of radioactive contaminants. The
longer the waste remains in the tanks, the higher the probability
that a hydrogen gas fire would occur. With respect to the risk of a
tank explosion, while it appears considerably less than in the early
1990s, there is still some risk due to continuing tank safety issues.
Approximately 200 square miles of Hanford Site groundwater is
contaminated from radioactive and hazardous waste. Groundwater
occurs at a depth of 230 to over 300 feet below the ground surface.
Past plutonium production and disposal practices resulted in
extensive contamination in the soils. Some of the contamination
Hazardous waste in the tanks poses threats to human health and the
environment because of the potential for release of high level
radioactive waste through fire or explosion and through leaks into
groundwater.
3
Report No. 2000-P-00012
-------
Hanford Single Shell Tank Farm Under Construction Circa 1944
(Source: DOE Integrated Management Plan for the Hanford TWRS,
January 1999)
was caused from tank waste management practices as well as leaks
from the tanks. Over time, the contaminants in the soils have been
carried down to the groundwater and toward the Columbia River.
DOE currently has no process to remove all contaminants from the
groundwater before they reach the river.
Contaminants in the groundwater include arsenic, chromium,
cyanide, carbon tetrachloride, cobalt-60, strontium-90, technetium-
99, iodine-129, cesium-137, tritium, and plutonium-239 and -240.
These materials have toxic, carcinogenic, mutagenic, or teratogenic
effects on humans and other life forms. The migration of such
materials presents a threat to the public health, welfare and the
environment. The contaminants in the groundwater could reach
the Columbia River in as little as 20 years and continue for the next
5,000 years. The Columbia River is heavily used for irrigation by
agriculture interests in the area and is a major contributor to the
economies of the cities of Kennewick, Pasco, and Richland,
Washington. Approximately 450,000 people reside within a 50
miles radius of Hanford's 200 Areas and rely on the river for
drinking water, employment, and/or recreation.
Regulatory History The State of Washington's Hazardous Waste Program was initially
authorized by EPA in 1986 and was revised to include regulation
of radioactive mixed wastes in 1987. This authorization gave the
State authority to operate its Hazardous Waste Program in lieu of
4
Report No. 2000-P-00012
-------
the Federal RCRA Program. The authorization places primary
implementation and enforcement responsibility of RCRA on the
State. Washington's Hazardous Waste Program is executed
through the State's Hazardous Waste Management Act (HWMA)
and the implementing regulations, the Dangerous Waste
Regulations.
In about 1984, Ecology staff began inquiring about RCRA
compliance at Hanford's tank farms and other hazardous waste
sites and operations. During the mid to late 1980's, Ecology and the
Region performed RCRA/HWMA compliance inspections at
Hanford, including the tank farms, noting many non-compliant
areas. In 1988, spurred by the outstanding compliance problems at
Hanford, Ecology, EPA, and DOE negotiated a combined Federal
Facility Agreement under the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA) and a
Consent Order under RCRA/HWMA. The document, known as the
Hanford Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO),
required DOE to undertake cleanup actions at many existing waste
sites, to obtain operating permits or undergo closure for RCRA
Treatment, Storage, and Disposal units (TSDs), and other cleanup
and compliance actions. The three parties signed the original
FFACO in May 1989. Under the agreement, Hanford's SSTs and
DSTs were designated as RCRA units.
In 1993 DOE sought to renegotiate the FFACO requirements for
the tank systems, in order to incorporate new information and
planning for them. DOE's new tank program, known as the TWRS
Program was signed in a revised FFACO in January 1994 and was
established to ensure that the tank waste is stored, treated, and
immobilized in a safe, environmentally sound, and cost-effective
manner.
The 1994 revision of the FFACO included a commitment from
DOE to retrieve all of the waste from the SSTs and vitrify
(stabilization within a molten glass matrix) tank waste from all
SSTs and DSTs. The deadline for completing waste vitrification
was 2028. The new amendment also required work to: (i) address
tank safety issues; (ii) continue stabilizing the SSTs; (iii) construct
new DST capacity; (iv) upgrade systems in tank farms;
(v) continue characterizing the tank waste; and (vi) and close all
SSTs.
5
Report No. 2000-P-00012
-------
In December 1995 the TWRS components of the FFACO were
further modified to allow a "privatized" approach to a tank waste
vitrification facility. This revision resulted in a revised schedule
for the vitrification facilities, but no change to the other tank
related work.
Regulatory Role of The FFACO defines the regulatory roles and responsibilities of
Ecology arid the Ecology and the Region for the Hanford Facility. The agreement
Region designates Ecology as the lead regulatory agency for all RCRA
units, including the SSTs and DSTs. As the lead regulatory
agency, Ecology is required to provide regulatory oversight,
including preparation of responses to documents submitted by
DOE. The FFACO designates the Region as the non-lead
regulatory agency for the SSTS and DSTs and specifies that the
Region will not assign staff to provide any oversight or support of
work at the RCRA units. However, the agreement does not
eliminate the Region's responsibility for oversight of Ecology's
exercise of its authorized RCRA authorities.
The Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between Ecology and
the Region concerning the Flanford FFACO specifies that Ecology
is the single point of contact, regulator and decision maker for all
activities subject to the State's Dangerous Waste Regulations. The
MOU also states that the Region will not oversee activity subject to
pa
Hanford "N" Reactor Adjacent to the Columbia River
(Source: Phil Weihrouch, EPA OIG)
6 Report No. 2000-P-00012
-------
State rules, including rules that have not yet been authorized by the
Region but which are substantially equivalent to RCRA. However,
the MOU specifies that the Region may become involved in
regulatory oversight when requested by Ecology or as otherwise
appropriate as part of the Region's State program oversight
responsibilities.
Ecology is the agency mandated by the Washington State
Legislature to administer the State's federally approved RCRA
Program. Ecology's Nuclear Waste Program is responsible for all
dangerous/hazardous waste cleanup program activities at the
Hanford Federal Facility. This responsibility includes oversight
and enforcement of TWRS components of the FFACO. The
Nuclear Waste Program has offices located in Olympia and
Kennewick, Washington and currently has about 70 staff. Most of
these staff are assigned to its Kennewick office.
The Region's Office of Waste and Chemicals Management
(OWCM) administers the Federal RCRA Program within
Region 10. At Ecology's request, the OWCM and the Region's
Office of Regional Counsel provide technical, regulatory, and legal
support for the TWRS Program.
AUDIT SCOPE & We performed this audit in accordance with the Government
METHODOLOGY Auditing Standards (1994 Revision) issued by the Comptroller
General of the United States as they apply to performance audits.
Our review included tests of program records and other auditing
procedures we considered necessary for the purposes of expressing
an opinion based on our audit objectives. We also reviewed the
Federal Manager's Financial Integrity Act reports for 1997 and
1998. The reports did not identify any material weaknesses, or
vulnerabilities, relating to the issues discussed in this report. See
APPENDIX A for scope and methodology details.
There have been no prior audits performed by the EPA Office of
Inspector General (OIG) on Ecology's and the Region's oversight
of the TWRS Program. However, GAO has performed a number of
audits covering various aspects of DOE's management of the
TWRS Program. The most recent reports entitled Nuclear Waste:
Department of Energy's Hanford Tank Waste Project-Schedule.
Cost, and Management Issues (GAO/RCED-99-13, October 1998)
PRIOR AUDIT
COVERAGE
7
Report No. 2000-P-00012
-------
and Nuclear Waste: Understanding of Waste Migration at Hanford
is Inadequate for Key Decisions (GAO/RCED-98-80, March 1998)
identified weaknesses in DOE's management of the program and
are discussed in Chapter 2.
Recent audits conducted by the DOE Office of Inspector also have
identified weaknesses in DOE's management of the Hanford tank
farms. In 1995, the OIG issued a report entitled Audit of the
Richland Operations Office Site Characterization Program
(DOE/IG-0368, March 1995) that concluded: (i) the reduction of
the completion period for core sampling of high level radioactive
waste tanks from 6 to 3 years increased the characterization costs
without a similar increase in benefits and (ii) renegotiation of the
FFACO milestone that required 80 percent of low level waste
sample analyses be performed within 25 miles of Hanford will add
$46 million over the next 8 years to the cost of sample analyses.
The DOE OIG also issued a report in 1993 entitled DOE
Management of High-Level Waste at the Hanford Site
(DOE/IG-0325, April 1993) that concluded DOE managed the
Hanford remediation program as a number of separate projects not
fully integrated into one major acquisition system. Consequently,
program costs were obscured, and DOE had not clearly defined
systems requirements or developed overall cost and schedule
baselines. They found a vast array of technical uncertainties,
including tank safety and inadequate information about the makeup
of the tank waste, that could significantly affect the program's cost
and ultimate success. At the time of our fieldwork, the DOE OIG
was conducting a follow up audit on the issues addressed in their
1993 report.
8
Report No. 2000-P-00012
-------
CHAPTER 2
MAJOR DELAYS THREATEN THE ENVIRONMENT
Progress with Hanford's TWRS Program has not been sufficient to
ensure compliance with RCRA and to provide adequate protection
to human health and the environment. Although the Hanford
FFACO established major milestones for stabilizing SSTs, treating
waste from SSTs and DSTs, and closing the SSTs, Ecology has
been unsuccessful in obtaining DOE's compliance with the
milestones. Specifically:
Milestones for interim stabilization of the SSTs have been
consistently missed and completion of interim stabilization
will be delayed by 9 years.
Milestones for the start of treatment of tank wastes will be
delayed at least 4 years and the completion of treatment
may be delayed up to 19 years.
The milestone to initiate waste retrieval from SST C-106, a
"Watch List" tank, was not met and waste retrieval was
delayed for over a year.
Milestones for the retrieval of waste from and the closure
of all SSTs may be delayed at least 15 years and 9 years,
respectively.
In addition, DOE's evaluation of DST storage capacity
requirements was deficient and did not meet milestone
requirements.
At least 1 million gallons of highly toxic and radioactive waste
from 67 of Hanford's 149 SSTs has already leaked, and some of
the waste has reached the groundwater. There are about 35
million gallons of high level radioactive waste remaining in the
149 SSTs and about 19 million gallons of waste stored in 28
DSTs. Continued delays in interim stabilization and delays in
treatment and retrieval of the tank wastes could result in the use of
both the
9
Report No. 2000-P-00012
-------
SSTs and DSTs significantly beyond the schedule established by
the FFACO. Deficient DST storage capacity evaluations may
cause additional delays in the retrieval and treatment of the tank
waste. These delays could significantly increase the risks of
releases into the environment.
We attribute the conditions to three principal causes. First, DOE
has not demonstrated the ability or sufficient commitment to
manage the TWRS Program to meet FFACO milestones and to
provide adequate protection to human health and the environment.
Second, DOE has not sufficiently funded all TWRS Program
activities. Third, Ecology and the Region have not developed and
implemented an effective oversight and enforcement strategy.
Exhibit 1 provides a timeline of actual and proposed revisions in
the TWRS Program at the time of our audit.
BACKGROUND RCRA Subtitle C establishes a program for managing hazardous
waste from generation to disposal. Section 3005 of RCRA
requires facilities to obtain operating permits that establish the
administrative and technical conditions under which hazardous
wastes at the facilities must be managed. It also grants interim
status to facilities until a permit is issued when specific qualifying
criteria are met.
The Hanford Facility qualified for interim status, and the SSTs
and DSTs are currently operating under interim status
requirements. Washington Administrative Code (WAC) Chapter
173-303- Dangerous Waste Regulations and 40 CFR, Part 265-
Interim Status Standards for Owners and Operators of Hazardous
Waste Treatment, Storage, and Disposal Facilities provide
regulations applicable to interim status tank systems used to store
or treat hazardous waste. The WAC Chapter 173-303-400 and
40 CFR, Part 265, Subpart J include requirements for general
operations, secondary containment systems, response to leaks and
disposition of unfit tank systems, and closure and post closure
care.1
1 WAC Chapter 173-303-400 and 40 CFR, Part 265, Subpart J specify that a tank system becomes subject to closure
and post closure requirements applicable to landfills in circumstances where all waste and contamination can not be
removed from in and around the tank system. 40 CFR, Part 265, Subpart N establishes closure and post closure
requirements for landfills.
10
Report No. 2000-P-00012
-------
The purpose of the FFACO is to: (i) bring the Hanford Facility into
compliance with RCRA and the State's Hazardous Waste
Management Act; and (ii) establish a framework and schedule for
implementing response actions in accordance with the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act. Because the SSTs and DSTs are not in compliance
with State and Federal hazardous waste laws and regulations, the
FFACO includes requirements and milestones for: (i) tank system
integrity assessments; (ii) tank system upgrades; (iii) waste
characterization of tank waste; (iv) resolution of tank safety issues;
(v) interim stabilization; (vi) waste retrieval; (vii) waste processing
facility construction and operations; (viii) waste storage and
disposal; and (ix) tank closure.
The FFACO includes enforcement provisions for noncompliance
with major requirements and milestones. Under the agreement,
Ecology, as the lead regulator, is responsible for enforcement of
FFACO milestones pertaining to regulation of the SSTs and DSTs.
In the event DOE fails to comply with a term or condition of the
FFACO, a stipulated penalty may be assessed in an amount up to
$5,000 for the first week (or part thereof), and up to $10,000 for
each additional week (or part thereof) of noncompliance. The
FFACO also authorizes Ecology to seek other remedies or
sanctions for noncompliance with the agreement, statutes, or
regulations.
The FFACO also provides a dispute resolution process in the event
DOE objects to Ecology's disapproval of a proposed modification,
decision, or determination made under the agreement. The
FFACO requires Ecology and DOE to make reasonable efforts to
resolve disputes at the project manager level. However, the dispute
may be elevated to the Interagency Management Integration Team
(IAMIT)2, if resolution at the project manager level cannot be
achieved within 30 days. If the IAMIT is unable to resolve the
dispute within 21 days, the Director of Ecology is required to make
a final determination within 35 days of the date the dispute was
elevated to the IAMIT. DOE may file an appeal with either the
2 The IAMIT is composed of a DOE Executive Manager, Ecology's Program Manager for the Nuclear Waste
Program, and the Region's Project Manager for the Hanford Project Office and is required by the FFACO. One of
the roles of the IAMIT is to serve as a forum for resolution of disputes when agreement can not be reached through
informal dispute resolution.
11
Report No. 2000-P-00012
-------
Washington Pollution Control Hearing Board3 (PCHB) or the
courts if DOE objects to the Director's final determination.
Milestones for interim stabilization of the SSTs have been
significantly delayed. In the initial FFACO, interim stabilization
was to be completed by September 1995. However, as of
August 1999, interim stabilization is not scheduled to be completed
until September 2004.
The intent of interim stabilization is to provide an interim measure
to reduce the impacts of leaks of liquid waste from the SSTs.
Interim stabilization is the process of pumping liquid mixed waste
from the SSTs to DSTs. An SST is interim stabilized and pumping
may be discontinued when the tank contains less than 50,000
gallons of drainable liquid, less than 5,000 gallons of supernatant
(free-standing) liquid, and the pump flow is 0.05 gallons per
minute or less.
A Delay of 5 Years The FFACO originally required DOE to complete interim
stabilization for all SSTs by September 1995, except tanks C-105
and C-106 which were to be interim stabilized by September 1996.
During the period May 1989 through March 1997, milestones were
modified 13 times. The most significant of these modifications
was the sixth amendment, which was made in January 1994. This
modification revised the major milestone for interim stabilization
by extending the completion date 5 years from September 1995 to
September 2000. Ecology and the Region approved the sixth
amendment4 in order to allow DOE additional time to resolve tank
safety issues, including those associated with flammable gas.
Another significant modification to the FFACO was the twelfth
amendment, which was made in September 1996. The
modification extended near term interim milestones under the
3 The PCHB was established under Washington Administrative Code to hear appeals of orders or decisions made by
state environmental departments, including the Department of Ecology.
4 The FFACO requires the approval of both Ecology and the Region for modifications of major milestones. The
sixth amendment revised a major milestone. Therefore, both Ecology and the Region were required to approve the
amendment.
INTERIM
STABILIZATION
MILESTONES
WERE MISSED
AND DELAYED
BY 9 YEARS
12
Report No. 2000-P-00012
-------
major interim stabilization milestone. In addition, the amendment
reduced the number of SSTs required to be interim stabilized by
the near term interim milestones and increased the number of SSTs
required to be interim stabilized by the later interim milestones.
However, the modification did not extend the major milestone
requiring completion of interim stabilization by September 2000.
Ecology approved the twelfth amendment5 because DOE provided
a recovery plan which included a schedule showing that interim
stabilization would be completed by the September 2000
milestone. In its justification for the extension, DOE disclosed that
the recovery plan included a schedule which addressed safety
analysis requirements and additional preparation time needed for
equipment and administrative controls for tanks containing
flammable gas.
Subsequent to the thirteenth amendment, DOE requested two
additional extensions of interim milestones. The first request was
made in June 1997 and asked for an extension from
September 30, 1997 to March 31, 1998 to start interim stabilization
of six SSTs. The second request was made in December 1997 and
asked for an extension from March 31, 1998 to a date "to be
determined" to start interim stabilization of eight SSTs. DOE said
unresolved flammable gas safety issues made the extensions
necessary.
DOE Stopped
Pumping
Unilaterally, DOE also placed an immediate moratorium on
pumping of the SSTs in July 1997, and a 1-year moratorium on the
tank interim stabilization program for fiscal 1998. DOE reported
that the moratorium was necessary because funding was expected
to be less than required to comply with all regulations and
compliance commitments. DOE also said that it wanted the
moratorium because the cost of interim stabilization per tank had
been escalating and, as a result, it wanted to stop and refine an
approach to reduce the cost prior to restarting the program.
Consequently, DOE cut funding for interim stabilization from
approximately $15 to $4 million for fiscal 1998.
Milestones not Met Ecology denied both extension requests. In response, DOE
invoked the FFACO dispute resolution process and appealed to the
Director of Ecology. The Director denied both extensions citing
5 The FFACO requires the approval of the lead regulatory agency for modifications of interim milestones. Ecology
approved the twelfth amendment because it is the lead agency for regulation of the SSTs and DSTs.
13
Report No. 2000-P-00012
-------
that DOE did not have sufficient cause for the extensions.
Although the extensions were denied, DOE subsequently failed to
meet the milestones. No penalties were assessed by Ecology in
response to DOE's failure to meet the September 1997 and March
1998 milestones.
DOE submitted another recovery plan for the interim stabilization
program during April 1998 as a result of the Director of Ecology's
decisions to deny the previous two extension requests. The
recovery plan stated that DOE was unable to meet completion of
interim stabilization by September 2000 and requested that the
milestone be extended 4 years to September 2004. The recovery
plan further stated that DOE could only meet the revised schedule
if 29 "enabling assumptions" proved true.
Intent to File Suit In response to DOE's April 1998 plan, Ecology notified DOE
during June 1998 that it intended to file suit for DOE's failure to
meet the September 1997 and March 1998 interim milestones.
Ecology advised DOE:
The history of the interim stabilization program at
Hanford is one of delay, mismanagement, and above
all failure to stop an ongoing threat to groundwater
and the Columbia River. For years, the State has
accommodated Energy's requests for more time to
complete work. Despite thirteen amendments, many
of them premised on the need to address safety issues,
Energy has failed to take steps necessary to work
safely in a flammable gas environment. In 1997, less
than a year after the last significant extensions were
made to interim stabilization milestones, Energy
abruptly stopped pumping waste from tanks at
Hanford. Apparently, Energy has decided that the
way to work is do no work at all.
Consent Decree
Established to
Enforce Revised
Schedule
Subsequent to Ecology's notice of intent to sue; DOE, Ecology, the
U.S. Department of Justice, and the Washington Attorney
General's Office entered into settlement negotiations which
resulted in a consent decree for the Interim Stabilization Program.
The consent decree in August 1999 removed the Interim
Stabilization Program from the FFACO, and replaced it with a new
agreement and schedule which is enforceable by Ecology through
the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Washington. The
consent decree also revised the date for completion of interim
14
Report No. 2000-P-00012
-------
stabilization an additional 4 years to September 2004. This
extension, combined with previously agreed upon amendments,
results in a 9-year delay in interim stabilization from the original
September 1995 milestone.
In response to the settlement negotiations, DOE began pumping the
first group of SSTs scheduled for interim stabilization under the
consent decree between March and June 1999. As of the end of
September 1999, pumping was progressing ahead of the latest
schedule. In its response to our position papers, Ecology stated:
Ecology would like EPA to note and be cognizant of
the tremendous amount of Ecology technical staff time
that went into the development of detail process
definition systems analysis, and schedule scrubbing
that is the basis of the new consent decree. Ecology
technical staff worked along side, DOE, and
contractor staff in this complete redefinition of the
processes needed to interim stabilize a tank. It is this
level of detail that gives Ecology confidence that the
schedules are technically doable and more importantly
that perhaps this time DOE has developed a well
defined systems approach to interim stabilization that
can be successful.
We acknowledge Ecology's efforts and accomplishment in
establishing the new interim stabilization schedule under the
consent decree and its confidence that the schedule is technically
doable. However, safety issues and insufficient funding could
cause further delays in interim stabilization. This is because the
decree provides that unforseen safety concerns may constitute good
cause for extending the interim stabilization schedule. If DOE is
unable to resolve safety issues timely, safety issues may continue
to cause delays in stabilizing the SSTs.
The consent decree also provides that DOE may raise
unavailability of funds as a defense for failure to comply with the
terms of the decree. Therefore, DOE's budget process could also
cause delays. As specified in the decree, Ecology does not agree
that lack of funding is a valid defense for further delays. However,
Ecology decided not to seek judicial resolution of the issue until
such time as DOE claims it is unable to perform because of
insufficient funds.
15
Report No. 2000-P-00012
-------
STARTAND
COMPLETION OF
WASTE
TREATMENT WAS
DELAYED
Waste treatment is a critical step in the process of getting
hazardous waste out of leaking tanks. Yet, DOE will delay the
start of waste treatment by at least 4 years6 and may delay the
completion of waste treatment up to 19 years. Furthermore,
Ecology has not been successful in establishing revised,
enforceable waste treatment milestones timely with DOE.
The purpose of waste treatment is to convert SST and DST wastes
into a solid form for storage and disposal. DOE plans to first
separate the wastes into low activity waste7 (LAW) and high level
waste8 (HLW). The LAW and HLW will then be stabilized within
a molten glass matrix, referred to as vitrification, that will be
poured into stainless steel containers to harden. The vitrified HLW
will be stored at Hanford until a national HLW repository is
constructed. The vitrified LAW will be disposed at Hanford in
near surface disposal facilities specially designed to meet
requirements of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the State's
Hazardous Waste Management Act, and RCRA.
The Start of Waste
Treatment Will be
Delayed at Least 4
Years
The start of waste treatment will exceed the current FFACO
milestones for waste treatment by at least 4 years. The FFACO
requires DOE to acquire tank waste treatment capacity on an
agreed-to primary path or, should DOE determine the primary path
to be infeasible, an agreed-to alternative path. Under the primary
path, FFACO milestone M-60-12 requires that two contractor-
owned and operated Phase I LAW treatment facilities be
operational by December 2002. If infeasible, however, then the
alternative path's milestone M-61-02 requires that one Phase I
LAW facility be operational by December 2003.
Under the primary path, DOE planned to purchase tank waste
processing services at fixed-unit prices from contractor-owned and
6 The 4 year delay is based on the current FFACO alternative path milestone requiring waste treatment to start in
December 2003 and DOE's current plan to start waste treatment in December 2007. The original FFACO milestone
for the start of waste treatment was December 1999. Therefore, the start of waste treatment will be delayed 8 years
from the original milestone if waste treatment begins in 2007.
7 LAW is high level waste that has been pre-treated to remove a portion of radioactive elements and when stabilized
qualifies as incidental waste according to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). The NRC allows disposal of
LAW in storage appropriately constructed near surface facilities.
8 HLW is a by-product of reprocessing spent nuclear fuel and is considered the most dangerous form of radioactive
waste. HLW requires radiation shielding, special handling techniques, and when disposed of, special measures to
isolate it from humans and the environment.
16
Report No. 2000-P-00012
-------
contractor-operated facilities at Hanford. Using this privatization
approach, DOE sought to achieve greater accountability and risk
sharing with the contractors than under traditional DOE cost-
reimbursement contracts.
DOE initially planned to comply with the primary path's
milestones through contracting for waste treatment services in two
phases: Phase I and Phase n. Phase I was designed to treat and
immobilize between 6 and 13 percent of Hanford's tank waste and
serve as a demonstration of the elements that would be required for
continuing the privatization approach with production-scale
facilities during Phase n. During Phase n, DOE envisioned that
the remaining tank waste would be processed.
The alternative path was intended as a fall back contracting and
funding path. The path's milestones were to become enforceable
only in the event that DOE was not maintaining adequate progress
under the primary path and elected to pursue the alternative path.
Therefore, the alternative path milestone was established to
provide additional time to enable DOE to make necessary
contracting and funding changes should the primary path become
unfeasible.
Following the primary path, DOE awarded Phase I contracts to two
contractors during September 1996. The contracts were structured
in two parts, a 20-month Part A ending in mid-1998, and an
optional Part B planned to last approximately 10 to 14 years. The
purpose of the Part A was to evaluate the technical, operational,
and immobilization services on a fixed-unit-price basis. If
authorized to proceed to Part B, the contractors would then design,
build, permit, operate, and deactivate privately financed, LAW and,
optionally, HLW treatment plants.
Although the FFACO established milestones for DOE to start
LAW waste treatment by either the end of 2002 or 2003, DOE
awarded a contract modification in August 1998 which does not
comply with either waste treatment milestone. Following
completion of Part A by the two contractors, DOE only authorized
one contractor to proceed to Part B. In the Part B contract, DOE
did not authorize the contractor to proceed with construction and
operation of the facilities as originally planned. Instead, the
contract only authorized a 24-month design period, ending August
2000 (with the possibility of a 9 month extension), to refine the
17
Report No. 2000-P-00012
-------
design, technical approach, regulatory requirements, and financial
and incentive structure of LAW and HLW waste treatment for
Phase I.9
DOE plans to make a decision on whether to proceed with the
contractor into construction and operation of Phase I in late August
2000 when the design phase will be at 30 percent and the
contractor can propose fixed-unit prices for waste processing
services. DOE estimates that if the contractor is granted an
authorization to proceed with construction and operation of the
facilities under Phase I, waste treatment will begin by
December 2007 and continue through December 2018, a period of
11 years.
Assuming the contractor is authorized to proceed with
construction, the August 1998 contract modification will result in a
delay of Phase I waste treatment facilities being operational from
December 2002 under the primary path (or December 2003 under
the alternative path) to December 2007, a delay of at least 4 years.
Further, the contract does not establish a commitment by DOE to
construct and operate tank waste treatment facilities and DOE has
not established an alternative plan for acquisition and operation of
waste treatment facilities should the contractor not be authorized to
proceed with the remainder of Phase I.
Completion of
Waste Treatment
may be Delayed
up to 19 Years
DOE may significantly delay the completion of waste treatment.
Primary path milestone M-60-00 requires completion of
pretreatment and immobilization of LAW by December 2024 and
alternative path milestone M-61-00 requires completion of
pretreatment and immobilization of LAW by 2028. In addition,
milestone M-51-00 requires completion of vitrification of HLW by
December 2028.
DOE plans to build sufficient waste treatment capacity during
Phase I to treat approximately 10 percent of the tank waste by
volume by the end of 2018. Therefore, approximately 90 percent of
the tank waste will be processed during Phase II of waste treatment
which is scheduled to begin in 2010. Waste treatment analysis
9 A major reason for DOE's change in contract scope for Part B was that both Part A contractors identified that
DOE's waste treatment plan to build proof of concept facilities with a design life of 10 years was not feasible.
Based on the need for a conservative, seismic-resistant design, and input from the financial communities, both
contractors proposed more robust, capital-intensive facilities with a design life of 30 years or more. As a result,
DOE determined that more time was needed to construct the facilities than originally planned and currently
reflected in FFACO milestones.
18
Report No. 2000-P-00012
-------
presented by DOE to Ecology during March 1999 identifies that
DOE will be required to significantly expand its treatment capacity
during Phase II in order to complete waste treatment by the
milestone of 2028.
However, DOE's waste treatment analysis indicates that the option
it is considering for waste treatment capacity during Phase II may
result in a delay of waste treatment completion for both LAW and
HLW from 2028 to as late as 2047, or a delay of up to 19 years.
DOE's analysis identifies 5 possible treatment capacity expansion
options with waste treatment completion ranging from 2028 to
2047.
Waste Treatment Capacity Options
Option
Pliiisc 1
Pliiisc II
l''.\|);insion
Idlill
(;i|);ici(\
TlVillllH'lll
(oinplek'd
Single Lino
10 \1T:;:
50 MT*
oo \l l ;:
2047
Minimum
Deliverable
30 MT
30 MT
60 MT
2047
Contract
Reference
30 MT
30 or 90 MT
60 or 120
MT
2032 or
2047
Double
Capacity
60 MT
60 MT
120 MT
2032
Maximum
Capacity
120 MT
N/A
120 MT
2028
*Metric tons per day
The waste treatment analysis identifies that DOE's preferred option
for expanding treatment capacity is the Contract Reference Option.
Under this option, waste treatment will not be completed until
about 2047 if DOE decides to contract for waste treatment facilities
with a total capacity of 30 metric tons per day during Phase I and
60 metric tons per day during Phase n.
19
Report No. 2000-P-00012
-------
In its response to our position papers, Ecology stated:
DOE has repeatedly said that it can and will meet
2028 and there has been no agreement to delay the
end of treatment of tank waste by Ecology. Actual
Phase I treatment performance efficiencies coupled
with Phase II facility expansion may allow DOE to
meet the 2028 treatment completion requirement.
We agree that DOE should be able to meet the 2028 milestone if it
obtains sufficient waste treatment capacity. However, DOE's
waste treatment capacity analysis suggests that adequate capacity
may not be acquired to treat all of the tank waste by 2028.
Furthermore, the delay of the start of waste treatment by at least 4
years may make it more difficult for DOE to meet the FFACO
milestone.
Revised FFACO
Milestones Have
Not Been
Established Timely
Recognizing the impact of the August 1998 contract modification
on waste treatment milestones, in October 1998, Ecology requested
that DOE enter into "Agreement in Principle, Hanford Federal
Facility Agreement And Consent Order Tank Waste Remediation
System (TWRS) Negotiations In conformance with TWRS
Privatization Contract Number DE-RP06-96RL13308 August 1998"
(AIP) to establish a negotiation framework for revision of FFACO
milestones. In a draft AIP provided to DOE, Ecology stated:
Signature of the contract will result in maj or impacts to
Hanford Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order
(Agreement) requirements for tank waste processing
facility design, construction, and operation, and will
similarly impact many other aspects of the TWRS
program. Approval to date of only Part B-l has
increased concern regarding further delay in processing
plant acquisition. Prior to issuance of contract Part
B-l, Agreement requirements represent the sole legal
driver for compliance and cleanup of the tank farms.
Ecology requested that the AIP be finalized by early November
1998. Although meetings between senior executives from Ecology,
Although DOE has made it clear that it would not meet waste
treatment milestones in the FFACO, Ecology has not been
successful in establishing revised enforceable waste treatment
milestones timely.
20
Report No. 2000-P-00012
-------
the Region, and DOE were held during February and April 1999 to
resolve DOE's concerns with committing to an AIP, Ecology was
unable to obtain a signed AIP from DOE until late May 1999.
Therefore, the AIP was signed by DOE over 6 months late.
The AIP required the parties to revise specific milestones for
Phase I waste treatment and establish milestones which provide a
schedule to negotiate revised milestones for waste retrieval and
Phase II waste treatment. The AIP also stated: "The Parties'
negotiations must result in clear DOE accountability to move
forward with pretreatment and vitrification of Hanford tank waste"
and set a July 31, 1999 deadline for completion of the negotiations.
However, the July 1999 deadline specified by the AIP was not met.
Ecology, the Region, and DOE signed "Agreement on Principal
Regulatory Commitments Pertaining to Hanford Tank Waste
Treatment Complex Construction and Operations" on
November 15, 1999, or VA months after the deadline. Under this
new agreement, DOE has committed to start operations for tank
waste treatment by 2007 and to complete treatment of 10 percent of
the tank waste by volume by 201810. In addition, the three parties
have agreed to establish milestones and target dates which provide a
specific schedule for the parties to revisit and negotiate FFACO
milestone modifications pertaining to Phase II waste treatment.
Under the agreement, these commitments will be incorporated into
the FFACO through an amendment.
The November 1999 agreement requires the 3 parties to complete
negotiations on conversion of the regulatory commitments to
FFACO change request format by the end of January 2000.
Therefore, revised waste treatment milestones which are enforceable
will not be established until after January 2000. If the negotiations
are successfully competed by the deadline, it will have taken
Ecology approximately 17 months (from the August 1998 contract
modification) to reach agreement on revised FFACO milestones for
Phase I waste treatment and a negotiation schedule for milestone
modifications pertaining to Phase n.
10 Ecology, the Region, and DOE have agreed that DOE will not seek an alternative path to meet the commitment
dates.
21 Report No. 2000-P-00012
-------
MILESTONE FOR
INITIATION OF
WASTE
RETRIEVAL FOR
SST C-106 WAS
NOT MET
DOE did not meet FFACO milestone M-45-03 A to initiate waste
retrieval from SST C-106 timely, and waste retrieval was
subsequently delayed for over a year.
SST C-106 is a 530,000 gallon tank built between 1943 and 1944.
It is 55 years old, 23/4 times its design life of 20 years. In addition
to normal deterioration, heat-generating radioisotopes threaten the
tank's integrity. At one time, the tank stored 229,000 gallons of
high-level radioactive waste, including 5 million curies of
strontium-90. Decay of the strontium-90 generates high heat
within the waste. Waste temperatures in the tank were observed in
excess of 210 degrees (F). The excessive heat could have resulted
in collapse of the tank dome and loss of containment of the tank's
contents. The tank required 6,000 gallons of water a month to be
added for cooling.
In 1990 Congress passed Public Law 101-510 which required DOE
to identify Hanford tanks that "may have a serious potential for
release of high level waste due to uncontrolled increases in
temperature or pressure," and to develop action plans to respond to
this risk. In response to the law, DOE placed tanks with high heat
and high pressure conditions on a "Watch List." Tank C-106 was
placed on the Watch List during 1991 as Hanford's only high heat
tank. DOE considered the high-heat waste in Tank C-106 a
priority 1 safety issue because:
(i) If the tank leaked and water cooling was stopped, an
uncontrolled release of radioactive material could occur due
to failure of the tank's dome, leading to on-site or off-site
radiation exposure and a potential loss of human lives, and
(ii) If the tank leaked and water cooling was not stopped,
maintaining cooling water levels would result in continual
water contaminant loss to area soils and eventually the
groundwater.
Completion of FFACO milestone M-45-03 A represents a critical
first step in determining how waste will be retrieved from the other
SSTs as well as closure of the tanks. It required DOE to initiate
retrieval of C-106 waste by October 31, 199711. The milestone was
11 The FFACO did not specify a completion date for the retrieval operations required under interim milestone M-45-
03A.
22
Report No. 2000-P-00012
-------
created in order to: (i) resolve the high heat safety issues associated
with the tank, and (ii) demonstrate SST retrieval technologies.
On May 6, 1997 DOE requested the due date for milestone
M-45-03A be extended to September 1998. The extension was
requested because DOE discovered an over-estimate in the
ventilation capacity of the waste receiver tank. The over-estimate
affected assumptions regarding the ability of the receiver tank to
cool the waste, creating a "steam bump" safety issue for the
receiver tank. A steam bump occurs when liquid comes in contact
with superheated sludge and is converted to steam. The steam may
result in over-pressurization of the tank and a release of
contaminants to the air outside. DOE concluded it would not be
possible to resolve the steam bump issue in time to meet the
milestone.
Ecology disapproved DOE's request to extend the milestone. In
response, DOE invoked the dispute resolution process outlined by
the FFACO and appealed the decision to the Director of Ecology.
The Director denied the appeal, stating DOE had been deficient in
developing a sound safety analysis and in identifying and resolving
safety issues within a reasonable time. The Director informed
DOE that they would be in violation of the milestone on
November 1, 1997, and that penalties may be assessed in
accordance with the FFACO. However, the Director stated that
penalties would not be assessed provided retrieval of waste was
completed by December 31,1999.
In November 1997, DOE appealed Ecology's decision to the
Pollution Control Hearing Board (PCHB). The PCHB affirmed
Ecology's determination in September 1998 denying extension of
the milestone. Even though the appeal was denied and no
extension was granted, DOE achieved in effect a 1-year delay by
pursuing the appeal process. DOE initiated waste retrieval from
C-106 in November 1998 instead of October 1997 as required by
the milestone.
DOE subsequently completed waste retrieval from the tank earlier
than the December 31, 1999 deadline established by Ecology's
Director. The waste retrieval was successfully completed in
October 1999.
23
Report No. 2000-P-00012
-------
SST WASTE
RETRIEVAL AND
CLOSURE MAY BE
DELAYED
DOE's current TWRS Operation and Utilization Plan12 (OUP),
dated May 1999, identifies that DOE may not meet the FFACO
tank waste retrieval and closure milestones. In addition, funding
reductions in retrieval technology development will most likely
cause additional delays in retrieval and closure activities.
Milestone M-45-05 requires DOE to retrieve the waste from all
149 SSTs by the end of September 2018 and milestone M-45-00
requires the closure of all SSTs by the end of September 2024.
Closure is to follow retrieval of as much tank waste as technically
possible, with tank waste residues not to exceed the lesser of, the
limit of waste retrieval technology capability or, 360 cubic feet in
each of the 100 series tanks and 30 cubic feet in each of the 200
series tanks.
Target milestones M-45-03-TO 1 and M-45-04-T01 represent
critical initial steps towards retrieving waste and closing the SSTs.
Target milestone M-45-03-T01 requires completion of a SST
retrieval demonstration for one tank by September 2003. Target
milestone M-45-04-T01 requires the completion of construction
and related testing of the initial SST retrieval systems for an entire
tank farm, or an equivalent number of tanks, by November 2003.
Retrieval and
Closure Delays
May be 15 and 9
Years,
Respectively
DOE's TWRS OUP identifies that DOE may not complete
retrieval operations until the end of September 2033, a delay of 15
years from the September 2018 due date specified by the FFACO.
According to the TWRS OUP, DOE's waste treatment contracting
changes significantly impacted its waste retrieval plans. The
TWRS OUP states:
Privatization contract changes also had a great
impact on SST retrieval plans.... There will not be
space available to retrieve any tanks beyond the
241-C-106 demonstration until processing has
started and has freed up space to allow further
retrieval. In addition, the delays do not allow any of
the SST retrieval interim target milestones to be
12 The TWRS Operation and Utilization Plan provides an integrated and updated planning baseline for DOE's
TWRS Program to use for revision of multi-year work plans, mission analysis reports, system specifications, and
project plans in order to meet contract commitments for privatized waste treatment facilities.
24
Report No. 2000-P-00012
-------
met. The Tri-Party Agreement compliant Case 0
(achieve the SST Retrieval completion milestone of
September 30, 2018) is not technically practical.
Retrieval and processing rates are impractically
high, the Phase 2 schedule has the same completion
date as Phase I, and Tank space is not available.
The TWRS OUP identifies that approximately 100 million gallons
of waste will be transferred from the SSTs during retrieval
operations. However, the plan discloses that, under DOE's
preferred schedule, only about 22 million gallons (or 22 percent)
will be retrieved from the SSTs by the original milestone
completion date of September 2018. DOE's preferred schedule for
completion of retrieval may also result in the delay of the closure
of the SSTs until after September 2033, a delay of at least 9 years
from the September 2024 due date specified by the FFACO. If so,
waste retrieval would not be completed until about 90 years after
the first SSTs were built.
During the audit, Ecology was in the process of addressing DOE's
plans to delay tank waste retrieval and closure through the
negotiations outlined in the "Agreement on Principal Regulatory
Commitments Pertaining to Hanford Tank Waste Treatment
Complex Construction and Operations", dated November 15, 1999.
Under the agreement, Ecology, the Region, and DOE will negotiate
milestones and target dates which establish a specific schedule for
further negotiation of FFACO milestone modifications pertaining
to waste retrieval and tank closure. The agreement requires that
the negotiations be completed no later than the end of January
2000.
Retrieval
Technology not
Adequately
Funded
DOE has not adequately funded retrieval technology development.
In April 1999 DOE suspended funding of the Hanford Tank
Initiative (HTI) Project. DOE originally established the HTI
Project to develop technologies for waste retrieval and to
determine the amount of waste retrieval that is technically
achievable. In a April 29, 1999 letter addressed to DOE's Manager
of the Office of River Protection, Ecology notified DOE that the
funding suspension was a short-sighted action and that the
suspension will have negative impacts on future SST retrieval and
closure activities. The suspension of funding will most likely
result in DOE's inability to meet the FFACO's target milestones
and may cause additional delays in retrieval of waste from the
25
Report No. 2000-P-00012
-------
SSTs beyond the 15-year delay identified by DOE's preferred
schedule.
ANNUAL DST
OPERATIONAL
WASTE VOLUME
REPORT WAS
DEFICIENT
DOE's DST Operational Waste Volume Report for 1998 was
deficient and did not meet FFACO milestone requirements. The
FFACO (milestone M-46-00E) requires DOE to submit an annual
DST volume projection report identifying additional DST space
requirements for tank waste remediation activities. The evaluation
is essential to ensure that DOE has sufficient DST storage capacity
to accommodate waste transferred from the SSTs during interim
stabilization and retrieval operations until the waste is treated. The
milestone also requires DOE to submit plans for acquisition of
additional tanks if the projection identifies that additional space is
needed. The report was due by September 1998.
Although DOE submitted the annual DST Operational Waste
Volume Report on time, Ecology determined that the evaluation
had serious shortcomings in the assumptions used for the
projections. Ecology concluded that none of the scenarios used in
the evaluation accurately reflected the actual site planning or
requirements of the FFACO. In a deficiency letter addressed to
DOE's Administrator for the Hanford FFACO, dated
November 30, 1998, Ecology stated:
A new analysis needs to be conducted and should
reflect site planning, consent order requirements,
retrieval of C-106 in late 1998/early 1999 and
subsequent SST waste retrieval in compliance with
the M-45 milestones, interim stabilization liquids of
up to 7 million gallons complete in 2004, and
treatment capacity available in 2006.
Current projections show that available tank space is
exceeded in 2004 to 2006 time frame. With no firm
commitment to date from USDOE to obtain waste
treatment capacity, even these projections may
underestimate the need for new tank space. Given
the 6-8 years required for new double shell tank
capacity to become available, a decision must be
made almost immediately to build new tank space in
order for the Hanford site to fulfill its mission of
waste retrieval and treatment.
26 Report No. 2000-P-00012
-------
The letter suggested that DOE recalculate the projection using the
latest information from the various elements of the program and
resubmit the projection by the end of January 1999. Ecology
subsequently agreed to give DOE until April 1999 to resubmit the
projection. However, DOE did not resubmit the projection to
Ecology until late July 1999, or about 10 months after the
projection was originally due. Therefore, Ecology was unable to
timely determine whether DOE has an adequate plan for ensuring
sufficient DST capacity is available to store waste transferred from
the SSTs.
Because the revised projection was not submitted to Ecology until
late July 1999, we did not evaluate it. However, Ecology informed
us in late September 1999 that it had completed its review of the
revised projection and determined that the projection was
acceptable.
There are about 35 million gallons of high level radioactive waste
remaining in the SSTs and about 19 million gallons of waste stored
in the DSTs. Continued delays in interim stabilization and planned
delays in treatment and retrieval of the tank wastes will result in
the use of both the SSTs and DSTs significantly beyond the
scheduled date of 2028 for completion of waste treatment
established by the FFACO. These delays may significantly
increase the risks of releases into the environment. DOE's 1998
Report to Congress. Treatment and Immobilization of Hanford
Radioactive Tank Waste, stated:
The waste poses a serious safety concern to the
public and to the environment. Since most of the
single-shell tanks have exceeded their design life,
that risk is growing. Sixty-seven of the single shell
tanks are known to have leaked, and several
additional tanks are being investigated for potential
leaks. Nearly a million gallons of the tank waste has
spilled into the soil of the vadose zone13 below the
tanks since the first leak occurred. Recent
information has indicated that tank waste
radionuclides have moved through the vadose zone
and now have reached the groundwater that flows
13 The vadose zone is the soil zone below the surface above the saturated groundwater area.
DELAYS
INCREASE RISKS
TO THE
ENVIRONMENT
27
Report No. 2000-P-00012
-------
under the Hanford Site and connects with the
Columbia River. However, it is not possible to
predict when the next tank will leak, and with the
passage of time, even the newer, safer, double-shell
tanks are approaching the end of their design lives.
Removal of waste from the tanks, treatment, and
immobilization as an inert waste form will constitute
a lasting solution to the problem.
The SSTs were built in the 1940's through the 1960's and had a
design life of approximately 20 years. At least 1 million gallons of
highly toxic and radioactive waste has already leaked from 67 of
the 149 SSTs. Some of the waste has reached the groundwater,
and DOE currently has no method of removing all of the hazardous
contaminates from the groundwater before it reaches the Columbia
River. DOE reported that the potential for accident resulting in
large releases of radioactive and chemical contaminants will
increase as the tanks age. Releases of tank waste to soil and
groundwater will be more difficult and expensive, if not
impossible, to remediate. Therefore, the extended use of the SSTs
may require subsurface barriers to prevent migration of
contamination through the vadose zone to the groundwater. In
addition, extensive use of surface barriers both in the near term, as
interim corrective measures, and in the long term, as closure
methods, may be required to prevent further contamination of the
groundwater.
The DSTs will be near or will exceed their 50 year design lives by
2028, the current milestone for completion of waste treatment.
DOE's preferred schedule for waste treatment is to extend
completion of treatment to approximately 2047. By 2047, the
average age of the DSTs will be 67 years. Extending the waste
treatment schedule will require the use of the DSTs significantly
beyond their design lives unless sufficient additional DST capacity
is built. The use of the tanks beyond their design lives will
increase the risk of releases into the environment from tank
structural failures.
The 1 year delay in retrieval of waste from Tank C-106 increased
the risk of an uncontrolled release of radioactive wastes into the
environment from a catastrophic failure of the tank. In addition, an
extension of the retrieval of waste from the SSTs from 2018 to
2033 will require the continued storage of waste in the failing
SSTs. By 2033, some of the SSTs will have exceeded their design
28
Report No. 2000-P-00012
-------
lives by about 70 years. Insufficient funding of the HTI program
may cause even further delays in retrieval of the wastes from the
SSTs.
Deficient DST space evaluations may cause additional delays in
the retrieval and treatment of the tank waste. DOE estimates that it
will take 6 to 8 years to build new DSTs. Based on DOE's DST
Operational Waste Volume Projection Report for 1998, DOE will
need 1 additional DST for fiscal 2001 and up to 6 additional DSTs
by 2012 in order to meet current waste retrieval and treatment
milestones. As of September 1999, DOE did not have any
contracts for construction of additional DSTs.
REASONS FOR
LACK OF
PROGRAM
PROGRESS AND
COMPLIANCE
We attribute the conditions to three principal causes. First, DOE
has demonstrated neither an ability nor sufficient commitment to
manage the TWRS Program to meet FFACO milestones and to
provide adequate protection to human health and the environment.
Second, DOE has not sufficiently funded all TWRS Program
activities. Third, Ecology and the Region have not developed and
implemented an effective oversight and enforcement strategy.
DOE Has Not
Managed the
TWRS Program
Effectively
Recent reports by DOE and GAO on TWRS Program operations
identified significant weaknesses in management of the Program.
Specifically:
(i) DOE report entitled Review of the Federal Management of
the Tank Waste Remediation System Project (January
1998). The report was based on the evaluation results of
an independent nine-person review team of DOE
employees and contractors chartered by the Secretary of
DOE to investigate confidential allegations regarding
management of the TWRS Program. The report included
the following findings:
•Current TWRS management processes for addressing
safety and technical issues lack sufficient rigor to
consistently detect, manage, and resolve problems before
they become major issues for the program. This lack of
rigor is evident throughout several aspects of TWRS
management processes.
29
Report No. 2000-P-00012
-------
•Processes for reviewing and resolving technical and safety
comments are weak and have failed to address significant
issues in several cases.
•Management problems in previous self-assessments
persist.
A March 1996 DOE report entitled DOE-RL TWRS
Organizational Effectiveness Study Report (March 1996).
The report was based on evaluation results of a review
team of senior DOE staff with Government and private
industry experience who were external to the TWRS
Program. It included the following findings:
•Organizational structure and responsibilities have
not been consistently defined in a clear and timely
manner to the DOE-TWRS staff.
•Project managers are not all fully trained,
knowledgeable or skilled in project management
practices.
•Decision making, problem resolution, action plan
development, and implementation are not timely or
of required quality.
•DOE-TWRS administrative procedures required to
support efficient "Conduct of Operations" are not
existent, not effectively utilized, or require further
development.
•Effectiveness of the DOE-TWRS organization is
adversely impacted by some poor management and
administrative practices.
GAO's report entitled Nuclear Waste: Department of
Energy's Hanford Tank Waste Project-Schedule. Cost, and
Management Issues (GAO/RCED-99-13. October 1998).
GAO pointed out that DOE has had a history of not fully
implementing its management and oversight plans at its
facilities. GAO also said that outstanding issues
concerning technical staff, site support activities, and
project administration may keep DOE from being fully
prepared to oversee the Hanford Tank Waste Project.
30
Report No. 2000-P-00012
-------
(iv) GAO's report entitled Nuclear Waste: Understanding of
Waste Migration at Hanford is Inadequate for Key
Decisions CGAQ/RCED-98-80. March 1998). GAO
concluded that DOE has no strategy for investigating the
contaminated soil beneath the tanks soil and above the
groundwater. GAO found that DOE: (i) assigned low
funding priority to most proposed studies of the
contaminated soil, (ii) responded slowly to experts'
recommendations for improving ongoing studies, (iii) did
not integrate the information needs of the three
organizational units responsible for cleanup activities, and
(iv) does not know what information is needed for key
cleanup decisions.
Insufficient DOE has not placed sufficient emphasis on meeting key
Emphasis on milestones pertaining to interim stabilization, waste treatment,
Meeting waste retrieval, DST space requirements, and closure of the SSTs.
Milestones
DOE's recent actions and current planning involving acquisition
and operation of tank waste treatment facilities provide an
example of DOE's lack of commitment to meeting important
FFACO milestones. DOE made a unilateral decision to delay
waste treatment even though it had committed to specific
milestones under the FFACO. In addition to DOE's decision to
not comply with current milestones, the Department was unwilling
to commit to revised milestones for construction and operations of
waste treatment facilities until mid November 1999. This
commitment by DOE, "Agreement on Principal Regulatory
Commitments Pertaining to Hanford Tank Waste Treatment
Complex Construction and Operations", will not result in
enforceable milestones until after negotiations on revised FFACO
milestones are successfully completed in January 2000.
Prior to November 1999, DOE was unwilling to commit to revised
waste treatment milestones because it was concerned that
agreeing to milestones for start of waste treatment construction
and operations would put it in a disadvantage when negotiating
contract clauses for construction and operation of waste treatment
facilities. In addition, DOE took the position that its schedules for
construction of waste treatment facilities and their operations were
only estimates and may change. As a result of DOE's position on
waste treatment commitments, it took Ecology over 6 months to
31
Report No. 2000-P-00012
-------
finalize the AIP and 1314 months to sign the "Agreement on
Principal Regulatory Commitments Pertaining to Hanford Tank
Waste Treatment Complex Construction and Operations."
DOE has not sufficiently funded all TWRS Program activities. For
example, DOE did not adequately fund the interim stabilization
operations during fiscal 1998 and it suspended funding for HTI.
According to Ecology, DOE's inability to obtain a commitment by
Congress to adequately fund the TWRS Program has contributed to
delays in the Program. In its response to our position papers,
Ecology stated:
An additional "cause"... is the issue of capital cost and
the historical lack of DOE ability to obtain
commitment from Congress to fund this costly
solution for the nation's largest environmental cleanup
effort. Today much of this decision will be based on
the financial and pricing package BNFL puts forward,
the contractual scoring agreements needed from the
Congressional Budget Office and finally funding
commitments from Congress. The issue of tank waste
treatment has historically always been and will always
be controlled by funding commitment for this large
capital project. All of this will either succeed or fail in
the year 2000. If it fails, there will be 5 to 10 years
delay in contracting and funding a
new arrangement for waste treatment.
Ecology and the Region have not developed and implemented an
effective oversight and enforcement strategy. Ecology as the lead
regulatory agency, developed an oversight and enforcement strategy
for the TWRS Program with primary elements of negotiation and
partnering with DOE to achieve compliance with FFACO
milestones and regulatory requirements. As a result, Ecology has
historically focused on negotiation to address FFACO compliance
issues rather than formal enforcement. While Ecology with the
support of the Region has been successful in resolving many issues
through its constant, ongoing negotiation efforts, additional
enforcement actions were needed.
For example, Ecology's experience with interim stabilization of the
SSTs showed that negotiation, by itself, was not successful in
14 Thirteen months from Ecology's October 1998 request to DOE for an AIP.
32 Report No. 2000-P-00012
TWRS Program
Has Not Been
Sufficiently
Funded
Ecology and
Regional
Oversight and
Enforcement Have
Not Been
Sufficient
-------
achieving compliance with key FFACO milestones. Ecology's
negotiations in response to DOE's inability to meet interim
stabilization milestones resulted in continued extensions of the
milestones. As a result of the lack of progress in interim
stabilization, Ecology threatened a civil action. This threat of an
enforcement action resulted in the entry of an enforceable consent
decree in Federal Court that establishes a schedule for completion
of interim stabilization of the SSTs by 2004.
Ecology's experience with DOE on addressing waste treatment
delays has also shown that continued negotiation has not achieved
timely resolution of significant compliance issues. As discussed
earlier, it took Ecology 13 months to obtain a commitment from
DOE to negotiate a FFACO change request to address planned and
potential delays in waste treatment, waste retrieval, and closure of
the SSTs.
The need for more effective regulation of the TWRS Program is
reflected in a December 1998 letter from the Hanford Advisory
Board15 to senior DOE management and Ecology's Director. In the
letter, the Hanford Advisory Board stated:
The health, environmental, and economic
consequences of a failure of the tank waste treatment
and disposal program are extreme. The Board has
been consistently correct in its warning of tank waste
pitfalls. The current lack of leadership on the parts of
DOE and Ecology in the implementation of this
program is alarming. Without real leadership and
action in the near-term, this program will fail.
Management of this vital program through inaction is
totally unacceptable.
CONCLUSION DOE has not demonstrated the ability or commitment to meet
milestones for interim stabilization and is currently not working
towards meeting several other key milestones. The waste stored in
the SSTs and DSTs represents about 60 percent of the DOE's
nationwide inventory of high level radioactive waste. The majority
15 The Hanford Advisory Board is an independent, non-partisan, and broadly representative body consisting of a
balanced mix of the diverse interests that are affected by Hanford cleanup issues. The primary mission of the Board
is to provide informed recommendations and advice to DOE, Ecology, and the Region on major policy issues related
to the cleanup of the Hanford site.
33
Report No. 2000-P-00012
-------
of this waste is currently stored in SSTs which are over 30 years
past their design lives and many of them have had leaks. DOE
estimates that it will cost about $30.5 billion to cleanup the 177
storage tanks at Hanford and Phase I of the cleanup alone will cost
$11.3 billion. Additional delays in the TWRS Program increases
the risk of releases into the environment from tank failures and
threats to human health. Furthermore, additional delays and tank
failures will increase the cost of the cleanup program.
DOE's history of poor performance, the significance of the
environmental problems, the technical complexity of the solutions,
and the cost of the cleanup program necessitate that both Ecology
and the Region develop and implement an oversight and
enforcement strategy that ensure compliance with FFACO
milestones for the TWRS Program. In our view, the revised
strategy should include increased use of formal enforcement
actions, to include penalties, when FFACO milestones are not met
by DOE in order to establish a deterrence to noncompliance.
In addition, Ecology, the Region, and appropriate EPA national
program managers should work jointly with DOE to ensure the
TWRS Program is sufficiently funded to meet FFACO milestones.
If DOE does not receive sufficient funding for the TWRS Program
from Congress, waste treatment and retrieval could be significantly
delayed.
In response to our request for suggested recommendations,
Ecology said that EPA should make the TWRS Program a national
priority and establish Hanford tank farms and acquisition of
treatment capacity as performance measures. Ecology also said
that EPA should advise DOE on DOE's budget priorities and urge
DOE to elevate Hanford tank waste treatment as a complex-wide
priority. Furthermore, Ecology said that it needed additional
support by EPA on enforcement actions to help counter DOE
resistance.
We agree that EPA should make the TWRS Program a national
cleanup priority and should advise DOE to elevate the program to a
higher funding priority. We also agree that EPA needs to increase
its participation with Ecology in oversight and enforcement of
FFACO milestones for the program.
The Federal Managers Financial Integrity Act (FMFIA) requires the
Regional Administrator to annually make a systemic
34
Report No. 2000-P-00012
-------
assessment of regional management controls that protect programs
and resources from fraud, waste, mismanagement, and help control
programs to achieve intended outcomes. After the assessment is
made, the Regional Administrator is required to provide personal
assurance that management controls are reasonable to ensure
protection of programs, operations, and functions and to notify the
EPA Administrator of any deficiencies in management controls.
DOE's noncompliance with RCRA and the FFACO poses a
significant threat to human health and the environment. Therefore,
we believe that the need for additional oversight and enforcement
of RCRA requirements and FFACO milestones by Ecology and the
Region is a matter that should be reported as a management control
deficiency to the Administrator.
In its response to our position papers, the Region stated:
EPA and Ecology clearly support a position that
effective oversight and/or enforcement of the TWRS
Program is necessary... Region 10 believes that EPA
and Ecology should be able to negotiate and apply an
optimal mix of state and federal resources and
authorities to accomplish the regulatory and
environmental goal of full compliance and treatment
of tank wastes.
RECOM M ENDATIONS We recommend that the Regional Administrator:
2-1.Negotiate with Ecology to address oversight and
enforcement responsibilities regarding DOE
compliance with FFACO and RCRA requirements
as part of the 2000/2001 Performance Partnership
Agreement (PPA) process. Negotiations should
consider:
a. Appropriate selection of enforcement and
compliance tools available respectively to
EPA and Ecology under RCRA,
Washington's Hazardous Waste
Management Act, and the Hanford FFACO,
specifically considering the availability and
suitability of each with respect to achieving
DOE compliance.
35
Report No. 2000-P-00012
-------
b.Existing State and Federal compliance and
penalty policies, including EPA's RCRA
Civil Penalty Policy and Washington's
Hazardous Waste Toxics Reduction
Program Compliance Assurance Policy.
2-2.Negotiate with Ecology through the fiscal
2000/2001 PPA process specific enforcement or
other programmatic actions directed towards timely
resolution of tank waste treatment issues and
establishment of appropriate enforceable
milestones.
2-3.Consult with Ecology prior to and during FFACO
change negotiations during fiscal 2000 to develop
appropriate language addressing mitigation or
prevention of environmental risks associated with
extending waste treatment, waste retrieval, and
closure milestones to be included in DOE FFACO
change packages.
2-4.Consult with EPA National Program Managers to
determine what actions can be taken at the EPA
Headquarters level to achieve a higher priority,
including receiving funding, on cleanup of the
Hanford tanks.
2-5.Report the weaknesses in the Hanford TWRS
Program as a management control deficiency in the
annual FMFIA assurance letter to the EPA
Administrator.
The Region and Ecology concurred with the recommendations and
provided an implementation schedule for each recommendation.
The Region and Ecology commented that they have already
initiated efforts in response to Recommendation 2-2 as illustrated
by EPA's February 3, 2000 letter to Ecology committing EPA
support for a final tank waste determination for FFACO
milestones. The Region and Ecology also said that they are
continuing close collaboration and communication as resolution of
tank waste milestone and Land Disposal Restriction reporting
requirement disputes continue.
36
Report No. 2000-P-00012
-------
In addition, the Region and Ecology stated that they are already
engaged in responding to Recommendation 2-3 through joint
participation in current negotiation of tank waste treatment and
retrieval milestones.
37
Report No. 2000-P-00012
-------
[This page was intentionally left blank]
38 Report No. 2000-P-00012
-------
CHAPTER 3
OVERSIGHT OF TANK SAFETY ISSUES NEED ATTENTION
Although DOE has responsibility for compliance with State and
Federal hazardous waste regulatory requirements, Ecology has not
provided sufficient oversight of some safety issues involving SSTs
and DSTs. Specifically, Ecology: (i) has not ensured that DOE
satisfactorily met a September 1998 FFACO milestone for the
resolution of a flammable gas safety question for SSTs and DSTs;
and (ii) was not timely in providing oversight on DOE's resolution
of serious waste level growth and gas retention safety issues
involving DST SY-101.
Unresolved flammable gas safety issues have caused significant
delays in stabilizing the SSTs, and may cause additional delays in
the TWRS Program and increased risks to human health and the
environment. In addition, DST SY-101 may eventually lose
double containment unless the safety issues for the tank are
adequately and timely resolved, and plans to transfer the waste to
another tank may create similar safety problems in the receiving
tank. A loss of double containment increases the risk of a release
of hazardous and radioactive wastes into the soil and groundwater.
Ecology was not able to effectively oversee and evaluate DOE's
resolution of safety issues mainly because it has not placed
sufficient emphasis on filling a safety position supporting the
TWRS Program. This position became vacant during August 1998
and was not filled at the time of our audit in September 1999.
BACKGROUND RCRA Subtitle F, Section 6001 requires Federal departments and
agencies engaged in any activity resulting, or which may result, in
the disposal or management of solid or hazardous waste to comply
with State and Federal hazardous waste regulations. Therefore,
DOE, as the owner and operator of the Hanford Federal Facility, is
required under RCRA to comply with the State of Washington's
and EPA's hazardous waste regulations.
39
Report No. 2000-P-000012
-------
WAC Chapter 173 -3 03 -Dangerous Waste Regulations and
40 CFR, Part 265 -Interim Status Standards for Owners and
Operators of Hazardous Waste Treatment, Storage, and Disposal
Facilities provide regulations applicable to interim status tank
systems used to store or treat hazardous waste. WAC Chapter
173-303-400 and 40 CFR, Part 265, Subpart C require in part that
hazardous waste treatment, storage, and disposal facilities be
maintained and operated to minimize the possibility of a fire,
explosion, or any unplanned sudden or non-sudden release of
hazardous waste or hazardous constituents to air, soil, or surface
water which could threaten human health or the environment.
The Hanford FFACO includes requirements and milestones that
DOE must comply with in order to bring the Hanford Facility into
compliance with RCRA and the State of Washington's Hazardous
Waste Management Act. Among the FFACO requirements are
milestones for mitigation and resolution safety issues for the SSTs
and DSTs.
Ecology has responsibility for oversight and enforcement of the
RCRA units at Hanford under both Washington's EPA approved
Hazardous Waste Program and the FFACO. As the lead regulatory
agency for the SSTs and DSTs, Ecology is required to provide
regulatory oversight, including preparation of responses to
documents submitted by DOE.
RESOLUTION OF
FLAMMABLE GAS
SAFETY ISSUE
WAS NOT
VERIFIED
Radioactive waste in the tanks generates flammable gas, primarily
hydrogen. The flammable gas represents a significant safety issue
because it can be trapped in some waste types and released
episodically, concentrating in the tank dome where it could burn or
explode if ignited.
In 1990, DOE declared a flammable gas unreviewed safety
question (USQ) based on the generation and possible ignition of
flammable gas. A USQ is declared by DOE when aspects of the
facility design or operation relied upon to authorize operation (the
Ecology has not ensured that DOE satisfactorily met FFACO
interim milestone M-40-09, which included a requirement for the
resolution of a flammable gas safety question for SSTs and DSTs
by the end of September 1998. Safety issues, principally
flammable gas, were the primary causes cited by DOE in FFACO
modifications delaying interim stabilization.
40
Report No. 2000-P-000012
-------
authorization basis) may be inadequate. Closure of a USQ
milestone should not occur until the related safety questions have
been resolved.
In general, the USQ concluded there was inadequate analysis of
flammable gas hazards and the controls to manage them. The
original USQ, applicable to 23 tanks, was eventually expanded to
cover 176 of the 177 SSTs and DSTs. DOE reported to Ecology
during September 1998 that it completed the milestone for closing
the flammable gas USQ. However, at the time of our audit
fieldwork in July 1999 Ecology had not verified that the milestone
had been satisfactorily met. Our review of the report DOE
submitted to Ecology disclosed that DOE reported controls were
adequate for safe storage of tank waste, but they were not adequate
for global waste disturbing activities including pumping of the
SSTs.
In its response to our position papers, Ecology said that the
importance placed on interim milestone M-40-09 is somewhat
exaggerated. Ecology stated that closing a USQ does not mean
that all technicalities of the safety issue are understood. Ecology
believes that major milestone M-40-00, which requires DOE to
resolve all flammable gas safety issues by September 2001, is more
significant.
We acknowledge that interim milestone M-40-09 does not close all
flammable gas safety issues and has lesser significance than the
major milestone M-40-00. However, we believe that Ecology
needs to ensure that all milestones associated with flammable gas
are adequately completed. Flammable gas has been an on-going
problem which has been cited in FFACO modifications delaying
interim stabilization since 1990 and needs to be resolved.
OVERSIGHT OF
SAFETY ISSUES
FOR SY-101 WAS
NOT TIMELY
Ecology was not timely in providing oversight of DOE's efforts to
resolve serious safety issues involving DST SY-101. Ecology
knew in January 1999 that the conditions in the tank had
significantly deteriorated and posed a significant risk to human
health and the environment. Yet, Ecology did not assign sufficient
staff to oversee DOE's actions until June 1999.
SY-101
Designated as
Watch List Tank
Tank SY-101 contains approximately 1 million gallons of the most
highly concentrated waste stored at Hanford. It has been
designated as a Watch List tank since January 1991 as a result of
41
Report No. 2000-P-000012
-------
the tank's generation of a flammable mixture of gases that includes
hydrogen, nitrogen, nitrous oxide, and ammonia. Until 1993, the
waste in the tank retained gas and periodically released large
volumes in sudden, buoyant displacement gas-release events
approximately every 100 days. Some of these gas releases
exceeded 10,000 cubic feet. This gas retention caused the waste
level in the tank to rise and suddenly drop as the gas was released.
During July 1993, a mixer pump was installed in the tank to test
the effectiveness of mixing waste at controlling the large gas
release events and fluctuating waste level. DOE declared the tank
mitigated during 1994 after the completion of a series of highly
successful tests with the pump.
Tank Conditions However, DOE notified Ecology in December 1997 that it had
Deteriorated identified an unexplained rise in the tank's waste level despite
continued use of the mixer pump. At that time, DOE reported that
a small rise in the waste level had occurred in the tank over the
previous 13-month period and that the rise was not considered to
be an immediate safety risk. DOE also disclosed that it had
increased mixer pump operations to reduce the waste level rise and
was evaluating the effectiveness of the additional operations. In
addition, DOE reported that it was developing an action plan to
determine the cause and to control of the waste level rise.
In January 1999, DOE informed Ecology that the conditions in the
tank had significantly deteriorated and posed a significant risk to
human health and the environment. Specifically, DOE informed
Ecology that the tank's waste level was rising at an accelerated rate
and it estimated the tank would lose double containment by
October 1999 if the waste level rise was not mitigated. DOE
estimated that the tank would lose double containment at 458
inches when the waste level rose into the single contained dome
space area of the tank. As of January 1999, DOE reported that
waste level in the tank had reached just over 425 inches.
As of January 1999, DOE also told Ecology that it attributed the
accelerated waste level rise to increased gas retention in a floating
crust layer in the tank and that the increased gas retention elevated
the risk of a large flammable gas release. DOE informed Ecology
that it planned to mitigate the safety issues by October 1999
through: (i) removing at least 100,000 gallons of the waste from
the tank; (ii) diluting it with water at a 1 to 1 ratio; and (iii) placing
the diluted waste in another DST, DST SY-102, for storage.
42
Report No. 2000-P-000012
-------
DOE subsequently disclosed in an April 1999 revision to a USQ
for the tank that the ongoing growth of the crust was causing the
waste level increase and a commensurate decrease in tank head
space. A decrease in head space increases the risk of fire,
explosion, or structural failure because flammable gas releases
from the waste are concentrated in a smaller area. The USQ also
reported that the increased growth in the thickness of the crust
could cause the bottom layer of the crust to encroach on the mixer
pump suction and, as a result, degrade the effectiveness of the
pump in mitigating large gas releases.
Tank Advisory During April 1999, DOE also requested advice on the resolution of
Panel Expressed the tank's safety issues from the Tank Advisory Panel (TAP), a
Concern with Tank panel of experts on nuclear and mixed wastes. The TAP
Conditions commented that it should have been notified earlier about the
conditions of the tank because the conditions had changed
significantly over the 8 months since DOE last met with a
sub-panel of its members. The TAP advised DOE that it was
evident most of the gas generated by the waste was being retained
in the tank and this additional safety concern heightened the
urgency with which the gas retention problem, as well as the waste
level rise, should be addressed.
The TAP also said that the current path forward for mitigation
primarily focused on crust growth and that DOE's plan needed to
be reviewed to ensure that increased gas retention was given equal
attention. As a result, the TAP did not consider the initial transfer
of waste from SY-101 as a solution to the safety issues. The TAP
also recommended that DOE develop and evaluate potential
solutions as soon as possible and before proceeding with additional
transfers or other dilution methods.
Furthermore, the TAP expressed concern that transferring waste
from the DST SY-101 to DST SY-102 might create similar safety
issues in DST SY-102. The TAP stated:
With regard to stability of SY-102 waste after the
transfer we have been given only a cursory description
of plans to study effects of mixing in SY-102. A
recent report distributed during the meeting analyzes
the possibility of a bouyancy driven gas release event
(GRE) and finds that, under conservative tank
conditions (should all solids in the waste remain
solids), buoyant-type gas release is not fully
43
Report No. 2000-P-000012
-------
eliminated. While the case is said to be conservative,
the data is yet to be collected to prove insufficient
solids will be added to the tank to permit buoyant
turnovers.
Consequently, to resolve safety concerns, the TAP recommended
that DOE obtain a sufficient understanding of the kinetics of
dissolution/precipitation and settling of solids in DST.
Ecology's Although Ecology managers told us that the waste level rise and
Oversight Was flammable gas retention issues of the tank were considered very
Insufficient Until serious, Ecology did not dedicate sufficient staff resources to
June 1999 monitor and formally evaluate DOE's remediation activities until
the beginning of June 1999, or just 4 months before DOE
estimated the tank might lose double containment. As a result of
the significance of the concerns expressed by the TAP during
April 1999, Ecology assigned two staff members on a part-time
basis to oversee DOE's remediation activities for the tank. In
addition, Ecology issued a letter to DOE on June 3, 1999
recommending immediate attention to the waste level and
flammable gas safety issues. Ecology also requested additional
information on conditions in the tank and DOE's planned actions
to resolve the issues.
In its response to our position papers Ecology agreed that there was
a lapse in oversight on the SY-101 safety issue between January
1999 and June 1999, during which critical developments within
tank waste behavior were underway. Ecology said they made
efforts to be as involved as possible during that time, including
involvement in the April 1999 TAP meeting on this issue. Ecology
also said that it issued another concern letter on SY-101 to DOE
during September 1999.
UNRESOLVED Unresolved flammable gas safety issues have caused significant
SAFETY ISSUES delays in stabilizing the SSTs, and may cause additional delays in
INCREASE RISKS the TWRS Program and increased risks to human health and the
TO THE environment. Therefore, Ecology needs to ensure that all FFACO
ENVIRONM ENT milestones requiring resolution of flammable gas safety issues are
adequately completed by DOE.
In addition, Tank SY-101 may eventually lose double containment
unless the safety issues for the tank are adequately and timely
resolved. Furthermore, DOE's plan to avoid this hazard by
44
Report No. 2000-P-000012
-------
transferring waste from the tank may create similar safety problems
in the receiving tank, Tank SY-102. A loss of double containment
increases the risk of a release of hazardous and radioactive wastes
into the soil and groundwater.
In its response to our position papers, Ecology stated the crust level
growth has been static since June 1999, and as a result, the loss of
double containment appears to lessened. However, Ecology agreed
that the tank needs to be pumped and that this is anticipated to take
place during mid-December 1999.
Ecology's comments are noted. We also note that subsequent to
our fieldwork, DOE did complete an initial transfer of waste in
December 1999, and as a result, the short term risk of loss of
double containment appears to be mitigated. However, the safety
issues have not been resolved. The TAP stated that the initial
waste transfer is not the solution to the safety issues, and that
DOE's current path forward does not adequately consider safety
issues caused by increased gas retention. In addition, Ecology's
September 9, 1999 letter to DOE expressed several concerns with
DOE's plan to mitigate the crust growth and gas retention beyond
the initial waste transfer. Ecology said the chemistry of the waste
is not well understood, and raised concerns regarding the
possibility of creating a reactive condition in the waste receiver
tank.
If the safety issues are not adequately remediated, risks associated
with gas retention in SY-101 may remain (including loss of
containment), and similar problems may be created in the waste
receiver tank.
ECOLOGY HAS
NOT PLACED
SUFFICIENT
EMPHASIS ON
FILLING SAFETY
POSITION
Ecology was not able to effectively oversee and evaluate DOE's
resolution of safety issues, including the DST SY-101 issues,
mainly because it has not placed sufficient emphasis on filling a
safety position supporting the TWRS Program. This position
became vacant during August 1998 and was still not filled at the
time of our audit in September 1999. According to Ecology
management, Ecology tried to fill the vacancy internally in
response to a reduction in force of some other agencies within the
Department. However, the internal recruitment was unsuccessful.
As a result, Ecology was in the process of trying to fill the vacancy
through sources external to Ecology.
45
Report No. 2000-P-000012
-------
According to the project manager for TWRS storage operations,
Ecology needs to fill a half-time safety position in order to provide
adequate oversight coverage for TWRS Program safety issues. In a
December 1998 justification for filling the safety position vacancy,
Ecology's project manager responsible for SST and DST storage
operations said that many of the safety issues for the TWRS
Program have not been addressed because Ecology staff assigned
to safety issues shrank over the past 2 years from approximately
120 percent of a full time position to the current empty status. In
the justification for filling the safety position vacancy the project
manager stated:
Safety is often the excuse DOE uses to explain
delays... Safety played an important role in recent
TWRS successes such as the PCHB decision in
favor of Ecology on the C-106 Tank Retrieval
Issue and current Interim Stabilization negotiations.
Therefore, it is imperative that this position be given
a high priority and be filled as soon as possible.
In its response to our position papers, Ecology concurred that the
safety position was unfilled between August 1998 and June 1999.
However, Ecology believed that even when no staff were expressly
dedicated pertinent safety issues were still adequately addressed.
We acknowledge that Ecology was involved in safety issues to
some extent during the period between August 1998 and June
1999. Although two staff were assigned on a part-time basis to
oversee DOE's safety activities for DST SY-101, Ecology's safety
position was still unfilled as of September 1999. The lack of an
evaluation of DOE's completion of the FFACO USQ milestone,
and the lack of oversight over the DST SY-101 safety issues until
June 1999, show a need for improvement in Ecology's oversight of
DOE's resolution of safety issues. Given their importance,
adequate resources need to be continually committed to safety
issues.
RECOM M ENDATIONS We recommend that the Regional Administrator:
3-1.Negotiate fiscal 2000/2001 PPA commitments with
Ecology to oversee TWRS program safety issues.
46
Report No. 2000-P-000012
-------
3-2.Review Ecology's progress towards meeting these
commitments during mid-year and end of year PPA
evaluations. It is important that the commitments address
Ecology's safety position staffing shortage.
The Region and Ecology concurred with the recommendations and
provided an implementation schedule for each recommendation.
47
Report No. 2000-P-000012
-------
[This page was intentionally left blank]
48 Report No. 2000-P-000012
-------
CHAPTER 4
ECOLOGY IS NOT CONDUCTING ENOUGH
TANK INSPECTIONS
Although DOE is responsible for compliance with State and
Federal hazardous waste regulations, Ecology, as the lead
regulator, did not conduct a sufficient number of tank inspections
to assess DOE compliance with RCRA.
Specifically, Ecology inspected only 22 percent of the tanks over a
period of approximately 7 years even though RCRA, as amended
by the Federal Facility Compliance Act, required thorough annual
inspections of Federal facilities. In addition, inspection coverage
for the tanks did not meet inspection commitments specified in
PPA workplans for the State's fiscals 1998 and 1999. Ecology had
not increased the number of inspections although 7 of the 8
inspections conducted during the 7-year period ended February
1999 identified serious compliance issues.
These conditions occurred because: (i) Ecology was not placing a
sufficiently high priority on conducting tank inspections; and
(ii) the Region was not monitoring PPA inspection commitments
for Hanford.
BACKGROUND Section 3007 of RCRA, as amended by the Federal Facility
Compliance Act of 1992, requires EPA or states with EPA
approved hazardous waste programs to conduct a thorough
inspection of each Federal facility that treats, stores, or disposes of
hazardous wastes on an annual basis. The purpose of the
inspection is to enforce compliance with RCRA.
The Hanford Facility qualified for interim status, and the SSTs and
DSTs are currently operating under interim status requirements.
WAC Chapter 173 -3 03 -Dangerous Waste Regulations and
40 CFR, Part 265 -Interim Standards for Owners and Operators of
Hazardous Waste Treatment, Storage, and Disposal Facilities
provide regulations applicable to interim status tank systems used
49
Report No. 2000-P-00012
-------
to store or treat hazardous waste. The WAC Chapter 173-303-400
and 40 CFR, Part 265, Subpart J include requirements for
assessment of the integrity of tank systems, containment and
detection of releases, general operating requirements, responses to
leaks or spills, disposition of leaking or unfit for use tank systems,
and closure and post closure care.
INSPECTION Ecology inspected only 22 percent of the tanks over a period of
COVERAGE WAS approximately 7 years even though RCRA, as amended by the
INADEQUATE Federal Facility Compliance Act, required thorough annual
inspections of Federal facilities. Ecology's inspection coverage for
the tanks also did not meet PPA workplan commitments for fiscals
1998 and 1999. The required number of inspections had not been
conducted although 7 of the 8 inspections conducted during the
7-year period ended February 1999 identified serious compliance
issues.
Although thorough annual inspections of the Hanford Facility were
required by RCRA, Ecology inspected only 39 of the 177 (22
percent) SSTs and DSTs to determine whether the tanks were in
compliance with interim status regulations over a 7-year period.
Ecology performed only 8 tank/tank farm16 inspections during the
7-year period from January 1992 through February 1999 which
assessed SST or DST compliance with the interim status
regulations for tank systems. Ecology identified 28 "tank farm"
inspections of various scopes performed during this period,
including inspections of waste drums, waste containers and
training. However, only 8 of these inspections covered SST or
DST compliance. Additionally, no tank inspections were
performed during the 3-year period between May 1993 and May
1996.
Furthermore, the inspections covered only 21 of the 149 SSTs and
18 of the 28 DSTs. The inspected tanks were located in 4 of the 12
SST tank farms and 3 of the 6 DST tank farms. Ecology did not
conduct inspections of any tanks located in 8 (67 percent) of the
SST tank farms and 3 (50 percent) of DST tank farms during the
7-year period.
16 Inspections conducted by Ecology were of either individual tanks or tank farms. A tank farm is a group of tanks
that were constructed together and are located in the same geographical area. Of the eight inspections, 5 were of
individual tanks and 3 were of tank farms.
Small Percentage
of Tanks Have
Been Inspected
50
Report No. 2000-P-00012
-------
In Ecology's response to our position papers regarding the small
number of tank inspections, Ecology said that oversight of tank
farms includes efforts beyond the compliance inspection staff,
including staff involved with permitting and closure plan
development, characterization, interim stabilization, and FFACO
milestones.
Acknowledging the importance of these efforts, we believe they do
not replace the role of inspections. The Federal Facility
Compliance Act specifically states that inspections are required to
enforce compliance with RCRA.
Inspection Ecology's inspection coverage for the SSTs and DSTs did not meet
Coverage Did Not inspection commitments specified in PPA workplans for the
Meet PPA State's fiscals 1998 and 1999. The PPA's purpose is to establish
Commitments the Region's and Ecology's mutual goals, objectives, activities, and
performance measures to meet the environmental and public health
priorities of the State of Washington. Towards meeting this
purpose, the PPAs between Ecology and the Region for the State's
fiscals 1998 and 1999 included workplans of activities that
Ecology was to accomplish each year. The workplans for both
years included SST and DST tank farm inspections at Hanford.
These workplan commitments amount to a six year inspection
cycle for all SSTs and DSTs.
Although the fiscal 1998 PPA specified that Ecology was to
inspect one SST tank farm and one DST tank farm, it only met the
DST tank farm (SY Tank Farm) inspection requirement. With
respect to SSTs, Ecology only inspected one tank (Tank SX-104)
during the year. In addition, Ecology did not inspect any tanks
during fiscal year 1999 even though the PPA required 2 SST and 2
DST tank farm inspections. Thus, rather than inspect 6 of the 18
SST/DST tank farms during the 2 years, only 1 tank farm plus 1
tank were inspected. If the fiscal 1998 and 1999 rate of inspections
continues, it will take about 18 years to inspect all tanks.
In its response to our position papers, Ecology agreed that the
general tank farm inspections described in the PPA have not been
conducted. Ecology also said they have ceased implementation of
the "six year inspection cycle" at tank farms in previous plans.
Ecology stated a comprehensive inspection of SST tank farms is
underway, as well as a review of the FFACO milestone for DST
integrity assessment. Ecology also stated that next year's
inspection planning will be decided beginning February 2000.
51
Report No. 2000-P-00012
-------
Ecology had not increased the number of inspections even though
7 of the 8 inspections that were conducted identified serious
compliance issues. Ecology's inspections disclosed that DOE
consistently failed to comply with requirements to: (i) provide
adequate leak detection systems; (ii) adequately inspect or respond
to deficiencies in tank systems; and (iii) adequately respond or
have measures to respond to leaks, spills, and disposition of unfit
for use tank systems. DOE had also failed to timely notify Ecology
of indications of leaks of radioactive waste, a very serious
violation. The results for the 7 inspections where significant
compliance issues were identified are summarized below.
Inspections of SY Tank Farm. April 1998. and DST
SY-101. February 1992. Ecology's February 1992
inspection of DST SY-101 found: (i) a leak detection
device was incorrectly set17 for more than 2 years; (ii) leak
detection equipment was inoperable for at least 3 months;
and (iii) a leak detection pit was filled with liquid of an
unknown composition rendering critical monitoring
equipment non-functional. The inspection report concluded
that "a leak from the tank system to the environment could
go or may have gone undetected for extended periods of
time."
Although DOE reported that the violations identified during
Ecology's 1992 inspection were corrected, Ecology's April
1998 inspection found that the violations had persisted or
recurred. There was no record of any Ecology inspections
of the tank during the 6 years between the 1992 and 1998
inspections.
Inspection of SST SX-104. April 1998. Ecology's
inspection found that DOE pumped waste from tank
SX-104 into transfer lines knowing that heat trace
equipment to prevent the line from plugging was not
working. Consequently, the transfer line clogged resulting
in unnecessary exposure of workers to radioactive waste.
The inspection also found DOE had not concluded whether
17 The leak detection device was incorrectly installed 2Vz feet above the tank floor. It should have been installed
between Vs to Vi inch above the tank floor in order to ensure detection of leaks of less than several thousand gallons.
Inspections
Identify Serious
Compliance
Issues
52
Report No. 2000-P-00012
-------
the tank was leaking more than 4 months after a drop in
liquid level was observed, and had failed to meet
requirements to remove waste from an unfit for use tank
system as timely as possible to prevent harm to the
environment. Additionally, DOE failed to execute the
pumping of the tank as required by the FFACO.
Inspection of SST BX-111. May 1993. Ecology's
inspection, performed in response to indications of a release
of dangerous waste from the tank, found DOE failed to:
(i) inspect data from monitoring and leak detection
equipment daily; (ii) immediately report to Ecology
indications of a release of radioactive mixed waste; and
(iii) immediately provide reports requested by Ecology
during the inspection.
Inspection of C-SST Farm. December 1992. Ecology's
inspection found that liquid level and tank temperature
detection instruments were frequently out of service, and
that leak detection drywells were not monitored daily and
did not provide adequate primary leak detection.
Inspection of SST T-101. November 1992. Ecology's
inspection found that between April 1992 and September
1992 the tank leaked approximately 7,425 gallons of
extremely hazardous and radioactive waste and that the
tank may be continuing to leak. The inspection also found
that the tank's leak detection systems and devices were
frequently out of service, and when operating, these
systems and devices were inadequate. The inspection
report noted that Ecology was not notified of leakage from
the tank until 6 months after monitoring data indicated the
tank had begun leaking.
Inspection of SSTs C-105 and C-106. August 1992.
Ecology's inspection found that a malfunction in the liquid
level monitoring equipment had not been corrected for
approximately 3 months, and that records showed no
readings of liquid level measurement data for 43 days.
Ecology's report stated that as liquid level monitoring
systems now stand, data is often poor or inadequate,
equipment failures are common, controls are often relaxed,
and management's overall level of concern is less than
necessary.
53
Report No. 2000-P-00012
-------
REASONS FOR
INSUFFICIENT
INSPECTION
COVERAGE
We attribute the lack of inspections to two causes: (i) Ecology was
not placing a sufficiently high priority on conducting tank
inspections; and (ii) the Region was not monitoring inspection
commitments in the PPA .
Ecology Was Not
Placing Sufficient
Priority on
Inspections
Ecology was not placing a sufficiently high priority on conducting
tank inspections. According to Ecology's inspection staff,
vacancies in inspector positions for the TWRS Program and other
priorities such as investigations of reported tank leaks by DOE
prevented Ecology from following the annual inspection plans.
With respect to vacant inspector positions, during the audit we
noted that only 3 of the 5 inspector positions for the TWRS
Program were filled; 1 of which was filled in February 1999.
Ecology agreed in its response to our position papers that inspector
turnover and other priorities had reduced the number of inspections
initiated. Ecology stated it anticipates full staffing of inspector
positions by January 2000 and, after appropriate training, the
ability to implement a balanced inspection oversight program.
Region Was Not
Monitoring PPA
Commitments
While Section 3007 of RCRA requires thorough annual inspections
of Federal facilities that treat, store, or dispose of hazardous
wastes, the Region apparently concluded that resource constraints
prevented inspecting all Hanford tanks annually. Based on the
fiscal 1998 and 1999 PPA workplans, the Region apparently
concluded that a 6-year cycle of conducting inspections of all 177
tanks would be reasonable.
Although the PPAs specified that Ecology and the Region would
assess the progress, as well as identify adjustments and additional
actions that need to be taken throughout the terms of the
agreements, the Region did not monitor the inspection
commitments to determine if they were met. Staff of the Region's
Office of Waste and Chemicals Management stated that they had
relied on Ecology to ensure that the inspection commitments were
met.
In its response to our position papers, the Region stated it monitors
Ecology inspection PPA commitments through mid-year and
end-of-year evaluations. Ecology's response said it believes the
Region has monitored and enforced inspection efforts at Hanford
through reviews of PPA commitments, oversight inspections, and a
multi-media inspection performed in 1998.
54
Report No. 2000-P-00012
-------
The Region's and Ecology's comments are noted. However, we
found the Regions's fiscal 1998 year-end and fiscal 1999 mid-year
program evaluation reports for Ecology did not address PPA
inspection commitments for Hanford. The purpose of the PPA is
to ensure that the State's environmental priorities are being met.
Therefore, Hanford inspection commitments should be monitored
by the Region in order to assess the progress, as well as identify
adjustments and additional actions that need to be taken throughout
the terms of the agreement.
DOE VIOLATIONS
AND RELEASES
OF HAZARDOUS
WASTE MAY GO
UNDETECTED
The limited number of tank inspections conducted by Ecology
indicate that there are significant weaknesses in DOE's monitoring
program for tank leaks. Without adequate inspection coverage,
DOE violations of State and Federal hazardous waste regulations,
including unreported releases of hazardous waste, may go
undetected.
DOE's monthly waste tank summary reports identify that all eight
SST tank farms that have not been inspected since at least 1992
have had at least one tank designated as an "assumed leaker"18.
Such releases pose serious human health and environmental risks.
RECOM M ENDATION We recommend that the Regional Administrator:
4-1.Establish annual EPA and Ecology inspection
commitments through the existing 2000/2001 PPA
process and in accordance with the Compliance
Assurance Agreement Between the Washington
Department of Ecology and the United States
Environmental Protection Agency for the
Hazardous Waste Program (1997)19, including a
18 The integrity classification assigned to a waste storage tank when monitoring data indicate a loss of liquid
attributed to a breach of the tank's integrity.
19 The Compliance Assurance Agreement Between the Washington Department of Ecology and the United States
Environmental Protection Agency for the Hazardous Waste Program (1997) defines the respective roles and
responsibilities of the two agencies for achieving compliance with Federal and State hazardous waste laws and
regulations. The agreement also establishes oversight criteria, performance measures, and oversight procedures to
be used by the Region.
55
Report No. 2000-P-00012
-------
mid-year and end-of-year review of commitment. EPA's review of
Ecology inspection and compliance commitments should be in
accordance with EPA/State Agency Agreement on Compliance
Assurance Principles (May 1997)20 and Compliance Assurance
Evaluation Principles (July 1998)21.
REGION'S AND The Region and Ecology concurred with the recommendation and
ECOLOGY'S provided an implementation schedule.
COMMENTS
20 The purpose of the EPA/State Agency Agreement on Compliance Assurance Principles (May 1997) is to clarify
the roles of the states and the Region in compliance and enforcement matters, foster a more collaborative approach,
enhance the sharing of information, and continue to improve performance measurement in compliance assurance for
environmental programs. The principles also outline criteria for performance measurement and oversight by the
Region.
21 The Compliance Assurance Evaluation Program Principles (July 1998) clarifies the Region's expectations for
delegated state compliance assurance programs. The principles also define the elements of a successful State
compliance assurance program and formulate the basic operating principles for the Region's evaluation of a
compliance assurance program.
56
Report No. 2000-P-00012
-------
CHAPTER 5
LEAK DETECTION AND INVESTIGATION PROCEDURES
DO NOT PROVIDE ADEQUATE PROTECTION
TO THE ENVIRONMENT
Effective leak detection systems have not been installed by DOE
for all Hanford tanks. In addition, DOE has not always conducted
adequate, timely, or documented investigations of suspected tank
leaks. Specifically, we found:
Original leak detection systems installed in 58 of the 149
SSTs were no longer effective.
An investigation had not been conducted into a possible
ongoing leak from one SST that leaked in the past.
Investigations were not completed timely for suspected
leaks from two SSTs that leaked in the past.
The investigation results of a suspected leak from one SST
were not documented.
These conditions occurred mainly because Ecology has not placed
sufficient emphasis on ensuring that DOE has implemented an
effective leak detection and investigation program. Specifically,
Ecology has not: (i) required DOE to establish a leak detection
program for all SSTs that meets State and Federal regulatory
requirements; and (ii) has not provided sufficient oversight and
enforcement over DOE's leak assessment activities.
As noted in Chapter 2, at least 1 million gallons of highly toxic and
radioactive waste has leaked from 67 of Hanford's 149 SSTs, some
of which has already reached the groundwater. Without effective
leak detection systems and an effective leak investigation process,
there is no assurance that tank leaks will be identified and
remediated timely. Minimizing the extent of leaks and an effective
leak investigation process for the SSTs are critical to preventing
additional groundwater contamination.
57
Report No. 2000-P-2000
-------
BACKGROUND DOE, as the owner and operator of the Hanford Federal Facility, is
required to comply with State and Federal hazardous waste
regulations under RCRA Subtitle F, Section 6001.
WAC Chapter 173-303 -Dangerous Waste Regulations and
40 CFR, Part 265 -Interim Standards for Owners and Operators of
Hazardous Waste Treatment, Storage, and Disposal Facilities
include requirements for containment and detection of tank
releases for interim status tank systems used to store or treat
hazardous waste. The WAC Chapter 173-303-400 and 40 CFR,
Part 265, Subpart J require that tank systems provide a leak
detection system which is capable of detecting a leak within 24
hours, or within the earliest practicable time if existing
technologies or site conditions do not allow detection within 24
hours.
Ecology has the responsibility for oversight and enforcement of the
RCRA units at Hanford under both Washington's EPA authorized
Hazardous Waste Program and the FFACO. Therefore, it has
responsibility for overseeing and enforcing DOE's compliance
with State and Federal laws and regulations which apply to the
SSTs and DSTs.
LEAK DETECTION Currently, 58 of the 149 aging SSTs do not have effective leak
SYSTEMS WERE detection systems. Thirty-nine of the 58 SSTs, or 67 percent, have
NOT INSTALLED been designated as "assumed leakers". All 58 tanks have been
interim stabilized, but they still contain a total of 6.3 million
gallons of high level radioactive waste in the form of liquid, sludge
and saltcake. Forty-one contain drainable liquid totaling
approximately 500,000 gallons22.
The 58 tanks were identified as having no primary or secondary
leak detection systems in DOE's Operating Specification
Document (OSD), Operating Specifications for Tank Farm Leak
Detection and Single Shell Tank Intrusion Detection. The OSD
establishes primary and backup leak detection systems as well as
monitoring frequencies for the SSTs. These leak detection systems
consist of in-tank liquid level measurement devices and liquid
22 The amount of drainable liquid in each tank ranges from 1,000 to 48,000 gallons. Approximately one third of
them contain more than 10,000 gallons of drainable liquid.
58
Report No. 2000-P-2000
-------
SST Configuration Showing Various Leak Detection Devices
(Source: Final Environmental Impact Statement for the TWRS,
DOE and Ecology, April 1996)
observation wells23. This document listed "none" for primary and
backup leak detection systems and did not specify a monitoring
frequency for each of the 58 tanks.
In its response to our position papers, Ecology explained that the
surface level measuring devices installed in the 58 tanks were
ineffective because the tanks were interim stabilized. With respect
to the surface level measuring devices, Ecology said that the
devices were not effective because the tanks either did not contain
drainable liquid waste or contain liquid waste at levels which are
too low to accurately measure. Ecology also said that it was
possible that a new technology could monitor the liquid level in the
tanks. However, Ecology suggested that it may be more productive
to monitor the vadose zone underneath the tanks. Ecology
explained that vadose zone monitoring would provide not only
information on the integrity of the tanks, but would also provide
much needed data regarding past leak behavior and identify
whether tanks were continuing to leak.
23 Liquid observation wells are used to monitor the liquid level in SSTs and extend to within 1 inch of the bottom of
the waste tank. Gama and neutron probes are used in the wells to measure the liquid level.
59
Report No. 2000-P-2000
-------
We acknowledge Ecology's comments with respect to the
ineffectiveness of current surface level measuring devices with
measuring tank waste that is not drainable or contains low amounts
of liquid. In our opinion, vadose monitoring systems which ensure
timely identification of tank leaks would meet the intent of the
State and Federal regulations.
LEAK
INVESTIGATION
WAS NOT
CONDUCTED
The tank contains hazardous chemical and radioactive wastes. In
addition, it contains 63 tons of cement that was added in 1966 as
part of a tank solidification pilot operation. The tank was
designated as an assumed leaker in 1984, 15 years ago. DOE
estimated that the tank released approximately 8,000 gallons of
waste as a result of the leak. As of the end of March 1999, DOE
estimated that the tank contained 192,000 gallons of drainable
liquid including 186,000 gallons of pumpable liquid.
In response to the leak, Ecology established a FFACO milestone
for DOE to interim stabilize the tank by September 1991. Because
of unresolved safety issues and pumping complications created by
the cement, the original milestone was extended from September
1991 to December 1997 and then to September 1999 under the
FFACO.
Interim stabilization of the tank was extended again under the
Interim Stabilization Consent Decree, which became effective in
August 1999. The Consent Decree requires DOE to start interim
stabilization of the tank by July 2001. Ecology staff informed us
that BY-105 was not scheduled for interim stabilization sooner
under the Consent Decree because: (i) the tank was no longer
leaking; and (ii) other tanks were identified as posing a greater risk
to the environment due to their waste content and higher waste
volume.
However, liquid waste level monitoring data for the tank covering
the period from January 1985 to January 1999 shows that the
tank's liquid level started decreasing in January 1994 at a steady
DOE had not conducted a formal leak investigation to determine if
SST BY-105 was leaking even though the liquid waste level in the
tank has been decreasing at a rate of about 0.6 inches a year since
1994. A drop of 0.6 inches in this tank is the equivalent of about
1,700 gallons.
60
Report No. 2000-P-2000
-------
rate of about 0.6 inches a year. From January 1994 to January
1999 the waste level fell from about 144 inches to about 141
inches. When we asked Ecology staff about the downward trend,
we were informed that they were unaware of the waste level
decrease. In response to our inquiry, Ecology requested that DOE
provide an explanation for the downward trend.
DOE's response to Ecology's inquiry identified that a formal leak
investigation had not been conducted on the decrease in liquid
level. However, DOE speculated that the decrease in the tank's
liquid waste level was caused from a redistribution of the waste in
the tank. DOE explained that the crust level measurement in the
tank fell at about the same time as the liquid level started falling in
the tank and that the crust level has been rising steadily since it fell
in January 1994. DOE said that the crust and liquid level
anomalies appeared to be related and theorized that a section of
crust which was suspended above the liquid waste fell into the
liquid. According to DOE, this section of crust may be absorbing
the liquid waste and causing the crust level and liquid level
measurements to rise and fall, respectively.
Ecology staff told us that DOE's explanation indicated that DOE
had not conducted a rigorous enough investigation into the
decrease in waste level. Because DOE had not completed a formal
leak investigation on the tank, we believe that there is no assurance
that the steady decrease in the tank's waste level is not the result of
a new leak.
INVESTIGATIONS
WERE NOT
TIMELY
Although SSTs SX-104 and B-l 11 had leaked in the past,
investigations into recent suspected leaks were not completed
timely by DOE.
SST SX-104 Was
Not Investigated
Timely
DOE did not investigate timely a suspected leak of SST SX-104,
even though the tank had leaked in the past and had not been
interim stabilized.
SST SX-104 was designated as an assumed leaker in 1988 and
DOE estimated that about 6,000 gallons leaked from the tank at
that time. In response to the leak, DOE pumped approximately
113,000 gallons of waste from the tank during 1988 and 1989.
Because the tank was designated as an assumed leaker, Ecology
established a FFACO milestone for DOE to interim stabilize the
61
Report No. 2000-P-2000
-------
tank by September 1990. However, the milestone was revised to
require DOE to start pumping the tank by September 1997 after
four extensions. The extensions were made because flammable gas
safety issues with the tank had not been resolved. DOE missed the
milestone and did not resume pumping the tank until April 1998.
As of September 1999, the tank was still undergoing interim
stabilization.
In December 1997, DOE reported to Ecology that the waste level
in the tank fell approximately 2 inches, a decrease of -7 standard
deviations24. At that time, the tank contained 201,000 gallons of
drainable liquid including 195,000 gallons of pumpable liquid
hazardous and radioactive wastes. In response to the reported
decrease in waste level, Ecology immediately initiated a
compliance inspection of the tank.
During the December 1997 inspection, Ecology found that DOE
made a determination that the decrease in waste level was caused
from atmospheric pressure. However, Ecology concluded that
DOE had not performed a thorough evaluation because it could not
provide sufficient evidence to support that the tank had not leaked.
DOE did not complete an investigation that was acceptable to
Ecology until April 1998, or about 4 months after the decrease in
waste level was identified. In April 1998, DOE submitted an
atmospheric pressure study on the tank to Ecology. The study
concluded that the decrease in waste level was attributable to
atmospheric pressure and gas retention in the tank rather than a
leak. After reviewing the study, Ecology accepted DOE's
conclusion that the tank had not leaked.
Although Ecology accepted DOE's explanation for the decrease in
waste level, Ecology concluded that DOE had not established
adequate procedures for tracking and evaluating suspected tank
leaks. As a result, Ecology issued DOE a notice of correction in
November 1998 addressing violations and concerns identified
during its inspection of the tank. In the letter, Ecology stated:
Ecology is concerned about the facility's
ability to determine, in a timely fashion, when a
24 Ecology considers a tank to be leaking when the tank's waste level decreases by more than three standard
deviations outside of the normal waste level range for the tank.
62
Report No. 2000-P-2000
-------
tank is actually leaking. There is no action for this
concern required by this letter; however,
Ecology will be addressing this issue in the
on-going investigation of tank B-l 11.
SST B-111 Was
Not Investigated
Timely
SST B-l 11 was designated as an assumed leaker in 1978 and was
interim stabilized during 1985. DOE estimated that about 8,000
gallons leaked from the tank and that it contained 22,000 gallons of
drainable liquid including 16,000 gallons of pumpable liquid
hazardous and radioactive wastes as of March 1999.
In early October 1998, DOE reported to Ecology that the tank's
waste level decreased in September 1998 by approximately 1.5
inches, a decrease in excess of -3 standard deviations. DOE
evaluated the cause for the decrease in waste level by conducting
two leak investigations over the period from October 1998 to June
1999.
The two evaluations were conducted using a new leak assessment
process that DOE developed in response to Ecology's concerns
with the procedures previously used for evaluating Tank SX-104.
Under the revised process, a team of experts conducted a
probabilistic assessment of whether the tank leaked using
monitoring data for the tank. The procedure's guidelines designate
a tank as an assumed leaker when the probability that a leak
occurred is assessed at greater than 50 percent.
The first assessment was conducted in October 1998 and arrived at
a mean probability of 55 percent that the tank leaked. The
assessment also identified that the decrease could have been caused
from a gas release. DOE concluded that the evidence of a new
tank leak was relatively weak even though the probability of a leak
was assessed at greater than 50 percent. Because the assessment
results showed a high level of uncertainty on the cause of the waste
level decrease, Ecology requested that DOE identify additional
monitoring data, including hydrogen gas release data, in order to
provide a more accurate conclusion.
DOE's investigation of a suspected leak from SST B-l 11 was not
completed timely even though Ecology advised DOE that its
concerns with DOE's leak investigation process would be
addressed during the investigation of the tank.
63
Report No. 2000-P-2000
-------
DOE did not complete a new assessment until June 1999, 8 months
after it first reported the decrease in the tank's waste level. Based
on the results from the second assessment, DOE concluded that the
decrease in waste level was caused from a small gas release or
other level adjustment rather than a leak. The conclusion was
based on a low probability of 5.6 percent that the tank leaked in
September 1998. After meeting with DOE in July 1999 on the leak
assessment results, Ecology concurred with DOE's leak assessment
conclusion.
In its response to our position papers, Ecology stated:
We concur that leak determinations by DOE take too
much time. We would like to point out however that
leak investigations vary in complexity and level of
effort. It is difficult to agree on a hard and fast time
period in which a leak determination must be
completed. The fact that DOE reacted appropriately
by starting the leak determination effort and notifying
Ecology indicates that the process, including the new
process developed after SX-104, is working as
intended. Our primary concerns with the current
efforts are that DOE does not fully include Ecology in
all levels of the determination review, and that more
can be done by DOE to expedite the process.
LEAK
INVESTIGATION
WAS NOT
DOCUMENTED
Ecology has no assurance that an adequate investigation of a
suspected leak from SST SX-102 was conducted because DOE did
not document its investigation results.
Tank SX-102 was listed as a leaking tank for a short time in 1993
after DOE identified a decrease in the tank's liquid level.
However, the tank was reclassified as "sound" later that year after
DOE's re-analysis of the waste level monitoring data and
measurement of evaporation thermodynamics suggested that the
tank had not leaked. As of September 1999, the tank was not
interim stabilized. DOE estimated that the tank contained 224,000
gallons of drainable liquid including 216,000 gallons of pumpable
liquid hazardous and radioactive wastes as of March 1999.
Our review of DOE's SX Tank Farm Report identified that Tank
SX-102 may have leaked in the past. The report states that
64
Report No. 2000-P-2000
-------
distribution of contamination in the vadose zone for SST SX-102
indicates that the tank may have leaked at some time before the
mid-1970s. The report also states that the contamination detected
beneath the tank suggests that the leak created two plumes and the
plumes may have been the result of more than one leak. As a
result, the report recommends that the tank's integrity classification
be revised from sound to assumed leaker.
However, the tank's integrity classification was not revised to
assumed leaker as recommended by the report and Ecology staff
were unable to explain what actions DOE had taken in response to
the report's findings on the tank. In response to our inquiry,
Ecology requested DOE to identify the actions it took to determine
whether the tank had leaked. In its response to Ecology's request,
DOE stated:
Tank SX-102 instrument data was re-evaluated.
The in-tank information, primarily neutron ILL,
showed no departure from the predicted
evaporation rate so there were no changes to the
tank classification. The technical staff at the time
felt that the Cesium in the drywell could have
come from a variety of sources other than an
SX-102 leak, while the in-tank ILL data was
fairly conclusive of an evaporation trend only.
There was no procedure in place in 1996 to
convene a full leak assessment panel or to
issue a formal document of the assessment,
so the tank remained classified as "sound,
based primarily on the steady ILL data.
In order to determine whether the tank is currently leaking, we
reviewed: (i) waste level data for the tank covering the period of
over 18 years from January 1981 to April 1999; and (ii) evaluation
documentation supporting DOE's reclassification of the tank in
1993 to a sound classification. While our review identified that the
tank's waste level has been on a steady decrease for a period of
over 18 years, we found no evidence that the tank leaked during the
period. However, we were unable to verify that the tank's current
sound integrity classification was correct because DOE did not
document its investigation of the suspected leak reported in the SX
Tank Farm Report.
65
Report No. 2000-P-2000
-------
With respect to the tank's waste level decreases, we determined
that DOE evaluated the trend and concluded that the waste level
decrease was caused from evaporation of liquid in the tank.
We found that the weaknesses in leak detection occurred mainly
because Ecology has not placed sufficient emphasis on ensuring
that DOE has implemented an effective leak detection and
investigation program. Although 58 of the SSTs do not have
effective leak detection systems in operation, Ecology has not
required DOE to establish a leak detection program for all SSTs
that meets State and Federal regulatory requirements.
In addition, Ecology has not provided sufficient oversight and
enforcement over DOE's leak assessment activities. We
acknowledge that Ecology compliance staff conduct tank
inspections, review tank monitoring data, and coordinate with
DOE staff and contractors in response to suspected tank leaks that
are reported to Ecology. In addition, we acknowledge that DOE
did develop a new leak assessment process in response to
Ecology's November 1998 Notice of Correction addressing
violations identified during an inspection of SST SX-104.
However, DOE's inadequate response to the waste level decrease
in BY-105, continued inability to complete leak investigations
timely, and failure to not always document leak investigation
results show that Ecology needs to provide additional emphasis on
oversight and enforcement of leak assessment activities conducted
by DOE.
CONCLUSION As noted in Chapter 2, at least 1 million gallons of highly toxic and
radioactive waste has leaked from 67 of Hanford's 149 SSTs, some
of which has already reached the groundwater. Without effective
leak detection systems and an effective leak investigation process,
there is no assurance that tank leaks will be identified and
remediated timely. Minimizing the extent of leaks and an effective
leak investigation process for the SSTs are critical to preventing
additional groundwater contamination.
Further, DOE currently plans to use hydraulic sluicing to remove
most of the hard salt cake and sludge from SSTs with a sound
integrity classification. This process could cause additional
releases from tanks that are leakers. Therefore, it is essential that
the integrity classification for each SST is accurate in order to
INSUFFICIENT
EMPHASIS
PLACED ON LEAK
DETECTION AND
INVESTIGATION
PROGRAM
66
Report No. 2000-P-2000
-------
ensure future waste retrieval activities provide sufficient protection
to workers and the environment.
RECOMMENDATIONS We recommend that the Regional Administrator:
5-1 .Assist Ecology in preparing a strategy for
addressing DOE actions for SSTs not currently in
compliance with interim status leak detection
requirements. The strategy should consider
technical impractibility, and performance
capabilities of non-traditional leak detection
systems. Additional activities to be performed by
Ecology pursuant to this strategy should be
documented through the fiscal 2000/2001 PPA
process.
5-2.Negotiate with Ecology appropriate inspection and
enforcement responses to suspected tank leaks
under interim status requirements and document
these commitments through the fiscal 2000/2001
PPA process.
REGION'S AND The Region and Ecology concurred with the recommendations and
ECOLOGY'S provided an implementation schedule for each recommendation.
COMMENTS
67
Report No. 2000-P-2000
-------
[This page was intentionally left blank]
68 Report No. 2000-P-2000
-------
EXHIBIT 1
TIMELINE OF SELECTED FFACO MILESTONES FOR THE
TWRS PROGRAM AND ACTUAL OR PROPOSED REVISIONS
Complete Interim Stabilization of SSTs
FFACO Revised Revised
FFACO Consent Decree
Mod. 6
C
Start and Complete SST/DST Waste Treatment
FFACO Primary Path1
~
FFACO Alternative Path
DOE Preferred Schedule for Waste Treatment
Retrieve Waste From All SSTs
~
FFACO
DOE Operation and Utilization Plan Preferred Option
Close All SSTs
FFACO
1986 1989
FFACO
SIGNED
End of 20 yr. life
for last SSTs
placed in seivice
2000 2002 2004 2007 2009 2012
2047
2036
End of 50 yr. life
for last DSTs
placed in seivice
1 The FFACO primary path requires completion of treatment of Low Activity Waste by 2024 and High
Level Waste by 2028.
Report No. 2000-P-00012
69
-------
[This page was intentionally left blank]
70 Report No. 2000-P-00012
-------
APPENDIX A
AUDIT SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY
This section describes the audit scope and methodology, including sample selection for our
review of regulatory oversight of the TWRS Program.
We performed our audit in accordance with the Government Auditing Standards issued by the
Comptroller General of the United States. Audit fieldwork was performed between
November 1998 and January 2000. The audit generally covered Ecology's and the Region's
management controls in effect for the 26-month period from July 1997 through September 1999.
We also reviewed relevant oversight and enforcement records of Ecology which covered periods
prior to and after this 26-month period which we deemed necessary for adequate evaluation of
program activities.
We interviewed State of Washington officials in Ecology's Nuclear Waste Program and
discussed our audit results with an official in the State's Office of the Attorney General. We also
interviewed officials in Region 10's Office of Waste and Chemicals Management and Office of
Regional Council. In addition, we interviewed officials from the State of Oregon's Office of
Energy and the Yakima Indian Nation which are stakeholders of the Hanford Federal Facility.
We also reviewed applicable laws, regulations, and records maintained by Ecology and the
Region.
The scope included a review of Ecology's and the Region's management controls associated with
oversight and enforcement of: (i) FFACO milestones associated with the TWRS Program; and
(ii) DOE compliance with State and Federal hazardous waste regulations applicable to interim
status tank systems. We obtained an understanding of management controls through inquiries,
observations, and inspections of documents and records. We assessed the control environment,
policies and procedures, and risk of the two areas listed above.
The management control deficiencies that were identified in the audit are described in this report,
along with recommendations for corrective actions. We also reviewed the Region's 1997 and
1998 annual FMFIA assurance letters to the Administrator.
FFACO Milestones
We focused on FFACO milestones for: (i) interim stabilization; (ii) waste treatment; (iii) waste
retrieval and closure of the tanks; (iv) DST capacity; and (v) resolution of flammable gas to
evaluate regulatory oversight of the TWRS Program.
71
Report No. 2000-P-00012
-------
Interim Stabilization
We reviewed all modifications to major milestones for interim stabilization of the SSTs,
milestones M-05-00 and M-41-00, as well as interim milestones covering a period of over 10
years from May 1989 to September 1999. We also reviewed Ecology's enforcement activities
covering this same period for missed milestones.
Waste Treatment
We reviewed compliance with waste treatment major milestones M-50-00, M-51-00, M-60-00,
and M-61-00 as well as judgmentally selected interim milestones. We selected key interim
milestones that were or may be effected by DOE's August 1998 Phase I contract amendment.
Waste Retrieval and Tank Closure
Major milestone M-45-00 requires retrieval of the waste from the SSTs and their complete
closure. We reviewed compliance with the major milestone and judgmentally selected interim
and target milestones. Our sample included an interim milestone requiring retrieval of waste
from SST C-106. The sample also included key interim and target milestones that may be
effected by DOE's August 1998 Phase I contract amendment.
DST Capacity
In order to determine whether DST space requirements for support of waste retrieval and
treatment had been adequately evaluated, we reviewed compliance with major milestones
M-46-00D and M-46-00E. These milestones required DOE to submit annual DST volume
projections to Ecology by September 30, 1997 and 1998.
Flammable Gas Resolution
Major milestone M-40-00 requires mitigation/resolution of tank safety issues for high priority
Watch List tanks. We judgmentally selected interim milestone M-40-09 for review because it
required resolution of a USQ involving flammable gas by September 1998.
Compliance with State and Federal Regulations
In order to evaluate oversight and enforcement of DOE compliance with Washington's and
EPA's hazardous waste regulations for interim status tank systems, we reviewed: (i) response
actions for safety issues involving DST SY-101; (ii) inspection coverage for the SSTs and DSTs
and enforcement responses to violations; (iii) leak detection systems in use for the SSTs and
DSTs; and (iv) the response process for actual and suspected tank leaks.
72
Report No. 2000-P-00012
-------
DST SY-101 Safety Issues
During the audit, serious safety issues involving DST SY-101 came to our attention. As a result,
we reviewed compliance and enforcement documents and records for the tank covering the
period from December 1997 to September 1999.
Inspections
To evaluate the adequacy of Ecology inspections, we reviewed all Hanford SST and DST
inspections performed by Ecology between January 1992 and February 1999. We used the same
inspections to evaluate the adequacy and timeliness of Ecology enforcement taken as a result of
DOE violations of State and Federal hazardous waste laws and regulations.
Leak Detection Systems
We reviewed DOE's leak detection system operating specification documents for all 177 SSTs
and DSTs covering tank operations for the period from July 1997 to June 1999.
Leak Response Process
Of the 67 SSTs that were designated as assumed leakers, three of the tanks (BY-105, BY-106,
and SX-104) were not interim stabilized as of January 1999. We selected all three tanks for
review because they had been designated as assumed leakers since the 1980's.
Two other SSTs (SX-102 and SX-109) were selected for review because preliminary information
obtained during our fieldwork indicated that adequate investigations may not have been
conducted into suspected leaks from the tanks.
We also selected one other SST (B-111) for review because the tank was designated as an
assumed leaker in 1978, was suspected of leaking again in 1997, and was under investigation
during our fieldwork.
73
Report No. 2000-P-00012
-------
[This page was intentionally left blank]
74 Report No. 2000-P-00012
-------
APPENDIX B
REGION 10 AND STATE DEPARTMENT OF ECOLOGY
RESPONSE TO THE DRAFT REPORT
Attached are the Region's and Ecology's response to the draft report.
75
Report No. 2000-P-00012
-------
[This page was intentionally left blank]
76 Report No. 2000-P-00012
-------
UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY
REGION 10
1200 Sixth Avenue, Seattle WA98101
February 22, 2000
Reply To
Atm Of: WCM- 127
Truman R. Beeler, Divisional Inspector General for Audits
United States Environmental Protection Agency
Office of the Inspector General for Audits
Western Audit Division
75 Hawthorne Street
19thFloor, Mail Code 1-1
San Francisco, CA 94106-3901
Re: Concurrence with Draft Report on the Tank Waste Remediation System (TWRS)
Program for the Hanford Federal Facility
EPA/Ecology ID No. WA7 89000 8967
Dear Mr. Beeler:
EPA Region 10 (EPA) and the Washington State Department of Ecology Nuclear Waste Program (Ecology) are in
receipt of your January 21, 2000 memo requesting comment and concurrence with the referenced draft audit report.
After review of the report and each of the recommendations, we concur in full with both the facts as presented in each
finding, and with the associated recommendations. EPA and Ecology fully support the findings identified in the audit
report, particularly the lack of progress on the part of Department of Energy (DOE) in addressing the significant threats
posed by Hanford tank wastes. We intend to move forward in a timely manner with each of the recommendations, and
believe our current activities, described below, demonstrate our resolve to address delays in the TWRS program. For
recommendations based upon Performance Partnership Agreement (PPA) commitments, we expect to begin these
discussions in the near future and conclude with a revised PPA document by mid-summer, 2000, consistent with our
established PPA cycle. Further details of our response activities are enclosed.
As documented in the audit report, Ecology and EPA have been engaged in negotiations with the Department of
Energy (DOE) to establish milestones in the Hanford Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (Tri-Party
Agreement) relating to tank waste retrieval, construction and operation of a tank waste treatment system, and
compliance concerns related to the RCRA Land Disposal Restriction (LDR) program. Despite extensive efforts on the
part of both agencies, these negotiations concluded on January 31, 2000 with no agreement reached. DOE's eleventh-
hour proposals for both tank waste treatment milestones and LDR dispute resolution served only to reinforce EPA's
and Ecology's belief that DOE remains unwilling to commit to necessary work and be accountable for progress toward
enforceable milestones. As a result, Ecology asked EPA to join in development and issuance of a final dispute
determination to resolve these issues. EPA responded in a February 3, 2000 letter to Ecology strongly
Prlntmi on Bucyttod Paper
77 fEB 2ft 2MB
Report No. 2000-P-00012
-------
endorsing Ecology's position, and stating in no uncertain terms EPA's concern with DOE failures to complete work,
fulfill milestone commitments, and demonstrate accountability for progress with Hanford environmental cleanup. We
believe these clear and decisive positions established by EPA and Ecology with respect to tank waste and LDR
compliance are fully consistent with recommendations in the audit report, and reflect our commitment to
implementing the audit recommendations. Noted communications between EPA and Ecology are enclosed for your
information.
Finally, we would like to thank you for the opportunity to work closely and collaboratively with you and your staff
throughout the audit process, including development of effective and implementable recommendations. We feel
confident that the final report will be an important asset to us as we continue to work toward resolving Hartford tank
waste issues. Should you have any questions, please feel free to contact us at (206) 553-1847 or
(360) 407-7150 , respectively.
Sincerely,
(Sig.)
Richard Albright, Director
Office of Waste and Chemicals Management
EPA Region 10
(Sig)
Mike Wilson, Program Manager
Nuclear Waste Program
Washington Department of Ecology
Enclosures (3)
cc: Janet Kesler, Audit Coordinator, Region 10
78
Report No. 2000-P-00012
-------
EPA Region 10
Hanford Inspector General Audit
Tank Waste Remediation System
Recommendation Implementation Schedule
Recommendation 1:
Negotiate with Ecology to address oversight and enforcement responsibilities regarding DOE compliance with
FFACO and RCRA requirements as part of the Fiscal 2000/2001 PPA process.
Region 10 will initiate these discussions with Ecology during the second quarter of EPA's FY2000 (all
subsequent commitment dates refer to the federal fiscal year) as part of the established PPA process. A revised
PPA including agreed-upon responsibilities will be finalized during the third quarter of FY2000.
Recommendation 2:
Consult with EPA National Program Managers to determine what action can be taken at the EPA Headquarters
level to achieve a higher priority, including receiving funding, on cleanup of the Hartford tanks.
In conjunction with Ecology and resolution of Tn-Party disputes. EPA will communicate with one or more
national program mangers in the Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response, Office of Enforcement
and Compliance Assurance, and/or the Office of the Administrator in the second or third quarter of FY2000.
Timing and content of this request will be dependant on prowess of tank waste TP A issues resolution.
Recommendation 3:
Report the weaknesses in the Hanford TWRS Program as a management control deficiency in the annual
Federal Managers Financial Integrity Act assurance letter to the EPA Administrator.
Region 10 will incorporate weaknesses in the Hanford TWRS program as potential FY2000 vulnerabilities
as part of mid-year update in the third quarter of FY2000 to the Management Integrity Act 1999 Assurance
Letter, issued October, 1999. We believe an update to the 1999 letter better reflects the significance and
timing of current tank waste development than including the TWRS program in the 2000 Assurance Letter.
Recommendation 4:
Negotiate Fiscal2000/2001 PA commitments with Ecology as necessary to oversee TWRS Program safety
issues.
79
Report No. 2000-P-00012
-------
See response to Recommendation 1 above.
Recommendation 5
Establish annual EPA and Ecology inspection commitments through the Fiscal 2000/2001 PPA
process in accordance with the Compliance Assurance Agreement Between the Washington
Department of Ecology and the United States Environmental Protection Agency for the Hazardous
Waste Program (1997), including a mid-year and end-of-year review of commitment.
See response to Recommendation 1 above. In addition, EPA and Ecology will complete a review of
commitment in the FY2000 mid-year and end-of-year meetings in the second and fourth quarters of
FY2001. This schedule will be consistent with establishing a final update to the 2000/2001 PPA in
the third quarter of FY2000.
Recommendation 6:
Assist Ecology in preparing a strategy for addressing DOE actions for SSTs not currently in
compliance with interim status leak detection requirements.
EPA and Ecology will develop this strategy and incorporate any resulting actions into the updated
PPA to be completed during the third quarter of FY2000.
Recommendation 7:
Negotiate with Ecology appropriate inspection and enforcement responses to suspected tank leaks
under interim status requirements and document these commitments through the FY2000/2001 PPA
process.
See response to Recommendation 1 above.
80
Report No. 2000-P-00012
-------
UNITED STATES ENVIRON MENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY
REGION 10
1200 Sixth Avenue
Seattle, WA 98101
March 10, 2000
Reply To
Attn Of: WCM-127
Truman R. Beeler, Divisional Inspector General for Audits
United States Environmental Protection Agency
Office of the Inspector General for Audits
Western Audit Division
75 Hawthorne Street
19th Floor, Mail Code 1-1
San Francisco, CA 94106-3901
Re: Updated Concurrence with Draft Report on the Tank Waste Remediation System
(TWRS) Program for the Hanford Federal Facility
EPA/Ecology ID No. WA7 89000 8967
Dear Mr. Beeler:
In response to your verbal request through Mike Owen of your office to update the EPA and Ecology concurrence with
the draft final report cited above, please find a revised attachment to our February 22, 2000 concurrence letter that
includes the proposed response to each audit recommendation.
Should you have any questions, please feel free to contact us at (206) 553-1847 or (360) 407-7150, respectively.
Sincerely.
(Sig.)
Richard Albright, Director
(Sig)
Office of Waste and Chemicals Management
EPA Region 10
Mike Wilson, Program Manager
Nuclear Waste Program
Washington Department of Ecology
Enclosures (3)
cc: Janet Kesler, Audit Coordinator, Region 10
81
Report No. 2000-P-00012
-------
EPA Region 10
Hanford Inspector General Audit
Tank Waste Remediation System
Recommendation Implementation Schedule
Recommendation 1 (Chapter 2, Recommendation 1):
Negotiate with Ecology to address oversight and enforcement responsibilities regarding DOE
compliance with FFACO and RCRA requirements as part of the Fiscal 2000/2001 PPA process.
Region 10 will initiate these discussions, addressing items a.) and b.) of the recommendation,
with Ecology during the second quarter of EPA's FY2000 (all subsequent commitment dates refer
to the federal fiscal year) as part of the established PPA process. A revised PPA including agreed-
upon responsibilities will be finalized during the third quarter of FY2000
Recommendation 2 (Chapter 2, Recommendation 2):
Negotiate with Ecology through the Fiscal 2000/2001 PPA process specific enforcement or other
programmatic actions directed towards timely resolution of tank waste treatment issues and
establishment of appropriate enforceable milestones.
See response to Recommendation 1 above. In addition, EPA and Ecology have already initiated
efforts in response to this recommendation as illustrated by EPA's February 3, 2000 letter to
Ecology committing EPA support for a final tank waste determination for TP A milestones. EPA
and Ecology are continuing close collaboration and communication as resolution of tank waste
milestone and Land Disposal Restriction reporting requirement disputes continues.
Recommendation 3 (Chapter 2, Recommendation 3):
Consult with Ecology prior to and during FFACO change negotiations during FY2000 to develop
appropriate language addressing mitigation or prevention of environmental risks associated with
extending waste treatment, waste retrieval, and closure milestones included in DOE FFACO
change packages.
EPA will negotiate through the PPA process described in the response to Recommendation 1
above appropriate levels of consultation during FY2000 to address this recommendation. In
addition, EPA will address this recommendation during EPA review of TP A change packages for
major milestones relating to tank wastes.
82
Report No. 2000-P-00012
-------
EPA and Ecology are already engaged in responding to this recommendation through joint
participation in current negotiation of tank waste treatment and retrieval milestones.
Recommendation 4 (Chapter 2, Recommendation 4):
Consult with EPA National Program Managers to determine what action can be taken at the EPA
Headquarters level to achieve a higher priority, including receiving funding, on cleanup of the
Hanford tanks.
In conjunction with Ecology and resolution of Tri-Party disputes, EPA will communicate with one
or more national program mangers in the Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response, Office
of Enforcement and Compliance Assurance, and/or the Office of the Administrator in the second
or third quarter of FY2000. Timing and content of this request will be dependant on progress of
tank waste TPA issues resolution.
Recommendation 5 (Chapter 2, Recommendation 5):
Report the weaknesses in the Hanford TWRS Program as a management control deficiency in the
annual Federal Managers Financial Integrity Act assurance letter to the EPA Administrator.
Region 10 will incorporate weaknesses in the Hanford TWRS program as potential FY2000
vulnerabilities as part of mid-year update in the third quarter of FY2000 to the Management
Integrity Act 1999 Assurance Letter, issued October, 1999. We believe an update to the 1999
letter better reflects the significance and timing of current tank waste development than including
the TWRS program in the 2000 Assurance Letter.
Recommendation 6 (Chapter 3, Recommendation 1):
Negotiate Fiscal2000/2001 PPA commitments with Ecology as necessary to oversee TWRS
Program safety issues.
See response to Recommendation 1 above.
Recommendation 7 (Chapter 3, Recommendation 2):
Review Ecology's progress toward meeting these commitments during mid-year and end-of-year
PPA evaluations. It is important that the commitment address Ecology's safety position staffing
shortage.
EPA will address this recommendation through the mid-year review meetings, and provide
documentation in mid-year and end-of-year reports.
83
Report No. 2000-P-00012
-------
Recommendation 8 (Chapter 4, Recommendation 1):
Establish annual EPA and Ecology inspection commitments through the Fiscal 2000/2001 PPA
process in accordance with the Compliance Assurance Agreement Between the Washington
Department of Ecology and the United States Environmental Protection Agency for the
Hazardous Waste Program (1997). including a mid-year and end-of-year review of commitment.
See response to Recommendation 1 above. In addition, EPA and Ecology will complete a review
of commitment in the FY2000 mid-year and end-of-year meetings in the second and fourth quarters
of FY2001. This schedule will be consistent with establishing a final update to the 2000/2001 PPA
in the third quarter of FY2000.
Recommendation 9 (Chapter 5, Recommendation 1):
Assist Ecology in preparing a strategy for addressing DOE actions for SSTs not currently in
compliance with interim status leak detection requirements.
EPA and Ecology will develop this strategy and incorporate any resulting actions into the
updated PPA to be completed during the third quarter of FY2000.
Recommendation 10 (Chapter 5, Recommendation 2):
Negotiate with Ecology appropriate inspection and enforcement responses to suspected tank leaks
under interim status requirements and document these commitments through the FY2000/2001 PPA
process.
See response to Recommendation 1 above.
84
Report No. 2000-P-00012
-------
STATE OF WASHINGTON
DEPARTMENT OF ECOLOGY
P.O. Box 47600 Olympia, Washington 98504-7600
(360) 407-6000 TDD Only (Hearing Impaired) (360) 407-6006
January 31, 2000
Mr. Chuck Clarke, Regional Administrator
U. S. Environmental Protection Agency, Region 10
1200 Sixth Avenue
Seattle, Washington 98101
Dear Mr. Clarke:
RE: Hanford tank waste treatment negotiations and associated Land Disposal Restrictions
dispute under the Hanford Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (HFFACO)
As you know, negotiations with the U. S. Department of Energy (DOE) regarding its Hanford site
high-level radioactive tank wastes have been in progress throughout this past year with little
success. Today, the period for concluding these negotiations expired with no agreement reached.
Consequently, by February 14, 2000,1 expect to issue a Final Determination requiring that DOE
move forward in the construction and operation of a tank waste treatment complex and that wastes
are retrieved from DOE's leaking single-shell tanks in a timely manner.
I am writing you today to ask for your assistance in ensuring that the environmental and human
health risks posed by DOE's leaking tanks, and DOE's seeming inability to bring its facilities into
compliance with hazardous waste law are not aggravated by further delay. Specifically, I am
requesting that the Environmental Protection Agency join the Department of Ecology in the
development and issuance of this Determination and our closely associated Determination
regarding DOE compliance with "RCRA" Land Disposal Restrictions. Your assistance on this
critical environmental compliance project would be of great help, and would be deeply appreciated
by Governor Locke, Attorney General Gregoire, I, and the citizens of the State. I would be pleased
to meet with you to discuss this issue further and to respond to any questions you or your staff may
have.
Sincerely,
(Sig.)
Tom Fitzsimmons
Director
cc: Carol Browner, USEPA HQ
Governor Gary Locke
Attorney General Christine Gregoire
Merilyn Reeves, HAB
Washington Congressional Delegation
85
Report No. 2000-P-00012
-------
UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY
REGION 10
1200 Sixth Avenue Seattle
Washington 98101
February 3, 2000
Reply To
Attn Of: ORC-158
Tom Fitzsimmons, Director
State of Washington Department of Ecology
P.O. Box 47600
Olympia, Washington 98304-7600
Re: Hanford tank waste treatment negotiations and associated Land Disposal
Restrictions disputes under the Hanford Federal Facility Agreement and
Consent Order (HFFACO)
Dear Mr. Fitzsimmons:
This is in response to your letter, dated January 31, 2000, requesting that the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) join the Department of Ecology (Ecology) in the
development and issuance of a final dispute determination under the HFFACO that would
require the Department of Energy (DOE) to move forward with construction and operation of a
tank waste treatment complex and retrieve wastes from Hartford's leaking single shell tanks in
a timely manner. You also asked if we would join you in issuing a final dispute determination
on DOE compliance with RCRA Land Disposal Restrictions (LDR). You can count on our
assistance and full support. EPA shares your concern that DOE has failed to make adequate
progress in addressing the significant threats posed by the Hanford tank wastes and must
commit to a program that ensures that the work is started and completed on schedule.
The retrieval and treatment of the Hanford site high-level radioactive tank waste (HLW) is
the largest and most pressing environmental project in the DOE complex. It's priority is
underscored by the continuing failure of DOE's single-shell tanks (SST), resultant loss of HLW
to area soils and groundwater, the fact that DOE's adjacent double-shell tanks are nearing
capacity and design life, and the delays the tank waste program has experienced to date.
It is appalling that after 18 months of negotiations we don't have agreement on a program to
address what certainly is one of the nation's most severe environmental problems. On January
31,2000, the final day of the negotiation period, DOE submitted its latest proposal for resolving
the dispute. It is clear from that proposal that DOE's position is that it will not commit to
complete the work necessary to address this
86
Report No. 2000-P-00012
-------
compliance with LDR requirements is a critical complement to the tank waste milestones
to be established through the final determination.
EPA stands ready to join the Department of Ecology in the development and issuance
of final determinations that will require DOE to move forward with construction and
operation of a tank waste treatment complex, retrieve wastes from DOE's leaking single
shell tanks in a timely manner, and ensure compliance with LDRs in a manner that
conforms to hazardous waste law, the Federal Facility Compliance Act, and the
HFFACO.
If you have any questions, please don't hesitate to call me at (206) 553-1234.
Sincerely,
(Sig.)
Chuck Clarke
Regional Administrator
cc: Richard T. French, DOE Office of River Protection
Governor John Kitzhaber, State of Oregon
Keith Klein, DOE Richland Field Office
Attorney General Christine Gregoire, State of Washington
Governor Gary Locke, State of Washington
Merilyn Reeves, Hanford Advisory Board
Lonnie Selam Sr., Yakama Nation
Antone Minthorn, Confederated Tribes of the Umatilla
Sam Penney, Nez Perce Tribe
Washington Congressional Delegation
87
Report No. 2000-P-00012
-------
APPENDIX C
REPORT DISTRIBUTION
Office of Inspector General
Inspector General
EPA Headquarters Office
Assistant Administrator for Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response
Assistant Administrator for Office of Enforcement and Compliance Assurance
Agency Followup Official
Agency Followup Coordinator
Associate Administrator for Regional Operations and State/Local Relations
Associate Administrator for Congressional and Legislative Affairs
Associate Administrator for Communications, Education and Public Affairs
Comptroller
Region 10
Regional Administrator
Director for Office of Waste and Chemicals Management
Audit Followup Coordinator
External Affairs Office
Regional Library
Ecology
Director for Washington Department of Ecology
88
Report No. 2000-P-00012
------- |