*>EPA
EPA/600/R-10/155 December 2010
United States
Environmental Protection
Agency
Supplement to All Hazards
Receipt Facility (AHRF) Screening
Protocol
Office of Research and Development
National Homeland Security Research Center
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Supplement to All Hazards Receipt
Facility (AHRF) Screening Protocol
December 2010
Office of Research and Development
National Homeland Security Research Center
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Acknowledgments
This document is intended to be supplementary to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and
U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) September 2008 All Hazards Receipt Facility Protocol
(AHRF Protocol), and attempts to address considerations raised by stakeholders since publication of the
protocol. Development of this document was funded by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) National Homeland Security Research Center (NHSRC), and includes information provided by
EPA Regions 1, 6, and 10; EPA Office of Radiation and Indoor Air (ORIA), the Association of Public
Health Laboratories (APHL): State Public Health Laboratories of Connecticut, Delaware, Massachusetts,
Minnesota, New Jersey, New York, and Virginia; and New York City; and the Canadian Defence
Research and Development Laboratory. This document was prepared by CSC under Contract EP-W-06-
046.
Disclaimer
This document is intended to be supplementary to the guidance provided in the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) and U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) September 2008 All
Hazards Receipt Facility Protocol (AHRF Protocol), and attempts to address considerations raised
by stakeholders since publication of the protocol. This supplement assumes that:
The September 2008 AHRF Protocol was developed and provided as a guide; implementation of
the protocol and the screening equipment included in the protocol may vary among locations,
depending on the goals and capabilities of the laboratory to which the facility is attached.
Retrofitting existing facilities to contain an AHRF-type area requires site-specific engineering
considerations that will not be addressed by this document.
This is a draft document and is currently under review. Information provided does not constitute nor
should it be construed as an EPA endorsement of any particular product, service, or technology.
Questions concerning this document or its application should be addressed to:
Erin Silvestri, MPH
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
National Homeland Security Research Center
Office of Research and Development (NG16)
26 West Martin Luther King Drive
Cincinnati, OH 45268
(513) 569-7619
silve stri. erin@epa.gov
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Foreword
Following the events of September 11, 2001, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) mission
was expanded to account for critical needs related to homeland security. Presidential directives identified
EPA as the primary federal agency responsible for the country's water supplies and for decontamination
following a chemical, biological, and/or radiological (CBR) attack. To provide scientific and technical
support to help EPA meet this expanded role, EPA's National Homeland Security Research Center
(NHSRC) was established. The NHSRC research program is focused on conducting research and
delivering products that improve the capability of the Agency to carry out its homeland security
responsibilities.
As a part of this mission, NHSRC provides support to the Environmental Response Laboratory Network
(ERLN), a nationwide network of federal and state laboratories responsible for the analysis of
environmental samples. The goal of NHSRC's research in this area is to support the technical capabilities
of these laboratories in their ability to provide an effective response. In September 2008, EPA and the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) co-published an All Hazards Receipt Facility (AHRF)
Screening Protocol, recommending a step-by-step approach to use when screening samples that have been
presented to an AHRF. Since publication of the AHRF Screening Protocol, EPA received requests for
additional information regarding screening equipment, operational controls, and general policies from
stakeholder implementing or interested in installing and implementing an AHRF. This document is
intended to address stakeholder requests since publication of the AHRF Screening Protocol, by
providing summary information on lessons learned, general engineering considerations, results of
equipment testing, and general policy recommendations. The process of developing this supplement
included participation across EPA and state public health laboratories.
Gregory D. Sayles, Ph.D., Acting Director
National Homeland Security Research Center
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Abbreviations and Acronyms
AC
Hydrogen cyanide
ABS
Alpha, beta scintillators
AEGL
Acute exposure guide levels
AHRF
All hazards receipt facility
APHL
Association of Public Health Laboratories
BSL
Biosafety level
CAFA
Celiteฎ analytical filter aid
CBR
Chemical, biological, and radiological
CEES
2-Chloroethyl ethylsulfide
CGI
Combustible gas indicator
CG
Phosgene
(iCi
Microcurie
CK
Cyanogen chloride
cpm
Counts per minute
CWA
Chemical warfare agent
DB-3
4-(4' -Nitrobenzyl)pyridine
DHS
U.S. Department of Homeland Security
DMMP
Dimethyl methylphosphonate
DOT
U.S. Department of Transportation
DoD
U.S. Department of Defense
DOE
U.S. Department of Energy
ECBC
Edgewood Chemical and Biological Center
EPA
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
FBI
U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigations
FID
Flame ionization detector
FSP
Flame spectrophotometer
FTIR
Fourier transform infrared spectroscopy
GA
Tabun
GB
Sarin
GC
Gas chromatography
GD
Soman
GM
Geiger-Miiller
H
Mustard agent
HD
Sulfur mustard
HEPA
High efficiency particulate air
HN
Nitrogen mustard
HP(Ge)
High purity Germanium
HT
Sulfur mustard with agent T (bis [2-(2-chloroethylthio)ethyl] ether)
IC
Ion Chamber
IMS
Ion mobility spectrometer
IPA
Isopropyl alcohol
IR
Infrared spectroscopy
ITMS
Ion trap mobility spectrometry
keV
Kiloelectron volt
LI
Lewisite 1
L2
Lewisite 2
L3
Lewisite 3
meV
Millielectron volt
mg/g
Milligram per gram
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mR/h
Milliroentgen per hour
NHSRC
National Homeland Security Research Center
N03
Nitrate
NYSDOH
New York State Department of Health
ORIA
Office of Radiation and Indoor Air
OSC
On-scene coordinator
OX
Oxidizers
PCR
Polymerase chain reaction
PID
Photoionization detector
PMT
Photomultiplier tube
POC
Point of contact
PT
Proficiency testing
QA/QC
Quality assurance/quality control
QMP
Quality management plan
RIID
Radioisotope identifier
RDTE
Research, development, test and evaluation
SAM
Standardized Analytical Methods for Environmental Restoration Following
Homeland Security Events
TIC
Toxic industrial compound
TTEP
EPA National Homeland Security Research Center's Technology Testing and
Evaluation Program
VOC
Volatile organic compound
VX
Nerve agent, S-2-(Diisopropylamino) ethyl O-ethyl methylphosphonothioate
WMD
Weapons of mass destruction
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Table of Contents
Attachments vii
List of Tables vii
List of Figures vii
1.0 Introduction 1
1.1 Background of the All Hazards Receipt Facilities (AHRFs) and Screening Protocol 1
1.2 Intended Purpose of the AHRF Protocol 1
2.0 Lessons Learned 2
2.1 AHRF Protocol Assessments 2
2.2 Lessons from Existing All Hazard Receipt Facilities 3
2.3 Additional Recommendations 4
3.0 Adapting AHRFs to Meet Lab-Specific Needs - General Considerations 5
3.1 AHRF Design Options 5
3.2 General Considerations regarding Engineering Designs and Controls 7
4.0 Screening Equipment 8
4.1 Equipment Included in September 2008 AHRF Protocol 8
4.1.1 AHRF Assessments -Screening Equipment Results 10
4.1.2 Independent Laboratory Testing of AHRF Chemical Screening Equipment 15
4.2 Considerations in Equipment Selection 16
4.3 Alternative and/or Additional Equipment Currently Being Used or Considered in AHRF 17
4.3.1 Chemical 22
4.3.2 Explosives 24
4.3.3 Radiological 25
4.3.4 Biological 28
5.0 Quality Control 28
5.1 Quality Assurance and Quality Control Procedures 28
5.2 Quality Assurance/Quality Control included in AHRF Protocol 28
5.3 Equipment Maintenance 29
5.4 Additional Quality Assurance/Quality Control Considerations 29
5.5 Training 29
5.6 Proficiency Testing 30
5.6.1 Selection of Chemical Warfare Agent Simulants for AHRF Assessments 32
5.6.2 Selection of Explosive Simulant 32
5.6.3 Selection of Oxidizer Simulant 32
5.6.4 Selection of Radiological Simulants 32
6.0 References 33
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Attachments
ATTACHMENT 1: Information Regarding Currently Available Screening Equipment for Use in All
Hazards Receipt Facilities
ATTACHMENT la: Radiochemistry Detection Equipment
Attachment lb: Colorimetric Tests
ATTACHMENT lc: Ion Spectrometry
ATTACHMENT Id: Enzyme/Immunoassay Detection
ATTACHMENT le: Flame Spectrophotometry
ATTACHMENT If: Photo and Flame Ionization Detectors
ATTACHMENT lg: Spectroscopy and Spectrophotometry
ATTACHMENT lh: Gas Chromatography
ATTACHMENT li: Mercury Detection
Attachment lj: X-Ray Devices
ATTACHMENT 2: AHRF Laboratory Contacts
ATTACHMENT 3: Technology Performance Summary for Chemical Detection Instruments
List of Tables
Table 1. AHRF Screening Equipment Types 9
Table 2. Comparison of Sample Screening Results at U.S. EPA Region 1 AHRF 11
Table 3. Comparison of Sample Screening Results at NYSDOH Health Center AHRF 13
Table 4. Threat Categories and Sample Screening Equipment 18
Table 5. Samples Used during AHRF Protocol Assessments 31
List of Figures
Figure 1. Sample Screening Equipment 21
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1.0 Introduction
1.1 Background of the All Hazards Receipt Facilities (AHRFs) and Screening Protocol
The All Hazards Receipt Facility (AHRF) Screening Protocol was developed in response to
requests from state and federal agencies, particularly public health and environmental
laboratories, to help protect laboratory facilities and staff from potential hazards in unknown
samples. The four-year, multi-agency effort to design and build prototype facilities, and develop
and evaluate corresponding sample screening procedures, involved the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA), U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), U.S. Department of
Defense (DoD), U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI), and the Association of Public
Health Laboratories (APHL). As a result of this effort, two prototype AHRFs have been situated
at the EPA Region 1 Laboratory in North Chelmsford, Massachusetts, and at the New York State
Department of Health (NYSDOH) Wadsworth Center Laboratory in Albany, New York. Sample
screening procedures designed specifically for use in the prototype facilities were assessed at
each location to evaluate their ability to detect general categories of hazards (e.g., chemical,
explosive, and radiochemical. Results of the assessment were used to improve the screening
procedures, and a final AHRF Screening Protocol was published in September 2008.1 Results of
the assessment are provided in EPA's Final Report - Assessment of All Hazards Receipt Facility
(AHRF) Protocol ("Assessment Report"); results also are described briefly in Sections 2.1 and
4.1 of this supplement.
Since publication of the AHRF Screening Protocol, EPA has received requests for information
regarding appropriate screening equipment, operational controls, and general policies from
stakeholders who are either implementing or interested in installing and implementing an AHRF
or AHRF-like area. This document is intended to be a supplement to the protocol, and attempts
to address stakeholder requests by providing summary information on lessons learned, general
engineering controls and considerations, results of equipment testing, and general policy
recommendations. This supplement also cites sources that contain additional information
provided by DHS, APHL, and EPA regarding screening facility controls and equipment.
1.2 Intended Purpose of the AHRF Protocol
The AHRF Screening Protocol is a guide for screening unknown samples for general categories
of chemical, explosive, and radiochemical hazards. The protocol is designed specifically for use
of the equipment and facilities included in the prototype AHRFs that were designed and built by
Edge wood Chemical and Biological Center (ECBC) under contract to DHS. However, the AHRF
and AHRF protocol can be adjusted to conform to the capabilities, needs, and goals of a particular
location. As written, the screening procedures included in the protocol are not intended to
provide detailed or quantitative information regarding the identity and/or amount of a particular
hazard; if additional information is needed, additional or alternative equipment can be used. A
brief discussion of various AHRF designs is provided in Section 3.0. Additional and more
detailed information will be provided in a DHS Best Practices Guide, which is currently under
development. Information about equipment that might be used in addition to, or instead of, the
equipment included in the protocol, is provided in Section 4.0 and Attachment 1. Considerations
for use in selecting equipment for a particular laboratory are provided in Section 4.0.
1 U.S. EPA and Department of Homeland Security. September 2008. All Hazards Receipt Facility Screening
Protocol, DHS/S&T-PUB-08-0001 and EPA/600/R-08/105.
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2.0 Lessons Learned
2.1 AHRF Protocol Assessments
During 2007, EPA performed a series of four assessments to verify the effectiveness of a draft
AHRF protocol. Initial assessments were performed during May and June 2007 at the EPA
Region 1 andNYSDOH Wadsworth Center AHRF sites; follow-up assessments were performed
during September and October 2007. During the assessments, AHRF staff appeared to be well
trained and experienced with the protocol, and excellent communication was observed between
staff performing activities in the bleaching station and glove box areas, and between the
bleaching station team and sample delivery personnel. This level of communication was critical
to appropriate decision making, sample screening, and safety. AHRF staff, panelists, and
observers participating in the assessments agreed that the AHRFs (1) meet the purpose of
protecting laboratory facilities and staff, and (2) support decisions concerning samples containing
certain classes of potentially hazardous unknowns.
A detailed discussion of the assessments is provided in EPA's Assessment Report. Results were
used to revise and improve the protocol prior to publication. In addition to changes incorporated
into the AHRF Protocol, the following information summarizes some of the lessons learned:
Colorimetric tests can serve as good indicators of the presence of hazards, but require caution
when making "yes/no" decisions. Several factors will impact colorimetric test results such as
indefinite and variable color changes; the variability based on how the sample is applied
to a test strip and/or responses to different environmental matrices. In addition, reading color
changes accurately and consistently requires training and practice. Colorimetric test results
should be assessed along with results generated by all other screening equipment used in the
protocol.
There are a number of additional or alternative technologies (see Section 4.0 of this
supplement) that may offer improved sensitivity and reliability. Each AHRF site should
assess its needs and capabilities in relation to both the existing AHRF protocol and alternative
screening tools including new and evolving equipment.
Although the radiation screening equipment proved to be reliable and appropriately sensitive,
specialized training and practice is necessary to assure correct reading of results. In addition,
because background radiation is ever present and is highly variable based on locale, there is a
need to understand site-specific "threshold" or "action" levels. It is recommended that each
laboratory containing an AHRF or AHRF-like area determine and understand localized
background levels and compare the levels with the threshold levels noted in the 2008 AHRF
Protocol. It is reasonable for each AHRF location to establish their own threshold levels in
concert with state authorities. Threshold levels should be determined for each site and
applied so that positive screening results are statistically different from background levels of
radiation.
Suspicious powders require a more detailed set of instructions than the instructions provided
in the 2008 AHRF Protocol. As previously noted, the protocol does not provide a basis to
make decisions or recommendations regarding biological hazards. Instead, the protocol
recommends that AHRF staff collect a sub-sample for biological analysis in an appropriate
laboratory, after the sample has been screened for chemical, explosive and radioactive threats.
For any unknown sample, it is critical to understand, in detail, the circumstances under which
the potential threat was identified and to cooperate with FBI weapons of mass destruction
(WMD) officials and local law enforcement. Sample receipt personnel should thoroughly
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interview any individuals involved in sample delivery and obtain contact information for any
field personnel who may be able to provide additional insight.
Large packages (greater than one foot x one foot) containing unknown materials are not
addressed in the 2008 Protocol, because these packages cannot fit through the sample receipt
port built into the AHRF prototypes. AHRFs should consider this problem and have a
contingency plan in place. At a minimum, gamma radiation screening can be performed
outside the facility with a portable gamma survey meter. Depending on the degree of
suspicion, the amount of knowledge about the package, and the circumstances surrounding
the package, it is recommended that follow-up action be coordinated with FBI WMD officials
and the local laboratory director.
The sequence of unknown sample screening depends a great deal on the facility configuration
and the available/selected screening equipment. As each assessment was performed, the
protocol was fine-tuned and revised to improve screening test results. To assure an efficient
and effective process, each AHRF should maintain and continuously test their protocol to
assure reliable results.
Each AHRF protocol should have an internal and external (out-reach) communication system
in place. AHRF screening results should be approved by the host Laboratory Director before
definitive action is taken. For highly suspicious packages, it may be appropriate to first
coordinate activities with the local law and FBI authorities. When a screening test is positive
for a given threat category (e.g., radiation, explosive, chemical), predetermined points of
contact (POCs) should be consulted to determine sample disposition. Information for
predetermined POCs should include contact information for back-up POCs.
Routine training and refresher training on all phases of sample screening, particularly in the
use of equipment, results interpretation, and decision coordination, are strongly
recommended. Each laboratory should establish standard operating procedures and schedules
for maintenance and testing of equipment used by their facility.
2.2 Lessons from Existing All Hazard Receipt Facilities
As laboratories design, install, and use AHRF capabilities, important additional site-specific, and
general, observations and insight will become available regarding these facilities. Some
observations made to date include:
Maintenance of a self-standing, external AHRF facility (such as the prototype installed at the
EPA Region 1 and NYSDOH Wadsworth Center laboratory sites) can be costly and time
consuming, particularly when considering the intended infrequent use of the facility. These
facilities are expected to be functioning on a minute's notice and require on-going operational
controls for heat and humidity, in addition to air filtering and circulation. The benefits of
stand-alone facilities similar to the AHRF prototypes, however, include the relative ease of
isolating hazards and the distance between potential hazards and the host laboratory. Host
laboratories should weigh the benefits of having a stand-alone facility against the
corresponding maintenance costs. Laboratories might also consider potential use of the
facility for a portion of laboratory sample handling and/or screening samples prior to routine
analyses. Additional AHRF facility considerations and options are discussed in Section 3.0.
Training for maintenance and use of the AHRFs and screening equipment, as well as for
implementation of the protocols, is critical to ensure that meaningful and useful results are
obtained. Each laboratory should determine a schedule to ensure this training is provided
initially and periodically as needed (see Section 5.5). In recognition of this need, periodic
AHRF training is being provided at the NYSDOH Wadsworth Center laboratory. During
2009, training sessions for AHRF engineering and support personnel were attended by
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participants from the New York City Department of Health and EPA Region 1; training
sessions for AHRF laboratory personnel were attended by participants from California,
Florida, Kentucky, Idaho, Minnesota, Nebraska, New Hampshire, and New Jersey state
laboratories, from New York City, and from EPA Regions 1, 3, and 10. NYSDOH is
continuing to provide training on operational and decision-making components of facility air
handling, security, liquid handling, biosafety systems, and routine maintenance.2
The performance of sample screening equipment can be highly variable and depends on
proper maintenance and calibration, sensitivity for a particular hazard or compound, and
experience of equipment handlers. Equipment handlers must understand the equipment's
limitations and abilities, and must be trained in its use, maintenance, data interpretation, and
technology limitations. In addition to information and technical support provided by
equipment manufacturers and vendors, testing is needed to evaluate equipment performance
and limitations in terms of its ability to assess hazards in sample matrices that laboratories
might receive. Some non-vendor testing information is provided in the references cited in
Attachments la - lj of this document. General information regarding equipment
considerations and performance also is provided in Section 4.0. Additional resources include
EPA's Field Screening Equipment Information Document (EPA/600/R-10/091, September
2010) and Rapid Screening and Preliminary Identification Techniques and Methods
(EPA/600/R-10/090, September 2010); ANSIN42.33 - Performance Criteria for Hand-held
Instruments for the Detection and Identification of Radionuclides', and ANSI N42.34 -
Performance Criteria for Hand-held Instruments for the Detection and Identification of
Radionuclides. The EPA National Homeland Security Research Center (NHSRC) continues
to test screening equipment against performance characteristics, requirements, and
specifications to provide reliable information regarding commercially available
technologies.3 Each laboratory should establish standard operating procedures and schedules
for maintenance and testing of the equipment used by their facility.
2.3 Additional Recommendations
In addition to information provided during the AHRF assessments and by stakeholders using
AHRFs or AHRF-like facilities since the assessments, recommendations have been provided by
technical experts during reviews of the AHRF Assessment Report and this supplement to the
AHRF Protocol. The following recommendations are provided for consideration:
Transport Vehicle Survey - Before anything is offloaded from a sample transport vehicle, a
radiation screening should be performed, including general dose and swipe screens of the
tires, outside surface, and interior surfaces using a Ludlum-type instrument (e.g., MicroR
meter) to ensure that inadvertant spread of contamination does not occur. Therefore, to this
first category, a category for "radiological survey -swipes" using the Ludlum-type
instrument should be added. U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) requirements and
information for screening transport vehicles are included in DOT regulations at 49 CFR
173.443 (Contamination Control). Sample delivery personnel also should be asked to remain
on site until a successful DOT screen of the package is completed.
2 Information regarding AHRF training offered by the New York State Biodefense Laboratory is available at:
http://www.wadsworth.org/testing/biodefense/traimng.html
3 Information regarding NHSRC's Technology Testing and Evaluation Program (TTEP) can be found at:
http://www.epa. gov/nhsrc/ttcp.html
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Samples used during AHRF assessments, equipment testing, proficiency testing, and/or
training, should be representative of the type of samples and level of hazards that might be
expected to be received at the particular facility.
If available, portable X-ray equipment can be used to inspect sample packages for explosive
devices prior to bringing samples into the screening facility.
3.0 Adapting AHRFs to Meet Lab-Specific Needs - General Considerations
Since publication of the AHRF Protocol, several federal, state, and municipal laboratories have begun
designing and/or implementing AHRFs or AHRF-like areas, including EPA Regions 1 and 10; the states
of Connecticut, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, and Virginia; New York City; and at least one
Canadian Defence laboratory. Through information provided by APHL, EPA currently is aware of 26
public health laboratories with unique spaces designated for screening unknown samples within the
laboratory, three public health laboratories with spaces designated to perform this function outside the
laboratory, and six public health laboratories with plans for either external or internal designated spaces.
Laboratories are pursuing, designing, or implementing AHRFs or AHRF-like areas ranging from mobile
carts containing radiation screening equipment to expanded versions of the prototype AHRFs built by the
ECBC and located at the EPA Region 1 and NYSDOH Wadsworth Center laboratories. These facilities
vary greatly in design and purpose depending on the needs of each laboratory.
As stated in the AHRF Screening Protocol and in this supplement document, the protocol is a guide and
does not require use of the prototype facilities (e.g., those located at the EPA Region 1 and NYSDOH
Wadsworth Center laboratories). The AHRF and the AHRF Protocol may be adjusted to conform to the
capabilities and goals of a particular location. A tiered approach to describing potential AHRF designs is
described in the draft DHS Best Practices Guide. Although both the draft DHS guide and this supplement
provide general guidelines and considerations for AHRF design, neither document provides site-specific
engineering designs. Therefore, individuals planning to design and install an AHRF or AHRF-like area
should contact individuals responsible for existing or planned facilities. Contact information is provided
in Attachment 2 for individuals wanting to obtain information regarding the design, intended use, and
current status of these facilities.
3.1 AHRF Design Options
AHRFs can range in size and configuration depending on host laboratory needs and resources. In
general, given their intended purpose to screen unknown or high-risk samples, these facilities are
designed to protect analysts and laboratories by isolating sample contents, controlling ventilation,
and providing sufficient space for screening tools and temporary storage of hazardous samples..
The two prototype facilities at the EPA Region 1 and New York State Public Health laboratories
were developed in concert with the 2008 AHRF Protocol and represent a "Tier 1" screening
facility as described in the draft DHS Best Practices Guide. Three tiers are identified in the
guidelines and their discriminating criteria are outlined below:
Tier 1: A dedicated facility that is separate from the laboratory and maximizes air
containment through robust engineering controls. Includes both Biosafety Level 3 and
Biosafety Level 2 (BSL-3 and BSL-2)4 rooms, such as a Class III glove box and a fume
4 Guidance regarding BSL-2 and BSL-3 areas is provided in the U.S. Department of Health Biosafety in
Microbiological and Biomedical Laboratories (BMBL) at: http://cdc.goc/OD/ohs/bmbl5/bmbl5toc.htm: and the
joint CDC/USDA Animal and Health Inspection Services at: htto://www.selescagents.gov/Resources.
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hood, both with chemical, biological, and radiological (CBR) high efficiency particulate air
(HEPA) and charcoal filtration systems. Room air is also vented through a CBR-filtration
system.
Tier 2: A dedicated room within the laboratory containing an isolated airflow system, along
with a fume hood and a Class III glove box, both with CBR filtration.
Tier 3: A dedicated room isolated from the building air flow system, containing a glove box
with CBR filtration.
The Tier 1 self-standing facilities, while costly to build and operate, offer the best protection for
the laboratory as well as the personnel screening the samples. Tier 2 and 3 facilities, however,
provide alternatives where resources and/or needs are limited. The important point to emphasize
is the intent to maximize sample containment when testing/exposing unknown samples. This is
accomplished by using the best available glove box (or other sample isolation area), properly
filtering air that is released from the glove box, and isolating and venting room air from the rest
of the building or other routes of exposure. Also critical to the process is the availability of well-
trained AHRF personnel to implement the screening equipment and to assess information about
the sample before potential hazards are transferred inside the host or alternative laboratory. For
facilities with limited AHRFs, highly suspicious samples may be better managed by an alternate
laboratory or the FBI.
In developing this supplement, workgroup members reviewed the design of some existing or
planned AHRFs, primarily within the federal and state laboratory community. Of the laboratories
involved in the workgroup, that either plan to construct or have existing AHRFs, five (including
the two prototypes noted above) are considered to be stand-alone Tier 1 AHRF facilities.
Although there is considerable variability in design detail, these facilities emphasize the Tier 1 air
containment and control criteria. Each of these facilities plans to use a range of screening
equipment, from that prescribed in the 2008 AHRF Protocol to a more expanded inventory,
including gas chromatography (GC) and Fourier transform infrared spectrometry (FTIR). At
least two of these Tier 1 facilities have or are considering adding a biological screening
component including polymerase chain reaction (PCR), immunoassay, and microscopy. One
facility also includes X-ray capability for detecting explosive devices.
The remaining workgroup laboratories with AHRF or AHRF-like facilities represent a continuum
of Tier 2 to Tier 3 capabilities. In most cases, laboratories have created or modified one or two
areas within an existing laboratory. Most include, at a minimum, a Class III glove box with CBR
filtration, and isolate room air from the rest of the laboratory. Configurations are highly variable,
with sample containers typically received into a fume hood and then transferred into a glove box
for analysis. These in-laboratory AHRFs also use a range of screening tools, deferring to the
equipment used in the 2008 Protocol as a reference point, but often also using GC, FTIR, and/or
PCR and immunoassays as appropriate. A common practice or intent among these laboratories
also is to use the AHRF to conduct a preliminary screen and take sub-samples for transfer to other
areas within the building for further analyses. The choice of equipment and the extent of analyses
conducted in the AHRF depend on available space and room configuration. Each laboratory
either has or plans to have their own protocol for receiving and handling unknown or high risk
samples.
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3.2 General Considerations regarding Engineering Designs and Controls
The three tiers discussed above represent a range of general AHRF design configurations. There
are many possible variations in the design of an AHRF or AHRF-like area within each tier and
again much will depend on an individual laboratory's needs. Before recommending a specific
facility configuration, laboratories should consider the following factors:
Laboratory capabilities for handling specific hazard categories - For example, a public health
laboratory designed to analyze samples for biological hazards may have specific needs to
screen samples for radiological or chemical hazards prior to clearing the samples for entrance
into the laboratory.
Intended type of analyses - To what extent might the AHRF or AHRF-like area be used to
perform quantitative and/or confirmatory analyses in addition to screening for the presence of
general hazard categories?
Number of samples expected - Will the AHRF be used as a sample production/processing
facility (high sample throughput) in addition to a screening facility for unknown samples (low
sample volume) or both?
Available expertise to operate facility and equipment
Available resources to construct and/or retrofit space for an AHRF
Available resources to maintain the AHRF or AHRF-like area, including ensuring its
availability in an emergency
Available resources for purchase and maintenance of screening equipment5
Availability of backup electrical power source and voltage conditioning
Once the scope and functionality (i.e., intended use) of an AHRF are determined, more specific
design parameters can be established. Although the list of these parameters can be long, a few
key considerations are identified below:
Size of room(s), equipment spacing/location, work space per person
Ventilation/filtration configuration
Air temperature and humidity controls
Protective clothing/gear storage and emergency shower space
Communication system within the AHRF, and between the laboratory and the AHRF
TV monitors, video, and photographic equipment
Sample and waste storage
Sample receipt portal (size, indoor-outdoor operation)
Sample pass-through and containment controls (e.g., sample transfer from receiving portal to
fume hood to glove box)
Work station design (e.g., ease of sample access and manipulation)
Available horizontal space for results reporting and recordkeeping
Available equipment resources
Available space to store backup instruments, cables, batteries, instrument manuals,
calibration sources, etc.
5 Information regarding storage, treatment, and disposal of hazardous samples is provided in U.S. EPA's Laboratory
Sample Disposal Information Document - Companion to Standardized Analytical Methods for Environemental
Restoration Following Homeland Security Events (SAM) Revision 5.0. Anticipated publication November 2010.
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Available space and resources for ensuring security while in both stand-by and operational
modes, including security cameras, alarms, stationing of personnel at entrances and egresses
during an event, etc.
4.0 Screening Equipment
The sample screening equipment included in the 2008 AHRF Protocol was specifically selected to be: (1)
relatively simple to operate, (2) low cost, and (3) reasonably reliable. While the AHRF protocol provides
a baseline set of screening tools, it is understood that additional or alternative tools are available and the
ultimate choice of equipment will depend on a given laboratory's preferences and needs, availability and
skills of laboratory personnel, and availability of funds to purchase and maintain an AHRF operation.
This section provides summary information regarding the screening equipment included in the AHRF
Protocol (Section 4.1), as well as additional or alternative equipment that is either currently being used or
is being considered for use by EPA responders, On-scene Coordinators (OSCs), and/or existing or
planned AHRFs (Section 4.2). Additional information on this equipment, including costs and available
non-vendor equipment testing information, is provided in EPA's Field Screening Equipment Information
Guide - Companion to Standardized Analytical Methods for Environmental Restoration Following
Homeland Security Events (SAM) {Note: anticipated publication date unknown) and in Attachments 1 and
3 of this document.
4.1 Equipment Included in September 2008 AHRF Protocol
Table 1 lists the tools and equipment that are included in the AHRF Protocol, along with
corresponding analyte categories and hazard types targeted by the equipment.
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Table 1. AHRF Screening Equipment
Types
AHRF SCREENING EQUIPMENT
Protocol
Section
TARGET ANALYTES
Transport Container Survey (immediately u
Don receipt, outside the AHRF)
Radiological
Survey
MicroR Meter gamma
scintillator
2.1
Gamma Ray Emission
Transport Container Screen (inside the AHRF)
Radiological
Survey
Alpha, beta, gamma
scintillator with data logger
3.2
Alpha and Beta emitters (container surface)
Gamma Ray emitters (contact dose)
Chemical
Screen
Wipe with M8 paper if any
unusual contamination is
visible
3.3
Nerve agents (GA, GB, GD, VX)
Blister agents (H, HD, HN, HT, and lewisite)
Any organic liquid
Explosives
Screen
Colorimetric Indicator
3.4
Nitro aromatics, nitrate-esters, nitramines, inorganic
nitrate compounds.
Primary Sample Container Screen (in fume hood or equivalent)
Radiological
Survey
Alpha, beta, gamma
scintillator with data logger
4.3
Alpha and Beta emitters (container surface)
Gamma Ray emitters (contact dose)
Explosives
Screen
Colorimetric Indicator
4.5
Nitro aromatics, nitrate-esters, nitramines, inorganic
nitrate compounds
Chemical
Screen
Flame Spectrophotometer
(FSP)
4.1
Compounds containing phosphorous or sulfur
Nerve agents (GA, GB, GD, VX)
Blister agents (H, HD, HN, HT, and lewisite)
Ion Mobility Spectrometer
(IMS)
4.1
Nerve agents (GA, GB, GD, VX)
Blister agents (HD, HN, lewisite)
M8 Paper
4.4
Nerve agents (GA, GB, GD, VX)
Blister agents (H, HD, HN, HT, and lewisite)
Any organic liquid
Sample Screen (in glove box)
Radiological
Survey
Alpha, beta scintillator with
data logger
5.5
Alpha and Beta emitters (sample surface)
Explosives
Screen
Colorimetric Indicator
5.8
Nitro aromatics, nitrate-esters, nitramines, inorganic
nitrate compounds
Thermal susceptibility test
(2)
5.9
Explosive materials
Energetic materials
Chemical
Screen
Photoionization Detector
(PID) and Combustible
Gas Indicator (CGI)
5.4
Most volatile organic compounds (VOCs)(a)
Nerve agents (GA, GB, GD, VX)
Blood agents (CK, AC)
Blister agents (H, HD, HN, HT, and lewisite)
Choking agents (CG)
FSP
5.6
Compounds containing phosphorous or sulfur
Nerve agents (GA, GB, GD, VX)
Blister agents (H, HD, HN, HT, and lewisite)
IMS
5.6
Nerve agents (GA, GB, GD, VX)
Blister agents (HD, HN, Lewisite)
Colorimetric paper tests:
pH, starch iodide, DB-3
5.12-
5.13
Acidity/alkalinity, oxidizing compounds, alkylating
agents (Mustard)
Colorimetric enzyme test:
nerve agent detection kit
5.11
Nerve agents (GA, GB, GD, VX)
Colorimetric test for
arsenic compounds
5.16
Lewisite and other arsenic compounds
(1) Wipes are used for radiological screens of container surfaces using the alpha, beta, gamma scintillator
(2) Thermal susceptibility tests use a portion of sample in a contained space (biological safety cabinet).
(3) PID and CGI do not identify or distinguish between VOCs.
AC - Hydrogen cyanide GB - Sarin VX-Nerve agent
CG-Phosgene GD - Soman
CK - Cyanogen chloride HD - Sulfur mustard
DB-3 - [4-(4'-nitrobenzyl)pyridine] HN - Nitrogen mustard
GA - Tabun HT - Sulfur mustard with agent
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4.1.1 AHRF Assessments -Screening Equipment Results
During the AHRF Protocol assessments performed in 2007, the protocol and screening tool
inventory (chemical, explosive, and radiological equipment) were tested using simulants. The
selection of simulants was based on relatively non-toxic compounds that would mimic detection
properties of the target analytes. Details and results of the assessments are provided in the Final
Report - Assessment of All Hazards Receipt Facility (AHRF) Screening Protocol - Revision 1.0,
EPA/600/R-09/098, September 2010. A description of assessment samples used is provided in
Section 5.6 (Proficiency Testing). A total of 88 unknown samples were prepared and processed
during the assessments; hazard classes were identified correctly for 78 of these samples. Because
the assessment samples were unknown to assessment participants, samples were screened for
multiple potential hazards independent of the simulants they contained. Depending on the step of
the protocol during which hazards were detected, samples were either isolated (e.g., early
detection of gamma radiation) or continued through the entire AHRF protocol screening process.
Tables 2 and 3 provide present the screening results from each of the assessments at the
NYSDOH facility (Table 2) and the EPA Region 1 facility (Table 3).
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Table 2. Comparison of Sample Screening Results at U.S. EPA Region 1 AHRF
Note: Shaded results correspond to samples screened during the second round assessment.
Unshaded results correspond to samples screened during the first round assessment.
Simulant (Matrix)
Equipment
Comments
Rad
M8
PH
PID
FSP
IMS
ELITE
DB-3
Starch-
Iodide
NAV
Ticket
Thermal
Susc.
Dimethoate (water)
NEG
NEG
5
POS
POS
NEG
NEG
-
NEG
POS
-
Positive results during sample
screen inside glove box.
NEG
NEG
4-8
POS
POS
NEG
NEG
-
NEG
NEG
-
NEG
NEG
5
NEG
NEG
NEG
NEG
-
NEG
NEG
-
-
CEES
(sand)
NEG
-
-
POS
POS
POS
-
POS
-
-
-
Positive results during sample
screen inside glove box.
NEG
-
-
POS
POS
POS
-
-
-
-
-
NEG
-
-
POS
POS
POS
-
-
-
-
-
CEES
(soybean oil)
NEG
NEG1"
-
POS
POS
NEG
NEG
POS
-
-
-
NEG
NEG1"
6
POS
POS
NEG
NEG
POS
NEG
-
-
CEES (neat)
NEG
POS
6
POS
POS
POS
-
-
-
-
-
Nitrocellulose (sand)
NEG
-
-
NEG
NEG
NEG
POS
-
-
-
-
Positive result during sample
screen inside glove box.
NEG
NEG
-
NEG
NEG
NEG
POS
-
-
-
-
Positive during transport container
screen in fume hood.
Nitrocellulose (70% in IPA)
NEG
NEG
-
NEG
NEG
NEG
POS
-
-
-
-
Positive result during sample
screen inside glove box.
Gamma emitter
(Cs-137 button source)
POS
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
Positive result during transport
container screen at sample
receipt.
Gamma emitter
(Cs-137 calibration disk)
POS
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
CAFA (neat)
NEG
-
-
NEG
NEG
NEG
-
-
-
-
NEG
-
Aerosilฎ (neat)
NEG
-
-
NEG
NEG
NEG
-
-
-
-
NEG
-
Alpha/Beta
(thorium mantle)(2)
POS
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
Positive result for gamma during
package screen at sample receipt.
Alpha/Beta
(Sr-90 calibration disk)
POS
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
Positive result for beta during
package screening in fume hood.
Arsenic trichloride
(sand)
NEG
-
-
POS
POS
POS
-
-
-
-
-
Positive results obtained during
sample screen inside glove box.
NEG
-
-
POS
POS
POS
-
-
-
-
-
Arsenic trichloride
(soybean oil)(3)
NEG
NEG1"
< 4
NEG
NEG
NEG
NEG
NEG
-
-
-
-
NEG
NEG1"
-
NEG
NEG
NEG
NEG
-
-
-
-
-
Arsenic trichloride (neat)
NEG
POS
0
NEG
POS
POS
-
-
-
-
-
Positive result obtained during
sample screen inside glove box.
H2O2 (1.78% in water)
NEG
NEG
4-7
NEG
NEG
NEG
NEG
-
POS
-
-
Positive result obtained during
sample screen inside glove box.
H2O2 (1.83% in water)
NEG
NEG
4-7
NEG
NEG
NEG
NEG
-
POS
-
-
H2O2 (1.30% in water)
NEG
NEG
6
NEG
NEG
NEG
NEG
-
POS
-
-
H2O2 (35% in water)
NEG
NEG
1-2
NEG
NEG
NEG
NEG
-
POS
NEG
-
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Simulant (Matrix)
Equipment
Comments
Rad
M8
PH
PID
FSP
IMS
ELITE
DB-3
Starch-
Iodide
NAV
Ticket
Thermal
Susc.
DMMP
(sand)
NEG
-
6
POS
POS
NEG
NEG
NEG
NEG
POS
NEG
Positive results obtained during
sample screen inside glove box.
NEG
-
4-8
POS
POS
NEG
-
-
NEG
POS
-
DMMP (soybean oil)
NEG
NEG1"
-
POS
POS
NEG
NEG
POS
-
-
-
NEG
NEG lu
4-8
POS
POS
NEG
-
NEG
NEG
POS
-
DMMP (water)
NEG
NEG
4-8
POS
POS
NEG
-
-
-
POS
-
DMMP (neat)
NEG
POS
-
POS
POS
NEG
NEG
NEG
NEG
POS
-
Dimethoate
(soybean oil)
NEG
NEG r"
-
POS
NEG
NEG
NEG
NEG
-
-
-
Positive result obtained during
sample screen inside glove box.
NEG
-
-
NEG
NEG
NEG
-
-
-
POS
NEG
Dimethoate (sand)
NEG
-
5
POS
POS
NEG
NEG
NEG
NEG
NEG
-
NEG
-
4-8
POS
POS
NEG
NEG
-
NEG
POS
-
Dimethoate (neat)
NEG
POS
5-6
POS
POS
NEG
NEG
NEG
NEG
POS
-
Blank (sand)
NEG
-
-
NEG
NEG
NEG
NEG
NEG
-
-
NEG
-
NEG
NEG
-
NEG
NEG
NEG
NEG
-
-
-
-
-
Blank (soybean oil)
NEG
NEG {V
-
NEG
NEG
NEG
NEG
NEG
-
-
-
-
NEG
NEG lu
-
NEG
NEG
NEG
NEG
NEG
-
-
-
-
Blank (water)
NEG
NEG
6
NEG
NEG
NEG
NEG
-
NEG
NEG
-
-
NEG
NEG
4-8
NEG
NEG
NEG
NEG
-
NEG
NEG
-
-
(1) A drop of sample wetted the M8 paper, but no color change was observed after 1 minute.
(2) Sample was intended for alpha/beta emission. Positive result for gamma radiation only; therefore, alpha/beta radiation was not evaluated.
(3) The second sample was prepared by depositing arsenic trichloride in soybean oil onto a ceramic tile.
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Table 3. Comparison of Sample Screening Results at NYSDOH Health Center AHRF
Note: Shaded results correspond to samples screened during the second round assessment.
Unshaded results correspond to samples screened during the first round assessment.
Simulant (Matrix)
Equipment
Comments
Rad
M8
PH
PID
FSP
IMS
ELITE
DB-3
Starch
Iodide
NAV
Ticket
Thermal
Susc
CEES
(sand)
NEG
POS
1.0
POS
POS
NEG
NEG
POS
NEG
POS1"
-
Positive results during sample
screen inside glove box.
NEG
POS
1-2
POS
POS
POS
NEG
POS
NEG
POS1"
-
NEG
-
-
POS
POS
POS
-
-
-
-
-
CEES
(soybean oil)
POS(2)
NEG
4-5
POS
NEG
NEG
NEG
POS
NEG
NEG
-
Positive result for alpha during
primary container screen in fume
hood. All other positives obtained
during sample screen in glove box.
NEG
NEG
4-5
POS
POS
NEG
-
POS
-
-
-
Positive results during sample
screen inside glove box.
CEES (neat)
NEG
-
-
POS
POS
POS
-
-
-
-
-
Nitrocellulose
(sand)
NEG
NEG
7
POS
NEG
NEG
POS
-
NEG
-
-
Positive results during sample
screen inside glove box.
NEG
NEG
-
POS
NEG
NEG
POS
-
-
-
POS
Positive result during primary
container screen in fume hood.
Nitrocellulose (70% in
IPA)
NEG
NEG
7
POS
NEG
NEG
POS
NEG
POS
POS
-
Positive result during sample screen
inside glove box.
Gamma emitter
(Cs-137 button source)
POS
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
Positive result for gamma during
package screen at sample receipt.
Gamma emitter
(Cs-137 calibration disk)
POS
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
B. thuringiensis (pure)
NEG
NEG
-
NEG
NEG
NEG
NEG
-
-
-
-
-
Aerosilฎ (neat)
NEG
-
-
POS
NEG
NEG
-
-
-
-
-
Positive result during sample screen
inside glove box.
Alpha/Beta
(thorium mantle)(4)
POS
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
Positive result for gamma during
package screen at sample receipt.
Alpha/Beta
(Sr-90 calibration disk)
POS
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
Positive result for beta during
package screening in fume hood.
Arsenic trichloride
(sand)
NEG
negct
0-1
POS
-
POS
NEG
NEG
NEG
-
-
Positive results during sample
screen inside glove box.
NEG
-
-
POS
POS
POS
-
-
-
-
-
Arsenic trichloride
(soybean oil)
NEG
NEGtdJ
2
POS
-
POS
NEG
NEG
NEG
-
-
Positive results during sample
screen inside glove box.
NEG
-
-
NEG
POS
POS
-
-
-
-
-
Arsenic trichloride
(neat)
NEG
POS
0
POS
POS
POS
NEG
POS
NEG
POS(1)
-
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Simulant (Matrix)
Equipment
Comments
Rad
M8
PH
PID
FSP
IMS
ELITE
DB-3
Starch
Iodide
NAV
Ticket
Thermal
Susc
H2C>2(3.3% in water)
NEG
NEG
5-6
POS
NEG
NEG
NEG
NEG
POS
NEG
-
Positive results during sample
screen inside glove box.
H2C>2(2.9% in water)
NEG
NEG
5
NEG
NEG
NEG
NEG
NEG
POS
NEG
-
H2O2 (1.30% in water)
NEG
NEG
6
NEG
NEG
NEG
NEG
-
POS
-
-
H2O2 (35% in water)
NEG
NEG
1-2
NEG
NEG
NEG
NEG
-
POS
POS1"
-
DMMP (sand)
NEG
NEG
6-7
POS
POS
NEG
NEG
|t&J
NEG
POS
-
Positive results during sample
screen inside glove box.
NEG
NEG
5-6
POS
POS
NEG
POS(B)
NEG
NEG
POS
-
DMMP
(soybean oil)
NEG
POS
5-6
POS
NEG
NEG
NEG
POS
NEG
POS
-
NEG
POS
6
NEG
POS
NEG
-
NEG
NEG
POS
-
DMMP (water)
NEG
NEG
5
POS
POS
NEG
NEG
-
NEG
POS
-
DMMP (neat)
NEG
POS
4
POS
POS
NEG
NEG
POS
NEG
POS
-
DMMP (carpet)
NEG
-
-
POS
POS
NEG
-
-
-
-
-
Positive results screening transport
container headspace in fume hood.
Dimethoate (water)
NEG
POS1"
7
POS
POS
NEG
NEG
POS
NEG
POS
-
Positive results obtained during
sample screen inside glove box.
NEG
POS(7)
4-5
POS
POS
NEG
NEG
POS
NEG
POS
-
Dimethoate
(soybean oil)
NEG
NEGlJ)
6-7
POS
NEG
NEG
NEG
POS
NEG
POS
-
NEG
POS
6
POS
POS
NEG
-
NEG
NEG
POS
-
Dimethoate
(sand)
NEG
POS
7
POS
POS
NEG
NEG
POS
NEG
POS
-
NEG
NEG
7
POS
POS
NEG
NEG
NEG
NEG
POS
-
Dimethoate (neat)
NEG
POS
5-6
POS
POS
NEG
NEG
POS
NEG
POS
-
Blank (sand)
NEG
NEG
7.0
POS
-
NEG
NEG
NEG
NEG
NEG
-
Positive result during sample screen
inside glove box.
NEG
NEG
-
NEG
NEG
NEG
NEG
NEG
-
-
NEG
-
Blank
(soybean oil)
NEG
NEGct
6-7
NEG
NEG
NEG
NEG
POS
NEG
NEG
-
Positive results obtained during
sample screen inside glove box.
NEG
neg(3)
6
NEG
NEG
NEG
NEG
-
NEG
POS
-
Blank (water)
NEG
NEG
6
NEG
POS
NEG
NEG
NEG
NEG
POS
NEG
NEG
6
NEG
NEG
NEG
NEG
-
NEG
NEG
(1) AHRF technicians questioned this result, because the pH was well below the range required for the NAV ticket test.
(2) Beta radiation was detected on the outside of the primary sample container, but was not detected during the sample screen.
(3) Sample drop wetted paper but no color change was observed after 1 minute.
(4) Sample was intended for alpha/beta emission. A positive result was obtained for gamma radiation only; therefore, alpha/beta radiation was not evaluated.
(5) Sample was inconclusive. A very slight color change was observed.
(6) Very small pink spot was observed.
(7) Sample contained both an organic and aqueous layer. The organic layer gave a positive result.
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In general, under the controlled conditions provided during the assessments, the equipment
performed well. The relatively high success rate for the unknown samples tested during the
assessments (Table 2) was due in part to redundancy within the screening process (i.e., samples
are screened using multiple screening techniques, at an average of nine tests per sample).
Success was attributable to individuals having been well trained and practiced in using the
equipment. As a caution, it is important to note that these screening results are considered hazard
category indicators only and a not a confirmatory analytical technique. Further, testing using
these tools can be impacted by multiple factors including equipment calibration status, shelf-life,
detection sensitivity, and manufacture's quality control (i.e., product consistency). Other factors
affecting results can include temperature, humidity, operator technique (training), contaminant
concentrations, and interferences within the sample and the surrounding environment.
The Assessment Report provides a detailed explanation of these results as well as possible
explanations of why some results were not as expected. Although all tests were reasonably
reliable, chemical screening tests had the most false positives or false negatives. Reasons for the
chemical screening problems cannot be stated absolutely, but are assumed to be related to several
possibilities, such as equipment sensitivity, cross contamination, unstable sample (i.e.,
vaporized), unsuitable simulant, difficulty reading color changes, etc. Radiation and explosive
screening proved to be most reliable, with only three radiation samples having unexpected results
and one explosives sample having unexpected results.
4.1.2 Independent Laboratory Testing of AHRF Chemical Screening Equipment
During development of the AHRF Protocol, EPA sponsored a laboratory test of 16 chemical
screening tools, most of which were in use by first responders and being considered for use in
AHRFs. The tools were evaluated for detection of several highly toxic chemicals, including
chemical warfare agents. The purpose of the study was to verify instrument sensitivity at
concentrations known to be hazardous to humans within minutes (i.e., Acute Exposure Guide
Levels [AEGL] and the Research, Development, Test and Evaluation [RDTE] Standards
published in U.S. Army Regulation 50.6).6 Each technology was tested with three replicate
samples of each of three sample matrix types (i.e., vapor, liquid, or surface), containing either a
chemical warfare agent (CWA) or toxic industrial compound (TIC), and equipment results were
evaluated for false positives, false negatives, and repeatability. A summary of study results is
provided in Attachment 3; additional details are provided in technology evaluation reports listed
in Section 6.0.
6 Details regarding this study are included in the September 2007 and March 2008 Technology Evaluation Reports
listed in Section 6.0.
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4.2 Considerations in Equipment Selection
Sample screening equipment selected can vary significantly depending on the design of the
AHRF or AHRF-like area and the data and information needs of the host laboratory. As much as
possible, equipment performance and limitations should be understood prior to equipment
selection and/or interpretation of data results. Equipment selected for use in the AHRF protocol
was intentionally designed to provide an overlap in detection of target hazards, to provide overall
confirmation of results; laboratories should ensure that two or more pieces of equipment or test
types are selected to ensure this confirmation capability. Laboratories should evaluate all
available non-vendor and vendor information, and should also consider performing in-house
studies to evaluate equipment performance under conditions of anticipated use. In selecting
equipment for use in AHRF or AHRF-like areas, the following equipment capabilities and
features should be understood and considered in terms of the intended use of the resulting data:
Sample throughput (i.e., instrument response time)
Ease of use, including response interpretation
Potential for contamination
Stability and durability
Maintenance requirements
Portability and size
Ruggedness, including exposure to temperature and humidity extremes or fluctuations
Sample size needed
Sample preparation and/or destruction requirements
Application across multiple sample matrices and/or container surfaces
Detection levels and concentration ranges
Cost, including initial purchase and continuing operation
Interferences
Degree of qualitative (presence/absence) or quantitative detection
Error rate (e.g., false negatives/false positives)
Consistency/repeatability and reliability of results (precision and bias)
Intrinsic safety (e.g., will not detonate in the presence of explosives)
Hazards created by the instrument or corresponding screening test (e.g., heat source,
corrosive reagents, gases)
Consumables required for equipment use and maintenance (e.g., calibration standards,
reagents, etc.)
Availability of manufacturer/technical support
In selecting equipment for AHRF applications, it is recommended that laboratories envision the
entire screening process to determine a suite of equipment that will be used, rather than basing
selection on isolated equipment units or screening processes. This approach can facilitate
decisions that balance equipment limitations against benefits (e.g., allowing for a degree of
sensitivity and specificity), and allow for multiple tools to provide definitive indications of the
presence of hazards. To decrease equipment contamination and increase sample throughput,
laboratories should consider supplying two sets of equipment in those cases where the same
equipment would be used in more than one area of the AHRF.
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4.3 Alternative and/or Additional Equipment Currently Being Used or Considered in
AHRF
EPA and APHL are aware of approximately 20-30 laboratories that have incorporated, in varying
degrees, the screening equipment included in the AHRF protocol. Additional or alternative
equipment that is being used by EPA responders or is being used or considered for use by
laboratories with AHRF or AHRF-like operations are listed in Table 4 and Figure 1; additional
information regarding this equipment is provided throughout this section and in Attachment 1.
Equipment in listed in Table 4 and Figure 1 does not imply that it is suitable for use in an AHRF
of AHRF location. Each user must consider equipment performance capabilities and features,
such as those provided in Section 4.2, before purchasing and implementing such equipment for
AHRF purposes. Most of these additional or alternative tools can add complexity and cost to the
screening process, but can also provide additional or more confirmatory results by identifying,
with higher certainty, possible hazards and high risk agents. The information provided in this
section is intended to briefly describe the general principles of operation, as well as benefits and
limitations of equipment that is being used, or is being considered for use in screening unknown
samples.
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Table 4. Threat Categories and Sample Screening Equipment
THREAT CATEGORY CODES
Radiochemical: Chemical:
Y - Gamma
a-Alpha
(3 - Beta
Other
Nerve - Nerve agents
Mustard - Mustard agents
Lewisite - Lewisite and arsenic compounds
pH - pH
Organics - organic solvents / water
VOC - Volatile organic compounds
Blood - Blood agents
Choke - Choking agents
Explosive:
OX - Oxidizers
NO3 - Nitro compounds
Device - Explosive devices
Biological:
Bio - Biological
THREAT CATEGORY
TARGET ANALYTES
AHRF EQUIPMENT
(Included in 2008 Protocol)
ADDITIONAL / ALTERNATIVE EQUIPMENT
Attachment
Transport Container Survey (immediately upon receipt, outside the AHRF)
Radiological
Y
Gamma ray emission
MicroR meter gamma
scintillator
Alpha, beta, and gamma Geiger-Muller (GM)
detector
Digital alpha, beta, and gamma GM or scintillation
rate meter
Digital gamma rate meter / scaler
Gamma scintillation rate meter
Ion chamber meter
Radioisotope identifier
1a
Transport Container Screen (inside the AHRF)
Radiological
a /13
Alpha and beta emitters
(container surface)
Alpha, beta, and gamma
scintillator with data logger
Alpha, beta, and gamma GM detector
Alpha and beta sample counter
Digital alpha, beta, and gamma rate meter/scaler
Digital alpha rate meter/scaler
Portable alpha and beta rate meter
1a
Y
Gamma ray emitters (contact
dose)
Alpha, beta, and gamma GM detector
Digital alpha, beta, and gamma rate meter/scaler
Ion chamber meter
Chemical
Nerve
Nerve agents
Wipe with M8 paper
Ion Mobility Spectrometer (IMS)'1'
Photoionization Detector (PID)('
Flame Spectrophotometer (FSP)(3)
Colorimetric indicator paper
1b
Mustard
Mustards
Lewisite
Lewisite
VOC
Any organic liquid
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THREAT CATEGORY
TARGET ANALYTES
AHRF EQUIPMENT
(Included in 2008 Protocol)
ADDITIONAL / ALTERNATIVE EQUIPMENT
Attachment
no3
Nitro aromatics, nitrate-esters,
nitramines, inorganic nitrate
compounds
Colorimetric indicator paper
Colorimetric spray kit
1b
Device
Explosive devices
X ray
1j
Primary Sample Container Screen (in fume hood or equivalent)
Radiological
a / (3
Alpha and beta emitters
(container surface)
Alpha, beta, and gamma
scintillator with data logger
Alpha, beta, and gamma GM detector
Alpha and beta sample counter
Analog alpha, beta, and gamma GM / scintillation
rate meter
Digital alpha, beta, and gamma ratemeter / scaler
Digital alpha rate meter/scaler
Portable alpha and beta rate meter
1a
Y
Gamma ray emitters (contact
dose)
Alpha, beta, and gamma GM detector
Analog alpha, beta, and gamma GM / scintillation
rate meter
Digital alpha, beta, and gamma ratemeter / scaler
Ion chamber meter
Explosives
no3
Nitro aromatics, nitrate-esters,
nitramines, inorganic nitrate
compounds
Colorimetric indicator paper
Colorimetric spray kit
1b
Chemical
Nerve
Nerve agents
Flame Spectrophotometer
(FSP)
Ion mobility spectrometer
(IMS)1
Flame ionization detector (FID)
Fourier transform infrared spectroscopy (FTIR)
Infrared spectroscopy (IR)
Ion trap mobility spectrometry (ITMS)
Photoionization detector (PID)(2)
Raman spectroscopy
1e(FSP)
1c (IMS/ITMS)
1f (PID / FID)
1g (FTIR / IR /
Raman)
Mustard
Mustards
Lewisite
Lewisite
VOC
Compounds containing
phosphorus or sulfur
Nerve
Nerve agents
M8 paper
Colorimetric indicator paper
1b
Mustard
Mustards
Lewisite
Lewisite
VOC
Organic liquids
Water-finding paper
Sample Screen (in glove box)
Radiological
a / (3
Alpha and beta emitters (sample
surface)
Alpha and beta scintillator
with data logger
Analog alpha, beta, and gamma GM or
scintillation rate meter
Digital alpha, beta, and gamma rate meter/scaler
Digital alpha rate meter/scaler
1a
Other
Radiological air particulate
sampling
Radiological air sampler
Gamma emitters (dose rate)
Gamma air monitor/tracer
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THREAT CATEGORY
TARGET ANALYTES
AHRF EQUIPMENT
(Included in 2008 Protocol)
ADDITIONAL / ALTERNATIVE EQUIPMENT
Attachment
Explosives
no3
Nitro aromatics, nitrate-esters,
nitramines, inorganic nitrate
compounds
Colorimetric indicator paper
Colorimetric kit
Colorimetric tube kit
1b
OX
no3
Explosive materials
Energetic materials
Thermal susceptibility test(4)
Chemical
Nerve
Nerve agents
Flame Spectrophotometer
(FSP)(3)
Ion mobility spectrometer
(IMS)0'
Photoionization detector
(PID)(2) and combustible gas
indicator (CGI)
Flame ionization detector (FID)
Fourier transform infrared spectroscopy (FTIR)
Gas chromatography (GC)('
Infrared spectroscopy (IR)(5)
Ion trap mobility spectrometry (ITMS)
Raman spectroscopy
1e(FSP)
1c (IMS/ITMS)
1f (PID / FID)
1g (FTIR / IR /
Raman)
1h (GC)
Mustard
Mustards
Lewisite
Lewisite
Choke
Choking agents
Blood
Blood agents
VOC
Pest
Compounds containing
phosphorus or sulfur
Most VOCs. Does not identify or
distinguish between VOCs
Nerve
Nerve agents
Colorimetric enzyme test:
CWA detection kit
Colorimetric indicator paper and tubes
1b
Mustard
Mustards / alkylating agents
Colorimetric test: [4-4'-
nitrobenzyl)pyridine] (DB-3)
dye kit
Lewisite
Lewisite and arsenic compounds
Colorimetric test for arsenic
OX
Oxidizing agents
Colorimetric tests: starch
iodide paper
Peroxide paper
PH
Acidity / alkalinity
Colorimetric test: pH paper
Biological
Bio
Aerosolized particulates
Float test
Pathogens (bacteria, viruses, and
protozoa)
(1) IMS equipment detects HD and HN mustards only. Due to low response for VX, manufacturers recommend a heated, direct - contact attachment to
reliably detect this compound.
(2) References listed in Attachment 1 suggest that PIDs may not reliably detect CWAs, particularly if the device is not regularly cleaned or used at conditions
other than room temperature and relative humidity of 50%.
(3) Due to low response of FSP for VX, manufacturers recommend a heated, direct - contact attachment to reliably detect this compound.
(4) Thermal susceptibility test is to be performed inside the bio-safety cabinet.
(5) Aliquot is taken from sample if instrument cannot be operated in glove box
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Figure 1. Sample Screening Equipment
AHRF Protocol
Equipment
Alternative / Additional
Equipment
Receipt of transportation container (outside AHRF)
Radiological
y Spectrometer-MicroRmeter
Secondary and primary sample container
(inside AHRF - fumehood)
Radiological
a/p/y Scintillator with data logger (container
surface / contact dose)
Chemical
M8 paper (colorimetric)
Ion Mobility Spectrometry (primary container only)
Flame Spectrophotometry (primary container only)
Explosives
Colorimetric
Sample screen inside glovebox
Radiological
a/p Scintillator with data logger
Chemical
Ion Mobility Spectrometry
Flame Spectrophotometry
Photo Ionization Detector
Explosives
Colorimetric
Thermal susceptibility test1-1'
Biologicalฎ
Float Test
Footnotes:
(1) Thermal susceptibility test is performed using a small
sample aliquot, inside the bio-safety cabinet
<2) Aliquot taken from sample if instrument cannot be
operated in glovebox
<3) See Section 4.3.4 of this document for a discussion of
biological screening
Receipt of transportation container (outside AHRF)
Radiological
a/p/y Geiger-Miieller detector
Digital a/p/y Geiger-Miieller / scintillation rate meter
Digital y rate meter/sealer
y scintillation rate meter
Ion chamber meter
Explosives
X Ray
Secondary and primary sample container
(inside AHRF - fumehood)
Radiological
a/p/y Geiger-Miieller detector
a/p sample counter
Analog a/p/y Geiger-Miieller / scintillation rate meter
Digital a/p/y ratemeter / scaler
Portable a/p rate meter
Ion chamber meter
Chemical
Flame Ionization Detector
Fourier Transform Infrared Spectroscopy
Infrared Spectroscopy
Ion Trap Mobility Spectrometry
Photo Ionization Detector
Raman Spectroscopy
Explosives
Colorimetric (spray kit)
Sample screen inside glovebox
Radiological
Analog a/p/y Geiger-Miieller / scintillation rate meter
Digital a/p/y rate meter / scaler
Digital a rate meter / scaler
Radiological air sampling
y air monitor / tracer
Chemical
Flame Ionization Detector
Fourier Transform Infrared Spectroscopy
Infrared Spectroscopy
Gas Chromatography
Ion Trap Mobility Spectrometry
Raman spectroscopy
Explosives
Colorimetric (tube and spray kits)
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4.3.1 Chemical
The information provided below is organized first by equipment that is included in the September
2008 AHRF Protocol detecting chemical hazards, followed by alternative or additional equipment
that might be used to address the same hazard. Additional information regarding equipment
capabilites is provided in Section 4.1, Attachments lb - li, and Attachment 3. Sample screening
equipment that is discussed in Section 4.1 and used in the September 2008 AHRF Protocol
includes the following:
Colorimetric indicator papers, tubes, and enzyme detection kits
Flame spectrophotometer (FSP)
Ion mobility spectrometer (IMS)
Photoionization detector (PID)
Additional or alternative equipment that is either currently in use, or is being considered for use
by EPA and/or AHRFs includes the following:
Flame ionization detector (FID)
Fourier transform infrared spectroscopy (FTIR) / infrared spectrometry (IR)
Gas chromatography (GC)
Ion trap mobility spectrometry (ITMS)
Raman spectroscopy
Colorimetric indicator papers and tubes change color in the presence of a particular compound
or hazard, in liquid or vapor form. In general, colorimetric tests are rapid and inexpensive.
Although this screening tool typically requires little maintenance, colorimetric papers and tubes
require replacement following use or expiration. Users should be cautioned that some
colorimetric tests can result in false positives generated by many organic compounds, or may not
be sensitive enough to detect low concentrations of hazards that may still pose a health danger.
Color changes produced by these tests also can be difficult to discern and interpret, and results
obtained may be affected by the operator's ability to perceive certain color changes. Colorimetric
tests are best used to identify compounds in liquid or air.
Flame spectrophotometers (FSPs) use atomic emission spectrometry to identify elements that
can be excited by the thermal energy of the flame, and it can be optimized for known chemicals
to provide rapid, real-time responses. FSPs are limited in that the use of a flame destroys the
sample during analysis and makes them unsuitable for use in areas containing combustible gases.
An exception is the AP2Ce model, which is designed to be used in explosive environments.
FSPs also may not be specific for detection of sulfur- and phosphorus-containing compounds.
Due to low response for VX, manufacturers recommend a heated, direct-contact attachment to
reliably detect this compound. This lack of specificity can result in false positives for compounds
such as CWAs. FSPs require special batteries and may require frequent gas calibration for
optimum performance.
Ion mobility spectrometers (IMSs) are used to separate and identify ionized molecules in the
gas phase based on their ion mobility in a carrier buffer gas. Quick response, high sensitivity, and
a low occurrence of false negatives (when used within instrument thresholds) as well as the
potential to detect many types of chemicals are some of the advantages. The ionization potential
of certain target compounds may require special or higher range lamps. Due to low response for
VX, manufacturers recommend a heated, direct-contact attachment to reliably detect this
compound. IMS detectors require a high degree of maintenance, and some may use a radioactive
source, such as Ni-63, which may impact transportability and storage. Additionally, IMSs with
short drift tubes may produce poor resolution and/or false positives. Portable or handheld IMSs
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tend to require that the ions monitored be programmed in to elicit an alarm response; therefore, its
use to detect non-specific toxic compounds may be limited.
Photoionization detectors (PIDs) use photons in the ultra-violet range to ionize molecules and
are best used for air or headspace monitoring. These detectors can be optimized for specific
compounds and have rapid, real-time responses. PIDs are limited in that they will not work well
for compounds with low vapor pressure and, unless specifically programmed, many are not
compound specific. For optimum performance, PIDs may also require frequent lamp cleaning
and special batteries.
Flame ionization detectors (FIDs) are similar to PIDs, but use a hydrogen flame rather than a
light source. Like PIDs, FIDs can be optimized for specific compounds, particularly
hydrocarbons, and offer rapid, real-time responses. FIDs are limited in that they will not work
well for compounds with low vapor pressures and, unless specifically programmed, many are not
compound specific. Like FSPs, the use of a flame destroys the sample during analysis and may
make an FID a poor choice to use in the presence of combustible gases. Additionally, FIDs may
require frequent gas calibration for optimum performance and special batteries. FIDs are
best used when monitoring air for compounds that can be burned.
Fourier transform infrared spectroscopy (FTIR) and infrared spectrometry (IR) work by
passing a beam of infrared light through a sample and measuring how much energy is absorbed at
each wavelength. FTIR and IR boast large detection libraries of organic and inorganic
compounds, and directly test for statistical equivalence between the measured material and each
library material. Results interpretation requires some level of expertise, and affects the false
identification rate. Compounds must have a covalent bond, and mixtures or complex matrices
can elicit poor responses. Equipment also has a tendency to identify only the most predominant
material(s) contained in a complex sample or matrix. Detection of ionic metals and weakly
absorbing compounds is limited. FTIR offers an advantage over IR in that multiple wavelengths
can be monitored simultaneously. FTIR and IR are best used in the field to determine unknown
liquid or solid substances.
Gas chromatography (GC) works by vaporizing an injected sample or sample extract, the
components of which are separated using a column. GC offers a variety of detectors (e.g., mass
spectrometry, photo ionization) to identify and measure specific compounds, allowing for
detection at low concentrations, and separation of complex mixtures (e.g., multi-phase or highly
contaminated samples), and a robust compound library generally unmatched by other devices.
GC limitations include the need for experienced operators to use, maintain, and troubleshoot the
instrument; relatively long analysis time; poor response for compounds that do not ionize well;
and indirect analysis of functional groups. The equipment also requires consumable carrier and
calibration gases that require specific safety precautions and can increase equipment costs. With
the appropriate sample preparation equipment and materials, GC can be used for determining
compounds in liquid, solid, or vapor forms.
Ion trap mobility spectrometry (ITMS) is a version of IMS with improved performance. ITMS
can identify compounds in a mixture and determine their quantity through measuring the time of
flight of ionized molecules down a drift tube. Differential migration of ions through a
homogeneous electric field offers improved sensitivity over conventional IMS. Limitations and
costs associated with this equipment are similar to those associated with the IMS equipment.
Raman spectroscopy works by Raman effect, which occurs when light passes through a
molecule and interacts with the bonds and electron cloud of that molecule. Advantages of Raman
spectroscopy include detection through non-opaque containers and identification of solid or liquid
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compounds as well as some ionic compounds. Some limitations of Raman spectroscopy include:
small compound libraries; fluorescence interference from target compounds, container, or
sunlight; poor detection of dilute concentrations (<10%); difficulty separating mixtures; and lack
of detection of metals and some ionic compounds. Raman spectrometry is best coupled with IR
or FTIR for the identification of unknown liquid or solid substances.
4.3.2 Explosives
The information provided below is organized first by equipment that is included in the September
2008 AHRF Protocol detecting explosive hazards, followed by alternative or additional
equipment that might be used to address the same hazard. Additional information regarding
equipment capabilites is provided in Section 4.1 and Attachments lb - lj. Sample screening
equipment that is discussed in Section 4.1 and used in the September 2008 AHRF Protocol
includes the following:
Colorimetric
Thermal susceptibility test
Additional or alternative equipment that is either currently in use, or is being considered for use
by EPA and/or AHRFs includes the following:
Fourier transform infrared spectroscopy (FTIR)
Ion mobility spectrometer (IMS)
Ion trap mobility spectrometry (ITMS)
X ray
Colorimetric indicator papers, tubes and spray kits change color in the presence of particular
explosive compounds (e.g., oxidizers, nitro- or nitrate-containing compounds). In general,
colorimetric tests are rapid and inexpensive. Although this screening tool typically requires little
maintenance, colorimetric papers and tubes require replacement following use or expiration.
Users should be cautioned that some colorimetric tests can result in false positives generated by
many organic compounds, or may not be sensitive enough to detect low concentrations of hazards
that may still pose a health danger. Some colorimetric tests require the use of heat or corrosive
agents that may pose health and safety concerns, particularly when used in a glove box. Color
changes produced by these tests also can be difficult to discern and interpret, and results obtained
may be affected by the operator's ability to perceive certain color changes. Colorimetric tests are
best used to identify compounds in liquid or air.
Thermal susceptibility test determines whether the sample contains explosive or energetic
materials. The test involves holding a small amount of sample to a flame, and observing the
reaction. The advantages of this test are its low cost and use of readily available equipment (i.e.,
high-quality butane lighter). Disadvantages include its use of an open flame (which may cause
safety concerns) and its inability to identify secondary explosives, which require more energy for
detection or ignition than can be provided by a flame.
Fourier transform infrared spectroscopy (FTIR) works by passing a beam of infrared light
through a sample and measuring how much energy is absorbed at each wavelength. FTIR boasts
large detection libraries of organic and inorganic compounds, and directly test for statistical
equivalence between the measured material and each library material. Results interpretation
requires some level of expertise, and affects the false identification rate. Compounds must have a
covalent bond, and mixtures or complex matrices can elicit poor responses. Equipment also has a
tendency to identify only the most predominant material(s) contained in a complex sample or
matrix. Detection of ionic metals and weakly absorbing compounds is limited. FTIR is capable
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of monitoring multiple wavelengths and is best used in the field to determine unknown liquid or
solid substances.
Ion mobility spectrometers (IMSs) are used to separate and identify ionized molecules in the
gas phase based on their ion mobility in a carrier buffer gas. Quick response, high sensitivity, and
a low occurrence of false negatives (when used within instrument thresholds) as well as the
potential to detect many types of chemicals are some of the advantages. IMS detectors require a
high degree of maintenance, and some use a radioactive source, such as Ni-63, which may impact
transportability and storage. Additionally, IMSs with short drift tubes may produce poor
resolution and/or false positives. Portable or handheld IMSs tend to require that the ions
monitored be programmed in to illicit an alarm response; therefore, its use to detect non-specific
toxic compounds may be limited.
Ion trap mobility spectrometry (ITMS) is a version of IMS (see IMS description above) that
can identify compounds in a mixture and determine their quantity through measuring the time of
flight of ionized molecules down a drift tube. Differential migration of ions through a
homogeneous electric field offers improved sensitivity over conventional IMS.
X ray machines and devices equipped with computed axial tomography can be used to scan
containers and suspicious packages for explosive and detonation devices. Specially designed
software containing libraries of known explosive threats can color code suspected threats to assist
the operator identification. X ray detection is limited in that compounds hidden within electronic
devices or other containers cannot be identified and may not be detected.
4.3.3 Radiological
The information provided below is organized first by equipment that is included in the September
2008 AHRF Protocol for detecting radiological hazards, followed by alternative or additional
equipment that might be used to address the same hazard. Additional information regarding
equipment capabilities is provided in Section 4.1 and Attachment la.
Radiological surveys should be performed by personnel trained in, and familiar with, the
equipment that is used. It is recommended that these procedures be performed by a radiation
technician/professional trained to use the AHRF equipment and to perform the calculations that
may be required to obtain survey results. Technical expertise regarding use of this equipment is
available within EPA's Office of Radiation and Indoor Air (ORIA) or other federal agencies,
such as the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), EPA's Radiological Laboratory Sample
Screening Analysis Guide for Incidents of National Significance (EPA 402-R-09-008, June 2009)
available at: www.epa.gov/narel. and the Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment
Center (FRMAC). Information also is available through U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)
Reach Back Programs, including: Radiological Assistance Program (RAP), which provides initial
DOE radiological emergency response including identifying the presence of radioactive
contamination on personnel, equipment, and property at an incident or accident scene; Radiation
Emergency Assistance Center/Training Site (REAC/TS), which provides 24-hour medical
consultation on health problems associated with radiation accidents, as well as training programs
for emergency response teams comprised of health professionals; the Nuclear Emergency Search
Team (NEST), which provides technical response to resolve incidents involving improvised
nuclear and radiological dispersal devices, including locating and identifying devices or
materials; and the Joint Technical Operations Team (JTOT), which is a combined DoD and DOE
team that provides technical advice and assistance to DoD.
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Sample screening equipment that is discussed in Section 4.1 and used in the September 2008
AHRF Protocol includes the following:
Gamma spectrometer - radioisotope identifier (RIID)/MicroR meter
Alpha/beta sample counter
Alpha/beta scintillators (ABS)
Additional or alternative equipment that is either currently in use, or is being considered for use
by EPA and/or other organizations in AHRF projects includes the following:
Geiger-Miiller (GM) detectors
Ion chamber (IC)
Gamma sample counter
Digital alpha, beta, and gamma rate meter/sealer
Radiological air sampler
Gamma air monitor/tracer
Gamma Spectrometer - Radioisotope identifier (RIID)/ MicroR meter is a portable gamma
spectroscopy system that detects and identifies multiple gamma and x-ray nuclides, providing
qualitative and quantitative analysis. The RIID may be operated in a variety of survey modes
with gamma-ray isotopic dose rates as the default mode of operation. The RIID uses a sodium
iodide crystal with a thallium activator Nal(Tl)) gamma scintillation detector or a HP(Ge)
detector, to allow for detection and identification of gamma or x-rays from 15 keV to 3 meV.
Gamma rays interact with the Nal(Tl) detector crystal producing light that is converted to an
electronic pulse by a photomultipler tube coupled to the detector. The charge is collected,
amplified, and shaped to form an electrical pulse, which is digitized and sorted according to its
amplitude (pulse height) and then stored as a count at a particular energy in a multichannel
analyzer. An HP(Ge) detector has higher resolution for gamma rays than the Nal(Tl) detector,
and must be operated at liquid nitrogen temperature because it is a semiconductor. Gamma- and
x-rays interact with the HP(Ge) detector to produce ion pairs. Electrons are collected to produce
output pulses that are amplified, digitized, and sorted according to their amplitude and then stored
as a count at a particular energy in a multichannel analyzer. The spectra produced by Nal(Tl) and
HP(Ge) detectors contain peaks at energies that are characteristic of various radionuclides, and
are analyzed using instrument-specific software algorithms to determine the radionuclides that are
present. Note that RIIDs, especially those with Nal(Tl) detectors, may misidentify the
radionuclides present due to spectral anomalies and ambiguities in the analysis, and a secondary
analysis of the gamma-ray spectrum by an expert may be needed to ensure the accuracy of the
identification. Use of HP(Ge) detectors will minimize radioisotope misidentification. When
unshielded these systems have high backgrounds from naturally occurring radionuclides.
Alpha/beta sample counter uses zinc sulfide, with a silver activator (ZnS(Ag)) adhered to a
thick plastic scintillation disk for detection of alpha and beta particles. The ZnS(Ag) scintillator
is used for measuring alpha particles. The plastic scintillator is used for measuring beta particles
and has low sensitivity for interference from gamma rays. The detector is connected to a dual
channel scaler to create an alpha/beta sample counter. A radioactive particle strikes the
scintillator and produces a flash of low energy photons, which are directed to the photosensitive
surface of a photomultiplier tube (PMT) where they eject electrons via the photoelectric effect.
The electrons are collected in the photomultiplier and amplified to yield a current pulse, and the
current pulse is converted to a voltage pulse height proportional to the number of photoelectrons
and photons reaching the tube, which in turn is proportional to the initial energy of the electron.
The pulse height analyzer provides alpha beta separation and displays the counts for each on
dedicated readouts.
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Alpha/beta scintillator (ABS) uses zinc sulfide, with a silver activator, (ZnS(Ag)) adhered to a
thick plastic scintillation material for detection of alpha particles and beta particles. The ZnS(Ag)
scintillator is used for measuring alpha particles. The plastic scintillator is used for measuring
beta particles and has low sensitivity for interference from gamma rays. A radioactive particle
strikes the scintillator and produces a flash of low energy photons. These photons are directed to
the photosensitive surface of a photomultiplier tube (PMT) where they eject electrons via the
photoelectric effect. The electrons are collected in the photomultiplier and amplified to yield a
current pulse, which is converted to a voltage pulse height proportional to the number of
photoelectrons and photons reaching the tube, which in turn is proportional to the initial energy of
the fast electron.
Geiger-Muller (GM) detectors are used for non-specific detection of ionizing radiation.
Depending on their configuration, these detectors will respond to beta, gamma, and less reliably
to alpha emissions. The GM detector can be configured in three basic designs: side window
(cylindrical), end window, and pancake. The primary application of the side window GM is the
measurement of gamma exposure rates, however, its wall can be thin enough to permit higher
energy betas (>300 keV) to be counted. The end window is most commonly used to count beta
activity, but can also be used to count alpha particles; however, alpha efficiencies are low due to
attenuation in the window of the detector. The pancake GM tube, a truncated cylinder resembling
a pancake, is used primarily to detect beta radiation, but also has some sensitivity for gamma and
(low sensitivity) for alpha. It is often used for counting surfaces, air filters, and swipes. As with
the end window GM tube, one end is covered with a thin (usually mica) window. When ionizing
radiation passes through the cylinder, some of the gas molecules are ionized, creating charged
ions and electrons. The strong electric field created by the electrodes accelerates the ions towards
the cathode and the electrons towards the anode. The ion pairs gain sufficient energy to ionize
further gas molecules through collisions, creating an avalanche of charged particles, resulting in a
short, intense pulse of current that passes from the negative electrode to the positive electrode and
is measured or counted. Most detectors include an audio amplifier that produces an audible click
on discharge. The number of pulses per second measures the intensity of the radiation field.
Typical GM counters display a count rate (e.g., counts per minute [cpm] and/or an exposure rate
(e.g. milliroentgen per hour [mR/h]). The exposure rate does not relate to a dose rate as the
detector does not discriminate between radiations of different energies. The instrument will not
detect alpha or beta energies below 4MeV or 70keV, respectively.
Ion chambers (ICs) measure the number of ions within a pressurized or non-pressurized gas
medium (usually air). If equipped with a mylar window, these instruments can detect gamma
rays, beta particles, and alpha particles. A gas filled enclosure is contained between two
conducting electrodes. When the gas between the electrodes is ionized by alpha particles, beta
particles, or gamma-ray emission, the ions and dissociated electrons move to the electrodes of the
opposite polarity, creating an ionization current that may be measured by a galvanometer or
electrometer. Each ion essentially deposits or moves a small electric charge to or from an
electrode such that the accumulated charge is proportional to the number of like-charged ions. A
voltage potential (which differs depending on whether alpha particles, beta particles, or gamma
ray are the target) is applied between the electrodes, allowing the device to work continuously by
sweeping up electrons and preventing the device from becoming saturated. This equipment
generally has a slow response time.
Digital alpha, beta, and gamma rate meter/sealer is a detector system utilizing one or a
combination of either a GM detector, ABS detector, or proportional counter detector with a
digital readout. The detector system can be either stationary or portable. Detection limitations
are dependent on detector types selected for use; detector efficiency(s) for the analyte (alpha,
beta, gamma) being measured; emission energy(s) of the alpha particle, beta particle, and/or
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gamma ray being measured; attenuation coefficients) of the sample media; and geometric
configuration of the source to the detector.
Radiological air sampler is a device that mechanically pulls a known quantity of ambient air,
containing radioactive aerosols of particulates/gas, through filter paper and/or absorption
cartridges. The filter paper or cartridges are subsequently analyzed for alpha- beta- and gamma-
emitting radionuclides in air-particulates or gases.
Gamma air monitor/tracer is a continuous dose evaluation monitoring system for gamma
emitters in ambient air. Data is transmitted from one or more monitoring systems to a centralized
data collection repository for evaluation. This equipment detects only gamma radiation, and
unshielded systems have high backgrounds from naturally occurring radioactivity.
4.3.4 Biological
The AHRF protocol is currently designed to address most unknown samples, however, the
biological screening test included in the 2008 Protocol is limited to a simple "float test," which is
considered inadequate by the majority of existing facilities and stakeholders. PCR is being
considered for use at several locations, but can be pathogen specific and requires a relatively high
level of expertise and specialized materials. For this reason, these tests were not included in the
2008 AHRF protocol. Instead, the protocol recommends that once the explosive, radiological,
and chemical screens are complete, an aliquot, or sub-sample be collected for transfer into an
appropriate laboratory for biological analyses.
Many laboratories have decided to include PCR as a part of their screening process. Others have
also added microscopy and immunoassays. Although these additions add complexity and require
specialized expertise, the tests can provide significantly improved information regarding the
presence of biological hazards. Laboratories that are interested in screening or handling unknown
samples for biological hazards should be prepared to provide ample BSL-3 space and personnel
protection to accommodate necessary equipment, material storage and sample manipulation.
Handling such samples outside a glove box would require dedicated lab space and safety
envelops similar to those used in a standard BSL-3 laboratory.
5.0 Quality Control
5.1 Quality Assurance and Quality Control Procedures
The AHRF Protocol assumes that each facility will have Quality Assurance and Quality Control
(QA/QC) procedures that describe, at a minimum, how samples will be analyzed, instrument
calibration and routine instrument checks, equipment maintenance schedules, sample tracking
procedures, staff training, data reporting, and storage of chemicals and reagents.
5.2 Quality Assurance/Quality Control included in AHRF Protocol
The AHRF Protocol assumes that the host laboratory has an approved QMP in place and
implements QMP QA/QC procedures and requirements as appropriate for the AHRF or AHRF-
like area. The protocol also provides certain QA/QC measures that can and should be applied
generally across all AHRF or AHRF-like areas, including:
Documented standardized screening procedures
Sample identification and tracking numbers
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Documentation of sample receipt/transfer on chain-of-custody forms
Example standardized data reporting forms
Instructions to screen areas within the AHRF (i.e., glove box and hood) for contamination
5.3 Equipment Maintenance
The AHRFs and AHRF-like areas are intended for screening unknown samples that may be
received by a laboratory to protect the laboratory from hazards and to facilitate decision making
regarding sample dissemination. Because these facilities and areas are intended for use in such
emergency situations, rather than in routine sample screening or analysis, it is important to
establish procedures to ensure that AHRFs and AHRF equipment are maintained and ready for
immediate use if needed, and to ensure that staff is trained and readily available. Routine
schedules for equipment calibration and maintenance are critical to ensure that results will
support decision making; these tasks cannot be performed on an as-needed basis. Monthly
checks, using calibration standards or surrogate samples (depending on the equipment), are
recommended. Each laboratory also should establish a routine proficiency testing (PT) program
that includes testing equipment readings and responsiveness (see Section 5.6). If possible, it is
also recommended that laboratories have a second set of equipment readily available to
compensate for possible equipment malfunctions or cases when equipment maintenance must be
performed off-site. To decrease equipment contamination and increase sample throughput,
laboratories should consider supplying two sets of equipment in those cases where the same
equipment would be used in more than one area of the AHRF.
5.4 Additional Quality Assurance/Quality Control Considerations
Each AHRF should have a site-specific Quality Assurance or Quality Management Plan that
includes procedures for monitoring and controlling contamination, engineering controls,
equipment, data reporting, and sample storage and disposal. In addition to the QA/QC
procedures included in the AHRF Protocol, laboratories should consider applying requirements
meant to maximize the accuracy of sample screening results. These requirements are highly
dependent on each specific sample-receipt scenario and must consider the number, type, and
amount of sample(s) received, the type of sample screening required, and the rapidity of decision
making needed. Such requirements could include: documentation of equipment calibration prior
to sample screening (when sufficient time is available), screening replicate aliquots of each
sample (when sufficient sample material and time is available), and periodic screening of blanks
and performance evaluation samples. Laboratories also should evaluate equipment to establish
expected precision and bias of the screening techniques that can be used to assess whether
observed error rates (e.g., false positive/false negative) meet or exceed tolerable error rates.
5.5 Training
Experience using the AHRF screening equipment is critical to accurate and rapid decision
making, and the importance of training cannot be over-emphasized. AHRFs and AHRF-like
areas must be ready to function at a moment's notice, and AHRF staff should be prepared to
interpret equipment results, communicate, and make decisions on short notice. During the AHRF
assessments in 2007, observers and AHRF staff noted difficulty interpreting results, particularly
with colorimetric tests. In addition, as noted throughout the AHRF Protocol, radiological surveys
should be performed by personnel trained in, and familiar with, the equipment used. The protocol
recommends further that these procedures be performed by a radiation technician/professional
trained both in the use of the AHRF equipment and in performing the calculations that may be
required to obtain survey results. Equipment vendors often offer training sessions, either in
person, by telephone, or online. The New York State Public Health Laboratory in Albany, New
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York, also has been offering training since installation of their AHRF prototype in 2008,
including hands-on training on screening equipment used in the 2008 AHRF Protocol, safety
considerations, and interpretation of data results. Additional information on this training is
provided in Section 2.2 of this document. Each laboratory should determine a schedule to ensure
this training is provided initially and periodically as needed, and should determine a site-specific
PT program (see Section 5.6).
5.6 Proficiency Testing
In addition to training, AHRF trial runs or assessments are recommended frequently enough to
ensure AHRF personnel and equipment are adequately prepared. These trials can be combined
with routine equipment maintenance schedules and scenarios that involve use of the AHRF
equipment to screen unknown samples (including complex-matrix samples), and should address
both the use of screening equipment and interpretation of results to support decision making.
Screening unknown samples for potential hazards is a complex and challenging process that
poses numerous considerations. As noted in Section 4.0 and Attachment 1, each analytical
technique has inherent limitations that require testing various matrices spiked with compounds of
concern (or surrogates) to better understand and interpret equipment responses.
Simulant samples used during the 2007 assessments of the AHRF screening procedures are listed
in Table 6. Simulant samples were tested independently, prior to the assessments to ensure the
simulants and concentration levels were sufficient to produce a response using the AHRF
equipment, and to document expected results for comparison with results obtained during the
assessments. Factors considered for determining simulant concentrations included: (1) risk levels
of the agent that the simulant is targeting, (2) hazard type (inhalation, dermal contact, ingestion),
and (3) expected equipment sensitivity. Results are provided in EPA's Final Report -
Assessment of All Hazards Receipt Facility (AHRF) Protocol.
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Table 5. Samples Used during AHRF Protocol Assessments
Simulant Samples used during Assessments1
Target Hazard
Initial Assessments
Follow-up Assessments
DMMP, neat
DMMP, neat (applied to carpet)
Nerve agent (G-agent)
Not analyzed
DMMP in water (18-23 mg/g)
Nerve agent (G-agent)
DMMP in soybean oil (19-20 mg/g)
DMMP in soybean oil (21-24 mg/g)
Nerve agent (G-agent)
DMMP in sand (19-23 mg/g)
DMMP in sand (21-22 mg/g)
Nerve agent (G-agent)
Dimethoate, neat
Not analyzed
Nerve agent (V-agent)
Dimethoate in water
(11 - 22 mg/g, dissolved first in MeCh)
Dimethoate in water (24.16 mg/g)
Nerve agent (G-agent)
Dimethoate in sand (21 - 40 mg/g)
Dimethoate in sand (18-20 mg/g)
Nerve agent (G-agent)
Dimethoate in soybean oil (18-24 mg/g)
Dimethoate in soybean oil (20-22 mg/g)
Nerve agent (G-agent)
CEES, neat
Not analyzed
Blister agent (HD)
CEES in sand (11 - 22 mg/g)
CEES in sand (11-12 mg/g)
Blister agent (HD)
CEES in sand (10 - 12 mg/g)
Not analyzed
Blister agent (HD)
CEES in soybean oil (10 - 12 mg/g)
CEES in soybean oil (10-12 mg/g)
Blister agent (HD)
H2O2 (2 - 3%, 35% by weight in water)
H2O2 (1 -2% by weight in water)
Oxidizer
Nitrocellulose (70% by weight in IPA)
Not analyzed
Explosive
Nitrocellulose (3 - 8% in sand/lPA)
Nitrocellulose (2-4% in sand/lPA)
Explosive
AsCb, neat
Not analyzed
Blister agent (Lewisite)
AsCb in sand (19-20 mg/g)
AsCb in sand (29-31 mg/g)
Blister agent (Lewisite)
AsChin soybean oil (19-20 mg/g)
AsCb in soybean oil (29 mg/g)
Blister agent (Lewisite)
AsCb in soybean oil
(30.94 mg/g applied to ceramic tile)
Blister agent (Lewisite)
< 1 |jCi Cesium-137 button source tlJ
5 |jCi Cesium-137 calibration disk
Gamma radiation
Thorium lantern mantle ll,M
0.1 |jCi Strontium-90 (calibration disk
Alpha/beta radiation
Celiteฎ Analytical Filter Aid (CAFA)
Aerosilฎ
Biological
Bacillus thuringiensis
Not analyzed
Biological
Blank, water
Blank, water
Blank
Blank, sand
Blank, sand
Blank
Blank, soybean oil
Blank, soybean oil
Blank
AsCb = Arsenic trichloride
DMMP = Dimethyl methylphosphonate
CEES = 2-Chloroethyl ethyl sulfide
H2O2 = Hydrogen peroxide
IPA = Isopropyl alcohol
MeCh = Methylene chloride
Note: Assessment results indicated a need for additional evaluation of non-reference sample matrices such
as those that might be received at a facility (e.g., soil, powders, building materials).
(1) All radiological simulants were packaged in 8"x8"x8" cardboard boxes for use during the assessments. Button
sources were 2" x 0.25". Calibration disks were 1ง" in diameter.
(2) Thorium lantern mantles were determined to be an inappropriate choice for alpha/beta screening. Packages
containing these mantles resulted in early detection of gamma radiation and, as a result, were not screened for
alpha/beta radiation during the first two assessments. Strontium-90 calibration disks were selected as beta emitters
for use during the second-round of assessments.
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5.6.1 Selection of Chemical Warfare Agent Simulants for AHRF Assessments
Because of the high toxicity of CWAs and issues concerning the shipment of samples containing
these agents, less toxic structural analogs were selected based on compound similarities (i.e.,
vapor pressure, viscosity, water solubility). Dimethyl methylphosphonate (DMMP) was chosen
as a simulant for sarin (GB), soman (GD) and VX due to the mutual presence of a P=0, P-CH3,
and P-OCH2- bond. 2-Chloroethyl ethylsulfide (CEES) was chosen as a simulant for HD because
it is identical in structure, with the exception of a missing chloride. With the exception of CEES
and arsenic trichloride (AsCl3) in water, these simulants are assumed to be somewhat stable in the
selected matrices.
5.6.2 Selection of Explosive Simulant
Picric acid was initially selected as the explosive simulant, but was found to be problematic (i.e.,
color changes were hard to detect using colorimetric tests, and the results of thermal susceptibility
tests were questionable). Nitrocellulose was selected instead, and provided the expected results
for the explosives tests during preliminary testing.
5.6.3 Selection of Oxidizer Simulant
An aqueous solution of hydrogen peroxide was selected to evaluate the AHRF screening
procedures for detection of oxidizing agents. Due to the nature of oxidizer compounds (e.g.,
oxidizers may react with certain matrices such as corn oil), only liquid samples were evaluated.
5.6.4 Selection of Radiological Simulants
Radiological sources were selected and provided by EPA ORIA. During the first round of
assessments, cesium-137 (Cs-137) button sources containing less than < 1 jj.Ci Cs-137 were used
as gamma emitters, and thorium lantern mantles were used as alpha/beta emitters. Because the
thorium mantles gave a positive result for gamma radiation, packages containing these mantles
resulted in early detection of gamma radiation and, as a result, were not screened for alpha/beta
radiation during the first two assessments. These samples were replaced with strontium-90 (Sr-
90) calibration disks containing 0.1 jj.Ci Sr-90 as a beta source during the second round of
assessments. During the second round of assessments, ORIA also provided Cs-137 calibration
disks containing 5 jj.Ci.
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6.0 References
The following references and information sources have been used in developing this document and/or are
recommended for additional information on the design of AHRFs or AHRF-like areas and sample
screening equipment that could be used for AHRF applications. Several references also are cited in
Attachments la - lj for information specific to screening equipment that is or may be considered for use
during AHRF sample screening.
U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Draft Best Practices Guide [currently under development].
Association of Public Health Laboratories. 2009 APHL All-Hazards Laboratory Preparedness
Survey Data, http://www.aphl.org/aphlprograms/ep/ahr/Documents/APHLallHazWhitePaterEPR.pdf
and http://www.aphl.org/aphlprograms/ep/ahr/pages/default.aspx.
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. September 2010. Field Screening Equipment Information
Document - Companion to Standardized Analytical Methods for Environmental Restoration
Following Homeland Security Events (SAM) Revision 5.0. EPA/600/R-10/091.
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. September 2010. Rapid Screening and Preliminary
Identification Techniques and Methods - Companion to Standardized Analytical Method for
Environmental Restoration Following Homeland Security Events (SAM) Revision 5.0. EPA/600/R-
10/090.
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. September 2010. Sample Disposal Information Document -
Companion to Standardized Analytical Methods for Environmental Restoration Following Homeland
Security Events (SAM) Revision 5.0. Anticipated publication November 2010.
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. September 2010. Final Report - Assessment of All Hazards
Receipt Facility (AHRF) Screening Protocol - Revision 1.0, EPA/600/R-09/098.
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency National Homeland Security Research Center. January 2009.
Technology Performance Summary for Chemical Detection Instruments. Technical Brief. EPA/600/S-
09/015.
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency and U.S. Department of Homeland Security. September
2008. All Hazard Receipt Facility Screening Protocol, DHS/S&T-PUB-08-0001 and EPA/600/R-
08/105.
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency National Homeland Security Research Center. March 2008.
Testing of Screening Technologies for Detection of Toxic Industrial Chemicals in All Hazards Receipt
Facilities. Technology Evaluation Report. Washington, DC. EPA/600/R-08/034
http://oaspub.epa.gov/eims/eimscomm.getfile7p download id=472251
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency National Homeland Security Research Center. September
2007. Testing of Screening Technologies for Detection of Chemical Warfare Agents in All Hazards
Receipt Facilities. Technology Evaluation Report. By Kelly BT, McCauley M, Fricker C, Burckle E,
and Fahey B. Washington, DC. U.S.EPA. EPA/600/R-07/104
http://cfpub.epa.gov/si/si public record report.cfm'.)dirEntrvld= 182964
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U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. August 2007. Draft Field Screening Workshop Instructor
Guide. [Internal EPA draft; contact Matthew Magnuson, K or Scott Minameyer.]
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Attachment 1:
Information Regarding Currently Available Screening Equipment for Use in
All Hazards Receipt Facilities
Attachments la - lj provide non-vendor information regarding the screening equipment included in
the AHRF Protocol, as well as additional or alternative equipment that is either currently being used or
is being considered for use by EPA responders, On-Scene Coordinators (OSCs), and/or existing or
planned AHRFs. The equipment listed and information provided does not constitute nor
should it be construed as an EPA endorsement of any particular product, service, or
technology. The equipment listed also is not all inclusive of the types of available equipment
or technologies; laboratories may consider and apply alternative or additional equipment as
deemed appropriate to meet site-specific needs.
The listing of equipment in this attachment does not imply that it is suitable for use in an
AHRF or AHRF location. Each user must consider equipment capabilities and features, such
as those provided in Section 4.2, before purchasing and implementing such equipment for
AHRF purposes.
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Attachment 1a: Radiochemistry Detection Equipment
Threat Categories:
Radiochemical:
Y - Gamma survey
a - Alpha survey
(3 - Beta survey
Other - Other radiochemical
Radiochemistry Detection Equipment
Equipr
rient Included in 2008 A
HRF Protocol
Threat
Cat.
Detection
Technology /
Type
Product Name
Non-vendor Performance Testing
Analytes / Comments
Approx.
Cost'1'
Y
Gamma
Berkeley
Nucleonics SAM
935 Gamma
Spectrometer
(1) Homeland Security Test and Evaluation of Commercially
Available Radionuclide Identifiers: Results Round 1, Department
of Homeland Security, System Assessment and Validation for
Emergency Responders (SAVER), Market Survey Report for
Radiation Isotope Identifier Devices (RIIDs), prepared by National
Security Technologies, LLC., January 2007 (must have access to
System Assessment and Validation for Emergency Responder
[SAVER], http://saver.tamu.edu, or the Responder Knowledge
Base [RKB], http://www2.rkb.mipt.org)
(2) Homeland Security Test and Evaluation of Commercially
Available Radionuclide Identifiers: Results Round 2, Department
of Homeland Security, System Assessment and Validation for
Emergency Responders (SAVER), Market Survey Report for
Radiation Isotope Identifier Devices (RIIDs), prepared by National
Security Technologies, LLC., January 2007 (must have access to
System Assessment and Validation for Emergency Responder
[SAVER], http://saver.tamu.edu or the Responder Knowledge
Base [RKB], http://www2.rkb.mipt.org)
(3) Los Alamos National Laboratory, Evaluation of Handheld
Isotope Identifiers, J.M.BIackadar, J.A. Bounds, P.A. Hypes, D.J,
Mercer, C.J. Sullivan, LA-UR-03-2742. http://www.ortec-
online.com/papers/la_ur_03_2742.pdf
(4) Oak Ridge National Laboratory Instrument Evaluation
Summary, BNC SAM-935.
http://public.ornl.gov/estd/ACTS/reports/BNCSAM935.pdf
Radiation (field analysis) and data
logging.
$9,590
Information in this attachment does not constitute EPA's endorsement or recommendation
Attachment 1a -1
-------
Threat
Cat.
Detection
Technology /
Type
Product Name
Non-vendor Performance Testing
Analytes / Comments
Approx.
Cost(1)
a(3
Alpha / Beta
Ludlum Model
2929
(1) Oak Ridge National Laboratory. Instrument Evaluation
Summary: Ludlum Model 2929 Dual Scaler. 1996.
http://public.ornl.gov/estd/ACTS/reports/2929.html
The Ludlum 2929 (wipe counter),
manufactured by Ludlum Measurements,
Inc., performs alpha/beta sample
counting.
Efficiencies (4pi geometry) for alpha
emitters are reported as: 37% for230Th;
39% for 238U; and 37% for239Pu.
Efficiencies for beta emitters are: 8%
for 14C; 27% for 99Tc; 29% for 137Cs;
26% for 90Sr/90Y.
Reported background (baseline) levels
for alpha radiation is 3 cpm or less;
background for beta is typically 80 cpm
or less (10 jjR/hr field).
$4,850
a(3
Alpha / Beta
Ludlum Model
2360
(1) Oak Ridge National Laboratory
The Ludlum 2360 (compatable with the
Ludlum 2929) is a portable rate meter
manufactured by Ludlum Measurements,
Inc. For use with various contamination
probes. It performs alph/beta
discrimination and data logging.
Typical efficiencies (4pi geometry) are
reported as: 30% for 239 Pu; 30% for
90Sr/90Y; and 5% for 14C.
Reported background (baseline) level
radiation is less than 3 cpm; background
for beta radiation is typically 300 cpm or
less (10 jjR/hr field).
$1,650
Information in this attachment does not constitute EPA's endorsement or recommendation
Attachment 1a - 2
-------
Threat
Cat.
Detection
Technology /
Type
Product Name
Non-vendor Performance Testing
Analytes / Comments
Approx.
Cost(1)
Y
Gamma
Ludlum Model 19
Micro R
Radiation Meter
(1) Department of Homeland Security. May 13, 2005. "System
Results of Test and Evaluation of Commercially Available Survey
Meters, Version 1.3." (must have access to System Assessment
and Validation for Emergency Responder [SAVER],
http://saver.tamu.edu, or the Responder Knowledge Base [RKB],
http://www2.rkb.mipt.org)
(2) Department of Homeland Security. November 2006. "System
Assessment and Validation for Emergency Responders
(SAVER), Commercial Radiation Pagers and Survey Meters
Performance Assessment, Ludlum 19A Survey Meter." Prepared
by Nevada Test Site (must have access to System Assessment
and Validation for Emergency Responder [SAVER],
http://saver.tamu.edu, or the Responder Knowledge Base [RKB],
http://www2.rkb.mipt.org)
(3) Pacific Northwest Laboratories. December 2004. ANSI
42.17A-1989 and 42-17C-1989 Compliance Tests.
http://www.ludlums.com/images/stories/test_reports/M19-ANSI-
combined.pdf
(4) Ludlum. "Energy Response for Model 19."
http://www.ludlums.com/images/stories/response_curves/RC_M1
9.jpg
Low-level gamma survey.
$1,275
Additic
>nal / Alteri
native Equipn
y
Gamma
Berkeley
Nucleonics SAM
940 Gamma
Spectrometer
Identifying and quantifying gamma-
emitting radionuclides in water, air,
soil/sediment, and wipes.
$9,800
Information in this attachment does not constitute EPA's endorsement or recommendation
Attachment 1a - 3
-------
Threat
Cat.
Detection
Technology /
Type
Product Name
Non-vendor Performance Testing
Analytes / Comments
Approx.
Cost(1)
Y
Gamma
SAM 935 Model
935-2B-G
Uses gamma-spectroscopy technology
and Quadratic Compression Algorithm to
identify radionuclides within 1 second.
$23,840
Y
Gamma
Thermo-Eberline
RO20 Ion
Chamber
(1) Oak Ridge National Laboratory. 2002. "Instrument Evaluation
Summary, RO-20."
http://public.ornl.gov/estd/ACTS/reports/ro20_0302.pdf
(2) Pacific Northwestern Laboratory. August 2001. "PNNL-13603,
Beta and Gamma Correction Factors for the Eberline RO-20
Ionization Chamber Survey Instrument."
http://www.pnl.g0v/main/publications/external/technical_reports/P
NNL-13603.pdf
(3) Chiaro, P.J. Jr. September 1998. "Instrument and Controls
Division, Technical Basis Document (TBD) and Users Guides
ORNL/M-6604." http://www.osti.gov/bridge/servlets/purl/307886-
oNHPGM/webviewable
(4) Oak Ridge National Laboratory. March 5-7 1996.
"Discussion RO-20 problems/issues, posted 4/10/96." Minutes of
the GOCO Health Physics (HP) Instrument Committee (HPIC)
Meeting HDS-06-96
Gamma emitters (not specific) in water,
air, soil / sediment and wipes.
Instrument may be limited in assessing
typical nominal background levels (e.g.,
approximately 10uR/hour).
$2,150
Y
aP
Alpha / Beta /
Gamma
Ludlum Model 15
Survey Meter
(1) American National Standards Institute. December 2004. "Test
Results Ludlum Model 15 ANSI N42.17C-1989 ."
http://www.ludlums.com/images/stories/test_reports/M15-ANSI-
combined.pdf
General portable survey meter for alpha
/ beta / gamma radiation (not specific) in
water, air, soil / sediment, and wipes.
Detects surface contamination. Alpha
readings are particularly questionable for
water or liquid samples.
$2,960
Information in this attachment does not constitute EPA's endorsement or recommendation
Attachment 1a - 4
-------
Threat
Cat.
Detection
Technology /
Type
Product Name
Non-vendor Performance Testing
Analytes / Comments
Approx.
Cost(1)
Y
aP
Alpha / Beta /
Gamma
Ludlum Model
2241-2 Survey
Meter w/ 44-9
probe for a/p/y
(1) Oak Ridge National Laboratory. March, 1997. "Instrument
Evaluation Summary, Ludlum Model 2241-2 with 44-9 GM
Probe." http://public.ornl.gov/estd/ACTS/reports/2241_449.html
(2) American National Standards Institute. 2000. "ANSI N42-17A-
1989 Test Results Model 2241-2 Digital Scaler/Ratemeter with
Model 44-9 pancake G-M Detector."
http://www.ludlums.com/images/stories/test_reports/M2241-
2with44-9_ANSI%20N42.17A-1989.pdf
(3) American National Standards Institute. 2000. "ANSI N42-17A-
1989 Test Results Model 2241-2 Digital Scaler/Ratemeter."
http://www.ludlums.com/images/stories/test_reports/M2241_ANS
l%20N42.17A-1989.pdf
(4) Department of Homeland Security. May 13, 2005. "System
Results of Test and Evaluation of Commercially Available Survey
Meters for the Department of Homeland Security, Version 1.3."
(must have access to System Assessment and Validation for
Emergency Responder [SAVER], http://saver.tamu.edu, or the
Responder Knowledge Base [RKB], http://www2.rkb.mipt.org)
(5) Ludlums. "Energy Response for Ludlum Model 44-9."
http://www.ludlums.com/images/stories/response_curves/RC_M4
4-9.jpg
Digital scaler / rate meter for radiation;
44-9 is pancake alpha / beta / gamma
detector.
$1,070
(Model
2241)+
$230 (44-9
detector)
Y
aP
Alpha / Beta /
Gamma
Ludlum Model
2241-3 Survey
Meter with Model
44-9 probe for
a/p/y; Model 43-
90 probe for a; or
Model 44-2 probe
for y
Alpha / beta / gamma emitters (not
analyte specific) in air, water, soil /
sediment, and wipe.
$1,070
(Model
2241-3) +
$230 (44-
9)+ $973
(43-90) + $
602 (44-2
detector)
Y
aP
Alpha / Beta /
Gamma
Ludlum Model
2241-3RK
Radiation
Response Kit
Radiation emergency response kit for
alpha / beta / gamma.
$2,525
Information in this attachment does not constitute EPA's endorsement or recommendation
Attachment 1a - 5
-------
Threat
Cat.
Detection
Technology /
Type
Product Name
Non-vendor Performance Testing
Analytes / Comments
Approx.
Cost(1)
Y
dp
Alpha / Beta /
Gamma
Ludlum Model
2350-1 w/ Data
Logger
(1) American National Standards Institute. 2000. "ANSI N42-17A-
1989 Test Results Model 2350-1 Data Logger."
http://www.ludlums.com/images/stories/test_reports/M2350-
1_ANSI%20N42.17A-1989.pdf
Radiation (field analysis) and data
logging.
$2730 +
Y
dp
Alpha / Beta /
Gamma
Ludlum Model
239-1F Floor
Monitor with
2350-1 Data
Logger, 43-37-
682 Gas
Proportinal
Detector Coupled
to Ludlum 2380-1
Data Logger
Floor contamination monitor for alpha,
beta, gamma emitters. Possible
adaptation for smooth, flat soil/sediment
surfaces.
Y
dp
Alpha / Beta /
Gamma
Ludlum Model 3
w/ Model 44-9 or
43-90 probe
(1) Oak Ridge National Laboratory. September 1995. "Instrument
Evaluation Summary, Ludlum Model 3 with a pancake GM
probe." http://public.ornl.gov/estd/ACTS/reports/3_w_gm.html
General portable survey meter for
radiation; 44-9 is pancake alpha / beta
gamma detector, 43-90 is alpha probe.
$495
(Model 3)
+ $215 (44-
9)
or
+ $905 (43-
90)
(2) Los Alamos National Laboratory. 1995. "Evaluation of ANSI
N42-17A by Investigating the Effects of Temperature and
Humidity on the Response of Radiological Instruments."
http://www.osti.gov/bridge/servlets/purl/105496-
W8qizd/webviewable/105496.pdf
(3) American National Standards Institute. February 2005.
"Ludlum Model 3 ANSI N42-17A Tests."
http://www.ludlums.com/images/stories/test_reports/M3-ANSI-
combined.pdf
dp
Alpha / Beta
Ludlum Model
3030 a/p Counter
Alpha / beta radiation sample counter
for water, air, soil / sediment, and wipes.
$3,350
a
Alpha
Ludlum Model
2241-2 Survey
Meter w/ 43-90
probe for a
Digital scaler / rate meter for radiation;
43-90 probe is 100 cm2 alpha scintillator.
$995
(Model
2241)
+ $905 (43-
90)
Information in this attachment does not constitute EPA's endorsement or recommendation
Attachment 1a - 6
-------
Threat
Cat.
Detection
Technology /
Type
Product Name
Non-vendor Performance Testing
Analytes / Comments
Approx.
Cost(1)
P
Beta
Ludlum Model
2241-2 Survey
Meter w/ 44-107 p
Scintillation
Probe
(1) Oak Ridge National Laboratory. 1997. "Instrument Evaluation
Summary, Ludlum Model 2241-2 with 4-107 Beta Scintillation
Probe." http://public.ornl.gov/estd/ACTS/reports/2241_107.html
Digital scaler / rate meter for radiation;
44-107 probe is beta scintillator.
$995 +
Other
Other
RADeCo Model
H810AC High
Volume Air
(Sample
Collection)
Air sample collection only.
$1,470
(1) Approximate equipment costs do not include consumables, such as batteries, gas culinders, and reagents.
Information in this attachment does not constitute EPA's endorsement or recommendation
Attachment 1a - 7
-------
Attachment 1b: Colorimetric Testing Equipment
Threat Categories:
Chemical:
CWA - Chemical warfare agents (nerve, mustard and lewisite agents)
Nerve - Nerve agents
Mustard - Mustard agents
pH-pH
Organic - organic solvents / water
TIC - Toxic industrial compounds (choking and blood agents, volatile organic compounds)
S/P - Other sulfur / phosphorus compounds
Explosive:
OX - Oxidizers
N03 - Nitro compounds
Colorimetric Testing Equipment
Equipr
nent Included in 2008 AHRF Protocol
Threat
Cat.
Detection
Technology /
Type
Product Name
Non-vendor Performance Testing
Analytes / Comments
Approx.
Cost(1)
Mustard
Colorimetric
indicator
reagent
DB-3 dye test
Detects alkylating agents.
Consists of two solutions (4-(4-
nitrobenzyl) pyridine [11.25 mg/mL] in
methanol and potassium carbonate
[600 mg/mL] in water) and
chromatography-grade silica paper,
which turns an intense blue/purple in
CWA
Organic
Colorimetric
indicator
paper
M8 papers
(1) Longworth, T.L., Barnhouse, J.L., and Ong, K.Y. February 1999.
"Testing of Commercially Available Detectors Against Chemical Warfare
Agents: Summary Report." Soldier and Biological Chemical Command,
AMSSB-RRT, Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD.
(2) U.S. Army Soldier and Biological Chemical Command. October
2001. "M8 Chemical Agent Detector Paper." Soldier and Biological
Chemical Command. Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD.
(3) EPA Technology Evaluation Report. 2007. "Testing of Screening
Technologies for Detection of Chemical Warfare Agents in All Hazards
Receipt Facility." Washington, DC.
http://www.epa.gov/nhsrc/pubs/600r07104.pdf
(4) EPA Technology Evaluation Report. 2007. "Testing of Screening
Technologies for Detection of Toxic Industrial Chemicals in All Hazards
Receipt Facility." Washington, DC.
http://www.epa.gov/nhsrc/pubs/600r08034.pdf
Used for determining whether a
liquid substance is organic or
aqueous. It will turn specific colors in
the presence of CWAs (G-agents turn
the paper yellow, V-agents turn the
paper green, and mustard turns the
paper red). It is not specific for
CWAs, however, and will turn color in
the presence of TICs and solvents.
Hazmat
Smart M8:
$6/roll
Information in this attachment does not constitute EPA's endorsement or recommendation
Attachment 1b -1
-------
Threat
Cat.
Detection
Technology /
Type
Product Name
Non-vendor Performance Testing
Analytes / Comments
Approx.
Cost(1)
OX
Colorimetric
indicator
paper
Starch Iodide
paper
Detects oxidizing compounds (e.g.
organic peroxide, nitrous acid, ozone)
which convert iodide ions to elemental
iodine to form triiodide and
pentaiodide ions. These ions react
$80/100
sheets
PH
Colorimetric
indicator
oaoer
pH (Litmus)
paper
Measures pH range of 0 - 14. pH is
determined by observing the color
change.
$2/100
sheets
A flrl Sfi/1
i a l+Ai'n'itiiiA n,
ฆฆฆฆฆฆฆฆฆฆฆฆฆฆฆI
Nerve
Mustard
Colorimetric
indicator
paper
3-Way Paper
(1) EPA Technology Evaluation Report. 2007. "Testing of Screening
Technologies for Detection of Chemical Warfare Agents in All Hazards
Receipt Facility." Washington, DC.
http://www.epa.gov/nhsrc/pubs/600r07104.pdf
(2) EPA Technology Evaluation Report. 2007. "Testing of Screening
Technologies for Detection of Toxic Industrial Chemicals in All Hazards
Receipt Facility." Washington, DC.
http://www.epa.gov/nhsrc/pubs/600r08034.pdf
HD, GB, and VX.
Color change occurs in seconds.
Three sample types tested: surfaces
(VX only); liquid (GB, HD, and VX);
and vapor (HD and GB).
$3/box
CWA
Organic
Colorimetric
indicator
paper
M9 Chemical
Agent
Detector
Paper
(1) DHS Prepardness Directorate Office of Grants and Testing. January
2007. "Guide for the Selection of Chemical Detection Equipment for
Emergency First Responders, 3rd edition."
G, V, L and H agents in liquid; turns
one color (reddish-brown) in response
to all agents.
Similar false-positive responses as
M8 (TICs such as solvents).
Once paper is wet, will not respond
to chemical agent.
$5/roll
OX
Colorimetric
indicator
paper
Peroxide
Paper
For semi-quantitative determinations
in aqueous matrices. Determines
peroxide concentrations in the range
of 0 - 25 mg/L. It can also be used
for the determination of peracetic acid
and other organic and inorganic
hydroperoxides.
$30/100
sheets
Information in this attachment does not constitute EPA's endorsement or recommendation
Attachment 1b - 2
-------
Threat
Cat.
Detection
Technology /
Type
Product Name
Non-vendor Performance Testing
Analytes / Comments
Approx.
Cost(1)
CWA
TIC
Colorimetric
indicator
tube
Draeger Civil
Defense Set
Kit
(1) Arnold, F. October 2006. "Measuring New Fumigants with Drager-
Tubesฎ." Ninth International Working Conference on Stored Product
Protection, New Chemicals and Food Residues." Sao Paulo, Brazil.
(2) EPA Technology Evaluation Report. 2007. "Testing of Screening
Technologies for Detection of Chemical Warfare Agents in All Hazards
Receipt Facility." Washington, DC.
http://www.epa.gov/nhsrc/pubs/600r07104.pdf
(3) EPA Technology Evaluation Report. 2007. "Testing of Screening
Technologies for Detection of Toxic Industrial Chemicals in All Hazards
Receipt Facility." Washington, DC.
http://www.epa.gov/nhsrc/pubs/600r08034.pdf
Test Set 1: Hydrogen cyanide,
phosgene, lewisite, arsenic, HN, HD.
Test Set V: Nerve agents, phosgene,
cyanogen chloride, chlorine, HD.
Works with Draegar tubes; many
types available.
$3,720
CWA
OX
N03
TIC
Colorimetric
indicator
tube
HazTech
HazCatฎ
Chemical
Identification
system
KT1235 WMD testing system (two
cases):
1: EntryCat (alpha / beta / gamma or
x-ray)
2: SampleCatฎ (explosives,
oxidizers, CWAs [GA, GB, GD, GF,
VX, HD, HN, L]), solid, liquid, and gas.
Also does amino acid and protein,
screens non-biological substances,
screens pesticides, immunoassay
tests for anthrax, ricin, and botulinum
toxin.
$3650 -
$4250
CWA
OX
TIC
S/P
Colorimetric
indicator
paper
HazMat-Smart
Stripฎ
(1) EPA Technology Evaluation Report. 2007. "Testing of Screening
Technologies for Detection of Chemical Warfare Agents in All Hazards
Receipt Facility." Washington, DC.
http://www.epa.gov/nhsrc/pubs/600r07104.pdf
(2) EPA Technology Evaluation Report. 2007. "Testing of Screening
Technologies for Detection of Toxic Industrial Chemicals in All Hazards
Receipt Facility." Washington, DC.
http://www.epa.gov/nhsrc/pubs/600r08034.pdf
(3) Illinois Fire/EMS/Special Operations. 2003. "TopOff II Supplemental
Report, Technological Field Tests."
Chlorine, pH, fluoride, nerve agents,
oxidizers, arsenic, sulfides, mustard-
H, and cyanide (in aerosol or liquid).
$20/sheet
Information in this attachment does not constitute EPA's endorsement or recommendation
Attachment 1b - 3
-------
Threat
Cat.
Detection
Technology /
Type
Product Name
Non-vendor Performance Testing
Analytes / Comments
Approx.
Cost(1)
CWA
OX
TIC
Colorimetric
indicator
paper/tube
kit
Nextteqฎ Civil
Defense Kit
(1) EPA Technology Evaluation Report. 2007. "Testing of Screening
Technologies for Detection of Chemical Warfare Agents in All Hazards
Receipt Facility." Washington, DC.
http://www.epa.gov/nhsrc/pubs/600r07104.pdf
(2) EPA Technology Evaluation Report. 2007. "Testing of Screening
Technologies for Detection of Toxic Industrial Chemicals in All Hazards
Receipt Facility." Washington, DC.
http://www.epa.gov/nhsrc/pubs/600r08034.pdf
GA, GB, GD, VX, GF, HD, CG, AC,
CK, GP, HN, L, and DP.
Included M8 paper did not respond
to GB in the water samples and gave
false negative for VX with diesel fuel
(1).
Color change within 10 seconds with
M8; 25 seconds with M9; 5 seconds
with 3-way; and 3.5 minutes with
colorimetric tubes (1).
$1,875
CWA
TIC
Colorimetric
indicator
paper
Truetech
M18A3
Chemical
Agent
Detector Kit
(1) EPA Technology Evaluation Report. 2007. "Testing of Screening
Technologies for Detection of Chemical Warfare Agents in All Hazards
Receipt Facility." Washington, DC.
http://www.epa.gov/nhsrc/pubs/600r07104.pdf
(2) EPA Technology Evaluation Report. 2007. "Testing of Screening
Technologies for Detection of Toxic Industrial Chemicals in All Hazards
Receipt Facility." Washington, DC.
http://www.epa.gov/nhsrc/pubs/600r08034.pdf
Nerve agent, sulfur mustard,
hydrogen cyanide, cyanogen chloride,
and phosgene.
4489-
$1190
CWA
TIC
Colorimetric
indicator
paper
Truetech
M272
Chemical
Agent Water
Testing Kit
(1) EPA Technology Evaluation Report. 2007. "Testing of Screening
Technologies for Detection of Chemical Warfare Agents in All Hazards
Receipt Facility." Washington, DC.
http://www.epa.gov/nhsrc/pubs/600r07104.pdf
(2) EPA Technology Evaluation Report. 2007. "Testing of Screening
Technologies for Detection of Toxic Industrial Chemicals in All Hazards
Receipt Facility." Washington, DC.
http://www.epa.gov/nhsrc/pubs/600r08034.pdf
Lewisite, nerve, cyanide, and
mustard chemical agents present in
water.
$178
$386-$180-
$390
Organic
Colorimetric
indicator
paper
Water-finding
Paper
Detects the presence of water in any
non-polar solvent or on any surface,
and is especially useful for detecting
$8/roll
Information in this attachment does not constitute EPA's endorsement or recommendation
Attachment 1b - 4
-------
Threat
Cat.
Detection
Technology /
Type
Product Name
Non-vendor Performance Testing
Analytes / Comments
Approx.
Cost(1)
N03
Colorimetric
indicator
reagent kit
Drop-Ex Plus
Portable, liquid drop test kit:
Drop-Ex-1 is used to search for
GROUP A type explosives which
include TNT, tetryl, TNB, DNT, picric
acid and its salts.
Drop-Ex-2 is used to search for
GROUP B type explosives which
include dynamite, nitroglycerine, RDX,
PETN, SEMTEX, nitrocellulose and
smokeless powder.
Drop-Ex-3 is used to search for
nitrate-based explosives which
includes ANFO (ammonium nitrate-
fuel oil), commercial and improvised
explosives based on inorganic
nitrates, black powder, flash powder,
gun powder, potassium chlorate and
nitrate, sulfur (powder), and
ammonium nitrate (both fertilizer and
aluminum).
$210
Information in this attachment does not constitute EPA's endorsement or recommendation
Attachment 1b - 5
-------
Threat
Cat.
Detection
Technology /
Type
Product Name
Non-vendor Performance Testing
Analytes / Comments
Approx.
Cost(1)
N03
Colorimetric
indicator
spray kit
Expray
(1) Bjella, Kevin L. 2005. US Army Corps of Engineers, Engineer
Research and Development Center. "Pre-Screening for Explosives
Residues In Soil Prior to HPLC Analysis Utilizing Expray."
ERDC/CRREL TN-05-2
Aerosol test kit for the immediate
detection and identification of
explosives:
"E": Expray-1 is used to search for
GROUP A type explosives which
include TNT, tetryl, TNB, DNT, picric
acid and its salts.
"X": Expray-2 is used to search for
GROUP B type explosives which
include dynamite, nitroglycerine, RDX,
PETN, SEMTEX, nitrocellulose and
smokeless powder
"I": Expray-3 is used to search for
nitrate-based explosives which
includes ANFO (ammonium nitrate-
fuel oil), commercial and improvised
explosives based on inorganic
nitrates, black powder, flash powder,
gun powder, potassium chlorate and
nitrate, sulfur (powder), and
ammonium nitrate (both fertilizer and
aluminum).
$260
CWA
TIC
Colorimetric
indicator
Fluoride
paper
Detects presence of fluoride in air
and liquid samples
$2/50
sheets
(1) Approximate equipment costs do not include consumables, such as batteries, gas culinders, and reagents.
Information in this attachment does not constitute EPA's endorsement or recommendation
Attachment 1b - 6
-------
Attachment 1c: Ion Mobility Spectrometry (IMS)
Threat Categories:
Chemical:
CWA - Chemical warfare agents (nerve, mustard and lewisite agents)
VOC - Volatile organic compounds
Explosive:
N03 - Nitro compounds
Ion Mobility Spectrometry (IMS)
Equipr
nent Included in 2008 AHRF Protocol
Threat
Cat.
Detection
Technology /
Type
Product Name
Non-vendor Performance Testing
Analytes / Comments
Approx.
Cost (1>
CWA
TIC
IMS
Smiths Detection
LCD 3.2E IMS
(1) Ryoj, Sekioka; Yasuo, Takayama; Yasuo, Seto; Urasaki, Yukio.
2007. "Detection Performance of Portable Colona Discharge
Ionization Type Mobility Spectrometer for CWAs." Bunseki Kagaku,
Vol. 56, No. 2, Annual Report.
Continuous, real-time detector of
CWAs and toxic chemicals that uses
enhanced IMS technology with a non-
radioactive source.
Nerve, blister, blood, choking
$10,000
CWA
TIC
IMS
Smiths Detection
Chemical Agent
Monitor IMS
(1) Longworth, Terri and Ong, Kwok. 2001. "Testing of the CAM-
Chemical Agent Monitor (Type L) Against Chemical Warfare Agents,
Summary Report." Domestic Preparedness Program. Edgewood
Chemical Biological Center.
http://www.ecbc.army.mil/downloads/reports/ECBC_cam_typel.pdf
Uses IMS principles to respond
selectively to toxic chemical agent
vapors.
Detects nerve and blister agents to
specified NATO requirements.
Additional programming can be
included to extend the range to cover
other agents.
$10,000
Additional / Alternative Equipment
CWA
N03
TIC
IMS
APD 2000ฎ
(1) Ong, Kwonk; Longworth, Terri; Barnhouse, J.L. August 2000.
"Domestic Preparedness Program: Testing of APD2000 Chemical
Warfare Agent Detector Against Chemical Warfare Agents Summary
Report." AMSSB-RRT Soldier and Biological Chemical Command,
Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD.
http://www.ecbc.army.mil/downloads/reports/ECBC_apd2000_detecto
r.pdf
(2) EPA Technology Evaluation Report. 2007. "Testing of Screening
Technologies for Detection of Chemical Warfare Agents in All
Hazards Receipt Facility." Washington, DC.
http://www.epa.gov/nhsrc/pubs/600r07104.pdf
GA, GB, HD, GD, VX, L, pepper
spray, and mace in vapor and
aerosols.
Response time: HD, 3-52 seconds;
GA, 3-106 seconds; GB, 5-46
seconds (1).
~6 lbs.
CW or irritant mode; detects nerve
and blister agents simultaneously
(CW mode).
Contains back-flush mode (reverses
sample flow path) to protect cell
assembly from cross contamination.
$9,620
Information in this attachment does not constitute EPA's endorsement or recommendation
Attachment 1c -1
-------
Threat
Cat.
Detection
Technology /
Type
Product Name
Non-vendor Performance Testing
Analytes / Comments
Approx.
Cost(1)
CWA
N03
TIC
IMS
Sabre 4000
(1) Longworth, Terri and Ong, Kwok. August 2001. "Domestic
Prepardness Program: Testing of SABRE 2000 Handheld Trace and
Vapor Detector Against Chemical Warfare Agents Summary Report."
Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD.
Detects GA and GB.
$23,500 -
$26,000
$27,360
CWA
N03
TIC
IMS/PID
Smiths Detection
HGVI
Identifies/quantifies a broad range
of: CWAs (nerve, blister, choking
agents), TICs, explosives, flammables
(from the ITF-25 list of high and
CWA
N03
VOC
ITMS
ITMSฎ Vapor
Tracer
(1) Longworth, Terri; Ong, Kwok; and Baranoski, John. 2002.
"Domestic Preparedness Program, Testing of the VaporTracer
against Chemical Warfare Agents Summary Report." Edgewood
Chemical Biological Center, Research and Technology Directorate,
Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD.
Http://www.ecbc.army.mil/downloads/reports/ECBC_vaportracer.pdf
CWAs, TNT, NG, RDX, PETN,
EGDN, DNT, and HMX.
$24,490
(1) Approximate equipment costs do not include consumables, such as batteries, gas cylinders, and reagents
Information in this attachment does not constitute EPA's endorsement or recommendation
Attachment 1c - 2
-------
Attachment 1d: Enzyme / Immunoassay Detection Equipment
Threat Categories:
Chemical:
CWA - Chemical warfare agents (CWAs) (nerve, mustard and lewisite agents)
Blood - Blood agents
Choke - Chokina aaents
Explosive:
N03 - Nitro compounds
Enzyme / Immunoassay Detection Equipment
Equipment Included in 2008 AHRF Protocol
Threat
Cat.
Detection
Technology /
Tvoe
Product Name
Non-vendor Performance Testing
Analytes / Comments
Approx.
Cost(1)
N03
Enzyme
Polymer
Technology
(ELITE)
ELITE Card
Will detect more than 30 types of
explosives including a broad range of
nitroaromatics, aliphatics, inorganics,
and nitramines (including all TNT-
based explosives, PETN, RDX, HMX,
C-4, Semtex, TNT and derivatives,
ammonium nitrate, and black powder).
<$250/box
of 10
EL100
cards
CWA
Blood
Choke
Enzyme
Polymer
Technology
Anachemia
M256A1 kit
(1) National Research Council, Commission on Life Sciences,
Committee on R&D. 1999. "Chemical and Biological Terrorism,
Research and Development to Improve Civilian Medical Response."
National Academy Press. Washington, D.C.
(2) EPA Technology Evaluation Report. 2007. "Testing of Screening
Technologies for Detection of Chemical Warfare Agents in All Hazards
Receipt Facility." Washington, DC.
http://www.epa.gov/nhsrc/pubs/600r07104.pdf
(3) EPA Technology Evaluation Report. 2007. "Testing of Screening
Technologies for Detection of Toxic Industrial Chemicals in All Hazards
Receipt Facility." Washington, DC.
http://www.epa.gov/nhsrc/pubs/600r08034.pdf
(4) Petryk, M.W.P. and Lecavalier, P. 2006. "Response of M256A1
Detector Kit to the Direct Application of Liquid-phase Blister Agents,
Defence Research and Development Canada (DRDC)." Technical
Memorandum, DRDC Suffield TM 2006-023.
Ticket from M256A kit developed by
Anachemia Sciences, that can be
used to detect nerve agents (G, V),
blood agents (AC, CK), mustard (HD),
and lewisite.
Can also detect other acetylcholine
esterase inhibitors such as organo-
phosphorus pesticides.
Kit includes multifunction card and
M8/M9 or 3-way paper.
In 2008 AHRF protocol, only the
enzyme ticket tests for nerve agents
are used.
$40-190
Information in this attachment does not constitute EPA's endorsement or recommendation
Attachment 1 d -1
-------
Additional / Alternative Equipment
Threat
Cat.
Detection
Technology /
Tvoe
Product Name
Non-vendor Performance Testing
Analytes / Comments
Approx.
Cost (1>
CWA
Blood
Choke
Enzyme
Polymer
Technology
ICX Agentase
Chemical
Agent Detector
(CAD) Kit
(1) Matthews, Robin; Altenbaugh, Amee L.; Longworth, Terri; Ong,
Kwok. 2007. "Evaluation of Chemical Agent Detector (CAD) Pens from
ICx Agentase." Report 2007-ATT-008. Edgewood Chemical and
Biological Center. Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD.
(2) EPA Technology Evaluation Report. 2007. "Testing of Screening
Technologies for Detection of Chemical Warfare Agents in All Hazards
Receipt Facility." Washington, DC.
http://www.epa.gov/nhsrc/pubs/600r07104.pdf
Engineered around enzyme polymer
technology to eliminate common
environmental interferences.
Multi-phase testing capability allows
users to test potentially contaminated
victims, contaminated surfaces, and
unknown liquids or solids in any
environment.
Detects GA, GB, GD, GF, VX, HD,
HN AC and CK
$150
(1) Approximate equipment costs do not include consumables, such as batteries, gas cylinders, and reagents
Information in this attachment does not constitute EPA's endorsement or recommendation
Attachment 1d - 2
-------
Attachment 1e: Flame Spectrophotometry (FSP)
Threat Categories:
Chemical
CWA -
Chemical warfare agents (CWAs) (nerve, mustard and lewisite agents)
Blood -
Blood agents
Choke -
Choking agents
S/P - Other sulfur / phosphorus compounds
TIC - Toxic industrial compounds (choking and blood agents and volatile organic compounds)
Flame Spectrophotometry (FSP)
Equipment Included in 2008 AHRF Protocol
Threat
Detection
Product Name
Non-vendor Performance Testing
Analytes / Comments
Approx.
Cat.
Technology /
Cost(1)
Type
CWA
FSP
AP2Ce
A version of the AP2C, designed to
$14,300
Blood
be used in an explosive atmosphere.
Choke
Same capabilities as AP2C: GA, GB,
S/P
GD, GF, VX, mustard gas in the form
of vapor or aerosols.
Detects compounds of phosphorus
(contained in G, V agents) and / or
compounds of sulfur (contained in
HD, V agents).
Information in this attachment does not constitute EPA's endorsement or recommendation
Attachment 1 e -1
-------
Additional / Alternative Equipment
Threat
Cat.
Detection
Technology /
Tvoe
Product Name
Non-vendor Performance Testing
Analytes / Comments
Approx.
Cost'1'
CWA
Blood
Choke
S/P
FSP
AP2C
(1) Kovacs, T. 2006. "Developed Physical Detection-Possibilities of
Chemical Agents." Acta Polytechnica Hungarica, 3(2): 133-141.
(2) Rostker, B. July 1998. "Case Narrative Czech and French Reports
of Possible Chemical Agent Detections, Tab D, Czech and French
Detection Equipment." Department of Defense, Force Health Protection
and Readiness, Gulflink.
(3) Longworth, Terri and Ong, K.Y. May 2001. "Domestic Preparedness
Program: Testing of Detectors Against Chemical Warfare Agents -
Summary Report, UC AP2C Portable Chemical Contamination Control
Monitor Collective Unit." Soldier and Biological Chemical Command,
AMSSB-RRT, Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD.
http://www.ecbc.army.mil/downloads/reports/ECBC_uc_ap2c.pdf
(4) Seto, Y., Kanamori-Kataoka, M.,Tsuge, K., et al. 2005. "Sensing
Technology for Chemical Warfare Agents and its Evaluation using
Authentic Agents." National Research Institute of Police Science,
Japan. Proceedings of the Tenth International Meeting on Chemical
Sensors, Vol 108, Issues 1-2, 22, pp. 193-197.
GA, GB, GD, GF, VX, Mustard gas
in the form of vapor or aerosols.
Detects compounds of phosphorus
(contained in G, V agents) and / or
compounds of sulfur (contained in
HD, V agents).
Also mentioned on the RKB: GE,
VS, VN, VE, VG, H, HDL, HL, HT.
Discontinued by manufacturer;
AP4C is new model.
$11,700
CWA
TIC
S/P
FSP
AP4C
(1) EPA Technology Evaluation Report. 2007. "Testing of Screening
Technologies for Detection of Chemical Warfare Agents in All Hazards
Receipt Facility." Washington, DC.
http://www.epa.gov/nhsrc/pubs/600r07104.pdf
(2) EPA Technology Evaluation Report. 2007. "Testing of Screening
Technologies for Detection of Toxic Industrial Chemicals in All Hazards
Receipt Facility." Washington, DC.
http://www.epa.gov/nhsrc/pubs/600r08034.pdf
Flame spectrometry detector used
for the analysis of spectrochemical
emissions.
Looks for several elements in order
to detect the presence of CW agents
and TICs.
Detects GA, GB, GD, GE, GF, VX,
HD, VS, VN, VE, VG, H, HDL, HL,
and HT; as well as TICs.
Can detect in solid, liquid, gas, and
vapor / aerosol form.
$23,560
(1) Approximate equipment costs do not include consumables, such as batteries, gas cylinders, and reagents
Information in this attachment does not constitute EPA's endorsement or recommendation
Attachment 1e - 2
-------
Attachment 1f: Photo Ionization Detectors (PID) and Flame Ionization Detectors (FID)
Threat Categories:
Chemical:
CWA - Chemical warfare agents (nerve, mustard and lewisite agents)
TIC - Toxic industrial compounds (choking and blood agents and volatile organic compounds)
VOC - Volatile organic compounds
Explosive:
N03 - Nitro compounds
Photo Ionization Detectors (PID) and Flame Ionization Detectors (FID)
Equipment Inclui
ted in 2008 AHRF Protocol
Threat
Cat.
Detection
Technology /
Type
Product Name
Non-vendor Performance Testing
Analytes / Comments
Approx.
Cost(1)
CWA
TIC
PID
MultiRAE Plus
PGM50-5P
Multigas Monitor
and PID
(1) EPA Technology Evaluation Report. 2007. "Testing of Screening
Technologies for Detection of Chemical Warfare Agents in All Hazards
Receipt Facility." Washington, DC.
http://www.epa.gov/nhsrc/pubs/600r07104.pdf
(2) EPA Technology Evaluation Report. 2007. "Testing of Screening
Technologies for Detection of Toxic Industrial Chemicals in All Hazards
Receipt Facility." Washington, DC.
http://www.epa.gov/nhsrc/pubs/600r08034.pdf
(3) Idaho National Lab. 2006. "Data for First Responder Use of
Photoionization Detectors for Vapor Chemical Constituents"
http://www.inl.gov/technicalpublications/documents/3589641 .pdf
(4) DHS/SAVER. 2006 - 2008. "Multi-Sensor Meter Chemical
Detectors Assessment Report"
https://saver.fema.gov/actions/document.act.aspx?type=file&source=vi
ew&actionCode=submit&id=5205
Combines a PID with the standard
four gases of a confined space
monitor (02, lower explosive limit
[LEL], and two toxic gas sensors) in
one compact monitor with a sampling
pump.
Measures volatile organic
compounds (VOCs) in the range 0.1 -
2,000 ppm with 0.1 ppm resolution.
o2, CO, h2s, so2, no, no2, ci2,
HCN, NH3, PH3.
References listed in this Attachment
suggest that PIDs may not reliably
detect CWAs, particularly if the device
is not regularly cleaned or used at
conditions other than room
temperature and relative humidity of
50%.
$3,200
Additional / Alter
native Equipment
Identifies/quantifies a broad range
of: CWAs (nerve, blister, choking
agents), TICs, explosives,
flammables (from the ITF-25 list of
$27,360
CWA
N03
TIC
IMS/PID
Smiths Detection
HGVI
Information in this attachment does not constitute EPA's endorsement or recommendation
Attachment 1 f -1
-------
Threat
Cat.
Detection
Technology /
Type
Product Name
Non-vendor Performance Testing
Analytes / Comments
Approx.
Cost(1)
CWA
N03
TIC
PID/FID
TVA1000B
(1) Longworth, Terri; Barnhouse, Jacob; and Ong, Kwok. February
1999. "Testing of Commercially Available Detectors Against Chemical
Warfare Agents: Summary Report." AMSSB-RRT, Soldier and
Biological Chemical Command, Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD.
http://www.chem-bio.com/resource/1999/dp_detectors_summary.pdf
Air monitoring, including CWAs.
References listed in this attachment
suggest that PIDs may not reliably
detect CWAs, particularly if the device
is not regularly cleaned or used at
conditions other than room
temperature and relative humidity of
50%.
$13,600
VOC
PID
MSA
Orion/Sirius
Multigas detector design to monitors
low-vapor pressure VOCs and
combustibles
$3,110-
$7,210
VOC
PID
Draeger - Multi-
PID2+
Contains library of ~70 compounds
for detection of VOCs in soil, water,
$3,650
(1) Approximate equipment costs do not include consumables, such as batteries, gas cylinders, and reagents
Information in this attachment does not constitute EPA's endorsement or recommendation
Attachment 1 f - 2
-------
Attachment 1g: Spectroscopy and Spectrophotometry
Threat Categories:
Chemical:
CWA - Chemical warfare agents (nerve, mustard and lewisite agents)
VOC - Volatile organic compounds
TIC - Toxic industrial compounds (choking and blood agents and VOCs)
Explosive:
NQ3 - Nitro compounds
Spectroscopy and Spectrophotometry
Additional / Alterr
ative Equipm
ent
Threat
Cat.
Detection
Technology /
Tvoe
Product Name
Non-vendor Performance Testing
Analytes / Comments
Approx.
Cost'1'
CWA
TIC
Raman
Spectroscopy
Ahura
FirstDefender
(1) Matthews, Robin; Longworth, Terri; Ong, Kwok; Zhu, Leyun.
December 2006. "Testing of Ahura's FirstDefender Handheld
Chemical Identifier Against Toxic Industrial Chemicals." Edgewood
Chemical and Biological Center, Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD.
(2) Matthews, Robin; Ong, Kwok; Brown, C.L.; Zhu, L.; Knopp, K.
January 2006. "Evaluation of Ahura's FirstDefender Handheld
Chemical Identifier." pp. 1 - 53. Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD.
TICs, TIMs, CWAs, narcotics,
precursors, white powders, binary
compounds.
Internal software contains spectra
library of over 1300 chemicals.
Results typically in 1 - 5 seconds
but up to 20 seconds in some cases.
Solid or liquid substances.
~4 lbs.
Has passed subset of Military
Standard 81 OF tests (MIL STD).
Three modes of use with two as a
point-and-shoot operation and the
third as an in-vial measurment.
Results from (1) suggest that there is
greater precission with in-vial
measurement than point-and-shoot.
$34,000 -
$52,000
Information in this attachment does not constitute EPA's endorsement or recommendation
Attachment 1 g -1
-------
Threat
Cat.
Detection
Technology /
Tvpe
Product Name
Non-vendor Performance Testing
Analytes / Comments
Approx.
Cost(1)
CWA
N03
TIC
FTIR
Ahura
Tru Defender
FTIR
(1) Brown, Dr. Christopher. "Evaluation of Ahura Scientific's
TruDefender FT Handheld Chemical Identifier." Edgewood
Chemical Biological Center. Aberdeen, MD.
Press-and-Shoot sampling
capability can sample thousands of
chemicals including GA, GB, GD,
GF, VX, HD, HN, L, and ITF-40 high
hazard index TIMs in solids and
liquids.
Spectral range: 4000 cm"1 to 650
cm"1; spectral resolution of 4 cm"1.
Headspace gas identification
capabilities.
~3 lbs.
Water-sealed unit that can be fully
decontaminated.
$45,000 +
CWA
N03
TIC
FTIR
Bruker Alpha
FTIR
Detection in solid, liquid, or gas
matrices.
$15,000 +
N03
TIC
FTIR
Environics ID100
Analyzes up to 25 gas compounds
(organic and inorganic) at 10 scans /
sec.
Can be connected with a laptop for
extended analysis capability
(unknowns).
Detects GA, GB, GD, VX, HD, L,
DIMP, phosgene, ammonia,
formaldehyde, hydrogen cyanide,
sulfur dioxide, and carbon monoxide.
~11.5 kg.
$59,410
CWA
N03
TIC
FTIR
Gasmet DX-
4030 FTIR
Multi-component gas analyzer can
measure 25 gases simultaneously
from a library of 250 gases. Option to
expand to 50 gases using software.
Measureable gases include
inorganics, corrosives, hydrocarbons,
VOCs, ferric ferrocyanides, and
perfluorocarbons.
$59,262
Information in this attachment does not constitute EPA's endorsement or recommendation
Attachment 1g - 2
-------
Threat
Cat.
Detection
Technology /
Tvpe
Product Name
Non-vendor Performance Testing
Analytes / Comments
Approx.
Cost(1)
CWA
N03
TIC
FTIR
Smiths Detection
HazMatID
(1) National Forensic Science Technology Center. July 2009.
"Testing and Evaluation Report Form: HazMatID FTIR Evaluation,
NFSTC Mobile Laboratory Project."https://www.nfstc.org/7dl_icM 32
Identifies: unknown liquids,
powders, and solids; nerve and
blister agents, TICs, white powders,
explosives and clan lab precursors;
drugs and drug precursors, and
pesticides.
No sample prep required.
Library spectra of over 32,000
known compounds included.
-23 lbs.
False readings: vinegar and
hydrogen peroxide as water; sodium
chloride as tellurium; diesel, lamp
and kerosine as mineral oil; Al and
Mg powder as tin oxide (1).
$48,000 +
FTIR
Illuminator
microscope
system
Used in the same way as an FTIR,
allowing a visual comparison of
sample components such as
powders.
CWA
N03
TIC
FTIR
Smiths Detection
HazMatID
Ranger
Identifies: chemicals and
components in mixtures, white
powders, WMDs, explosives,
narcotics and drugs precursors,
$45,000
CWA
N03
TIC
FTIR
Thermo Electron
Transport Kit
Portable FTIR
(1) Department of Homeland Security. March 2007. "Guide for the
selection of Biological Agent Detection Equipment for Emergency
First Responders, 2nd Edition."
https://www.rkb. us/contentdetail.cfm?content_id=97649
Portable FTIR.
Screens biological samples; no
specific identification of biological
samples (1).
No sample prep required.
Spectral range: 7800 - 375 cm"1;
resolution: 16-1 cm"1 standard.
$45,325
CWA
N03
IR
Draeger
MultiWarn
Replaced by manufacturer with
MultiWarn II.
CWA
N03
TIC
IR
Draeger
MultiWarn II
(1) Evans, Thomas; Werner, Juliane; Rose-Pehrsson, Susan;
Hammond, Mark; and Callahan, John. August 29, 2003. "Phase 1:
Laboratory Investigation of Portable Instruments for Submarine Air
Monitoring." NRL/MR/6110-03-8704, Chemical Dyanmics and
Diagnostics Branch, Chemisrtry Division, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-
bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA417349&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf
Combustible gases and carbon
dioxide.
Information in this attachment does not constitute EPA's endorsement or recommendation
Attachment 1 g - 3
-------
Threat
Cat.
Detection
Technology /
Type
Product Name
Non-vendor Performance Testing
Analytes / Comments
Approx.
Cost(1)
voc
IR
Draeger Polytron
7000 Series
Detectors
List of detectable gases and vapors
2008:
http://www.draeger.com/media/10/01/
10/10011004/gas_list_br_9046375_e
n.pdf
Relatively new item. Unable to find
non-vendor information
voc
Nephelometer
MIE DataRam
(1) Thorpe, A. and Walsh P.T. 2002. "Performance Testing of Three
Portable, Direct-reading Dust Monitors." Ann. Occup. Hyg., Vol. 46,
No. 2, pp. 197-207
http://annhyg.oxfordjournals.Org/cgi/content/full/46/2/197
Gas sensitivity from 0.001 to 400
mg/m3; dust, smoke, mist, and
fumes.
$4,250
(1) Approximate equipment costs do not include consumables, such as batteries, gas cylinders, and reagents
Information in this attachment does not constitute EPA's endorsement or recommendation
Attachment 1g - 4
-------
Attachment 1h: Gas Chromatography
Threat Categories:
Chemical:
CWA - Chemical warfare agents (nerve, mustard and lewisite agents)
TIC - Toxic industrial compounds (choking and blood agents and volatile organic compounds)
VOC - Volatile organic compounds
Gas Chromatography
Additional / Alterna
tive Equipmen
Threat
Cat.
Detection
Technology /
Tvoe
Product Name
Non-vendor Performance Testing
Analytes / Comments
Approx.
Cost(1)
CWA
TIC
VOC
GC-MS (Mass
Spectrometry)
Inficon HAPSITEฎ
Smart Chemical
Identification
System
(1) National Institutes of Justice. 2000. "Guide for the Selection of
Chemical Agent and Toxic Industrial Material Detection
Equipment for Emergency First Responders."
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gOv/nij/pubs-sum/184449.htm
(2) EPA Environmental Technology Verification Report. 1998.
"Field-portable Gas Chromatograph/Mass Spectrometer, Inficon,
Inc., HAPSITE." Las Vegas, NV.
htt p ://www. e pa. g 0 v/etv/pu bs/01 _vr_i nf. pdf
VOC's including TICs, some CWAs
in air, soil and water. Vapors,
headspace on water and soil.
Dynamic 104 range (i.e., working
range from 5 ug/L - 50 mg/L - 20
ug/L - 200 mg/L depending on
detection limit of analyte).
Response time <12 minutes.
Throughput 2-3 water samples
per hour (2).
$100,000
CWA
TIC
VOC
GC-MAID (Micro
Argon Ionization
Detector) -
Portable.
Optional PID
Sentex
Scentoscreen Gas
Chromatograph
(1) Baranoski, John; Longworth, Terri; Ong, Kwonk. August 2002.
"Domestic Preparedness Program, Testing of the Scentoscreen
Gas Chromatograph Instrument Against Chemical Warfare
Agents Summary Report." Soldier and Biological Chemical
Command, Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD.
http://www.edgewood.army.mil/downloads/reports/ECBC_scentos
creen.pdf
HD, GA, and GB vapor; volatile
hydorcarbons to polychlorinated
biphenyls.
Retention times (in seconds): HD,
55 - 57; GB, 205 - 213; GA, 240 -
246 (1).
<30 lbs.
Sampling time ~6 minutes at 250
$17,525
CWA
TIC
VOC
Agilent GC-MS
CWA
TIC
VOC
Shimatsu GC-MS
(1) Approximate equipment costs do not include consumables, such as batteries, gas cylinders, and reagents
Information in this attachment does not constitute EPA's endorsement or recommendation
Attachment 1 h -1
-------
Attachment 1i: Mercury Detection Equipment
Threat Categories:
Chemical:
Hg - Mercury
Mercury Detection Equipment
Additional / Alternative Equipment
Threat Cat.
Detection
Technology /
Tvoe
Product Name
Non-vendor Performance Testing
Analytes / Comments
Approx.
Cost(1)
Hg
Mercury
Analyzer
(gold film)
Jerome 411/431
Mercury Vapor
Analyzer
(1) Ragan, Gregory; andAlvord, Gregory. 2006. "Assessing Mercury
Levels in the Wastewater of an Aging Research Laboratory Building."
Chemical Health and Safety, 14(2), pp. 4-8.
http://www.pubmedcentral.nih.gov/articlerender.fcgi?artid=2346441
(2) Singhvi, R.,Turpin, R., Kalnicky, D.J., Patel, J. 2001. "Comparison
of Field and Laboratory Methods for Monitoring Metallic Mercury
Vapor in Indoor Air." Journal of Hazardous Materials, Issue 83(1-2),
pp. 1-10.
Mercury in indoor air.
Equipment also can be used to
detect mercury vapor in head
space above non-vapor samples
$10,800
Hg
Mercury
Analyzer
(gold film)
Lumex RA-915+
Mercury Vapor
Analyzer
(1) EPA Technology Verification Report. May 2004. "Field
Measurment Technology for Mercury in Soil and Sediment." EPA
Office of Research and Development
http://www.epa.gov/esd/cmb/site/pdf/papers/sb133.pdf
Mercury (incl. mercuric chloride,
methoxyethylmercuric acetate) in
air, water, or solids.
$19,650
(1) Approximate equipment costs do not include consumables, such as batteries, gas cylinders, and reagents
Information in this attachment does not constitute EPA's endorsement or recommendation
Attachment 1 i -1
-------
Attachment 1 j: X Ray
- Information Regarding Currently Available Screening Equipment for Use in All Hazards Receipt Facilities
Threat Categories:
Explosive:
Explosive devices
X Ray Devices
Addition
al and Alternative Equi
oment
Threat Cat.
Detection
Technology /
Type
Product Name
Non-vendor Performance Testing
Analytes / Comments
Approx.
Cost
Explosive
Devices
X Ray
X-ray screening can be used to
detect hardware indicating the
presence of an explosive device
Information in this attachment does not constitute EPA's endorsement or recommendation
Attachment 1j -1
-------
Draft AHRF Protocol Supplement
Attachment 2:
All Hazards Receipt Facility - Laboratory Contacts
Affiliation
Name
Contact Information
Biodefense Laboratory Wadsworth Center
New York State Department of Health
120 New Scotland Ave.
Albany, NY 12208
Christina Egan
eganc@wadsworth.org
(518) 473-6900
Kenneth Aldous
aldous@wadsworth.org (5
18 ) 396-7114
State of Connecticut,
Department of Public Health,
Division of Laboratory Services
10 Clinton Street
Hartford, CT 06106
Jack Bennett
jack.bennett@ct.gov
(860) 509-8530
Defense Research and Development
Canada Suffield, Operational Support Section
P.O. Box 4000, Stn. Main
Medicine Hat, Alberta Canada
Scott A.
Holowachuk
Scott.Holowachuk@crdc-
rddc.gc.ca
(403) 544-4178
State of Delaware
Delaware Public Health Laboratory,
30 Sunnyside Road
Smyrna, DE 19977
Tara Lydick
Ta ra .lydick@state.de. us
(302) 223-1520
-------
Draft AHRF Protocol Supplement
Attachment 3:
Technology Performance Summary for Chemical Detection Instruments
[US EPA Technical Brief. January 2009. EPA/600/S-09/015]
-------
technical BRIEF
&EPA
3
www.epa. gov/nhsrc
Technology Performance Summary for
Chemical Detection Instruments
Sixteen Instruments Tested to Determine Their Capability to
Screen Samples Submitted to All Hazards Receipt Facilities
All Hazards Receipt Facilities (AHRFs) were developed to
prescreen for chemical, radiochemical, arid explosive hazards
in samples collected during suspected terrorist attacks. The
technologies (i.e., instruments) used in AHRFs are intended
to screen samples prior to a full analysis, helping protect
responders, laboratory workers, and others from potential injury.
Evaluations of these technologies are summarized in two
technology evaluation reports:
1) Testing of Screening Technologies for Detection of Chemical
Warfare Agents in All Hazards Receipt Facilities (CWAs)
2) Testing of Screening Technologies for Detection of Toxic
Industrial Chemicals in All Hazards Receipt Facilities (TICs)
The chemicals included in the reports were chosen because
they might be used during, or develop as a by-product
from, a terrorist attack.
The screening technologies are intended:
To be rapid and qualitative
To be simple to use and of relatively low cost
To indicate if samples contain hazardous chemicals of concern.
Not all of the technologies evaluated were deemed suitable for the AHRF, although they might be
useful for on scene responders.
Technology Descriptions
The screening technologies tested were chosen based on a
review of commercially available detection devices. From the
variety of detection instruments reviewed, 16 screening
technologies were selected for testing based on their
suitability for use in AHRFs.
The 16 technologies ranged from simple test papers, kits,
and color-indicating tubes to hand-held electronic detectors
based on ion mobility spectrometry (IMS), photoionization
detection (RID), and flame spectrophotometry (FSP). Each
technology was tested with three replicate samples for each
matrix (vapor, liquid, or on a surface) containing either a
CWA or TIC. CWAs and TICs were tested at concentrations
EPA's National Homeland Security
Research Center (NHSRC) develops
products based on scientific research
and technology evaluations. Our
products and expertise are widely used in
preventing, preparing for, and recovering
from public health and environmental
emergencies that arise from terrorist
attacks. Our research and products
address biological, radiological, or
chemical warfare agents that could affect
indoor areas, outdoor areas, or water
infrastructures. NHSRC rigorously tests
technologies against a wide range of
performance characteristics,
requirements, and specifications.
Technology testing and evaluation is
an effort to provide reliable information
regarding the performance of
commercially available technologies
that may have application for homeland
security.
This document does not constitute nor should be construed as an EPA endorsement of any particular product,
service, or technology.
Attachment 3 -1
-------
known to be hazardous to humans within a few minutes of exposure (e.g., AEGL = Acute Exposure
Guide Level (www.epa.gov/opptintr/aeql) and RDT&E = Research, Development, Test, and
Evaluation Standards (Chemical Surety, Chapter 6: Army Regulation 50-6, 26 June 2001)).
The following performance parameters were evaluated for each technology:
Identifying the number of false positives/false negatives and the repeatability of test results
Time in which the instrument detected the presence of a chemical (i.e., response time)
Operational information including ease of use and response indication (e.g., color change
indicating chemical detection)
Cost including initial, sample, and continuing operating costs.
Technologies were tested to determine their detection capability for the following hazardous
chemicals in different matrices:
Vapor
Liquid
Surface
Hydrogen cyanide
Cyanide
Nerve agent (VX)
Cyanogen chloride
Hydrogen peroxide
Phosgene Fluori
de
Chlorine Sarin
Hydrogen sulfide
Sulfur mustard
Arsine
Nerve agent (VX)
Sarin
Sulfur mustard
Testing Methodologies
Each technology was tested with one chemical target agent at a time.
Vapor Testing - Each screening technology was first sampled (or was exposed to) the clean air
flow, and any response or indication from the screening technology was noted. After this background
measurement, the 4-way valve was switched to the challenge plenum to deliver the target gas. The
sequence of exposure to clean air, followed by exposure to the target gas, was carried out three times
for each screening technology.
The test apparatus used to evaluate the technologies allowed both the temperature and relative
humidity (RH) to be adjusted. For each technology, the test sequence of three clean air blanks
interspersed with three target gases was conducted under four different conditions (i.e., base
temperature and RH; elevated temperature and RH; low temperature and RH; and base temperature
and RH with an interferent, a mixture of hydrocarbons representative of polluted urban air). Testing
at the base temperature and RH was conducted first, and if a technology failed under this condition,
then no tests were conducted using the other three conditions.
Liquid Testing - For CWAs, testing was conducted for technologies and target agents in liquid
samples that were diluted in isopropyl alcohol (IPA) or deionized (Dl) water. The detection device
was tested with three blank samples of the solvent used (IPA or Dl water) and three samples of the
test solution containing the target agent. If a technology detected the chemical in at least one of the
three samples in the pure solvent, then the challenge was repeated with a hydrocarbon mixture
interferent (1% of the total volume) added to both the blank and challenge samples.
For TICs, samples were prepared in Dl water, in municipal tap water, and in Dl water containing 3.0%
sodium chloride by weight to simulate potential interfering sample matrices that might be encountered.
January 2009
EPA/600/S-09/015
This document does not constitute nor should be construed as an EPA endorsement of any particular product,
service, or technology.
Attachment 3 - 2
-------
Each screening technology was tested with three blank samples and with three samples containing
the TICs. If the instrument failed to detect a TIC in all three challenge samples with the Dl water
matrix, then no tests were conducted with that TIC in tap or salt water.
Surface Testing - Testing was conducted for each technology using three blank glass coupons and
three glass coupons spiked with the nerve agent VX. All tests were conducted at room temperature
and approximately 50% relative humidity. For those technologies that correctly indicated the
presence of VX in at least one of these three tests, interference tests were then conducted by
spiking approximately 1 mg of interferent per coupon onto both the blank and VX-spiked coupons.
Additionally, for these same technologies, the blank and spiked coupon tests (without interferent)
were repeated at the same low and high temperature and relative humidity conditions used in the
vapor testing.
Test Results
Table 1 provides a summary of the detection capability of the screening technologies tested.
The following summarizes the testing information for each matrix form:
Vapor
Draeger Civil Defense Kit (CDK) detected 6 of 7 chemicals 100% of the time
Sensidyne Gas Detector Tubes detected 5 of 5 chemicals 100% of the time
Draeger Chip Measurement System (CMS) Analyzer, MSA Single CWA Sampler Kit,
and Nextteq Civil Defense Kit (CDK) detected 4 chemicals 100% of the time (out of 4, 5,
and 5 chemicals tested, respectively)
Anachemia CM256A1, Safety Solutions HazMat Smart-Stripฎ (SS), and Truetech M183A
detected 2 of 4 chemicals 100% of the time and Proengin AP2C detected 2 of 6 chemicals
100% of the time
Anachemia C2 and RAE Systems MultiRAE Plus detected 1 chemical 100% of the time
(out of 5 and 8 chemicals tested, respectively)
Smiths Detection APD2000ฎ did not detect either of the 2 chemicals tested 100% of the time.
Liquid
Due to the lack of acceptable results, samples that were diluted with isopropyl alcohol for CWA testing
were not factored into the Table 1 summary results. One explanation for the lack of acceptable results
may be that the technologies were not designed for application using non-aqueous solvents.
Truetech M272 Water Kit detected 3 of 3 chemicals 100% of the time
Severn Trent Services Eclox Strip detected 2 of 2 chemicals 100% of the time
Proengin AP2C and Safety Solutions HazMat Smart-Stripฎ detected 1 chemical 100% of
the time (out of 4 and 5 chemicals, respectively)
Anachemia C2, Anachemia CM256A1, and Nextteq CDK did not detect any chemical
100% of the time (3 chemicals tested).
Surface
All of the tested instruments detected the presence of VX 100% of the time, regardless
of temperature, relative humidity, or presence of interferent.
False Negatives and Positives
False negative results indicate that the screening technology was not able to detect the presence
of a chemical known to be present. This information is factored into the test results provided in
Table 1 and in the summary information above.
January 2009
EPA/600/S-09/015
This document does not constitute nor should be construed as an EPA endorsement of any particular product,
service, or technology.
Attachment 3 - 3
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Testing for false positive responses was done using "clean" blank samples (i.e., clean air in the vapor
testing, pure solvents in the liquid testing, and a clean coupon in the surface testing) or interferent
blank samples (i.e., samples with the hydrocarbon mixture interferent, but without any test chemical
present). Few false positives occurred. The following summarizes these occurrences:
Vapor
False positive sarin responses occurred in all three interferent blank samples using Draeger
CDK and the MSA Single CWA Kit
One false positive sulfur mustard response occurred in the three interferent blank samples
using Smiths Detection APD2000ฎ.
Liquid
As indicated, false positives were observed only in the IPA blank samples, which was likely due
to incompatibility of the screening technologies with that solvent. Proengin AP2C, in particular,
responded positively to every IPA blank sample.
Surface
Two false positive responses occurred using the Proengin AP2C at the high temperature
and relative humidity condition.
Repeatability
Repeatability for the presence of TICs was tested for those instruments yielding quantitative results
(i.e., Draeger CMS Analyzer, RAE Systems MultiRAE Plus, and Sensidyne Gas Detector Tubes).
Quantitative results were recorded for each of the triplicate tests, and repeatability was calculated in
terms of percent relative standard deviation (% RSD). The following summarizes the test information:
32 of the 40 results had less than 15% RSD
Over half of the results (22 of 40) had less than 10% RSD
Several % RSD values exceeded 20% (e.g., Draeger CMS Analyzer for hydrogen
cyanide and chlorine).
Note: The PID principle of the MultiRAE Plus was not necessarily expected to respond to TICs or
CWAs; however, it was tested based on the instrument's promotion as a general toxic compound
detector.
Conclusions from this testing indicate that these instruments can provide reproducible results;
however, this cannot be assumed to be the case under different environmental conditions
(i.e., varying temperature and relative humidity) or with different concentrations.
Operational Information
Table 2 provides operational information on the 16 screening technologies tested. Information
included in the table includes:
Response time information (seconds or minutes to obtain an instrument response)
Ease of use
Response indication (e.g., detection is indicated by color change)
Initial cost.
Response and Ease of Use Information
The speed and simplicity of the vapor screening process varied widely among the tested
technologies. Ease of use was not necessarily correlated with instruments' detection capabilities. The
following provides some general highlights on response time and ease of use for each sample matrix:
January 2009
EPA/600/S-09/015
This document does not constitute nor should be construed as an EPA endorsement of any particular product,
service, or technology.
Attachment 3 - 4
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Vapor
Color-indicating tube technologies were simple to use in principle, but differed in the time
and difficulty of obtaining samples.
o The number of manual pump strokes required to draw in the air sample ranged widely,
as did the manual effort needed for those technologies requiring multiple pump strokes,
o Nextteq CDK used an electric air sampling pump that greatly reduced the physical effort
needed; however, it still required a few minutes to draw the required sample volume.
The three real-time technologies tested (RAE Systems MultiRAE Plus, Proengin AP2C, and
Smiths Detection APD2000ฎ) provided easy and rapid sample analysis for chemicals in vapor;
however, there was a wide range in instruments' detection capability.
Safety Solutions HazMat Smart-Stripฎ was the simplest technology, requiring only removal of
a protective film to expose the indicating patches on the card. The detection response occurred
within seconds.
Color-indicating tubes that require the minimum sample volume are preferable for use in
AHRFs. Additionally, the use of an electrical sampling pump is helpful if a large numbers
of samples are to be screened.
Liquid and Surface
For surface samples, M8, M9, and 3-way indicating papers were especially easy to use
and responses typically occurred within seconds.
For liquid samples, Severn Trent Services Eclox Strip and Truetech M272 Water
Kit were relatively easy to use and responses occurred within minutes.
Analysis of liquid and surface samples with Proengin AP2C was relatively rapid because
the detector's attachments were simple to use.
During homeland security events, it would be important for the technologies to screen for multiple
chemicals simultaneously. Technologies using multiple color-indicating tubes at once provide this
capability. Proengin AP2C provided multi-chemical detection and could be used to detect chemicals
in vapor, liquid, and surface samples.
Cost
The initial cost of the technologies varied substantially, ranging from a few hundred to a few thousand
dollars. The two exceptions were Proengin AP2C at a discounted cost of nearly $16,000 and Smiths
Detection APD2000ฎat a cost of $10,000. Comparing purchase prices of different technologies can
be misleading. Many of the technologies can screen relatively few samples with the originally supplied
materials. For example, several technologies that rely on color-indicating tubes initially come with
only enough tubes to screen 10 to 40 samples. Testing larger numbers of samples requires additional
tubes. All technologies tested require consumable items such tubes and batteries. Simple test papers
are the least expensive, with costs estimated at less than $0.50 per sample. Most technologies tested
had similar costs per sample, typically ranging from $4 to $20 per sample.
For more information about the technologies evaluated for use in AHRFs, or by first responders,
visit the NHSRC Web site at www.epa.gov/nhsrc. or view the full reports, Testing of Screening
Technologies for Detection of Chemical Warfare Agents in All Hazards Receipt Facilities at
www.epa.gov/nhsrc/pubs/600r07104.pdf and Testing of Screening Technologies for Detection
of Toxic Industrial Chemicals in All Hazards Receipt Facilities at
www.epa.gov/nhsrc/pubs/600r08034.pdf.
Principal Investigator: Eric Koglin
Feedback/Questions: Kathy Nickel (513) 569-7955
January 2009
EPA/600/S-09/015
This document does not constitute nor should be construed as an EPA endorsement of any particular product,
service, or technology.
Attachment 3 - 5
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Table 1. Instrument Detection/Screening Capabilities for Various Hazardous Chemicals in Vapor, Liquid, and/or Solid Form"
Technology Vender
(Instrument Name)
TIC Vapor Testing
Accurately Detected Results (%]
CWA Vapor Testing
Accurately Detected
Results (%)
TIC Liquid Testing
Accurately Detected Results (%)
CWA Liquid Testing
Accurately Detected Results'5 (%)
CWA Surface Testing
Accurately Detected
Results (%)
Hydrogen
cyanide
Cyanogen
chloride
Phosgene
Chlorine
Hydrogen
sulfide
Arsine
Sarin
Sulfur
mustard
Cyanide
Hydrogen
peroxide
Fluoride
Sarin
Sulfur
mustard
VX Nerve
agent
VX Nerve agent
Agentase
(CAD Kit)
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
100
Anachemia
(C2)
1
1
1
NA
NA
NA
100
25 NA
NA
NA
1
1
1
100
Anachemia
(CM256A1)
100
100 NA
NA
NA
NA
1
1
NA
NA
NA
1
1
1
100
Draeger
(CMS Analyzer)
100 NA
100
100
100 NA
NA
NA
NA
NA NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
Draeger
(CDK)
100
92
100
100 NA
100
100
100 NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
MSA
(Single CWA Detector Kit)
100
100
100 NA
NA
NA
100
1
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
Nextteq
(CDK)
100
100
100 NA
NA
NA
1
100 NA
NA
NA
HI
C
83/|/|
C
33/|/|
C
100
Proengin
(AP2C)
75
1
NA
NA
82
100
100
1
1
NA
NA
100
83
1
100
RAE Systems
(MultiRAE Plus)
1
1
1
1
100
1
1
1
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
Safety Solutions
(HazMat Smart-Stripฎ)
1
NA
NA
100
100 NA
1
NA
1
100
1
1
NA
1
NA
Safety Solutions
(HazMat Smart-M8ฎ)
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
1
1
1
100
Sensidyne
(Gas Detector Tube)
100 NA
100
100
100
100 N/
I
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
Severn Trent Services
(Eclox Strip)
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
100 NA
100 NA
Smiths Detection
(APD2000ฎ)
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
1
75 NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
Truetech
(M272 Water Kit)
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
100 NA
NA
100 NA
100 NA
Truetech
(M18A3)
100
1
75 NA
NA
NA
100 NA
NA
NA
NA
1
1
1
100
Note: Information was derived from the Testing of Screening Technologies for Detection of Toxic Industrial Chemicals in All Hazards Receipt Facilities and the Testing of Screening Technologies for Detection of Chemical Warfare Agents in All Hazards Receipt Facilities. Technologies were tested to
determine their ability to accurately detect hazardous chemical in various matrices, at various environmental conditions, or with the addition of an interferent (Refer to the text in this brief or to the reports for specific details). The % of accurately detected results is based on the number of samples each
technology accurately detected each target chemical (within an acceptable concentration range). Ranges were based on chemical concentrations that would cause irreversible or long-lasting adverse health effects (e.g., AEGL = Acute Exposure Guideline Level).
aNA = Not applicable, = Technology accurately detected chemical 100% of the time, = Technology accurately detected chemical >0% and <100% of the time, = Technology did not accurately detect chemical at all (0% of the time), TIC = Toxic industrial chemicals, and CWA = Chemical
warfare agents.
bDue to the lack of acceptable results, samples that were diluted with isopropyl alcohol were not factored into the % of accurately detected results. One explanation for the lack of acceptable results may be that the technologies were not designed for application using non-aqueous solvents.
ฐResults for to M8 paper, M9 paper, and 3-way paper, respectively.
January 2009
EPA/600/S-09/015
This document does not constitute nor should be construed as an EPA endorsement of any particular product,
service, or technology.
Attachment 3 - 6
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Table 2. Performance Factors Including Response Time, Operational Information, and Cost Associated with Hazardous Chemical Detection Technologies
Technology Vender
(Name)
Technology
Type
Matrix
(Chemical Type)3
Response Time
Information15
Operational
Information
Instrument
Cost0
Agentase
(CAD Kit)
Color-indicating pen
Surface (CWA)
Seconds - Response (color change) within 1 second at room conditions and up to
26 seconds at low temperature/relative humidity or with interferent present
Simple procedure
$286
Anachemia
(C2)
Color tubes
Vapor
(TIC and CWA)
Minutes - A few minutes needed for pump strokes (40 strokes for CWAs and 10 for
TICs)
Relatively complex procedure
Arm/hand strength needed for pump
$684
Color ticket
Vapor (CWA)
Minutes - Response (color change) within 2 minutes
Simple procedure
3-way paper
Surface (CWA)
Seconds - Response (color change) within 5 seconds
Simple procedure
Anachemia
(CM256A1)
Multifunction card
Vapor
(TIC and CWA)
Minutes - Response (color change) occurs within several seconds after exposure
and manipulation of card takes up to one minute
Simple procedure
Breakage of two green ampules at the same time creates fumes and
green liquid spray
$189
3-way paper
Surface (CWA)
Seconds - Response (color change) within 5 seconds
Simple procedure
Draeger
(CMS Analyzer)d
Multicolor tubes
on a chip
Vapor(TIC)
Minutes - Automated color tube sampler and reader take several minutes for a
reading
Simple procedure
Misaligned gears can cause chips to become unusable
$1,922
Draeger
(CDK)
Color tubes
Vapor
(TIC and CWA)
Seconds - Initial response within a few pump strokes; a few minutes required for
requisite 50 pump strokes
Five compounds can be tested at one time
Simple procedure
Easily distinguishable color changes
Arm/hand strength needed for pump
$3,114
MSA (Single CWA
Detector Kit)
Color tubes
Vapor
(TIC and CWA)
Minutes - 2 minutes (30 pump strokes) needed for noticeable color change. Note:
The time for noticeable color change depends on concentration of analyte
Simple procedure
Arm/hand strength needed for pump
Some color changes difficult to distinguish
$1,295
Nextteq
(CDK)
Color tubes
Vapor
(TIC and CWA)
Minutes - Sample drawn for 3.5 minutes; time for noticeable color change depends
on concentration of analyte; required sample volume takes several minutes with
electric pump
Five compounds can be tested at one time
Simple procedure
Some color changes difficult to distinguish
$1,875
M8 paper
Liquid and Surface
(CWA)
Seconds - Response (color change) within about 10 seconds with liquid and
surface samples
Simple procedure
M9 paper
Surface (CWA)
Seconds - Response (color change) within 25 seconds
Simple procedure
3-way paper
Surface (CWA)
Seconds - Response (color change) within 5 seconds
Simple procedure
Proengin
(AP2C)d
Flame spectrometer
Vapor
(TIC and CWA)
Seconds - Response typically occurs within a few seconds
Simple procedure of starting device and observing readings from vapors
or taking samples and observing readings from liquids and surface
samples
Wth regular use, batteries and low-pressure hydrogen supplies need
replacement periodically
$15,708e
(discount for
testing)
Liquid
(TIC and CWA)
Seconds - Response within 10 seconds. Note: It takes less than 1 minute to install
instrument parts necessary to collect liquid samples.
Surface (CWA)
Seconds - Response within 25 seconds
January 2009
EPA/600/S-09/015
This document does not constitute nor should be construed as an EPA endorsement of any particular product,
service, or technology.
Attachment 3 - 7
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Technology Vender
(Name)
Technology
Type
Matrix
(Chemical Type)3
Response Time
Information15
Operational
Information
Instrument
Cost0
RAE Systems
(MultiRAE Plus)d
PID
Vapor(TIC)
Seconds - Response within approximately 15 seconds
Simple procedure
$3,290
Safety Solutions
(HazMat Smart-Stripฎ)
Multifunction card
Vapor(TIC)
Seconds - Response (color change) within several seconds
Simple procedure of peeling of protective cover for immediate use
Some color changes difficult to distinguish
$20
Liquid (TIC)
Seconds - Response (color change) within a few seconds
Safety Solutions
(HazMat Smart-M8ฎ)
M8 paper
Surface (CWA)
Seconds - Response (color change) typically within 5 seconds
Simple procedure of peeling of protective cover for immediate use
$6
Sensidyne
(Gas Detector Tube)d
Color tubes
Vapor(TIC)
Seconds - Response (color change) within a few seconds (1 minute needed per
pump stroke). Note: Analytes tested required only one pump stroke.
Only one TIC can be tested at a time
Simple procedure
Number of pump strokes needed depends on suspected concentration
$532
Severn Trent Services
(Eclox Strip)
Color ticket
Liquid (CWA)
Minutes - Response within 3 minutes due to reaction time needed for color
change.
Simple procedure
$510
Smiths Detection
(APD2000ฎ)
Ion mobility
Vapor (CWA)
Seconds - Most responses within 30 seconds
Simple procedure
The provided chemical surrogate vapor source allows for rapid indication
of proper operation
Contains a small radioactive source
$9,620
Truetech
(M272 Water Kit)
Color tubes
Liquid (TIC)
Minutes - Response requires several minutes due to complexity of required
procedure
Relatively complex procedure
Requires 60 mL of sample and multiple steps for detection
Minimal effort but time consuming
$386
Color ticket
Liquid (CWA)
Minutes - Response within 3 minutes due to reaction time needed for color
change
Simple procedure of wetting pad with sample and pressing together with a
second reagent pad
Truetech
(M18A3)
Color tubes
Vapor(TIC)
Minutes - Recommended 60 pump strokes take several minutes to complete;
color change begins in a fraction of that time
Relatively complex procedure
Arm/hand strength needed for pump
Some color changes difficult to distinguish
$1,189
Color ticket
Vapor (CWA)
Minutes - Response within 3 minutes due to reaction time needed for color
change
Simple procedure
M8 paper
Surface (CWA)
Seconds - Response (color change) within 10 seconds
Simple procedure
aTIC = Toxic industrial chemicals and CWA = Chemical warfare agents
b = Response time occurs in seconds and = Response time occurs in minutes
These costs represent purchase prices. For long-term use, the cost of samples and consumable items need to be evaluated (refer to subject matter reports for more information on these cost).
dDraeger (CMS), RAE Systems (MultiRAE Plus), and Sensidyne (Gas Detector Tube) provide quantitative readings. The PID principle of the MultiRAE Plus was not necessarily expected to respond to TICs or CWAs; however, it was tested based on the instrument's promotion as a general toxic
compound detector. Proengin (A2PC) provides semi-quantitative readings.
eA model newer than the model tested is now available. The cost of the newer model is $11,700.
January 2009
EPA/600/S-09/015
This document does not constitute nor should be construed as an EPA endorsement of any particular product,
service, or technology.
Attachment 3 - 8
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oEPA
United States
Environmental Protection
Agency
PRESORTED STANDARD
POSTAGE & FEES PAID
EPA
PERMIT NO. G-35
Office of Research and Development
National Homeland Security Research Center
Cincinnati, OH 45268
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