^osr'%
f A \
w
prc^
Office of Inspector General
Superfund Case Studies
REVIEW OF BARRIERS
TO SUPERFUND SITE CLEANUPS
- CASE STUDIES -
EISFB5-11 -0008-6400016
November 29. 1995
-------
Inspector General Division
Conducting the Review:
Program Offices Involved:
Headquarters Audit Division
Office of Solid Waste
and Emergency Response
Office of Enforcement
and Compliance Assurance
Photographs included in this report were provided by:
• EPA Regional Offices
• EPA OIG Auditors
-------
TABLE OF CONTENTS
MEMO TO THE ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATORS 1
WHITMOYER LABORATORIES CASE STUDY
SUMMARY OF BARRIERS 6
BACKGROUND AND SITE HISTORY . 8
SITE DISCOVERY, PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT,
SITE INSPECTION AND NPL LISTING 12
REMEDIAL INVESTIGATION/FEASIBILITY STUDY 12
REMOVAL ACTIVITIES 15
REMEDIAL DESIGN/REMEDIAL ACTION 26
COST RECOVERY ACTIONS 33
CONCLUSIONS 33
WASATCH CHEMICAL CASE STUDY
SUMMARY OF BARRIERS 35
BACKGROUND AND SITE HISTORY 37
SITE DISCOVERY, PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENTS,
AND SITE INSPECTIONS 42
REMOVAL ACTIONS 43
NPL LISTING ...49
REMEDIAL INVESTIGATION/FEASIBILITY STUDY 49
REMEDIAL DESIGN/REMEDIAL ACTION 51
COST RECOVERY ACTIONS 57
CONCLUSIONS 58
-------
Whitmoyer Laboratories Case Study
handled by the remedial process, is estimated at $18 million due mainly to the
^application of additional regulatory requirements according to Agency officials, and
has yet to be completed. Further, and more importantly, if the vault is leaking,
additional ground and surface water contamination may have occurred over the 12
years since EPA became aware of the vault. It is possible that if the removal
action had been completed, additional ground and surface water contamination -
could have been avoided.
Another barrier the Agency encountered revolved around the 1990 remedial
action decision to use on-site incineration for the contents of the vault and other
wastes at the site. The decision sparked opposition from the community, state,
local government. Congressional leaders, and PRP officials. According to many of
these officials, there was great skepticism and uncertainty in the ability to safely
incinerate the wastes, and additional concerns about having the incinerator
operating so close to the community. In an effort to address these concerns, EPA
allowed the PRPs to search for an off-site incinerator. In the summer of 1995, an
off-site incinerator was located and approved by EPA for use. Although a good
decision, overall it resulted in a delay of approximately 4 years.
One final barrier that was identified involved severe weather conditions.
Excessive snow and ice formations caused one of the hazardous waste storage
buildings to collapse. Those portions of the collapsed building which came in
contact with the stored hazardous wastes were then looked upon as hazardous
vastes. This caused approximately six weeks of delay at the site. While this
delay is not necessarily significant, it does show that while the Agency can plan
for unforeseen circumstances, some delays in site cleanup are out of the Agency's
control.
7
-------
Whitmoyer Laboratories Case Study
WHITMOYER LABORATORIES
CASE STUDY
BACKGROUND AND SITE HISTORY
Whitmoyer Laboratories is a 22-acre veterinary pharmaceutical
manufacturing plant located in the borough of Myerstown, Lebanon County, PA.
The company manufactured veterinary pharmaceuticals between 1934 and 1984
and produced and stored soluble arsenic compounds and aniline. The site itself
consists of numerous buildings, a large waste storage vault, lagoons, storage
tanks, a waste pit, and a petroleum products pipeline and pump station. The area
surrounding the site is agricultural and residential. About 4700 people reside
within three miles of the site. Additionally, there is an elementary school located
within a half mile of the site.
In 1957, Whitmoyer Laboratories beg¥h the "production of arsenical
pharmaceuticals. Waste water from these operations containing arsenic and
arsenic compounds were ultimately dumped into the Atlantic Ocean. However,
concern over ocean dumping forced Whitmoyer to change disposal practices. As a
result, Whitmoyer began disposing of arsenic and other wastes in unlined lagoons
on-site.
In 1964, Rohm and Haas Company purchased Whitmoyer Laboratories.
About this time, two local residents were hospitalized with chronic arsenic
poisoning. Rohm and Haas then initiated an investigation into contaminated
ground water and residential wells. The investigation revealed arsenic
contamination in the lagoons, soil, surface water, ground water and nearby
residential wells. Arsenic was also found in the nearby Tulpehocken Creek and
Union Canal and could be traced as far downstream as Philadelphia. Ground water
contamination was reported to have reached 150,000 parts per billion (ppb)1,
exceeding the Maximum Contamination Level by a factor of about 3000, and
arsenic from the Whitmoyer plant was also found in springs up to 20 miles from
the site.
In 1964, Rohm and Haas voluntarily began cleanup efforts to address
contamination on- and off-site. These efforts included changing waste water
disposal operations, excavation of sludges and soils, ground water pumping and
5 T>if maximum contaminant Level (MCL)for arsenic was 50 parts pa billion.
8
-------
Whitmoyer Laboratories Case Study
Whitmoyer Laboratory
Current Site Map
Figure 1
» •
L>0
$
CcmM L0900™
OlMiMtal To»» -
-------
Whitmoyer Laboratories Case Study
In 1973, a United States Geological Survey (USGS) study confirmed the
presence of elevated levels of arsenic in soil on and adjacent to the Whitmoyer
site. In 1976, EPA and the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Resources
(PADER) investigated the Myerstown Sewage Treatment Plant (MSTP) for arsenic
contamination. The study concluded that ground water containing arsenic was"
entering the sewer lines near the Whitmoyer plant and that it was the probable
source.
In 1978, Rohm and Haas sold Whitmoyer Laboratories to Beecham Inc. As
a condition of sate, Beecham agreed to continue providing bottled water to
residents whose wells were contaminated. Beecham sold Whitmoyer Laboratories
to Stafford Laboratories in 1982. Stafford also agreed to supply bottled water to
residents with contaminated wells. In March of 1982, four of the residents who
were receiving bottled water entered into a cash settlement with Whitmoyer
Laboratories for no further claims against Whitmoyer Laboratories. We spoke with
other residents who told us they refused a cash settlement because it would
prevent any future claims against the Laboratory.
In February 1983, a Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
-------
Whitmoyer Laboratories Case Study
Chronology of EPA Superfund Involvement
Figure 2
WHITMOYER LABORATORIES
CLEANUP TIMELINE
ALL OPERABLE UNITS
DISCOVERY TO DELETION
Disc/PA/SI
NPL Listing
Rl/FS
Removal 1
Removal 2
Remedial Design
Remedial Action
1M31I64 19SB 1IN19C7 1006 1W01MO IM1 INS (Ml )M41N81«M 19971000 3000 2001 1050
1111II11111111111111 H11111II111111111111111111 III 1111111111111H11H111111111111
State Lead^^^H EPA Lead
PRP Lead
Source: EPA Data depicted in calendar year.
Remedial Design and Remedial Action timeframes are RPM estimates.
11
-------
Whitmoyer Laboratories Case Study
SITE DISCOVFRY/PRKIIMINARY ASSESSMENT/SITE
INSPECTION/NPL LISTING
In May 1983, EPA, Region 3, Hazardous Waste Management Division was
notified by an anonymous caller of the conditions at Whitmoyer Laboratories.
Specifically, the caller noted waste from the on-site vault was leaking into the
ground and into the nearby Tuipehocken Creek. While others {USGS, PADER, Corp
of Engineers, and EPA's RCRA and Water program offices) were aware of the site
and had studied the area around the Whitmoyer facility, this is the earliest record
of EPA Superfund involvement that we could identify in the site files. Therefore,
we used this date for Site Discovery.
The Preliminary Assessment (PA) for Whitmoyer Laboratories was completed
by PADER in December 1983, approximately seven months after site discovery.
The PA Report states that the seriousness of the site problems ranked high and
possessed the following potential hazards: threat to human life, contamination of
food chain, contamination of ground water, surface water and soil, leaking
containers (specifically arsenic within the concrete vault). As a result, a Site
Inspection (SI) was recommended.
The SI for Whitmoyer Laboratories was completed on April 11, 1984,
approximately 11 months after site discovery. The SI Report shows that the SI
was conducted using existing EPA information. The report stated that the
containment of wastes at the site was insecure, unsound, and dangerous. A
Hazard Ranking System score for the site was completed on April 12, 1984. The
site ranked third in Pennsylvania and number 244 nationally at the time of ranking.
In October 1984, Whitmoyer Laboratories was proposed for listing on the National
Priorities List (NPL). In June 1986, approximately 21 months later, and
approximately 37 months after discovery, the site was finalized on the NPL.
REMEDIAL INVESTTGA tjqjsj/feASJBIIJTY STUDY
On June 26, 1985, PADER began the RI/FS by contracting with E&E Inc. to
develop the Remedial Action Master Plan (RAMP). Additionally, PADER began
conducting formal negotiations with the PRPs for conducting the RI/FS. In April
1986, PADER submitted the RAMP to EPA for review and acceptance. EPA
rejected PADER's RAMP, calling it inadequate. The work plan was never
implemented. The RI/FS negotiations with PADER continued until April 1987. At
this time PADER turned the site lead over to EPA because of difficulties in
12
-------
Whitmoyer Laboratories Case Study
negotiating an RI/FS settlement with the PRPs and pressure from EPA to take
quicker action. Overall, PADER spent approximately 2 years developing the RAMP
and negotiating with the PRPs.
While the negotiations for conducting the RI/FS were being conducted by-
the state, the PRPs approached EPA with a 50/50 preauthorized mixed funding
proposal. According to the EPA files, in February 1987, one PRP (Rohm and Haas
Company) offered to enter into a consent order to conduct the RI/FS if EPA would
accept a 50/50 preauthorized mixed funding agreement. While EPA agreed that
SARA section 122 (a) and (b) allowed EPA to enter, into preauthorized mixed
funding agreements, EPA officials declined the offer stating they would rather use
mixed funding agreements for Remedial Designs and Remedial Actions.
In April 1987, the state formally returned the site to EPA as a Federal lead
site. According to the site files the site was returned because the state was
having difficulties negotiating the RI/FS settlement with the PRPs. EPA continued
the RI/FS negotiations through September 1987, however, no agreement could be
reached. EPA ultimately decided to fund and conduct the RI/FS.
To better manage the RI/FS and cleanup operations, the site was divided
into six Operable Units (OU) encompassed in three Records of Decisions (RODs):
OU Number Description ROD
1 Concentrated Liquids 1
Buildings, Structures and 2
2 Miscellaneous Products and
Feedstocks
3 Soils and Sediments 3
4 Vault Waste 2
5 Lagoons 2
6 Groundwater 3
In November 1987, EPA contracted with Ebasco to develop and perform the RI/FS
for all of the operable units. In June 1988, the work plan for conducting the RI/FS
was accepted by EPA. Field sampling was conducted from July 1988 through
May of 1989.
13
-------
Whitmoyer Laboratories Case Study
On March 24, 1989, the equivalent of an RI/FS report, "Concentrated
Liquids Assessment" was issued for OU 1. This operable unit was completed early
because Agency officials believed they had sufficient information to begin remedial
action. On June 30, 1989, approximately 4 years after the RI/FS was started, and
6 years after site discovery, the Regional Administrator signed the ROD for
OU 1.
Concurrent with the RI/FS fieldwork, Region 3 officials conducted
enforcement negotiations with the PRPs to take responsibility for conducting the
Remedial Design/Remedial Action (RD/RA) for OU 1. These negotiations were
unsuccessful and EPA took the lead in conducting the RD/RA for OU 1.
The second ROD, which encompasses OUs 2, 4, and 5, was signed by the
Regional Administrator on December 17, 1990. The third ROD which
encompasses OUs 3 and 6 was signed on December 31, 1990. In total, over 2
years were spent negotiating the RI/FS, and over 3 years were spent completing
the RI/FS. To put this in some perspective, EPA Headquarters goal is 120 days for
RI/FS negotiations and 18 months for actual RI/FS completion. Overall, nearly 8
years passed from site discovery until the RI/FS completion.
RI/FS Negotiation Durations
| RI/FS Negotiations (State)
644 Days f
RI/FS Negotiations (EPA)
238 Days |
Total Days in Negotiations
882 Days |
| Agency Goal for RI/FS Negotiations
120 Days (
RI/FS Durations
Start RI/FS to ROD 3 Approval
3.2 Years
Agency Goal for RI/FS
1.5 Years
14
-------
Whitmoyer Laboratories Case Study
REMOVAL ACTIVITIES
Potential Water line Installation
As stated earlier, Whitmoyer Laboratories started supplying bottled water to
residences with contaminated wells in 1964. In 1983, PADER assessed the
Whitmoyer facility. The assessment revealed that arsenic contamination was not
confined to any discreet aquifer, but had spread to various depths. As a result,
EPA was requested to investigate the site for a possible removal action.
In January 1984, EPA's Removal Program directed its Technical Assistance
Team (TAT) to perform a site assessment of Whitmoyer Laboratories for possible
CERCLA removal actions. From February 1984, through May 1985, EPA's
contractor collected samples from the site and the surrounding residences. In July
1984, Stafford Laboratories, the current owners, filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy.
On or about September 6, 1984, after 20 years of doing so, Whitmoyer
Laboratories stopped providing bottled water to nearby residences.
On July 17, 1985, the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry -
(ATSDR), the Department of Health and Human Services, issued a memorandum to
EPA on the results of the Whitmoyer Laboratories sampling. ATSDR's opinion was
that five we|ls should not be used for human consumption purposes. Two of the
welis had unacceptable levels of arsenic. Three other wells indicated organic
contamination, but the levels did not exceed the Office of Drinking Water's Ten-
Day Health Advisory. They were sufficiently high, however, to require either
frequent monitoring or an alternative water supply. The ATSDR report
recommended that the best course of action, in the short term, would be an
alternative water supply and that, in the long term, residents with contaminated
wells should be connected to a public water supply. The ATSDR report further
stated that there were additional wells with historically high arsenic values that
were not included in this study and using these wells would be questionable
without current monitoring information. ATSDR concluded that the contamination
of wells over such a widespread area, would indicate that all the private and public
wells in the area should be sampled.
In August 1985, the OSC drafted a removal request calling for:
1. Providing a temporary drinking water supply to one resident (whose well
was contaminated with unacceptable levels of arsenic).
2. Identifying homes and conducting sampling to determine any
additional homes thai may require alternate water.
15
-------
Whitmoyer Laboratories Case Study
3. An evaluation of the data collected from Step 2 as well as an
investigation of the necessity, feasibility and cost effectiveness of
providing a permanent water supply to the affected residents.
The removal request was not approved by the Region. The Region found
that one resident, with a well showing high levels of arsenic had already been
hooked up to the public water supply; hence, there was no need to provide an
alternative water supply. Similarly, another resident reached a private, cash
settlement with Whitmoyer Laboratories, thereby undermining the need for
alternative water.
As mentioned above, ATSDR recommended that the best course of action
for the three residents with elevated organics would be to provide an alternative
water supply rather than monitoring followed by an alternative water supply in the
future. EPA chose to monitor the three wells rather than supply an alternative
water supply.
On October 9, 1985 an EPA official wrote a letter to a resident whose well
was identified as having elevated levels of arsenic (76 ppb). The information on
the well was sent to the CDC for review. The letter states:
The Centers for Disease Control has reviewed this data and concluded
that the water is suitable for consumption over the short term.
However, due to the historical arsenic fluctuations in your well water
we recommend that you continue using an alternative water supply
for drinking purposes.
The next day, October 10, 1985, this same official wrote to the same resident:
... EPA and DER conducted sampling of drinking water wells adjacent
to the site to determine if conditions warrant emergency action. Your
well was included in this sampling. The results of the sampling were
sent to the Centers for Disease Control (CDC).
Based on CDC's review of the data I have concluded that at this time
groundwater contamination at the site poses no immediate and significant
risk of harm to human life or health. Therefore, no EPA funded emergency
action is justified. Cleanup actions will remain the responsibility of the
Superfund Remedial Program.
We spoke with the resident who received these letters who told us that
Whitmoyer stopped providing water in 1984. f-urthei, EPA knew they did not have
an alternative water supply because the removal reouest stated that the PRPs hac!
16
-------
Whitmoyer Laboratories Case Study
stopped providing bottled water. The residents told us that they had to supply
their own water from 1984 through 1987, when EPA began providing bottled
water.
Actual Water Line Installation
The 1986 Superfund Amendments revised the threshold for a removal action
from, "potential risk of harm" to an "imminent and substantial risk." Further, the
MCL for arsenic was reduced from 50 ppb to 15 ppb. In light of these changes, in
March 1987, PADER again requested that EPA consider Whitmoyer for a possible
removal action.
According to the On-Scene Coordinator's (OSC) Report, the primary
concerns surrounding Whitmoyer Laboratories in 1987, were arsenic contamination
in five residential wells, organic contamination in 12 wells, and an increase of
arsenic contamination by 900 percent in the nearby Union Canal. On December
17, 1987, a removal request to extend the water line to the affected residents was
approved. Until the water line was installed, EPA provided bottled water to the
affected residents.
We found that some of the residents who received the water line were the
same ones that were considered in 1985. Further, some residents receiving the
water line did not have contamination that exceeded the established risk level. We
discussed this issue with EPA officials who stated that because of the history and
extent of contamination at this site, they chose to take a conservative approach
when installing the water line. Further, according to EPA officials, "the region had
a well founded belief that there was a significant likelihood that the levels might
fluctuate and increase to the established risk level."
We found indications in the site files that Congressional, community, and
news media interest in the site may have also influenced the initiation of the 1987
water line extension. While we could find no evidence in the site files, a couple of
residents told us that they believed the primary reason for the water line action
stemmed from a young man in the town being diagnosed with a brain tumor.
These residents believed the brain tumor was somehow related to the arsenic
contamination. This sparked community, news media and Congressional concern
over the progress of site cleanup. Additional indications could be found in the
weekly pollution reports:
-- Media interest in the site is high, as several newspaper articles
have recently appeared expressing concern about the quality of
around wste: in the eree surrounding the Whitmoyet facility.
17
-------
Whitmoyer Laboratories Case Study
- EPA [staff] expressed concern about the current status of
available uncontaminated drinking water for residents at the
site, in light of high current media interest.
-- Congressional and news media interest is high due to local
community concerns involving contaminated groundwater and
children entering the site through a hole in the fence.
- The existing health threat, as described in the ATSDR health
consultation memo, in addition to the public and political implications
of citizens purchasing their own bottled water due to chemical
contaminated wells, dictates that the concurrence chain review be
kept to a minimum.
On March 17, 1988, an EPA contractor submitted a preliminary engineering
design report for the water line extension. EPA officials objected to the design
because it exceeded the minimum requirements necessary to supply water to the
affected residents. They claimed that the design was too costly and was beyond
the scope of the Agency's authority because it included provisions for future
development. In May 1988, EPA regional officials revised the design and limited
the extension to that which was necessary to provide potable water to the
affected residents. The local water authority refused to sign a letter of intent for
ownership and maintenance of the redesigned system. They demanded the
system meet their specifications and provide provisions for future expansion.
From July of 1988, through September of 1990, EPA and the local water
authority debated the following issues:
-- The size of the water main: The local water authority wanted EPA
to pay for a water line large enough for future growth while EPA
claimed that CERCLA funds could only pay for a water line large
enough to supply the current residents;
- Who would take over ownership and maintenance: EPA wanted the
local water authority to take over, while the water authority would
not if the line did not meet their specifications;
-- Specifications for the water pressure and water flow: The water
authority claimed that the EPA design did not meet fire protection
specifications for water pumping stations.
18
-------
Whitmoyer Laboratories Case Study
To resolve the debate, EPA designed two systems: one for potable water
for existing residences {Alternative I); and one for potable water for existing
residences plus fire water and future expansion {Alternative II). The water
authority chose alternative II and agreed to pay the difference in construction
costs. Finally on September 13,1990, agreement on the water line extension was
reached.
Concurrent to the water line debate, EPA and two PRPs successfully
negotiated an agreement that the PRPs would install the water line. On September
28, 1990, EPA and two PRPs signed an Administrative Order By Consent.
According to PRP representatives, the water line which was installed was larger
than either of the alternatives proposed, and cost approximately $1.5 million. The
PRPs completed installation of the water line, and hook-ups for a total of 24
residents on October 15, 1992, approximately 5 years after the removal action
started.
We discussed the water line installation with the affected residents.
According to most of the residents, they were very pleased with the water line
once it was installed. However, many commented that it took an extraordinary
amount of time to get it installed. Further, once the water line was installed the
residents began receiving water bills. According to several residents, they did not
think it was fair that they had to pay a water bill when in the past they did not
have one. Most residents stated that the PRPs, being the ones who contaminated
the water to begin with, should be responsible for picking up their water bills.
According to EPA officials, this was not considered during the negotiations.
Duration of Removal Action # 1
Removal Start to PRP Takeover
2.8 yrs
Actual PRP Water line installation
2.0 yrs
Total Duration Removal # 1
4.8 yrs
Potential Vault Removal
As mentioned earlier, during 1964 and 1965, Rohm and Haas constructed a
large cement vault to dispose of highly contaminated arsenic waste and other
hazardous wastes. The vault was built partially underground along the banks of
the Tulpehocken Creek and measures 123 feet long by 83 feet wide by 12 feet
deep. The vault was filled to capacity and was estimated to contain nearly 4
million poundr of solublf arsenic and other hazardous. wastes.
19
-------
Whitmoyer Laboratories Case Study
View of barrels and other debris contained in the vault
View of contractor personnel opening t section ol the vault.
20
-------
Whitmoyer Laboratories Case Study
View of upper vault wastes being excavated for on-site storage.
View o1 the Union Canal and its proximity tc the Whitmoyer Laboratories site.
21
-------
Whitmoyer Laboratories Case Study
In 1978, Rohm and Haas sold the facility to Beecham Inc. From 1978 to
1982, increasing concern over the stability of the vault prompted Whitmoyer
personnel to gather samples from the nearby Tulpehocken Creek. Forty pairs of
samples were gathered, 36 of which showed an increase in arsenic concentration
between the water that enters Whitmoyer Laboratories property and the same
water after it passes the vault. The overall results showed a 900 percent increase
in the average arsenic concentrations in the Tulpehocken Creek. Further,
Whitmoyer Laboratories personnel concluded that the most likely source of the
contamination was the vault because the arsenic wastes within the vault were
soluble while the arsenic wastes from the old lagoons were relatively insoluble. In
1983, Whitmoyer Laboratories began making plans to remove the vault and its
contents. However, it never implemented this removal.
In 1984, PADER inspected the Whitmoyer site. According to an incident
notification report, PADER recommended that EPA perform a removal action
because the storage vault was leaking and had been since the 1970's. We found
no record of any response to this recommendation.
Again, on March 16, 1987, PADER requested that a removal action be
initiated in accordance with the new requirements in the 1986 Superfund
Amendments. The request stated that the vault removal should be the first priority
at the site.
...The quantity of arsenic contaminated waste in the vault is
estimated at about 4500 cubic yards. Beginning in March 1979, a
variety of sampling surveys were initiated by Whitmoyer Labs' staff to
determine if the storage vault was leaking. In 1981, the results of the
sampling and inspections by Whitmoyer Labs' personnel indicated that
the concrete walls of the vault were cracked, and personnel expressed
concern that the arsenic wastes may be coming into contact with a
fluctuating groundwater table. A 1984 inspection by DER inspectors
reported that hairline cracks were visible along some of the vaults
outside walls. Although the integrity of the vault was in question and
a removal action had been recommended and planned by Whitmoyer
Labs' personnel in 1983, it was never implemented.
PADER recommended that the concentrated arsenic wastes in the vault,
"...be removed at once, since available evidence indicates that the integrity of the
22-year-old structure is no longer sound. A removal action is clearly justified and
could be accomplished quickly and efficiently in a cost-effective manner. This
would also eliminate one current potential source of the groundwater
contamination at Whitmoyer Labs."
22
-------
Whitmoyer Laboratories Case Study
In June 1987, EPA's Emergency Response Team (ERT) began examining and
sampling the vault for possible removal action. More soil samples were taken in
the vicinity of the vault. They showed arsenic concentration levels as high as
28,400 ppm in the vicinity of the vault, and arsenic concentration levels as high as
670,000 ppm2 (67 percent) within the vault. On October 23, 1987, the OSC-
obtained prices for the removal of the vault's contents. Estimates for removing
approximately 4500 cubic yards of vault waste, plus an additional 2000 cubic
yards of contaminated concrete and soil, totaled about §3 million.
In a November 1987 meeting in Region 3 the OSC described the significance
of the analytical data that indicated arsenic was migrating out of the vault and said
the most immediate threat to the environment from the Whitmoyer facility
appeared to be the state of decay of the vault. Later, on December 18, 1987,
(one day after the removal request for the water line was approved) the OSC and
the RPM concurred that the removal of the vault contents should be combined with
the ongoing water line removal action. According to an EPA document, "a speedy
removal of the arsenic in the vault would remove the threat of a catastrophic
release of arsenic into the Tulpehocken Creek." The RPM for the site indicated
that the removal of the vault contents would be clearly consistent with future
remedial actions at the site. Accordingly, the OSC began making preliminary
arrangements for the preparation of an additional funding request for the vault
removal.
On February 1, 1988, another meeting was held to discuss options for the
vault removal. According to EPA files, one ERT official questioned the evidence
supporting an immediate removal. However, the OSC and PADER representatives,
who knew the most about the site, argued that the evidence proved that the
arsenic in the vault was leaching directly into the ground water and Tulpehocken
Creek. To settle this debate, it was decided to take additional samples from the
perimeter of the vault and from the Tulpehocken Creek.
The analysis of these new samples was completed on February 18, 1988.
According to EPA files, the results indicated what was previously suspected—that
the arsenic in the vault was leaching into the surrounding soils north of the vault.
The OSC forwarded the analytical results to the ERT who then concluded that the
vault was leaking and suggested a removal action be initiated. A request for an
exemption to the $2 million limit was prepared by the OSC on March 4, 1988.
" According to the RPM, additional sample? revealed arsenic concentration.< of 12-1- percent, which i.'
believed to be more representative of actual levels.
-------
Whitmoyer Laboratories Case Study
About this same time, Rohm and Haas Company and Beecham Inc.
approached EPA and offered to conduct the vault removal and committed to
having it completed by the fail of 1988, if EPA would agree to a 50-50 mixed
funding arrangement. Again, EPA declined to enter into the mixed funding
agreement and the vault contents were not removed.
In July 1988, the OSC received a memorandum from the RPM stating that
the RI/FS contractors identified some drums that were stored on-site that might
contain explosives. The RPM requested ah emergency removal of the drums.
According to the memorandum, the drums could be considered abandoned because
the previous site owner was under State and Federal orders to remove them. On
August 22, 1988, a funding request and change of scope for a removal action was
prepared by the OSC. The request called for the stabilization of all drums and
laboratory waste on site. Funding for the drum removal was approved by the
Regional Administrator on September 21, 1988.
Once the drums were identified for potential removal action, we could not
identify any further mention of a removal action for the vault. We asked Agency
officials why the vault removal was never performed. One Agency official told us
that he did not think the vault added any more contamination than was already
present. A second official thought it was a management decision not to conduct a
removal of the vault, however, he did not know who, if anyone, made the
decision. A third official stated that because of the consistency of the
contamination (dry and flaky) he did not think the vault was leaking. However, he
did not know why the removal action did not take place. According to Agency
officials, another complicating factor in approving the removal was the
implementation and application of Land Disposal Restrictions (LDR). LDR set limits
on the concentrations of waste that can be disposed of in a land disposal facility.
Agency officials were concerned that they may not be able to meet the LDR
requirements. As will be described later, the vault is being handled under the
remedial program. As of June 1995, the vault and its contents remain at the site.
Drum Removal
As mentioned above, on September 21, 1988, an additional funding request
of $1.1 million and change of scope of work was added to the water line removal.
The request covered actions to:
-- Identify, segregate, and package laboratory reagent chemicals. Repair
structures which house the waste.
24
-------
Whitmoyer Laboratories Case Study
— Assess, sample and stabilize an estimated 800 drums of known and
unknown chemicals.
- Treat or dispose of the drums and labpack waste.
Removal activities began on November 1, 1988. Wastes removed from the
site consisted of 1414 drums and 20 one-gallon containers of hazardous
substances, including flammable and corrosive liquids, a total of 24,657 gallons of
arsenic-contaminated waste water and 630 cubic yards of waste material. A
variety of other wastes were neutralized on the site: one 55 gallon drum of
hydrazine, a small quantity of potassium metal, one container of benzoyl peroxide,
two jars of picric acid, four 8-ounce bottles of nitromethane, one gallon can of
petroleum ether, and small quantities of yellow and red phosphorous. Once these
substances were neutralized, they were also removed from the site.
According to the OSC report, disposal of substances generated at the site
posed several problems. First, due to the highly toxic nature of arsenic and its
compounds, extensive compatibility testing and research into disposal methods,
and extensive negotiations with disposal facilities were required. The testing,
research and negotiations caused the disposal phase of the project to be extended
requiring the continued monitoring and maintenance of the laboratory and the
hazardous waste staged for removal. As a result, tank leaks occurred on several
occasions. However, these leaks were quickly resolved and the disposal and
neutralization of hazardous substances, including flammable and corrosive liquids
was completed by May 7, 1991.
Duration of Drum Removal
Removal Start Date
September 21, 1988
Removal Completion Date
May 7, 1991
Total Duration
2.6 yrs |
25
-------
Whitmoyer Laboratories Case Study
As mentioned earlier, three RODs were issued for cleanup of six OUs. ROD
1 encompassed the concentrated liquids; ROD 2 covered the buildings and
structures, vault wastes, and lagoons; and ROD 3 was for the soils and sediments
and the ground water.
ROD 1, Concentrated Liquids, was the first to be completed. As stated
earlier, RD/RA enforcement negotiations were unsuccessful. Therefore, the
Agency took the lead and performed the cleanup for OU 1. As shown in Figures 3
and 4, (See pages 29 and 30) this work is complete. On the other hand, much of
the cleanup efforts for RODs 2 and 3 has only recently started and is substantially
incomplete.
Controversy over the remedy selected for OU 4 has significantly delayed
remedial action. Nearly everyone; the state, the community, the PRPs, and the
Congressional representatives have opposed on-site incineration as a remedy. The
proposed plan for these efforts was issued in April 1990. Because of concerns
over the use of on-site incineration, EPA announced, at the mandatory public
meeting, that the comment period would be extended for an additional 30 days to
allow all interested parties to comment.
- On June 12, 1990 the Jackson Township Board of Supervisors stated:
...we reviewed the records of the Whitmoyer site found in the
Myerstown library and it appears that incineration on the site will release
gases which would, in our opinion, pose a health hazard to the
community and put at risk a larger number of people than those exposed
to the danger presently at the Whitmoyer site. Therefore, we are going
on record as being opposed to the method of removal proposed by EPA
at the present time...
-- On June 15, 1990, the Honorable David Brightbill, Pennsylvania Senate,
formally opposed incineration.
-- On October 29, 1990, the Borough of Myerstown emphatically opposed
the use of incineration.
-------
Whitmoyer Laboratories Case Study
- On October 31, 1990, the Honorable Nicholas Moehlmann, Pennsylvania
House of Representatives, registered his total opposition to incineration.
...Arsenic, being an element and incapable of being broken down into
harmless components, cannot be rendered non-toxic by burning. I have
seen no study or other information which suggests that sending it up a
smokestack is safe for the surrounding population...
I urge you to discontinue consideration of incineration as an option
for this site. A decision for incineration, I believe, will create a
huge public outcry which may well deteriorate to actions in the
courts, resulting in serious delays in an extremely important
project.
PADER also objected to the use of on-site incineration. PADER wrote EPA
pursuant to the state participation provision of CERCLA. PADER did not concur
with the decision to use incineration. The letter states:
Based on current information, the Department is not convinced that
incineration is appropriate or acceptable at this facility. As a matter of
course, a waste trial burn and a subsequent risk analysis using trial
burn data should have preceded the determination of an incineration
remedy.
in response to these concerns, EPA held meetings with Congressional
Representatives and the local community to explain that the incineration proposed
by the Agency, if properly designed and operated, would not pose any significant
risk to the community surrounding the Whitmoyer site. Further, EPA agreed to
conduct test burns to ensure that the incinerator would operate as planned.
On December 17, 1990, 8 months after the proposed plan was issued, the
Regional Administrator approved ROD 2, providing for on-site incineration.
According to Agency officials, EPA had to choose on-site incineration because at
the time, there were no off-site incinerators available that could handle the wastes.
On May 23, 1991, EPA sent out Special Notice Letters providing the PRPs
an opportunity to participate in the RD/RA for ROD 2 and ROD 3. The subsequent
negotiations were successful and the consent decree was lodged on September
16, 1992. We asked Agency officials why the negotiations exceeded the 120 day
goal. They told us that because of the size of the cleanup operation, nearly $125
million, and because the negotiations were going well, they elected to extend them
in the hopes of reaching settlement with the PRPs.
2 J
-------
Whitmoyer Laboratories Case Study
PRP representatives told us they also did not agree with ROD 2 which called
for on-site incineration. As a result, the PRPs explored the possibility of locating
an off-site incinerator that could handle the wastes. On December 28, 1994, the
PRPs obtained EPA approval of an Explanation of Significant Differences (ESD)
which calls for off-site incineration of certain hazardous materials on site.
According to the RPM, he expects another ESD calling for off-site incineration of
carbon and tars from the vault to be approved in the near future. The RPM also
told us that he expects off-site incineration to be used as much as possible,
perhaps eliminating the need for any on-site incineration.
Nevertheless, delays in remedial action have occurred as a result of the
reaction to the remedy selected. The ROD was signed in December 1990, and
remedial actions under ROD 2 did not start until September 1993. The remedial
actions that have occurred through May 1995, include removing non-ha2ardous
wastes, piping and residual waste from the buildings and the demolition of
buildings and structures. According to the RPM, while both EPA and the PRPs
considered remediation of the on-site vault a high priority, the demolition of
buildings was moved ahead of the vault remediation so that treatability studies
could be conducted on the vault wastes. On October 25, 1993, full scale
excavation and on-site storage of the upper vault wastes were initiated and
excavation and treatability studies of the lower vault wastes also began.
Excavation and treatment of the lower vault wastes is scheduled to be completed
in December 1995. Treatment of the upper vault waste is estimated to be
completed in 1999, depending on the capacity of the off-site incinerator to process
the waste.
The status of all cleanup activities are summarized in Figures 3 and 4. (See
pages 29 and 30.) As of May 1995, RD/RA efforts have been completed on OU 1
and most of OU 2. While construction is estimated to be completed at the site in
the year 2001, the RPM estimates that the long term remedial actions (i.e.
groundwater pump and treat] will most likely continue until the year 2050.
28
-------
Whitmoyer Laboratories Case Study
Remedial Design Timeframes Figure 3
ROD #
OU #
Phase
RD
Start
RD
Completion
1
1
Concentrated Liquids
8/89
1/90
2
2
Non-Hazardous Debris
3/92
9/93
2
2
Piping/Residual Waste
3/92
11/94
2
2
Buildings and Structures
3/92
4/95
2
2
Hazardous Debris
3/92
7/95*
2
4
Lower Vault Sludge
3/92
8/95*
2
4
Carbon and Tar (Drums)
3/92
8/95*
2
4
Carbon and Tar (Roll Offs)
3/92
2/96*
2
4
Vault Debris
3/92
6/96*
2
4
Vault Soil
3/92
1/97*
2
5
Lagoons(**)
3/92
10/97*
3
3
Soil and Sediments (**)
3/92
1/98*
3
6
Groundwater - Initial
3/92
7/96*
3
6
Groundwater - Fullscale
10/99*
10/00*
* RPM Estimate
* * Not yet broken into phases.
29
-------
Whitmoyer Laboratories Case Study
Remedial Action Timeframes Figure 4
ROD #
OU #
Phase
RA
Start
RA
Completion -
1
1
Concentrated Liquids
2/90
12/90
2
2
Non-Hazardous Debris
9/93
2/95
2
2
Piping/Residual Waste
11/94
2/95
i 2
2
Buildings and Structures
4/95
7/95
2
2
Hazardous Debris
7/95
2/96*
2
4
Lower Vault Sludge
8/95*
12/95*
2
4
Carbon and Tar (Drums)
8/95*
9/95*
2
4
Carbon and Tar (Roll Offs)
2/96*
2/98*
2
4
Vault Debris
6/96*
9/96* I
2
4
Vault Soil
1/97*
9/99* |
2
5
Lagoons {**)
10/97*
7/98*
3
3
Soil and Sediments (**)
1/98*
3/99*
3
6
Groundwater - Initial
7/96*
9/97*
3
6
Groundwater - Fullscale
10/00*
02/01 *
* RPM Estimate
* * Not yet broken into phases.
Once the remedial cleanup actions at the site actually started we identified
little in the way of delays. However, we noted that an on-site building which was
constructed to stage hazardous waste collapsed under the weight of excessive
snow and ice causing about a six week delay. While the delay is not substantial,
we believe it is worth pointing out that some delays in site cleanups are outside of
anyone's control.
30
-------
Whitmoyer Laboratories Case Study
View of buildings contaminated with arsenic
View o1 contaminated buildinas durino demolition activities
31
-------
Whitmoyer Laboratories Case Study
View of the temporary hazardous waste storage building before it collapsed.
New hazardous waste storage building constructed to withstand harsh climates.
32
-------
Whitmoyer Laboratories Case Study
COST RECOVERY ACTIONS
EPA incurred costs of about $5.3 million conducting pre-remedial, removal,
and OU 1 remedial activities. In 1992, EPA initiated cost recovery actions against
the PRPs. EPA entered into a Consent Decree with the Whitmoyer Estate (original
site owner), calling for the estate to reimburse costs of $2.9 million plus
pay EPA 50 percent of the residual value of the Whitmoyer estate (amount to be
determined). Additionally, Rohm and Haas Company and Beecham Inc. agreed to
reimburse EPA $250,000 in past costs and agreed to conduct the RD/RA for
actions under RODs 2 and 3 which are estimated to cost about $ 124 million.
The two settlements collectively total $127.15 million and represent a 98.3
percent settlement of the United States claim. Approximately $2.15 million in past
costs remain outstanding and EPA continues seeking these costs from the
recalcitrant PRPs.
As part of the 1992 RD/RA settlement agreement, Rohm and Haas and
Beecham agreed to reimburse EPA for all future costs incurred by the Agency not
inconsistent with the National Contingency Plan. As part of this agreement, EPA.
agreed to annually bill for these costs. As of May 1995, EPA had not billed for
oversight costs for fiscal years 1993 and 1994, and Agency officials could not tell
us the total dollar amount that should be billed. We discussed this with Agency
officials who told us that a bill is being generated and will be sent out in the near
future.
CONCLUSIONS
While our review may not have captured every barrier that the Agency faced
on the site, some of the more prominent barriers did come to light. The state
spent 2 years negotiating with the PRPs to conduct the RI/FS, yet the negotiations
were unsuccessful. Rather than undertaking the Rl/FS, EPA decided to hold
another round of negotiations. Further, the negotiations for conducting the RD/RA
were also extended well beyond the Agency goals of 120 days. Although
enforcement first is an Agency policy, and the policy seeks to strike a balance
between the need for PRPs to fund cleanups versus the need to proceed
expeditiously, the actions at this site indicate that failure to abide by the Agency's
established timeline for negotiations can unduly delay site cleanup.
-------
Further, some of the residents in the community stated that they felt
abandoned by EPA. The PRPs provided water to the residents for approximately
20 years. Once the PRPs stopped providing bottled water in 1984, these residents
had to supply their own bottled water or use well water with a history of arsenic
contamination. It wasn't until 1987 that EPA made the decision to provide these
residents with bottled water until the water line was installed. Once the decision
to install the water line was made, 3 additional years were spent considering size,
capacity and other issues surrounding the water line. Once an alternative was
decided upon, it took an additional 2 years for installation.
Documentation from the site files shows that the on-site vault was leaking,
was coming into contact with the fluctuating ground water table, and was
deteriorating. The files also indicated that the vault was one of the main sources
of ground and surface water contamination. EPA became aware of this situation in
1983. In 1987, a removal action to address the vault was planned by EPA at a
cost of approximately $3 million. This removal never took place. Rather, EPA
chose to handle the vault wastes under the remedial program using on-site
incineration. The remedial action costs are currently estimated at about $18
million, due mainly to the application of additional regulatory requirements
associated with Land Disposal Restrictions, according to Agency officials. Because
of community, Congressional, state and PRP objections to the proposed remedy,
the remedial action was delayed. While actions are currently being taken to treat
and dispose of the vault waste, the question remains whether the proposed
removal action could have prevented additional contamination and provided
additional protection of human health and the environment at a significantly lower
cost.
While the remedial actions at the Whitmoyer site are underway, much of the
work on the site has yet to be completed. Much of the time, with the exception of
those removal and remedial activities mentioned, has been spent studying the site
and designing remedies. Many more years will pass before the site will be cleaned
up.
34
-------
Wasatch Chemical Case Study
WASATCH CHEMICAL CASE STUDY
SUMMARY OF BARRIERS
Site Overview
EPA listed August 1980 as the discovery date of the Wasatch Chemical site
in the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability
Information System (CERCLIS) and added a portion of the site, Lot 6, to the
National Priorities List (NPL) in 1991. Over 15 years have elapsed since the site
was identified and cleanup of the site is not yet complete. Although some actions
have been taken (the removal of drums and capping of contaminated soil), untimely
cleanup may have ultimately resulted in additional contamination and higher
cleanup costs.
Barriers Identified
Our review disclosed several barriers encountered by the Agency, which
may have resulted in a longer and more costly cleanup of the site. We identified
barriers related to the following: removals, enforcement negotiations, RPMs,
innovative technologies, site study and the weather.
First, the planned investigation and potential removal of the evaporation
pond was not implemented. Utah state officials documented evidence from 1981
to 1985 indicating that the ground water at the Wasatch Chemical site was
contaminated with toxic chemicals, many of which were probable or suspected
carcinogens. Evidence also indicated that the evaporation pond, used to contain
process wastes, was the source of this contamination. In 1985, EPA proposed
further investigation and possible removal of the evaporation pond. However,
neither action, investigation or removal of the evaporation pond, occurred. Thus,
the evaporation pond remained unaddressed until 1994, at which time remediation
of the pond began.
Second, a removal action was repeated because over 5 years had elapsed
since the initial removal and remedial cleanup had not yet started. The first
removal was conducted in 1986 to removal deteriorating drums and gas cylinders
and visibly stained dioxin-contaminated soils. This action cost approximately
$200,000. The second removal was conducted in 1991 to address the soils in the
same area as the 1986 removal action and cost approximately $70,000. If the
remedial action had been started in a more timely manner, it would not have been
necessary to perform thf seconc removal action.
35
-------
Wasatch Chemical Case Study
We also identified lengthy RI/FS negotiations as a barrier at the Wasatch
site. The first removal action was completed in June 1986; however, the RI/FS
did not start until September 1988. During this period, EPA and the State of Utah
debated the lead for the RI/FS for approximately 16 months. The state spent an
additional 12 months negotiating with PRPs regarding performance of the RI/FS".
Thus, for 2 1/2 years, there was no actual cleanup activity at the site.
The turnover of RPMs, EPA and the state, was identified as a barrier to a
more timely and cost-effective cleanup. From 1987 to the present, there were at
least six different EPA RPMs at Wasatch, two of whom were on detail from other
program offices and had no prior Superfund experience. Moreover, the State of
Utah had at least five RPMs during this time. EPA officials attribute this turnover
to resource limitations, promotions and people leaving the Agency. However,
when the site changes hands as many as six times, historical knowledge of the site
may be lost and the learning curve associated with each new RPM may add
additional time and expense to the site cleanup.
We noted that the use of an innovative technology at the Wasatch Chemical
site presented a barrier to timely and cost effective cleanup. However, it is not our
intention to discourage the use of innovative technologies, but to note that any
new process is likely to add cost and time to a cleanup.
The innovative technology, in-situ vitrification (ISV), is being used at the
Wasatch Chemical site to remediate soils and sludges contaminated with dioxins as
well as other toxic chemicals. Before implementing ISV at Wasatch Chemical, the
technology was not fully demonstrated. As expected, the operation of ISV at
Wasatch was not flawless. There were a number of incidents that added
additional time and cost to the cleanup. ISV was initially estimated to be complete
within 6 months from the first melt. It Is currently expected to take at least a year
to complete. In addition, the cost of ISV was originally estimated at §3,345,438.
However, the most recent cost estimates, projected through the end of the ISV
process, are $6,320,000. Moreover, until sampling in and around the vitrified rock
is performed, it is unclear how effective ISV has been in remediating the site.
Another barrier identified at the Wasatch Chemical site involved prolonged
site study. With the exception of 2 removal actions, 12 years have basically been
spent performing pre-remedial activities and studying the site, while only the past 3
years have involved actual remediation of the site. Thus, the site has been in the
Superfund pipeline for approximately 15 years and cleanup is not yet complete.
Finally, weather conditions were identified as a barrier to cleanup. The
landfarming portion of the remedial action was delayed tor approximately 6
months, November 1992 to April 1993, due to unfavorable weather.
36
-------
Wasatch Chemical Case Study
WASATCH CHEMICAL CASE STUDY
RACKGROUND AND SITE HISTORY
The Wasatch Chemical site is located within an industrialized corridor in Salt
Lake City, Utah. The population within a one-mile radius is approximately 5,000,
with the nearest residential area being located approximately a quarter-mile
northwest of the site. The 15-acre Wasatch property consists of all or portions of
Lots 2 through 6. Lot 6, which is an unpaved 3.7-acre area located at the north
end of the Site (see site map on p.38) was placed on the National Priorities List
(NPL) on February 11, 1991. Lot 6 contains a former concrete evaporation pond,
which was used to reduce chemical waste water to a sludge. It also contains
leach lines and an old septic tank.
For over 30 years, this site was the location of several chemical operations.
In 1958, Wasatch Chemical Company (WCC) began producing agricultural
chemicals including fertilizers and toxic pesticides. Among the chemicals produced
were chlordane, 2,4,-Dichlorophenoxyacetic acid (2,4,-D) and 2,4,5-
Trichlorophenoxyacetic acid (2,4,5-T), all of which are suspected carcinogens.
WCC continued operations until 1968, when, it was sold to Mountain Fuel Supply
Company. WCC then became a wholly-owned subsidiary of Mountain Fuel Supply
Company. In 1971, Entrada Industries was incorporated as a wholly-owned
subsidiary of Mountain Fuel and WCC was merged into Entrada. Entrada continued
to operate the WCC business as the Wasatch Chemical Division of Entrada.
Also in 1971, the Salt Lake City Health Department reported an
unauthorized waste water discharge from the Wasatch chemical plant to a drainage
ditch along 700 West Street. After determining that the waste water was
unsuitable for discharge, the Utah Water Pollution Committee requested WCC to
immediately discontinue this practice. In response, WCC proposed the
construction of an evaporation pond to contain the waste water. The plan was
approved and the pond was constructed on Lot 6 in late 1972. The evaporation
pond measured approximately 125 feet by 125 feet by 4 feet deep. Waste water
drained from chemical operations and was pumped into the evaporation pond.
WCC continued operations until 1978. At this time, Entrada Industries sold
its industrial chemical business, not including the property, to Great Western
Chemical Company. Their connection with the evaporation pond was reportedly
severed. Entrada then leered with a purchase option, the WCC property to
Huntsman-Christensen Chemical and Oil Corporpnon.
37
-------
Wasatch Chemical Site Map
Salt Lake City, UT
itfftsf i#
«*¦***¦*
num »
««*•
Lot 5
Lot 4
Lot 3
lot *
i t«t«*
gO
00
Moonctt taoae iunw uiim
tiMcum, Mt iw
CXitlined area represents the portion of the site listed on the NPL
|!1C MVNftAllV
*=«£:
ictOiVAir
l«UIO» CMtMCii K!(
i*«c art. viMf
ffTC H*P
«,l. CWWHOwKlllM. *>«ftcno«
-------
Wasatch Chemical Case Study
Aerial view of Wasatch Chemical Site (1995)
(The area highlighted is the Lot 6 portion of the site)
3S
-------
Wasatch Chemical Case Study
As part of the lease agreement, Huntsman-Cbristensen assumed
esponsibiiity for cleaning up the evaporation pond. In 1980, Huntsman-
"hristensen submitted an application to the State Department of Health for the in-
)lace storage of the contents of the evaporation pond. In February 1980, the -
State Department of Health granted the permit. The permit required that the waste
>e dry, no more material be discharged to the evaporation pond and that wells be
nstalled around the pond and sampled annually. The evaporation pond, which
:ontained approximately eight inches or 1200 cubic yards of sludge, was backfilled
with layers of cobble rock, sand, and clay, and capped with a concrete slab.
40
-------
Wasatch Chemical Case Study
Chronology of EPA Superfund Involvement
Wasatch Chemical Site
Timeline of Cleanup Activities
D i sco ve ry/ P A/SI
Removal 1
NPL Listing
RI/FS
Removal 2
Remedial Design
Remedial Action
H
111111111 i 1111111 u I i i ill i ill 11111111 n 111111111111111111111 m 1111 f n 11111 In 111 n
State Lead
EPA Lead
PRP Lead
Note 1: Physical removal activities during Removal 1 were completed within approximately 2 months.
However, the removal program was responsible for oversight of the temporary dioxin-storage
facility until the remedial program assumed responsibility for the site in June 1988. Thus,
the die remained the responsibility of the removal program from March 1986 until June
1988.
Note 2: Phase I of the RA is complete, Phase II is scheduled for completion by 10/95 and Phase III
is scheduled for construction completion by the end of calendar year 1995. However, the
groundwater treatment system included in Phase III will be in operation until at least the
year 2000. See p.51 for additional information.
Source:
EPA data depicted in calendar year
41
-------
Wasatch Chemical Case Study
SITE DISCOVERY. pREUMINARY ASSESSMENTS.
AND SITE INSPECTIONS
The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, Liability
Information System (CERCLIS) lists August 1980 as the site discovery date for the
Wasatch Chemical site. Available documentation did not indicate by whom or
when the site was discovered. Therefore, we could not verify the date listed in
CERCLIS. However, a Utah official said that EPA directed the state in 1980 to
identify potential Superfund sites and Utah identified the Wasatch Chemical site at
that time.
On April 15, 1981, EPA prepared Preliminary Assessment (PA) and Site
Inspection (SI) reports for the Wasatch Chemical site. The information in the
reports was based on an inspection conducted by Utah State Health Department
officials on January 29, 1979, and ground water sampling results obtained from
Huntsman-Christensen Corporation in March 1981. The ground water samples
were collected from the monitoring wells installed around the encased evaporation
pond. According to a Utah official, these sample results were the initial indicatiorr
that the ground water around the evaporation pond was contaminated. However,
both the PA and SI reports completed in 1981 concluded that there were no
apparent serious problems at the site. Available documentation did not indicate
the reason for the discrepancy between the sampling results and the conclusion
reached on the PA and SI reports.
Jn 1982, Utah officials inspected the site and completed a second PA report.
The report stated, "Leakage has been allegedly detected. Contamination of
groundwater has been documented, although the extent of the problem is
unknown." This second PA report recommended that the site be given high
priority for a site inspection. The report was transmitted to EPA on February 23,
1984. The transmittal memo reiterated the recommendation contained in the PA
report "that action on this site be continued, and that it be given a high priority."
Utah officials conducted an SI and submitted a report to EPA on July 30,
1984. According to the SI report, ground water samples collected beneath the
evaporation pond contained concentrations of many toxic chemicals believed to be
stored in the evaporation pond. The state also submitted a preliminary Hazard
Ranking System (HRS) score with this report of 51.02. This ranking qualified the
site for listing on the NPL.
42
-------
Wasatch Chemical Case Study
A third SI was conducted by Utah officials in June 1985. Based on
information gathered during the 1984 and 1985 Sis, a second HRS scoring
package was submitted to ERA on October 9, 1985. The HRS package included a
score of 63.31; however, this score was based on incomplete; laboratory analyses
and results. After additional results were submitted, the site was assessed a final
HRS score of 66.43. This SI report concluded that the surface stream along 700
West Street, the street running parallel to the site, and the ground water
underlying the facility had been affected, and that the site exhibited a high
contamination potential.
REMOVAL ACTIONS
Potential Removal of Evaporation Pond Contents
Before capping the evaporation pond in 1980, Huntsman-Christensen had
the sludge sampled to characterize the waste. The hazardous substances
contained in the pond included arsenic, cadmium, lead, and 2-4-D. In 1981 and
1982, in accordance with the provisions of the pond closure plan, Huntsman-
Christensen collected samples from the four monitoring wells installed around the
evaporation pond. Results from these samples indicated that many of the
hazardous substances believed to be in the evaporation pond were detected in the
ground water.
In June 1984, Utah officials collected ground water samples from the
monitoring wells beneath the evaporation pond. The analysis of these samples
revealed that concentrations of some of the contaminants associated with the
evaporation pond were present in the ground water. The following table describes
the concentrations of the contaminants that exceeded the corresponding EPA
Drinking Water Standard. In addition to those contaminants included in the table,
there were three other contaminants present which did not exceed the standards.
43
-------
Wasatch Chemical Case Study
June 5, 1984 Sample Results of Evaporation Pond Wells
Concentrations in //g/l (micrograms/liter)
Contaminant
EPA Drinking
Water
Standard
East
Well
West
Well
South
Well
North
Well
Arsenic
50
350
430
150
160
Cadmium
10
28
15
13
13
Lead
50
1640
960
500
290
2,4,5-TP
10
.08
142.1
1.4
.6
2,4-D
100
.4
1.25
4.8
"10.4 |
T richloroethylene
27
5.1
35.7
42.3
2
T etrachloroethy lene
8
No
Data
314.7
10.6
No
Data
lource: Table 1, EPA Study Plan, February 19, 1985
The July 1984 SI report, summarized the site conditions as follows:
As the Huntsman-Christensen pond may be presenting a serious
potential hazard to an important municipal well and is releasing toxic
and carcinogenic compounds to the local ground and surface waters,
it is felt that further CERCLA action there should be given a high
priority. While at this point it is too early to say just what dangers it
really has created or what measures will be required to correct the
situation, it appears likely that removal will be the final outcome.
As a result of the state's sampling information, EPA, the Technical Assistance
Team (TAT), and the state met to discuss potential removal actions. In a
November 30, 1984 memo, EPA's Emergency Response Branch (ERB) Chief
indicated that the main concern at the site was the covered concrete pond and the
apparent leakage of materials from the vault into ground water. The Chief, ERB,
indicated that the evaporation pond needed to be sampled and that a removal
action may be necessary if the situation was determined to pose a threat to human
health or the environment.
44
-------
Wasatch Chemical Case Study
In order to further assess the threats posed by the evaporation pond, the
On-Scene Coordinator (OSC) prepared a site study plan in February 1985. The
plan described the condition of the evaporation pond as follows:
The source of on-site contamination is believed to be the vault
[evaporation pond]... Visually, several cracks appear in the walls of
the vault and the cap-wall joints appear to be loose. The gas-vent
pipes contain water above elbow joints, indicating that the sludge,
which was supposedly dry or dehydrated when the cap was built,
may now be saturated or submerged.
The plan proposed sampling of ground and surface waters, soil and deteriorating
drums which had been previously discovered on Lot 6.
In May 1985, the OSC completed a draft Action Memorandum for an
immediate removal action. The purpose was to determine the extent of ground
water and surface contamination and to possibly remove the source of
contamination, which was believed to be the evaporation pond. Further, the memo
indicated that there were several private wells near the evaporation pond, which
were believed to be used for industrial purposes only. However, no surface water
or drinking water wells, either private or municipal, had been sampled to determine
the extent of off-site contamination. The memo also mentioned that, "no Federal,
state, local, or privately sponsored activities to abate the threat at the site has yet
been undertaken." The cost of the removal activities was estimated at
approximately $70,000.
According to a TAT memo, on May 8, 1985, the Region 8 Office of Regional
Counsel (ORC) reviewed the draft Action Memo and conditions at the site and
determined that "only the 60 drums and carboys stored on-site constituted an
immediate threat, and, therefore, a CERCLA Section 106 Administrative Order
could not be issued for the removal of the contents of the vault since the sampling
plan would not adequately identify the source of contamination." Thus, the
evaporation pond was neither investigated nor removed at this time.
4b
-------
Wasatch Chemical Case Study
Visible crack in the cap of the evaporation pond {1985)
Stain around crack in cap of the evaporation pond (1985)
46
-------
Wasatch Chemical Case Study
Removal of Drums
After the ORC determined that only the drums constituted an immediate
threat, a new draft Action Memorandum was completed. State officials took ~
samples in June 1985 and confirmed that the drums and their contents posed an
imminent threat to human health and the environment. In December 1985, state
officials held several meetings with the potentially responsible parties (PRPs)
regarding the removal of the drums and gas cylinders. In January 1986, after
attempts to prompt the PRPs to conduct a removal action failed, the State of Utah
filed a complaint in Federal District Court seeking an order to require the PRPs to
undertake an immediate removal action. Three days later, on January 13, 1986,
state officials requested EPA to initiate immediate removal of the drums and gas
cylinders.
In March 1986, EPA initiated the removal action at the Wasatch Site. The
drums were staged, sampled and overpacked. After this was complete,
contaminated wooden pallets and visually stained soils on and adjacent to the
drum storage area were overpacked. An area of stained soil approximately eight
feet by nine feet to a depth of two inches was excavated from the storage area.
Samples of excavated soils and of the newly exposed ground surface within the
cavity were collected for analysis. The excavated area was backfilled with clean
dirt and on June 4, 1986, removal crews demobilized. This removal action cost
about $200,000.
An OSC memo discussed the analytical results of samples collected beneath
the excavated soil. The samples contained tectrachlorodibenzo-p-dioxins (TCDD),
commonly known as dioxins, at concentrations of 21.487 parts per billion (ppb).
The cleanup standard at that time was 1 pbb. The OSC determined that all drums,
where TCDD analytical detection limits exceeded 1.0 ppb, would be placed in
temporary storage on-site. However, the unexcavated soils, which contained
concentrations of dioxins in excess of 20,000 times the cleanup standard, were
left on-site covered by clean dirt.
The OSC told us that the removal program was aware that the remaining soil
was contaminated. However, the removal program assumed the remedial program
would be addressing the site in approximately 18 months. Therefore, they
believed that the placement of clean dirt over this portion of the site was
sufficient. When asked about the protectiveness of the clean dirt, the OSC
responded that it is designed to protect anyone walking through the soil; however,
it is not designed to protect the underlying aquifer.
47
-------
Wasatch Chemical Case Study
Only a year later, the OSC was considering another removal action. A June
1987 memo from the OSC stated, "further removal actions or 'housekeeping type'
measures were justified and could be taken at the site to further insure site
stability until remedial actions had run their course (i.e., RI/FSK" However, based
on our review of the site files, it does not appear that these additional removal
actions or "housekeeping" measures were pursued at this time. Moreover, as a
result of negotiations between EPA and the State of Utah regarding the lead and
the state and the PRPs regarding the remedial investigation and feasibility study,
the remedial program did not assume responsibility for the site until 1988.
In August 1990, as part of the "Make Sites Safe Initiative"1 and after the
remedial investigation (Rl) started, the removal program staff revisited the site to
evaluate the actions taken in 1986. Specifically, samples were collected from
around the backfill area, from the backfill area itself, and from underneath the
backfill. It was determined that an additional removal action would be necessary
to stabilize this area of the site. According to a March 12, 1991 Action
Memorandum:
...the surface soil around the backfill area contained up to 212 ppb
2,3,7,8 TCDD. The two samples collected from immediately
underneath the backfill through borings four inches in diameter
contained 50.7 and 403 ppb 2,3,7,8 TCDD. The backfill had eroded
to one-half inch thickness in places, apparently due to repeated
vehicular and foot traffic across the backfill, settling, or erosion.
Unless measures are taken before remedial action to contain the
dioxin at issue, ongoing contaminant release from the DSA (drum
storage area) can be expected, possibly exposing to that
contamination any visitor entering the Lot 6 portion of the Wasatch
Chemical Site.
Therefore, on June 12, 1991, approximately 5 years after the first removal, a time-
critical removal action was initiated to cap and secure the dioxin-contaminated
soils. The cap consisted of placing a liner over the area, which was then staked
down with fence posts and secured with sand bags. No soil was removed from
this area of the site. This removal action was estimated to cost approximately
$70,000.
1 Tin "Make Sitej Safe Initiative' w introduced to reevaluate sites where EPA had performed
previous response actions to ensure the actions remained protective of human health and the en\nronrnem. This
initiative was prompted by the slow response of the remedial program in addressing sites..
48
-------
Wasatch Chemical Case Study
NATIONAL PRIORITIES LIST
In February 1986, Region 8 officials recommended the entire Wasatch site
be proposed for listing. After a debate over listing the entire site or just Lot 6, EPA
Headquarters proposed listing only Lot 6 in January 1987.
In March 1987, comments were received from the state and the PRPs. Utah
officials supported listing the entire site; the PRPs requested the entire site be
dropped from NPL consideration. EPA Headquarters officials were reluctant to list
the entire site because of conflicts between CERCLA and Resource Conservation
and Recovery Act (RCRA). Apparently, a new policy was being developed where
lot 6 would be under CERCLA and lots 2 through 5 would be under RCRA. They
were reluctant to list the site before the policy was finalized. Also, in October
1988, EPA's contractor reviewing the HRS package posed several questions
regarding the state's documentation. However, it was not until March 15,1990,
approximately 17 months later, that the NPL Listing Coordinator forwarded the
questions to the state. In April 1990, state officials informed EPA that the
documentation supporting the scoring package had been destroyed. State officials
suggested using the data obtained during the removal action. However, according
to EPA officials the data collected during the Rl was of higher quality and
therefore, it was used to score the site. On January 11, 1991, approximately 4
years after proposal of the site, lot 6 of the Wasatch Chemical site was listed in
the NPL.
REMEDIAL INVESTIGATION/FEASIBILITY STUDY
In May 1986 EPA began considering whether the Wasatch Chemical site
should be classified as a federal or state-lead site. Officials were divided on the
issue, and no decision was made at the time. In February 1987, Utah officials
requested a letter from EPA that would formally give the state the lead for the
remedial investigation and feasibility study (RI/FS) at the site. EPA responded that
the state would have to submit an application for a cooperative agreement before a
final decision regarding the lead could be made. The state eventually did so, and'
EPA officials again debated the issue among themselves in the summer of 1987.
In September 1987, EPA agreed to allow Utah officials to take the lead on the
RI/FS.
The State of Utah then entered into negotiations with the PRPs regarding
performance of the RI/FS. Entrada Industries, the primary PRP at the site,
proposed c mixed fundinc careermen!, which would sllow them to conduct 100
percern o1 the RI/FS, but only pey tor 50 percem of the cosu. EPA Headquarters
49
-------
Wasatch Chemical Case Study
would not approve a mixed funding agreement. However, in September 1988, a
partial consent decree between the State of Utah and Entrada Industries was
executed. In June 1988, conflict of interest issues arose regarding the contractor
Entrada Industries had selected to conduct the RI/FS. Therefore, Entrada Industries
had to find a replacement contractor. In September 1988, over 2 years after the
first removal action, Entrada Industries assumed responsibility for conducting the
RI/FS. The other PRP active in negotiations, Huntsman-Christensen Corporation,
requested a de minimis settlement, which was granted.
In March 1990, Entrada completed the Rl. The Rl identified elevated
concentrations of chemicals in the following areas of the site: the process
drainage system, yard drain system, the septic system and the former evaporation
pond. The chemicals of concern included pesticides, herbicides, volatile organic
compounds (VOCs}, base/neutral and acid extractables, and dioxins. Elevated
concentrations of the same chemicals were also found in soils and VOCs were
detected in the ground water.
The FS was delayed due to disagreements between EPA and Entrada
Industries regarding the Endangerment Assessment. Entrada Industries conducted
the endangerment assessment and concluded that there were no significant current
risks at the site, particularly related to the ground water. However, according to
discussions with the EPA remedial project manager, EPA and the state believed
that Entrada conducted the risk assessment incorrectly. In addition, EPA officials
stated that Entrada fought for months to use calculation methods that understated
the risk. Thus, EPA requested that Entrada take the necessary actions to revise
the assessment. Entrada eventually agreed to do additional ground water
investigations and the issue was resolved. When asked about the problems with
the endangerment assessment, Entrada officials stated that they had to be
concerned with tort claims that may arise as a result of risk assessments that
included high numbers. The FS was issued on August 22, 1990.
EPA issued the Proposed Plan regarding the remedial action alternatives
considered for the site in October 1990 for public comment. EPA only received
limited comments, which was indicative of the level of public interest and
involvement in this site. The comments were reviewed and incorporated into the
Record of Decision (ROD), which the Regional Administrator signed on March 29,
1991, approximately 11 years after the site was discovered.
50
-------
Wasatch Chemical Case Study
REMEDIAL DESIGN
The ROD prescribed remedial action to occur in three phases: (1) land -
farming of hydrocarbon contaminated soils, (2) in-situ vitrification (ISV) treatment
of soils, sludges and dioxin removal wastes, and (3) ground water pumping and
treating using air stripping. The following chart illustrates the actual timeframes
for the remedial design.
Timeframes for Remedial Design Activities
1 Remedial Design Phase
Start Date
Completion Date
| Landfarming
9/30/91
10/16/92
ISV
9/30/91
9/10/93
Ground water Treatment
. 9/30/91
3/8/95 |
REMEDIAL ACTION ACTIVITIES
The remedial action began in October 1992. The first phase, landfarming,
was completed in January 1994. The other two phases, ISV and ground water
treatment, are ongoing. The following chart illustrates the actual start and
completion dates for each phase.
Schedule of Remedial Action Activities
Remedial Activity
Start Date
Completion Date
Landfarming
10/16/92
1/19/94
ISV
11/23/94
Planned completion
10/95
Ground Water Treatment2
10/11/94
Unknown at this time
2 Construction completion of the ground water treatment system is scheduled to be complete by the end
of calendar year 1995. However, the system will be in operation until at least the year 2000.
51
-------
Wasatch Chemical Case Study
Laridfarmine
The first phase involved landfarming of contaminated soils. During this
process, approximately 1000 cubic yards of soil contaminated with toluene and
xylene were excavated from an area between buildings K and M as shown on the
site map on page 38. Excavated soils were spread over an asphalt area on the site
and remediated by aeration and enhanced biodegradation. The landfarming was
delayed approximately 6 months, November 1992 to April 1993, due to weather-
related unfavorable work conditions. Landfarming was completed in January
1994. Samples of the remediated soil were collected. Soils which met cleanup
standards were used as backfill. The soils exceeding cleanup levels were placed in
and over the evaporation pond for final remediation during ISV.
ISV
The second phase involved a new and innovative technology, ISV. ISV is
used tamelt wastes, soils and sludges in place. The waste is bound in a glassy,
solid mass, which is resistant to leaching. During the ISV process, electrodes are
inserted into the soil to the desired treatment depth {7-8 feet at Wasatch). Heat
from the high current of electricity passing through the electrodes creates a melt.
The soils and/or sludge are heated to temperatures in the range of 3,000 to 3,600
degrees fahrenheit. As the melt grows downward and outward, it destroys the
organic components. When the electric current ceases, the molten mass cools and
solidifies. A hood placed over the processing area provides confinement for the
combustion gases, drawing the gases into an off-gas treatment system.
The effectiveness of the ISV technology has been questioned. PRC
Environmental Management, Inc., an EPA contractor, reported on the use of ISV at
the Wasatch Chemical site. The report stated that, "ISV is not a demonstrated or
proven reliable technology." The report mentions that a treatability study
demonstrated the feasibility of using ISV on Wasatch Chemical site soils; however,
several concerns were not resolved by this study. The primary concerns were (1)
the vaporization, migration, and condensation of contaminants away from the ISV
process area; (2) effectiveness of ISV in saturated soils, or below the water table;
and (3) effectiveness of the off-gas collection system. In addition, the report
stated that, "the limited experience with ISV at full scale is the basis of the
concerns because there is no history of successful use of ISV in environments
similar to the Wasatch Chemical site." As a result of a second treatability study,
EPA was able to resolve 2 of the 3 concerns raised by PRC through engineering of
the technology. However, EPA determined that the possible vaporization,
migration anc condensation oi contaminants away irom the ISV process area
52
-------
Wasatch Chemical Case Study
would have to be addressed after ISV was complete. At which time, subsequent
sampling would be performed to verify whether this occurred.
The ISV process was started in November 1994 and is being conducted over
the old evaporation pond. Contaminated wastes such as excavated soils and the
dioxin-contaminated wastes were consolidated and placed into the evaporation
pond for vitrification. This area was then covered with the soils, including those
remediated during the landfarming process. ISV will be used to reduce the
contaminant levels in the soils, sludges and dioxin wastes to levels suitable for
continued industrial use of the site. The ISV process is scheduled to be performed
in 37 melts and was originally estimated to be complete within six months of the
first melt. However, it is currently estimated to take an additional six months and
be completed by October 1995.
To date, there have been problems with several of the ISV melts at the site.
The first melt was started on November 23, 1994, and stopped on November 26,
after problems with underhood flaring and damage to the blower.
The second melt started on December 15, 1994. However, before
completion of this melt, pressurization of the hood resulted in the displacement of
a small amount of molten material from under the hood. The hood movement
caused one of the electrodes to break and fall into the melt. This caused molten
material to be ejected from the vacant electrode port. It was also reported that the
electrodes had melted through the concrete floor of the evaporation pond.
Emergency crews were dispatched and the melt was terminated.
According to the incident report, the probable cause of the incident was a
trapped bubble of water vapor that rose suddenly to the surface and caused the
displacement of molten material. This may have occurred as a result of melting
through the bottom of the pond and into the ground water table. An official
associated with cleanup activities said that melting through the bottom of the pond
may have allowed contaminants to escape into the ground water below the
evaporation pond. There were also incidents involving pressurization on the fourth,
seventh, and twelfth melts.
In addition, the Salt Lake City Health Department is concerned about the
health effects associated with the ISV incidents. We spoke with one official at the
Health Department who expressed great concern. He mentioned that some
employees, working adjacent to the Wasatch Chemical site, experienced ill effects
they believe were associated with the ISV incidents. On two occasions, both
correlating with ISV-related incidents at Wasatch, some employees experienced
burninc o1 eyes, shortness ol breath and nausea. In a letter lespondinc to these
53
-------
Wasatch Chemical Case Study
concerns, the Director of Utah's Division of Environmental Response and
Remediation provided assurance that air emissions from these incidents were
monitored and negligible releases of contaminants were detected. Agency offjcials
also indicated that they were satisfied with the quality of the air monitoring of
these incidents. However, another person involved with the cleanup work at the
Wasatch site stated that the quality of air monitoring at the site is extremely poor.
EPA officials expressed confidence that the ISV technology is working at the
Wasatch Chemical site; however, the overall effectiveness of the technology at the
site is yet to be determined. Upon completion of ISV, sampling is planned in and
around the vitrified rock to ensure that the contaminated wastes were effectively
treated.
Ground Water
Phase three involves pumping and treating of ground water using an air
stripper. The goal is to reduce the levels of contaminants found in the shallow
portions of the aquifer by 50 percent within the first 5 years of remediation. The
ground water pump and treat system started operating on an incremental basis in
October 1994. Thie system will not run on a continuous basis until the ISV
treatment is complete. At some point, yet to be determined, the ground water will
be pumped and treated for 5 consecutive quarters, at which time it will be
evaluated to determine if the contamination is being reduced. Based on results
obtained at that point, pumping and treating may continue for up to 5 years. The
Agency will, at that time, have to determine if it is technically practicable to
achieve the 50 percent reduction of ground water contamination.
54
-------
Wasatch Chemical Case Study
Hood used to cover ISV treatment area and collect off-gases (1995)
Electrodes inserted into the soil to create a melt (1995)
55
-------
Wasatch Chemical Case Study
Vitrified rock after completion of ISV (1995)
56
-------
Wasatch Chemical Case Study
RPM Turnover
Entrada Industries is conducting remedial activities at the Wasatch Chemical
site, and EPA and State of Utah remedial project managers (RPMs) are overseeing
the activities. Since 1987, there have been at least six EPA RPMs at the Wasatch
Chemical site, including two RPMs detailed from other EPA program offices. Two
of these RPMs had no background in the Superfund program. We asked an EPA
official how someone could be expected to effectively manage a Superfund site
with no prior experience in the program. He stated that, at this site specifically, it
was not a problem because one of the detailed RPMs "was working with a
knowledgeable contractor." In addition, there have been at least 5 state RPMs
during this time. Entrada Industry officials expressed concern about the turnover
of RPMs at Wasatch. An Entrada official told us that each time a new RPM was
assigned, they (Entrada) were responsible for the costs associated with that RPM's
learning curve. We asked one forme/ EPA RPM, based on his experience, how
long it generally took to become familiar with a site after being assigned. He
stated that it took approximately 6 months to learn about the site and become
comfortable with managing site activities. According to EPA officials, there were a
number of reasons for the RPM turnover at Wasatch, some of which included
resource limitations, promotions and people leaving the Agency.
COST RECOVERY ACTIONS
From October 1985 to September 1990, EPA incurred costs for response
actions including a removal action and oversight of the RI/FS. Therefore, on March
29, 1991, EPA issued a Special Notice and Demand for Payment in the amount of
$483,035 to Entrada Industries. This amount was later revised, to $418,956. On
September 27, 1991, Entrada paid the revised amount.
Also, in September 1991, EPA and the State of Utah entered into a Consent
Decree (CD) with Entrada Industries for performance of the RD/RA work at the
Wasatch Chemical site. In accordance with the CD, EPA agreed to provide Entrada
Industries annual billings of oversight and response costs associated with the
agreement. However, it was not until 3 years later, on November 1, 1994, that
EPA submitted a bill to Entrada Industries for the period October 1, 1990 to
December 31, 1993 in the amount of $792,883. As a result, Entrada disputed the
billing based on the provision in the CD which requires EPA to submit annual
billings. EPA and Entrada attempted to resolve this matter through an informal
dispute resolution process The dispute is currently beinc negotiated through a
lormsl dispute resolution process anc remains unresolved.
57
-------
Wasatch Chemical Case Study
During December 1994 discussions with Entrada, EPA agreed to provide
billings on a yearly basis beginning in calendar year 1995. As agreed upon, EPA
submitted a billing for the period of January 1, 1994 to December 31, 1994, on
May 9, 1995.
CONCLUSIONS
Although actions were taken to conduct some site cleanup at the Wasatch
Chemical site, our review disclosed several barriers encountered by the Agency,
which may have resulted in a longer and more costly cleanup of the site.
For example, because EPA did not address the evaporation pond until 1994,
it is possible that toxic contaminants could have been leaking into the ground
water for as many as 14 years (1981 - 1994).
Also, there were two removal-actions completed to address the same area
of the site. The first removal was completed in 1986, It was almost 2 years until
the remedial program assumed responsibility for the site and another 4 years
before remedial cleanup began. Therefore, an additional removal action was
completed in 1991 to readdress the dioxin-contaminated soils that were subject to
the 1986 removal. Thus, had the remedial action been initiated in a more timely
manner, a second removal action would not have been necessary.
After the 1986 removal action and until the RI/FS was negotiated in
September 1988, there was no cleanup activity conducted at the Wasatch
Chemical site. During this period, EPA and the State of Utah spent approximately
16 months negotiating the lead for the RI/FS {May 1986 - September 1987). The
state spent an additional 12 months negotiating with the PRPs regarding the
performance of the RI/FS (October 1987 - September 1988). Therefore, for almost
2 1/2 years no actual cleanup activity occurred at the site.
Moreover, there were at least six EPA RPMs and five state RPMs at the
Wasatch Chemical site. At least two of the EPA RPMs were from other program
offices and had little or no Superfund experience. Considering the site changed
hands at least six times, there is concern that historical knowledge of the site may
be lost and the learning curve associated with each new RPM may add additional
time and expense to the site cleanup.
)
58
-------
Wasatch Chemical Case Study
Additionally, we noted that there were difficulties with the innovative
technology at the site. We acknowledge that this is anticipated and is a part of
trying something new. However, the difficulties encountered during operation-of
the technology have added time and cost to the cleanup. It appears that
completion of ISV will take at least 6 months longer than originally estimated. In
addition, it appears that ISV will cost approximately $6,320,000, which is almost
$3,000,000 more than originally estimated. Moreover, until sampling in and
around the vitrified materials is performed, the overall effectiveness of the ISV
technology cannot be determined.
With the exception of 2 removal actions, almost 12 years were spent
performing pre-remedial activities and studying the Wasatch Chemical site, while
only 3 years have involved actual remediation of the site. Thus, this site has been
in the Superfund "pipeline" for approximately 15 years and it will be several more
years before cleanup is actually complete and the site can be deleted.
59
-------
Southern Maryland Wood Treating Case Study
SOUTHERN MARYLAND WOOD TREATING CASE STUDY
SUMMARY OF BARRIERS
Site Overview
We limited our review of this site to an analysis of the events surrounding
the local community's concerns regarding the use of on-site incineration as a
cleanup remedy. We were particularly interested in learning how the Agency
reacts to a community which objects to an approved remedy and how that
ultimately affects site cleanup. While other factors at this site also delayed
cleanup, we wanted to examine how community involvement can play a role in
slowing down the decision-making and cleanup process. We included the
timeframes for the various phases of activity to provide a site chronology and for
consistency with the other two case studies.
The Southern Maryland Wood Treating (SMWT) site originally operated as a
wood treating facility from 1965 to 1978. The main chemicals used to treat wood
were creosote and pentachlorophenol (PCP). The operators of the facility disposed
of waste in unlined lagoons on the site. Hazardous wastes on the site eventually
contaminated the ground water, surface water, and a fresh water pond on the site.
Contamination was also found in a tributary west of the site which empties into
the Potomac River.
EPA discovered the site in December 1981 and added it to the National
Priorities List (NPL) in June 1986. EPA began investigating and assessing the site
in 1982 and took a number of actions to stabilize the site and mitigate the further
spread of contamination. However, partially due to community and political
pressures, work on a 95 percent-completed remedial design was halted in 1992.
EPA reexamined other alternatives and conducted a Focused Feasibility Study,
which was released in February 1995. The new Record of Decision (ROD) had not
been issued by the end of our review. Over §30 million has been expended on this
site. Although various cleanup activities have taken place on-site, the site remedy
is not operational and the site is not cleaned up.
Barriers Identified
Community involvement in the selection of a remedy to clean up a
Superfund site is an important factor to ensure community acceptance of the
remedy. During our review, we found documentation which indicated that EPA
attempted to inform the community about activity at the site. Public meetings
were held and the local paper published £ number oi articles concerning the site.
Prior to 1988, EPA received only minimal response 1rom the community. However,
60
-------
Southern Maryland Wood Treating Case Study
by 1992, community concern had increased dramatically. The community, in
general, was adamantly opposed to on-site incineration of the waste materials.
Relationships had deteriorated to the point that residents believed EPA was not
being forthright and honest. They had developed substantial mistrust of the
Agency. They further doubted EPA when the RPM could not answer technical-
questions regarding the site. The community representatives stated that the
community believed EPA tried to force them to accept on-site incineration. Later in
1992, EPA held monthly conference calls with the community to discuss possible
remedies, resulting in improved relationships.
Several EPA Region 3 officials noted that community and political pressures
slowed down the cleanup process. Even community representatives we talked
with stated their involvement probably extended cleanup efforts. The community
representatives stated that while community intervention may have slowed down
the cleanup process, the delay was worth it to obtain a safer and more effective
remedy.
fii
-------
Southern Maryland Wood Treating Case Study
SOUTHERN MARYLAND WOOD TREATING
CASE STUDY
BACKGROUND AND SITE HISTORY
The Southern Maryland Wood Treating (SMWT) facility, a wood treating
facility on the western shore of the Chesapeake Bay in Hollywood, Maryland (see
Figure 1), operated from 1965 to 1978. Approximately four acres of the property
were used to treat or process wood. Two tributaries. Brooks Run and Mcintosh
Run flow alongside the site and a pond is located on-site. Adjoining land is
primarily used for residential and agricultural purposes. About 260 residents living
within 3 miles of the site relied on wells for their drinking water.
Site Location Figure 1
' WstftineWkQC-
as
«o
62
-------
Southern Maryland Wood Treating Case Study
Creosote and pentachlorophenol (PCP) were used as preservatives to pressure-treat
wood at the SMWT facility. This process produced waste water which was
deposited in six unlined lagoons. The waste water ultimately contaminated the
soil, ground water, and surface water on the property. The contamination affected
a shallow aquifer and the on-site pond.
In 1973, officials from St. Mary's County Department of Environmental
Hygiene inspected the property and discovered a potentially serious source of
contamination. Officials in the Maryland Water Resources Administration (WRA)
conducted further inspections at the site. In 1977, WRA also sampled residential
wells which indicated low levels of creosote. In a September 1978 memorandum,
WRA reported that: {1} ground water was contaminated by phenolic waste (penta
and creosote); (2) ground water contamination had, in turn, contaminated a small
stream; (3) nearby shallow water wells showed traces of penta and creosote; and,
(4) an old, abandoned, and unsealed well posed a serious threat to a deep aquifer.
L.A. Clarke and Son, Inc., purchased the SMWT facility in 1975. In 1977,
the state issued a State Discharge Permit to SMWT, to develop a plan for site
renovation and to construct a waste water treatment facility. L.A. Clarke and Son,
Inc. was experiencing financial difficulties and closed the facility in 1978. In
1980, following a series of court actions, L.A. Clarke and Son, Inc. agreed to clean
up the site in compliance with a consent decree issued by the St. Mary's County
Court. Lagoon liquids were disposed of by spray irrigation to an adjacent wooded
area and lagoon sludges were treated (excavated, backfilled, graded). South of the
freshwater pond, a stone and straw filter fence was constructed to mitigate any
sediment and oily waste from migrating into Old Tom's Run, a tributary to
Mcintosh Run and the Potomac River.
According to documents in the administrative record file, state officials
believed the site had been stabilized. However, when EPA conducted its initial
investigation in 1982, officials found that attempts made by L.A. Clarke and Son,
Inc. to stabilize the site were not successful. In fact, the company's efforts
resulted in more widespread contamination of the topsoil with polycyclic aromatic
hydrocarbons (PAHs). The unlined lagoons were also seeping, while other site
areas were contaminated by wood treatment drippings. The ground water was
contaminated with volatile organic compounds (VOCs), PCPs, and PAHs.
Furthermore, contaminants continued to empty into the pond on the site. Further
activities would be necessary to properly clean up the site to ensure the protection
of public health and the environment.
63
-------
Southern Maryland Wood Treating Case Study
Chronology of EPA Superfund Involvement
Figure 2
SOUTHERN MARYLAND WOOD TREATING
CLEANUP TIMELINE FROM DISCOVERY
PA/SI
NPL LISTING
RJFS &c FFS
RMVL 1 Sc 2
RD 1
RA
RD 2
Source: EPA data depicted in calendar year.
IM2 1NSIM4 19M 1IN1M7 1OTO IMS 1MMI 1M7 1IM 1*M 200C
I I I I I I I 1 I I I I I I I I I 1 1 I 1 I I I I 1 I I I I I I I I I 1 I I 1 I I I I I I I I I I I I I 1 I I I I H I I I I I I I I I I I I ll I I I I I I
I
ALL ACTIONS EPA LEAD
64
-------
Southern Maryland Wood Treating Case Study
SITE DISCOVERY. PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT SITE
INSPECTIONS
THe SMWT facility was originally identified in 1973 by the St. Mary's
County Department of Environmental Hygiene. The date of EPA site discovery"was
listed in CERCLIS as December 1, 1981 (see Figure 2). A preliminary assessment
was completed by Ecology and Environment Inc., an EPA contractor, on August
22, 1982. The preliminary assessment evaluated the site risk as "low," but the
report recommended that an immediate site inspection be conducted by the Field
Investigation Team (FIT), Region 3.
Several site inspections were conducted by FIT and TAT between August
1982 and January 1985 in an effort to characterize site conditions. The Region 3
FIT contractor sampled residential wells, surface water, soil, and sediment, and
identified contamination on the site. Tests of residential wells, however, did not
find any contamination. However, the sampling results were never validated by
EPA Region 3. The January 1983 site inspection report classified the apparent
seriousness of the contamination at this site as "low."
REMOVAL ACTIONS
In January 1985, because prior samples were not validated, the On-Scene
Coordinator (OSC), the technical assistance team (TAT), and the Environmental
Response Team conducted additional site assessment sampling. Samples were
collected from on-site tanks, soil core, sediment, surface water, and monitoring
wells. This sampling verified that contamination from Polynuclear Aromatics
(PNAs) and PCPs were in surface water and sediments of the freshwater pond and
a tributary, on-site soils, and an on-site monitoring well. Tank sludge samples
were contaminated with chlorinated dibenzodioxins. Based on these results, the
OSC requested that a removal action be initiated and on March 12,1985, funding
was approved.
This was the first removal action, and it began on March 15, 1985. An
additional 350 samples were collected and analyzed on-site. Results disclosed
widespread distribution of contaminants throughout the site. The most
contaminated areas were in the former processing area, the lagoon area, and the
land treatment and spray irrigation areas. Exploratory pits were dug to characterize
waste and soil horizons and establish depths of ground water and water bearing
sands. Based on surveys of these pits, construction of an underflow dam on Old
Tom's Run was initiated
6t
-------
Southern Maryland Wood Treating Case Study
Around April 1985, straw filter fences were installed to control downstream
migrations of sediment along Old Tom's Run. In August 1985, heavy rains
destroyed the underflow dam and two of the filter fences. The underflow dam and
two filter fences were not replaced. Instead the state agreed that excavating and
securing the contaminated pond was an acceptable alternative. In January 1986,
soil was excavated from the northwestern bank of the pond. The excavated soil
was then placed onto a synthetic liner and capped with a synthetic cover on the
site. The OSC believed that adequate measures had been taken to stabilize the
site, and all personnel were demobilized by the end of January 1986.
On June 29, 1993, a second removal action was approved because of
delays in implementing the remedial action. Hazardous conditions justifying the
removal action were described in the June 29, 1993, removal action
memorandum:
The tanks were rusting and have deteriorated over time... found
breaches in the cover on the waste pile created during the 1985-1986
removal action. These breaches expose the waste pile to the
weather. Tanks are in poor condition... Sampling results indicate that
the tanks contain PCP and creosote... Approximately 200 drums of
. soil contaminated with PCP and creosote are on-site and in poor
condition. There is a high likelihood that the drums could fail.... An
on-site pond which feeds Old Tom's Run, a tributary of the Potomac
River, is being impacted by a black oily seep which contains high
levels of PCP and creosote.
During the second removal action, the following activities occurred: (1)
several buildings that were in danger of collapsing were demolished; (2) liquids and
solid waste, tanks, retorts (small laboratory containers), and over 350 drums of
waste, and sludge were removed for off-site disposal; (3) the pile of previously
excavated sediment was re-covered; (4} a trench was constructed to collect
contaminated ground water; (5) an underflow dam was installed to prevent the
release of floating and sinking materials from an on-site pond; and (6) a water
treatment facility was constructed. The facility treats the surface water and
operates to mitigate the further flow of contaminated surface water from the site.
The RPM, at the time of our site visit on July 5, 1995, informed us the water
facility would be operating throughout site remedial activities.
Approximately 8 years elapsed between the start of the first and second
removals. EPA Region 3 officials stated the reason for the long period between the
removal action? wa.c because they believed that remedial action (incineration)
would be implemented. Another Region 3 otliciei stetec that the remedial program
66
-------
Southern Maryland Wood Treating Case Study
officials had lead responsibility and did not promptly request assistance from the
removal program officials. The same official stated that, in some instances,
remedial personnel may not immediately recognize a severe condition that needs a
removal action. The official also believed that the site was not in an emergency
state, but because site conditions met the criteria for a removal and because of
political pressures, a time-critical removal was performed.
LISTING AND REMEDIAL INVESTIGATION/FEASIBILITY STUDY
In June 1986, about 4 months after the first removal ended, the site was
listed on the National Priorities List (NPL) with a score of 48.77. According to an
EPA Region 3 official, there were no viable PRPs, so the SMWT facility became a
fund-lead site.
The RI/FS took over 3 years to complete. This phase began in March 1985,
and was completed in June 1988. An EPA contractor conducted the RI/FS and
also performed a risk assessment and found that the site had an unacceptable level
of risk to human health and the environment. The Record of Decision (ROD) was-
signed on June 29, 1988, which estimated cleanup costs at $38 million. The
MaryJand Department of the Environment (MDEJ agreed with the remedy selected,
but requested that EPA reevaluate the remedy if its cost (as determined through
the remedial design and bid-selection process) exceeded the ROD estimate.
REMEDIAL DESIGN/REMEDIAL ACTION
Remedial Design
EPA wanted to begin remedial action as soon as possible. Therefore, the
Agency divided the remedy into phases. Phase 1 consisted of constructing a
barrier wall around the heavily contaminated area (process and lagoon areas) to
control ground water migration, and constructing a large vehicle decontamination
facility. The remedial design for Phase 1 took about 9 months, from September
22, 1988 to June 30, 1989. The other part of the remedy, incineration and
treatment of ground water, was to be initiated under Phase 2. The remedial design
for phase 2, which took over 3 years, was begun on September 22, 1988, and
was 95 percent completed on May 11, 1992. A Region 3 official said the lengthy
timeframe was needed to fully characterize the volume of soils to be treated during
the incineration process.
67
-------
Southern Maryland Wood Treating Case Study
Remedial Action 1 Completed
EPA, the Army Corps of Engineers, and the Phase 1 design contractor
agreed to install interlocking steel sheet piles around the heavily contaminated
ground water area. The sheet piles were driven into an underlying clay layer to
help contain the contaminated ground water. The Phase 1 construction contract
was awarded in September 1989 and field work began in January 1990. All
construction activities were completed in November 1990. The closeout report
was not signed until March 1991.
Remedial Action 2: Incineration Remedy Suspended After Design 95% Complete
Phase 2 design activities continued until May 1992 when activities were 95
percent completed and the estimated cost of the remedy was over $70 million.
Due to the increased costs, (the original estimate was $38 million), MDE was
unable to fund its 10 percent share required by law. Consequently, because this
was a fund-lead site, EPA could not implement the remedial action. At the same
time, the community and local government expressed deep concern about the
health risks related to on-site incineration. Design work was halted and EPA and -
MDE agreed that EPA would conduct a Focused Feasibility Study (FFS) to
reexamine the options.
The FFS was issued in February 1995. However, a cleanup alternative was
not selected. Instead, a Superfund Program Proposed Plan was issued in March
1995. In the plan, EPA officials recapped information in the FFS and other related
documents and indicated that thermal desorption was the Agency's "preferred
remedial alternative." Costs associated with the excavation, thermal desorption,
and backfilling of soils and sediments amounted to $31 million compared to $57
million {the Agency's new estimate) for incineration.
The proposed plan defined thermal desorption as:
The process by which contaminated soils/sediments are heated at low
temperatures to volatilize water and organic contaminants. A carrier
gas or vacuum system transports volatilized water and organics to a
gas treatment system. The contaminants are not destroyed, rather
they are physically separated from the soils and concentrated in a
vapor treatment system before being disposed of properly.
EPA received public comment concerning the remedy from March 22 to April 21,
1996. Af of July ?4, 1995, the new ROD had not been issued; although the
Agency planned to issut n bv the end o1 summer 1991.
68
-------
Southern Maryland Wood Treating Case Study
Current Status and Future Actions
As of July 14, 1995, over $30 million had been disbursed from the trust
fund for the site since fiscal 1982. One removal and one remedial action have
been completed. The second removal is virtually completed, aside from the
continued operation of the water treatment facility.
As of July 5, 1995, the day of our site visit, the site had been stabilized and
there was little activity on-site. The water treatment system was operating and
being monitored by contractors. An EPA Region 3 official stated the remedial
design for the new remedy would take approximately 1 year. Another official
stated they should not have to start from the beginning because of the many
similarities between incineration and thermal desorption. Construction completion
was estimated to take another 2 to 3 years. However, the site deletion date was
unknown.
COMMUNITY RELATIONS
There was significant community interest in this site even before the wood
treating facility was built in 1965. Community members protested the
construction of the facility because they preferred residential development of the
land; however, the facility was built anyway. Later, the community members
complained of creosote-like odors to Maryland county health officials. The county
sampled the air quality, but the results were inconclusive. As stated earlier,
Maryland state officials performed some testing and sampling and instructed the
L.A. Clarke and Son, Inc., the owners of the facility, to clean up the site. L.A.
Clarke and Son, Inc., took actions to clean up the site; however, the work
performed did not effectively remediate the site. Consequently, EPA took a
number of actions to contain the site contaminants.
Our review of the site administrative record files found a fairly consistent
effort by EPA officials to maintain communications with the community regarding
site activities. For example, an On-Scene Coordinator's report for the period March
15, 1985, through February 18, 1986, noted several public meetings and various
television and newspaper reports. Sixty to 70 local residents attended a public
meeting concerning the first removal on March 19, 1985. In addition, EPA officials
notified the local press whenever an activity occurred at the site. On July 2,
1986, EPA completed a community relations plan for the site. The plan was
based partly on interviews with local residents and state and local officials. The
plan discussed activities that would occur during the RI/FS staae.
6S
-------
Southern Maryland Wood Treating Case Study
When the RI/FS was released in the spring of 1988, EPA also provided a
proposed remedial action plan listing eight cleanup alternatives and the preferred
remedy (incineration) to the Enterprise, a local newspaper. The plan announced a
June 15, 1988, public meeting to discuss the remedy and obtain input from the
public before EPA's final selection. Approximately 12 of 260 well water users-in
the community attended this meeting. Those in attendance appeared to find the
remedy acceptable. An article in the Enterprise indicated that local health officials
approved of incineration. There appeared to be no objection to incineration and,
therefore, the ROD was signed on June 29, 1988.
Although only a limited number of residents attended the pre-ROD meeting,
interest increased dramatically after the ROD was approved. Officials attributed
this increased interest to an increase in the population from the time the ROD was
signed to the completion of the remedial design in May 1992. This interest
extended to a neighboring county in Virginia. The community formed groups such
as the Southern Maryland Wood Treating Task Force and the Environmental
Awareness Coalition (EACJ. These groups were formed because of a concern for
the community's well-being and a belief the they were receiving contradictory
information from EPA. In April 1991, the EAC applied for a Technical Assistance
Grant (TAG) to hire a technical consultant. In March 1992, a TAG was awarded.
Affected community members and the Potomac River Association expressed
their concern to Senator Mikulski and the Administrator, respectively. The
overwhelming consensus of the community was that incineration was neither a
safe nor effective remedy and they wanted EPA to cancel plans for incineration and
seek other remedies. EPA officials stated they would review and consider any
proposed remedy until the construction contract was awarded. Senator Mikulski
subsequently contacted the Administrator to voice the community's concern about
the health risks of an incinerator at the site.
Senator Mikulski also contacted the Agency for Toxic Substances and
Disease Registry (ATSDR) and requested an assessment of the site. The request
specifically asked that ATSDR evaluate the health effects of soil incineration and
analyze the effects of on-site incineration. ATSDR issued a Petitioned Public
Health Assessment report on November 9, 1992 that concluded the public health
hazards were indeterminate because of inadequate information. However, ATSDR
made several recommendations, including the following:
collect additional ground water and air data,
ensure that residents do not expose themselves to surface water and
sedimeni in Die lom'; Run, aric
70
-------
Southern Maryland Wood Treating Case Study
examine storage tanks to determine if other storage options were
required.
EPA acted on some of the recommendations listed in ATSDR's report by improving
site conditions and mitigating possible threats to the public and the environment.
ATSDR did not perform an analysis of the effects of on-site incineration,
because of EPA's apparent compliance with public demand. EPA officials
determined that: (1) a re-evaluation of the remedy was needed, and (2) new
alternatives to remediate the site should be identified. ATSDR stated in its report
that they would evaluate other forthcoming remediation alternatives as they
developed.
Community representatives continued to closely monitor EPA's progress. In
April 1993, EPA distributed a draft FFS for public comment. MDE and the
community officials commented on the document. An August 1994 letter from
the St. Mary's County Commissioners to EPA Region 3, notified EPA that two
alternatives from the FFS were deemed acceptable, thermal desorption and
bioremediation. However, incineration was not acceptable and St. Mary's County
officials requested that the remedy be removed from the list of alternatives. In
November 1994, a draft final FFS was circulated. In February 1995, the final FFS
was released, and in March 1995, a proposed plan for the preferred remedial
alternative was published.
We met with representatives from the Task Force and the EAC in June
1995, to obtain their perspectives on the barriers to successful cleanups of
Superfund sites and their perceptions of the problems and ultimate solutions at this
site. The community representatives expressed their concern that, at least initially,
EPA officials were not as cooperative as they should have been and they were not
always as well informed as they should have been. For example, one
representative stated they were not informed that the selected remedy was
incineration until 1990. Before then, they were told that the remedy was "thermal
treatment." However, based on the information in the 1988 ROD, which included
a draft responsiveness summary, at least one resident present questioned the use
of on-site incineration. EPA officials then addressed the resident's concerns
regarding incineration. Community officials also believed EPA was going to
implement the remedy without considering the community's concerns. Therefore,
they contacted Senator Mikulski to express their concerns and frustrations. The
group believed the senator's office was very responsive and worked effectively
with EPA and the community. Also, members of the community educated
themselves about the Superfund program, their site, similar sites, and EPA
technologies.
/ i
-------
Southern Maryland Wood Treating Case Study
Another reason the community representatives distrusted EPA was that
supposedly knowledgeable EPA officials could not answer their questions. For
example, the community representatives claimed that the RPM assigned to the site
in January 1990 could not answer technical questions about the site. The
representatives believed EPA placed a person in the position vvho may not have
had the necessary experience.
The representatives also believed that communication was not only poor
between EPA and the community, but also within EPA. The representatives stated
that employees in the different divisions of the Agency did not communicate with
each other regarding the site. They claimed there were contradictions between
what the RPM said and what EPA guidance stated. Also, there did not appear to
be good communication between regions. Community representatives also stated
they found calculation errors in information EPA used to support the remedy
decision.
Community representatives also believed that EPA was unable to monitor its
contractors. For example, EPA promised the community that the FFS would be
completed on a certain date; however, the FFS was provided late. EPA told then)
that delays in getting the products to them were caused by inadequate products
being provided by the contractor. They pointed out to us that if the contractor
was providing insufficient or inadequate work, then the contractor should not be
working for EPA. They told us they believe that contractors cause the most delays
and the RPMs are not able to manage or control the contractors.
According to the representatives, EPA was resistant to new or different
ideas. For example, during the processing of the FFS, the Potomac River
Association proposed another alternative to incineration. In a letter dated March
23, 1992, the Potomac River Association informed MDE that thermal distillation
(thermal desorption) could be a feasible alternative to incineration. According to
the community representatives, EPA officials argued that alternatives to
incineration were hard to find. However, EPA was already aware of thermal
distillation and had been involved in pilot tests of the technology at another site.
Community representatives believed that EPA changed the remedy and took other
various actions only as a result of pressure from them and Senator Mikulski.
From the Agency's perspective, their goal was always to keep the
community informed and aware of the conditions on the site and the proposed
remedies. We met with the Community Involvement Facilitator (CIF) for this site in
June 1995 to discuss the Agency's version of the events at this site. This official
stated that EPA had spent a significant amount of resources trying to mitigate the
tension surrounding the site. At one lime, this w&s one ci the most contentious
-------
Southern Maryland Wood Treating Case Study
sites in the region. Every issue had to be presented to the community and there
were comment periods on just about every document.
The CIF believed the most important issue to the community was to be
assured that the health and safety of the community and the environment were-
being adequately protected. He believed that this community wanted a voice in
deciding on actions occurring in the community. They did not believe that EPA had
been forthright and honest with them. He indicated that EPA had an adversarial
relationship with the community. To help improve this relationship, he began
holding monthly conference calls starting in September 1992, and the calls
continued every month thereafter, until about March or April 1995.
The official stated that in retrospect, concern among the community may
have started with the 1988 ROD meeting. Perhaps too little information was
provided. He also noted that the poor attendance at this meeting may have been
indicative of too little community awareness. According to the CIF, EPA officials
were under pressure to clean up sites faster. This, at times, may have prompted
them to take action without allowing sufficient time to inform the community.
Today, he believed that EPA was doing more to obtain community acceptance of
cleanup remedy. Realistically, however, if a community wanted to stop a remedy"
they could do so even though EPA had met ail the requirements in the law.
CONCLUSIONS
EPA discovered this site in December 1981. More than 13 years have
elapsed since then, and over 10 years of tests, studies, and designs have been
performed. Although several actions have been completed, the site remedy is not
operational and the site is still not cleaned up.
The activities at this site clearly show how dramatically the community can
affect the progress at a Superfund site. In this case, they stopped the selected
remedy and forced the Agency to adopt a new remedy. The impacts on cleanup
costs and time were significant. Although community involvement is important
and necessary, it appears significant involvement has the potential to increase the
time, and possibly the cost, of site cleanups.
It would be speculation to conclude that an earlier, and more intensive effort
by EPA to include the community in the decision-making process would have
substantially shortened the time involved. However, it is not speculative to
conclude that involvement by the community may slow the process, sometimes
cramatically. Howeve:, consioerinc what is a' fiake in the community, it only
73
-------
Southern Maryland Wood Treating Case Study
makes sense for EPA to continue and improve efforts to obtain effective
community involvement.
74
-------
APPENDIX I
Page 1 of 7
OCT 19 1995
OFFICeOF
SOLID W*$TC ANO 6M€«G€NCV
RESPONSE
MEMORANDUM
SUBJECT:
FROK:
TO:
The purpose of this Memorandum is to respond to your
September 14, 1995, memorandum transmitting and requesting
comments on the draft report No. E1SFB5-11-G008 prepared by the
Office of the Inspector General (OIG) on Review of Barriers to
Superfund Site Cleanups.
We appreciate the opportunity to review the draft report.
We understand that the primary goal of the project was to
identify barriers to cleaning up Superfund sites, and, in that,
it parallels many of our efforts, some of which you acknowledge
on page 5 of your memorandum (such as the Superfund Accelerated
Cleanup Model, the Superfund Administrative Improvements
initiatives, and our Superfund Administrative Reforms), to
identify and address barriers to cleanup. However, we have some
concerns about the nature and content of the report.
September 14, 1995, Memorandum
p. 1—The overall scope of the report appears to be the
development of three case studies. However, the context of
developing three case studies and how the three case studies were
selected are not clear. Are these three case studies typical of
anything or are they specifically outliers on the "duration" of
cleanup continuum? This kind of context is important so the
reader can understcne the j rr.p] j cat i ens . If these are, in fact,
out] j en- : then it should be made cJ ear that, uh€ c j eanup e*
many si 11:- r-rccc-ec;- apace . thftr* ere scnif constrti nts and
problems that impact sofr,€ .
p \ UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY
1332 I WASHINGTON. D.C. 20460
HIO'4
Comments on Draft Report from the Office of the
Inspector General on Review of Barriers to Superfund
Site Cleanups (No. /PISFBStII-
Elliott P. Laws
Assistant Administrator
Michael Simmons
Deputy Assistant Inspector General
for Internal and Performance Audits
75
Oil B&setJ Inks on 100% Recycled Papef (<0% Posicoosumer)
-------
APPENDIX I
Page 2 of 7
2
Your memorandum states that the OIG did not develop
recommendations, but plans to use the information to develop a
long-term audit plan for Superfund. However, the report does
contain summaries and conclusions which must be identified as
deriving only from three case studies.
We do not understand the significance of the statement that
"the OIG did not measure the surveyed offices' performance
against the standards established by the National. Contingency
Plan (NCP)," because the report does conclude on p. 3 that
"extraneous requirements in the legislation and those developed
subsequently consume a great amount of time and resources.-
However, the report does not identify what requirements, either
in the legislation or developed subsequently (presumably in the
NCP) , are considered by the OIG to be "barriers^1 to cleanup. The
identification by the OIG of such requirements would be useful to
consider, as we work toward both administrative and legislative
reforms.
p. 2—The first bullet at the, bottom of the page concludes that
"the amount of time spent studying sites and designing remedies
has encompassed a majority (about 75 percent) of the tine since
the sites were discovered.- While the active-study phase can
logically take longer than the cleanup phase, the implication is
that a site would be in active study or active cleanup from the
day the site is discovered. However, the immense task of site'
cleanup has required thie development of a prioritization for
addressing sites, based upon contamination and risk to public
health and the environment, which necessarily has resulted in
some sites being in inactive phases after discovery.
, An important fact that is not reflected in the case studies
is the effect of changing priorities, both among activities at
one site and among other sites in a Region.. Some problems, which
on first inspection seem to be emergencies, may, in fact, be
amenable to remedial action rather than removal action. In some
situations, exposures do not meet the requirements of presenting
an imminent threat to human health and the environment as
required for a removal action, and, therefore, do not justify
immediate attention, given other priorities. This appears to be
the situation with the vault at Whitmoyer and the pond at
Wasatch. The overall "game plan" for addressing the various
problems posed at a site can change, which can lead to changes in
priorities among the activities at the site. This appears to be
why Wasatch was in the investigation phase so long. The text of
the report does not indicate whether the OIG concluded that
active investigation or reprioritization accounts for this lag.
Dej eti or. is no; <. rei event measure ci prooren: effectiveness,
because- c: thf ir.er.y <.r-pc-cvr essocj eiec v*; t.h six f oe 3 eti on.
Ground wate: ecticnt £3 t i one - term acti c-ni. £ jic- construction
completion, which measures actual completion of remedy
76
-------
APPENDIX I
Page 3 of 7
3
construction, is a much better and more tangible indicator of
progress on site cleanup.
p. 3—The characterization of the referenced removal action being
repeated because the original was inadequate is inaccurate and"
inappropriate. The subsequent removal action was in the same
area, but was not initially necessary because other remedial
actions -would be taken to address those risks. Because those
remedial actions could not be cued up in time, the subsequent
removal action was required. It is not that the first removal
was inadequate; but rather that the scope of what was needed
changed.
It is unfair to characterize the weather-related delay as
the only delay completely outside of EPA*s control. The decision
of a community to delay action is not within EPA1s control.
Neither is the refusal of the PRPs to negotiate up to the point
that EPA can.and does proceed without PRP consent. This should
be re-characterized. . .
High turnover of Remedial Project Managers (RPMs) has
historically been a problem of the Agency. Some of the
improvements resulting from the 90-day study in 1990 were
designed to address those problems. As long as staff can find
technically-satisfying jobs with better pay in the private
sector, turnover will remain something of a problem.
We appreciate that "the report acknowledges that the
legislation can be considered a barrier to cleanup with
prescribed events and deadlines which may not allow the Agency to
proceed in the most effective manner for a given site,, although
the report does not give any examples of such barriers. As
mentioned earlier, the Agency has sought to identify those
legislative reform opportunities and would appreciate examples
identified by the OIG.
We feel that the statement, "It appears that the Superfund
process drives program officials rather than the obvious goal of
cleaning up sites," should not be included in the report.
Superfund program officials are most certainly driven by their
commitment to protect human health and the environment by
cleaning up "sites, not by "extraneous requirements in the
legislation." While we acknowledge that the subsequent paragraph
tries to explain the statement, we recommend that the statement
be omitted.
We have concern:- with th« jest psracraph in which the OIG
conclude? t.hei "zh<- extraneous requirements in the- legislation
anc the fc- cc-ve j qtxzC sruhsecuenzl v consume e crea x amount of time
and resources . Thez. t- processes art- c* : en count t * - product j ve to
cost effective cleanup. This point is clearly illustrated in zhe
case studies that show a great amount of time and resources are
77
-------
APPENDIX I
Page 4 of 7
4
devoted to negotiations with PRPs or to taking samples while the
known contaminants remain in place." However, the conclusions
are drawn only on the three case studies, which makes the
statement "often counter-productive" a rather broad
generalization. The report does not document enough examples.in
the three studies to conclude that the requirements "consume a
great amount of time and resources.^
There are several instances where the report places emphasis
on the consideration of actions which were subsequently not
takien. The reader is left with the inference that action should
have been taken- This is not necessarily so, as shown in the two
examples discussed later under Whitmoyer Laboratories and Wasatch
Chemical.
Whitmoyer Laboratories Case Study '
The removal of the vault probably did not occur because of
the large scale of the action. The remedial-action to address
the vault is valued at $18 million, which would be a very
significant percentage of the removal budget for all of EPA for
the entire year. It is not clear that the $3 million dollar
estimate to address the vault was realistic^ More importantly,
removal actions roust meet applicable or relevant and appropriate
requirements (ARARs) to the degree practicable. Selected
remedies will meet requirements, such as land disposal
restrictions (LDRs), as a matter of policy. Sites that exceed
the $2 million level for removal must be consistent with remedial
actions, as required by the statute. Therefore, LDRs would have
to be met, which would significantly increase the estimate of the
cost of the action. Since the restrictions related to the LDRs
were known before promulgation, these levels were treated as
relevant and appropriate requirements, which the action would
have to meet. Therefore, these delays to addressing the vault
and the increased cost can be directly related to the statutory
requirements related' to meeting ARARs and the removal limit
exemptions.
Wasatch Chemical Case Study
It is not uncommon, and can be most efficient from an
overall programmatic expenditure of the Fund, for the removal
program to perform a "quick fix" that will address some immediate
exposure concern and rely on the remedial program to perform a
final, more complete action. This is the case at Wasatch with
contaminated soil. The subsequent removal action would not have
been necessary, if the planned remedial action had occurred on
time. Since it -did net, for £ number ci reasons, the subsequent
remove] action was necessary.
78
-------
APPENDIX I
Page 5 of 7
5
Southern Maryland wood Treating Case Study
The case study concludes on p. 74-75, "The activities at this
site clearly show how dramatically the community can affect the
progress at a Superfund site. In this case, they stopped the
selected remedy and forced the Agency to adopt a new remedy. The
impacts on cleanup costs and time were significant. Although
community involvement is important and necessary, it appears
significant involvement will likely increase the time, and
possibly the cost, of site cleanups. -
•There are two main issues to consider in evaluating EPA
community involvement efforts for this site: first, whether EPA
followed the prescribed requirements to inform and include the
community during site remediation procedures; second, whether the
community involvement aspect acted as a barrier to "successful"
remediation of the site.
The first question is site-specific and may be addressed by
evaluating administrative records. Documentation appears to be
present indicating EPA outreach efforts early in the RI/FS
process. The site was listed on the NPL in June 1986, and,
according to the report, "..an On-Scer.e Coordinator's report for
the period March 15, 1985, through February 18, 1986, noted
several public meetings and various television and newspaper
reports." (p. 70) The community relations plan was completed
July 7, 1986, and the plan "was based partly on interviews with
local residents and state and local officials. "
"When the RI/FS was released in the spring of 1988, the
preferred remedy of incineration was reported in a local.
newspaper (p. 71) and a public meeting was held to discuss the
remedy selection and "obtain input from the public before EPA's
final selection." Those in attendance "appeared to find the
remedy acceptable," and local health officials approved of
incineration. The ROD was signed on June 29, 1988, with no
objection from the community.
By April 1991, a community group had been formed "because of
a concern for the community's well—being and a belief that they
were receiving contradictory information from EPA. " The group
applied for and received a Technical Assistance Grant (TAG) by
March 1992. The community also involved Senator Barbara
Mikulski, who ran for and was re-elected to'her second term in
November 1992. Community members wanted EPA to cancel
incineration and seek other remedies. EPA acknowledged the
communitv reeves* enc , ir. Apr: 2 199~, z draft focused feasibility
stucv (FFS} J i st j nc th€rn.£j oescrpti en cs £ remedy was made
eve: j efcj <- J cr pub} i <* comment..
Increased community involvement, earlier may have precluded
subsequent community discontent. However, based on the report.
79
-------
APPENDIX I
Page 6 of 7
6.
it appears that EPA did make an effort to include, the community
and provide opportunities for comment. The fact that only 12 out
of 260 potential users were present at a critical community
meeting (p.. .71) may indicate, although the community involvement
requirements were met, that efforts to enhance community
awareness were not successful. Yet, it appears that an ongoing
outreach effort was sustained and that EPA did follow community
involvement requirements.
Answering the second question on whether the community
involvement aspect acted as a barrier to "successful" remediation
of the site is more difficult. Community involvement is somewhat
philosophical in nature (e.g., how much should a community be
involved? how much "say" should residents have upon technical
decisions?). The report states that involvement "will likely
increase the time, and possibly the cost, of site cleanups
However, based on EPA's response to citizens, the final costs for
the thermal.desorption remedy were $31 million versus $57 million
estimated costs for incineration. Though time delays may have
increased overall cost, this remedy selection is less- costly as a
result of community involvement. There is no documentation in
the case study to support the first sentence on p. 75.
Additionally, the report concludes that increased time
requirements are not only "likely" when including the community,
but a given ("it is not speculative to conclude that involvement
by the community may slow the process, sometimes dramatically, "
p. 75) . However, the report does not address the fact that early
and intensive community involvement can occur concurrently with
other site activities, A remedy selection process with
aggressive community participation involving many people may
result in more time initially, but not necessarily more total
time. The goal for early, enhanced community involvemeint in the
remedy selection process is, while taking more time initially,
that it should result in the selection of remedies which are .
acceptable to the communities the first time, obviating the need
to reconsider remedies and to issue amended RODs. The report
should be revised to acknowledge that effective community
involvement requires resources and time and that involvement by
the community may slow the process, but not necessarily.
We believe the report would be more constructive if it would
clearly identify the barriers at this site which•resulted from
community involvement activities. Considering the fact that the
site was listed on CERCLIS in 1981 and it took ten years to
complete the ROD, while, community concerns have been an issue for
:he past four years, the primary barriers to successful
:ompJetior, ci the Southern Kcry] snc site ?hou]c ncf be attributed
:c community j nvc3 veroent eftorti , but tc other technical' anc.
:cta3 ni st. rat: vf issues throuchoui the site history.
80
-------
APPENDIX I
Page 7 of 7
7
We appreciate the opportunity to review this report. If you
have any questions, please have your staff contact Carolyn Offutt
at (703)603-8797.
cc; W. Michael McCabe, Regional Administrator, Region 3
William P. Yellowtail, Regional Administrator, Region 8
Tim Fields
Tom Sheckells
Carolyn offutt
Becky Brooks
Sharon Hallinan (5201G)
Barbara Braddock (5201G)
81
-------
APPENDIX II
Page 1 of 5
AGENCY COMMENTS AND OIG EVALUATION
In its response to our draft case studies dated October 19, 1995, the Office
of Solid Waste and Emergency Response (OSWER) indicated that the context of
developing the case studies and how the three sites were selected was unclear.
We inserted a paragraph on page 3 of the opening memorandum to the case
studies which explains how we selected the sites for review, and according to the
information obtained during our review, the sites selected were not considered to
be outliers.
OSWER's response recommended that the summaries and conclusions
contained within our report must be identified as deriving only from the three case
studies. We have added the additional sources of information used to develop
conclusions regarding the overall Superfund program on pages 3 and 4 of the
opening memorandum. For example, we reviewed prior Superfund program studies
and interviewed state and major trade association officials during our field work.
OSWER did not understand the significance of the statement that "the OIG
did not measure the surveyed offices' performance against the standards
established by the National Contingency Plan (NCP)", because we concluded that
certain legislative requirements consume significant time and resources. This
statement is a disclaimer which was developed jointly by the Office of Enforcement
and Compliance Assurance and the OIG. Such a disclaimer is included in all
Superfund audit reports which have potential Superfund enforcement impact.
OSWER, in responding to the OIG finding that study and design of remedies
comprised the majority of time spent on the sites since discovery, indicated that
the immense task of site cleanup required development of a prioritization for
addressing sites, resulting in some sites being in inactive phases after discovery.
At the very outset of our review, we requested a site prioritization list from
OSWER, but were informed that there was no prioritization available.
82
-------
APPENDIX II
Page 2 of 5
OSWER's response indicated that site construction completion is a much
better and more tangible indicator of site cleanup progress than site deletion,
because of the many aspects associated with deletion. The OIG disagrees. We
consider deletion to be a critical measure of site cleanup success, the point where
a site no longer poses a threat to human health and the environment. Construction
completion, while an important milestone, represents the completion of remedy
construction. Since both construction completion and site deletion have value in
indicating site cleanup progress, we have revised our report to include both
measures.
OSWER noted that OIG characterization of the original Wasatch site removal
action as inadequate because a second removal action was required, was
inaccurate and inappropriate. We amended the languajge on page 58 of the case
study to reflect that the second removal was conducted because the planned
remedial action did not occur on time.
In its response, OSWER indicated that it was unfair to characterize the
weather-related delay as the only delay outside of EPA's control. On page 4 of our
opening memorandum, we added additional factors outside of the Agency's control
which can delay site cleanup progress, such as community and PRP objections to
selected remedies.
OSWER noted that high turnover of RPMs has been an ongoing problem for
EPA. We agree that as long as staff can find satisfying jobs with better pay in the
private sector, turnover will be a problem. However, it should be noted that most
of the RPMs who have been involved with the three sites we reviewed, never left
the Agency.
OSWER disagreed that the Superfund process drives program officials rather
than the goal of cleaning up sites. We amended the appropriate paragraph on page
4 of the opening memorandum to indicate how legislative requirements and how
the laws are implemented can result in more focus on achieving process steps than
on accomplishing end results. We eliminated references to Superfund program
officials.
In its response, OSWER was concerned that the OIG drew conclusions
based solely on information obtained from the three Superfund site studies. We
added the additional sources of information used to develop conclusions regarding
the overall Superfund program on pages 3 and 4 of the opening memorandum.
These includec reviewtnc prioi Superlund ptooiem studies (e.c., National Academy
83
-------
APPENDIX II
Page 3 of 5
of Public Administration and Congressional Budget Office reports) and interviewing
state and major trade association officials.
Whitmover Laboratories Case Study
OSWER's response stated that the vault removal probably did not occur
because of the large scale of the action. We interviewed numerous EPA regional
officials responsible for the site. During these interviews we specifically asked
why the vault was not handled as a removal. The large scale of the action was
never mentioned by any regional officials as a reason for not removing the vault
contents.
The OSWER response indicated that the remedial action to address the vault
was valued at $18 million which would be a very significant percentage of the
removal budget. Further, the response notes that it was unclear if the $3 million
estimate was realistic. We agree that $18 million would be a significant portion of
the removal budget. However, the point is not that the removal would cost
$18 million, rather it was estimated to cost $3 million. In response to whether the
$3 million dollar estimate is realistic, 1) the 13 million was a formal estimate
provided by an outside contractor to EPA, 2) the $3 million request was the
estimate used in the proposed removal request, and 3) according to an EPA official
responsible for the removal, the removal action on the vault could have probably
been completed for half of the $3 million estimate.
Another reason provided by OSWER as to why the vault was not removed
revolves around the application of Land Disposal Restrictions (LDR) as Applicable
or Relevant and Appropriate Requirements {ARARs). OSWER's response states
that removal actions must meet ARARs, such as LDRs to the degree practicable.
Further, removals that exceed the $2 million level must be consistent with remedial
actions and therefore LDRs would have to be met. which would significantly
increase the estimate of the cost of the action. Since the restrictions related to
I DRs were known before promulgation, these levels were treated as ARARs. which
the action would have to meet. The OSWER response concluded that the delays in
addressing the vault and the increased cost can therefore be directly related to the
statutory requirements related to meeting ARARs.
Given the above scenario, LDRs, which place more stringent controls over
the disposal ol wesie, would have to be met. However, as the Agency
acknowledges, restriction*, were known, ye: were not promulgated at the time o1
the remove I. Rather, the Agency decided tc tree: them as ARARs, although it was
84
-------
APPENDIX II
Page 4 of 5
not required that the Agency apply them as ARARs. According to the OSC, state
officials, and PRP representatives, the removal action was scheduled to be
completed before promulgation of LDRs. Further, the proposed removal request
specifically stated that one of the reasons in favor of conducting an immediate
removal was because of the approaching LDRs "which would force the Superfund
remedial section to utilize some costly alternative technology on the vault
contents."
Wasatch Chemical Case Study
OSWER noted that the second removal action would not have been
necessary at the Wasatch site if the planned remedial action had occurred on time.
Since it did not, for a number of reasons, the subsequent removal action was
necessary. As indicated previously, we rephrased the appropriate paragraph on
page 59 of the Wasatch Chemical case study to reflect that the second removal
was conducted at the site because the planned remedial action did not occur on .
time.
Southern Maryland Wood Treating Case Study
OSWER indicated that there was no documentation in the draft case study
to support the assertion that community involvement will likely increase the time,
and possibly the cost of site cleanups. OSWER recommended that the case study
be revised to acknowledge that effective community involvement requires
resources and time and may slow the cleanup process, but not necessarily. We
amended the case study on page 73 to indicate that increased community
involvement has the potential to increase the time and cost of cleanups.
In its response, OSWER also noted that the report would be of better use if
we identified the barriers at the site which resulted from community Involvement.
OSWER believed that the primary barriers to cleanup of the site should not be
attributed to the community, but to other technical and administrative issues. As
indicated in the Summary of Barriers to the case study, on page 60, we focused
our analysis of the Southern Maryland Wood Treating Site on community concerns
and involvement. Community involvement, itself, was the potential delaying factor
examined during this particular site study. We wanted to determine how
community involvement and EPA's response to community concerns can play a
role in slowinp down The decision-making and cleanup process. However, 1or
85
-------
APPENDIX II
Page 5 of 5
consistency with the other two case studies, we have included additional
information on other aspects/phases of cleanup at the site on pages 65 through.69
of the Southern Maryland Wood Treating Site case study.
86
-------
APPENDIX III
Page 1 of 2
list o f Acronyms
ATSDR: Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry
CDC: Centers for Disease Control
CERCLA: Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability
Act of 1980
CERCLIS: CERCLA Information System
DSA: Drum Storage Area
ERB: Emergency Response Branch
EPA: Environmental Protection Agency
ERT: Emergency Response Team
ESD: Explanation of Significant Differences
HRS: Hazard Ranking System
ISV: In-Situ Vitrification
LDR: Land Disposal Restrictions
MCL: Maximum Contaminant Level
MSTP: Myerstown Sewage Treatment Plant
NPL: National Priorities List
ORC: Office of Regional Counsel
OSC: On-Scene Coordinator
OU: Operable Unii
87
-------
APPENDIX III
Page 2 of 2
PA:
Preliminary Assessment
PADER:
Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Resources
ppb:
Parts Per Billion
ppm:
Parts Per Million
PRP:
Potentially Responsible Party
RCRA:
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
RAMP:
Remedial Action Master Plan
RD/RA:
Remedial Design/Remedial Action
RI/FS:
Remedial Investigation/Feasibility Study
ROD:
Record of Decision
RPM:
Remedial Project Manager
SI:
Site Investigation
SMWT:
Southern Maryland Wood Treating
TAT:
Technical Assistance Team
TCDD:
Tectrachlorodibenzo-p-dioxins
USGS:
United States Geological Survey
VOC:
Volatile Organic Compound
WCC:
Wasatch Chemical Company
2,4-D:
2,4-Dichlorophenoxyacetic Acid
2.4,5-T:
2,4,5-Trichlorophenoxyacetic Acid
88
-------
DISTRIBUTION LIST
Inspector General (2410)
Assistant Administrator, Office of Solid Waste and Emergency
Response (5103)
Assistant Administrator, Office of Enforcement and Compliance
Assurance (W1037)
Regional Administrator, Region 3
Regional Administrator, Region 8
Director, Federal Facilities Enforcement Office (2261)
Audit Coordinator, Office of Solid Waste and Emergency
Response (5103)
Audit Coordinator, Office of Enforcement and Compliance
Assurance (W1037)
Audit Followup Official (3101)
89
------- |