Handbook on the Management of Ordnance and Explosives
at Closed, Transferring, and Transferred Ranges
and Other Sites
INTERIM FINAL
February 2002
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Disclaimer
This handbook provides guidance to EPA staff. The document does not substitute for EPA's
statutes or regulations, nor is it a regulation itself. Thus, it cannot impose legally binding
requirements on EPA, States, or the regulated community, and may not apply to a particular
situation based upon the circumstances. This handbook is an Interim Final document and
allows for future revisions as applicable.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
GLOSSARY OF TERMS ix
ACRONYMS xix
1.0 INTRODUCTION 1-1
1.1 Overview 1-1
1.2 The Common Nomenclature 1-2
1.3 Organization of This Handbook 1-4
2.0 REGULATORY OVERVIEW 2-1
2.1 Regulatory Overview 2-2
2.1.1 Defense Environmental Restoration Program 2-2
2.1.2 CERCLA 2-3
2.1.3 CERCLA Section 120 2-6
2.1.4 Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) 2-6
2.1.5 Department of Defense Explosives Safety Board (DDESB) 2-8
2.2 Conclusion 2-9
3.0 CHARACTERISTICS OF ORDNANCE AND EXPLOSIVES 3-1
3.1 Overview of Explosives 3-1
3.1.1 History of Explosives in the United States 3-1
3.1.2 Classification of Military Energetic Materials 3-5
3.1.3 Classification of Explosives 3-6
3.2 Sources of Hazards from Explosives, Munition Constituents, and Release
Mechanisms 3-11
3.2.1 Hazards Associated with Common Types of Munitions 3-11
3.2.2 Areas Where OE Is Found 3-13
3.2.3 Release Mechanisms for OE 3-14
3.2.4 Chemical Reactivity of Explosives 3-14
3.3 Sources and Nature of the Potential Hazards Posed by Conventional
Munitions 3-15
3.3.1 Probability of Detonation as a Function of Fuze Characteristics .... 3-15
3.3.2 Types of Explosive Hazards 3-17
3.3.3 Factors Affecting Potential for Ordnance Exposure to Human
Activity 3-18
3.3.4 Depth of OE 3-19
3.3.5 Environmental Factors Affecting Decomposition of OE 3-21
3.3.6 Explosives-Contaminated Soils 3-22
3.4 Toxicity and Human Health and Ecological Impacts of Explosives and Other
Munition Constituents 3-23
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TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued)
3.5 Other Sources of Conventional Munition Constituents 3-28
3.5.1 Open Burning/Open Detonation (OB/OD) 3-28
3.5.2 Explosives Manufacturing and Demilitarization 3-29
3.6 Conclusions 3-29
4.0 DETECTION OF UXO AND BURIED MUNITIONS 4-1
4.1 Introduction 4-1
4.2 Selection of the Geophysical Detection System 4-3
4.2.1 Geophysical Sensors in Use Today 4-3
4.2.2 Selection of the Geophysical Detection System 4-5
4.2.3 UXO Detection System Components 4-6
4.2.4 Costs of UXO Detection Systems 4-8
4.2.5 Quality Assurance/Quality Control 4-8
4.3 Emerging UXO Detection Systems 4-8
4.3.1 Advanced EMI Systems 4-9
4.3.2 Airborne Detection 4-9
4.4 Use of Processing and Modeling To Discriminate UXO 4-10
4.5 UXO Detection Demonstration Programs 4-12
4.5.1 Jefferson Proving Ground Technology Demonstration Program .... 4-12
4.5.2 Former Fort Ord Ordnance Detection and Discrimination Study
(ODDS) 4-15
4.5.3 UXO Technology Standardized Demonstration Sites 4-16
4.6 Fact Sheets and Case Studies on Detection Technologies and Systems 4-16
4.7 Conclusion 4-17
5.0 RESPONSE TECHNOLOGIES 5-1
5.1 Treatment and Disposal of OE: An Overview 5-3
5.1.1 Handling OE Safely 5-5
5.1.2 Render-Safe Procedures 5-6
5.2 Treatment of OE 5-6
5.2.1 Open Burning and Open Detonation 5-6
5.2.2 Alternative Treatment Technologies 5-8
5.3 Treatment of Soils That Contain Reactive and/or Ignitable Compounds .... 5-12
5.3.1 Biological Treatment Technologies 5-12
5.3.2 Soil Washing 5-17
5.3.3 Wet Air Oxidation 5-18
5.3.4 Low-Temperature Thermal Desorption 5-18
5.4 Decontamination of Equipment and Scrap 5-19
5.5 Safe Deactivation of Energetic Materials and Beneficial Use of Byproducts . 5-20
5.6 Conclusion 5-20
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TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued)
6.0 EXPLOSIVES SAFETY 6-1
6.1 Introduction to DoD Explosives Safety Requirements and the DoD Explosives
Safety Board (DDESB) 6-1
6.2 Explosives Safety Requirements 6-3
6.2.1 General Safety Rules 6-4
6.2.2 Transportation and Storage Requirements 6-4
6.2.3 Quantity-Distance (Q-D) Requirements 6-5
6.2.4 Protective Measures for UXO/EOD Personnel 6-6
6.2.5 Emergency Response and Contingency Procedures 6-6
6.2.6 Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) 6-7
6.2.7 Personnel Standards 6-7
6.2.8 Assessment Depths 6-8
6.2.9 Land Use Controls 6-9
6.3 Managing Explosives Safety 6-11
6.3.1 Site Safety and Health Plans 6-11
6.3.2 Explosives Safety Submissions for OE Response Actions 6-13
6.3.3 Explosives Safety Submission Requirements 6-14
6.4 Public Education About UXO Safety 6-17
6.5 Conclusion 6-19
7.0 SITE/RANGE CHARACTERIZATION AND RESPONSE 7-1
7.1 Overview of Elements of OE Site Characterization 7-2
7.2 Overview of Systematic Planning 7-3
7.3 Stage 1: Establishing the Goal(s) of the Investigation 7-4
7.3.1 Establishing the Team 7-4
7.3.2 Establishing the Goals of the Site Characterization Process 7-5
7.4 Stage 2: Preparing for the Investigation: Gathering Information To Design a
Conceptual Site Model and Establishing Sampling and Analysis Objectives . . 7-6
7.4.1 The Conceptual Site Model (CSM) 7-6
7.4.2 Preliminary Remediation Goals 7-9
7.4.3 Assessment of Currently Available Information To Determine Data
Needs 7-12
7.4.4 Project Schedule, Milestones, Resources, and Regulatory
Requirements 7-16
7.4.5 Identification of Remedial Objectives 7-18
7.4.6 The Data Quality Objectives of the Investigation 7-19
7.4.7 Documentation of the CSM 7-21
7.5 Stage 3: Designing the Sampling and Analysis Effort 7-22
7.5.1 Identification of Appropriate Detection Technologies 7-24
7.5.2 UXO Detection Methods 7-25
7.6 Methodologies for Identifying OE Areas 7-27
7.6.1 Operational Analysis of Munitions Activities 7-27
7.6.2 Use of Statistically Based Methodologies To Identify UXO 7-28
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TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued)
7.7 Incorporating QA/QC Measures Throughout the Investigation 7-36
7.8 Selecting Analytical Methods 7-37
7.8.1 Field Methods 7-38
7.8.2 Fixed Lab Methods 7-40
7.9 Developing the Site Response Strategy 7-43
7.9.1 Assumptions of the Site Response Strategy 7-44
7.9.2 Attributes of the Site Response Strategy 7-45
7.9.3 Questions Addressed in the Development of the Site Response
Strategy 7-49
7.10 Making the Decision 7-51
7.11 Conclusion 7-51
SOURCES AND RESOURCES
Chapter 2 2-10
Chapter 3 3-31
Chapter 4 4-30
Chapter 5 5-21
Chapter 6 6-21
Chapter 7 7-53
LIST OF TABLES
Table 3-1. Pyrotechnic Special Effects 3-8
Table 3-2. Examples of Depths of Ordnance Penetration into Soil 3-20
Table 3-3. Potential Toxic Effects of Exposure to Explosive Chemicals and Components . . . 3-24
Table 3-4. Primary Uses of Explosive Materials 3-26
Table 4-1. Examples of Site-Specific Factors To Be Considered in Selecting a Detection
System 4-5
Table 4-2. System Element Influences on Detection System Performance 4-7
Table 5-1. Overview of Remediation Technologies for Explosives and Residues 5-3
Table 5-2. Characteristics of Incinerators 5-11
Table 6-1. Assessment Depths To Be Used for Planning Purposes 6-9
Table 7-1. Ordnance-Related Activities and Associated Primary Sources and Release
Mechanisms 7-7
Table 7-2. Release Mechanisms and Expected OE Contamination 7-8
Table 7-3. Example of CSM Elements for Firing Range 7-8
Table 7-4. Potential Information for OE Investigation 7-15
Table 7-5. Comparison of Statistical Sampling Tools 7-31
Table 7-6. Comparison of Statistical Sampling Methodologies 7-32
Table 7-7. Explosive Compounds Detectable by Common Field Analytical Methods 7-40
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TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued)
LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 3-1. Schematic of an Explosive Train 3-6
Figure 3-2. Explosive Trains in a Round of Artillery Ammunition 3-6
Figure 3-3. Mechanical All-Way-Acting Fuze 3-17
Figure 3-4. Mechanical Time Fuze 3-17
Figure 4-1. Hand-Held Magnetometer 4-20
Figure 4-2. EM61 System 4-23
Figure 5-1. Windrow Composting 5-14
Figure 5-2. Typical Windrow Composting Process 5-15
Figure 5-3. Side and Top View of Windrow Composting System 5-15
Figure 5-4. Slurry Reactor 5-16
Figure 6-1. Routing and Approval of Explosives Safety Submission (ESS) for OE
Response Actions 6-15
Figure 7-1. Systematic Planning Process 7-3
Figure 7-2. Conceptual Site Model: Vertical View 7-21
Figure 7-3. Conceptual Site Model: Plan View of a Range Investigation Area 7-22
Figure 7-4. Developing a Site Response Strategy 7-47
ATTACHMENTS
Chapter 2. DoD and EPA Management Principles for Implementing Response Actions at
Closed, Transferring, and Transferred (CTT) Ranges 1
ATTACHMENT 4-1. FACT SHEET #1: MAGNETOMETRY 4-18
ATTACHMENT 4-2. FACT SHEET #2: ELECTROMAGNETIC INDUCTION (EMI) .... 4-22
ATTACHMENT 4-3. FACT SHEET #3: GROUND PENETRATING RADAR (GPR) .... 4-25
ATTACHMENT 4-4. CASE STUDY #1: MULTISENSOR SYSTEM 4-27
ATTACHMENT 4-5. CASE STUDY #2: MAGNETOMETRY SYSTEM 4-28
ATTACHMENT 4-6. CASE STUDY #3: GROUND PENETRATING RADAR SYSTEM . 4-29
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1
GLOSSARY OF TERMS
2 Anomaly. Any identified subsurface mass that may be geologic in origin, unexploded ordnance
3 (UXO), or some other man-made material. Such identification is made through geophysical
4 investigation and reflects the response of the sensor used to conduct the investigation.
5 Anomaly reacquisition. The process of confirming the location of an anomaly after the initial
6 geophysical mapping conducted on a range. The most accurate reacquisition is accomplished using
7 the same instrument used in the geophysical survey to pinpoint the anomaly and reduce the area the
8 excavation team needs to search to find the item.2
9 Archives search report. An investigation to report past ordnance and explosives (OE) activities
10 conducted on an installation.3
11 Arming device. A device designed to perform the electrical and/or mechanical alignment necessary
12 to initiate an explosive train.
13 Blast overpressure. The pressure, exceeding the ambient pressure, manifested in the shock wave
14 of an explosion.8
15 Blow-in-place. Method used to destroy UXO, by use of explosives, in the location the item is
16 encountered.
17 Buried munitions. Munitions that have been intentionally discarded by being buried with the intent
18 of disposal. Such munitions may be either used or unused military munitions. Such munitions do
19 not include unexploded ordnance that become buried through use.
20 Caliber. The diameter of a proj ectile or the diameter of the bore of a gun or launching tube. Caliber
21 is usually expressed in millimeters or inches. In some instances (primarily with naval ordnance),
22 caliber is also used as a measure of the length of a weapon's barrel. For example, the term "5 inch
23 38 caliber" describes ordnance used in a 5-inch gun with a barrel length that is 38 times the diameter
24 of the bore.5
25 Casing. The fabricated outer part of ordnance designed to hold an explosive charge and the
26 mechanism required to detonate this charge.
27 Chemical warfare agent. A substance that is intended for military use with lethal or incapacitating
28 effects upon personnel through its chemical properties.4
29 Clearance. The removal of UXO from the surface or subsurface at active and inactive ranges.
30 Closed range. A range that has been taken out of service and either has been put to new uses that
31 are incompatible with range activities or is not considered by the military to be a potential range
32 area. A closed range is still under the control of the military.6
Glossary of Terms
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1 Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA).
2 CERCLA, commonly known as Superfund, is a Federal law that provides for the cleanup of releases
3 from abandoned waste sites that contain hazardous substances, pollutants, and contaminants.7
4 Deflagration. A rapid chemical reaction occurring at a rate of less than 3,300 feet per second in
5 which the output of heat is enough to enable the reaction to proceed and be accelerated without input
6 of heat from another source. The effect of a true deflagration under confinement is an explosion.
7 Confinement of the reaction increases pressure, rate of reaction, and temperature, and may cause
8 transition into a detonation.8
9 Demilitarization. The act of disassembling chemical or conventional military munitions for the
10 purpose of recycling, reclamation, or reuse of components. Also, rendering chemical or conventional
11 military munitions innocuous or ineffectual for military use. The term encompasses various
12 approved demilitarization methods such as mutilation, alteration, or destruction to prevent further
13 use for its originally intended military purpose.10
14 Department of Defense Explosives Safety Board (DDESB). The DoD organization charged with
15 promulgation of ammunition and explosives safety policy and standards, and with reporting on the
16 effectiveness of the implementation of such policy and standards.8
17 Detonation. A violent chemical reaction within a chemical compound or mechanical mixture
18 evolving heat and pressure. The result of the chemical reaction is exertion of extremely high
19 pressure on the surrounding medium. The rate of a detonation is supersonic, above 3,300 feet per
20 second.4
21 Disposal. The discharge, deposit, injection, dumping, spilling, leaking, or placing of any solid waste
22 or hazardous waste into or on any land or water so that such solid waste or hazardous waste or any
23 constituent thereof may enter the environment or be emitted into the air or discharged into any
24 waters, including groundwaters.9
25 Dud-fired. Munitions that failed to function as intended or as designed. They can be armed or not
26 armed as intended or at some stage in between.
27 Electromagnetic induction. Transfer of electrical power from one circuit to another by varying
28 the magnetic linkage.
29 Excavation of anomalies. The excavation, identification, and proper disposition of a subsurface
30 anomaly.2
31 Explosion. A chemical reaction of any chemical compound or mechanical mixture that, when
32 initiated, undergoes a very rapid combustion or decomposition, releasing large volumes of highly
33 heated gases that exert pressure on the surrounding medium. Also, a mechanical reaction in which
34 failure of the container causes sudden release of pressure from within a pressure vessel. Depending
35 on the rate of energy release, an explosion can be categorized as a deflagration, a detonation, or
36 pressure rupture.4
Glossary of Terms
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1 Explosive. A substance or mixture of substances, which is capable, by chemical reaction, of
2 producing gas at such a temperature, pressure and rate as to be capable of causing damage to the
3 surroundings.
4 Explosive filler. The energetic compound or mixture inside an OE item.
5 Explosive ordnance disposal (EOD). The detection, identification, field evaluation, rendering-safe
6 recovery, and final disposal of unexploded ordnance or munitions. It may also include the
7 rendering-safe and/or disposal of explosive ordnance (EO) that has become hazardous by damage
8 or deterioration, when the disposal of such EO is beyond the capabilities of the personnel normally
9 assigned the responsibilities for routine disposal.11
10 EOD incident. The suspected or detected presence of a UXO or damaged military munition that
11 constitutes a hazard to operations, installations, personnel, or material. Each EOD response to a
12 reported UXO is an EOD incident. Not included are accidental arming or other conditions that
13 develop during the manufacture of high explosives material, technical service assembly operations,
14 or the laying of land mines or demolition charges.
15
16 Explosive soil. Explosive soil refers to any mixture of explosives in soil, sand, clay, or other solid
17 media at concentrations such that the mixture itself is reactive or ignitable. Defined by the U.S.
18 Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) as soil that is composed of more than 12 percent reactive or
19 ignitable material. See also ignitable soil and reactive soil.
20 Explosive train. The arrangement of different explosives in OE arranged according to the most
21 sensitive and least powerful to the least sensitive and most powerful (initiator - booster - burster).
22 A small quantify of an initiating compound or mixture, such as lead azide, is used to detonate a
23 larger quantity of a booster compound, such as tetryl, that results in the main or booster charge of
24 a RDX composition, TNT, or other compound or mixture detonating.
25 Explosives safety. A condition in which operational capability, personnel, property, and the
26 environment are protected from the unacceptable effects of an ammunition or explosives mishap.9
27 Explosives Safety Submission. The document that serves as the specifications for conducting work
28 activities at the project. It details the scope of the project, the planned work activities and potential
29 hazards, and the methods for their control.3 It is prepared, submitted, and approved per DDESB
30 requirements. It is required for all response actions that deal with energetic material (e.g., UXO,
31 buried munitions), including time-critical removal actions, non-time-critical removal actions, and
32 remedial actions involving explosive hazards.
33 False alarm. The incorrect classification of nonordnance (e.g., clutter) as ordnance, or a declared
34 geophysical target location that does not correspond to the actual target location.
35 False negative. The incorrect declaration of an ordnance item as nonordnance by the geophysical
36 instrument used, or misidentification in post-processing, which results on potential risks remaining
37 following UXO investigations.
Glossary of Terms
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1 False positive. The incorrect identification of anomalous items as ordnance.
2 Federal land manager. With respect to any lands owned by the United States Government, the
3 secretary of the department with authority over such lands.
4 Formerly Used Defense Site (FUDS). Real property that was formerly owned by, leased by,
5 possessed by, or otherwise under the jurisdiction of the Secretary of Defense or the components,
6 including organizations that predate DoD.3
7 Fragmentation. The breaking up of the confining material of a chemical compound or mechanical
8 mixture when an explosion occurs. Fragments may be complete items, subassemblies, or pieces
9 thereof, or pieces of equipment or buildings containing the items.4
10 Fuze. 1. A device with explosive components designed to initiate a train of fire or detonation in
11 ordnance. 2. A nonexplosive device designed to initiate an explosion in ordnance.5
12 Gradiometer. Magnetometer for measuring the rate of change of a magnetic field.
13 Ground-penetrating radar. A system that uses pulsed radio waves to penetrate the ground and
14 measure the distance and direction of subsurface targets through radio waves that are reflected back
15 to the system.
16 Hazard ranking system (HRS). The principal mechanism EPA uses to place waste sites on the
17 National Priorities List (NPL). It is a numerically based screening system that uses information
18 from initial, limited investigations the preliminary assessment and the site inspection to assess
19 the relative potential of sites to pose a threat to human health or the environment.7
20 Hazardous substance. Any substance designated pursuant to Section 311(b)(2)(A) of the Clean
21 Water Act (CWA); any element, compound, mixture, solution, or substance designated pursuant to
22 Section 102 of CERCLA; any hazardous waste having the characteristics identified under or listed
23 pursuantto section 3001 ofthe Solid Waste Disposal Act (but not including any waste the regulation
24 of which under the Solid Waste Disposal Act has been suspended by an Act of Congress); any toxic
25 pollutant listed under Section 307(a) of the CWA; any hazardous air pollutant listed under Section
26 112 of the Clean Air Act; and any imminently hazardous chemical substance or mixture with respect
27 to which the EPA Administrator has taken action pursuant to Section 7 of the Toxic Substances
28 Control Act.12
29 Hazardous waste. A solid waste, or combination of solid waste, which because of its quantity,
30 concentration, or physical, chemical, or infectious characteristics may (a) cause, or significantly
31 contribute to an increase in mortality or an increase in serious irreversible, or incapacitating
32 reversible, illness; or (b) pose a substantial present or potential hazard to human health or the
33 environment when improperly treated, stored, transported, or disposed of, or otherwise managed.8
34 Chemical agents and munitions become hazardous wastes if (a) they become a solid waste under 40
35 CFR 266.202, and (b) they are listed as a hazardous waste or exhibit a hazardous waste
Glossary of Terms
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1 characteristic; chemical agents and munitions that are hazardous wastes must be managed in
2 accordance with all applicable requirements of RCRA.13
3 Ignitable soil. Any mixture of explosives in soil, sand, clay, or other solid media at concentrations
4 such that the mixture itself exhibits any of the properties of ignitability as defined in 40 CFR 261.21.
5 Inactive range. A military range that is not currently being used, but that is still under military
6 control and considered by the military to be a potential range area, and that has not been put to a new
7 use that is incompatible with range activities.13
8 Incendiary. Any flammable material that is used as a filler in ordnance intended to destroy a target
9 by fire.
10 Indian Tribe. Any Indian Tribe, band, nation, or other organized group or community, including
11 any Alaska Native village but not including any Alaska Native regional or village corporation,
12 which is recognized as eligible for the special programs and services provided by the United States
13 to Indians because of their status as Indians.12
14 Inert. The state of some types of ordnance, which have functioned as designed, leaving a harmless
15 carrier, or ordnance manufactured without explosive, propellant or pyrotechnic content to serve a
16 specific training purpose. Inert ordnance poses no explosive hazard to personnel or material.14
17 Installation Restoration Program (IRP). A program within DoD that funds the identification,
18 investigation, and cleanup of hazardous substances, pollutants, and contaminants associated with
19 past DoD activities at operating and closing installations, and at FUDS.
20 Institutional controls. Nonengineering measures designed to prevent or limit exposure to
21 hazardous substances left in place at a site or ensure effectiveness of the chosen remedy.
22 Institutional controls are usually, but not always, legal controls, such as easements, restrictive
23 covenants, and zoning ordinances.15
24 Land use controls. Any type of physical, legal, or administrative mechanism that restricts the use
25 of, or limits access to, real property to prevent or reduce risks to human health and the environment.
26 Lead agency. The agency that provides the on-scene coordinator or remedial project manager to
27 plan and implement response actions under the National Contingency Plan (NCP). EPA, the U.S.
28 Coast Guard, another Federal agency, or a State operating pursuant to a contract or cooperative
29 agreement executed pursuant to section 104(d)(1) of CERCLA, or designated pursuant to a
30 Superfund Memorandum of Agreement (SMOA) entered into pursuant to subpart F of the NCP or
31 other agreements may be the lead agency for a response action. In the case of a release or a
32 hazardous substance, pollutant, or contaminant, where the release is on, or the sole source of the
33 release is from, any facility or vessel under the jurisdiction, custody or control of a Federal agency,
34 that agency will be the Lead Agency.7
35 Magnetometer. An instrument for measuring the intensity of magnetic fields.
Glossary of Terms
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1 Maximum credible event. The worst single event that is likely to occur from a given quantity and
2 disposition of ammunition and explosives. Used in hazards evaluation as a basis for effects
3 calculations and casualty predictions.3
4 Military munition. All ammunition products and components produced or used by or for DoD or
5 the U.S. Armed Services for national defense and security, including military munitions under the
6 control of the Department of Defense, the U.S. Coast Guard, the U. S. Department of Energy (DOE),
7 and National Guard personnel. The term military munitions includes: confined gaseous, liquid, and
8 solid propellants, explosives, pyrotechnics, chemical and riot control agents, smokes, and
9 incendiaries used by DoD components, including bulk explosives and chemical warfare agents,
10 chemical munitions, rockets, guided and ballistic missiles, bombs, warheads, mortar rounds, artillery
11 ammunition, small arms ammunition, mines, torpedoes, depth charges, cluster munitions and
12 dispensers, grenades, demolition charges, and devices and components thereof. Military munitions
13 do not include wholly inert items, improvised explosive devices, and nuclear weapons, nuclear
14 devices, and nuclear components thereof. However, the term does include non-nuclear components
15 of nuclear devices, managed under DOE's nuclear weapons program after all required sanitization
16 operations under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, have been completed.3
17 Military range. Any designated land and water areas set aside, managed, and used to conduct
18 research on, develop, test, and evaluate military munitions and explosives, other ordnance, or
19 weapon systems, or to train military personnel in their use and handling. Ranges include firing lines
20 and positions, maneuver areas, firing lanes, test pads, detonation pads, impact areas, and buffer
21 zones with restricted access and exclusionary areas.13
22 Mishap. An accident or an unexpected event involving DoD ammunition and explosives.9
23 Most probable munition. The round with the greatest hazardous fragment range that can
24 reasonably be expected to exist in any particular OE area.3
25 Munition constituents. Potentially hazardous chemicals that are located on or originate from CTT
26 ranges and are released from military munitions or UXO, or have resulted from other activities on
27 military ranges. Munition constituents may be subject to other statutory authorities, including, but
28 not limited to, CERCLA (42 U.S.C. 9601 et seq.) and RCRA (42 U.S.C. 6901 et seq.).
29 Munitions response. DoD response actions (removal or remedial) to investigate and address the
30 explosives safety, human health or environmental risks presented by munition and explosives of
31 concern (MEC, also known as ordnance and explosives or OE) and munition constituents. The term
32 is consistent with the definitions of removal and remedial actions that are found in the National
33 Contingency Plan. The response could be as simple as an administrative or legal controls that
34 preserve a compatible land use (i.e. institutional controls) or as complicated as a long-term response
35 action involving sophisticated technology, specialized expertise, and significant resources.
36 National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan, or National Contingency
37 Plan (NCP). The regulations for responding to releases and threatened releases of hazardous
38 substances, pollutants, or contaminants under CERCLA.7
Glossary of Terms
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1 National Priorities List (NPL). A national list of hazardous waste sites that have been assessed
2 against the Hazard Ranking System and score above 28.5. The listing of a site on the NPL takes
3 place under the authority of CERCLA and is published in the Federal Register1
4 Obscurant. Man-made or naturally occurring particles suspended in the air that block or weaken
5 the transmission of a particular part or parts of the electromagnetic spectrum.
6 On-scene coordinator (OSC). The Federal designated by EPA, DoD, or the U.S. Coast Guard or
7 the official designated by the lead agency to coordinate and direct response actions. Also, the
8 Federal official designated by EPA or the U.S. Cost Guard to coordinate and direct Federal
9 responses under subpart D, or the official designated by the lead agency to coordinate and direct
10 removal actions under subpart E of the NCP.7
11 Open burning. The combustion of any material without (1) control of combustion air, (2)
12 containment of the combustion reaction in an enclosed device, (3) mixing for complete combustion,
13 and (4) control of emission of the gaseous combustion products.10
14 Open detonation. A chemical process used for the treatment of unserviceable, obsolete, and/or
15 waste munitions whereby an explosive donor charge initiates the munitions to be detonated.10
16 Ordnance and explosives (OE). OE, also known as munitions and explosives of concern (MEC),
17 are any of the following: (1) military munitions that are unexploded ordnance (UXO) or are
18 abandoned. (2) Soil with a high enough concentration of explosives to present an explosive hazard.
19 (3) Facilities, equipment, or other materials contaminated with a high enough concentration of
20 explosives such that they present a hazard of explosion.
21 Ordnance and explosives area (OE area). Any area that may contain ordnance and explosives and
22 that requires an explosives safety plan prior to investigation and/or cleanup. Entire ranges or
23 subparts of ranges may be OE areas that are the target of investigation and cleanup activities.
24 Other sites. Sites, such as scrap yards, ammunition depots, disposal pits, ammunition plants, and
25 research and testing facilities no longer under DoD control and that may contain OE.
26 Overpressure. The blast wave or sudden pressure increase resulting from a violent release of
27 energy from a detonation in a gaseous medium.11
28 Practice ordnance. Ordnance manufactured to serve a training purpose. Practice ordnance
29 generally does not carry a full payload. Practice ordnance may still contain explosive components
30 such as spotting charges, bursters, and propulsion charges.14
31 Preliminary assessment (PA) and site inspection (SI). A PA/SI is a preliminary evaluation of the
32 existence of a release or the potential for a release. The PA is a limited-scope investigation based
33 on existing information. The SI is a limited-scope field investigation. The decision that no further
34 action is needed or that further investigation is needed is based on information gathered from one
35 or both types of investigation. The results of the PA/SI are used by DoD to determine if an area
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1 should be designated as a "site" under the Installation Restoration Program. EPA uses the
2 information generated by a PA/SI to rank sites against Hazard Ranking System criteria and decide
3 if the site should be proposed for listing on the NPL.
4 Projectile. An object projected by an applied force and continuing in motion by its own inertia, as
5 mortar, small arms, and artillery shells. Also applied to rockets and to guided missiles.
6 Propellant. An agent such as an explosive powder or fuel that can be made to provide the necessary
7 energy for propelling ordnance.
8 Quantity-distance (Q-D). The relationship between the quantity of explosive material and the
9 distance separation between the explosive and people or structures. These relationships are based
10 on levels of risk considered acceptable for protection from defined types of exposures. These are
11 not absolute safe distances, but are relative protective or safe distances.3
12 Reactive soil. Any mixture of explosives in soil, sand, clay, or other solid media at concentrations
13 such that the mixture itself exhibits any of the properties of reactivity as defined in 40 CFR 261.23.
14 Real property. Land, buildings, structures, utility systems, improvements, and appurtenances
15 thereto. Includes equipment attached to and made part of buildings and structures (such as heating
16 systems) but not movable equipment (such as plant equipment).
17 Record of Decision (ROD). A public decision document for a Superfund site that explains the basis
18 of the remedy decision and, if cleanup is required, which cleanup alternative will be used. It
19 provides the legal record of the manner in which the selected remedy complies with the statutory
20 and regulatory requirements of CERCLA and the NCP.7
21 Release. Any spilling, leaking, pumping, pouring, emitting, emptying, discharging, injecting,
22 escaping, leaching, dumping, or disposing into the environment (including the abandonment or
23 discarding of barrels, containers, and other closed receptacles containing any hazardous substance
24 or pollutant or contaminant).12
25 Remedial action. A type of response action under CERCLA. Remedial actions are those actions
26 consistent with a permanent remedy, instead of or in addition to removal actions, to prevent or
27 minimize the release of hazardous substances into the environment.12
28 Remedial investigation and feasibility study (RI/FS). The process used under the remedial
29 program to investigate a site, determine if action is needed, and select a remedy that (a) protects
30 human health and the environment; (b) complies with the applicable or relevant and appropriate
31 requirements; and (c) provides for a cost-effective, permanent remedy that treats the principal threat
32 at the site to the maximum extent practicable. The RI serves as the mechanism for collecting data
33 to determine if there is a potential risk to human health and the environment from releases or
34 potential releases at the site. The FS is the mechanism for developing, screening, and evaluating
35 alternative remedial actions against nine criteria outlined in the NCP that guide the remedy selection
36 process.
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1 Remedial project manager (RPM). The official designated by the lead agency to coordinate,
2 monitor, and direct remedial or other response actions.7
3 Removal action. Short-term response actions under CERCLA that address immediate threats to
4 public health and the environment.12
5 Render-safe procedures. The portion of EOD procedures involving the application of special EOD
6 methods and tools to provide for the interruption of functions or separation of essential components
7 of UXO to prevent an unacceptable detonation.11
8 Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA). The Federal statute that governs the
9 management of all hazardous waste from cradle to grave. RCRA covers requirements regarding
10 identification, management, and cleanup of waste, including (1) identification of when a waste is
11 solid or hazardous; (2) management of wastetransportation, storage, treatment, and disposal; and
12 (3) corrective action, including investigation and cleanup, of old solid waste management units.8
13 Response action. As defined in Section 101 of CERCLA, "remove, removal, remedy, or remedial
14 action, including enforcement activities related thereto." As used in this handbook, the term
15 response action incorporates cleanup activities undertaken under any statutory authority.12
16 Solid waste. Any garbage, refuse, sludge from a waste treatment plant, water supply treatment
17 plant, or air pollution control facility and other discarded material, including solid, liquid, semisolid,
18 or contained gaseous material resulting from industrial, commercial, mining, and agricultural
19 operations, and from community activities, but not including solid or dissolved material in domestic
20 sewage, or solid or dissolved materials in irrigation return flows or industrial discharges which are
21 point sources subject to permits under section 402 of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act as
22 amended, or source, special nuclear, or byproduct material as defined by the Atomic Energy Act of
23 1 954, as amended.8 When a military munition is identified as a solid waste is defined in 40 CFR
24 266.202.13
25 State. The several States of the United States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of
26 Puerto Rico, Guam, American Samoa, the Virgin Islands, the Commonwealth of Northern Marianas,
27 and any other territory or possession over which the United States has jurisdiction. Includes Indian
28 Tribes as defined in CERCLA Chapter 103 § 9671.7
29 Transferred ranges. Ranges that have been transferred from DoD control to other Federal
30 agencies, State or local agencies, or private entities (e.g., Formerly Used Defense Sites, or FUDS).
31 A military range that has been released from military control.6
32 Transferring ranges. Ranges in the process of being transferred from DoD control (e.g., sites that
33 are at facilities closing under the Base Realignment and Closure Act, or BRAC). A military range
34 that is proposed to be leased, transferred, or returned from the Department of Defense to another
35 entity, including Federal entities.6
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Treatment. When used in conjunction with hazardous waste, means any method, technique, or
process, including neutralization, designed to change the physical, chemical, or biological character
or composition of any hazardous waste so as to neutralize such waste or so as to render such waste
nonhazardous, safer for transport, amenable for recovery, amenable for storage, or reduced in
volume. Such term includes any activity or processing designed to change the physical form or
chemical composition of hazardous waste so as to render it nonhazardous.8
Unexploded ordnance (UXO). Military munitions that have been primed, fuzed, armed, or
otherwise prepared for action, and have been fired, dropped, launched, projected, or placed in such
a manner as to constitute a hazard to operations, installation, personnel, or material and that remain
unexploded either by malfunction, design, or any other cause.13
Warhead. The payload section of a guided missile, rocket, or torpedo.
Sources:
1. U.S. EPA. Guidance on Conducting Non-Time-Critical Removal Actions Under CERCLA. EPA/540/R-93/057.
August 1993.
2. Department of Defense. EM 1110-1-4009. June 23, 2000.
3. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Pamphlet No. 1110-1-18, "Engineering and Design Ordnance and Explosives
Response," April 24, 2000.
4. DoD 6055.9-STD, Department of Defense Ammunition and Explosives Safety Standards.
5. Federal Advisory Committee for the Development of Innovative Technologies, "Unexploded Ordnance (UXO):
An Overview," Naval Explosive Ordnance Disposal Technology Division, UXO Countermeasures Department,
October 1996.
6. Closed, Transferring, and Transferred Ranges Containing Military Munitions, Proposed Rule, 62 FR 187,
September 26, 1997.
7. National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan (more commonly called the National
Contingency Plan), 40 C.F.R. § 300 et seq.
8. Department of Defense Directive 6055.9. "DoD Explosives Safety Board (DDESB) and DoD Component
Explosives Safety Responsibilities," July 29, 1996.
9. Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), 42 U.S.C. § 6901 et seq.
10. Department of Defense. Policy to Implement the EPA's Military Munitions Rule. July 1, 1998.
11. Joint Publication 1-02, "DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms," April 12, 2001.
12. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. § 9601 et seq.
13. Military Munitions Rule: Hazardous Waste Identification and Management; Explosives Emergencies; Manifest
Exception for Transport of Hazardous Waste on Right-of-Ways on Contiguous Properties, Final Rule, 40 C.F.R.
§ 260 et seq.
14. Former Fort Ord, California, Draft Ordnance Detection and Discrimination Study Work Plan, Sacramento District,
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. Prepared by Parsons. August 18, 1999.
15. EPA Federal Facilities Restoration and Reuse Office. Institutional Controls and Transfer of Real Property Under
CERCLA Section 120(h)(3)(A), (B), or (C), Interim Final Guidance, January 2000.
Glossary of Terms
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ACRONYMS
ARAR applicable or relevant and appropriate requirements
ATR aided or automatic target recognition
ATSDR Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry
ATV autonomous tow vehicle
BIP blow-in-place
BRAC Base Realignment and Closure Act
CERCLA Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
CSM conceptual site model
CTT closed, transferring, and transferred [ranges]
DDESB Department of Defense Explosives Safety Board
DERP Defense Environmental Restoration Program
DGPS differential global positioning system
DoD Department of Defense
DOE Department of Energy
DQO data quality objective
EMI electromagnetic induction
EMR electromagnetic radiation
EOD Explosive ordnance disposal
EPA Environmental Protection Agency
EPCRA Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act
ESS Explosives Safety Submission
FFA Federal facility agreement
FFCA Federal Facility Compliance Act
FUDS Formerly Used Defense Sites
GIS geographic information system
GPR ground-penetrating radar
GPS global positioning system
HMX Her Maj esty' s Explosive, High Melting Explosive
IAG interagency agreement
IR infrared
IRIS Integrated Risk Information System
JPGTD Jefferson Proving Ground Technology Demonstration Program
JUXOCO Joint UXO Coordination Office
MCE maximum credible event
MTADS Multisensor Towed-Array Detection System
NCP National Contingency Plan
NPL National Priorities List
OB/OD open burning/open detonation
OE ordnance and explosives
PA/SI preliminary assessment/site inspection
PEP propellants, explosives, and pyrotechnics
PPE personal protective equipment
PRG preliminary remediation goal
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QA/QC quality assurance/quality control
Q-D quantity-distance
RCRA Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
RDX Royal Demolition Explosive
RF radio frequency
RI/FS remedial investigation/feasibility study
ROD Record of Decision
SAR synthetic aperture radar
SARA Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act
SERDP Strategic Environmental Research and Development Program
TNT 2,4,6-Trinitrotoluene
US ACE U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
USAEC U.S. Army Environmental Center
UWB ultra wide band
UXO unexploded ordnance
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1.0
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Overview
This handbook has been written for regulators and the interested public to facilitate
understanding of the wide variety of technical issues that surround the investigation and cleanup of
closed, transferring, and transferred (CTT) ranges and other sites at current and former Department
of Defense (DoD) facilities (see text box below). The handbook is designed to provide a common
nomenclature to aid in the management of ordnance and explosives (OE) at CTT ranges and other
sites, including:
Unexploded Ordnance (UXO),
Abandoned and/or buried munitions, and
Soil with properties that are reactive and/or ignitable due to contamination with munition
constituents.
The definition of OE also includes facilities and equipment; however, the focus of this handbook
is on the three items above.
The handbook also discusses common chemical residues (called munition constituents) of
explosives that may or may not retain reactive and/or ignitable properties but could have a potential
impact on human health and the environment through a variety of pathways (surface and subsurface,
soil, air and water).
Why Does This Handbook Focus on CTT Ranges and Other Sites?
EPA's major regulatory concern is CTT ranges and other sites where the industrial activity may have ceased and
OE and munition constituents may be present. This focus occurs for several reasons:
Transferring and transferred ranges are either in or about to be in the public domain. EPA, States, Tribes,
and local governments have regulatory responsibility at the Base Realignment and Closure Act (BRAC)
facilities and the Formerly Used Defense Sites (FUDS) that make up the transferring and transferred ranges.
EPA, States, Tribes, and local governments have encountered numerous instances where issues have been
raised about whether transferring and transferred ranges are safe for both their current use and the uses to
which they may be put in the future.
Closed ranges at active bases are sites that have been taken out of service as a range and may be put to
multiple uses in the future that may not be compatible with the former range use.
The most likely sites where used and fired military munitions will be a regulated solid waste, and therefore
a potential hazardous waste, are at CTT ranges.
Other sites that are addressed by this handbook include nonoperational, nonpermitted sites where OE may be
encountered, such as scrapyards, disposal pits, ammunition plants, DoD ammunition depots, and research and
testing facilities.
Finally, EPA anticipates that the military will oversee and manage environmental releases at their active and
inactive ranges and at permitted facilities as part of their compliance program.
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For the purposes of simplifying the discussion, when the term ordnance and explosives is
used, the handbook is referring to the three groups listed above. When the handbook is referring to
chemical residues that may or may not have reactive and/or ignitable characteristics, they are called
munition constituents.
Buried or stored bulk explosives are not often found at CTT ranges, but may be found on
other sites (e.g., old manufacturing facilities). Although bulk explosives are not explicitly identified
as a separate OE item, the information in this handbook often applies to bulk explosives, as well as
other OE items.
The handbook is designed to facilitate a common understanding of the state of the art of OE
detection and munitions response, and to present U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
guidance on the management of OE at CTT ranges and other sites. The handbook is currently
organized into seven chapters that are designed to be used as resources for regulators and the public.
Each of the chapters presents basic information and defines key terms. The handbook is a living
document and additional chapters are under development. In addition, a number of areas covered
by the handbook are the subject of substantial on-going research and development and may change
in the future (see text box below). Therefore, the handbook is presented in a notebook format so that
replacement pages can be inserted as new technical information becomes available and as policies
and procedures evolve. Replacement pages will be posted on the Federal Facilities Restoration and
Reuse Office web page, a website of the Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response
(www.epa.gov/swerffrr).
Policy Background on Range Cleanup
The regulatory basis for OE investigation and cleanup on CTT ranges is evolving. This handbook has been
prepared within the context of extensive discussion involving Congress, DoD, EPA, Federal land managers, States,
Tribes, and the public about the cleanup and regulation of CTT ranges.
1.2 The Common Nomenclature
Listed below are selected key terms that
are necessary for understanding the scope of
this handbook (see text box at right). For
additional definitions, the user is directed to the
glossary at the beginning of this document.
1. Unexploded ordnanceThe term
UXO, or unexploded ordnance,
means military munitions that have
been primed, fuzed, armed, or
otherwise prepared for action, and
have been fired, dropped, launched,
projected, or placed in such a
About These Definitions
The user of this handbook should be aware that the
definitions below are not necessarily official or
regulatory definitions. Instead, they are an attempt to
"translate" the formal definition into "plain English."
However, the glossary associated with this handbook
uses official definitions when available. Those
definitions that come from official sources (e.g.,
statutes, regulations, formal policy or standards) are
appropriately footnoted. The user should not rely on
the definitions in this chapter or the glossary for legal
understanding of a key term, but should instead refer to
the promulgated and/or other official documents.
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manner as to constitute a hazard to operations, installations, personnel, or material and
remain unexploded either by malfunction, design, or any other cause.
2. Military Range A range is any designated land mass and/or water body that is or was
used for the conduct of training, research, development, testing, or evaluation of military
munitions or explosives.
3. Closed, transferring, and transferred ranges A closed range is a range that has
been taken out of service and either has been put to new uses that are incompatible with
range activities or is not considered by the military to be a potential range area, yet it
remains in the control of the Department of Defense.1 Transferring ranges are those
ranges in the process of being transferred from DoD control or ownership (e.g., sites that
are at facilities closing under the Base Realignment and Closure Program, or BRAC).
Transferred ranges are those ranges that have been transferred from DoD control or
ownership to other Federal agencies, State or local agencies, or private entities (e.g.,
Formerly Used Defense Sites, or FUDS).
4. Ordnance and explosives (OE), also called munitions and explosives of concern, or
MEC This term is used by U.S. Army explosives safety personnel to refer to all
military munitions that have been used, discarded, buried, or abandoned. The term
encompasses the materials that are the subject of this handbook, such as UXO, materials
in soil from partially exploded or decomposing ordnance that make the soil reactive and
ignitable, and munitions that have been discarded or buried. It also encompasses
facilities, equipment, and other materials that have high enough concentrations of
explosives to present explosive hazards. The term OE is used at various places in the
handbook where the reference is to all ordnance and explosives, not just UXO.
5. Ordnance and explosives area (OE area) An OE area is any area that may contain
ordnance and explosives and that requires an explosives safety plan prior to investigation
and/or cleanup. Entire ranges or subparts of ranges may be OE areas that are the target
of investigation and cleanup activities.
6. Buried munitions Buried munitions are used or unused military munitions that have
been intentionally discarded and buried under the land surface with the intent of disposal.
7. Explosive soil Soil is considered explosive when it contains concentrations of
explosives or propellants such that an explosion hazard is present and the soil is reactive
or ignitable.
8. Munition constituents This term refers to the chemical constituents of military
munitions that remain in the environment, including (1) residuals of munitions that retain
reactive and/or ignitable properties, and (2) chemical residuals of explosives that are not
'The definition of closed range is taken from Department of Defense Policy to Implement the Munitions Rule,
July 1998. It is consistent with the definitions in the Munitions Rule described.
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reactive and/or ignitable but may pose a potential threat to human health and the
environment through their toxic properties.
9. Anomaly The term is applied to any identified subsurface mass that may be geologic
in origin, UXO, or some other man-made material. Such identification is made through
geophysical investigations and reflects the response of the sensor used to conduct the
investigation.
10. Clearance Clearance is the removal of UXO from the surface or subsurface to a
specific depth at active and inactive ranges. This term has been frequently used to
describe responses at CTT ranges. However, the term used in this handbook to describe
responses at CTT ranges and other nonoperational, nonpermitted sites is munitions
response.
11. Munitions response The term includes DoD response actions (removal or remedial)
to investigate and address the explosives safety, human health, or environmental risks
presented by ordnance and explosives (OE), also known as munitions and explosives of
concern (MEC) or munition constituents (MC). The term is consistent with the lengthy
definitions of removal and remedial actions that are found in the National Contingency
Plan (NCP). The response could be as simple as administrative or legal controls that
preserve a compatible land use (i.e., institutional controls), or as complicated as a long-
term response action involving sophisticated technology, specialized expertise, and
significant resources.
1.3 Organization of This Handbook
The remaining six chapters of this handbook are organized as follows:
Chapter 2 Regulatory Overview
Chapter 3 Characteristics of Ordnance and Explosives
Chapter 4 Detection of UXO
Chapter 5 Response Technologies
Chapter 6 Explosives Safety
Chapter 7 Site/Range Characterization and Response
At the end of each chapter is a section titled "Sources and Resources." The information on
those pages directs the reader to source material, websites, and contacts that may be helpful in
providing additional information on subjects within the chapter. In addition, it documents some of
the publications and materials used in the preparation of this handbook.
The handbook is organized in a notebook format because of the potential for change in a
number of important areas, including the regulatory framework and detection and remediation
technologies. Notes are used to indicate that a section is under development.
Chapter 1. Introduction 1-4 December 2001
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Warning
UXO poses a threat to life and safety. All areas suspected of having UXO should be considered unsafe, and
potential UXO items should be considered dangerous. All UXO should be considered fuzed and capable of
detonation. Only qualified UXO technicians or military explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) personnel should
consider handling suspected or actual UXO. All entry into suspected UXO areas should be with qualified UXO
technicians or EOD escorts.
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2.0 REGULATORY OVERVIEW
The management of and response to OE (UXO, buried munitions, and explosive soil) and
munitions constituents at CTT ranges and other sites is governed by numerous Federal, State, Tribal
and local laws and may involve interaction among multiple regulatory and nonregulatory authorities.
On March 7, 2000, EPA and DoD entered into an interim final agreement to resolve some
of the issues between the two agencies.2 Some of the central management principles developed by
DoD and EPA are quoted in the next text box. A number of other important issues are addressed
by the principles, which are reprinted as an attachment to this chapter. Some of these will be
referred to in other parts of this regulatory overview, as well as in other chapters of this handbook.
The discussion that follows describes the current regulatory framework for OE and munitions
constituents, identifies issues that remain uncertain, and identifies specific areas of regulatory
concern in the investigation of and decisions at CTT ranges and other sites. The reader should be
aware that interpretations may change and that final EPA and DoD policy guidance and/or
regulations may alter some assumptions.
Key DoD/EPA Interim Final Management Principles
The legal authorities that support site-specific response actions at CTT ranges include, but are not limited
to,...CERCLA, as delegated by Executive Order (EO 12580) and the National Oil and Hazardous Substances
Pollution Contingency Plan (the National Contingency Plan, or NCP); the Defense Environmental Restoration
Program (DERP); and the standards of the DoD Explosives Safety Board (DDESB).
A process consistent with CERCLA and these management principles will be the preferred response
mechanisms used to address UXO at CTT ranges. This process is expected to meet any RCRA corrective
action requirements.
DoD will conduct response actions on CTT ranges when necessary to address explosives safety, human health,
and the environment. DoD and the regulators must consider explosives safety in determining the appropriate
response actions.
DoD and EPA commit to the substantive involvement of States and Indian Tribes in all phases of the response
process, and acknowledge that States and Indian Tribes may be the lead regulators in some cases.
Public involvement in all phases of the response process is considered to be crucial to the effective
implementation of a response.
These principles do not affect Federal, State, and Tribal regulatory or enforcement powers or authority... nor
do they expand or constrict the waiver of sovereign immunity by the United States in any environmental law.
Finally, it is not the purpose of this chapter to provide detailed regulatory analysis of issues
that should be decided site-specifically. Instead, this chapter discusses the regulatory components
of decisions and offers direction on where to obtain more information (see "Sources and Resources"
at the end of this chapter).
2U.S. Department of Defense, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Environmental Security, and U.S. EPA
Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response. Interim Final Management Principles for Implementing Response
Actions at Closed, Transferring, and Transferred (CTT) Ranges, March 7, 2000.
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2.1 Regulatory Overview
As recognized in the DoD/EPA Interim Final Management Principles cited above and in
EPA's draft OE policy,3 the principal regulatory programs that guide the cleanup of CTT ranges
include CERCLA, the Defense Environmental Restoration Program (DERP), and the requirements
of the DoD Explosives Safety Board (DDESB). In addition, the principles assert a preference for
cleanups that are consistent with CERCLA and the CERCLA response process. A number of other
regulatory processes provide important requirements.
Federal, State and Tribal laws applicable to off-site response actions (e.g., waste material
removed from the contaminated site or facility), must be complied with. In addition, State
regulatory agencies will frequently use their own hazardous waste authorities to assert their role in
oversight of range investigation and cleanup. The RCRA program provides a particularly important
regulatory framework for the management of OE on CTT ranges. The substantive requirements of
the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) must be achieved when response proceeds
under CERCLA and if those requirements are either applicable, or relevant and appropriate (ARAR)
to the site situation (see Section 2.2.1.1). Substantive requirements of other Federal, State and Tribal
environmental laws must also be met when such laws are ARARs.
The following sections briefly describe the Federal regulatory programs that may be
important in the management of OE.
2.1.1 Defense Environmental Restoration Program
Although the Department of Defense has been implementing its Installation Restoration
Program since the mid-1970s, it was not until the passage of the Superfund Amendments and
Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA), which amended CERCLA, that the program was formalized
by statute. Section 211 of SARA established the Defense Environmental Restoration Program
(DERP), to be carried out in consultation with the Administrator of EPA and the States (including
Tribal authorities). In addition, State, Tribal and local governments are to be given the opportunity
to review and comment on response actions, except when emergency requirements make this
unrealistic. The program has three goals:
Cleanup of contamination from hazardous substances, pollutants, and contaminants,
consistent with CERCLA cleanup requirements as embodied in Section 120 of CERCLA
and the National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan (NCP).
Correction of environmental damage, such as the detecting and disposing of unexploded
ordnance, that creates an imminent and substantial endangerment to public health and
the environment.
Demolition and removal of unsafe buildings and structures, including those at Formerly
Used Defense Sites (FUDS).
3EPA, Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response, Federal Facilities Restoration and Reuse Office, Policy
for Addressing Ordnance and Explosives at Closed, Transferring, and Transferred Ranges and Other Sites, July 16,
2001, Draft.
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2.1.2 CERCLA
CERCLA (otherwise known as Superfund) is an important Federal law that provides for the
cleanup of releases of hazardous substances, pollutants, or contaminants. The National Oil and
Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan (NCP) (40 CFR 300) provides the blueprint to
implement CERCLA. Although the Federal Government (through EPA and/or the other Federal
agencies) is responsible for implementation of CERCLA, the States, Federally recognized Tribal
governments, and communities play a significant role in the law's implementation.
CERCLA (Section 104) authorizes a response when:
There is a release or threat of a release of a hazardous substance into the environment,
or
There is a release or threat of a release into the environment of any pollutant or
contaminant that may present an imminent and substantial danger to the public health or
welfare
The CERCLA process (described briefly below) examines the nature of the releases (or potential
releases) to determine if there is an unacceptable threat to human health and the environment.
The principal investigation and cleanup processes implemented under CERCLA may involve
removal or remedial actions. Generally:
1. Removal actions are time sensitive actions often designed to address emergency
problems or immediate concerns, or to put in place a temporary or permanent remedy to
abate, prevent, minimize, stabilize, or mitigate a release or a threat of release.
2. Remedial actions are actions consistent with a permanent remedy, taken instead of or
in addition to removal actions to prevent or minimize the release of hazardous
substances. Remedial actions often provide for a more detailed and thorough evaluation
of risks and response options than removal actions. In addition, remedial actions have
as a specific goal attaining a remedy that "permanently reduces the volume, toxicity, or
mobility of hazardous substances, pollutants, or contaminants."
Whether a removal or remedial action is undertaken is a site-specific determination. In either
case, the process generally involves a number of steps, including timely assessment of whether a
more comprehensive investigation is required, a detailed investigation of the site or area to
determine if there is unacceptable risk, and identification of appropriate alternatives for cleanup,
documentation of the decisions, and design and implementation of a remedy. As noted in the DoD
and EPA Interim Final Management Principles, CERCLA response actions may include removal
actions, remedial actions, or a combination of the two.
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DoD/EPA Interim Final Management Principles Related to Response Actions
DoD components may conduct CERCLA response actions to address explosives safety hazards, to include UXO,
on CTT ranges per the NCP. Response activities may include removal actions, remedial actions, or a combination
of the two.
1 For the most part, the CERCLA process is implemented at three kinds of sites:
2 Sites placed on the National Priorities List (NPL) (both privately owned sites and those
3 owned or operated by governmental entities). These are sites that have been assessed
4 using a series of criteria, the application of which results in a numeric score. Those sites
5 that score above 28.5 are proposed for inclusion on the NPL. The listing of a site on the
6 NPL is a regulatory action that is published in the Federal Register. Both removal and
7 remedial actions can be implemented at these sites.
8 Private-party sites that are not placed on the NPL but are addressed under the removal
9 program.4
10 Non-NPL sites owned or controlled by Federal agencies (e.g., Department of Defense,
11 Department of Energy). Both removal and remedial actions may be implemented at these
12 sites. These sites generally are investigated and cleaned up in accordance with CERCLA.
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Interim Final Management Principles and Response Actions
The Interim Final Management Principles signed by EPA and DoD make a number of statements that bring key
elements of the Superfund program into a range cleanup program regardless of the authority under which it is
conducted. Some of the more significant statements of principle are quoted here:
Characterization plans seek to gather sufficient site-specific information to identify the location, extent, and type
of any explosives safety hazards (particularly UXO), hazardous substances, pollutants or contaminants, and
"other constituents"; identify the reasonably anticipated future land uses; and develop and evaluate effective
response alternatives.
In some cases, explosives safety, cost, and/or technical limitations may limit the ability to conduct a response
and thereby limit the reasonably anticipated future land uses....
DoD will incorporate any Technical Impracticability (TI) determinations and waiver decisions in appropriate
decision documents and review those decisions periodically in coordination with regulators.
Final land use controls for a given CTT range will be considered as part of the development and evaluation of
the response alternatives using the nine criteria established under CERCLA regulations (i.e., NCP)....This will
ensure that any land use controls are chosen based on a detailed analysis of response alternatives and are not
presumptively selected.
DoD will conduct periodic reviews consistent with the Decision Document to ensure long-term effectiveness
of the response, including any land use controls, and allow for evaluation of new technology for addressing
technical impracticability determinations.5
4Generally, actions taken at private party sites that are not NPL sites are removal actions. However, in some
cases, remedial response actions are taken at these sites as well.
5U.S. Department of Defense, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Environmental Security, and U.S. EPA
Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response. Interim Final Management Principles for Implementing Response
Actions at Closed, Transferring, and Transferred (CTT) Ranges, March 7, 2000.
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The authority to implement the CERCLA program is granted to the President of the United
States. Executive Order 12580 (January 23, 1987) delegates most of the management of the
program to the Environmental Protection Agency. However, DoD, and the Department of Energy
(DOE), and other Federal land managers (e.g., Department of Interior) are delegated response
authority at their non-NPL facilities, for remedial actions and removal actions other than
emergencies. They must still consult with Federal, State, and Tribal regulatory authorities, but make
the "final" decision at their sites. DoD and DOE are delegated responsibility for response authorities
at NPL facilities as well. When a DoD or DOE facility is on the NPL, however, under Section 120,
EPA must concur with the Record of Decision (decision document).
Whether EPA concurrence is required or not, EPA and the States have substantial oversight
responsibilities that are grounded in both the CERCLA and DERP statutes.
Extensive State and Tribal involvement in the removal and remedial programs is
provided for (CERCLA Section 121(f)). A number of very specific provisions
addressing State and Tribal involvement are contained in the NCP (particularly, but not
exclusively, Subpart F).
Notification requirements apply to all removal actions, no matter what the time period.
Whether or not the notification occurs before or after the removal is a function of time
available and whether it is an emergency action. State, Tribal and community
involvement is related to the amount of time available before a removal action must start.
If the removal action will not be completed within 4 months (120 days), then a
community relations plan is to be developed and implemented. If the removal action is
a non-time-critical removal action, and more than 6 months will pass before it will be
initiated, issuance of the community relations plan, and review and comment on the
proposed action, occurs before the action is initiated. (National Contingency Plan, 40
CFR 300.415)
In addition, DERP also explicitly discusses State involvement with regard to releases of
hazardous substances:
DoD is to promptly notify Regional EPA and appropriate State and local authorities of
(1) the discovery of releases or threatened releases of hazardous substances and the
extent of the threat to public health and the environment associated with the release, and
(2) proposals made by DoD to carry out response actions at these sites, and of the start
of any response action and the commencement of each distinct phase of such activities.
DoD must ensure that EPA and appropriate State and local authorities are consulted (i.e.
have an opportunity to review and comment) at these sites before taking response actions
(unless emergency circumstances make such consultation impractical) (10 U.S.C. §
2705).
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2.1.3 CERCLA Section 120
Section 120 of CERCLA is explicit as to the manner in which CERCLA requirements are
to be carried out at Federal facilities. Specifically, Section 120 mandates the following:
Federal agencies (including DoD) are subject to the requirements of CERCLA in the
same manner as nongovernmental entities.
The guidelines, regulations, and other criteria that are applicable to assessments,
evaluations, and remedial actions by other entities apply also to Federal agencies.
Federal agencies must comply with State laws governing removal and remedial actions
to the same degree as private parties when such facilities are not included on the NPL.
When the facility or site is on the NPL, an interagency agreement (IAG) is signed
between EPA and the Federal agency to ensure expeditious cleanup of the facility. This
IAG must be signed within 6 months of completion of EPA review of a remedial
investigation/feasibility study (RI/FS) at the facility.
When hazardous substances were stored for one or more years, and are known to have
been released or disposed of, each deed transferring real property from the United States
to another party must contain a covenant that warrants that all remedial actions necessary
to protect human health and the environment with respect to any such [hazardous]
substance remaining on the property have been taken (120(h)(3)).6
Amendments to CERCLA (Section 120(h)(4)) through the Community Environmental
Response Facilitation Act (CERFA, PL 102-426) require that EPA (for NPL
installations) or the States (for non-NPL installations) concur with uncontaminated
property determinations made by DoD.
2.1.4 Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA)
The Federal RCRA statute governs the management of all hazardous waste from generation
to disposal, also referred to as "cradle to grave" management of hazardous waste. RCRA
requirements include:
Identification of when a material is a solid or hazardous waste
Management of hazardous waste transportation, storage, treatment, and disposal
Corrective action, including investigation and cleanup, of solid waste management units
at facilities that treat, store, or dispose of hazardous waste
The RCRA requirements are generally implemented by the States, which, once they adopt
equivalent or more stringent standards, act through their own State permitting and enforcement
processes in lieu of EPA's to implement the program. Thus, each State that is authorized to
implement the RCRA requirements may have its own set of hazardous waste laws that must be
considered.
6Under CERCLA § 120(h)(3)(C), contaminated property may be transferred outside the Federal Government
provided the responsible Federal agency makes certain assurances, including that the property is suitable for transfer
and that the cleanup will be completed post-transfer.
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When on-site responses are conducted under CERCLA, the substantive (as opposed to
administrative) RCRA requirements may be considered to be either applicable, or relevant and
appropriate, and must be complied with accordingly; however, DoD, the lead agency, need not
obtain permits for on-site cleanup activities.
The Federal Facility Compliance Act of
1992, or FFC A (PL 102-3 86), amended RCRA.
FFCA required the EPA Administrator to
identify when military munitions become
hazardous wastes regulated under RCRA
Subtitle C, and to provide for the safe transport
and storage of such waste.
What Is a Military Munition?
According to the Military Munitions Rule, a military
munition is all ammunition products and components
produced or used by or for DoD or the U.S. Armed
Services for national defense and security.
As required by the FFCA, EPA promulgated the Military Munitions Rule (62 FR 6622,
February 12, 1997; the Munitions Rule), which identified when conventional and chemical military
munitions become solid wastes, and therefore potentially hazardous wastes subject to the RCRA
Subtitle C hazardous waste management requirements. Under the rule, routine range clearance
activities - those directed at munitions used for their intended purpose at active and inactive ranges
- are deemed to not render the used munition a regulated solid or potential hazardous waste. The
phrase "used for their intended purpose" does not apply to on-range disposal (e.g., recovery,
collection, and subsequent burial or placement in a landfill). Such waste will be considered a solid
waste (and potential hazardous waste) when burial is not a result of a product use.
Unused munitions are not a solid or
hazardous waste when being managed (e.g.,
stored or transported) in conjunction with their
intended use. They may become regulated as a
solid waste and potential hazardous waste
under certain circumstances. An unused
munition is not a solid waste or potential
hazardous waste when it is being repaired,
reused, recycled, reclaimed, disassembled,
reconfigured, or otherwise subjected to
materials recovery actions.
Finally, the Military Munitions Rule
provides an exemption from RCRA procedures
(e.g., permitting or manifesting) and
substantive requirements (e.g., risk assessment
for open burning/open detonation, Subpart X)
in the response to an explosive or munitions
emergency. The rule defines an explosive or
munitions emergency as:
Unused Munitions Are a Solid (and Potentially
Hazardous) Waste When They Are
Discarded and buried in an on-site landfill
Destroyed through open burning and/or open
detonation or some other form of treatment
Deteriorated to the point where they cannot be
used, repaired, or recycled or used for other
purposes
Removed from storage for the purposes of
disposal
Designated as solid waste by a military official
Used or Fired Munitions
Military munitions that (1) have been primed, fuzed,
armed, or otherwise prepared for action and have been
fired, dropped, launched, projected, placed, or
otherwise used; (2) are munitions fragments (e.g.,
shrapnel, casings, fins, and other components that
result from the use of military munitions); or (3) are
malfunctions or misfires.
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"...A situation involving the suspected or detected presence of unexploded ordnance
(UXO), damaged or deteriorated explosives or munitions, an improvised explosive
device (IED) or other potentially harmful chemical munitions or device that creates
an actual or potential imminent threat to human health, including safety or the
environment..."
In general, the emergency situations described in this exemption parallel the CERCLA description
of emergency removals - action must be taken in hours or days. However, the decision as to whether
a permit exemption is required is made by an explosives or munitions emergency response specialist.
2.1.5 Department of Defense Explosives Safety Board (DDESB)
TheDDESB was established by Congress in 1928 as a result of a major disaster at the Naval
Ammunition Depot in Lake Denmark, New Jersey, in 1926. The accident caused heavy damage to
the depot and surrounding areas and communities, killed 21 people, and seriously injured 51 others.
The mission of the DDESB is to provide objective expert advice to the Secretary of Defense and the
Service Secretaries on matters concerning explosives safety, as well as to prevent hazardous
conditions for life and property, both on and off DoD installations, that result from the presence of
explosives and the environmental effects of DoD munitions. The roles and responsibilities of the
DDESB were expanded in 1996 with the issuance of DoD Directive 6055.9, on July 29, 1996. The
directive gives DDESB responsibility for serving as the DoD advocate for resolving issues between
explosives safety standards and environmental standards.
DDESB is responsible for promulgating safety requirements and overseeing their
implementation throughout DoD. These requirements provide for extensive management of
explosive materials, such as the following:
Safe transportation and storage of munitions
Safety standards for the handling of different kinds of munitions
Safe clearance of real property that may be contaminated with munitions
Chapter 6 expands on and describes the roles and responsibilities of DDESB, as well as outlining
its safety and real property requirements.
In addition to promulgating safety requirements, DDESB has established requirements for
the submission, review, and approval of Explosives Safety Submissions for all DoD responses
regarding UXO at FUDS and at BRAC facilities.
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DoD/EPA Interim Final Management Principles Related to DDESB Standards
In listing the legal authorities that support site-specific response actions, the management principles list
CERCLA, DERP, and the DDESB together.
With regard to response actions, in general the principles state that "DoD and the regulators must consider
explosives safety in determining the appropriate response actions."
Regarding response actions under CERCLA, the principles state that "Explosives Safety Submissions (ESS),
prepared, submitted, and approved per DDESB requirements, are required for Time-Critical Removal Actions,
Non-Time-Critical Removal Actions, and Remedial Actions involving explosives safety hazards, particularly
UXO."
2.2 Conclusion
The regulatory framework for the management of OE is both complex and extensive. The
DoD/EPA Interim Final Management Principles for Implementing Response Actions at Closed,
Transferring, and Transferred (CTT) Ranges were a first step to providing guiding principles to the
implementation of these requirements. EPA's own draft policy for addressing ordnance and
explosives is another step. As DoD works with EPA, States, and Tribal organizations and other
stakeholders to consider the appropriate nature of range regulation at CTT ranges, it is expected that
the outlines of this framework will evolve further.
Dialogue will continue over the next few years on a number of important implementation
issues, including many that are addressed in this handbook. For this reason, the handbook is
presented in a notebook format. Sections of this handbook that become outdated can be updated
with the new information.
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1
SOURCES AND RESOURCES
2 The following publications, offices, laboratories, and websites are provided as a guide for
3 handbook users to obtain additional information about the subject matter addressed in each chapter.
4 Several of these publications, offices, laboratories, or websites were also used in the development
5 of this handbook.
6 Publications
7 Defense Science Board Task Force, Unexploded Ordnance (UXO) Clearance, Active Range UXO
8 Clearance, and Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) Programs, Washington, DC, Department of
9 Defense, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition and Technology), April 1998.
10 Department of Defense Operation and Environmental Executive Steering Committee for Munitions
11 (OEESCM), Draft Munitions Action Plan: Maintaining Readiness through Environmental
12 Stewardship and Enhancement ofExplosives Safety in the Life Cycle Management of Munitions,
13 Draft Revision 4.3, U.S. Department of Defense, February 25, 2000.
14 Department of Defense and U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Management Principles for
15 Implementing Response Actions at Closed, Transferring, and Transferred (CTT) Ranges, Interim
16 Final, DoD and EPA, March 7, 2000.
17 U.S. EPA, Federal Facilities Restoration and Reuse Office, EPA Issues at Closed, Transferring,
18 and Transferred Military Ranges, letter to Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Environmental
19 Security), April 22, 1999.
20 Information Sources
21 Department of Defense
22 Washington Headquarters Services
23 Directives and Records Branch (Directives Section)
24 http://web7.whs.osd.mil/
25 Department of Defense Environmental Cleanup (contains reports, policies, general
26 publications, as well as extensive information about BRAC and community involvement)
27 http://www.dtic.mil/envirodod/index.html
28 Department of Defense Explosives Safety Board (DDESB)
29 2461 Eisenhower Avenue
30 Alexandria, VA 22331-0600
31 FAX: (703)325-6227
32 http://www.hqda.army.mil/ddesb/esb.html
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1 Department of Defense, Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of
2 Defense (Environmental Security)
3 http://www.acq.osd.mil/ens/
4 Environmental Protection Agency
5 Federal Facilities Restoration & Reuse Office
6 http://www.epa.gov/swerffrr/
7 Environmental Protection Agency
8 Office of Solid Waste
9 RCRA, Superfund and EPCRA Hotline
10 Tel: (800) 424-9346 - Toll free
11 (703) 412-9810 - Metropolitan DC area and international calls, (800) 553-7672 - Toll free TDD
12 (703) 412-3323 - Metropolitan DC area and international TDD calls
13 http://www.epa.gov/dpaoswer/osw/comments.hem
14 U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
15 U.S. Army Engineering and Support Center
16 Ordnance and Explosives Mandatory Center of Expertise
17 4820 University Square
18 P.O. Box 1600
19 Huntsville, AL 35807-4301
20 http://www.hnd.usace.army.mil/
21 Guidance
22 Department of Defense, Deputy Secretary of Defense, Finding ofSuitability to Transferfor BRA C
23 Property, June 1, 1994.
24 Department of Defense, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition and Technology),
25 Management Guidance for the Defense Environmental Restoration Program, September 2001.
26 Department of Defense, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition and Technology),
27 Responsibility for Additional Environmental Cleanup after Transfer of Real Property,
28 Washington, DC, July 25, 1997.
29 Department of Defense and U.S. EPA, The Environmental Site Closeout Process, 1998.
30 U.S. Army, Environmental Restoration Programs Guidance Manual, April 1998.
31 U.S. EPA, Compliance with Other Laws Manual (Vols 1 & 2), August 8, 1988.
32 U.S. EPA, EPA Guidance on the Transfer of Federal Property by Deed Before all Necessary
33 Remedial Action Has Been Taken Pursuant to CERCLA Section 120(h)(3), June 16, 1998.
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1 U.S. EPA, Guidance on Conducting Non-time-critical Removal Actions Under CERCLA, August
2 1993 (PB93-963402).
3 U.S. EPA, Guide to Preparing Superfund Proposed Plans, Records of Decision, and Other
4 Remedy Selection Decision Documents, July 1999 (PB98-963241).
5 U.S. EPA, Institutional Controls and Transfer of Real Property Under CERCLA Section
6 120(h)(3)(A), (B) or (C), February 2000.
7 U.S. EPA, Use of Non-Time Critical Removal Authority in Superfund Response Actions,
8 February 14, 2000.
9 Statutes and Regulations
10 Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA),42 U.S C.
11 § 9601 et seq.
12 Defense Environmental Restoration Program, 10 U.S.C. § 2701-2708, 2810.
13 Department ofDefense Ammunition and Explosives Safety Standards, DoD Directive 6055.9-STD,
14 July 1999.
15 Department ofDefense Explosives Safety Board, 10 U.S.C. § 172.
16 Department ofDefense Instruction (DODI) 4715.7, Environmental Restoration Program, April 22,
17 1996.
18 Military Munitions Rule: Hazardous Waste Identification and Management; Explosives
19 Emergencies; Manifest Exception for Transport of Hazardous Waste on Right-of-Ways on
20 Contiguous Properties; Final Rule, 40 C.F.R. § 260 et seq.
21 National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan (more commonly called the
22 National Contingency Plan), 40 C.F.R. § 300 et seq.
23 Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), 42 U.S.C. § 6901 et seq.
24 Superfund Implementation, Executive Order (EO) 12580, January 13, 1987, and EO 13016,
25 Amendment to EO 12580, August 28, 1996.
26 U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Engineering and Design Ordnance and Explosives Response, EP
27 1110-1-18, April 24, 2000.
28 U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Engineering and Design Ordnance and Explosives Response, EM
29 1110-1-4009, June 23, 2000.
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Interim Final
March 7, 2000
DoD and EPA
Management Principles for Implementing Response Actions at
Closed, Transferring, and Transferred (CTT) Ranges
Preamble
Many closed, transferring, and transferred (CTT) military ranges are now or soon will be
in the public domain. DoD and EPA agree that human health, environmental and
explosive safety concerns at these ranges need to be evaluated and addressed. On
occasion, DoD, EPA and other stakeholders, however, have had differing views
concerning what process should be followed in order to effectively address human
health, environmental, and explosive safety concerns at CTT ranges. Active and
inactive ranges are beyond the scope of these principles.
To address concerns regarding response actions at CTT ranges, DoD and EPA
engaged in discussions between July 1999 and March 2000 to address specific policy
and technical issues related to characterization and response actions at CTT ranges.
The discussions resulted in the development of this Management Principles document,
which sets forth areas of agreement between DoD and EPA on conducting response
actions at CTT ranges.
These principles are intended to assist DoD personnel, regulators, Tribes, and other
stakeholders to achieve a common approach to investigate and respond appropriately
at CTT ranges.
General Principles
DoD is committed to promulgating the Range Rule as a framework for response
actions at CTT military ranges. EPA is committed to assist in the development of
this Rule. To address specific concerns with respect to response actions at CTT
ranges prior to implementation of the Range Rule, DoD and EPA agree to the
following management principles:
DoD will conduct response actions on CTT ranges when necessary to address
explosives safety, human health and the environment. DoD and the regulators
must consider explosives safety in determining the appropriate response actions.
DoD is committed to communicating information regarding explosives safety to
the public and regulators to the maximum extent practicable.
DoD and EPA agree to attempt to resolve issues at the lowest level. When
necessary, issues may be raised to the appropriate Headquarters level. This
agreement should not impede an emergency response.
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Interim Final
March 7, 2000
The legal authorities that support site-specific response actions at CTT ranges
include, but are not limited to, the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), as delegated by Executive Order
(E.O.) 12580 and the National Oil and Hazardous Substances Contingency Plan
(NCP); the Defense Environmental Restoration Program (DERP); and the DoD
Explosives Safety Board (DDESB).
A process consistent with CERCLA and these management principles will be the
preferred response mechanism used to address UXO at a CTT range. EPA and
DoD further expect that where this process is followed, it would also meet any
applicable RCRA corrective action requirements.
These principles do not affect federal, state, and Tribal regulatory or enforcement
powers or authority concerning hazardous waste, hazardous substances,
pollutants or contaminants, including imminent and substantial endangerment
authorities; nor do they expand or constrict the waiver of sovereign immunity by
the United States contained in any environmental law.
1. State and Tribal Participation
DoD and EPA are fully committed to the substantive involvement of States and
Indian Tribes throughout the response process at CTT ranges. In many cases, a
State or Indian Tribe will be the lead regulator at a CTT range. In working with the
State or Indian Tribe, DoD will provide them opportunities to:
Participate in the response process, to the extent practicable, with the DoD
Component.
Participate in the development of project documents associated with the
response process.
Review and comment on draft project documents generated as part of
investigations and response actions.
Review records and reports.
2. Response Activities under CERCLA
DoD Components may conduct CERCLA response actions to address explosives
safety hazards, to include UXO, on CTT military ranges per the NCP. Response
activities may include removal actions, remedial actions, or a combination of the
two.
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DoD may conduct response actions to address human health, environmental,
and explosives safety concerns on CTT ranges. Under certain circumstances,
other federal and state agencies may also conduct response actions on CTT
ranges.
Removal action alternatives will be evaluated under the criteria set forth in the
National Contingency Plan (NCP), particularly NCP §300.410 and §300.415.
DoD Components will notify regulators and other stakeholders, as soon as
possible and to the extent practicable, prior to beginning a removal action.
Regulators and other stakeholders will be provided an opportunity for timely
consultation, review, and comment on all phases of a removal response, except
in the case of an emergency response taken because of an imminent and
substantial endangerment to human health and the environment and consultation
would be impracticable (see 10 USC 2705).
Explosives Safety Submissions (ESS), prepared, submitted, and approved per
DDESB requirements, are required for Time Critical Removal Actions, Non-Time
Critical Removal Actions, and Remedial Actions involving explosives safety
hazards, particularly UXO.
The DoD Component will make available to the regulators, National Response
Team, or Regional Response Team, upon request, a complete report, consistent
with NCP §300.165, on the removal operation and the actions taken.
Removal actions shall, to the extent practicable, contribute to the efficient
performance of any anticipated long-term remedial action. If the DoD
Component determines, in consultation with the regulators and based on these
Management Principles and human health, environmental, and explosives safety
concerns, that the removal action will not fully address the threat posed and
remedial action may be required, the DoD Component will ensure an orderly
transition from removal to remedial response activities.
3. Characterization and Response Selection
Adequate site characterization at each CTT military range is necessary to
understand the conditions, make informed risk management decisions, and
conduct effective response actions.
Discussions with local land use planning authorities, local officials and the public,
as appropriate, should be conducted as early as possible in the response
process to determine the reasonably anticipated future land use(s). These
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discussions should be used to scope efforts to characterize the site, conduct risk
assessments, and select the appropriate response(s).
Characterization plans seek to gather sufficient site-specific information to:
identify the location, extent, and type of any explosives safety hazards
(particularly UXO), hazardous substances, pollutants or contaminants, and
"Other Constituents"; identify the reasonably anticipated future land uses; and
develop and evaluate effective response alternatives.
Site characterization may be accomplished through a variety of methods, used
individually or in concert with one another, including, but not limited to: records
searches, site visits, or actual data acquisition, such as sampling. Statistical or
other mathematical analyses (e.g., models) should recognize the assumptions
imbedded within those analyses. Those assumptions, along with the intended
use(s) of the analyses, should be communicated at the front end to the
regulator(s) and the communities so the results may be better understood.
Statistical or other mathematical analyses should be updated to include actual
site data as it becomes available.
Site-specific data quality objectives (DQOs) and QA/QC approaches, developed
through a process of close and meaningful cooperation among the various
governmental departments and agencies involved at a given CTT military range,
are necessary to define the nature, quality, and quantity of information required
to characterize each CTT military range and to select appropriate response
actions.
A permanent record of the data gathered to characterize a site and a clear audit
trail of pertinent data analysis and resulting decisions and actions are required.
To the maximum extent practicable, the permanent record shall include sensor
data that is digitally-recorded and geo-referenced. Exceptions to the collection of
sensor data that is digitally-recorded and geo-referenced should be limited
primarily to emergency response actions or cases where impracticable. The
permanent record shall be included in the Administrative Record. Appropriate
notification regarding the availability of this information shall be made.
The most appropriate and effective detection technologies should be selected for
each site. The performance of a technology should be assessed using the
metrics and criteria for evaluating UXO detection technology described in Section
4.
The criteria and process of selection of the most appropriate and effective
technologies to characterize each CTT military range should be discussed with
appropriate EPA, other Federal State, or Tribal agencies, local officials, and the
public prior to the selection of a technology.
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In some cases, explosives safety, cost, and/or technical limitations, may limit the
ability to conduct a response and thereby limit the reasonably anticipated future
land uses. Where these factors come into play, they should be discussed with
appropriate EPA, other federal, State or Tribal agencies, local officials, and
members of the public and an adequate opportunity for timely review and
comment should be provided. Where these factors affect a proposed response
action, they should be adequately addressed in any response decision
document. In these cases, the scope of characterization should be appropriate
for the site conditions. Characterization planning should ensure that the cost of
characterization does not become prohibitive or disproportionate to the potential
benefits of more extensive characterization or further reductions in the
uncertainty of the characterization.
DoD will incorporate any Technical Impracticability (Tl) determination and waiver
decisions in appropriate decision documents and review those decisions
periodically in coordination with regulators.
Selection of site-specific response actions should consider risk plus other factors
and meet appropriate internal and external requirements.
4. UXO Technology
Advances in technology can provide a significant improvement to
characterization at CTT ranges. This information will be shared with EPA and
other stakeholders.
The critical metrics for the evaluation of the performance of a detection
technology are the probabilities of detection and false alarms. A UXO detection
technology is most completely defined by a plot of the probability of detection
versus the probability or rate of false alarms. The performance will depend on
the technology's capabilities in relation to factors such as type and size of
munitions, the munitions depth distribution, the extent of clutter, and other
environmental factors (e.g., soil, terrain, temperature, geology, diurnal cycle,
moisture, vegetation). The performance of a technology cannot be properly
defined by its probability of detection without identifying the corresponding
probability of false alarms. Identifying solely one of these measures yields an ill-
defined capability. Of the two, probability of detection is a paramount
consideration in selecting a UXO detection technology.
Explosives safety is a paramount consideration in the decision to deploy a
technology at a specific site.
General trends and reasonable estimates can often be made based on
demonstrated performance at other sites. As more tests and demonstrations are
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completed, transfer of performance information to new sites will become more
reliable.
Full project cost must be considered when evaluating a detection technology.
Project cost includes, but is not limited to, the cost of deploying the technology,
the cost of excavation resulting from the false alarm rate, and the costs
associated with recurring reviews and inadequate detection.
Rapid employment of the better performing, demonstrated technologies needs to
occur.
Research, development, and demonstration investments are required to improve
detection, discrimination, recovery, identification, and destruction technologies.
5. Land Use Controls
Land use controls must be clearly defined, established in coordination with
affected parties (e.g., in the case of FUDS, the current owner; in the case of BRAC
property, the prospective transferee), and enforceable.
Because of technical impracticability, inordinately high costs, and other reasons,
complete clearance of CTT military ranges may not be possible to the degree
that allows certain uses, especially unrestricted use. In almost all cases, land
use controls will be necessary to ensure protection of human health and public
safety.
DoD shall provide timely notice to the appropriate regulatory agencies and
prospective federal land managers of the intent to use Land Use Controls.
Regulatory comments received during the development of draft documents will
be incorporated into the final land use controls, as appropriate. For Base
Realignment and Closure properties, any unresolved regulatory comments will be
included as attachments to the Finding of Suitability to Transfer (FOST).
Roles and responsibilities for monitoring, reporting and enforcing the restrictions
must be clear to all affected parties.
The land use controls must be enforceable.
Land use controls (e.g., institutional controls, site access, and engineering
controls) may be identified and implemented early in the response process to
provide protectiveness until a final remedy has been selected for a CTT range.
Land use controls must be clearly defined and set forth in a decision document.
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Final land use controls for a given CTT range will be considered as part of the
development and evaluation of response alternatives using the nine criteria
established under CERCLA regulations (i.e., NCP), supported by a site
characterization adequate to evaluate the feasibility of reasonably anticipated
future land uses. This will ensure that land use controls are chosen based on a
detailed analysis of response alternatives and are not presumptively selected.
DoD will conduct periodic reviews consistent with the Decision Document to
ensure long-term effectiveness of the response, including any land use controls,
and allow for evaluation of new technology for addressing technical
impracticability determinations.
When complete UXO clearance is not possible at military CTT ranges, DoD will
notify the current land owners and appropriate local authority of the potential
presence of an explosives safety hazard. DoD will work with the appropriate
authority to implement additional land use controls where necessary.
6. Public Involvement
Public involvement in all phases of the CTT range response process is crucial to
effective implementation of a response.
In addition to being a requirement when taking response actions under CERCLA,
public involvement in all phases of the range response process is crucial to
effective implementation of a response.
Agencies responsible for conducting and overseeing range response activities
should take steps to proactively identify and address issues and concerns of all
stakeholders in the process. These efforts should have the overall goal of
ensuring that decisions made regarding response actions on CTTs reflect a
broad spectrum of stakeholder input.
Meaningful stakeholder involvement should be considered as a cost of doing
business that has the potential of efficiently determining and achieving
acceptable goals.
Public involvement programs related to management of response actions on
CTTs should be developed and implemented in accordance with DOD and EPA
removal and remedial response community involvement policy and guidance.
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7. Enforcement
Regulator oversight and involvement in all phases of CTT range investigations
are crucial to an effective response, increase credibility of the response, and
promote acceptance by the public. Such oversight and involvement includes
timely coordination between DoD components and EPA, state, or Tribal
regulators, and, where appropriate, the negotiation and execution of enforceable
site-specific agreements.
DoD and EPA agree that, in some instances, negotiated agreements under
CERCLA and other authorities play a critical role in both setting priorities for
range investigations and response and for providing a means to balance
respective interdependent roles and responsibilities. When negotiated and
executed in good faith, enforceable agreements provide a good vehicle for
setting priorities and establishing a productive framework to achieve common
goals. Where range investigations and responses are occurring, DoD and the
regulator(s) should come together and attempt to reach a consensus on whether
an enforceable agreement is appropriate. Examples of situations where an
enforceable agreement might be desirable include locations where there is a high
level of public concern and/or where there is significant risk. DoD and EPA are
optimistic that field level agreement can be reached at most installations on the
desirability of an enforceable agreement.
To avoid, and where necessary to resolve, disputes concerning the
investigations, assessments, or response at CTT ranges, the responsible DoD
Component, EPA, state, and Tribe each should give substantial deference to the
expertise of the other party.
At NPL sites, disputes that cannot be mutually resolved at the field or project
manager level should be elevated for disposition through the tiered process
negotiated between DoD and EPA as part of the Agreement for the site, based
upon the Model Federal Facility Agreement.
At non-NPL sites where there are negotiated agreements, disputes that cannot
be mutually resolved at the field or project manager level also should be elevated
for disposition through a tiered process set forth in the site-specific agreement.
To the extent feasible, conditions that might give rise to an explosives or
munitions emergency (e.g., ordnance explosives) are to be set out in any
workplan prepared in accordance with the requirements of any applicable
agreement, and the appropriate responses to such conditions described, for
example as has been done In the Matter of Former Nansemond Ordnance Depot
Site, Suffolk, Virginia, Inter Agency Agreement to Perform a Time Critical
Removal Action for Ordnance and Explosives Safety Hazards.
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1 Within any dispute resolution process, the parties will give great weight and
2 deference to DoD's technical expertise on explosive safety issues.
3 8. Federal-to-Federal Transfers
4 DoD will involve current and prospective Federal land managers in addressing
5 explosives safety hazards on CTT ranges, where appropriate.
6 DoD may transfer land with potential explosives safety hazards to another federal
7 authority for management purposes prior to completion of a response action, on
8 condition that DoD provides notice of the potential presence of an explosives
9 safety hazard and appropriate institutional controls will be in place upon transfer
10 to ensure that human health and safety is protected.
11 Generally, DoD should retain ownership or control of those areas at which DoD
12 has not yet assessed or responded to potential explosives safety hazards.
13 9. Funding for Characterization and Response
14 DoD should seek adequate funding to characterize and respond to explosives
15 safety hazards (particularly UXO) and other constituents at CTT ranges when
16 necessary to address human health and the environment.
17 Where currently identified CTT ranges are known to pose a threat to human
18 health and the environment, DoD will apply appropriate resources to reduce risk.
19 DoD is developing and will maintain an inventory of CTT ranges.
20 DoD will maintain information on funding for UXO detection technology
21 development, and current and planned response actions at CTT ranges.
22 10. Standards for Depths of Clearance
23 Per DoD 6055.9-STD, removal depths are determined by an evaluation of site-
24 specific data and risk analysis based on the reasonably anticipated future land
25 use.
26 In the absence of site-specific data, a table of assessment depths is used for
27 interim planning purposes until the required site-specific information is
28 developed.
29 Site specific data is necessary to determine the actual depth of clearance.
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1 11. Other Constituent (OC) Hazards
2 CTT ranges will be investigated as appropriate to determine the nature and extent
3 of Other Constituents contamination.
4 Cleanup of other constituents at CTT ranges should meet applicable standards
5 under appropriate environmental laws and explosives safety requirements.
6 Responses to other constituents will be integrated with responses to military
7 munitions, rather than requiring different responses under various other
8 regulatory authorities.
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References
A. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
(CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. § 9601 et seq.
B. National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan (more
commonly called the National Contingency Plan), 40 C.F.R. § 300 et seq.
C. Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), 42 U.S.C. § 6901 et seq.
D. Military Munitions Rule: Hazardous Waste Identification and Management;
Explosives Emergencies; Manifest Exception for Transport of Hazardous Waste on
Right-of-Ways on Contiguous Properties; Final Rule, 40 C.F.R. § 260, et al.
E. Defense Environmental Restoration Program, 10 U.S.C. § 2701-2708, 2810.
F. Department of Defense Explosives Safety Board, 10 U.S.C. § 172
G. Executive Order (E.O.) 12580, Superfund Implementation, January 13, 1987, and
E.O. 13016, Amendment to Executive Order 12580, August 28, 1996.
H. DoD Ammunition and Explosives Safety Standards, DoD Directive 6055.9-STD,
dated July 1999.
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3.0
CHARACTERISTICS OF ORDNANCE AND EXPLOSIVES
By their nature, ordnance and explosives (OE, including UXO, buried munitions, and
reactive or ignitable soil) and other munition constituents present explosive, human health, and
environmental risks. When disturbed, OE may present an imminent hazard and can cause immediate
death or disablement to those nearby. Different types of OE vary in their likelihood of detonation.
The explosive hazards depend upon the nature and condition of the explosive fillers and fuzes.
Nonexplosive risks from OE result from the munitions' constituents and include both human
health and environmental risks. As the munition constituents of OE come into contact with soils,
groundwater, and air, they may affect humans and ecological receptors through a wide variety of
pathways including, but not limited to, ingestion of groundwater, dermal exposure to soil, and
various surface water pathways.
This chapter provides an overview of some of the information on OE that you will want to
consider when planning for an investigation of OE. As will be discussed in Chapter 7, planning an
investigation requires a careful and thorough examination of the actual use of munitions at the CTT
range that is under investigation. Many CTT ranges were used for decades and had different
missions that required the use of different types of munitions. Even careful archives searches will
likely reveal knowledge gaps in how the ranges were used. This chapter provides basic information
on munitions, and factors that affect when they were used, where they may be found, and the human
health and environmental concerns that may be associated with them. Information in this chapter
provides an overview of:
The history of explosives, chemicals used, and explosive functions.
The nature of the hazards at CTT ranges from conventional munitions and munition
constituents.
The human health effects of munition constituents that come from conventional
munitions.
Other activities at CTT ranges that may result in releases of munition constituents.
3.1 Overview of Explosives
In this section, we discuss the history of explosives in the United States, the nature of the
explosive train, and the different classifications of explosives and the kinds of chemicals associated
with them.
3.1.1 History of Explosives in the United States
The following section presents only a brief summary of the history of explosives in the
United States. Its purpose is to provide an overview of the types of explosive materials and
chemicals in use during different time periods. This overview may be used in determining the
potential types of explosives that could be present at a particular site.
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3.1.1.1 Early Development
The earliest known explosive mixture discovered was what is now commonly referred to as
black powder.7 For over 1,200 years, black powder was the universal explosive and was used as a
propellant for guns. For example, when ignited by fire or a spark from a flint, a loose charge of
black powder above a gun's borehole or in a priming pan served as a priming composition. The
train of black powder in the borehole served as a fuze composition. This combination resulted in
the ignition of the propellant charge of black powder in the gun's barrel. When the projectile in the
gun was a shrapnel type, the black powder in the delay fuze was ignited by the hot gases produced
by the propellant charge, and the fuze then ignited the bursting charge of black powder.8
3.1.1.2 Developments in the Nineteenth Century
Black powder had its limitations; for example, it lacked the power to blast through rock for
the purpose of making tunnels. The modern era of explosives began in 1838 with the first
preparation of nitrocellulose. Like black powder, it was used both as a propellant and as an
explosive. In the 1840s, nitroglycerine was first prepared and its explosive properties described.
It was first used as an explosive by Alfred Nobel in 1864. The attempts by the Nobel family to
market nitroglycerine were hampered by the danger of handling the liquid material and by the
difficulty of safely detonating it by flame, the common method for detonating black powder. Alfred
Nobel would solve these problems by mixing the liquid nitroglycerine with an absorbent, making
it much safer to handle, and by developing the mercury fulminate detonator. The resulting material
was called dynamite. Nobel continued with his research and in 1869 discovered that mixing
nitroglycerine with nitrates and combustible material created a new class of explosives he named
"straight dynamite." In 1875 Nobel discovered that a mixture of nitroglycerine and nitrocellulose
formed a gel. This led to the development of blasting gelatin, gelatin dynamites, and the first
double-base gun propellant, ballistite.9
In the latter half of the nineteenth century, events evolved rapidly with the first commercial
production of nitroglycerine and a form of nitrocellulose as a gun propellant called smokeless
powder. The usefulness of ammonium nitrate and additional uses of guncotton (another form of
nitrocellulose) were discovered. Shortly thereafter, picric acid10 began to be used as a bursting
charge for shells. Additional diverse mixtures of various compounds with inert or stabilizing fillers
were developed for use as propellants and as bursting charges.11
7 A mixture of potassium nitrate, sulfur, and powdered charcoal or coal.
8Military Explosives, TM 9-1300-214, Department of the Army. September 1984.
9 A. Bailey and S.G. Murray, Explosives, Propellants and Pyrotechnics. Brassey's (UK) Ltd. 1989.
10Picric acid, 2,4,6-Trinitrophenol.
nMilitary Explosives, 1984.
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1 During the Spanish-American War, the United States continued its use of black powder as
2 an artillery propellant. During this period, the U.S. Navy Powder Factory at Indian Head started
3 manufacturing single-base powder. However, the U.S. Army was slow to adopt this material, not
4 manufacturing single-base powder until about 1900. This pyrocellulose powder was manufactured
5 by gelatinizing nitrocellulose by means of an ether-ethanol mixture, extruding the resulting colloid
6 material, and removing the solvent by evaporation.12
7 Because of its corrosive action on metal casings to form shock-sensitive metal salts, picric
8 acid was replaced by TNT13 as a bursting charge for artillery shells. By 1909, diphenylamine was
9 introduced as a stabilizer. Ammonium picrate, also known as "Explosive D," was also standardized
10 in the United States as the bursting charge for armor-piercing shells.
11 3.1.1.3 World War I
12 The advent of the First World War saw the introduction of lead azide as an initiator and the
13 use of TNT substitutes, containing mixtures of TNT, ammonium nitrate, and in some cases
14 aluminum, by all the warring nations. One TNT substitute developed was amatol, which consisted
15 of a mixture of 80 percent ammonium nitrate and 20 percent TNT. (Modern amatols contain no
16 more than 50 percent ammonium nitrate.) Tetryl was introduced as a booster explosive for shell
17 charges.14
18 3.1.1.4 The Decades Between the Two World Wars
19 The decades following World War I saw the development and use of RDX,15 PETN,16 lead
20 styphnate, DEGDN,17 and lead azide as military explosives. In the United States, the production of
21 toluene from petroleum resulted in the increased production of TNT. This led to the production of
22 more powerful and castable explosives such as pentolite.18 Flashless propellants were developed
23 in the United States, as well as diazodinitrophenol as an initiator.19
12Ibid.
13TNT, 2,4,6-Trinitrotoluene.
^Military Explosives, 1984.
15RDX, Hexahy dro -1,3,5 -trinitro -1,3,5 -triazine.
1<5Use of PETN, or pentaerytMte tetranitrate, was not used on a practical basis until after World War I. It is
used extensively in mixtures with TNT for the loading of small-caliber projectiles and grenades. It has been used in
detonating fuzes, boosters, and detonators.
17DEGDN, Diethylene glycol dinitrate.
18 An equal mixture of TNT and PETN.
19Military Explosives, 1984.
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3.1.1.5 World War II
2 The industrial development and manufacturing of synthetic toluene from petroleum just prior
3 to World War II in the United States resulted in a nearly limitless supply of this chemical precursor
4 of TNT. Because of its suitability for melt-loading, a process that heats the mixture to a near liquid
5 state for introducing into the bomb casing, and for forming mixtures with other explosive
6 compounds that could be melt-loaded, TNT was produced and used on an enormous scale during
7 World War II. World War II also saw the development of rocket propellants based on a mixture of
8 nitrocellulose and nitroglycerine or nitrocellulose and DEGDN. Tetrytol20 and picratol,21 special-
9 purpose binary explosives used in demolition work and in semi-armor-piercing bombs, were also
10 developed by the United States.22
11 RDX and HMX23 came into use during World War II, but HMX was not produced in large
12 quantities, so its use was limited.24 Cyclotols, which are mixtures of TNT and RDX, were
13 standardized early in World War II. Three formulations are currently used: 75 percent RDX and 25
14 percent TNT, 70 percent RDX and 30 percent TNT, and 65 percent RDX and 35 percent TNT.
15 A number of plastic explosives for demolition work were developed including the RDX-
16 based C-3. The addition of powdered aluminum to explosives was found to increase their power.
17 This led to the development of tritonal,25 torpex,26 and minol,27 which have powerful blast effects.
18 Also developed was the shaped charge, which permits the explosive force to be focused in a specific
19 direction and led to its use for armor-piercing explosive rounds.28
20 3.1.1.6 Modern Era
21 Since 1945, military researchers have recognized that, based on both performance and cost,
22 RDX, TNT, and HMX are not likely to be replaced as explosives of choice for military applications.
23 Research has been directed into the optimization of explosive mixtures for special applications and
24 for identifying and solving safety problems. Mixing RDX, HMX, or PETN into oily or polymer
20A binary bursting charge explosive containing 70% tetryl and 30% TNT.
21A binary bursting charge explosive containing 52% ammonium picrate (Explosive D) and 48% TNT.
22Military Explosives, 1984.
23HMX, Octahydro-1,3,5,7-tetranitro-1,3,5,7-tetrazocine.
24Bailey.
25A mixture of 80% TNT and 20% flaked aluminum.
26A mixture of 41% RDX, 41% TNT, and 18% aluminum.
21A mixture of TNT, ammonium nitrate, and aluminum.
2SMilitary Explosives, 1984.
Chapter 3. Characteristics of OE
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matrices has produced plastic or flexible explosives for demolition. Other polymers will produce
tough, rigid, heat-resistant compositions for conventional missile warheads and for the conventional
implosion devices used in nuclear weapons.29
3.1.2 Classification of Military Energetic Materials
Energetic materials used by the military consist of energetic chemical compounds or
mixtures of chemical compounds. These are divided into three uses: explosives, propellants, and
pyrotechnics. Explosives and propellants, if properly initiated, will evolve large volumes of gas
over a short period of time. The key difference between explosives and propellants is the reaction
rate. Explosives react rapidly, creating a high-pressure shock wave. Propellants react at a slower
rate, creating a sustained lower pressure. Pyrotechnics produce heat but less gas than explosives or
propellants.30
The characteristic effects of explosives result from a vast change in temperature and pressure
developed when a solid, liquid, or gas is converted into a much greater volume of gas and heat. The
rate of decomposition of particular explosives varies greatly and determines the classification of
explosives into broadly defined groups.31
Military explosives are grouped into three classes:32
1. Inorganic compounds, including lead azide and ammonium nitrate
2. Organic compounds, including:
a. Nitrate esters, such as nitroglycerine and nitrocellulose
b. Nitro compounds, such as TNT and Explosive D
c. Nitramines, such as RDX and HMX
d. Nitroso compounds, such as tetrazene
e. Metallic derivatives, such as mercury fulminate and lead styphnate
3. Mixtures of oxidizable materials, such as fuels, and oxidizing agents that are not
explosive when separate. These are also known as binary explosives.
The unique properties of each class of explosives are utilized to make the "explosive train."
One example of an explosive train is the initiation by a firing pin of a priming composition that
detonates a charge of lead azide. The lead azide initiates the detonation of a booster charge of tetryl.
The tetryl in turn detonates the surrounding bursting or main charge of TNT. The explosive train
is illustrated in Figures 3-1 and 3-2.
29Bailey.
^Military Explosives, 1984.
^Military Explosives, Department of the Army, TM 9-1910, April 1955.
32Ibid.
Chapter 3. Characteristics of OE
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Main Charge
Least Sensitive
Booster
LeuMtto
1 Figure 3-1. Schematic of an Explosive Train
Figure 3-2. Explosive Trains in a Round of Artillery Ammunition
2 3.1.3 Classification of Explosives
3 An explosive is defined as a chemical material that, under the influence of thermal or
4 mechanical shock, decomposes rapidly with the evolution of large amounts of heat and gas.33 The
33R.N. Slireve, Chemical Process Industries, 3rd Ed., McGraw-Hill. NY, NY, 1967.
Chapter 3. Characteristics of OE 3-6 December 2001
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categories low explosive and high explosive are based on the velocity of the explosion. High
explosives are characterized by their extremely rapid rate of decomposition. When a high explosive
is initiated by a blow or shock, it decomposes almost instantaneously, a process called detonation.
A detonation is a reaction that proceeds through the reacted material toward the unreacted material
at a supersonic velocity (greater than 3,300 feet per second). High explosives are further divisible
by their susceptibility to initiation into primary and secondary high explosives. Primary or initiating
high explosives are extremely sensitive and are used to set off secondary high explosives, which are
much less sensitive but will explode violently when ignited. Low explosives, such as smokeless
powder and black powder, on the other hand, combust at a slower rate when set off and produce
large volumes of gas in a controllable manner. Examples of primary high explosives are lead azide
and mercury fulminate. TNT, tetryl, RDX, and HMX are secondary high explosives. There are
hundreds of different kinds of explosives and this handbook does not attempt to address all of them.
Rather, it discusses the major classifications of explosives used in military munitions.
3.1.3.1 Low Explosives, Pyrotechnics, Propellants, and Practice
Ordnance
Low explosives include such materials as smokeless
powder and black powder. Low explosives undergo chemical
reactions, such as decomposition or autocombustion, at rates from
a few centimeters per minute to approximately 400 meters per
second. Examples and uses of low explosives are provided below.
Pyrotechnics are used to send signals, to illuminate areas
of interest, to simulate other weapons during training, and as
ignition elements for certain weapons. Pyrotechnics, when ignited,
undergo an energetic chemical reaction at a controlled rate
intended to produce, on demand in various combinations, specific
time delays or quantities of heat, noise, smoke, light, or infrared
radiation. Pyrotechnics consist of a wide range of materials that
in combination produce the desired effects. Some examples of
these materials are found in the text box to the right.34 Some
pyrotechnic devices are used as military simulators and are
designed to explode. For example, the M80 simulator, a paper
cylinder containing the charge composition, is used to simulate
rifle or artillery fire, hand grenades, booby traps, or land mines.35
Table 3-1 shows examples of pyrotechnic special effects.36
Chemicals Found in
Pyrotechnics
Aluminum
Barium
Chromium
Hexachlorobenzene
Hexachloroethane
Iron
Magnesium
Manganese
Titanium
Tungsten
Zirconium
Boron
Carbon
Silicon
Sulfur
White Phosphorus
Zinc
Chlorates
Chromates
Dichromates
Halocarbons
Iodates
Nitrates
Oxides
Perchlorates
34Ibid.
35Pyrotechnic Simulators, TM 9-1370-207-10, Headquarters, Department of the Army, March 31, 1991.
3<5Bailey.
Chapter 3. Characteristics of OE
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1 Table 3-1. Pyrotechnic Special Effects
2
r.iTcci
l'.\aiii|)les
3
Heat
Igniters, incendiaries, delays, metal producers, heaters
4
Light*
Illumination (both long and short periods), tracking, signaling, decoys
5
Smoke
Signaling, screening
6
Sound
Signaling, distraction
7 * Includes not only visible light but also nonvisible light, such as infrared.
8 Propellants are explosives that can be used to provide controlled propulsion for a proj ectile.
9 Projectiles include bullets, mortar rounds, artillery rounds, rockets, and missiles. Because the
10 projectile must be directed with respect to range and direction, the explosive process must be
11 restrained. In order to allow a controlled reaction that falls short of an actual detonation, the
12 physical properties of the propellant, such as the grain size and form, must be carefully controlled.
13 Historically, the first propellant used was black powder. However, the use of black powder
14 (in the form of a dust or fine powder) as a propellant for guns did not allow accurate control of a
15 gun's ballistic effects. The development of denser and larger grains of fixed geometric shapes
16 permitted greater control of a gun's ballistic effects.37
17 Modern gun propellants consist of one or more explosives and additives (see text box below).
18 These gun propellants are often referred to as "smokeless powders" to distinguish these materials
19 from black powder. They are largely smokeless on firing compared to black powder, which gives
20 off more than 50 percent of its weight as solid products.38
21 All solid gun propellants contain nitrocellulose. As a
22 nitrated natural polymer, nitrocellulose has the required mechanical
23 strength and resilience to maintain its integrity during handling and
24 firing. Nitrocellulose is partially soluble in some organic solvents.
25 These solvents include acetone, ethanol, ether/ethanol, and
26 nitroglycerine. When a mixture of nitrocellulose and solvent is
27 worked, a gel forms. This gel retains the strength of the
28 polymer structure of nitrocellulose. Other propellant ingredients
29 include nitroglycerine and nitroguanidine.39
30 There are three compositions of gun propellants: single-
31 base, double-base, and triple-base. A single-base propellant
Chemicals Found in Gun
Propellants
Dinitrotoluenes (2,4 and 2,6)
Diphenylamine
Ethyl centralite
N-nitro so -diphenylamine
Nitrocellulose
Nitroglycerine
Nitroguanidine
Phthalates
^Military Explosives, 1984.
38Bailey.
39Ibid.
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contains nitrocellulose as its primary explosive ingredient. Some compositions contain
dinitrotoluenes (DNTs) as well. Single-base propellants are used in all manner of guns, from pistols
to artillery. A double-base propellant contains nitroglycerine in addition to nitrocellulose. The
amount of nitroglycerine present is lower now than when double-base propellants were introduced
because modern automatic weapons are eroded by the hotter gases produced by propellants of higher
nitroglycerine composition propellants. Double-base propellants are largely used in ammunition for
pistols and submachine guns. Triple-base propellants contain up to 55 percent by weight of
nitroguanidine, as well as nitrocellulose and a small amount of nitroglycerine. The use of triple-base
propellants is especially effective in large guns, because their use reduces barrel erosion, extends
barrel life, and reduces flash.
Rocket propellants are explosives designed to burn smoothly without risk of detonation, thus
providing smooth propulsion. Some classes of rocket propellants are similar in composition to the
previously described gun propellants. However, due to the different requirements and operating
conditions, there are differences in formulation. Gun propellants have a very short burn time with
a high internal pressure. Rocket propellants can burn for a longer time and operate at a lower
pressure than gun propellants.40
Rocket propellants can be liquid or solid. There are two types of liquid propellants:
monopropellants, which have a single material, and bipropellants, which have both a fuel and an
oxidizer. Currently, the most commonly used monopropellant is hydrazine. Bipropellants are used
on very powerful launch systems such as space vehicle launchers. One or both of the components
could be cryogenic material, such as liquid hydrogen and liquid oxygen. Noncryogenic systems
include those used on the U.S. Army's tactical Lance missile. The Lance missile's fuel is an
unsymmetrical demethylhydrazine. The oxidizer is an inhibited fuming nitric acid that contains
nitric acid, dinitrogen tetroxide, and 0.5 percent hydrofluoric acid as a corrosion inhibitor.41
Unlike the liquid-fueled rocket motors, in which the propellant is introduced into a
combustion chamber, the solid fuel motor contains all of its propellant in the combustion chamber.
Solid fuel propellants for rocket motors consist of double-base, modified double-base, and
composites. Double-base rocket propellants are similar to the double-base gun propellants discussed
earlier. Thus, they consist of a colloidal mixture of nitrocellulose and nitroglycerine with a
stabilizer. A typical composition for a double-base propellant consists of nitrocellulose (51.5%),
nitroglycerine (43%), diethylphthalate (3%), potassium sulfate (1.25%), ethyl centralite (1%),
carbon black (0.2%), and wax (0.05%).
Modified double-base propellants provide a higher performance than double-base
propellants. Two typical compositions for modified double-base propellants are (a) nitrocellulose
(20%>), nitroglycerine (30%), triacetin (6%), ammonium perchl orate (11%), aluminum (20%), HMX
(1 !%>), and a stabilizer (2%); or (b) nitrocellulose (22%), nitroglycerine (30%), triacetin (5%),
40Ibid.
41Ibid.
Chapter 3. Characteristics of OE 3-9 December 2001
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ammonium perchlorate (20%), aluminum (21%), and a stabilizer (2%). Composite propellants
consist of a polymer structure and an oxidizer. The oxidizer of choice is ammonium perchlorate.
Practice ordnance is ordnance used to simulate the weight and flight characteristics of an
actual weapon. Practice ordnance usually carries a small spotting device to permit the accuracy of
impact to be assessed.
3.1.3.2 High Explosives
High explosives includes compounds such as TNT, tetryl, RDX, HMX, and nitroglycerine.
These compounds undergo reaction or detonation at rates of 1,000 to 8,500 meters per second. High
explosives undergo much greater and more rapid reaction than low explosives (see 3.1.3.1). Some
high explosives, such as nitrocellulose and nitroglycerine, are used in propellant mixtures. This
conditioning often consists of mixing the explosive with other materials that permit the resulting
mixture to be cut or shaped. This process allows for a greater amount of control over the reaction
to achieve the desired effect as a propellant.
High explosives are further divisible into primary and secondary high explosives according
to their susceptibility to initiation. Primary or initiating high explosives are extremely sensitive and
are used to set off secondary high explosives, both booster and burster explosives, which are less
sensitive but will explode violently when ignited.
Primary or initiating explosives are high explosives that
are generally used in small quantities to detonate larger quantities
of high explosives. Initiating explosives will not burn, but if
ignited, they will detonate. Initiating agents are detonated by a
spark, friction, or impact, and can initiate the detonation of less
sensitive explosives. These agents include lead azide, lead
styphnate, mercury fulminate, tetrazene, and diazodinitrophenol.
Booster or auxiliary explosives are used to increase the
flame or shock of the initiating explosive to ensure a stable
detonation in the main charge explosive. High explosives used as
auxiliary explosives are less sensitive than those used in initiators,
primers, and detonators, but are more sensitive than those used as
filler charges or bursting explosives. Booster explosives, such as
RDX, tetryl, and PETN, are initiated by the primary explosive and
detonate at high rates.
Bursting explosives, main charge, or fillers are high
explosive charges that are used as part of the explosive charge in
mines, bombs, missiles, and projectiles. Bursting charge
explosives, such as TNT, RDX compositions, HMX, and
Primary Explosives
Lead azide
Lead styphnate
Mercury fulminate
Tetrazene
Diazodinitrophenol
Booster Explosives
RDX
Tetryl
PETN
Bursting Explosives
TNT
RDX compositions
HMX
Explosive D
Chapter 3. Characteristics of OE
3-10
December 2001
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1 Explosive D, must be initiated by means of a booster explosive. Some common explosive
2 compositions are discussed in the following text box.
Explosive Compositions
Explosive compounds are the active ingredients in many types of explosive compositions, such as Compositions
A, B, and C. Composition A is a wax-coated, granular explosive consisting of RDX and plasticizing wax that is
used as the bursting charge in Navy 2.75- and 5-inch rockets and land mines. Composition B consists of castable
mixtures (substances that are able to be molded or shaped) of RDX and TNT and, in some instances, desensitizing
agents that are added to the mixture to make it less likely to explode. Composition B is used as a burster in Army
projectiles and in rockets and land mines. Composition C is a plastic demolition explosive consisting of RDX,
other explosives, and plasticizers. It can be molded by hand for use in demolition work and packed by hand into
shaped charge devices.
3 3.1.3.3 Incendiaries
4 Incendiaries are neither high nor low explosives but are any flammable materials used as
5 fillers for the purpose of destroying a target by fire,42 such as red or white phosphorus, napalm,
6 thermite, magnesium, and zirconium. In order to be effective, incendiary devices should be used
7 against targets that are susceptible to destruction or damage by fire or heat. In other words, the
8 target must contain a large percentage of combustible material.
9 3.2 Sources of Hazards from Explosives, Munition Constituents, and Release Mechanisms
10 3.2.1 Hazards Associated with Common Types of Munitions
11 The condition in which a munition is found is an important factor in assessing its likelihood
12 of detonation. Munitions are designed for safe transport and handling prior to use. However,
13 munitions that were abandoned or buried cannot be assumed to meet the criteria for safe shipment
14 and handling without investigation. In addition, munitions that have been used but failed to function
15 as designed (called unexploded ordnance, duds, or dud-fired) may be armed or partially armed. As
16 a category of munitions, UXO is the most hazardous and is normally not safe to handle or transport.
17 Although it may be easy to identify the status (fuzed or not fuzed) of some munitions (e.g.,
18 abandoned), this is generally not the case with buried munitions or UXO. Many munitions use
19 multiple fuzing options; one fuze may be armed and others may not be armed. Therefore, common
20 sense dictates that all munitions initially be considered armed until the fuze can be properly
21 investigated and the fuze condition determined.
22 Munitions that detonate only partially are said to have undergone a "low order" detonation,
23 which may result in exposed explosives scattered in the immediate vicinity. In addition to the
24 detonation hazard of UXO varying with the condition in which it is found, the explosive hazard also
25 varies with the type of munition, as briefly described in the following text box.
42 Naval Explosive Ordnance Disposal Technology Division, Countermeasures Department, Unexploded
Ordnance: An Overview, 1996.
Chapter 3. Characteristics of OE
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Conventional Munitions Commonly Found as UXO
Small arms munitions present minimal explosive risks, but because they often consist of lead projectiles, they
may cause lead contamination of the surrounding environment. Small arms include projectiles that are 0.6 inch
or less in caliber and no longer than approximately 4 inches. They are fired from various sizes of weapons,
such as pistols, carbines, rifles, automatic rifles, shotguns, and machine guns.
Hand grenades are small explosive- or chemical-type munitions that are very hazardous, in part because they
are designed to land on the ground surface, making unexploded items accessible to the public. Various classes
of grenades may be encountered as UXO, including fragmentation, smoke, blast, riot control, and illumination
grenades. All grenades have three main parts: a body, a fuze with a pull ring and safety clip assembly, and
a filler. Grenades have metal, plastic, cardboard, or rubber bodies and may contain explosives, white
phosphorus, chemical agents, orilluminationflares, depending on their intended use. Fragmentation grenades,
the most frequently used type of grenade, break into small, lethal, high-velocity fragments and pose the most
serious explosive risks.
Mortar shells are munitions launched from gun tubes at a very high arc. Mortar shells range from
approximately 2 to 11 inches in diameter and are filled with explosives, white phosphorus, red phosphorus,
illuminationflares, chemical agents, or otherfillers. Typical U.S. sizes include the 60mm, 81mm, and 4.2-inch
mortars. Mortar shells, like projectiles, canbe eitherfin stabilized or spin stabilized and are common ordnance
deployed by ground troops. Mortar shells are sensitive to disturbances.
Projectiles/artillery rounds range from approximately 0.6 to 16 inches in diameter and from 2 inches to 4
feet in length. Projectiles are typically deployed from ground gun platforms but in certain configurations the
guns canbe mounted on an aircraft. A typical projectile configuration consists of a bullet-shaped metal body,
a fuze, and a stabilizing assembly. Fillers include antipersonnel submunitions, high explosives, illumination,
smoke, white phosphorus, riot control agent, or a chemical filler. Fuzing may be located in the nose or base.
Fuze types include proximity, impact, and time delay, depending upon the mission and intended target.
Submunitions typically land on the ground surface, making them potentially accessible and hazardous to
humans and animals. Submunitions include bomblets, grenades, and mines that are filled with either
explosives or chemical agents. Submunitions are used for a variety of purposes, including antipersonnel,
antimateriel, antitank, dual-purpose, and incendiary. They are scattered over large areas by dispensers,
missiles, rockets, or projectiles. Submunitions are activated in a number of ways, including pressure, impact,
movement, or disturbance, while in flight or when near metallic objects.
Rockets and missiles pose serious hazards, as the potential exists for residual propellant to burn violently if
subjected to sharp impact, heat, flame, or sparks. Rockets and missiles consist of a motor section, a warhead,
and a fuze. A rocket is an unmanned, self-propelled ordnance, with or without a warhead, designed to travel
about the surface of the earth and whose trajectory or course can not be controlled during the flight. Missiles
also have a guidance system that controls their flight trajectory. The warhead can be filled with explosives,
toxic chemicals, white phosphorus, submunitions, riot-control agent, or illumination flares. Rockets and
missiles may be fuzed with any number of fuzes. The fuze is the most sensitive part of an unexploded rocket
or missile.
Bombs may penetrate the ground at variable depths. Dud-fired bombs that malfunction and remain on or near
the ground surface canbe extremely hazardous. Bombs commonly range from 100 to 3,000 pounds in weight
and from 3 to 12 feet in length. Bombs consist of a metal container (the bomb body), a fuze, and a stabilizing
device. The bomb body holds the explosive chemical or submunition filler, and the fuze (nose and/or tail) may
be anti-disturbance, time delay, mechanical time, proximity, or impact or a combination thereof.
Adapted from: Naval Explosive Ordnance Disposal Technology Division, UXO Countermeasures Department,
Unexploded Ordnance (UXO): An Overview, October 1996, and DoD Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense
(Environmental Security), BRAC Environmental Fact Sheet, Unexploded Ordnance (UXO), Spring 1999. Also based
on comments received from NAVEODTECHDIV.
Chapter 3. Characteristics of OE
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3.2.2 Areas Where OE Is Found
Areas that are most likely to contain OE include munitions manufacturing plants; load,
assemble, and pack operations; military supply depots; ammunition depots; proving grounds; open
detonation (OD) and open burning (OB) grounds; range impact areas; range buffer zones; explosive
ordnance disposal sites; live fire areas; training ranges; and ordnance test and evaluation (T&E)
facilities and ranges. The primary ordnance-related activity will also assist planners in determining
the potential OE hazards at the site; for example, an impact area will have predominantly
unexploded ordnance (fuzed and armed), whereas munitions manufacturing plants should have only
ordnance items (fuzed or unfuzed but unarmed). At all of these sites, a variety of munition types
could have been used, potentially resulting in a wide array of OE items at the site. The types and
quantities of munitions employed may have changed overtime as a result of changes in the military
mission and advances in munition technologies, thus increasing the variety of OE items that may
be present at any individual site. Changes in training needs also contribute to the presence of
different OE types found at former military facilities.
The types of munition constituents
potentially present on ranges varies,
depending on the range type and its use. For
example, a rifle range would be expected to
be contaminated with lead rounds and metal
casings. For ranges used for bombing, the
most commonly found munition constituents
would consist of explosive compounds such
as TNT and RDX. This has been confirmed
by environmental samples collected at
numerous facilities. For example, TNT or
RDX is usually present in explosives-
contaminated soils. Studies of sampling and
analysis at a number of explosives-
contaminated sites reported "hits" of TNT or
RDX in 72 percent of the contaminated soil
samples collected43 and up to 94 percent of
contaminated water samples collected.44
Early (World War I era) munitions
tended to be TNT- or Explosive D
(ammonium picrate)-based. To a lesser
extent, tetryl and ammonium nitrate were
Military Ranges
The typical setup of bombing and gunnery ranges
(including live-fire and training ranges) consists of
one or more "targets" or "impact areas," where fired
munitions are supposed to land. Surrounding the
impact area is a buffer zone that separates the impact
area from the firing/release zone (the area from which
the military munitions are fired, dropped, or placed).
Within the live fire area, the impact area usually
contains the greatest concentration of UXO. Buried
munitions may be found in other areas, including the
firing area itself.
A training range, troop maneuver area, or troop
training area is used for conducting military exercises
in a simulated conflict area or war zone. A training
range can also be used for other nonwar simulations
such as UXO training. Training aids and military
munitions simulators such as training ammunition,
artillery simulators, smoke grenades, pyrotechnics,
mine simulators, and riot control agents are used on the
training range. While these training aids are safer than
live munitions, they may still present explosive
hazards.
43A.B. Crockett, H.D. Craig, T.F. Jenkins, and W.E. Sisk, Field Sampling and Selecting On-Site Analytical
Methods for Explosives in Soils, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, EPA/540/R-97/501, November 1996.
44A.B. Crockett, H.D. Craig, and T.F. Jenkins, Field Sampling and Selecting On-Site Analytical Methods for
Explosives in Water, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, EPA/600/S-99/002, May 19, 1999.
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used as well. TNT is still used, but mixtures of RDX, HMX, ammonium picrate, PETN, tetryl, and
aluminum came into use during World War II. Incendiary charges consisting of white phosphorus
also were used in World War II.
3.2.3 Release Mechanisms for OE
The primary mechanisms for the occurrence and/or release of OE at CTT ranges are based
on the type of OE activity or are the result of improper functioning (e.g., detonation) of the OE. For
example, when a bomb or artillery shell is dropped or fired, it will do one of three things:
It will detonate completely. This is also called a "high order" detonation. Complete
detonation causes a "kick-out" of both munition debris (e.g., fragments) and small
quantities of munition constituents (e.g., energetic compounds such as TNT and RDX,
lead and other heavy metals) into the environment. Kick-out also may occur during open
detonation of OE during range clearing operations.
It will undergo an incomplete detonation, also called a "low order" detonation. This
causes a kick-out of not only munitions debris and larger amounts of munition
constituents into the environment, but also larger pieces of the actual munition itself.
It will fail to function, or "dud fire," which results in UXO. The UXO may be
completely intact, in which case releases of munition constituents are less likely; or the
UXO may be damaged or in an environment that subjects it to corrosion, thus releasing
munition constituents over time.
In addition, OE could be lost, abandoned, or buried, resulting in bulk OE that could be fuzed
or unfuzed. If such an OE item is in an environment that is corrosive or otherwise damaging to the
OE item, or if the OE item has been damaged, munition constituents could leach out of the ordnance
item.
The fate and transport of some munition constituents in the environment have not yet
received the level of focus of some more commonly found chemicals associated with other military
operations (such as petroleum hydrocarbons in groundwater from jet fuels). For example, TNT
adsorbs to soil particles and is therefore not expected to migrate rapidly through soil to groundwater.
However, the behavior in the environment of TNT's degradation products is not well understood
at this time, nor is the degree to which TNT in soil might be a continuing low-level source of
groundwater contamination.
DoD is currently investing additional resources to better understand the potential for
corrosion of intact UXO in different environments and to better quantify the fate and transport of
other munition constituents.
3.2.4 Chemical Reactivity of Explosives
Standard military explosives are reactive to varying degrees, depending on the material,
conditions of storage, or environmental exposure. Precautions must be taken to prevent their
reacting with other materials. For example, lead azide will react with copper in the presence of
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water and carbon dioxide to form copper azide, which is an even more sensitive explosive.
Ammonium nitrate will react with iron or aluminum in the presence of water to form ammonia and
metal oxide. TNT will react with alkalis to form dangerously sensitive compounds.45 Picric acid
easily forms metallic compounds, many of which are very shock sensitive.
Because of these reactions, and others not listed, military munitions are designed to be free
of moisture and any other impurities. Therefore, munitions that have not been properly stored may
be more unstable and unpredictable in their behavior, and more dangerous to deal with than normal
munitions. This is also true for munitions that are no longer intact, have been exposed to weathering
processes, or have been improper disposed of. These conditions may exist on ranges.
3.3 Sources and Nature of the Potential Hazards Posed by Conventional Munitions
This section of the handbook addresses two factors that affect the potential hazards posed
by conventional munitions: (1) the sensitivity of the OE and its components (primarily the fuze and
fuze type) to detonation and (2) the environmental and human factors that affect the deterioration
of the OE or the depth at which OE is found.
The potential for the hazards posed by conventional munitions is a result of the following:
Type of munition
Type and amount of explosive(s) contained in the munition
Type of fuze
The potential for deterioration of the intact UXO and the release of munition constituents
The likelihood that the munition will be in a location where disturbance is possible or
probable
However, a full understanding of the potential hazards posed by conventional munitions is
not possible prior to initiating an investigation unless the munition items have been identified in
advance, the state of the munitions is known, and the human and environmental factors (e.g., frost
heave) are well understood.
3.3.1 Probability of Detonation as a Function of Fuze Characteristics
Most military munitions contain a fuze that is designed to either ignite or cause the
detonation of the payload containing the munition. Although there are many types of fuzes, all are
in one of three broad categories - mechanical, electronic, or a combination of both. These fuze
types describe the method by which a fuze is armed and fired. Modern fuzes are generally not
armed until the munition has been launched. For safety purposes, DoD policy is that all munitions
and OE found on ranges should be assumed to be armed and prepared to detonate and should be
approached with extreme caution (see Chapter 6, "Safety").
^Military Explosives, 1955.
Chapter 3. Characteristics of OE
3-15
December 2001
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The type of fuze and its condition (armed or unarmed) directly determine its sensitivity. It
should always be assumed that a fuzed piece of ordnance is armed. Many fuzes have backup
features in addition to their normal method of firing. For example, a proximity fuze may also have
an impact or self-destruct feature. Also, certain types of fuzes are more sensitive than others and
may be more likely to explode upon disturbance. Some of the most common fuzes are described
below.
Proximity fuzes are designed to function only when they are at a predetermined distance
from a target.46 They are used in air-to-ground and ground-to-ground operations to
create airbursts above the target, and they do not penetrate and detonate within the target,
as do impact fuzes. A proximity fuze by design uses an electrical signal as the initiation
source for the detonation. In a dud-fired condition, the main concern is the outside
influence exerted by an electromagnetic (EM) source. EM sources include two-way
radios and cell phones; therefore, the use of such items must not be permitted in these
types of environments. However, proximity fuzes sometimes can be backed up with an
impact fuze, which is designed to function on target impact if the proximity mode fails
to function.
Impact fuzes are designed to function upon direct impact with the target. Some impact
fuzes may have a delay element. This delay lasts fractions of a second and is designed
to allow the projectile to penetrate the target before functioning. Examples of specific
impact fuzes include impact inertia, concrete piercing, base detonating, all-way acting,
and multi-option. (An example of an all-way-acting fuze is shown in Figure 3-3.) In
order for a proximity or impact fuze to arm, the projectile must be accelerating at a
predetermined minimum rate. If the acceleration is too slow or extends over too short
a period of time, the arming mechanism returns to its safety position; however, munitions
with armed proximity fuzes that have not exploded may be ready to detonate on the
slightest disturbance.
Mechanical time fuzes use internal movement to function at a predetermined time after
firing. Some of these fuzes may have a backup impact fuze. Moving UXO with this
type of fuze may also cause a detonation. An example is shown in Figure 3-4.
Powder train time fuzes use a black powder train to function at a predetermined time
after firing.
4<5Major N. Lantzer et al., Risk Assessment: Unexploded Ordnance, Prepared for NAVEODTECHDIV, 1995.
Chapter 3. Characteristics of OE 3-16 December 2001
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FIRING PIN
ASSEMBLY
WEIGHT
CENTERING
SPRING
LEAD CUP
ASSEMBLY
SAFETY
DISC
BALL
HOUSING
ASSEMBLY
WEIGHT
CENTERPLATE
Figure 3-3. Mechanical All-Way-Acting Fuze
Figure 3-4. Mechanical Time Fuze
3.3.2 Types of Explosive Hazards
Both planned and accidental detonations can cause serious injury or even death and can
seriously damage structures in the vicinity of the explosion. Explosive hazards from munitions vary
with the munition components, explosive quantities, and distance from potential receptors. The
DDESB has established minimum safety standards forthe quantity of explosives and their minimum
separation distance from surrounding populations, structures, and public areas forthe protection of
personnel and facilities during intentional and accidental explosions.4' (DDESB is currently in the
process of revising the safety standards.) These DDESB standards, called Quantity-Distance
Standards, are based on research and accident data on the size of areas affected by different types
of explosions and their potential human health and environmental impacts (see Chapter 6 for a
-^9r- SQ FlftiNaJ
FiN
LHl fON-dtTQfl
M21
DoD Ammunition and Explosives Safety Standards, DoD 6055.9-STD, Chapters 2, 5, and 8, July 1999.
Chapter 3. Characteristics of OE 3-17 December 2001
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discussion of Quantity-Distance Standards). State and local authorities may have additional and/or
more stringent quantity-distance requirements.
Understanding the explosive hazards specific to the munitions at your site will help you plan
the appropriate safety precautions and notification of authorities. The primary effects of explosive
outputs include blast pressure, fragmentation, and thermal hazards. Shock hazards are also a
concern but are more of an issue with respect to storage of munitions in underground bunkers at
active ranges. Each of these hazards is described below. Many OE hazards in the field may result
in more than one type of explosive output.
Blast pressure (over pressure) is the almost instantaneous pressure increase resulting from
a violent release of energy from a detonation in a gaseous medium (e.g., air). The health hazards
of blast pressure depend on the amount of explosive material, the duration of the explosion, and the
distance from the explosion, and can include serious damage to the thorax or the abdominal region,
eardrum rupture, and death.
Fragmentation hazards result from the shattering of an explosive container or from the
secondary fragmentation of items in close proximity to an explosion. Fragmentation can cause a
variety of physical problems ranging from skin abrasions to fatal injuries.
Thermal hazards are those resulting from heat and flame caused by a deflagration or
detonation. Direct contact with flame, as well as intense heat, can cause serious injury or death.
Shock hazards result from underground detonations and are less likely to occur at CTT
ranges than at active ranges or industrial facilities where munitions are found. When an ordnance
item is buried in the earth (e.g., stored underground), if detonation occurs, it will cause a violent
expansion of gases, heat, and shock. A blast wave will be transmitted through the earth or water in
the form of a shock wave. This shock wave is comparable to a short, powerful earthquake. The
wave will pass through earth or water just as it does through air, and when it strikes an object such
as a foundation, the shock wave will impart its energy to the structure.
Practice rounds of ordnance may have their own explosive hazards. They often contain
spotting charges which are explosive fillers designed to produce a flash and smoke when detonated,
providing observers or spotters a visual reference of ordnance impact. Practice UXO found on the
ranges must be checked for the presence of unexpended spotting charges that could cause severe
burns.
3.3.3 Factors Affecting Potential for Ordnance Exposure to Human Activity
Because exposure to OE is a key element of explosive risk, any action that makes OE more
accessible adds to its potential explosive risks. The combined factors of naturally occurring and
human activities, such as the following, increase the risk of explosion from OE:
Flooding and erosion
Frost heaving
Chapter 3. Characteristics of OE
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Agricultural activities
Construction
Recreational use (may provide open access)
Heavy flooding can loosen and displace soils, causing OE located on or beneath the ground
surface to be moved or exposed. In flooded soils, OE could potentially be moved to the surface or
to another location beneath the ground surface. Similarly, soil erosion due to high winds, flooding,
or inadequate soil conservation could displace soils and expose OE, or it could cause OE to migrate
to another location beneath the surface or up to the ground surface. Frost heaving is the movement
of soils during the freeze-thaw cycle. Water expands as it freezes, creating uplift pressure. In
nongranular soils, OE buried above the frost line may migrate with frost heaving. The effects of
these and other geophysical processes on the movement of OE in the environment, while known to
occur, are being studied more extensively by DoD.
Human activities can also increase the potential for OE exposure. Depending on the depth
of OE, agricultural activities such as plowing and tilling may loosen and disturb the soil enough to
cause OE to migrate to the surface, or such activities may increase the chances of soil erosion and
OE displacement during flooding. Further, development of land containing OE may cause the OE
to be exposed and possibly to detonate during construction activities. Excavating soils during
construction can expose OE, and the vibration of some construction activities may create conditions
in which OE may detonate. All of these human and naturally occurring factors can increase the
likelihood of OE exposure and therefore the explosive risks of OE.
3.3.4 Depth of OE
The depth at which OE is located is a primary determinant of both potential human exposure
and the cost of investigation and cleanup. In addition, the DoD Ammunition and Safety Standards
require that an estimate of expected depth of OE be included in the site-specific analysis for
determining response depth.48 A wide variety of factors may affect the depth at which OE is found,
including penetration depth a function of munition size, shape, propellant charge used, soil
characteristics, and other factors as well as movement of OE due to frost heave or other factors,
as discussed in Section 3.3.3.
There are several methods for estimating the ground penetration depths of ordnance. These
methods vary in the level of detail required for data input (e.g., ordnance weight, geometry, angle
of entry), the time and level of effort needed to conduct analysis, and the assumptions used to obtain
results. Some of the specific soil characteristics that affect ordnance penetration depth include soil
type (e.g., sand, loam, clay), whether vegetation is present, and soil moisture. Other factors affecting
penetration depth include munition geometry, striking velocity and angle, relative location of firing
point and striking point, topography between firing point and striking point, and angle of entry.
Table 3-2 provides examples of the potential effects that different soil characteristics can have on
penetration depth. These depths do not reflect the variety of other factors (e.g., different striking
velocities and angles) that affect the actual depth at which the munition may be found. The depths
4SDoD Ammunition and Explosives Safety Standards, DoD 6055.9-STD, Chapter 12, July 1999.
Chapter 3. Characteristics of OE 3-19 December 2001
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1 provided in Table 3-2 are taken from a controlled study to determine munition penetration into earth.
2 They are presented here to give the reader an understanding of the wide variability in the depths at
3 which individual munitions may be found, based on soil characteristics alone.
4 While Table 3-2 provides a few examples of penetration depths, it does not illustrate the
5 dramatic differences possible within ordnance categories. For example, rockets can penetrate sand
6 to depths of between 0.4 and 8.1 feet, and clay to depths of between 0.8 and 16.3 feet, depending
7 on the type of rocket and a host of site-specific conditions.49
8 Table 3-2. Examples of Depths of Ordnance Penetration into Soil
9
Tj po of
Munition
Ordiiiinco
Depth ill" Penel union (ID
10
1(0111
Limes lo no
Siintl
Soil ( onliiininu Yeueliilinn
( l:i\
11
Projectile
155 mm Ml 07
2
14
18.4
28
12
Projectile
75 mm M48
0.7
4.9
6.5
9.9
13
Projectile
37 mm M63
0.6
3.9
5.2
7.9
14
Grenade
40 mm M822
0.5
3.2
4.2
6.4
15
Projectile
105 mm Ml
1.1
7.7
10.1
15.4
16
Rocket
2.36" Rocket
0.1
0.4
0.5
0.8
17 Sources: U.S. Army Corps ofEngineers, Ordnance and Explosives Response: Engineering and Design, EM 1110-1-
18 4009, June 23, 2000; Ordata II, NAVEODTECHDIV, Version 1.0; and Crull Michelle et al., Estimating Ordnance
19 Penetration Into Earth, presented at UXO Forum 1999, May 1999.
20 A unique challenge in any investigation of OE is the presence of underground munition
21 burial pits, which often contain a mixture of used, unused, or fired munitions as well as other wastes.
22 Munition burial pits, particularly those containing a mixture of deteriorated munitions, can pose
23 explosive and environmental risks. The possibility of detonation is due to the potentially decreased
24 stability and increased likelihood of explosion of commingled and/or degraded munition
25 constituents.
26 Buried munitions may detonate from friction, impact, pressure, heat, or flames of a nearby
27 OE item that has been disturbed. Adding to the challenge, some burial pits are quite old and may
28 not be secured with technologically advanced liners or other types of controls. Further, because
29 some burial pits are very old, records of their contents or location may be incomplete or absent
30 altogether.
49U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Interim Guidance for Conventional Ordnance and Explosives Removal
Actions, October 1998.
Chapter 3. Characteristics of OE
December 2001
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3.3.5 Environmental Factors Affecting Decomposition of OE
Deteriorated OE can present serious explosive hazards. As the OE ages, the explosive
compound/mixtures in the OE can remain viable and could increase in sensitivity.50
The probability of corrosion of an intact OE item is highly site specific. OE can resist
corrosion under certain conditions. There are OE sites dating back to World War I in Europe that
contain subsurface OE that remains intact and does not appear to be releasing any munition
constituents. However, there are certain environments, such as OE exposed to seawater, that can
cause OE51 to degrade. In addition, as OE casings degrade under certain environmental conditions,
or if the casings were damaged upon impact, their fillers, propellants, and other constituents may
leach into the surrounding soils and groundwater.
In general, the likelihood of OE deterioration depends on the integrity and thickness of the
OE casing, as well as the environmental conditions in which the OE item is located and the degree
of damage to the OE item after being initially fired. Most munitions are designed for safe transport
and handling prior to use. However, if they fail to explode upon impact, undergo a low-order
detonation, or are otherwise damaged, it is possible that the fillers, propellants, and other munition
constituents may leach into surrounding soils and groundwater, potentially polluting the soil and
groundwater and/or creating a mixture of explosives and their breakdown products. Anecdotal
evidence at a number of facilities suggests adverse impacts to soil and groundwater from ordnance-
related activities.
The soil characteristics that may affect the likelihood and rate of OE casing corrosion include
but are not limited to the following:
Soil moisture
Soil type
Soil pH
Buffering capacity
Resistivity
Electrochemical (redox) potential
Oxygen
Microbial corrosion
Moisture, including precipitation, high soil moisture, and the presence of groundwater,
contribute to the corrosion of OE and to the deterioration of explosive compounds. Soils with a low
water content (i.e., below 20 percent) are slightly corrosive on OE casings, and soils with periodic
groundwater inundation are moderately corrosive.
50U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Ordnance and Explosives (OE) Response Workshop. Control #399, USACE
Professional Development Support Center, FY01.
51OE specifically designed for use in a marine environment, such as sea mines and torpedoes, would not be
included in this scenario.
Chapter 3. Characteristics of OE
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December 2001
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The texture and structure of soil affect its corrosivity. Cohesive soils, those with a high
percentage of clay and silt material, are much less corrosive than sandy soils. Soils with high
organic carbon content, such as swamps, peat, fens, or marshes, as well as soils that are severely
polluted with fuel ash, slag coal, or wastewater, tend to be highly corrosive.
The pH level also affects soil corrosivity. Normal soils with pH levels between 5 and 8 do
not contribute to corrosivity. In fact, soils with pH above 5 may form a calcium carbonate coating
on buried metals, protecting them from extensive corrosion. However, highly acidic soils, such as
those with a pH below 4, tend to be highly corrosive.
Buffering capacity, the measure of the soil's ability to withstand extreme changes in pH
levels, also affects its corrosion potential. Soils with a high buffering capacity can maintain pH
levels even under changing conditions, thereby potentially inhibiting corrosive conditions.
However, soils with a low buffering capacity that are subj ect to acid rain or industrial pollutants may
drop in pH levels and promote corrosivity.
Another factor affecting the corrosive potential of soils is resistivity, or electrical
conductivity, which is dependent on moisture content and is produced by the action of soil moisture
on minerals. At high resistivity levels (greater than 20,000 ohm/cm) there is no significant impact
on corrosion; however, corrosion can be extreme at very low resistivity levels (below 1,000
ohm/cm). High electrochemical potential can also contribute significantly to OE casing corrosion.
The electrochemical or "redox" potential is the ability of the soil to reduce or oxidize OE casings
(the oxidation-reduction potential). Aerated soils have the necessary oxygen to oxidize metals.
3.3.6 Explosives-Contaminated Soils
A variety of situations can create conditions of contaminated and potentially reactive and/or
ignitable soils, including the potential for low-order detonations, deterioration of the OE container
and leaching of munition constituents into the environment, residual propellants ending up in soils,
and OB/OD, which may disperse chunks of bulk explosives and munition constituents. Soils
suspected of being contaminated with primary explosives may be very dangerous, and no work
should be attempted until soil analysis has determined the extent of contamination and a detailed
work procedure has been approved.52 Soils with a 12 percent or greater concentration of secondary
explosives, such as TNT andRDX, are capable of propagating (transmitting) a detonation if initiated
by flame. Soils containing more than 15 percent secondary explosives by weight are susceptible to
initiation by shock. In addition, chunks of bulk explosives in soils will detonate or burn if initiated,
but a detonation will not move through the soil without a minimum explosive concentration of 12
percent. To be safe, the U.S. Army Environmental Center considers all soils containing 10 percent
52U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Ordnance and Explosives Response: Engineering Design, EP 1110-1-18,
April 2000.
Chapter 3. Characteristics of OE
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or more of secondary explosives or mixtures of secondary explosives to be reactive or ignitable
soil.53
3.4 Toxicity and Human Health and Ecological Impacts of Explosives and Other Munition
Constituents
The human health and environmental risks of other munition constituents from OE are
caused by explosives or other chemical components, including lead and mercury, in munitions and
from the compounds used in or produced during munitions operations. When exposed to some of
these munition constituents, humans may potentially face long-term health problems, including
cancer, and animals may develop physical health and behavioral problems. The adverse effects of
munition constituents are dependent on the concentration of the chemicals and the pathways by
which receptors become exposed. Understanding the human health and environmental risks of
munition constituents and byproducts requires information about the inherent toxicity of these
chemicals and the manner in which they may migrate through soil and water toward potential human
and environmental receptors. This section provides an overview of some commonly found explosive
compounds and their potential health and ecological impacts.
Explosive compounds that have been used in or are byproducts of munitions use, production,
operations (load, assemble, and pack), and demilitarization or destruction operations include, but
are not limited to, the list of substances in Table 3-3. Other toxic materials, such as lead, are found
in the projectiles of small arms. These explosive and otherwise potentially toxic compounds can be
found in soils, groundwater, surface waters, and air and have potentially serious human health and
ecological impacts. The nature of these impacts, and whether they pose an unacceptable risk to
human health and the environment, depend upon the dose, duration, and pathway of exposure, as
well as the sensitivity of the exposed populations.
Table 3-3 illustrates the chemical compounds used in munitions and their potential human
health effects as provided by EPA's Integrated Ri sk Information System (IRIS), the National Library
of Medicine's Toxicology DataNetwork (TOXNET) Hazardous Substances Data Bank, the Agency
for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry (ATSDR), and material safety data sheets (MSDS).
Table 3-4 shows the uses of many of the
same compounds found on Table 3-3. It
illustrates that many compounds have multiple
uses, such as white phosphorus, which is used
both in pyrotechnics and incendiaries. The list
of classifications on Table 3-4 is not intended
to be all-inclusive but to provide a summary of
some of the more common uses for various
explosive materials.
53Federal Remediation Technologies Roundtable andUSAEC, ETL Ordnance and Explosives Response, 1110-
1-8153, May 14, 1999.
Chapter 3. Characteristics of OE 3-23 December 2001
Perchlorate
Perchlorate is a component of solid rocket fuel that has
recently been detected in drinking water in States
across the United States. Perchlorate interacts with the
thyroid gland in mammals, with potential impacts on
growth and development. Research continues to
determine the maximum safe level for human drinking
water. While perchlorate is not currently listed on
EPA's IRIS database, several States, including
California, have developed interim risk levels.
-------
1 Table 3-3. Potential Toxic Effects of Exposure to Explosive Chemicals and Components
2
( oiiliiiniiiiiiil
Chomiciil Cum push ion
Polcnlhil loxicilv/I ITocls
3
TNT
2,4,6-Trinitrotoluene
c7h5n3o6
Possible human carcinogen, targets liver, skin
irritations, cataracts.
4
RDX
Hexahydro-1,3,5-trinitro-1,
3,5-triazine
c3h6n6o6
Possible human carcinogen, prostate problems, nervous
system problems, nausea, vomiting. Laboratory
exposure to animals indicates potential organ damage.
5
HMX
Octahydro-1,3,5,7-tetranitro
-1,3,5,7-tetrazocine
c4h8n8o8
Animal studies suggest potential liver and central
nervous system damage.
6
PETN
Pentaerythritol tetranitrate
c5h8n4o12
Irritation to eyes and skin; inhalation causes headaches,
weakness, and drop in blood pressure.
7
Tetryl
2,4,6-Trinitrophenyl-N-
methylnitramine
c7h5n5o8
Coughing, fatigue, headaches, eye irritation, lack of
appetite, nosebleeds, nausea, and vomiting. The
carcinogenicity of tetryl in humans and animals has not
been studied.
8
Picric acid
2,4,6-Trinitrophenol
c6h4n3o7
Headache, vertigo, blood cell damage, gastroenteritis,
acute hepatitis, nausea, vomiting, diarrhea, abdominal
pain, skin eruptions, and serious dysfunction of the
central nervous system.
9
Explosive D
Ammonium picrate
c6h6n4o7
Moderately irritating to the skin, eyes, and mucous
membranes; can produce nausea, vomiting, diarrhea,
skin staining, dermatitis, coma, and seizures.
10
Tetrazene
c2h6n10
Associated with occupational asthma; irritant and
convulsants, hepatotoxin, eye irritation and damage,
cardiac depression and low blood pressure, bronchial
mucous membrane destruction and pulmonary edema;
death.
11
DEGDN
Diethylene glycol dinitrate
(C2H4N03)20
Targets the kidneys; nausea, dizziness, and pain in the
kidney area. Causes acute renal failure.
12
2,4-Dinitrotoluene
c7h7n2o4
Exposure can cause methemoglobinemia, anemia,
leukopenia, liver necrosis, vertigo, fatigue, dizziness,
weakness, nausea, vomiting, dyspnea, arthralgia,
insomnia, tremor, paralysis, unconsciousness, chest
pain, shortness of breath, palpitation, anorexia, and loss
of weight.
13
2,6-Dinitrotoluene
c7h7n2o4
Exposure can cause methemoglobinemia, anemia,
leukopenia, and liver necrosis.
14
Diphenylamine
N,N-Diphenylamine
c12hun
Irritation to mucous membranes and eyes; pure
substance toxicity low, but impure material may contain
4-biphenylamine, a potent carcinogen.
Chapter 3. Characteristics of OE
3-24
December 2001
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Table 3-3. Potential Toxic Effects of Exposure to Explosive Chemicals and Compounds
(Continued)
( oiiliiiniiiiiiil
Chcmiciil Composition
I'oicnliiil 1 o\ici(\/l!ITec(s
1
2
N-
Nitrosodiphenylamine
C12H10N2O
Probable human carcinogen based on an increased
incidence of bladder tumors in male and female rats and
reticulum cell sarcomas in mice, and structural
relationship to carcinogenic nitrosamines.
3
Phthalates
Various
An increase in toxic polyneuritis has been reported in
workers exposed primarily to dibutyl phthalates;
otherwise very low acute oral toxicity with possible eye,
skin, or mucous membrane irritation from exposure to
phthalic anhydride during phthalate synthesis.
4
Ammonium nitrate
nh4no3
Prompt fall in blood pressure; roaring sound in the ears
with headache and associated vertigo; nausea and
vomiting; collapse and coma.
5
6
Nitroglycerine
(Glycerol trinitrate)
c3h5n3o9
Eye irritation, potential cardiovascular system effects
including blood pressure drop and circulatory collapse.
7
Lead azide
N6Pb
Headache, irritability, reduced memory, sleep
disturbance, potential kidney and brain damage, anemia.
8
Lead styphnate
PbQHNjOg .H20
Widespread organ and systemic effects including
central nervous system, immune system, and kidneys.
Muscle and joint pains, weakness, risk of high blood
pressure, poor appetite, colic, upset stomach, and
nausea.
9
Mercury fulminate
Hg(OCN)2
Inadequate evidence in humans for carcinogenicity;
causes conjunctival irritation and itching; mercury
poisoning including chills, swelling of hands, feet,
cheeks, and nose followed by loss of hair and
ulceration; severe abdominal cramps, bloody diarrhea,
corrosive ulceration, bleeding, and necrosis of the
gastrointestinal tract; shock and circulatory collapse,
and renal failure.
10
White phosphorus
P4
Reproductive effects. Liver, heart, or kidney damage;
death; skin burns, irritation of throat and lungs,
vomiting, stomach cramps, drowsiness.
11
Perchlorates
C104-
Exposure causes itching, tearing, and pain; ingestion
may cause gastroenteritis with abdominal pain, nausea
vomiting, and diarrhea; systemic effects may follow and
may include ringing of ears, dizziness, elevated blood
pressure, blurred vision, and tremors. Chronic effects
may include metabolic disorders of the thyroid.
12
Hydrazine
n2h4
Possible human carcinogen; liver, pulmonary, CNS, and
respiratory damage; death.
13
Nitroguanidine
ch4n4o2
No human or animal carcinogenicity data available.
Specific toxic effects are not documented.
Chapter 3. Characteristics of OE 3-25 December 2001
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5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
Table 3-4. Primary Uses of Explosive Materials
Compound
Propclliinl
Priniiin or
Iniliiilor
liooslcr
liurslcr
( h;iriic
P\ roll-clinics
Inccndiiin
TNT
RDX
HMX
PETN
Tetryl
Picric acid
Explosive D
Tetrazene
DEGDN
Nitrocellulose
2,4-
Dinitrotoluene
2,6-
Dinitrotoluene
Ammonium
nitrate
Nitroglycerine
Lead azide
Lead styphnate
Mercury
fulminate
White
phosphorus
Perchlorates
Hydrazine
Nitroguanidine
Chapter 3. Characteristics of OE
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1 White Phosphorus
2 One of the most frequently used pyrotechnics is white phosphorus, which is used for
3 "spotting" or marking an area. White phosphorus burns rapidly when exposed to oxygen. In soils
4 with low oxygen, unreacted white phosphorus can lie dormant for years, but as soon as it is exposed
5 to oxygen, it may react. If ingested, white phosphorus can cause reproductive, liver, heart, or kidney
6 damage, or death. Skin contact can burn the skin or cause organ damage.54
7 Trinitrotoluene (TNT)
8 TNT is soluble and mobile in surface water and groundwater. It is rapidly broken down into
9 other chemical compounds by sunlight, and is broken down more slowly by microorganisms in
10 water and sediments. TNT is not expected to bioaccumulate under normal environmental
11 conditions. Human exposure to TNT may result from breathing air contaminated with TNT and
12 TNT-contaminated soil particles stirred up by wind or construction activities. Workers in explosive
13 manufacturing who are exposed to high concentrations of TNT in workplace air experience a variety
14 of organ and immune system problems, as well as skin irritations and cataracts. Both EPA and
15 ATSDR have identified TNT as a possible human carcinogen.
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
Toxicological Profiles of RDX and TNT
The EPA's IRIS uses a weight-of-evidence classification for carcinogenicity that characterizes the extent to which
the available data support the hypothesis that an agent causes cancer in humans. IRIS classifies carcinogenicity
alphabetically from A through E, with Group A being known human carcinogens and Group E being agents with
evidence of noncarcinogenicity. IRIS classifies both TNT and RDX as Group C, possible human carcinogens, and
provides a narrative explanation of the basis for these classifications.55
The ATSDR is tasked with preventing exposure and adverse human health effects and diminished quality of life
associated with exposure to hazardous substances from waste sites, unplanned releases, and other sources of
pollution present in the environment.
The ATSDR has developed toxicological profiles for RDX and TNT to document the health effects of exposure to
these substances. The ATSDR has identified both TNT and RDX as possible human carcinogens.56
54Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry, Toxicological Profile for White Phosphorous, U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services, Public Health Service, Atlanta, GA, 1970.
^Carcinogenicity Assessment for Lifetime Exposure ofHexahydro-1,3,5-trinitro-l,3,5-triazine (RDX), and
Carcinogenicity Assessment for 2,4,6-trinitrotoluene (TNT) for Lifetime Exposure, EPA Integrated Risk Information
System, 1993.
56Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry, Toxicological Profile for 2,4,6-trinitrotoluene (update),
and Toxicological Profile for RDX, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Public Health Service, Atlanta,
GA, 1995.
Chapter 3. Characteristics of OE
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1
2
3
The ecological impacts of TNT include blood, liver, and immune system effects in wildlife.
In addition, in laboratory tests, male test animals treated with high doses of TNT developed serious
reproductive system effects.
4 Royal Demolition Explosive (RDX)
5 RDX, also known as Royal Demolition Explosive, is another frequently found synthetic
6 explosive chemical. RDX dissolves in and evaporates from water very slowly. RDX does not bind
7 well to soil particles and can migrate to groundwater, but the rate of migration depends on the soil
8 composition. If released to water, RDX is degraded mainly by direct photochemical degradation
9 that takes place over several weeks. RDX does not biologically degrade in the presence of oxygen,
10 but anaerobic degradation is a possible fate process under certain conditions. RDX's potential for
11 bioaccumulation is low. Human exposure to RDX results from breathing dust with RDX particles
12 in it, drinking contaminated water, or coming into contact with contaminated soils. RDX inhalation
13 or ingestion can create nervous system problems and possibly organ damage. As discussed
14 previously, RDX has been identified as a possible human carcinogen.
15 The ecological effects of RDX suggested by laboratory studies include neurological damage
16 including seizures and behavioral changes in wildlife that ingest or inhale RDX. Wildlife exposure
17 to RDX may also cause damage to the liver and the reproductive system.
18 3.5 Other Sources of Conventional Munition Constituents
19 Contamination of soils and groundwater with explosive compounds results from a variety
20 of activities. These activities include the release of other munition constituents during planned
21 munitions training and testing, munitions disposal/burial pits associated with military ranges, and
22 munition storage sites and build-up locations. Contamination also results from the deterioration of
23 intact ordnance, the open burning and open detonation of ordnance, and the land disposal of
24 explosives-contaminated process water from explosives manufacturing or demilitarization plants.
25 Munition constituents include heavy metals, particularly lead and mercury, because they are
26 components of primary or initiating explosives such as lead azide and mercury fulminate. These
27 metals are released to the environment after a detonation or possibly by leaching out of damaged or
28 corroded OE. The sections below describe specific sources of munition constituents.
29 3.5.1 Open Burning/Open Detonation (OB/OD)
30 Concentrations of munition constituents, such as explosives and metals, and bulk explosives
31 have been found at former OB/OD areas at levels requiring a response. OB/OD operations are used
32 to destroy excess, obsolete, or unserviceable munitions and energetic materials. OB operations
33 employ self-sustained combustion, which is ignited by an external source such as heat or a
34 detonation wave. In OD operations, explosives and munitions are destroyed by a detonation, which
35 is normally initiated by the detonation of an energetic charge. In the past, OB/OD operations have
36 been conducted on the land surface or in shallow burn pits. More recently, burn trays and blast
37 boxes have been used to help control and contain emissions and other contamination resulting from
38 OB/OD operations. See Chapter 5 for a fuller discussion of OB/OD.
Chapter 3. Characteristics of OE
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December 2001
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1 Incomplete combustion of munitions and energetic materials can leave uncombusted TNT,
2 RDX, HMX, PETN, and other explosives. These materials can possibly be spread beyond the
3 immediate vicinity of the OB/OD operation by the kick-out these operations generate and can
4 contribute to potentially adverse human health and ecological effects.
5 3.5.2 Explosives Manufacturing and Demilitarization
6 Explosives manufacturing and
7 demilitarization plants are also sources of
8 munition constituents. These facilities are
9 usually commercial sites that are not usually co-
10 located with CTT ranges. Many of these
11 facilities have contaminated soils and
12 groundwater. The manufacture; load, assemble,
13 and pack operations; and demilitarization of
14 munitions create processing waters that in the
15 past were often disposed of in unlined lagoons,
16 leaving munition constituents behind after
17 evaporation.
18 Red water, the effluent from TNT
19 manufacturing, was a major source of munition constituents in soils and groundwater at army
20 ammunition plants. TNT production ended in the mid-1980s in the United States; however,
21 contamination of soils and groundwater from red water remains in some areas.
22 In the demilitarization operations conducted in the 1970s, explosives were removed from
23 munitions with jets of hot water or steam. The effluent, called pink water, flowed into settling
24 basins, and the remaining water was disposed of in unlined lagoons or pits, often leaving highly
25 concentrated munition constituents behind. In more advanced demilitarization operations developed
26 in the 1980s, once the solid explosive particles settled out of the effluent, filters such as
27 diatomaceous earth filters and activated carbon filters were employed to further reduce the explosive
28 compounds, and the waters were evaporated from lagoons or discharged into water systems.
29 3.6 Conclusions
30 The potential for explosive damage by different types of OE, including buried munitions,
31 UXO, and munition constituents, depends on many different factors. These factors include the
32 magnitude of the potential explosion, the sensitivity of the explosive compounds and their
33 breakdown products, fuze sensitivity, the potential for deflagration or detonation, the potential for
34 OE deterioration, and the likelihood that the item will be disturbed, which depends on environmental
35 and human activities.
36 OE items may also present other human health and environmental risks, depending on the
37 state of the OE item. Specifically, an OE item that is degraded may release propellants, explosives,
38 pyrotechnics, and other munition constituents into the surrounding area, thereby potentially
Demilitarization of Munitions
Demilitarization is the processing of munitions so they
are no longer suitable for military use.
Demilitarization of munitions involves several
techniques, including both destructive and
nondestructive methods. Destructive methods include
OB/OD and incineration. Nondestructive methods
include the physical removal of explosive components
from munitions. Munitions are generally demilitarized
because they are obsolete or their chemical
components are deteriorated.
Chapter 3. Characteristics of OE
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1 contaminating the environment and affecting human health. Other human health and environmental
2 risks may result from the explosives and from other chemicals used or produced in munitions
3 operations such as OB/OD; manufacturing; demilitarization; and load, assemble, and pack
4 operations.
Chapter 3. Characteristics of OE
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1
SOURCES AND RESOURCES
2 The following publications, offices, laboratories, and websites are provided as a guide for
3 handbook users to obtain additional information about the subject matter addressed in each chapter.
4 Several of these publications, offices, laboratories, or websites were also used in the development
5 of this handbook.
6 Publications
7 Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry (ATSDR). Toxicological Profile for 1,3-
8 Dinitrobenzene/l,3,5-trinitrobenzene (update), Atlanta, GA: U. S. Department of Health and Human
9 Services, Public Health Service, 1995.
10 ATSDR. Toxicological Profile for RDX, Atlanta, GA: U.S. Department of Health and Human
11 Services, Public Health Service, 1995.
12 ATSDR. Toxicological Profile for Tetryl (update), Atlanta, GA: U.S. Department of Health and
13 Human Services, Public Health Service, 1995.
14 ATSDR. Toxicological Profile for 2,4,6-Trinitrotoluene (update), Atlanta, GA: U. S. Department
15 of Health and Human Services, Public Health Service, 1995.
16 ATSDR. Toxicological Profile for 11 MX Atlanta, GA: U.S. Department of Health and Human
17 Services, Public Health Service, 1997.
18 Bailey, A., and S.G. Murray. Explosives, Propellants and Pyrotechnics, Brassey's(UK)Ltd., 1989.
19 Bucci, J.E., and P.F. Buckley. Modeling the Degradation of Unexploded Ordnance (UXO) and
20 Its Use as a Tool in the Development of Risk Assessments, U. S. Army Aberdeen T est Center and
21 Army Research Laboratory, Aberdeen Proving Ground.
22 Cooper, P.W. Explosives Engineering, Wiley-VCH, New York, NY, 1996.
23 Crockett, A.B., H.D. Craig, and T.F. Jenkins. Field Sampling and Selecting On-site Analytical
24 Methods for Explosives in Water, U.S. EPA Federal Facilities Forum Issue, May 1999.
25 Crull, M L., Taylor, and J. Tipton. Estimating Ordnance Penetration Into Earth, Paper presented
26 at UXO Forum 1999, 1999.
27 Federal Advisory Committee for the Development of Innovative Technologies. Unexploded
28 Ordnance (UXO): An Overview, U.S. Navy, Naval Explosive Ordnance Disposal Technology
29 Division, UXO Countermeasures Department, October 1996.
30 Kleine, H., and A. Makris. Protection Against Blast Effects in UXO Clearance Operations, UXO
31 Forum 1999 Proceedings, 1999.
Chapter 3. Characteristics of OE
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1 Roberts, W.C., and W.R. Hartley. Drinking Water Health Advisory: Munitions, Lewis Publishers,
2 Boca Raton, FL, 1992.
3 U. S. Army Corps of Engineers. Ordnance and Explosives Response: Engineering and Design, No.
4 1110-1-4009, June 23, 2000.
5 U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition and
6 Technology). Report to Congress, Unexploded Ordnance Clearance: A Coordinated Approach
I to Requirements and Technology Development, Joint Unexploded Ordnance Clearance Steering
8 Group, March 25, 1997.
9 U. S. Environmental Protection Agency. Handbook: Approaches for the Remediation of Federal
10 Facility Sites Contaminated With Explosive or Radioactive Wastes, (EPA/625/R-93/013),
II September 1993.
12 Wilcher, B.L., D. Eisen, and R. Booth. Evaluation of Potential Soil Contamination from Open
13 Detonation During Ordnance and Explosives Removal Actions, Former Fort Ord, California,
14 Paper presented at UXO Forum 1999, 1999.
15 Information Sources
16 Department of Defense Explosives Safety Board (DDESB)
17 2461 Eisenhower Avenue
18 Alexandria, VA 22331-0600
19 Fax: (703)325-6227
20 http://www.hqda.army.mil/ddesb/esb.html
21 ORDATA II (database of ordnance items)
22 Available from: NAVEOTECHDIV
23 Attn: Code 602
24 20008 Stump Neck Road
25 Indian Head, MD 20640-5070
26 E-mail: ordata@eodpoc2.navsea.navy.mil
27 U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Public Health Service
28 Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry (ATSDR)
29 Division of Toxicology
30 1600 Clifton Road, E-29
31 Atlanta, GA 20222
32 http://www.atsdr.cdc.gov
33 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Technology Innovation Office
34 Hazardous Waste
35 Cleanup Information (CLU-IN)
36 http://www.clu-in.org/
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7
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13
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U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
Integrated Risk Information System (IRIS)
U.S. EPA Risk Information Hotline
Tel: (513) 569-7254
Fax:(513) 569-7159
E-mail: RIH.IRIS@epamail.epa.gov
http://www.epa.gov/ngispgm3/iris/index.html
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
U.S. Army Engineering and Support Center
Ordnance and Explosives Mandatory Center of Expertise
P.O. Box 1600
4820 University Square
Huntsville, AL 35807-4301
http://www.hnd.usace.army.mil/
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4.0
DETECTION OF UXO AND BURIED MUNITIONS
4.1 Introduction
Geophysical detection technologies are deployed in a nonintrusive manner to locate surface
and subsurface anomalies that may be UXO or buried munitions. (For purposes of brevity,
discussions of UXO and buried munitions will be referred to as UXO throughout this chapter.)
Proper selection and use of these technologies is an important part of the site investigation, which
often takes place on ranges or parts of ranges that cover many acres. Since excavating all the land
to depth is usually not practical, UXO detection technologies are used to locate anomalies that are
subsequently verified as UXO or non-UXO. Given the high cost of UXO excavation (due to both
range size and safety considerations), the challenge of most UXO investigations is the accurate and
appropriate deployment of nonintrusive geophysical detection technologies to maximize probability
of detection and minimize false alarms.
Since the early 1990s, existing geophysical survey technologies have improved in their
capabilities to efficiently and cost-effectively detect UXO. Much of the improvement is the result
of greater understanding of operational requirements for the use of detection technologies.
However, the primary challenge in UXO detection today is the achievement of high levels of
subsurface detection in a consistent, reproducible manner with a high level of quality assurance.
Distinguishing ordnance from fragments and other nonordnance materials based solely on the
geophysical signature, called target discrimination, is also a major challenge in UXO detection and
the focus of research and development activities. This problem is known as a false alarm, as
described in the text box below. Poor discrimination results in lower probability of detection, higher
costs, longer time frames for cleanups, and potentially greater risks following cleanup actions.
False Alarms
The term false alarm is used when a declared UXO detection location does not correspond to an actual UXO
location based upon the groundtruth data. False positives are anomalous items incorrectly identified as ordnance.
False positives can result in incorrect estimations of UXO density and often lead to expensive or unnecessary
excavation of an anomaly if it is not UXO. Depending on the site-specific conditions, as few as 1 percent of
anomalies may actually be UXO items. Because of the difficulty, danger, and time required to excavate UXO, high
costs per acre are exacerbated by a high false positive rate. False negatives occur when ordnance items are not
detected by the geophysical instrument used or are misidentified in post-processing, resulting in potential risks
remaining following UXO investigations.
It should be noted that a particular technology or combination of technologies will never
have the highest effectiveness, best implementability, and lowest cost at every site. In other words,
there is no "silver bullet" detection technology. It is also important to note that no existing
technology or combination of existing technologies can guarantee that a site is completely UXO-
free. As discussed in Section 4.2 below and in Chapter 7, a combination of information from a
variety of sources (including historical data, results of previous environmental data collection, and
knowledge of field and terrain conditions) will be used to make decisions about the detection system
to be used, including the particular sensor(s), the platform on which it is deployed, and data
Chapter 4. Detection of UXO/Buried Munitions 4-1
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acquisition and processing techniques. Detailed fact sheets on each of the detection sensors
currently in use are found at the end of this chapter.
Experts in the UXO research and development community have indicated that currently
available detection technologies will improve with time and that no revolutionary new systems are
likely to be developed that uniformly improve all UXO detection. Much of the performance
improvement of current detection technologies has come from a better understanding of how to use
the technologies and from the use of combinations of technologies at a site to improve anomaly
detection rates. Improvements in detection systems generally focus on distinguishing ordnance from
nonordnance. Emerging processing and numerical modeling programs will enhance the target
discrimination capabilities of detection systems. In general, these programs rely on identifying UXO
and clutter based on their "signatures" (e.g., spatial pattern of magnetic signal).
Geophysical sensors have specific capabilities and limitations that must be evaluated when
selecting a detection system for a site. The primary types of sensors in use today are:
Magnetometry - a passive sensor that measures a magnetic field. Subsurface ferrous
items create irregularities in the Earth's magnetic field and may contain remnant
magnetic fields of their own that are detected by magnetometers.
Electromagnetic Induction (EMI) - an active sensor that induces electrical currents
beneath the earth's surface. Conductivity readings of the secondary magnetic field
created by the electrical currents are used to detect both ferrous and nonferrous ordnance
items.
In addition, under specific and limited conditions, ground-penetrating radar (GPR) has been
successfully used to detect UXO. This sensor is mainly helpful when the location of larger
munitions burial sites is known and boundaries must be identified. Magnetometers, EMI sensors,
and GPR sensors are discussed in detail in Section 4.2 and in the fact sheets at the end of the chapter.
The results of investigations using any sensor can vary dramatically depending not only on the site
conditions, but also on the components of the detection system, the skill of the operator, and the
processing method used to interpret the data.
Detection systems that will be available in the near future include advanced electromagnetic
systems and airborne magnetometers. Long-term research endeavors include a GPR that can
identify UXO at discrete locations, and an airborne EMI sensor. An overview of emerging detection
technologies, as well as data processing and modeling for target discrimination, is presented in
Sections 4.3 and 4.4.
In response to the stagnancy of detection technology development at the beginning of the
Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) Program, the U.S. Congress established the Jefferson
Proving Ground Technology Demonstration (JPGTD) program in Madison, Indiana. The JPGTD
program was established to demonstrate and promote advanced and innovative UXO systems that
are more cost-efficient, effective, and safer. The JPGTD as well as other demonstration programs,
such as the Environmental Security Technology Certification Program UXO Technology
Chapter 4. Detection of UXO/Buried Munitions 4-2
December 2001
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1 Standardized Demonstration Sites and the Fort Ord Ordnance Detection and Discrimination Study
2 (ODDS) are discussed in Section 4.5.
3 4.2 Selection of the Geophysical Detection System
4 Many factors should be considered when identifying the detection system appropriate to your
5 site. First, information about the detection sensors currently available, and the factors that contribute
6 to their successful application, should be evaluated. Next, basic site conditions should be evaluated,
7 such as expected targets (size, location, density, depths), terrain, vegetation, and electromagnetic
8 fields. Finally, the role of each system component and how it affects overall performance should
9 be examined to ensure maximum effectiveness.
10 4.2.1 Geophysical Sensors in Use Today
11 Magnetometry and electromagnetic induction are the most frequently used sensors for
12 detecting UXO. Both sensors are commercially available and are employed on a variety of systems
13 using various operational platforms, data processing techniques, and geolocation devices.
14 4.2.1.1 Electromagnetic Induction (EMI)
15 EMI sensors are perhaps the most widely used systems for detecting UXO. The
16 electromagnetic induction system is based on physical principles of inducing and detecting electrical
17 current flow within nearby conducting objects. EMI surveys work by inducing time-varying
18 magnetic fields in the ground from a transmitter coil. The resulting secondary electromagnetic field
19 set up by ground conductors is then measured at a receiver coil. EMI systems can detect all
20 conductive materials but are at times limited by interference from surface or near-surface metallic
21 objects. In general, the EMI response will be stronger the closer the detector head is to the buried
22 target, but close proximity to the ground surface may subj ect the sensor to interference from shallow
23 fragments. In areas of heavy vegetation, the distance between the detector head and the earth's
24 surface is increased, potentially decreasing signal strength and decreasing the probability of
25 detection. Soil type also plays a role in EMI system detection. EMI systems may have difficulty
26 detecting small items in conductive soils, such as those containing magnetite, or in soils with
27 cultural interferences, such as buildings, metal fences, vehicles, cables, and electrical wires.
28 Because the difficulties with detecting small items in conductive soils are also present for
29 magnetometry, this issue is usually not a limiting factor in selection of an EMI system.
30 EMI systems operate in time or
31 frequency domains (i.e., regions). Time-
32 domain electromagnetic (TDEM) systems
33 operate by transmitting a magnetic pulse that
34 induces currents in and near conducting
35 objects. These currents produce secondary
36 magnetic fields that are measured by the sensor
37 after the transmitter pulse has ended. The
38 sensor integrates the induced voltage over a
39 fixed time gate and averages over the number
EMI and Electronic Fuzes
EMI is an active system for which there has been
concern about increasing the risk of initiating OE with
electronic fuzing. However, there is no evidence that
the current generation of EMI based systems (e.g.,
EM61) generate enough power to cause this effect.
This may be an issue to watch in the future, however,
if more powerful systems are developed.
Chapter 4. Detection of UXO/Buried Munitions 4-3
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of pulses. When TDEM detectors are handheld and/or smaller in size, they may have a lessor
penetration depth than the more commonly used EMGI.
Frequency domain electromagnetic (FDEM) instruments operate by transmitting continuous
electronic signals for a single frequency and measuring the resulting eddy currents. FDEM
instruments are able to detect deeply buried munitions that are grouped together. In addition, some
types of FDEM instruments are capable of detecting very small individual UXO items that are buried
just beneath the ground surface; for example, metal firing pins in plastic land mines. When detecting
individual, deeply buried munitions, FDEM instruments should not be used because of the sensor's
decreased resolution, as well as difficulty in measuring the amplitude of return of individual targets.
4.2.1.2 Magnetometry
Magnetometers are passive systems that use the Earth's magnetic field as the source of the
signal. Magnetometers detect distortions in the magnetic field caused by ferrous objects. The
magnetometer has the ability to detect ferrous items to a greater depth than can be achieved by other
systems. Magnetometers can identify small anomalies because of the instrument's high levels of
sensitivity. However, magnetometers are also sensitive to many iron-bearing minerals and "hot
rocks" (rocks with high iron content), which affects the detection probability by creating false
positives and masking signals from real ordnance.
The two most common magnetometry systems used to detect buried munitions are cesium
vapor or fluxgate. Cesium vapor magnetometers measure the magnitude of a magnetic field. These
systems produce digital system output. The fluxgate systems also measure the direction and
magnitude of a magnetic field. These systems are inexpensive, reliable, and rugged and have low
energy consumption.
4.2.1.3 Ground Penetrating Radar
GPR is another sensor technology that is currently commercially available, although it is not
used as frequently as EMI and magnetometry and is generally not as reliable. GPR systems use
high-frequency (approximately 10-1,000 MHz) electromagnetic waves to excite the conducting
object, thus producing currents. The currents flow around the object, producing electromagnetic
fields that radiate from the target. The signals are received by the GPR antenna and stored for
further processing. Most commercial systems measure total energy return and select potential
targets based on contrast from background. More advanced processing uses the radar information
to produce 2-D or 3-D images of the subsurface or to estimate directly features of the target, such
as length or a spectra. Such processing systems are not generally in use at this time.
The GPR system is more accurate when used in areas of dry soil. Water in the soil absorbs
the energy from the GPR, thus interfering with UXO detection. GPR may be used to find the
boundaries of large caches of buried munitions.
Chapter 4. Detection of UXO/Buried Munitions 4-4
December 2001
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1 4.2.2 Selection of the Geophysical Detection System
2 The selection of a detection system is a site-specific decision. Some of the factors that
3 should be considered in selecting a detection system include, but are not limited to:
4 Site size
5 Soil type, vegetation, and terrain
6 Subsurface lithology
7 Depth, size, shape, composition, and type of UXO
8 Geological and cultural noise (e.g., ferrous rocks and soils, electromagnetic fields from
9 power lines)
10 Non-UXO clutter on-site
11 Historical land use
12 Reasonably anticipated future land use
13 UXO density
14 Each of the above factors should be considered against the decision goals of the investigation in
15 order to select the most appropriate detection system. Table4-1 highlights the effects of each factor
16 on the investigation process. This list of considerations is not all-inclusive.
17 Table 4-1. Examples of Site-Specific Factors To Be Considered in Selecting
18 a Detection System
19
Silo I'iicloi's
ConsiriiTiilions
20
Site size
Different operational platforms cover areas at different speeds. If a large area
needs to be surveyed, operational platforms such as towed-array or airborne may
be considered, if appropriate.
21
Soil properties
Potential for high conductivity levels to interfere with target signals; potentially
reduced detection capabilities using magnetometers in ferrous soils.
22
Vegetation
Heavy vegetation obstructs view of OE items on surface and may interfere with
sensor's ability to detect subsurface anomalies, as well as access to the site and
operation of the sensor.
23
Terrain
Easily accessible areas can accommodate any operational platform; difficult terrain
may require man-portable platform.
24
Subsurface lithology
Soil and rock layers and configurations beneath the ground surface will influence
the depth of the UXO and the ability of the sensor to "see" anomalies.
25
Target size and orientation
Capability of detector to find objects of various sizes and at various orientations.
26
Target penetration depth
Capability of detector to find targets at depths. Potential for decreased signal when
detecting deeply buried targets.
27
Composition of UXO
Shell and fuze composition may dictate sensor selection. Magnetometers detect
only ferrous materials, while EMI systems detect all metals.
Chapter 4. Detection of UXO/Buried Munitions 4-5
December 2001
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Table 4-1. Examples of Site-Specific Factors To Be Considered in Selecting
a Detection System (Continued)
Silo l-aclors
Considei'alions
1
Noise
Both geological noise (e.g., hot rocks or high ferrous content in soil) and cultural
noise (e.g., buried cables, overhead utilities) potentially increase false alarms and
mask ordnance signals.
2
Non-UXO clutter
Potential difficulty discriminating between small objects and metallic scrap,
resulting in high numbers of false alarms.
3
Historical land use
Information about expected target location, types, and density.
4
Future land use
Enables setting of realistic decision goals for investigation.
5
UXO density
Enables sensor strengths (e.g., ability to see individual items as opposed to large
caches of targets) to be maximized.
DoD/EPA Management Principles on Detection Technologies
EPA and DoD identified the critical metrics for evaluating the performance of a detection technology as the
probabilities of detection and false alarms. Specifically, they call for the performance evaluation of detection
technologies to consider the following factors:
Types of munitions
Size of munitions
Depth distribution of munitions
Extent of clutter
Environmental factors (e.g., soil, terrain, temperature, and vegetation)
"The performance of a technology cannot be properly defined by its probability of detection without identifying
the corresponding probability of false alarms. Identifying solely one of these measures yields an ill-defined
capability. Of the two, probability of detection is a paramount consideration in selecting a UXO detection
technology."
6 4.2.3 UXO Detection System Components
7 Table 4-2 identifies the various elements of a detection system and highlights how each
8 element may affect the overall system performance. For example, the three operational platforms
9 man-held, towed-array, and airborne directly affect the sensor's distance from the target,
10 which, in turn, affects the sensor's ability to detect targets. The ability of all sensors to "see" targets
11 decreases as distance from the target increases. However, the rate at which the performance drops
12 off with distance varies by individual sensor. An additional consideration when selecting the
13 operational platform includes what is expected to be found beneath the surface. Large caches of
14 ordnance buried deep beneath the surface may remain detectable from large distances, whereas
15 smaller ordnance items may be more easily missed by the sensor at a distance.
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1 Table 4-2. System Element Influences on Detection System Performance
2
S\sk'in 1. lemon (
l-aclors To IJe Considered
3
Geophysical sensor
Site-specific conditions and the results of the geophysical prove-out are
used to determine the sensor and system configuration best suited to achieve
the goals of the investigation.
4
Geophysical prove-out
The accuracy with which geophysical prove-out represents field conditions
and sampling methods helps to ensure the development of data with a
known level of certainty in field operations.
5
Operator capability
The selection and use of detection systems is complex and requires
individuals with appropriate qualifications and experience. Geophysical
certification of the team to meet prove-out performance is a recommended
QA/QC measure.
6
Operational platform
Size and depth of ordnance, sensor sensitivity to height above target, and
potential for interference with sensor operation by platform components,
and terrain and vegetation restriction need to be taken into account when
selecting a platform.
7
Data acquisition
Digital versus analog data, reliability of data points, and ability to merge
geophysical signals with global positioning system (GPS) makers affect
potential for human error.
8
Data analysis
Experienced and qualified analysts and appropriate procedures help to
ensure reliability of results.
9
Positional data
Accuracy and precision in positioning and navigation are needed to locate
targets in relation to coordinate systems. Tree cover, terrain, and need for
line of sight may restrict choices.
Operational Platforms for UXO Detection Systems
Man-Portable - Man-portable systems can be used in areas that cannot be accessed by other platforms, such
as those with heavy vegetation or rough terrain. The use of man-portable systems generally requires extensive
man-hours, as the maximum speed with which the system canbe operated is that at which an operator can walk
the sampling area.
Towed Array - These systems are generally used in flat treeless areas and can cover a larger area using fewer
man-hours. Limitations include the inability to use towed-array systems in heavily wooded areas, other areas
inaccessible to vehicles, or urban areas with tall buildings.
Airborne - These systems are used to survey large, flat, treeless areas in a short period of time, using current
magnetometry sensors requiring minimal standoff. The disadvantage of airborne detection is the high cost of
the hardware and potential difficulty of penetrating deep enough below the ground surface, which is a function
of both the altitude at which aircraft must fly, as well as of the sensor used. However, airborne systems can
be highly cost-effective on large ranges because of the amount of acreage that canbe covered and the resulting
low cost per acre. In limited use today, airborne platforms are not as widely used as the other platforms.
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4.2.4 Costs of UXO Detection Systems
The factors influencing the costs of deploying UXO detection systems are complex, and
much broader the simple rental or purchase of a detector or sensor. The entire life cycle of the
response process and the nature of the detection system must be considered. Life-cycle issues
include:
Costs of capital equipment
Acreage that can be covered by your detection system over a specific period of time
Rate of false positives, and costs of unnecessary excavation
Costs of rework if it is later proven that the system deployed resulted in a number of
false negatives
Required clearance of vegetation
Costs of cleanup
Costs of operator salaries, based on the complexity and sophistication of the detection
system (including training and certification of operators)
Evaluation of the factors may lead to site-specific decisions related to certain cost tradeoffs,
for example:
That high capital expenditures (e.g., airborne platforms) will result in reduced costs
when large acreage is involved.
Extensive use of expensive target discrimination equipment may be more worthwhile at
a transferring base where land uses are uncertain, and transfer will not occur until the
property is "cleaned" for the particular use.
For small acreage, equipment producing a high rate of false positives may be acceptable
if excavation is less costly than extensive data processing.
Investments in systems with sensitive detectors and extensive data processing may be
considered worthwhile when the potential of rework, and lack of acceptance of cleanup
decisions is considered.
4.2.5 Quality Assurance/Quality Control
As discussed in Chapter 7, there are several aspects of quality assurance/quality control that
affect the quality of UXO detection data. Specifically, data acquisition quality is a function of
appropriate data management, including acquisition of data in the field, data processing, data entry,
and more. In addition, field observation of data acquisition, reacquisition, and excavation procedures
will help to ensure that proper procedures that directly affect data quality are followed. In addition,
general practices that help to ensure quality include monitoring the functionality of all instruments
on a daily basis and ensuring that the full site was surveyed and that there are no data gaps.
4.3 Emerging UXO Detection Systems
The detection systems discussed in the following sections are in various stages of
development and implementation. Some are still being researched and tested, while others will be
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available for operational use in the near future. All of the systems discussed are advanced versions
of EMI and magnetometry technologies. The EMI systems discussed below collect vast quantities
of data at each position that is used for identification and discrimination purposes, while the
magnetometry systems are modifications to accommodate additional operational platforms.
4.3.1 Advanced EMI Systems
There is a whole class of advanced EMI in research and development in DoD.
GEM-3 (Geophex Ltd.) The Geophex Ltd. GEM-3 is a multichannel frequency-domain
EMI system that collects the EMI data over many audio frequencies. In other words, the GEM-3
collects multiple channels of information at each survey point. Frequency response data are used
for the discrimination of UXO targets from clutter (both manmade and natural). This system has
performed well in field tests for discrimination and identification of UXO.
EM-63 (Geonics Ltd.). The EM-63 is a time-domain EM sensor that records multiple
channels of time-domain data at each survey point. It is already commercially available.57
Processing approaches to fully exploit the additional data measured by the EM-63 are currently
being researched. NAEVA Geophysics has demonstrated good performance with the EM-63 in field
tests. Zonge Engineering has also developed a multitime gate, multiaxis system currently being
characterized.
4.3.2 Airborne Detection
Airborne Magnetometry. Low-altitude airborne magnetometry has proved promising in
tests on the Cuny Table at the Badlands Bombing Range in Pine Ridge, SD. Because of the
conditions at Badlands Bombing Range and other large expanses of flat, open, and treeless ranges
in the arid and semiarid climate of the western U.S., aircraft are able to fly close to the ground,
providing for increased detection capabilities. Originally, the mission envisioned for airborne
magnetics was the identification of concentration of ordnance for further investigation by ground-
based sensors. However, performance in initial tests of COTs equipment indicated that for large
ordnance (210 kg), individual items were detectable at about 50 percent of the rate of ground-based
sensors. Research to improve the probability of detection is ongoing. Aircraft-mounted
magnetometers may present a viable option for detecting and characterizing UXO, because the
relatively low operation time required to characterize a very large range makes the detection time
and cost per acre potentially reasonable despite the high setup and equipment costs.58
Airborne EM. Airborne electromagnetic induction is under research and development for
use at ranges with characteristics similar to those discussed above (e.g., vast, open, treeless, and flat
57ERDC/EL TR-01-20, Advanced UXO Detection/Discrimination Technology Demonstration, U.S. Army
Jefferson Proving Ground, Madison, Indiana, Ernesto Cespedes, September 2001.
^Evaluation of Footprint Reduction Methodology at the Cuny Table in the Former Badlands Bombing Range,
July 2000, Environmental Security Technology Certification Program.
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areas). However, unlike airborne magnetometry, airborne EMI could be used at sites with ferrous
soils. Because EM signals fall off more quickly with increased distances, the challenge of using this
technique from an airborne platform will be greater. Initial tests have shown detectability of large
items on seeded sites.
Ground Penetrating Radar Identification. Studies of various GPR systems have been
conducted. One study, by Ohio State University with the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Research
and Development Center and the Cold Regions Research and Engineering Laboratory, examined the
capabilities of an ultra-wideband, fully polarimetric GPR system to provide information about the
size and shape of buried objects. This study was based on UXO with known target locations, and
focused on both detecting the UXO items and classifying specific ordnance types.59
4.4 Use of Processing and Modeling To Discriminate UXO
The development of advanced processing and modeling to reduce the false alarm rates
without affecting an even improved Pd ordnance detection performance is evolving. Rather than
using a simple amplitude of response in raw physical data exclusively, advanced processing methods
organize large quantities of data. In efforts to encourage the development of algorithms for target
discrimination without the expense and burden of field data collection, they have made standard
sensor data sets for both controlled and live sites publicly available. For example, EM data in the
time-frequency or spatial domain to discriminate particular objects of interest. Statistical methods
can be used to associate field geophysical data with signatures of ordnance items that have either
been measured or calculated using EM modeling tools. Alternatively, good data can be used to
calculate the essential parameters of the targets, such as size, shape, and depth, which can be used
to infer the nature of the item giving rise to the return.
About Signatures
The various methodologies deployed to detect UXO produce digital data that is recorded at each survey location.
These data are displayed as graphs, charts, and maps that indicate the presence of an anomalous measurement. The
graphical reports produce patterns that may be used to estimate the sizes, types, and orientations of UXO. These
patterns are called "signatures." Signatures are being used in emerging technologies and rely on databases of
electronic signatures to help discriminate between types of UXO, fragments of UXO, naturally occurring metals,
and non-OE scrap.
Aided or automatic target recognition, or ATR, is a term used to describe a hardware/
software system that receives sensor data as input and provides target classes, probabilities, and
locations in the sensor data as output. ATR is used to design algorithms to improve detection and
classification of targets and assist in discriminating system responses from clutter and other noise
59M. Higgins, C.C. Chen, and K. O'Neill, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Research and Development Center
(ERDC), Cold Regions Research and Engineering Laboratory, ESTCP Project 199902 - TyndallAFB Site Demo: Data
Processing Results for UXO Classification Using UWB Full-Polarization GPR System, 1999.
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signals, thereby reducing the false alarm rate.60 These techniques are under development and are
not yet available for use in the field.
AETC, Inc., and Geophex Ltd., under contract to SERDP, have developed a data-base GEM-
3 electromagnetic induction data to support identification of UXO and nonordnance items based on
their frequency-domain electromagnetic signature. The signature library for a wide variety of UXO
and clutter objects were developed at frequencies between 30 Hz and 30 kHz. A database has been
set up to organize and make available results from over 60,000 measurements of different sizes and
shapes of UXO and non-UXO objects.61 In addition, software has been developed to analyze the
data and identify a wide variety of anomalies.62
The Naval Research Laboratory has developed a technique that uses data fusion to
discriminate objects detected in magnetometry and electromagnetic surveys. The laboratory has
developed model-based quantitative routines to identify the target's position, depth, shape, and
orientation (see Fact Sheet 2 for a full description of MTADS). In addition, location information,
including position, size, and depth, is expected to be improved to a small degree.63 This data fusion
method is primarily effective in the discrimination of large UXO items. However, the major
contribution of this system and the AETC/Geophex system described above is anticipated to be their
ability to differentiate UXO from fragments of ordnance and other clutter.
DoD is funding multiple universities for advanced processing research. Duke University,
for example, has engaged in both physics-based modeling and statistical signal processing and has
shown performance improvements in many diverse data sets, including EMI, magnetometer, and
GPR/SAR.
60Notes from the Aided Target Recognition Workshop, Unexploded Ordnance Center for Excellence, January
28-29, 1998.
"'EMI signature database in Microsoft Access available at FTP host: server.hgl.com, log in ID: anonymous,
File :/pub/SERDP/GEM3 .data.zip.
62T. Bell, J. Miller, D. Keiswetter, B. Barrow, I.J. Won, Processing Techniques for Discrimination Between
Buried UXO and Clutter UsingMultisensor Array Data, Partners in Environmental Technology Conference, December
2, 1999.
"J.R. McDonald, Model-Based Data Fusion and Discrimination of UXO in Magnetometry and EM Surveys,
Naval Research Laboratory, May 18, 1999.
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4.5
UXO Detection Demonstration Programs
Several demonstration programs have
been developed to test the effectiveness of
various UXO detection sensors and systems in
controlled environments. Because of the lack
of technologies available to effectively locate
UXO on thousands of acres of DoD ranges
being closed or realigned under the BRAC
program, Congress established the Jefferson
Proving Ground Technology Demonstration
Program. Since then, other programs such as
the former Fort Ord Detection and
Discrimination Study and the Environmental
Security Technology Certification Program
(ESTCP) UXO Technology Standardized
Demonstration Sites have been established to
further the development of UXO detection
technologies.
4.5.1 Jefferson Proving Ground Technology Demonstration Program
Congress established the JPGTD program in response to the realization that the BRAC
process could not take place until thousands of acres of military property littered with UXO were
cleaned up. Available technologies were also inefficient and inadequate to address the widespread
need to detect and remove UXO on such a large scale. (See Chapter 7, "Mag and Flag" had been
in use for several decades with few advances or improvements.)
The JPGTD program was established under the management of the U.S. Army
Environmental Center (USAEC) to identify innovative technologies that would provide more
effective, economical, and safe methods for detecting and removing ordnance from former DoD
testing and training areas. The program also was created to examine the capability of commercial
and military equipment to detect, classify, and remove UXO and to develop baseline performance
standards for UXO systems. The JPGTD program aimed to (1) establish criteria and metrics to
provide a framework for understanding and assessing UXO technology, (2) provide funding for
technology demonstrations, (3) documentthe performance of advanced technologies to give decision
makers abetter understanding of the capabilities and limitations of the technologies; and (4) improve
demonstration methodologies so that the results would be applicable to actual UXO clearance
operations and decision making. The objectives and results of each of the demonstration projects
are outlined in the text box below.
SERDPand ESTCP
The Department of Defense (DoD) operates two
programs designed to develop and move innovative
technologies into the field to address DoD's
environmental concerns. The Strategic
Environmental Research and Development
Program (SERDP) is DoD's environmental research
and development program. Executed in partnership
withboththe Department of Energy and EPA, the goal
of SERDP is to identify, develop, and transition
technologies that support the defense mission. The
second program is the Environmental Security
Technology Certification Program (ESTCP). The
goal of the ESTCP is to demonstrate and validate
promising innovative technologies. Both organizations
have made heavy investments in detection,
discrimination, and cleanup technologies for UXO.
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Synopsis of Objectives and Results of Jefferson Proving Ground Technology Demonstration Program, Phases
I through IV
Phase 1,1994
Objective: Evaluate existing and promising technologies for detecting and remediating UXO.
Results: Limited detection and localization capabilities and inability to discriminate between ordnance and
nonordnance. Average false alarm rate was 149 per hectare. Airborne platforms and ground penetrating radar
sensors performed poorly; combination electromagnetic induction and magnetometry sensors were the best
performers, but also had modest probabilities of detection and very high false alarm rates.
Phase II, 1995
Objective: Evaluate technologies effective for detecting, identifying, and remediating UXO, and measuring these
results against the Phase I baseline.
Results: Significant improvement in detection capabilities with commensurate increases in false alarms among better
performing technologies. Continued inability to distinguish ordnance from nonordnance. Again, airborne platforms
and ground penetrating radar sensors performed poorly; combination electromagnetic induction and magnetometry
sensors were the better performers, but continued to have very high false alarm rates.
Phase III, 1996
Objective: Develop relevant performance data of technologies used in site-specific situations to search, detect,
characterize, and excavate UXO. Four different range scenarios were used, which had typical groups of UXO.
Results: Improvement in detection, but continued inability to distinguish ordnance from nonordnance. Localization
performance for ground-based systems improved. Probability of detection is partially dependent on target size.
False alarm rates ranged from 2 to 241 per hectare.
Phase IV, 1998
Objectives: Demonstrate the capabilities of technology to discriminate between UXO and non-UXO; establish
discrimination performance baselines for sensors and systems; make raw sensor data available to the public;
establish state of the art for predicting ordnance "type"; direct future R&D efforts.
Results: Capability to distinguish between ordnance and nonordnance is developing. Five demonstrators showed
a better than chance probability of successful discrimination.
UXO detection technologies such as
magnetometry, electromagnetic induction,
ground penetrating radar, and multi sensor
systems were tested and analyzed using a
variety of platforms and data processing
systems at the JPGTD. The platforms analyzed
for the detection technologies included
airborne, man-portable, vehicle-towed, and
combination man-portable and vehicle-towed.
Systems were analyzed using evaluation
criteria such as probability of detection, false alarm rate, and other parameters, as described in the
adjacent text box. Certain local and regional conditions and soil characteristics (e.g., soil type,
moisture, resistivity) may impact the effectiveness of detection systems. Specifically, detector
performance may differ significantly at sites with conditions different from those at Jefferson
Proving Ground (e.g., ranges in the western U.S. with different soil resistivity/conductivity).
Demonstrator Evaluation Criteria
Detection capability
False negative rate
False positive rate
Target position and accuracy
Target classification capability
Survey rate (used in Phase I only)
Survey costs (used in Phase I only)
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Each of the four phases of JPGTD provided useful data about UXO detection and
remediation technologies. In Phase I, conducted in 1994, 26 demonstrators, representing
magnetometry, electromagnetic induction (EMI), ground penetrating radar (GPR), synthetic aperture
radar (SAR), and infrared (IR) sensors, performed using 20 vehicle-mounted and man-towed
platforms and six airborne platforms. Only one demonstrator achieved over a 50 percent detection
rate and the false alarm rate was high, an especially disappointing rate considering most of the
clutter had been removed prior to the demonstration. Electromagnetic induction, magnetometry, and
gradiometry proved to be the most effective sensors, while GPR, IR, and other imaging technologies
were not effective. Airborne systems performed the worst of all the platforms, detecting less than
8 percent of buried ordnance, while hand-held systems had the best performance. At the conclusion
of Phase I it was suggested that the geological conditions at the Jefferson Proving Ground may
reduce the capabilities of certain sensors. Therefore, live test sites at five other installations were
used to compare the detection data obtained in different geological conditions. Results from the live
test sites showed that magnetometry and EMI continued to be the best performers. The average
probability of detection at the live test sites was 0.44, and there was a continued inability to
distinguish between ordnance and nonordnance.
In Phase II, conducted in 1995, demonstrators had better detection performance, with some
sensors detecting over 80 percent of buried ordnance. However, the false alarm rates increased as
overall anomaly detection increased. The best performing sensors in Phase II were multisensor
systems combining EMI and magnetometry.
In Phase III, conducted in 1996, four different range scenarios were used in Phase III to
facilitate the development of performance data for technologies used in specific site conditions.
Over 40 percent of demonstrators had greater than 85 percent detection, and combination
magnetometry and EMI systems repeatedly detected close to 100 percent of buried ordnance. In
addition, the multisensor system, which consisted of electromagnetic induction and either
magnetometry or gradiometry, had a slightly lower than average false alarm rate. However, no
sensor or combination of sensors demonstrated an ability to distinguish baseline ordnance from
nonordnance, and no system performed better than chance in this area.
Phase IV, conducted in 1998, was aimed at improving the ability to distinguish ordnance and
nonordnance. Fifty percent of the demonstrators showed a better than chance probability of
discriminating UXO from clutter, with one demonstrator correctly identifying 75 percent of
ordnance and nonordnance items. While advanced data processing has greatly improved target
discrimination capabilities in pilot testing, these methods need to be further developed and tested.
In order to make advanced processing techniques widely used and to develop a market for constantly
improving systems, they need to be made commercially available. With reliable and readily
available target discrimination technologies, false alarm rates could be greatly reduced, thereby
significantly improving the efficiency and reducing the costs of UXO detection and remediation.
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4.5.2 Former Fort Ord Ordnance Detection and Discrimination Study (ODDS)
A phased geophysical study of ordnance detection and discrimination specific to the former
Fort Ord, California, environment has been in existence since 1994. In November 1998, the U.S.
Army evaluated OE at Fort Ord in an Ordnance and Explosives Remedial Investigation/Feasibility
Study (OE RI/FS) concurrently with removal actions. The RI/FS evaluated long-term response
alternatives for cleanup and risk management at Fort Ord. The technologies considered for use
during the Fort Ord study were demonstrated during the Jefferson Proving Ground study. The text
box below describes the four phases of the Fort Ord study.
Synopsis of Objectives and Results of the Former Fort Ord Ordnance Detection and Discrimination Study,
Phases I through IV
Phase I
Objective: Evaluate detection technologies "Static" measurements in free air (i.e., in the air above and away from
ground influences/effects) given variable OE items, depths, and orientations.
Results: Signal drop-off in the electromagnetic (EM) response is proportional to the depth of the object to the 6th
power. For horizontally oriented OE items, the EM signal response was predicted fairly well.
Phase II
Objective: Evaluate the effectiveness of geophysical instruments' ability to detect and locate "seeded" or planted
OE items.
Result: Noise levels increased 3 to 35 times from the static to seeded tests. There was a significant degradation of
profile signatures between static and field trial tests.
Phase III
Objective: Evaluate geophysical instruments and survey processes at actual uninvestigated OE sites.
Results: The effects of rough terrain and vegetation on detection and discrimination capabilities can be significant.
Removal of range residue before the OE investigation began would have reduced time and effort spent on
unnecessary excavations.
Phase IV
Objective: Evaluate discrimination capabilities of OE detection systems.
Results: The instruments with the highest detection rate required the most intrusive investigation. Conversely,
instruments with lower detection rates required less intrusive investigations. The ODDS determined that no one
instrument provides the single solution to meet the OE detection needs at Fort Ord.
The first phase of the ODDS found the electromagnetic and magnetometer systems to be
effective in the detection and location of buried OE items. Phase II was conducted in a controlled
testing environment. The controlled area consisted of five "seeded" plots. Two of the plots
consisted of items with known depths and orientations, while the other three areas consisted of
"unknown" plots where target information was withheld. The plots were designed to be
representative of the terrain of Fort Ord. The seeded tests concluded that the noise levels of the EMI
systems increased 3 to 35 times from the static to seeded tests. In Phase III it was concluded that
the effects of terrain, vegetation, and range residues can significantly alter detection and
discrimination capabilities of the detectors. Phase IV of the study determined that discrimination
capability of the instruments tested was minimal. The Phase IV study also determined that both EMI
and magnetometer systems performed well in finding the larger and deeper items, whereas only the
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EMI systems consistently found smaller and shallower items. The results indicated that different
systems are required for different types of sites, depending on OE expected and the site-specific
environmental/geological conditions.
4.5.3 UXO Technology Standardized Demonstration Sites
The U.S. Army Environmental Center (USAEC) is conducting an ESTCP-funded program
to provide UXO technology developers with test sites for the evaluation of UXO detection and
discrimination technologies using standardized protocols. The USAEC is developing standardized
test methodologies, procedures, and facilities to help ensure accuracy and replicability in
measurements of detection capability, false alarms, discrimination, target reacquisiti on, and system
efficiency. Data generated from these standardized sites will be compiled into a technology-
screening matrix to assist UXO project managers in selecting the appropriate detection systems for
their application.
Standardized test sites will be made up of three areas - the calibration lane, the blind grid,
and the open field. The calibration area will contain targets from a standardized target list at six
primary orientations and at three depths. The target depth, orientation, type, and location will be
provided to demonstrators. The calibration area will allow demonstrators to test their equipment,
build a site library, document signal strength, and deal with site-specific variables. In the blind grid
area, demonstrators will know possible locations of targets and will be required to report whether
or not a UXO target clutter or nothing actually exists. If a UXO target is found, they must report
the type of target, classification of target, and target depth and a confidence level. The blind grid
allows testing of sensors without ambiguities introduced by the system, site coverage, or other
operational concerns. The open field will be a 10 or more acre area with clutter and geolocation
targets about which demonstrators will be given no information and will be required to perform as
if they were performing at an actual DoD range. Testers will report the location of all anomalies,
classify them as clutter or UXO, and provide type, classification, and depth information. The open
field conditions will document the performance of the system in an actual range operation mode.
In addition to the construction of test sites available to the UXO community, the primary
products of this program will be the creation of a series of protocols to establish procedures
necessary for constructing and operating a standardized UXO test site. A standardized target
repository will be amassed that can be used by installations, technology developers, and
demonstrators.
4.6 Fact Sheets and Case Studies on Detection Technologies and Systems
Three fact sheets on UXO sensors and three case studies describing detection systems are
found at the end of this chapter as Attachments 1 through 6. Information on the nature of the
technology and its benefits and limitations is provided. Since the performance of the instruments
is not solely based upon the sensors deployed, the case studies provide more insights on the
operation of the systems. The performance of detection systems is dependent upon platform
characteristics, survey methodology and quality, data processing, personnel operation/performance,
and appropriate quality control measures that should be taken throughout the investigation.
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4.7 Conclusion
The performance of many existing and emerging technologies for UXO detection and
discrimination is limited by specific site characteristics such as soil type and composition,
topography, terrain, and type and extent of contamination. What works at one site may not work
at another. Our ability to find UXO in subsurface locations has improved dramatically. The JPGTD
studies have shown that we have gotten much smarter about how to deploy these technologies and
how to locate a high percentage of UXO. However, the results of a controlled study such as the
JPGTD should not give us unrealistic expectations about the capabilities of these technologies when
used in range investigation. Studies at true UXO areas, such as at Fort Ord, provide additional
information about the challenges and issues that have to be considered in selecting UXO detection
systems. For example, the nature of the targets (e.g., composition, size, and mass), the depth of
UXO penetration (a function of the soil and the ordnance item), and expected spatial and depth
distribution should be considered along with the geology, terrain, and vegetation. Other factors
affecting the results include operator performance and postprocessing techniques. Given the sizes
of the ranges and the cost of investigating anomalies, the greatest challenge to improving UXO
detection is being able to discriminate UXO from other subsurface anomalies. Although there have
been improvements in this area, much developmental work remains.
Chapter 4. Detection of UXO/Buried Munitions 4-17
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1 ATTACHMENT 4-1. FACT SHEET #1: MAGNETOMETRY
Magnetometry
What is
magnetometry?
Magnetometry is the science of measurement and interpretation of magnetic fields.
Magnetometry, which involves the use of magnetometers and gradiometers, locates
buried ordnance by detecting irregularities in the Earth's magnetic field caused by the
ferromagnetic materials in the ordnance assembly. The magnetometer can sense only
ferrous materials, such as iron and steel; other metals, such as copper, tin, aluminum,
and brass, are not ferromagnetic and cannot be located with a magnetometer. Although
they have been in use for many years and many newer technologies are available,
magnetometers are still considered one of the most effective technologies for detecting
subsurface UXO and other ferromagnetic objects. Magnetometry remains the most
widely used subsurface detection system today.
The two basic categories of magnetometer are total-field and vector.
The total-field magnetometer is a device that measures the magnitude of the
magnetic field without regard to the orientation of the field.
The vector magnetometer is a device that measures the projection of the magnetic
field in a particular direction.
A magnetic gradiometer is a device that measures the spatial rate of change of the
magnetic field. Gradiometers generally consist of two magnetometers configured to
measure the spatial rate of change in the Earth's magnetic field. The gradiometer
configuration was designed to overcome large-scale diurnal intensity changes in the
Earth's magnetic field; this design may also be used to minimize the lateral effects of
nearby fences, buildings, and geologic features.
How are
magnetometers
used to detect
UXO?
Magnetometers can theoretically detect every UXO target that contains ferrous
material, from small, shallow-buried UXO to large, deep-buried UXO, provided that
the magnetic signature is larger than the background noise. A magnetometer detects a
perturbation in the geomagnetic field caused by an object that contains ferrous material.
The size, depth, orientation, magnetic moment, and shape of the target, along with
local noise fields (including ferrous clutter), must all be considered when assessing the
response of the magnetometer.
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What are the
different types of
magnetometers?
There are numerous types of magnetometers, which were developed to improve
detection sensitivity. Three of the most common are the cesium vapor, proton
precession, and fluxgate magnetometers.
Cesium vapor magnetometers - These magnetometers are lightweight and
portable. The sensor can also be mounted on a nonmagnetic platform. The
principal advantage of this type of magnetometer is its rapid data collection
capability. The common hand-held sensors are capable of measuring at a rate of 10
times per second, and specially designed sensors are capable of measuring at a rate
of 50 times per second. The one disadvantage of this magnetometer is that it is
insensitive to the magnetic field in certain directions, and dropouts can occur where
the magnetic field is not measured. However, this can be avoided with proper field
procedures.
Proton precession magnetometers - These magnetometers have been used in
clearing UXO sites, but achieving the data density required for a UXO site is time
consuming. The primary disadvantage of these types of magnetometers is that
accurate measurements require stationary positioning of the sensor for a period of
several seconds. Also, these magnetometers require tuning of the local magnetic
field. The primary use of these magnetometers today is as a base station for
monitoring diurnal variations in the Earth's magnetic field and possible
geomagnetic storms.
Fluxgate magnetometers - These magnetometers are used primarily to sweep
areas to be surveyed. They are also used in locating UXO items during
reacquisition. These magnetometers are relatively inexpensive, locate magnetic
objects rapidly, and are relatively easy to operate. The disadvantage of these types
of magnetometers is that most of them do not digitally record the data, and accurate
measurements require leveling of the instrument.
What are the
components of a
magnetometer?
A passive magnetometer system includes the following components:
The detection sensor
A power supply
A computer data system
A means to record locations of detected anomalies
More technologically advanced systems typically incorporate a navigation system, such
as a differential global positioning system (DGPS), to determine locations. Advanced
navigation systems may also include a graphical output device (printer), a mass data
storage recorder, and telecom systems.
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FACT SHEET #1:
UXO DETECTION
TECHNOLOGIES
What are the
operational
platforms for a
magnetometer?
Magnetometers can be transported in a variety of ways:
Man-portable
Towed by a vehicle
Airborne platforms
Magnetometers are most frequently used on man-portable platform, but they also can
perform well when towed on a vehicular platforms, as long as the vehicular platform
and sensor array have been carefully designed to minimize magnetic noise and ensure
high quality data collection. These platforms are restricted to areas accessible to
vehicles. Airborne systems are currently being evaluated for commercial use as
discussed in Section 4.3.
Figure 4-1. Hand-Held Magnetometer
One of the most commonly used and
oldest UXO detection methods is the
"Mag and Flag" process. Mag and
Flag involves the use of hand-held
magnetometers by UXO technicians,
who slowly walk across a survey area
and flag those areas where UXO may
be located for later excavation. The
success of the method is dependent on
the competence and alertness of the
technician and his ability to identify
changes in the audible or visible signals
from the magnetometer indicating the
presence of an anomaly .
Dual 1-3-858
Magnetometer
Array
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What are the
benefits of using
magnetometry for
detecting UXO?
The benefits of using magnetometry for UXO detection include the following:
Magnetometry is considered one of the most effective technologies for detecting
subsurface UXO and other ferromagnetic objects.
Magnetometry is one of the more developed technologies for detection of UXO.
Magnetometers are fairly simple devices.
Magnetometers are nonintrusive.
Relative to other detection technologies, magnetometers have low data acquisition
costs.
Magnetometers have the ability to detect ferrous items to a greater depth than can
be achieved using other methods.
Depending on the data acquisition and post processing systems used
magnetometers can provide fair to good information on the size of the detected
object.
Because magnetometers have been in use since World War II, the limitations are
well understood.
What are the
limitations of using
magneto metry for
detecting UXO?
The limitations of using magnetometry for UXO detection include the following:
The effectiveness of a magnetometer can be reduced or inhibited by interference
(noise) from magnetic minerals or other ferrous objects in the soil, such as rocks,
pipes, drums, tools, fences, buildings, and vehicles, as well as UXO debris.
Depending on the data analysis systems used, magnetometers may suffer from high
false alarm rates, which lead to expensive excavation efforts.
Depending on the site conditions, vegetation and terrain may limit the ability to
place magnetometers (especially vehicle-mounted systems) near the ground
surface, which is needed for maximum effectiveness.
Magnetometers have limited capability to distinguish targets that are located near
each other. Clusters of ordnance of smaller size may be identified as clutter, and
distributed shallow sources (UXO or not) may appear as localized deep targets.
Accurately distinguishing between targets depends heavily on coordination
between sensors, navigation, and processing.
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ATTACHMENT 4-2. FACT SHEET #2: ELECTROMAGNETIC INDUCTION (EMI)
Electromagnetic Induction (EMI)
What is
electromagnetic
induction (EMI)
and how is it used
to detect UXO?
Electromagnetic induction is a geophysical technology used to induce a magnetic field
beneath the Earth's surface, which in turn causes a secondary magnetic field to form around
nearby objects that have conductive properties. The secondary magnetic field is then
measured and used to detect buried objects. Electromagnetic induction systems are used to
detect both ferrous and nonferrous UXO.
In electromagnetic induction, a primary transmitter coil creates a time-dependent
electromagnetic field that induces eddy currents in the subsurface. The intensity of the
currents is a function of ground conductivity and the possible presence of metallic objects
in the subsurface. The secondary, or induced, electromagnetic field caused by the eddy
currents is measured by a receiver coil. The voltage measured in the receiver coil is related
to the physical properties of the subsurface conductor. The strength and duration of the
induced field depend on the size, shape, conductivity, and orientation of the object.
There are two basic types of EMI methods: frequency domain and time domain.
Frequency-domain EMI measures the response of the subsurface as a fraction of
frequency. Generally, a receiver coil shielded from the transmitted field is used to
measure the response of targets. Frequency-domain sensors, such as the mono-static,
multi-frequency Geophex GEM-3, are used for UXO detection. In addition, the
Geonics EM31 has been used for detecting boundaries of trenches that may be UXO
disposal sites.
Time-domain EMI measures the response ofthe subsurface to apulsed electromagnetic
field. After the transmitted pulse is turned off, the receiving coil measures the signal
generated by the decay of the eddy currents in any nearby conductor. These
measurements can be made at single time gates, which may be selected to maximize the
signal of targets sought. In more advanced instruments, measurements can be made in
several time gates, which will increase the information obtained about the physical
properties ofthe targets. The time-domain EMI sensor that is commonly used for UXO
detection is the Geonics EM61. Under ideal conditions, the EM61 instrument is
capable of detecting large UXO items at depths of as much as 10 feet below ground
surface when ground clutter from debris does not exceed the signal level . The
instrument can detect small objects, such as a 20 mm projectile, to depths of
approximately 1 foot below ground surface, if noise (terrain and instrument) conditions
are less than the response of the object.
How effective is
EMI for detecting
UXO?
The effectiveness of EMI systems in detecting UXO depends on many factors, including
distance between sensor and UXO, metallic content of UXO, concentrations of
surface ordnance fragments, and background noise levels. EMI methods are well
suited for reconnaissance of large open areas because data collection is rapid. Vertical
resolution is transmitter and target dependent. The range of frequencies for
electromagnetic instruments used in UXO site characterization is from approximately 75
Hz (cycles per second) to approximately 1,000 kHz.
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FACT SHEET #2: UXO
DETECTION
TECHNOLOGIES
What are the
components of an
EMI system?
The components of an EMI system include the following:
Transmitting and receiving units
A power supply
A computer data acquisition system
A means of recording locations of detected metallic anomalies
Advanced systems incorporate a navigation system as well, such as a differential global
positioning system (DGPS).
What are the
operational
platforms for an
EMI system?
In general, EMI systems are configured on man-portable units. Such units often consist
of the following items:
A small, wheeled cart used to transport the transmitter and receiver assembly
A power supply
An electronics backpack
A hand-held data recorder
'n general EMI systems are
configured to be man portable or
towed by a vehicle. However,
I vehicle-towed systems are limited
in that the platform can be a source
of background noise and
interference with target detection
and they have high potential for
mechanical failures. In addition,
vehicle-towed systems can only be
used on relatively flat and
11m unvegetated areas. Man-portable
Figure 4-2. EM61 System systems provide easier access to
areas of a site that are accessible
to personnel. In general man-portable systems are the most durable and require the
least maintenance.
What are the
benefits of using
EMI for detecting
UXO?
The benefits of using EMI include the following:
EMI can be used for detecting all metallic objects near the surface of the soil, not
only ferrous objects.
EMI has potential to discriminate clusters of UXO from a single item.
EMI sensors permit some measure of control over their response to ordnance and
other metal objects.
EMI systems are generally easy to use.
EMI is nonintrusive.
Man-portable EMI systems provide access to all areas of a site, including uneven
and forested terrain.
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What are the
limitations of
using EMI for
detecting UXO?
The limitations of using EMI to detect UXO include the following:
Depending on the data acquisition and processing systems used EMI may suffer from
fairly large false alarm rates, particularly in areas with high concentrations of
surface ordnance fragments. (Some buried metallic debris can produce EMI
signatures that look similar to signatures obtained from UXO, which results in a
large false alarm rate.) Specifically, EMI sensors that utilize traditional detection
algorithms based solely on the signal magnitude suffer from high false alarm rates as
well.
Implementing EMI systems in areas on the range that may contain electronically
fuzed ordnance could be unsafe because the induced magnetic field could detonate
the ordnance. (However, this is very unlikely because the EMI power density and
induced current is very low in most systems.)
Large metal objects can cause interference, typically when EMI is applied within 5
to 20 feet of power lines, radio transmitters, fences, vehicles, or buildings.
What are the costs
of using EMI to
detect UXO?
Per acre costs for EMI vary depending on the operational platform, the terrain, and other
factors.
Chapter 4. Detection of UXO/Buried Munitions 4-24
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1 ATTACHMENT 4-3. FACT SHEET #3: GROUND PENETRATING RADAR (GPR)
Ground Penetrating Radar (GPU)
What is GPR?
Ground penetrating radar (GPR), sometimes called ground probing radar, georadar,
or earth sounding radar, is a well-established remote sensing technology that can detect
metallic and nonmetallic objects. Only recently (within the last 10 years) has GPR
been applied to locating and identifying UXO at military sites on a limited basis.
Under optimum conditions, GPR can be used to detect individual buried munitions up
to 5 feet below the ground surface. However, such optimum conditions seldom occur
and the method has not been extremely successful in detecting UXO. GPR is not
routinely used to perform detection of individual UXO, but may be useful for detecting
large block of ordnance.
How is GPR used
to detect UXO?
GPR uses high-frequency electromagnetic waves (i.e., radar) to acquire subsurface
information. Both time-domain (impulse) and stepped frequency GPR systems are in
use today.
Time-domain (pulsed) sensors transmit a pulsed frequency. The transmitter uses
a half-duty cycle, with the transmitter on and off for equal periods.
Stepped frequency domain sensors transmit a continuous sinusoidal
electromagnetic wave.
The waves are radiated into the subsurface by an emitting antenna. As the transmitted
signal travels through the subsurface, "targets," such as buried munitions or
stratigraphic changes, reflect some the energy back to a receiving antenna. The
reflected signal is then recorded and processed. The travel time can be used to
determine the depth of the target. GPR can potentially be used to verify the
emplacement, location, and continuity of a subsurface barrier. The GPR method uses
antennas that emit a single frequency between 10 MHz and 3,000 MHz. Higher
frequencies provide better subsurface resolution at the expense of depth ofpenetration.
Lower frequencies allow for greater penetration depths but sacrifice subsurface target
resolution.
In addition to the radar frequency, the depth of wave penetration is controlled by the
electrical properties of the media being investigated. In general, the higher the
conductivity of the media, the more the radar wave is attenuated (absorbed), lessening
the return wave. Electrically conductive materials (e.g., many mineral clays and moist
soil rich in salts and other free ions) rapidly attenuate the radar signal and can
significantly limit the usefulness of GPR. In contrast, in dry materials that have
electrical conductivity values of only a few millimhos per meter, such as clay-free soil
and sand and gravel, penetration depths can be significantly greater. Penetration
depths typically range between 1 and 5 feet. In addition, subsurface inhomogeneity
can cause dispersion, which also degrades the performance of radars. As a result, it is
important to research the subsurface geology in an area before deciding to use this
method.
GPR measurements are usually made along parallel lines that traverse the area of
interest. The spacing of the lines depends on the level of detail sought and the size of
the target(s) of interest. The data can be recorded for processing off-site, or they can
be produced in real time for analysis in the field.
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What are the
components of a
GPR system?
The components of a GPR systems consist of the following:
A transmitter/receiver unit
A power supply
An antenna
A control unit
A display and recorder unit
Geolocation ability
GPR systems are available for commercial use. The pulsed systems are the most
commonly used and are available from a variety of vendors. Physically commercial
systems provide a selection of antennas that operate at frequency bandwidths.
Antennas are available from the gigahertz range for extremely shallow targets to the
megahertz range for greater depths of ground penetration.
What are the
benefits of using
GPR for detecting
UXO?
The benefits of using GPR to detect UXO are as follows:
GPR is nonintrusive.
GPR is potentially able to identify breach and discontinuity and determine the size
of both.
GPR may provide a three-dimensional image of the structure. (Requires very
sophisticated processing and data collection.)
GPR can help define boundaries, if you know the location of buried munitions.
Under optimum conditions, GPR may be used to detect individual buried munitions
several meters deep. In areas with dry soils and vegetation, GPR systems may
produce accurate images as long as the antenna is positioned perpendicularly to the
ground.
What are the
limitations of using
GPR for detecting
UXO?
The limitations of using GPR to detect UXO include the following:
The primary limitation of the GPR system is that its success is site specific and not
reliable. Low-conductivity soils are necessary if the method is to penetrate the
ground. Soils with high electrical conductivity (e.g., many mineral clays and moist
soil rich in salts) rapidly attenuate the radar signal, inhibiting the transmission of
signals and significantly limiting usefulness. Even a small amount of clay minerals
in the subsurface greatly degrade GPR's effectiveness.
Lower frequencies can penetrate to a greater depth, but result in a loss of
subsurface resolution. Higher frequencies provide better subsurface resolution, but
at the expense of depth of penetration.
Interpretation of GPR data is complex; an experienced data analyst is required.
High signal attenuation decreases the ability of GPR systems to discriminate UXO
and increases the relative amount of subsurface inhomogeneity (i.e., soil layers,
pockets of moisture, and rocks).
Airborne GPR signals may not even contact the soil surface because the signals are
reflected by the vegetation or are absorbed by water in the vegetation.
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Case Study on the Use of a Multiscnsor System
The multisensor system combines two or more sensor technologies with the objective of improving UXO detection
performance. With multiple-sens or systems operating in a given area, complementary data sets can be collected to
confirm the presence of UXO, or one system may detect a characteristic that another system does not.
The technologies that have proven to be most effective both individually and deployed in multisensor systems are
the Geonics EM61 electromagnetic detection system and the cesium vapor magnetometer. Other types of
sensors have been tested and evaluated, but they are still under development and research continues.
The Naval Research Laboratory's MTADS represents a state-of-the-art, automated, UXO detection system. The
system incorporates arrays of full-field cesium vapor magnetometers and time-domain EMI pulsed sensors.
The sensors are mounted as linear arrays on low-signature platforms that are towed over survey sites by an all-
terrain vehicle. The position over ground is plotted using state-of-the-art real-time kinematic DGPS technology that
also provides vehicle guidance during the survey. An integrated data analysis system processes MTADS data to
locate, identify, and categorize all military ordnance at maximum probable self-burial depths.
During the summer of 1997 the system was used to survey about 150 acres at a bombing target and an aerial
gunnery target on the Badlands Bombing Range on the Oglala Sioux Reservation in Pine Ridge, South Dakota.
Following the survey and target analysis, UXO contractors and personnel from the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers,
Huntsville, selectively remediated targets to evaluate both the detection and discrimination capabilities of MTADS.
Two remediation teams worked in parallel with the surveying operations. The full distribution of target sizes was
dug on each target range because one goal of the effort was to create a database of both ordnance and ordnance
clutter signals for each sensor system that could be used to develop an algorithm for future data analysis.
An initial area of 18.5 acres was chosen as a test/training range. All 89 analyzed targets were uncovered,
documented, and remediated. Recovered targets in the training areas included 40 M-38 100-pound practice bombs,
four rocket bodies and warheads, and 33 pieces of ordnance scrap (mostly tail fins and casing parts). The smallest
intact ordnance items recovered were 2.25-inch SCAR rocket bodies and 2.75-inch aerial rocket warheads.
Information from the training area was used to guide remediation on the remainder of both ranges.
Magnetometry and EM data analysis identified a total of 1,462 targets on both ranges. Of these, 398 targets were
selected for remediation. For each target, an extensive digsheet was filled out by the remediation team to augment
the photographic and digital electronic GPS records. Recovered ordnance-related targets included 67 sand-filled M-
38 practice bombs, four M-57 250-pound practice bombs, and 50 2.25-inch and 2.75-inch rocket bodies and rocket
warheads. In addition, 220 items of ordnance-related scrap were recovered. The target depths were generally
predicted to within 20 percent of the actual depths of the target centers.
MTADS has the sensitivity to detect all ordnance at its likely maximum self-burial depths and to locate targets
generally within the dimensions of the ordnance. On the basis of all evaluation criteria, the MTADS demonstration,
survey, and remediation were found to be one of the most promising system configurations given appropriate site-
specific conditions and appropriately skilled operators..
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ATTACHMENT 4-5. CASE STUDY #2: MAGNETOMETRY SYSTEM
In August 1998, Geophysical Technology Limited (GTL) used an eight-sensor magnetometer system towed by an
autonomous tow vehicle (ATV) to detect UXO over approximately 200 acres of the flat and treeless Helena Valley
in Helena, Montana. The system was navigated by a real-time differential global positioning system (DGPS).
The system had the following main features:
The trailer used was low cost and any standard four-wheel bike could be used to tow the array. This means that
the system can be easily duplicated and multiple systems can be run on large or concurrent projects.
The system had a high-speed traverse, a 4-meter swath, and complete DGPS coverage, making it very efficient.
The TM-4 magnetometer at the center of the system was the same instrument used in the hand-held application
for surveying fill-in areas inaccessible to the trailer system.
The one-operator trailer system did not require a grid setup prior to the commencement of the surveys. The survey
computer guided the operator along the survey lanes with an absolute cross-track accuracy of 0.75 meters
(vegetation and terrain permitting). An expandable array of magnetic sensors with adjustable height and separation
allowed the operators to optimize the system for this application. Eight sensors, 0.5 meters apart, were used in the
survey.
GTL's proprietary MAGSYS program was used for detailed anomaly interpretation and the printing of color
images. Magnetic targets that were identified were then modeled using a semiautomatic computer-aided procedure
within MAGSYS. A selection of key parameters (position, depth, approximate mass, and magnetic inclination) was
used to adjust the model for best fit. The confidence that the interpreted items were UXO was scaled as high,
medium, and low according to their least squares fit value. GTL's system successfully detected over 95 percent of
the emplaced 76 mm and 81 mm mortar shells.
In Montana, accurate, real-time DGPS positioning and navigation resulted in good coverage of the survey areas
using the trailer system. The GTL trailer system enables practical, fast collection of high-resolution, accurately
positioned magnetic data, as required for UXO detection.
The GTL trailer system opens new possibilities of covering large areas efficiently, and it is an important milestone
in achieving large-scale remediation with performance that is quantifiable.
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ATTACHMENT 4-6. CASE STUDY #3: GROUND PENETRATING RADAR SYSTEM
Case Study on the Use of Ground Penetrating
Radar in a Multisensor Data Acquisition System
GPR is not often used as a stand-alone UXO detection technology because its detection capabilities are limited.
GPR is most commonly used as part of a multisensor system, such as the one described below.
The Air Force Research Laboratory at Tyndall AFB has developed a semiautonomous UXO detection,
characterization, and mapping system. The system consists of two major functional components: an unmanned
autonomous tow vehicle (ATV) and a multisensor data acquisition system. By combining an ATV, the GPR's
highly accurate positioning and mapping systems, and a multiple-sensor platform, operators plan, execute, and
analyze collected data while monitoring the vehicle and data acquisition system at a safe distance from the survey
site.
The multiple-sensor platform (MSP) provides a mounting structure for an array of four cesium vapor
magnetometers, three Geonics EM61 inductance coils, and an impulse GPR system. The GPR is suspended below
the platform frame using a pinned hanger. An encoder at the GPR hanger point measures the relative GPR angular
displacement from the platform frame. In general, the ATV/MSP GPR transmits a series of 3-5 nanosecond, 100-
250 volt impulses into the ground at a specific pulse repetition interval. Signals received from objects with
electrical properties that vary from the surrounding soil are fed through an adjustable attenuator, to a band pass
filter, and finally to track-and-hold circuitry, which digitizes and stores collected data. The system uses a single
broad-bandwidth antenna, which covers a frequency range of 20 MHz to 250 MHz.
To date, data collection has been conducted at several sites, one of them being Tyndall AFB. The test site in the
9700 area of Tyndall AFB is composed of a loose sandy top layer approximately 20 cm deep and a packed sandy
layer that reaches the water table, which starts at a depth of less than 1 meter. The test site provides a
homogeneous background in which inert ordnance items, 60 mm mortar shells, 105 mm artillery shells,
miscellaneous clutter, angle iron, barbed wire, concrete blocks, and steel plates were placed to simulate an active
range. Data collected at the Tyndall test site included those from the magnetometer, electromagnetic induction
(EMI), and GPR.
Analysis of magnetometer, EMI, and GPR cursory calibration raw data is performed in situ at the mobile command
station. Synthetic aperture radar (SAR) processing was used to focus the complex and large bandwidth information
inherent in GPR data. In order to perform this focusing of the SAR images, the waveforms generated by the GPR
must be accurately registered in the time domain, with an associated registration of position in the spatial domain.
The original purpose of the ATV/MSP was to evaluate various sensor systems. It quickly became clear that its
higher purpose was to provide a powerful aid to the process of analysis. The accuracy, repeatability, and
completeness of coverage obtained during autonomous surveys cannot be matched using manual operations.
The GPR system tested at Tyndall AFB achieved an approximate false alarm rate of 51 percent. Overall, the
measured data from the targets and GPR measurements were somewhat close. Currently, the GPR is unable to
distinguish between UXO's and non-UXO targets if the length-to-diameter (L/D) ratio is greater than 3. The GPR
system also had problems identifying UXO-like items buried at an angle greater than 45 degrees, as well as UXO
partially buried in the water table.
Chapter 4. Detection of UXO/Buried Munitions 4-29
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1
SOURCES AND RESOURCES
2 The following publications, offices, laboratories, and websites are provided as a guide for
3 handbook users to obtain additional information about the subject matter addressed in each chapter.
4 Several of these publications, offices, laboratories, or websites were also used in the development
5 of this handbook.
6 Publications
7 U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE), Research and Development Center (ERDC). Data
8 Processing Results for UXO Classification Using UWB Full-Polarization GRP System, ESTCP
9 Project 199902, Tyndall AFB Site Demo, 1999.
10 USACE. Geophysical Investigationsfor Unexploded Ordnance (UXO), EM 1110-1-4009, Chapter
11 7, June 23, 2000.
12 USACE. The Former Fort Ord Ordnance Detection and Discrimination Study (ODDS),
13 Executive Summary, 2000.
14 U.S. Army Environmental Center (US AEC). EvaluationofIndividual Demonstrator Performance
15 at the Unexploded Ordnance Advanced Technology Demonstration Program at Jefferson Proving
16 Ground (Phase I), March 1995.
17 US AEC. Unexploded Ordnance Advanced Technology Demonstration Program at Jefferson
18 Proving Ground (Phase II), June 1996.
19 US AEC. UXO Technology Demonstration Program at Jefferson Proving Ground, Madison,
20 Indiana, (Phase III), April 1997.
21 U.S. Department of Defense (DoD). Unexploded Ordnance (UXO), BRAC Environmental Fact
22 Sheet, Spring 1999.
23 U.S. Department of Defense(DoD). Evaluation of Unexploded Ordnance Detection and
24 Interrogation Technologies, For Use in Panama: Empire, Balboa West, andPina Ranges: Final
25 Report, February 1997.
26 Information Sources
27 Air Force Research Laboratory AFRL/MLQC
28 1 04 Research Road, Bldg. 9738
29 Tyndall AFB, FL 32403-5353
30 Tel: (850)283-3725
31 http://www.afrl.af.mil
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Colorado School of Mines
1500 Illinois Street
Golden, CO 80401-1887
Tel: (303)273-3000
http://www.mines.edu
Department of Defense Explosives Safety Board (DDESB)
2461 Eisenhower Avenue
Alexandria, VA 22331-0600
Fax: (703)325-6227
http://www.hqda.army.mil/ddesb/esb.html
Environmental Security Technology Certification Program (ESTCP)
901 North Stuart Street, Suite 303
Arlington, VA 22203
Tel: (703) 696-2127
Fax: (703)696-2114
http://www.estcp.org
Joint UXO Coordination Office (JUXOCO)
10221 BurbeckRoad, Suite 430
Fort Belvoir, VA 22060-5806
Tel: (703) 704-1090
http://www.denix.osd.mil/UXOCOE
Naval Explosive Ordnance Disposal Technology Division
(NAVEODTECHDIV)
UXO Countermeasures Department, Code 30U
2008 Stump Neck Road
Indian Head, MD 20640-5070
http://www.ih.navy.mil/
Naval Ordnance Environmental Support Office
Naval Ordnance Safety and Security Activity
23 Strauss Avenue, Bldg. D-323
Indian Head, MD 26040
Tel: (301) 744-4450/6752
http://enviro.nfesc.navy.mil/nepss/oeso.htm
Naval Research Laboratory
Chemistry Division, Code 6110
Washington, DC 20375-5342
Tel: (202) 767-3340
http://chemdiv-www.nrl. navy. mil/6110/index. html
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Strategic Environmental Research and Development Program (SERDP)
901 North Stuart Street, Suite 303
Arlington, VA 22203
Tel: (703)696-2117
http ://www. serdp. org
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
Engineering and Support Center, Huntsville
4820 University Square
Huntsville, AL 35816-1822
Tel: (256) 895-1545
http://www.hnd.usace.army.mil
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
Engineer Research and Development Center
3909 Halls Ferry Road
Vicksburg, MS 39180-6199
Tel: (601) 634-3723
http://www.erdc.usace.army.mil
U.S. Army Environmental Center (USAEC)
Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD 21010-5401
Tel: (800) USA-3845
http://www.aec.army.mil
U.S. Army Research Laboratory (ARL)
Attn: AMSRL-CS-EA-PA
2800 Powder Mill Road
Adelphi, MD 20783-1197
Tel: (301) 394-2952
http://www.arl.army.mil
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5.0 RESPONSE TECHNOLOGIES
Ordnance and explosives (OE), which may include buried or abandoned munitions, UXO,
or reactive or ignitable soil, not only pose explosive hazards but also present disposal challenges to
personnel conducting munition response and cleanup. This chapter briefly discusses recovery in
addition to treatment technologies. Recovery technologies are often dependent on the subsequent
remediation technique. For example, blow-in-place requires no relocation of OE; however,
contained detonation chambers require movement of the OE to a secondary location for safe
disposal. See the following text box for a discussion of OE relocation techniques.
Treatment technologies have been developed to destroy the reactive and/or ignitable
material, reduce the amount of contaminated material at a site, remove the component of the waste
that makes it hazardous, or immobilize the contaminant within the waste. However, different forms
of energetic material require different technological approaches to their treatment and disposal. The
types of hazards are divided into the following three categories:
UXO
Reactive and/or ignitable soils and debris
Buried and abandoned munitions, including bulk explosives
The most commonly used technique for treating OE at CTT ranges is in-place open
detonation (OD), also known as blow-in-place. In OD, the explosive materials in OE are detonated
so that they no longer pose explosive hazards. It is often the preferred choice for managing OE
because of overarching safety concerns if the items were to be moved. However, OD is
controversial because of the concerns of the regulatory community and environmentalists that
harmful emissions and residues will contaminate air, soils, and groundwater. This chapter also
addresses several alternative treatments for OE.
Reactive and/or ignitable residues found in soils at concentrations above 12 percent can pose
hazards similar to those of the munitions themselves. The treatment of these wastes can be
extremely difficult because they may be prone to detonate when disturbed or exposed to friction or
heat, depending on the nature and extent of contamination. However, treatments have been
developed that allow reactive and/or ignitable soil and debris to be decontaminated to levels that
make it safe to dispose of them or leave them in place for in-situ remediation.
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Excavating OE
There are three general techniques used to excavate subsurface OE once it is detected: manual, mechanized, and
remote control. The selection of a retrieval method or, frequently, a combination of retrieval methods, is based
on the types and characteristics of OE detected, their depth, and site-specific soil and geological conditions.
Retrieval actions should only be conducted by qualified workers after determinationby a qualified EOD technician
or UXO technician that the risk associated with movement is acceptable.
The only equipment used in manual excavation is shovels and/or other digging tools to move the top layers of soil.
Manual excavation is extremely labor-intensive and can be hazardous to workers, as there is no barrier protecting
them from an accidental explosion. When using manual retrieval methods in heavily vegetated areas, the vegetation
should be removed in order to increase surface visibility and reduce the possibility of an accidental explosion.
Also, additional OE detection activities are usually performed when using these methods in order to confirm target
removals and increase the probability of clearing all OE in the area. Manual excavation methods are best suited
for surface and near-surface OE and are most effective when retrieving smaller OE items, such as small arms
munitions, grenades, and small-caliber artillery projectiles. OE located in remote areas, areas with saturated soils,
and areas with steep slopes and/or forest may be best suited for manual methods. The retrieval of larger, more
hazardous OE items at greater subsurface depths should be reserved for mechanized retrieval methods, as the
excavation involved is much more labor-intensive and hazardous.
Mechanized OE retrieval methods involve the use of heavy construction equipment, such as excavators,
bulldozers, and front-end loaders. Excavation below the groundwater table might require pumping equipment.
Mechanized methods are generally faster and more efficient than manual retrieval methods, and they tend to be less
hazardous than manual methods, as the machinery provides some separation between workers and OE.
Mechanized methods are best suited for excavation efforts where large OE items are buried at significant subsurface
depths, such as 1-3 meters below ground surface. Mechanized methods work most efficiently in easy-to-access
areas with dry soils. Site preparation, such as vegetation removal and the construction or improvement of access
roads, may be required as well. In the future, mechanized methods may have a role in excavating heavily
contaminated surface areas. It should also be noted that large excavation efforts, usually performed by mechanized
methods, can have a significant negative impact on the environment, as they can destroy soil structure and disrupt
nutrient cycling.
The effective use of remote-controlled mechanized methods generally requires site conditions similar to those
required for mechanized excavation. The primary difference between the two methods is that remote-controlled
systems are much saferbecause the operator of the system remains outside the hazardous area. Remotely controlled
retrieval methods may involve the use of telerobotic and/or autonomous systems with navigation and position
controls, typically a real-time differential global positioning system (DGPS). DGPS signals, however, can be
obstructedby trees and dense vegetation, limiting the accuracy and implementability of remote-controlled systems.
Remote-controlled systems are still being developed and improved. Two remote-controlled systems were
demonstrated at the Jefferson Proving Ground Technology Demonstration Program, Phase III. The systems were
generally adept at excavating large items; however, they did not reduce the time or cost of OE retrieval. Current
systems have variable weather and terrain capabilities, but demonstrate better performance in relatively flat, dry,
easy-to-access grassy or unvegetated areas.
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5.1 Treatment and Disposal of OE: An Overview
In-place open detonation, or blow-in-place (BIP), is the most commonly used method to
destroy OE on CTT ranges. However, other techniques, such as incineration (small arms only),
consolidated detonation, and contained detonation may be viable alternatives to blow-in-place,
depending on the specific situation. In addition, bioremediation (in-situ, windrow composting, and
bioslurry methods), low-temperature thermal desorption, wet air oxidation, and plasma arc
destruction are alternatives that can be applied to reactive and/or ignitable soils. Each technology
or combination of technologies has different advantages and disadvantages. A combination of safety,
logistical, throughput, and cost issues often determines the practicality of treatment technologies.
Significant statutory and regulatory requirements may apply to the destruction and disposal
of all OE (see Chapter 2, "Regulatory Overview"). The particular requirements that will be either
most applicable or most relevant and appropriate to OE remediation are the Federal and State RCRA
substantive requirements for open burning and open detonation (OB/OD) and incineration. While
the regulations may vary among States and individual sites, they generally include stringent closure
requirements for sites at which OB/OD is used, trial burn tests prior to operating incinerators, and
a variety of other requirements. Familiarity with the State and Federal requirements will be critical
in determining your approach to munitions response.
Table 5-1 summarizes the effective uses of treatment technologies for remediating OE and
munition constituents found in soils and debris. These technologies are addressed in more detail in
subsequent sections of this chapter. Readers should note that many of these treatment technologies
are not standard practice at CTT ranges. Some technologies are currently used primarily at
industrial facilities, while others are still in the early stages of development. However, when
appropriate, alternatives to blow-in-place may be considered in the evaluation of alternatives for the
response at CTT ranges. The evaluation of treatment technologies will vary from site to site and will
depend on several factors, including, but not limited to:
Safety considerations
Scale of project (or throughput)
Cost and cost-effectiveness
Size of material to be treated and capacity of technology
Logistics considerations such as accessibility of range and transportability of technology
CERCLA nine criteria remedy evaluation and selection process
Table 5-1. Overview of Remediation Technologies for Explosives and Residues
Problem
1 iviilmonl
Options
Siiiiiiiioiis/( hiiniclcrislics 1 h;il AITccl 1 iviilnionl Sui(;il)ili(\
Munitions or
fragments
contaminated
with munitions
residue
Open burning
(OB)
Limits the explosive hazard to the public and response personnel.
Inexpensive and efficient, but highly controversial due to public and
regulator concern over health and safety hazards. Noise issues.
Significant regulatory controls. Used infrequently at CTT ranges.
Chapter 5. Response Technologies
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Table 5-1. Overview of Remediation Technologies for Explosives and Residues (Continued)
9
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13
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21
22
23
24
25
26
27
Problem
1 iviilmonl
Options
Siiiiiiiioiis/( hiiniclcrislics 1 h;il AITccl 1 iviilnionl Sui(;il)ili(\
Munitions or
fragments
contaminated
with munitions
residue
Open detonation
(OD)
Limits the explosive hazard to the public and response personnel.
Inexpensive and efficient, similar to OB, but OD is generally cleaner.
This technique can be used to dispose of higher order explosives. A
characteristic of OD is complete, unconstrained detonation, which does
not allow for the creation of intermediaries and, if successfully
implemented, results in more complete combustion.
Variable caliber
munitions
Contained
detonation
chamber
Significantly reduces noise and harmful emissions, as well as the
overpressure, shock wave, and fragmentation hazards of OB/OD.
Available as transportable units. Actual case throughput of a
nontransportable unit destroyed 12,500 projectiles (155 mm in size) in
1 year.
Small-caliber
munitions or
fragments,
debris, soil, and
liquid waste
Rotary kiln
incinerator
Generally effective for removing explosives and meeting regulatory
cleanup requirements. Requires large capital investment, especially
incinerators that can handle detonation. For incinerators that treat soil,
quench tanks clog frequently; clayey, wet soils jam feed systems; and
cold conditions exacerbate clogging problems. Controversial due to
regulator and public concerns over air emissions and ash byproducts.
Nonportable units require transport of all material to be treated, which
can be dangerous and costly. Project scale should be considered.
Average throughput is 8,700 pounds of 20 mm ammunition per 15-
hour operating day.
Small-caliber
munitions or
fragments, soil
Deactivation
furnace
Thick-walled primary combustion chamber withstands small
detonations. Renders munitions unreactive. The average throughput is
8,700 pounds of 20 mm ammunition per 15-hour operating day.
Munitions or
fragments, soil,
and debris
Safe deactivation
of energetic
materials and
beneficial use of
byproducts
Still under development. At low temperatures, reacts explosives with
organic amines that neutralize the explosives without causing
detonation. Some of the liquid byproducts have been found to be
effective curing agents for conventional epoxy resins. Low or no
discharge of toxic chemicals.
Soil and debris
Wet air oxidation
Treats slurries containing reactive and/or ignitable material. Very
effective in treating RDX; however, may produce hazardous
byproducts and gaseous effluents that require further treatment. High
capital costs and frequent downtime.
Soil
(munition
constituents
residue)
Windrow
composting
Microorganisms break down reactive and/or ignitable residues into less
reactive substances. Requires relatively long time periods and large
land areas. Highly effective and low process cost, but ineffective with
extremely high concentrations of explosives.
Soil
(munition
constituents
residue)
Bioslurry (soil
slurry
biotreatment)
Optimizes conditions for maximum microorganism growth and
degradation of reactive and/or ignitable material. Slurry processes are
faster than many other biological processes and can be either aerobic or
anaerobic or both, depending on contaminants and remediation goals.
Effective on soil with high clay content. In general, treated slurry is
suitable for direct land application.
Chapter 5. Response Technologies
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Table 5-1. Overview of Remediation Technologies for Explosives and Residues (Continued)
1 iviilmonl
Problem
Options
Siiiiiiiioiis/( hiiniclcrislics 1 h;il AITccl 1 iviilnionl Sui(;il)ili(\
1
Soil/
Bioremediation
Conditions are maintained that promote growth of microorganisms that
2
Groundwater
degrade reactive and/or ignitable compounds. May not be effective in
3
(Munition
clayey or highly layered soils and can take years to achieve cleanup
4
constituents
goals. Chlorinated compounds may be difficult to degrade.
5
residue)
6
Soil/
Chemical
Chemicals are pushed into a medium through injection wells or
7
Groundwater
remediation
delivered by pipes or sprinklers to shallow contaminated soils. These
8
(Munition
chemicals oxidize/reduce reactive and/or ignitable compounds,
9
constituents
transforming them to non-toxic compounds. Some reagents may be
10
residue)
dangerous.
11
Soil
Soil washing
Reduces the total volume of contaminated soil and removes reactive
12
(Munition
and/or ignitable compounds from soil particles. Requires additional
13
constituents
treatment for wastewater and, potentially, for treated soils.
14
residue)
15
Soil
Low-temperature
Used to treat soils with low concentrations of some reactive and/or
16
(Munition
thermal desorption
ignitable material. Contaminated soil is heated to separate contaminants
17
constituents
by volatilizing them. They are then destroyed. Not very effective for
18
residue)
treating explosives.
19
Equipment,
Hot gas
Process uses heated gas to clean reactive and/or ignitable residue from
20
debris, and
decontamination
equipment and scrap. The system is designed to clean up to 1 pound of
21
scrap
total explosives from 3,000 pounds of material. The advantage of this
system is that it does not destroy the equipment it cleans.
22
Debris and
Base hydrolysis
Process uses heated acid to clean reactive and/or ignitable residue from
23
scrap
material. This system can be designed to accommodate a range of
throughput needs.
24 Note: This table is not exhaustive. Each of the treatment technologies is discussed in more detail in the succeeding
25 pages.
26 5.1.1 Handling OE Safely
27 The handling of OE at CTT ranges is based on the types of munitions found and the site-
28 specific situation. There is no single approach for every munition, or every site. The complete
29 identification and disarming of munitions is often dangerous and difficult, if not impossible. In most
30 cases, the safest method to address munition items is in place OD (also called BIP). This is
31 particularly true when the munition is located in an area where its detonation would not place the
32 public at risk. It is most appropriate when the munition or its fuzing mechanism cannot be
33 identified, or identification would place a response worker at unacceptable risk. Great weight and
34 deference will be given, with regard to the appropriate treatment, to the explosives safety expertise
35 of on-site OE technical experts. When required, DDESB-approved safety controls (e.g.,
36 sandbagging) can be used to provide additional protection to potential harmful effects of in-place
37 OD. In cases where OE experts determine that in-place OD poses an unacceptable risk to the public
38 or critical assets (e.g., natural or cultural resources), munitions items may be transported to another
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1 location for consolidated detonation. Such transport must be done carefully under the supervision
2 of OE experts, taking into account safety concerns. Movement with remote-control systems
3 sometimes will be appropriate to minimize danger to OE personnel.
4 5.1.2 Render-Safe Procedures
5 In rare cases when munitions pose an immediate, certain, and unacceptable risk to personnel,
6 critical operations, facilities, or equipment, as determined by on-scene EOD personnel, render-safe
7 procedures (RSPs) may be performed to reduce or eliminate the explosive hazards. For ordnance
8 of questionable condition, RSPs may be unsafe. RSPs are conducted by active duty military EOD
9 experts and typically involve disarming OE (removing or disabling the fuze and/or detonator), or
10 using specialized procedures. Such procedures can dramatically increase explosives safety risks to
11 EOD personnel, and DoD considers their use only in the most extraordinary circumstances. During
12 these procedures, blast mitigation factors are taken into account (i.e., distance and engineering
13 controls), and EOD personnel disarm the OE items and move them from the location at which they
14 were found to a central area on-site for destruction. Instead of detonating all OE items in place,
15 consolidated treatment allows for improved efficiency and control over the destruction (e.g., safe
16 zones surround the OD area; blast boxes and burn trays are used).
17 5.2 Treatment of OE
18 5.2.1 Open Burning and Open Detonation
19 Although open burning and open detonation (OB/OD) are often discussed together, open
20 detonation remains the safest and most frequently used method for treating UXO at CTT ranges.
21 When open detonation takes place where UXO is found, it is called blow-in-place. In munitions
22 response, demolition is almost always conducted on-site, most frequently in the place it is found,
23 because of the inherent public safety concerns and the regulatory restrictions on transporting even
24 disarmed explosive materials.
25 Blow-in-place detonation maybe accomplished by adding a small explosive charge or using
26 laser-initiated techniques. It is considered by explosives safety experts to be the safest, quickest,
27 and most cost-effective remedy for destroying OE. However, increasing regulatory restrictions and
28 public concern over its human health and environmental impacts may create significant barriers to
29 conducting both OB and OD in the future. The development of alternatives to OD in recent years
30 is a direct result of these growing concerns and increased restrictions on the use of OD (see text box
31 on following page).
32 There are significant environmental and technical challenges to treating ordnance and
33 explosives with OB/OD.64 These limitations include the following:
"'EPA Office of Research and Development, Approaches for the Remediation of Federal Facility Sites
Contaminated with Explosive or Radioactive Wastes, Handbook, September 1993.
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Restrictions on emissions. Harmful emissions may pose human health and
environmental risks and are difficult to capture sufficiently for treatment. Areas with
emissions limitations may not permit OB operations.
Soil and groundwater contamination. Soil and groundwater can become contaminated
with byproducts of incomplete combustion and detonation.
Area of operation. Large spaces are required for OB/OD operations to maintain
minimum distance requirements for safety purposes (see Chapter 6, "Safety").
Location. Environmental conditions may constrain the use of OB/OD. For example,
in OB/OD operations, emissions must be carried away from populated areas, so
prevailing winds must be steady. Ideal wind speeds are 4-15 mph, because winds at
these speeds are not likely to change direction and they tend to dissipate smoke rapidly.
In addition, any type of storm (including sand, snow, and electrical) that is capable of
producing static electricity can potentially cause premature detonation.
Legal restrictions. Legal actions and regulatory requirements, such as restrictions on
RCRA Subpart X permits, emissions restrictions, and other restrictions placed on
OB/OD, may reduce the use of OB/OD in the future. However, for CTT ranges
addressed under CERCLA, no permits are currently required.
Noise. Extreme noise created by detonations limits where and when OB/OD can be
performed.
The Debate Over OD
Because of the danger associated with moving OE, the conventional wisdom, based on DoD's explosive safety
expertise, is to treat UXO on-site using OD, usually blow-in-place. However, coalitions of environmentalists,
Native Americans, and community activists across the country have voiced concerns and filed lawsuits against
military installations that perform OB/OD for polluting the environment, endangering their health, and diminishing
their quality of life. While much of this debate has focused on high-throughput industrial facilities and active
ranges, and not on the practices at CTT ranges, similar concerns have also been voiced at CTT ranges. Preliminary
studies of OD operations at Massachusetts Military Reservation revealed that during the course of open detonation,
explosive residues are emitted in the air and deposited on the soil in concentrations that exceed conservative action
levels more than 50 percent of the time. When this occurs, some response action or cleanup is required. It is not
uncommon for these exceedances to be significantly above action levels.
Several debates are currently underway regarding the use of blow-in-place OD at CTT ranges. One debate is about
whether OD is in fact a contributor to contamination and the significance of that contribution. A second debate
is whether a contained detonation chamber (CDC) is a reasonable alternative that is cleaner than OD (albeit limited
by the size of munitions it can handle, and the ability to move munitions safety). Another study at Massachusetts
Military Reservation revealed that particulates trapped in the CDC exhaust filter contain levels of chlorinated and
nitroaromatic compounds that must be disposed of as hazardous waste, thus suggesting the potential for hazardous
air emissions in OD. The pea gravel at the bottom of the chamber, after repeated detonations, contains no
detectable quantities of explosives, thus suggesting that the CDC is highly effective. The RPM at Massachusetts
Military Reservation has suggested that when full life-cycle costs of OD are considered, including the cost of
cleanup at a number of the OD areas, the cost of using OD when compared to a CDC may be more even.
Additional information will help shed light on the costs and environmental OD versus CDC. The decision on
which alternative to use, however, will involve explosive safety experts who must decide that the munitions are
safe to move if they will be detonated in a CDC. In addition, current limitations on the size of munitions that can
be handled in a CDC must also be considered.
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In open detonation, a small amount of charge is added in order to detonate and destroy
energetic materials and munitions. Engineering controls and protective measures can be used, when
appropriate, to significantly reduce the effects and hazards associated with blast and high-speed
fragments during OD operations. Common techniques for reducing these effects include
constructing berms and barricades that physically block and/or deflect the blast and fragments,
tamping the explosives with sandbags and/or earth to absorb energy and fragmentation, using blast
mitigation foams, and trenching to prevent transmission of blast-shock through the ground. These
methods have been effective in reducing the size of exclusion zones required for safe OD and
limiting local disruptions due to shock and noise. In some instances (e.g., low-explosive-weight
OE), well-engineered protective measures can reduce the effects and hazards associated with OD
to levels comparable to contained detonation chambers (see Section 5.2.2.2).
5.2.2 Alternative Treatment Technologies
Because of growing concern and regulatory constraints on the use of OD, alternative
treatments have been developed that aim to be safer, commercially available or readily constructed,
cost-effective, versatile in their ability to handle a variety of energetics, and able to meet the needs
of the Army.65 Although some of these alternative treatments have applicability for field use, the
majority are designed for industrial-level demilitarization of excess or obsolete munitions that have
not been used.
5.2.2.1 Incineration
Incineration is primarily used to treat soils containing reactive and/or ignitable compounds.
In addition, small quantities of OE, bulk explosives, and debris containing reactive and/or ignitable
material may be treated using incineration. Most OE is not suitable for incineration. This technique
may be used for small-caliber ammunition (less than 155 mm), but even the largest incinerators with
strong reinforcement cannot handle the detonations of very large munitions. Like OB/OD,
incineration is not widely accepted by regulators and the public because of concerns over the
environmental and health impacts of incinerator emissions and residues.
The strengths and weaknesses of incineration are summarized as follows:
Effectiveness. In most cases, incineration reduces levels of organics to nondetection
levels, thus simplifying cleanup efforts.
Proven success. Incineration technology has been used for years, and many companies
offer incineration services. In addition, a diverse selection of incineration equipment is
available, making it an appropriate operation for sites of different sizes and containing
different types of contaminants.
Safety issues. Munitions must be considered safe to move in order to relocate them to
an incinerator. Determining this may require that RSPs be performed prior to
65J. Strattaet al., Alternatives to Open Burning/Open Detonation of Energetic Materials, U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers, Construction Engineering Research Lab, August 1998.
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incineration. In addition, the treatment of hazardous and reactive and/or ignitable
materials with extremely high temperatures is inherently hazardous.
Emissions. Incinerator stacks emit compounds that may include nitrogen oxides (NOx),
volatile metals (including lead) and products of incomplete combustion.
Noise. Incinerators may have 400-500 horsepower fans, which generate substantial
noise, a common complaint of residents living near incinerators.
Costs. The capital costs of mobilizing and demobilizing incinerators can range from $1
million to $2 million. However, on a large scale (above 30,000 tons of soil treated),
incineration can be a cost-effective treatment option. Specifically, at the Cornhusker
Army Ammunition Plant, 40,000 tons of soil were incinerated at an average total cost
of $260 per ton. At the Louisiana Army Ammunition Plant, 102,000 tons of soil were
incinerated at $330 per ton.66
Public perception. The public generally views incineration with suspicion and as a
potentially serious health threat caused by possible emission of hazardous chemicals
from incinerator smokestacks.
Trial burn tests. An incinerator must demonstrate that it can remove 99.99 percent of
organic material before it can be permitted to treat a large volume of hazardous waste.
Ash byproducts. Like OB/OD, most types of incineration produce ash that contains
high concentrations of inorganic contaminants.
Materials handling. Soils with a high clay content can be difficult to feed into
incinerators because they clog the feed mechanisms. Often, clayey soils require
pretreatment in order to reduce moisture and viscosity.
Resource demands. Operation of incinerators requires large quantities of electricity and
water.
The most commonly used type of incineration system is the rotary kiln incinerator. Rotary
kilns come in different capacities and are used primarily for soils and debris contaminated with
reactive and/or ignitable material. Rotary kilns are available as transportable units for use on-site,
or as permanent fixed units for off-site treatment. When considering the type of incinerator to use
at your site, one element that you should consider is the potential risk of transporting reactive and/or
ignitable materials.
The rotary kiln incinerator is equipped with an afterburner, a quench, and an air pollution
control system to remove particulates and neutralize and remove acid gases. The rotary kiln serves
as a combustion chamber and is a slightly inclined, rotating cylinder that is lined with a heat-
resistant ceramic coating. This system has had proven success in reducing contamination levels to
destruction and removal efficiencies (DRE) that meet RCRA requirements (40 CFR 264, Subpart
O).67 Specifically, reactive and/or ignitable soil was treated on-site at the former Nebraska Ordnance
66U. S. EPA, Office of Research and Development, Approaches for the Remediation of Federal Facility Sites
Contaminated with Explosive or Radioactive Wastes, Handbook, September 1993.
67U.S. EPA, Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response, Technology Innovation Office, On-Site
Incineration at the Celanese Corporation Shelby Fiber Operations Superfund Site, Shelby, North Carolina, October
1999.
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Plant site in Mead, Nebraska, using a rotary kiln followed by a secondary combustion chamber,
successfully reducing constituents of concern that included TNT, RDX, TNB, DNT, DNB, HMX,
tetryl, and NT to DRE of 99.99 percent.68
For deactivating large quantities of small arms munitions at industrial operations (e.g., small
arms cartridges, 50-caliber machine gun ammunition), the Army generally uses deactivation
furnaces. Deactivation furnaces have a thick-walled primary detonation chamber capable of
withstanding small detonations. In addition, they do not completely destroy the vaporized reactive
and/or ignitable material, but rather render the munitions unreactive.69
For large quantities of material, on-site incineration is generally more cost-effective than off-
site treatment, which includes transportation costs. The cost of soil treatment at off-site incinerators
ranges from $220 to $1,100 per metric ton (or $200 to $1,000 per ton).70 At the former Nebraska
Ordnance Plant site, the cost of on-site incineration was $394 per ton of contaminated material.71
Two major types of incinerators used by the Army are discussed in Table 5-2. While incineration
is used most often in industrial operations as opposed to at CTT ranges, it may be considered in the
evaluation of remedial alternatives at CTT ranges as well.
The operation and maintenance requirements of incineration include sorting and blending
wastes to achieve levels safe for handling (below 12 percent explosive concentration for soils),
burning wastes, and treating gas emissions to control air pollution. Additional operation and
maintenance factors to consider include feed systems that are likely to clog when soils with high
clay content are treated, quench tanks that are prone to clog from slag in the secondary combustion
chamber, and the effects of cold temperatures, which have been known to exacerbate these
problems.
68Federal Remediation Technologies Roundtable, Incineration at the Former Nebraska Ordnance Plant Site,
Mead, Nebraska, Roundtable Report, October 1998.
69U. S. EPA, Office of Research and Development, Approaches for the Remediation of Federal Facility Sites
Contaminated with Explosive or Radioactive Wastes, Handbook, September 1993.
70 DoD, Environmental Technology Transfer Committee, Remediation Technologies Screening Matrix and
Reference Guide, Second Edition, October 1994.
71Federal Remediation Technologies Roundtable, Incineration at the Former Nebraska Ordnance Plant Site,
Mead, Nebraska, Roundtable Report, October 1998.
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Table 5-2. Characteristics of Incinerators
2
3
4
5
6
Incinci'iilor
1 >
Description
Opci'iilin^ Temps
Sironiilhs iiml
\\ oiikiiossos
r.lTcc(i\e I sos
Kolsin Kiln
A rotary kiln is a combustion
chamber that may be designed
to withstand detonations. The
secondary combustion chamber
destroys residual organics from
off-gases. Off-gases then pass
into the quench tank for
cooling. The air pollution
control system consists of a
venturi scrubber, baghouse
filters, and/or wet electrostatic
precipitators, which remove
particulates prior to release
from the stack.
Primary chamber -
Gases: 800-1,500 °F
Soils: 600-800 °F
Secondary chamber -
Gases: 1,400-1,800 °F
Renders munitions
unreactive. Debris
or reactive and/or
ignitable materials
must be removed
from soils prior to
incineration; quench
tank clogs; clayey,
wet soils can jam
the feed system;
cold conditions
exacerbate clogging
problems. Requires
air pollution control
devices.
Commercially
available for
destruction
of bulk
explosives and
small OE,
as well as
contaminated
soil and debris.
l)c;icli\;ilion
I 'll I'll illT
Designed to withstand small
detonations from small arms.
Operates in a manner similar to
the rotary kiln except it does
not have a secondary
combustion chamber.
1,200-1,500 °F
Renders munitions
unreactive.
Large quantities
of small arms
cartridges, 50-
caliber machine
gun ammunition,
mines, and
grenades.
7 Source: U.S. EPA, Office of Research and Development. Approaches for the Remediation of Federal Facility Sites
8 Contaminated with Explosive or Radioactive Wastes, Handbook, September 1993.
9 New incineration systems under development include a circulating fluidized bed that uses
10 high-velocity air to circulate and suspend waste particles in a combustion loop. In addition, an
11 infrared unit uses electrical resistance heating elements or indirect-fired radiant U-tubes to heat
12 material passing through the chamber on a conveyor belt.
13 5.2.2.2 Contained Detonation Chambers
14
15 Contained detonation chambers (CDCs) are capable of repeated detonations of a variety of
16 ordnance items, with significant reductions in the air and noise pollution problems of OD; however,
17 the use of CDCs assumes that the munition item is safe to move. CDCs, or blast chambers, are used
18 by the Army at a few ammunition plants to treat waste pyrotechnics, explosives, and propellants.
19 In addition, several types of transportable detonation chambers are available for emergency
20 responses for small quantities of OE. In general, blast chambers do not contain all of the detonation
21 gases, but vent them through an expansion vessel and an air pollution control unit. Such a vented
22 system minimizes the overpressure and shock wave hazards. In addition, CDCs contain debris from
23 detonations as well, eliminating the fragmentation hazards.
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Several manufacturers have developed CDCs for both commercial and military use.
However, DoD has not implemented CDCs at many military installations because of safety issues
relating to the moving of munitions, rate of throughput, transportability, and cost.
Both industrial-level (fixed) and mobile (designed for use in the field) CDCs display a range
of capabilities. CDCs designed for field use are limited in the amount of explosives they can
contain, the types of munitions they can handle, and their throughput capability. Portable units have
size constraints and are not designed to destroy munitions larger than 81 mm HE or 10 pounds of
HMX, but the nonportable units can handle munitions up to 155 mm or 100 pounds of HMX (130
lb TNT equivalent).72
5.3 Treatment of Soils That Contain Reactive and/or Ignitable Compounds
Some of the technologies described in Section 5.2 can also be used to treat reactive and/or
ignitable soil (e.g., thermal treatment). However, there are a number of alternative treatment
technologies that are specifically applicable to soils containing reactive and/or ignitable materials.
These are described in the sections that follow.
5.3.1 Biological Treatment Technologies
Biological treatment, or bioremediation, is a broad category of systems that use
microorganisms to decompose reactive and/or ignitable residues in soils into byproducts such as
water and carbon dioxide. Bioremediation includes ex-situ treatments such as composting and slurry
reactor biotreatment that require the excavation of soils and debris, as well as in-situ methods such
as bioventing, monitored natural attenuation, and nutrient amendment. Bioremediation is used to
treat large volumes of contaminated soils, and it is generally more publicly accepted than
incineration. However, highly contaminated soils may not be treatable using bioremediation or may
require pretreatment, because high concentrations of reactive and/or ignitable materials, heavy
metals, or inorganic salts are frequently toxic to the microorganisms that are the foundation of
biological systems. While biological treatment systems generally require significantly lower capital
investments than incinerators or other technology-intensive systems, they also often take longer to
achieve cleanup goals. Therefore, the operation and monitoring costs of bioremediation must be
taken into account. Because bioremediation includes a wide range of technological options, its costs
can vary dramatically from site to site. The benefits and limitations of bioremediation include the
following:
Easily implemented. Bioremediation systems are simple to operate and can be
implemented using commercially available equipment.
Relatively low costs. In general, the total cost of bioremediation is significantly less
than more technology-intensive treatment options.
72DeMil International, Inc., The "Donovan Blast Chamber" Technology for Production Demilitarization at
Blue Grass Army Depot and for UXO Remediation, Paper presented at the Global Demilitarization Symposium and
Exhibition, 1999.
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Suitability for direct land application. In general, soil treated using most
bioremediation systems is suitable for land application.
Limited concentrations of reactive and/or ignitable materials and other
contaminants. Soil with very high levels of reactive and/or ignitable material may not
be treatable using bioremediation, so pretreatment to reduce contaminant levels may be
required. In addition, the presence of other contaminants, such as metals, may render
bioremediation ineffective.
Temperature limitations. Cold temperatures limit the effectiveness of bioremediation.
Resource demands. With the exception of bioslurry treatments, bioremediation systems
require large land areas. In addition, many biological treatment systems require
substantial quantities of water to maintain adequate moisture levels.
Long time frame. With the exception of bioslurry treatments, bioremediation systems
may require long time periods to degrade reactive and/or ignitable materials.
Post-treatment. In some systems, process waters and off-gases may require treatment
prior to disposal.73
There are many different options to choose from in selecting your biological treatment
systems, but your selection will depend on the following factors:
Types of contaminants
Soil type
Climate and weather conditions
Cost and time constraints
Cleanup goals at your site
Biological treatment systems that are available can be in-situ and can be open or closed,
depending on air emission standards. Other available features include irrigation to maintain optimal
moisture and nutrition conditions, and aeration systems to control odors and oxygen levels in aerobic
systems. In general, bioremediation takes longer to achieve cleanup goals than incineration.
Biological treatment can be conducted in-situ or ex-situ; however, because reactive and/or
ignitable materials in the soil are usually not well mixed, removing them for ex-situ treatment is
usually recommended, as the removal process results in thorough mixing of the soil, increasing the
uniformity of degradation. Also, the likelihood of migration of reactive and/or ignitable materials
and their breakdown products is reduced with controlled ex-situ remediation of removed soils. Both
ex-situ and in-situ treatment systems are discussed below.
5.3.1.1 Monitored Natural Attenuation
Monitored natural attenuation (MNA) is a response action that rules on natural attenuation
processes (within the context of a carefully controlled and monitored site cleanup approach) to
73DoD, Environmental Technology Transfer Committee, Remediation Technologies Screening Matrix and
Reference Guide, Second Edition, October 1994.
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achieve site-specific remediation objectives within a time frame that is reasonable compared to that
offered by more active methods.74
Monitored natural attenuation uses microbes already present in the soil or groundwater to
degrade contaminants. It is never a default or presumptive remedy, but is carefully evaluated prior
to selection. The burden of proof as to whether MNA is appropriate rests with the party proposing
MNA. EPA's directive on the use of MNA at sites requires substantial analysis and continuous
monitoring to prove that MNA can achieve cleanup goals on the particular chemicals of concern
within a reasonable timeframe when compared to other response methods. In addition to a
comparable timeframe, MNA may be appropriate when plumes are no longer increasing (or are
shrinking), and/or when used in conjunction with active remediation measures (e.g., source control,
sampling, and treating of hot spots). Monitored natural attenuation is currently employed at several
groundwater sites containing reactive and/or ignitable compounds. Louisiana Army Ammunition
Plant has used MNA to reduce TNT and RDX in groundwater. Initial results show a marked
decrease in both of those compounds. The suitability to use MNA for explosive compounds must
be carefully evaluated based on site-specific factors, since explosive compounds do not act in the
same manner as the solvents for which MNA has been most frequently used.
5.3.1.2 Composting
Composting is an ex-situ process that involves tilling the
contaminated soils with large quantities of organic matter and
inorganic nutrients to create a microorganism-rich environment.
An organic agent such as straw, sawdust, or wood chips is usually
added to increase the number of microorganism growth sites and to
improve aeration. Additional nutrient-rich amendments may be
added to maximize the growth conditions for microorganisms and
therefore the efficiency with which reactive and/or ignitable
compounds biodegrade.
In windrow composting, the soil mixture is layered into long piles known as windrows.
Each windrow is mixed by turning with a composting machine as shown in Figure 5-1. Figures 5-2
and 5-3 provide schematic diagrams of a typical windrow composting process and system.
Figure 5-1. Windrow
Composting
74U.S. EPA, Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response, Use of Monitored Natural Attenuation at
Superfund RCR4 Corrective Action and Underground Storage Tank Sites, OSWER Directive 9200.4-17, November
1997.
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Amendment Mix
(4)W(i|iji^ of Soi]
~
Excavated
Con tarn rated
Soil
(Average Initial
Concentration
6000-7000ppm TNT]
Screen Mi*ngPad Soil-Annendmen t Mix
I |M img d one by P '-00-2000 ppm THT|
f windrow composter)
Wndrows
k
Treated Sol
ir<3 h.crcriElHd
} =
Rocks
Water
Washed Flo (is
Wash Basil
Mis d with To p Soi
' andReuegetatsd
IwExcauated frea
^l^MLandlill
Figure 5-2. Typical Windrow Composting Process
D
L-jri Ndfim Hfii;
Wndrow
Wndrows
Vhindrcws
Figure 5-3. Side and Top View of Windrow Composting System
3 Windrow composting has proved to be highly successful in achieving cleanup goals at a field
4 demonstration at the Umatilla Army Depot Activity in Hermiston, Oregon.75 At Umatilla, soil was
5 mixed with soil amendments and composted in both aerated and nonaerated windrows for a total of
6 40 days. The resulting compost generally reduced the levels of the target explosives (TNT, RDX,
"Federal Remediation Technologies Roundtable, Technology Application Analysis: Windrow Composting of
Explosives Contaminated Soil at Umatilla Army Depot Activity. Hermiston, Oregon, October 1998.
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and HMX) to below cleanup goals. Specifically, TNT reductions were as high as 99.7 percent at 30
percent soil in 40 days of operation, with the majority of removal occurring in the first 20 days.
Destruction and removal efficiencies for RDX and HMX were 99.8 and 96.8 percent, respectively.
The field demonstration showed the relative simplicity and cost-effectiveness of windrow
composting when compared with nonbiological treatment technologies.
5.3.1.3 Soil Slurry Biotreatment
Soil slurry biotreatment (also known as bioslurry or slurry
reactor treatment) is an ex-situ process that involves the submersion of
contaminated soils or sludge in water in a tank, lagoon, or bioreactor to
create a slurry (Figure 5-4). The nutrient content, pH, and temperature
are carefully controlled, and the slurry is agitated to maximize the
nutrient, microorganism, and contaminant contact. Because the
conditions are optimized for the microorganisms, slurry processes are
faster than those in many other biological processes and, therefore, the
operation and maintenance (O&M) costs are lower than in other
biological processes. However, the highly controlled environment
requires capital investments beyond those of other biological treatment
systems. The treated slurry can be used directly on land without any
additional treatment.
Bioslurry treatment can be conducted under both aerobic and anaerobic conditions. In
aerobic bioslurry, the oxygen content is carefully controlled. In anaerobic bioslurry, anaerobic
bacteria consume the carbon supply, resulting in the depletion of oxygen in the soil slurry. Findings
of a field demonstration at the Joliet Army Ammunition Plant demonstrated that maximum removal
of reactive and/or ignitable materials occurred with operation of a slurry reactor in an aerobic-
anaerobic sequence, with an organic cosubstrate, operated in warm temperatures. The same
demonstration project showed that bioslurry treatment can remove TNT, RDX, TNB, and DNT to
levels that meet a variety of treatment goals.76 Soil slurry biotreatment is expected to cost about one-
third less than incineration.77 The primary limitations of soil slurry biotreatment include the
following:
Soil excavation. Soils must be excavated prior to treatment.
Pretreatment requirements. Nonhomogeneous soils can potentially lead to materials-
handling problems; therefore, pretreatment of soils is often necessary to obtain uniformly
sized materials.
Post-treatment. Dewatering following treatment can be costly, and nonrecycled
wastewaters must be treated before being disposed of.
Emissions. Off-gases may require treatment if volatile compounds are present.
Figure 5-4. Slurry
Reactor
7oJ.F. Manning, R. Boopathy, and E.R. Breyfogle, Field Demonstration of Slurry Reactor Biotreatment of
Explosives-Contaminated Soils, 1996.
77DoD Environmental Technology Transfer Committee, Remediation Technologies Screening Matrix and
Reference Guide, Second Edition, October 1994.
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5.3.1.4 In-Situ Chemical and Biological Remediation
Treating contaminated soils in-situ involves the introduction of microbes (enhanced or
augmented bioremediation), or the addition of nutrients with the intention of inducing a suitable
environment for the biological degradation of pollutants. Alternatively, selected reactive compounds
may be introduced into the soil to chemically transform reactive and/or ignitable compounds through
oxidative or reductive processes. For aqueous media, hydrogen peroxide, oxygen release
compounds (e.g., magnesium peroxide), ozone, or microorganisms are added to the water to degrade
reactive and/or ignitable materials more rapidly. Depending on the depth of the contaminants, spray
irrigation may be used, or for deeper contamination, injection wells may be used. The primary
advantage of in-situ remediation is that soils do not need to be excavated or screened prior to
treatment, thus resulting in cost savings. In addition, soils and groundwater can be treated
simultaneously. The primary limitation of in-situ remediation is that it may allow reactive and/or
ignitable materials to migrate deeper into the soil or into the groundwater under existing site-specific
hydrodynamic conditions. Other limitations of this type of remediation include the following:
There is a high degree of uncertainty about the uniformity of treatment and a long
treatment period may be required.
Nutrient and water injection wells may clog frequently.
The heterogeneity of soils and preferential flow paths may limit contact between inj ected
fluids and contaminants.
The method should not be used for clay, highly layered, or highly heterogeneous
subsurface environments (such as complex karst or fractured rock subsurface
formations).
High concentrations of heavy metals, highly chlorinated organics, long-chain
hydrocarbons, or inorganic salts are likely to be toxic to microorganisms.
The method is sensitive to temperature (i.e., it works faster at high temperatures and
slower at colder temperatures).
The use of certain reagents (e.g., Fenton's reagent) can create potentially hazardous
conditions.
5.3.2 Soil Washing
Soil washing is a widely used treatment technology that reduces contaminated soil volume
and removes contamination from soil particles. Reactive and/or ignitable materials are removed
from soils by separating contaminated particles from clean particles using particle size separation,
gravity separation, and attrition scrubbing. The smaller particles (which generally are the ones to
which reactive and/or ignitable materials adhere) are then treated using mechanical scrubbing, or
are dissolved or suspended and treated in a solution of chemical additives (e.g., surfactants, acids,
alkalis, chelating agents, and oxidizing or reducing agents) or treated using conventional wash-water
treatment methods. In some cases, the reduced volume of contaminated soil is treated using other
treatment technologies, such as incineration or bioremediation. Following soil washing, the
contaminated wash water is treated using wastewater treatment processes.
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Soil washing is least effective in soils with large amounts of clay and organic matter to which
reactive and/or ignitable materials bind readily. Soil washing systems are transportable and can be
brought to the site. In addition, soil washing is relatively inexpensive ($120 to $200 per ton), but
in many cases it is only a step toward reducing the volume of soil that requires additional treatment,
such as when another technology is used to treat the reduced volume of contaminated soil following
soil washing.
The operation and maintenance components of soil washing include preparing soils for
treatment (moving soils, screening debris from soils), treating washing agents and soil fines
following treatment, and returning clean soils to the site. The time required for treating a 20,000-ton
site using soil washing would likely be less than 3 months.78
5.3.3 Wet Air Oxidation
Wet air oxidation (WAO) is a high-temperature, high-pressure oxidation process that can
be used to treat contaminated soil. Contaminated slurries are pumped into a heat exchanger and
heated to temperatures of 650-1,150 °F. The slurries are then pumped into a reactor where they are
oxidized in an aqueous solution at pressures of 1,000-1,800 psi.
WAO has been proven to be highly effective in treating RDX. However, the method also
produces hazardous byproducts of TNT and gaseous effluents that require additional treatment. The
technology has high capital costs and a high level of downtime resulting from frequent blockages
of the pump system and heat exchange lines. Laboratory tests have indicated that some WAO
effluents can be further treated using biological methods such as composting.79
5.3.4 Low-Temperature Thermal Desorption
Low-temperature thermal desorption (LTTD) is a commercially available physical separation
process that heats contaminated soils to volatilize contaminants. The volatilized contaminants are
then transported for treatment. While this system has been tested extensively for use on reactive
and/or ignitable materials, it is not one of the more effective technologies. In general, a carrier gas
or vacuum system transports volatilized water and reactive and/or ignitable materials to a gas
treatment system such as an afterburner or activated carbon. The relatively low temperatures (200-
600 °F) and residence times in LTTD typically volatilize low levels of reactive and/or ignitable
materials and allow decontaminated soil to retain its physical properties.80 In general, LTTD is used
to treat volatile organic compounds and fuels, but it can potentially be used on soil containing low
concentrations of reactive and/or ignitable materials that have boiling points within the LTTD
temperature range (e.g., TNT).
78Ibid.
79J. Stratta, R. Schneider, N. Adrian, R. Weber, B. Donahuq, Alternatives to Open Burning/Open Detonation
of Energetic Materials: A Summary of Current Technologies. USACERL Technical Report 98/104, 1998.
80DoD Environmental Technology Transfer Committee, Remediation Technologies Screening Matrix and
Reference Guide, Second Edition, October 1994.
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The two commonly used LTTD systems are the rotary dryer and the thermal screw. Rotary
dryers are horizontal cylinders that are inclined and rotated. In thermal screw units, screw
conveyors or hollow augers are used to transport the soil or debris through an enclosed trough. Hot
oil or steam circulates through the augur to indirectly heat the soil. The off-gas is treated using
devices such as wet scrubbers or fabric filters to remove particulates, and combustion or oxidation
is employed to destroy the contaminants.81 The primary limitations of LTTD include the following:
It is only marginally effective for treating reactive and/or ignitable materials.
Extensive safety precautions must be taken to prevent explosions when exposing
contaminated soil and debris to heat.
Explosives concentration and particle size can affect the applicability and cost of LTTD.
Plastic materials should not be treated using LTTD, as their decomposition products
could damage the system.
Soil with a high clay and silt content or with a high humic content will increase the
residence time required for effective treatment.
Soil or sediments with a high moisture content may require dewatering prior to treatment.
Air pollution control devices are often necessary.
Additional leaching of metals is a concern with this process.
5.4 Decontamination of Equipment and Scrap
Various chemical and mechanical methods are available for the cleaning and
decontamination of equipment and scrap metal. One such method is hot gas decontamination.
Demonstrations have shown that a 99.9999 percent decontamination of structural components is
possible using this method. Residue from reactive and/or ignitable compounds is volatilized or
decomposed during the process when gas is heated to 600 °F for 1 hour. Any off-gases are
destroyed in a thermal oxidizer, and emissions are monitored to ensure compliance with
requirements. Specifications state that the furnace can accept a maximum of 3,000 pounds of
contaminated materials containing less than 1 pound of total explosives. Up to four batch runs can
be processed by a two-person crew every 24 hours.82
Base hydrolysis is a chemical method of decontaminating material of reactive and/or
ignitable compounds. A tank of heated sodium hydroxide is prepared at a concentration of 3 moles
per liter. The high pH and high temperature have the effect of breaking apart any reactive and/or
ignitable compounds on the scrap metal. Following decontamination, hydrochloric acid is added
to lower the pH to a range of 6-9. The cleaned material has no detectable level of reactive and/or
S1EPA Superfund Innovative Technology Evaluation (SITE) Program, Thermal Desorption System (TDS),
Clean Berkshires, Inc., October 1999.
82U. S. Army Environmental Center, Hot-Gas Decontamination: Proven Technology Transferredfor Army Site
Cleanups, December 2000.
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1 ignitable contaminants following the procedure. This process is scalable to accommodate a variable
2 throughput.83'84'85
3 Other decontamination methods include pressure washing, steam cleaning, and incineration.
4 5.5 Safe Deactivation of Energetic Materials and Beneficial Use of Byproducts
5 A technique for safely eliminating energetic materials and developing safe and useful
6 byproducts is currently under development with funding from the Strategic Environmental Research
7 and Development Program (SERDP). One such process reacts energetic materials, specifically
8 TNT, RDX, and Composition B, with organic amines, which neutralize the energetic materials. The
9 reaction is conducted at low temperatures, safely breaking down the energetic materials without
10 causing detonation.
11 The gaseous byproducts of this process consist of nitrous oxide, nitrogen, water, and carbon
12 dioxide. The liquid byproducts contain amide groups and carbon-nitrogen bonds. The liquid
13 byproducts of TNT and RDX were discovered to be effective curing agents for conventional epoxy
14 resins. The epoxy polymers produced using the curing agents derived from the liquid byproducts
15 were subjected to safety and structural tests. It was determined that they have comparable
16 mechanical properties to epoxy formed using conventional resins and curing agents. Testing is
17 currently underway to verify their safety and resistance to leaching of toxic compounds.
18 In preliminary testing, this process has been shown to be a viable alternative to OB/OD and
19 appears to have the potential to achieve high throughput, be cost-effective and safe, and discharge
20 no toxic chemicals into the environment.86
21 5.6 Conclusion
22 The treatment of OE and reactive and/or ignitable soil and debris is a complex issue in terms
23 of technical capabilities, regulatory requirements, and environmental, public health, and safety
24 considerations. Public concern over OB/OD and incineration has encouraged the development of
25 new technologies to treat reactive and/or ignitable wastes, but there is still a long way to go before
26 some of the newer technologies, such as plasma arc destruction, become commercially available and
27 widely used. Further, many of the newer technologies have been developed for industrial facilities
28 with high throughput levels not found at CTT ranges. However, with the appropriate site-specific
29 conditions, alternative technologies may be considered at CTT ranges.
83UXB International, Inc., UXBase: Non-Thermal Destruction of Propellant and Explosive Residues on
Ordnance and Explosive Scrap, 2001.
84D.R. Felt, S.L. Larson, and L.D. Hansen, Kinetics of Base-Catalyzed 2,4,6-Trinitrotoluene Transformation,
August 2001.
85R.L. Bishop et al., "Base Hydrolysis of HMX and HMX-Based Plastic Bonded Explosives with Sodium
Hydroxide between 100 and 155°C." Ind. Eng. Chem. Res. 1999, 38:2254-2259.
86SERDP and ESTCP, "Safe Deactivation of Energetic Materials and Beneficial Use of By-Products," Partners
in Environmental Technology Newsletter, Issue 2, 1999.
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1
SOURCES AND RESOURCES
2 The following publications, offices, laboratories, and websites are provided as a guide for
3 handbook users to obtain additional information about the subject matter addressed in each chapter.
4 Several of these publications, offices, laboratories, or websites were also used in the development
5 of this handbook.
6 Publications
7 Stratta, J., R. Schneider, N. Adrian, R. Weber, and B. Donahue. Alternatives to Open
8 Burning/Open Detonation of Energetic Materials: A Summary of Current Technologies, U.S.
9 Army Corps of Engineers, Construction Engineering Research Laboratories, August 1998.
10 U.S. Department of Defense, Environmental Technology Transfer Committee. Remediation
11 Technologies Screening Matrix, Second Edition, October 1994.
12 U. S. Environmental Protection Agency. Handbook: Approaches for the Remediation of Federal
13 Facility Sites Contaminated with Explosive or Radioactive Wastes, (EPA/625/R-93/013),
14 September 1993.
15 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response.
16 Completed North American Innovative Remediation Technology Demonstration Projects, (PB 96-
17 153-127), August 1996.
18 Information Sources
19 Center for Public Environmental Oversight
20 c/o PSC 222B View Street
21 Mountain View, CA 94041
22 Tel: (650)961-8918
23 Fax:(650)968-1126
24 http://www.cpeo.org
25 Environmental Security Technology Certification Program (ESTCP)
26 901 North Stuart Street, Suite 303
27 Arlington, VA 22203
28 Tel: (703) 696-2127
29 Fax:(703)696-2114
30 http://www.estcp.org
31 Federal Remediation Technologies Roundtable
32 U.S. EPA, Chair
33 (5102G) 401 M Street, S.W.
34 Washington, DC 20460
35 http://www.frtr.gov
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1 Joint UXO Coordination Office (JUXOCO)
2 10221 Burbeck Road, Suite 430
3 Fort Belvoir, VA 22060
4 Tel: (703) 704-1090
5 Fax: (703) 704-2074
6 http://www.denix.osd.mil/UXOCOE
7 Naval Explosive Ordnance Disposal Technology Division
8 (NAVEODTECHDIV)
9 UXO Countermeasures Department, Code 30U
10 2008 Stump Neck Road
11 Indian Head, MD 20640-5070
12 http://www.ih.navy.mil/
13 Strategic Environmental Research and Development Program (SERDP)
14 901 North Stuart Street, Suite 303
15 Arlington, VA 22203
16 Tel: (703) 696-2117
17 http://www.serdp.org
18 U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
19 U.S. Army Engineering and Support Center,
20 Ordnance and Explosives Mandatory Center of Expertise
21 P.O. Box 1600
22 Huntsville, AL 35807-4301
23 Street Address: 4820 University Square
24 http://www.hnd.usace.army.mil/
25 U.S. Army Environmental Center (USAEC)
26 Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD 21010-5401
27 Tel: (800) USA-3845
28 http://aec.army.mil
29 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Research and Development
30 Alternative Treatment Technology Information Center (ATTIC)
31 (a database of innovative treatment technologies)
32 http://www.epa.gov/bbsnrmrl/attic/index.html
33 U.S. EPA, Technology Information Office
34 Remediation and Characterization Innovative Technologies (REACH-IT)
35 http://www.epareachit.org/index.html
36 U.S. EPA, Technology Information Office
37 Hazardous Waste Clean-Up Information (CLU-IN)
38 http://www.clu-in.org/
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Guidance
U.S. EPA, Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response
Directive 9200.4-17
Use ofMonitored Natural Attenuation at Superfund, RCRA Corrective Action, Underground Storage
Tank Sites
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6.0 EXPLOSIVES SAFETY
Substantial safety issues are associated with investigation and munition response activities
at sites that may contain UXO. This section describes the statutory and regulatory requirements on
explosives safety, as well as common practices for managing explosives safety. General safety
practices are addressed, as are the specific requirements for the health and safety of OE site
personnel, explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) personnel, and protection of the public.
6.1 Introduction to DoD Explosives Safety Requirements and the DoD Explosives Safety
Board (DDE SB)
Explosives safety is overseen within the DoD by the DoD Explosives Safety Board
(DDESB). This centralized DoD organization is charged with setting and overseeing explosives
safety requirements throughout DoD (see text box on next page). DoD Directive 6055.9 (DoD
Explosives Safety Board and DoD Component Explosives Safety Responsibilities) authorized the
DoD Ammunition and Explosives Safety Standards (July 1999, 6055.9-STD). This directive
requires the implementation and maintenance of an "aggressive" explosives safety program that
addresses environmental considerations and requires the military components to act jointly.
The policies of DoD 605 5 9-STD (the DoD explosives safety standard) include the following:
Provide the maximum possible protection to personnel and property, both inside and
outside the installation, from the damaging effects of potential accidents involving DoD
ammunition and explosives.
Limit the exposure to a minimum number of persons, for a minimum time, to the
minimum amount of ammunition and explosives consistent with safe and efficient
operations.
These policies apply to UXO-contaminated property currently owned by DoD, property undergoing
realignment or closure, and Formerly Used Defense Sites (FUDS), and require that every means
possible be used to protect the public from exposure to explosive hazards. Property known to be or
suspected of being contaminated with UXO must be decontaminated with the most appropriate
technology to ensure protection of the public, taking into consideration the proposed end use of the
property and the capabilities and limitations of the most current UXO detection and discrimination
technologies.
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The Role of the DoD Explosives Safety Board
The DDESB was established by Congress in 1928 as a result of a major disaster at the Naval Ammunition Depot
in Lake Denmark, New Jersey, in 1926. The accident caused heavy damage to the depot and surrounding areas
and communities, killed 21 people, and seriously injured 51 others.
The mission of the DDESB is to provide objective advice to the Secretary of Defense and Service Secretaries on
matters concerning explosives safety and to prevent conditions that may be hazardous to life and property, both
on and off DoD installations, that may result from explosives or the environmental effects of military munitions.
The roles and responsibilities of the DDESB were expanded in 1996 with the reissuance of DoD Directive 6055.9,
on July 29, 1996. The directive gives the DDESB responsibility for resolving any potential conflicts between
explosives safety standards and environmental standards.
To protect human health and property from hazards from explosives, the DDESB (or the
organizations to which it delegates authority) has established requirements for overseeing all
activities relating to munitions at property currently owned by DoD, property undergoing
realignment or closure, and FUDS. As part of those responsibilities, the DDESB or its delegates
must review and approve the explosives safety aspects of all plans for leasing, transferring,
excessing, disposing of, or remediating DoD real property when OE contamination exists or is
suspected to exist. Plans to conduct munitions response actions at FUDS are also submitted to the
DDESB for approval of the explosives safety aspects.87 All explosives safety plans are to be
documented in Explosives Safety Submissions (ESSs), which are submitted to DDESB for approval
prior to any munitions response action being undertaken, or prior to any transfer of real property
where OE may be present (see Section 6.3.2 for a discussion on ESSs). Several investigation and
documentation requirements must be fulfilled in order to complete an ESS (see Section 6.3.3).
The DoD explosives safety standard (6055.9-STD) also applies to any investigation (either
intrusive or nonintrusive) of any ranges or other areas that are known or suspected to have OE.
Adherence to DoD safety standards and to the standards and requirements of the Occupational
Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) is documented in approved, project-specific Site Safety
and Health Plans (SSHPs) for investigations and cleanup actions.88'89 The DDESB may review
SSHPs if requested to do so, but approval of these plans is generally overseen by the individual
component's explosives safety center. Elements of the SSHP and the ESS are likely to overlap,
particularly when the SSHP addresses response actions.
The DoD explosives safety standard is a lengthy document with a great deal of technical
detail. It is organized around 13 technical chapters, plus an introduction. These chapters address:
8"DoD Ammunition and Explosives Safety Standards, DoD Directive 6055.9-STD, Chapter 12, July 1999.
^Occupational Safety and Health Administration Standard, 29 C.F.R. § 1910.120 (b)(4) 29 C.F.R. § 1926.65
(b)(4).
89National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan, 40 C.F.R. § 300.430 (b)(6).
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Effects of explosions and permissible exposures as they relate to buildings,
transportation, and personnel.
Hazard classification and compatibility groups to guide the kinds of explosives that
may and may not be stored together.90
Personnel protection from blast, fragmentation, and thermal hazards.
Facilities construction and siting, as they apply to potential explosion sites.
Electrical standards, establishing minimum requirements for DoD buildings and areas
containing explosives.
Lightning protection, for ammunition and explosives facilities, including safety criteria
for the design, maintenance, testing, and inspection of lightning protection systems.
Hazard identification for fire fighting, providing criteria to minimize risk in fighting
fires involving ammunition and explosives.
Quantity-distance (Q-D), which set minimum standards for separating a potential
explosion site from an exposed site.
Theater of operations quantity-distance, setting standards outside the continental
United States and inside the United States in certain CONUS training situations where
the premise "to train as we fight" would be compromised.
Chemical agent standards, for protecting workers and the general public from the
harmful effects of chemical agents.
Real property contaminated with ammunition, explosives, or chemical agents,
establishing the policies and procedures necessary to protect personnel exposed "as a
result of DoD ammunition, explosives, or chemical agent contamination of real property
currently and formerly owned, leased, or used by the Department of Defense."
Mishap reporting and investigation requirements, establishing procedures and data
to be reported for all munition and explosive mishaps.
Special storage procedures for waste military munitions under a conditional
exemption from certain RCRA requirements or a new RCRA storage unit standard, as
set forth in the Military Munitions Rule (40 C.F.R 260) Federal Register 62(29): 6621-
6657 (February 12, 1997).
6.2 Explosives Safety Requirements
Safety standards published by DDESB are to be considered minimum protection criteria.
In addition to 6055.9-STD, explosives safety organizations are in place in each of the military
components. Each has established its own procedures. A number of these centers have developed
additional technical guidance. The following sections highlight key safety considerations as
described in 6055.9-STD or in various other guidance documents published by military components.
While they often contain similar requirements, guidance documents produced by different
components may use different terminology.
90Hazard classification procedures have been updated in Changes to Department of Defense Ammunition and
Explosives Hazard Classification Procedures, DDESB-KT, July 25, 2001.
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6.2.1 General Safety Rules
The following commonsense safety
rules apply to all munitions response actions
and explosives ordnance disposal (EOD)
activities:
Only qualified UXO/EOD
personnel can be involved in
munitions response actions.
However, non-UXO-qualified
personnel may be used to perform
UXO-related procedures when
supervised by UXO-qualified
personnel. All personnel must be
trained in explosives safety and be
capable of recognizing hazardous
situations.
An exclusion zone (a safety zone established around an OE work area) must be
established. Only essential project personnel and authorized, escorted visitors are
allowed within the exclusion zone. Essential personnel are those who are needed for the
operations being performed. Unauthorized personnel must not be permitted to enter the
area of activity.
Warning signs must be posted to warn the public to stay off the site.
Proper supervision of the operation must be provided.
Personnel are not allowed to work alone during operations.
Exposure should be limited to the minimum number of personnel needed for a
minimum period of time.
Appropriate use of protective barriers or distance separation must be enforced.
Personnel must not be allowed to become careless by reason of familiarity with
munitions.
6.2.2 Transportation and Storage Requirements
Radio Frequencies
Some types of ordnance are susceptible to
electromagnetic radiation (EMR) devices in the radio
frequency (RF) range (i.e., radio, radar, cellular phone,
and television transmitters). Preventive steps should
be taken if such ordnance is encountered in a suspected
EMR/RF environment. The presence of antennas and
communication and radar devices should be noted
before initiating any ordnance-related activities. When
potential EMR hazards exist, the site should be
electronically surveyed for EMR/RF emissions and the
appropriate actions taken (i.e., obey the minimum safe
distances from EMR/RF sources).
The DoD explosives safety standard requires that explosives be stored and transported with
the highest possible level of safety. The standard calls for implementation of the international
system of classification developed by the United Nations Committee of Experts for the Transport
of Dangerous Goods and the hazardous material transportation requirements of the U. S. Department
of Transportation. The classification system comprises nine hazard classes, two of which are
applicable to munitions and explosives. Guidelines are also provided for segregating munitions and
explosives into compatibility groups that have similar characteristics, properties, and potential
accident effects so that they can be transported together without increasing significantly either the
probability of an accident or, for a given quantity, the magnitude of the effects of such an accident.
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The DoD Ammunition and Explosives Hazard Classification Procedures calls for the
following safety precautions for transporting conventional UXO in a nonemergency response:91
EOD-qualified personnel must evaluate the UXO and affirm in writing that the item is
safe for transport prior to transport from the installation or FUDS.
UXO should be transported in a military vehicle using military personnel where possible.
All UXO shall be transported and stored as hazard class 1.1 (defined as UXO capable
of mass explosion), and with the appropriate Compatibility Group. UXO shall be stored
separately from serviceable munitions.92
Military components, working with EOD units, will determine the appropriate
packaging, blocking and bracing, marking, and labeling, and any special handling
requirements for transporting UXO over public transportation routes.
Similarly, storage principles require that munitions and explosives be assigned to
compatibility groups, munitions that can be stored together without increasing the likelihood of an
accident or increasing the magnitude of the effects of an accident. The considerations used to
develop these compatibility groups include chemical and physical properties, design characteristics,
inner and outer packing configurations, Q-D classification, net explosive weight, rate of
deterioration, sensitivity to initiation, and effects of deflagration, explosion, or detonation.
6.2.3 Quantity-Distance (O-D) Requirements
The DoD explosives safety standard establishes guidelines for maintaining separation
between the explosive material expected to be encountered in the OE action and potential receptors
such as personnel, buildings, explosive storage magazines, and public traffic routes. These
encounters may be planned encounters (e.g., open burning/open detonation) or accidental (e.g.,
contact with an ordnance item during investigation). The standard provides formulas for estimating
the damage or injury potential based on the nature and quantity of the explosives, and the minimum
separation distance from receptors at which explosives would not cause damage or injury.
These Q-D siting requirements must be met in the ESS for all OE areas where response
actions will occur, for storage magazines used to store demolition explosives and recovered OE, and
for planned or established demolition areas. In addition, "footprint" areas, those in which render-safe
or blow-in-place procedures will occur during the response action, are also subject to Q-D siting
requirements, but they are not included in the ESS because they are determined during the actual
removal process.
9lChanges to Department of Defense Ammunition and Explosives Hazard Classification Procedures, DDESB-
KT, July 25, 2001.
92For the sake of convenience, the term munition has been used throughout this chapter, in some cases where
the source used the term ammunition.
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Examples of Quantity-Distance Siting Requirements
The following are examples of key concepts used in establishing Q-D requirements (USACE Engineering Manual
1110-1-4009, June 2000):
Extensive and well-documented historical information is essential to understanding the blast and damage
potential at a given OE site.
For all OE sites, a most probable munition (MPM) is determined on the basis of OE items anticipated to be
found at the site. The MPM is the OE item that has the greatest hazard distance (the maximum range fragments
and debris will be thrown), based on calculations of explosive effects. The two key elements considered in
establishing the hazard distance for the MPM are fragmentation (the breaking up of the confining material of
a chemical compound or mechanical mixture when an explosion takes place) and overpressure (the blast wave
or sudden pressure increase).
For explosive soils, a different concept, called maximum credible event (MCE), applies. The MCE is
calculated by relating the concentration of explosives in soil to the weight of the mix. Overpressure and soil
ejection radius are considered in determining Q-D requirements for explosive soils.
6.2.4 Protective Measures for UXO/EOD Personnel
The DoD safety standard and CERCLA, OSHA, and component guidance documents require
that protective measures be taken to protect personnel during investigation and response actions.
The DDESB and military components have established guidelines for implementing such measures.
UXO/EOD personnel conducting OE investigations and response actions face potential risk of injury
and death during these activities. Therefore, in addition to general precautions, DoD health and
safety requirements include (but are not limited to) medical surveillance and proper training of
personnel, as well as the preparation and implementation of emergency response and personal
protective equipment (PPE) programs.
6.2.5 Emergency Response and Contingency Procedures
In the event that an OE incident occurs during response actions or disposal, injuries can be
limited by maintaining a high degree of organization and preparedness. CERCLA, OSHA, and
military component regulations call for the development and implementation of emergency response
procedures before any ordnance-related activities take place. The minimum elements of an
emergency response plan include the following:
Ensure availability of a qualified emergency medical technician (EMT) with a first-
aid kit.
Ensure that communication lines and transportation (i.e., a designated vehicle) are
readily available to effectively care for injured personnel.
Maintain drenching and/or flushing facilities in the area for immediate use in the event
of contact with toxic or corrosive materials.
Develop procedures for reporting incidents to appropriate authorities.
Determine personnel roles, lines of authority, and communications procedures.
Post emergency instructions and a list of emergency contacts.
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Train personnel in emergency recognition and prevention.
Establish the criteria and procedures for site evacuation (emergency alerting
procedures, place of refuge, evacuation routes, site security, and control).
Plan specific procedures for decontamination and medical treatment of injured
personnel.
Have route maps to nearest prenotified medical facility readily available.
Establish the criteria for initiating a community alert program, contacts, and
responsibilities.
Critique the emergency responses and follow-up activities after each incident.
Develop procedures for the safe transport and/or disposal of any live UXO items. In
addition, handle practice rounds with extreme caution and use chain-of-custody
procedures similar to those for live UXO items (practice rounds may contain explosive
charges).
Plan the procedures for acquisition, transport, and storage following demolition of
recovered UXO items.
Equipment such as first-aid supplies, fire extinguishers, a designated emergency vehicle, and
emergency eyewashes/showers should be immediately available in the event of an emergency.
6.2.6 Personal Protective Equipment (PPE)
As required by CERCLA, OSHA, and military component regulations, a PPE program
should be in place at all OE sites. Prior to initiating any ordnance-related activity, a hazard
assessment should be performed to select the appropriate equipment, shielding, engineering controls,
and protective clothing to best protect personnel. Examples of PPE include flame-resistant clothing
and eye and face protection equipment. A PPE plan is also highly recommended to ensure proper
selection, use, and maintenance of PPE. The plan should address the following activities:
PPE selection based on site-specific hazards
Use and limitations of PPE
Maintenance and storage of PPE
Decontamination and disposal of PPE
PPE training and fitting
Equipment donning and removal procedures
Procedures for inspecting equipment before, during, and after use
Evaluation of the effectiveness of the PPE plan
Medical considerations (e.g., work limitations due to temperature extremes)
6.2.7 Personnel Standards
Personnel standards are designed to ensure that the personnel working on or overseeing the
site are appropriately trained. Typical requirements for personnel training vary by level and type
of responsibility, but will specify graduation from one of DoD's training programs. USACE, for
example, requires that all military and contractor personnel be graduates of one of the following
schools or courses:
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The U.S. Army Bomb Disposal School, Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland
U.S. Naval Explosive Ordnance Disposal School, Eglin Air Force Base, Florida (or
Indian Head, Maryland, prior to Spring 1999)
The EOD Assistant's Course, Redstone Arsenal, Alabama
The EOD Assistant's Course, Eglin Air Force Base, Florida
Other DoD-certified course
USACE specifically requires that UXO safety officers be graduates of the Army Bomb Disposal
School and/or the Naval EOD School and have at least 10 years of experience in all phases of UXO
remediation and applicable safety standards. Senior UXO supervisors must be graduates of the same
programs and have had at least 15 years of experience in all aspects of UXO remediation and at least
5 years of experience in a supervisory capacity.93
6.2.8 Assessment Depths
In addition to safeguarding UXO personnel from the hazards from explosives, the DoD
explosives safety standard also mandates protecting the public from UXO hazards. Even at a site
that is thought to be fully remediated, there is no way to know with certainty that every UXO item
has been removed. Therefore, the public must be protected from UXO even after a munitions
response action has been completed. The types and levels of public safeguards will vary with the
level of uncertainty and risk at a site. Public safeguards include property clearance (e.g., depth of
response) to the appropriate depth for planned
DDESB standards establish assessment
depths to be used for interim planning in the
absence of adequate site-specific information
(See Table 6-1 and text box). ESS approvals
rely on the development of site-specific
information to determine response depth
requirements. When site-specific data are not
available, DDESB interim planning assessment
depths are used in an ESS and amended as site-
specific data are developed during the course of a response action.
The response depth selected for response actions is determined using site-specific
information such as the following:
Geophysical characteristics such as bedrock depth and frost line (see Chapters 3 and 7
and text box on the next page).
Estimated UXO depth based on surface detection and intrusive sampling.
In the absence of sampling data, information about the maximum depth of ordnance used
on-site based on maximum penetration source documents.
93 Ordnance and Explosives Response: Engineering and Design, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, EP 1110-1-18,
April 24, 2000.
Chapter 6. Explosives Safety 6-8 December 2001
land uses and enforcement of designated land uses.
EPA/DoD Management Principles on Standards for
Depths of Clearance
In the absence of site-specific data, a table of
assessment depths is used for interim planning
purposes until the site-specific information is
developed.
Site-specific data are necessary to determine the
actual depth of clearance.
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Actual planned land use that may require deeper excavation than the default clearance
depths (e.g., a commercial or industrial building with foundations deeper than 10 feet).
Remediation response depth a minimum of 4 feet below the excavation depth planned
for construction (DDESB requirement).
Presence of cultural or natural resources (e.g., potential risk to soil biota or
archeologically sensitive areas)
Other factors that affect the munitions response depth include the size of the range, the cost
of the munition response (depends on many variables, including range size and terrain), and the
practicality of finding and excavating all of the UXO.
If UXO detection capabilities are not
sensitive enough or funds are not available to
remove UXO to the depth needed to meet site
specific response requirements, then the
proposed land use must be changed so that risks
to human health and the environment are
managed appropriately. Site records should
include information concerning the depth to
which UXO was removed, the process by
which that depth was determined, and notice of
the risks to safety if the end land use is
violated.
Table 6-1. Assessment Depths To Be Used for Planning Purposes
Planned Land I se
Dcplli
Unrestricted - Commercial, Residential, Utility, Subsurface, Recreational (e.g., camping),
Construction Activity
10 ft*
Public Access - Agricultural, Surface Recreational, Vehicle Parking, Surface Supply Storage
4 ft
Limited Public Access - Livestock Grazing, Wildlife Preserve
1ft
Not Yet Determined
Surface
* Assessment planning at construction sites for any projected end use requires looking at the possibility of UXO
presence 4 feet below planned excavation depths.
Source: DoD Ammunition and Explosives Safety Standards, DoD Directive 6055.9-STD, Chapter 12, July 1999.
The DDESB is in the process of revising Chapter 12 of DoD 6055.9-STD.
6.2.9 Land Use Controls
Land use controls include institutional controls (e.g., legal or governmental), site access (e.g.,
fences), and engineering controls (e.g., caps over contaminated areas) that separate people from
potential hazards. They are designed to reduce ordnance and explosive risk over the long term
without physically removing all of the OE. Land use controls are necessary at many sites because
of the technical limitations and prohibitive costs of adequately conducting a munitions response at
CTT ranges to allow for certain end uses, particularly unrestricted use (see text box).
Frost Line and Erosion
The ultimate removal depth must consider the frost line
of the site and the potential for erosion. A phenomenon
known as frost heave can move ordnance to the
surface during the freeze and thaw cycles. If ordnance
is not cleared to the frost line depth, or if the site
conditions indicate erosion potential (such as in
agricultural areas), a procedure must be put in place to
monitor the site for migration of ordnance. (See
Chapter 3, Section 3.3.3, for more information on this
topic.)
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The DoD explosives safety standard
specifically addresses a requirement for
institutional controls when OE contamination
has been or may still be on the site: "Property
transfer records shall detail past munition and
explosive contamination and decontamination
efforts; provide requisite residual
contamination information; and advise the user
not to excavate or drill in a residual
contamination area without a metal detection survey."94
The appropriate land use control depends on site-specific factors such as proximity to
populations, land use, risk of encountering OE, community involvement, and site ownership (both
current and future). It is important to coordinate activities with the appropriate Federal, State, local,
and Tribal governments in the development and implementation of land use controls to ensure their
effectiveness even after the response action has been completed (see text box on next page).
The EPA policy, "Institutional Controls and Transfer of Real Property under CERCLA
Section 120 (h)(3)(A), (B), or (C)," recognizes that although a variety of land use controls may be
used to manage risk at sites, the maintenance of site access and engineering controls depends on
institutional controls. Institutional controls include the governmental and legal management controls
that help ensure that engineering and site access controls are maintained. The Federal agency in
charge of a site has responsibilities beyond implementing the institutional controls. EPA policy
requires the responsible agency to perform the following activities:95
Monitor the institutional controls' effectiveness and integrity.
Report the results of such monitoring, including notice of violation or failure of controls,
to the appropriate EPA and/or State regulator, local or Tribal government, and
designated party or entity responsible for enforcement.
Enforce the institutional controls should a violation or failure of the controls occur.
In order to ensure long-term protection of human health and safety in the presence of
potential explosive hazards, institutional controls must be enforceable against whomever may gain
ownership or control of the property in the future.
Examples of Land Use Controls
Security fencing or other measures to limit access
Warning signs
Postremoval site control (maintenance and
surveillance)
Land repurchase
Deed restrictions
94Department of Defense, DoD Ammunition and Explosives Safety Standard, DoD 6055.9-STD, July 1999.
95Institutional Controls and Transfer of Real Property Under CERCLA Section 120 (h)(3)(A), (B), or (C),
Interim Final Guidance, U.S. EPA, January 2000.
Chapter 6. Explosives Safety 6-10 December 2001
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EPA/DoD Interim Final Management Principles on Land Use Controls
Land use controls must be clearly defined, established in coordination with affected parties, and enforceable.
Land use controls will be considered as part of the development and evaluation of response alternatives for
a given CTT range.
DoD will conduct periodic reviews to ensure the long-term effectiveness of response actions, including land
use controls.
6.3 Managing Explosives Safety
DoD Directive 6055.9 establishes the roles and responsibilities for DDESB and each of the
military components. DDESB oversees implementation of safety standards throughout DoD and
may conduct surveys to identify whether such standards are appropriately implemented. The
military components conduct similar reviews within their respective services. At ranges where
investigation, response action, and real property transfer are the major focus, the implementation of
explosives safety requirements is normally documented in two ways:
Site Safety and Health Plans (SSHPs) describe activities to be taken to comply with
occupational health and safety regulations. SSHPs are often part of a work plan for
investigation and response. Although implementation is overseen by DDESB, approval
of specific SSHPs is typically conducted by the individual military component
responsible for the response action (e.g., Army, Navy, or Air Force) through their
explosives safety organizations.
Explosives Safety Submissions (ESSs) describe the safety considerations of the planned
response actions, including the impact of planned clearance depths on current and future
land use. All DoD ESSs are submitted to and approved by DDESB, as described in
Section 6.3.2 and 6.3.3.
Many requirements documented in detail in the SSHP are summarized in the ESS.
6.3.1 Site Safety and Health Plans
SSHPs fulfill detailed requirements for compliance with the occupational safety and health
program requirements of CERCLA, OSHA, and the military components.96'97'98 SSHPs are based
on the premise of limiting the exposure to the minimum amount of OE and to the fewest personnel
for the shortest possible period of time. Prior to the initiation of on-site investigations, or any
96National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan, 40 C.F.R. § 300.430 (b)(6).
97Occupational Safety and Health Administration Standard, 29 C.F.R. § 1910.120 (b)(4), 29 C.F.R. § 1926.65
(b)(4).
98 Ordnance and Explosives Response: Engineering and Design, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, EP 1110-1-18,
April 24, 2000.
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design, construction, or operation and maintenance activities, an SSHP must be prepared and
submitted for review and acceptance for each site task and operation described in the work plan."
SSHPs are typically prepared by industrial hygiene personnel at the installation level.100 The SSHP
review and approval processes vary with the type of property (e.g., FUDS, BRAC, active
installations), the stage of the investigation, and the military component responsible. Typically,
however, the component's explosives safety organization will be responsible for the review and
approval of SSHPs (see text box on next page).
The SSHP describes the safety and health procedures, practices, and equipment to be used
to protect personnel from the OE hazards of each phase of the site activity. The level of detail to
be included in the SSHP should reflect the requirements of the site-specific project, including the
level of complexity and anticipated hazards. Nonintrusive investigation activities such as site visits
or pre-work-plan visits may require abbreviated SSHPs.101 Specific elements to be addressed in the
SSHP include several of those discussed in previous sections, including:
Personnel protective equipment,
Emergency response and contingency planning, and
Employee training.
Other commonly required elements of SSHPs include, but are not limited to:
Employee medical surveillance programs;
Frequency and type of air monitoring, personnel monitoring, and environmental
sampling techniques and instrumentation to be used;
Site control measures to limit access; and
Documented standard operating procedures for investigating or remediating OE.
99Safety and Health Requirements, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, EM 385-1-1, September 3, 1996.
l00Safety and Occupational Health Requirements for Hazardous, Toxic, and Radioactive Waste (HTRW)
Activities, ER 385-1-92, September 1, 2000.
mOrdnance and Explosives Response: Engineering and Design, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, EP 1110-1-18,
April 24, 2000.
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Implementation of Explosives Safety at the Site Level
Each military component has its own set of specific requirements for work plans and Site Safety and Health Plans
(SSHPs). The nomenclature and organization may vary by component. USACE requires the following plans in
the implementation of explosives safety requirements. These will not necessarily be separate plans, but may be
subplans of response action work plans.
Explosives Management Plan, regarding the procedures and materials that will be used to manage explosives
at the site, including acquisition, receipt, storage, transportation, and inventory.
Explosives Siting Plan, providing the safety criteria for siting explosives operations at the site. This plan
should provide a description of explosives storage magazines, including the net explosive weight (NEW) and
quantity-distance (Q-D) criteria, and OE areas, including separation distances and demolition areas, all of
which should be identified on a site map. The footprint of all areas handling explosives also should be
identified. Explosives siting plans should be incorporated into the Q-D section of the ESS.
Site Safety and Health Plan (SSHP), addressing the safety and health hazards of each phase of site activity
and the procedures for their control. The SSHP includes, but is not limited to, the following elements:
Safety and health risk or hazard analysis for each site task identified in the work plan
Employee training assignments
Personal protective equipment program
Medical surveillance requirements
Frequency and type of air monitoring, personnel monitoring, and environmental sampling techniques and
instrumentation to be used
Emergency response plan
Site control program
Sources: Engineering andDesignof Ordnance andExplosives Response, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, EM 1110-
1-4009, June 23,2000; and Safety and Health Requirements Manual, U.S. Army Corps ofEngineers, EM-385-1-1,
September 3, 1996.
6.3.2 Explosives Safety Submissions for OE Response Actions
An Explosives Safety Submission (ESS)
must be completed by those wishing to conduct
an OE investigation and response action and
approved by appropriate authorities prior to
commencing work (see text box at right).
Although the DDESB oversees the approval
process, the internal approval processes are
slightly different for each military component.
However, all ESSs should be written in
coordination with the DDESB, as well as with stakeholder, public, and Tribal participation. In
addition, the DDESB's role in approving ESSs is slightly different, depending on whether the OE
area is a FUDS project, a BRAC-related project involving property disposal, or a project at an active
facility:
For all DoD-owned facilities, the ESS is prepared at the installation level (either the
active installation or the BRAC facility) and sent through the designated explosives
EPA/DoD Interim Final Management Principles on
Explosives Safety Submissions
Explosives safety submissions (ESS), prepared,
submitted, and approved per DDESB requirements, are
required for time-critical removal actions, non-time-
critical removal actions, and remedial actions involving
explosives safety hazards, particularly UXO.
Chapter 6. Explosives Safety
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safety office for initial approval. The role of the explosives safety organization in the
approval chain differs slightly by component.
For FUDS, the initial ESS is prepared by the USACE district with responsibility for the
site.
The DDESB reviews and gives approval to all ESSs at BRAC facilities and other closed
facilities (i.e., a facility that has been closed by a component but is not part of the BRAC
program).
Regulators and other stakeholders will be provided an opportunity for timely
consultation, review, and comment on all phases of a removal response, except in the
case of an emergency response taken because of an imminent and substantial
endangerment to human health and the environment, for which consultation would be
impractical (see 10U.S.C. 2705, Addressing DoD Environmental Restoration Activities
under SARA).
Final approval of ESSs for closed ranges at active facilities is provided by the command
(e.g., MAJCOM, MACOM, or Major Claimant) often in coordination with the DDESB.
Coordination Prior to Submission of the ESS
ESSs, reviewed by the DDESB, must include a description of public and regulator involvement before they are
approved. The extent to which involved parties agree with the proposed response action is important to avoiding
unnecessary conflict and delay of the proposed cleanup. This issue has received specific attention during
development of the UXO Interim Final Management Principles.
Source: Interview with DDESB secretariat member.
An ESS is not required for military EOD emergency response actions (on DoD or non-DoD
property); for interim removal actions taken to abate an immediate, extremely high hazard; and for
normal maintenance operations conducted on active ranges. Figure 6-1 outlines the approval
processes for OE projects under different types of DoD ownership. "Sources and Resources," at the
end of this chapter, lists the location of the various explosives safety offices for each of the military
components.
6.3.3 Explosives Safety Submission Requirements
Safety planning involves a thorough assessment of the explosive hazards likely to be
encountered on-site during the investigation and response actions. The potential explosive hazards
must be assessed and documented prior to submitting an explosives safety plan, as outlined in the
next text box.102
The ESS often includes information obtained in preliminary studies, historical research,
previous OE sampling reports, and SSHPs. Specific information required in the submission includes
the following:
lmExplosives Safety Policyfor Real Property Containing Conventional Ordnance and Explosives, U.S. Army,
DACS-SF HQDA LTR 385-00-2, June 30, 2000.
Chapter 6. Explosives Safety
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FUDS projects
BR AC or other
closed facilities
Closed Ranges at
Active Facilities
All Services
Army
Air Force
Navy
All Services
USACE
geographic district
prepares ESS
USACE geographic
district sends ESS to
US Army Engineering
and Support Center
(Huntsville) for review
US Army Engineering
and Support Center
(Huntsville) reviews
ESS and forwards to
Headquarters, USACE
Safety and
Occupational Health
Office
The Headquarters,
USACE Safety and
Occuaptional health
Office endorsesESS
and forwards to
USATCES for review
and final Army approval
The USATCES
approves ESS and
forwards to DDESB for
final approval
( The DDESB\
reviews and gives j
V approval J
The Army
installation
prepares ESS
The installation
forwards ESS to
MACOM safety office
for endorsement.
Installation sends ESS
to USACE district office
and to US Army
Engineering and
Support Center
(Hunsville) for review.
The USACE geographic
district and the U.S.
Army Engineering and
Support Center
(Huntsville) provide
comments and
concurrence to the
MACOM safety office.
The MACOM safety
office reviews the ESS
and forwards to
USATCES with
MACOM
recommendations.
The USATCES
approves ESS and
forwards to DDESB for
final approval
The DDESB\
reviews and gives)
approval J
The Host Wing,
Installation
Commander, or
specific AF Agency
prepare ESS
ESS sent to
Numbered Air
Force (NAF) (if
one exists)
NAF sends ESS to
MAJCOM
MAJCOM provides
review and concurrence
and forwards ESS to Air
Force Safety Center
(AFSC/SEW), and
appropriate Army
agency, if one is
involved
AFSC/SEW sends
ESS to DDESB for
review and
approval
The DDESB
reviews and gives
approval
Activity or
NAVFAC prepares
ESS
Activity explosive
safety
representative
reviews ESSs
Activity sends ESS
to Major claimant
Claimant forwards
ESS to
NAVORDCEN for
review and approval
and copy is sent to
Naval Ordnance
Safety and Security
Activity (NOSSA)
NOSSA sends
ESS to DDESB for
review and
approval
The DDESB^
reviews and gives)
approval J
Installation, Host
Wing, agency, or
Activity prepares
ESS
Installation (or
other organization)
provides ESS to
component
explosives safety
office.
/MACOM, MAJCOM, or\
Major Claimant provides j
V final approval J
Sources: DACS-SF HQDA LTR 385-00-2, 30 June 2000 (Expires 30 June 2002). Subject: Explosives Safety Policy for Real Property Containing Conventional Ordnance and Explosives
NAVSEA OP 5, Ammunition and Explosives Ashore: Safety Regulations for Handling, Storing, Production, Renovation and Shipping, Vol. 1, Rev. 6, Chg. 4.
Air Force Manual 91-201, Explosives Safety Standards, 7 March 2000
Figure 6-1. Routing and approval of explosives safety submission (ESS) for OE response actions
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Quantity-distance (Q-D) maps describing the location of OE, storage magazines, and
demolition areas
Soil sampling maps for explosives-contaminated soils
The amounts and types of OE expected based on historical research and site sampling
Planned techniques to detect, recover, and destroy OE103
The amount and type of OE expected in each OE area is identified in the ESS. The
submission must specify the most probable munition likely to be present. The most probable
munition is the round with the greatest fragmentation distance that is anticipated to be found in any
particular OE area. The ESS also identifies explosives-contaminated soils, which are expressed as
the maximum credible event (established by multiplying the concentration of explosives times the
weight of the explosives-contaminated soil). These data are input into formulas for establishing the
damage or injury potential of the OE on-site. See the text box in Section 6.2.3 on Q-D requirements
for additional information about the use of these data in the ESS.
Explosives Safety Submission Requirements
Safety plans are submitted at least 60 days prior to the planned response action and typically cover the following
elements:
1.
Reason for OE presence
2.
Maps (regional, site, quantity-distance, and soil sampling)
3.
Amounts and types of OE
4.
Start date of removal action
5.
Frost line depth and provisions for surveillance (if necessary)
6.
Clearance techniques (to detect, recover, and destroy OE)
7.
Alternate techniques (to destroy OE on-site if detonation is not used)
8.
Q-D criteria (OE areas, magazines, demolition areas, "footprint" areas)
9.
Off-site disposal (method and transportation precautions, if necessary)
10.
Technical support
11.
Land use restrictions and other institutional controls
12.
Public involvement plan
13.
After action report (list OE found by type, location, and depth)
14.
Amendments and corrections to submission
Note: This list is not inclusive. See military component's guidance for full requirements.
6.4 Public Education About UXO Safety
Public education is an important component of managing explosive hazards and their
potential impacts on human health and safety. At some sites, such as at Naval Air Station Adak in
Alaska, it is technically and economically impossible to remove all of the OE littered throughout the
island. In such a situation, educating the public about hazards posed by OE is a necessity in
protecting the public. Also, at other, less contaminated sites where cleared areas are being opened
l03Explosives Safety Submissionsfor Removal ofOrdnance and Explosives (OE) from Real Property, Guidance
for Clearance Plans, DDESB-KO, February 27, 1998.
Chapter 6. Explosives Safety
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1 to the public but where a small number of UXO items may remain, public education is also necessary
2 in the event that someone encounters a previously undetected UXO item. A discussion of the highly
3 successful public education program at NAS Adak is presented in the following text box.
Adak Island, Alaska
The northern half of Adak Island was used by the Army Air Corps and then the Navy for over 50 years, resulting
in UXO and OE materials in and around the former range areas. Some portions of the property have been made
suitable for transfer while others have been/are being retained by the Navy because of the presence of known
ordnance. The parcels of land that are being transferred to local commercial interests may still contain isolated OE
in developed and undeveloped portions of the property. The Reuse Safety Plan stipulates permitted land use
activities and regulatory, legal, and educational requirements to ensure the safety of residents (both current and
future) and visitors to the island.
Historically, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS), which now owns the land, implemented a
comprehensive program to provide education about ordnance to visitors to Adak. This program, along with other
institutional controls, has resulted in a very low number of ordnance-related injuries on Adak Island over the past
50 years.
The islandwide ordnance education program now includes several approaches:
Ordnance safety videos are shown to new visitors or future residents before they are allowed to work or reside
on the island. The videos cover the following topics:
~ Dig permit requirements
~ OE identification
~ Safety requirements for construction personnel
~ Geophysical screening
~ Locations of UXO sites and clearance activities
~ Ordnance descriptions
~ Safety protocols
~ Access restrictions and warning signs
~ Emergency procedures
An ordnance education program is incorporated into the educational system at the lower grades to educate
and protect local children.
The Adak On-line Safety Program was developed by the Navy to assist in the annual ordnance safety
certification process for residents and visitors. The program includes a description of the types of ordnance
hazards that may potentially exist, an automated dig permit application, an on-line graphic glossary of historical
ordnance locations and schematics of the most commonly found ordnance types, emergency procedures, and
a database to record the training records of everyone who has taken the on-line training.
Deed restrictions ensure that future purchasers of property aware of potential contamination on the property.
Signage for restricted and nonrestricted property is posted at entrances and exits and at specified intervals along
the perimeter.
4 Education about the hazards associated with UXO should be available to everyone in the
5 community, with special attention paid to those who reside, work, and play at or near affected areas.
6 Public education should be directed at both the adults and children of the community and should be
7 reinforced on a regular basis. However, a balance must be found between addressing explosives
8 safety and alarming the public. The types of information conveyed to the public should include the
9 fact that any UXO item poses the risk of injury or death to anyone in the vicinity. UXO can be
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1 found anywhere - on the ground surface, or partially or fully buried. UXO can be found in any state
2 - fully intact or in parts or fragments. An encounter with UXO should be reported immediately -
3 either to site EOD personnel or, if they are not available, the military provost marshal or the local
4 law enforcement agency.
5 Those living, working, or recreating in or near areas thought to contain UXO should be
6 taught what to do and what not to do in the event of an encounter with UXO, including whom they
7 should notify. The Navy EOD Technology Division has developed instructions for the public and
8 site personnel to follow in the event of an encounter with UXO, as described in the following text
9 box.
Instructions for Responding to and Reporting UXO Hazards
1. After identifying the potential presence of UXO, do not move any closer to it. Some types of ordnance have
magnetic or motion-sensitive proximity fuzes that may detonate when they sense a target. Others may have self-
destruct timers built in.
2. Do not transmit any radio frequencies in the vicinity of a suspected UXO hazard. Signals transmitted from
items such as walkie-talkies, short-wave radios, citizens band (CB) radios, cellular phone, or other
communication or navigation devices may detonate the UXO.
3. Do not attempt to remove any object on, attached to, or near a UXO. Some fuzes are motion-sensitive, and the
UXO may explode.
4. Do not move or disturb a UXO because the motion could activate the fuze, causing the UXO to explode.
5. If possible, mark the UXO hazard site with a standard UXO marker or with other suitable materials, such as
engineer's tape, colored cloth, or colored ribbon. Attach the marker to an object so that it is about 3 feet off
the ground and visible from all approaches. Place the marker no closer than the point where you first
recognized the UXO hazard.
6. Leave the UXO hazard area.
7. Report the UXO to the proper authorities.
8. Stay away from areas of known or suspected UXO. This is the best way to prevent accidental injury or death.
REMEMBER: "IF YOU DID NOT DROP IT, DO NOT PICK IT UP!"
10 6.5 Conclusion
11 DoD has developed extensive requirements aimed at protecting OE workers and the public
12 from explosive hazards. These safeguards include general precautions as well as highly technical
13 explosives safety and personnel health and safety requirements. Management requirements include
14 preparing and submitting SSHPs for all OE investigations and response actions, and ESSs for OE
15 removal actions. SSHPs require that protective measures be taken for OE personnel, including the
16 development and implementation of emergency response and contingency plans, personnel training,
17 medical surveillance, and personnel protective equipment programs. The development of ESSs
18 requires knowledge about the munitions likely to be found on-site and the devising of plans for
19 separating explosive hazards from potential receptors.
20 DoD safety guidance also addresses the protection of public health and safety. The DoD
21 explosives safety standard (6055.9-STD) provides assessment depths to be used for planning
Chapter 6. Explosives Safety
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purposes, storage and transport principles, and land use controls, all of which are designed to ensure
long-term protection of human health and safety.
Public health and safety can also be protected by educating the public about explosives
safety. In addition, educating the public about procedures to follow upon encountering OE will help
to prevent accidents and to give the public control over protecting themselves from explosive
hazards.
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SOURCES AND RESOURCES
The following publications, offices, laboratories, and websites are provided as a guide for
handbook users to obtain additional information about the subject matter addressed in each chapter.
Several of these publications, offices, laboratories, or websites were also used in the development
of this handbook.
Publications
Department of Defense, Operation and Environmental Executive Steering Committee for Munitions
(OEESCM). Draft Munitions Action Plan: Maintaining Readiness through Environmental
Stewardship and Enhancement ofExplosives Safety in the Life Cycle Management of Munitions,
Draft Revision 4.3, February 25, 2000.
Department of Defense and U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. Management Principles for
Implementing Response Actions at Closed, Transferring, and Transferred (CTT) Ranges, March
7, 2000.
Guidance Documents
Air Force Manual 91-201, Safety: Explosives Safety Standards, March 7, 2000.
Air Force Instruction 32-9004, Civil Engineering. Disposal of Real Property, July 21, 1994.
Department of the Army, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Safety and Occupational Health
Requirements for Hazardous, Toxic, and Radioactive Waste (HTRW) Activities, ER 385-1-92,
September 1, 2000.
Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, Interservice Responsibilities for Explosive
Ordnance Disposal, Joint Army Regulation 75-14, OPNAVINST 8027.1G, MCO 8027. ID, AFJI
32-3002, February 14, 1992.
Department of Defense, DoD 6055.9-STD, Do I) Ammunition and Explosives Safety Standards,
July 1999.
Department of Defense Directive 6055.9. DoD Explosives Safety Board (DDESB) and DoD
Component Explosives Safety Responsibilities, July 29, 1996.
Department of Defense Explosives Safety Board, Changes to Department ofDefense Ammunition
and Explosives Hazard Classification Procedures, DDESB-KT, July 25, 2001.
Department of Defense Explosives Safety Board, DDESB-KO, Guidance for Clearance Plans,
February 27, 1998.
Chapter 6. Explosives Safety
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1 U.S. Army, Headquarters, Explosives Safety Policy for Real Property Containing Conventional
2 Ordnance and Explosives, DACS-SF HQDA LTR 385-00-2, June 30, 2000.
3 U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Huntsville Center, Ordnance and Explosives Center of Expertise,
4 Public Involvement Plan for Ordnance and Explosives Response, Interim Guidance (Draft ETL
5 1110-1-170), September 15, 1995.
6 U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Engineering and Design, Safety and Health Aspects ofHTRW
I Remediation Technologies, Engineer Manual (EM 1110-1-4007), September 30, 1999.
8 U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Ordnance and Explosives Response: Engineering and Design,
9 Pamphlet No. 1110-1-18, April 24, 2000.
10 U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Engineering and Design Ordnance and Explosives Response,
II Manual No. 1110-1-4009, June 23, 2000.
12 U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Huntsville Center, Basic Safety Concepts and Considerations for
13 Ordnance and Explosives Operations, EP 3 85-1-95a, June 29, 2001.
14 U.S. EPA, Institutional Controls and Transfer of Real Property Under CERCLA Section
15 120(h)(3)(A), (B) or (C), February 2000.
16 U.S. Navy, U.S. Navy Explosives Safety Policies, Requirements, and Procedures, Explosives
17 Safety Policy Manual, OPNAV Instruction 8023.2C., January 29, 1986.
18 U.S. Navy, Ammunition and Explosives Ashore: Safety Regulations for Handling, Storing,
19 Production, Renovation and Shipping, NAVSEA, OP 5, Vol. 1, Rev. 6, Chg. 4, March, 1999.
20 Information Sources
21 Department of Defense Explosives Safety Board (DDESB)
22 2461 Eisenhower Avenue
23 Alexandria, VA 22331-0600
24 Fax: (703)325-6227
25 http://www.hqda.army.mil/ddesb/esb.html
26 Joint UXO Coordination Office (JUXOCO)
27 1 0221 Burbeck Road, Suite 430
28 Fort Belvoir, VA 22060-5806
29 Tel: (703) 704-1090
30 Fax: (703) 704-2074
31 http://www.denix.osd.mil/UXOCOE
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Naval Safety Center, Code 40
375 A Street
Norfolk, VA 23511-4399
Tel: (757) 444-3520
http://www.safetycenter.navy.mil/
Naval Explosive Ordnance Disposal Technology Division
(NAVEODTECHDIV)
UXO Countermeasures Department, Code 30U
2008 Stump Neck Road
Indian Head, MD 20640-5070
http://www.ih.navy.mil/
Naval Ordnance Environmental Support Office
Naval Ordnance Safety and Security Activity
23 Strauss Avenue, Bldg. D-323
Indian Head, MD 26040
Tel: (301) 744-4450/6752
Ordata II (database of ordnance items)
Available from: NAVEODTECHDIV, Code 602
2008 Stump Neck Road
Indian Head, MD 20640-5070
e-mail: ordata@eodpoe2. navsea. navy .mil
U.S. Air Force Safety Center
HQ AFSC
9700 G Avenue SE
Kirtland AFB, NM 87117-5670
http://www-afsc.saia.af.mil/
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
U.S. Army Engineering and Support Center
Ordnance and Explosives Mandatory Center of Expertise
P.O. Box 1600
4820 University Square
Huntsville, AL 35807-4301
http://www.hnd.usace.army.mil/
U.S. Army Technical Center for Explosives Safety
Attn: SIOAC-ESL, Building 35
1C Tree Road
McAlester, OK 74501-9053
e-mail: sioac-esl@dac-emh2. army. mil
http://www.dac.army.mil/es
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7.0
SITE/RANGE CHARACTERIZATION AND RESPONSE
Characterizing OE contamination is a challenging process that requires specialized
investigative techniques. Unlike traditional hazardous waste contamination, OE may not be
distributed in a predictable manner; OE contamination is not contiguous, and every ordnance item
and fragment is discrete. The use of existing technologies by investigators to detect anomalies, and
find the ordnance, and then discriminate between UXO, fragments of exploded ordnance, and
background levels of ferrous materials in soils may be technically challenging or infeasible.
Locating buried munitions whose burial may not have been well documented can also be difficult.
The technical and cost issues become even more daunting when the large land areas associated with
many ranges (potentially tens of thousands of acres), as well as other range characteristics, such as
heavy vegetation or rock strata and soils, are considered. Some level of uncertainty is expected for
any subsurface environmental investigation; however, the consequences of potential uncertainties
related to OE investigations (e.g., accidental explosion resulting in possible death or
dismemberment) elevate the level of public and regulatory concern.
The purpose of this chapter is to outline
an approach to site characterization for OE
based on a systematic planning process and to
identify the choices you will make to tailor the
investigation to your site. Specifically, this
chapter is designed to:
Present an overview of the
elements and issues associated with
sampling and the systematic
planning process (SPP).
Discuss development of the goals of
the investigation.
Help you prepare for the
investigation: gathering
information, preparing the
Conceptual Site Model, and
establishing data quality objectives.
Discuss the design of the sampling
and analysis effort (including the
role of statistical sampling).
Demonstrate the integration of
quality assurance/quality control
(QA/QC) throughout the
investigation.
What Is the Systematic Planning Process?
"Systematic planning" is a generic term used to
describe a logic-based scientific process for planning
environmental investigations and other activities. EPA
developed a systematic planning process called the
Data Quality Objectives Process and published a
document called Guidance for the Data Quality
Objectives (DQO) Process (EPA/600/R-96/055,1996).
While not mandatory, this seven-step process is
recommended for many EPA data collection activities.
The planning processes used by other Federal agencies
do not necessarily follow the seven steps of the DQO
process. Forexample, using different terminology, but
a similar systematic planning process, the U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers adopted a four-step Technical
Project Planning Process to implement systematic
planning for cleanup activities. Confusion is caused by
the different names applied to similar processes used
by different Federal agencies and departments.
Therefore, EPA is moving toward a more general
descriptor of this important process that can be used to
describe a number of different systematic planning
processes. (EPA Order, "Policy and Program
Requirements for the Mandatory Quality System"
(5360.1 A2, May 2000).
Identify analytical methods for analyzing munition constituents.
Outline how to pull together the information developed in the sampling and analysis
process to develop a site response strategy.
Chapter 7. Site/Range Characterization 7-1 December 2001
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This chapter does not focus on the investigation of munition constituents except where there are
issues unique to such constituents that should be addressed. Except for OE-unique issues such an
investigation would be similar to the investigation of other hazardous wastes, and the numerous
guidance documents that have been written on the investigation of hazardous wastes would apply.
(See "Sources and Resources" at the end of this chapter for guidance on conducting hazardous waste
investigations.) Instead, this chapter addresses site investigations of OE, which generally consists
of one of three types of waste products:
Munitions that have not exploded, including UXO (e.g., duds) or buried or otherwise
discarded munitions, including bulk explosives
Ordnance fragments from exploded munitions that may retain residues of sufficient
quantity and type to be explosive
Concentrations of reactive and/or ignitable materials in soil (e.g., munition constituents
in soil from partly exploded, i.e., low-order detonation, or corroded ordnance that are
present in sufficient quantity and weight to pose explosive hazards)
7.1 Overview of Elements of OE Site Characterization
An effective strategy for OE site characterization uses a variety of tools and techniques to
locate and excavate OE and to ensure understanding of uncertainties that may remain. The selection
and effective deployment of these tools and techniques for the particular investigation will be
determined through the systematic planning process. The following steps are included in a typical
investigation:
Use of historical information to:
Identify what types of ordnance were used at the facility and where they were used
Identify areas of the facility where there is no evidence of ordnance use, thereby
reducing the size of the area to be investigated
Prioritize the investigation in terms of likelihood of ordnance presence, type of
ordnance used, potential hazard of ordnance, public access to the area, and planned
end uses
Consider the need to address explosives safety issues prior to initiating the
investigation
Visual inspection of range areas to be investigated, and surface response actions to
facilitate investigation
Selection of appropriate geophysical system(s) and determination of site-specific
performance of the selected geophysical detection system
Establishment and verification of measurement quality objectives in the sampling and
analysis methodologies (QA/QC measurements)
Geophysical survey of areas of concern (i.e., areas likely to be contaminated)
Analysis of geophysical survey data to identify metallic anomalies, and possibly to help
discriminate between OE, ordnance fragments, and non-OE-related metal waste, and
QA/QC of that analysis
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Anomaly reacquisition and excavation to identify the sources of the geophysical
anomalies, to verify geophysical mapping results, and to gather data on the nature and
extent of OE contamination
Analysis of investigation results to test assumptions and set priorities for future work
Some of the particular challenges and issues to consider in using these tools include the
following:
Finding adequate and reliable historical information on the former uses of ranges and the
types of munitions likely to be found
Matching the particular detection technology to the type of UXO expected and to the
geology and the topography of the range
Confirming the field detection data
Establishing a clear understanding
of the nature and extent of UXO
contamination and resulting
uncertainty
Performing the investigation in
stages that refine its focus in order
to ensure that the data collected are
appropriate to the decision required
Optimizing available resources
There is no single solution for
resolving the challenges of an OE site
characterization, but the starting place for
every investigation is to establish the decisions
to be made and the resulting goal(s) of the
investigation.
7.2 Overview of Systematic Planning
As with any environmental
investigation, designing the range investigation
and judiciously applying investigative tools
must take place in the context of a systematic
planning process (Figure 7-1). The process
starts with identifying the decision goals of the
project. Available information is then used to
identify data requirements that support the
decision goals and to define the objectives of
the investigation. Finally, the sampling
strategy of the investigation is tailored to
ensure that the data gathered are of appropriate
quantity and quality to support the decision
Establish team to direct
project.
Identify decisions that
will be made as a result
of investigation.
Develop conceptual
site model (CSM) and
preliminary remediation
goals (PRGs).
Gather existing
information.
Identify uncertainties.
Determine required
additional information.
Identify project
schedule, resources,
milestones, and
regulatory
requirements.
Identify remedial
objectives.
Identify data quality
objectives.
Determine how, when,
and where data will be
collected.
Determine quantity of
data needed and
specific performance
*
criteria.
Specify QA/QC
activities.
Investigation
Stage 2:
Identify objectives
f investigation
Stage 3:
Design Sampling
and Analysis
Effort
Figure 7-1. Systematic Planning Process
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goals. Each stage of the systematic planning process is carefully refined by the succeeding stages.
Figure 7-1 outlines how the systematic planning process is used to design the investigation to meet
the requirements of the project. Although the figure outlines an apparently sequential process, in
practice, the process involves a number of concurrent steps and iterative decisions.
The steps you will take to plan and carry out your investigation will be similar regardless of
which regulatory program governs the investigation (e.g., removal or remedial action under
CERCLA or investigations performed under RCRA). The significance and complexity of any
particular step will depend on your decision goals, the data quality obj ectives (DQOs), and a variety
of site-specific conditions.
The purpose of any investigation is to obtain enough information to make the decisions that
were identified as decision goals of the investigation. It is important, however, that you understand
the uncertainty associated with the available data on the presence, absence, or types of UXO so that
decisions you make are not based on erroneous assumptions. For example, using limited sampling
data to estimate the density of UXO may be sufficient to estimate the cost of a response to a 2-foot
depth. On the other hand, a higher level of certainty will be required when the decision goal is a no-
action decision and the planned land use is unrestricted.
As with any environmental investigation, you will want to collect data in appropriate stages
and be prepared to make changes in the field. Some kinds of information may not be needed if the
initial information you collect answers basic questions. In addition, as you collect data, you may find
that your initial hypotheses about the site were not correct. New information may cause your
investigation to go in different directions. Anticipating field conditions that may potentially modify
your investigation, and planning and articulating the decision rules that can lead to such changes, will
foster cooperation among your project team, the DoD investigators, the regulators, and the public.
7.3 Stage 1: Establishing the Goal(s) of the Investigation
The goal of the investigation is to obtain the information required to make site-specific
decisions. Therefore, the stated goal will reflect the final decision goal (e.g., action or no-action
decision). As used in the discussion that follows, the goals of the investigation differ from the
objectives of the investigation. The objectives are the specific data needs for achieving the goals.
Establishing the goals of the investigation requires two key steps. The first step involves
selecting an appropriate project team to guide the investigation. The second step is to identify the
decisions that will be made at the conclusion of the site characterization process. Both elements will
guide the remaining steps of the investigation process.
7.3.1 Establishing the Team
To be scientifically based, the investigation must be planned and managed by those people
who will use the data to make decisions. This approach ensures that all of the data needed for
decision making are acquired at an appropriate level of quality for the decision. The project team
generally includes an experienced proj ect manager, OE personnel, data processing experts, chemists,
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geophy si cists, a logistics coordinator, health and safety personnel, natural/cultural resource experts,
and regulatory personnel from the appropriate Federal, State, Tribal, and local regulatory agencies.
Involving all of the potential end users in the planning process also has other important outcomes:
Common understanding among all of the parties of how the data will be used.
Subsequent review of work plans, with a clear understanding of the decision goals in
mind, will result in comments targeted to the agreed-upon goals of the investigation, not
unspoken assumptions about those goals.
Minimization of rework. If all of the decision makers and data users are involved from
the beginning of the study, the study design will be more likely to include objectives that
clearly relate to the goals, and the various investigative tools will be targeted
appropriately.
A team-based approach can expedite the process of making decisions and, ultimately, of
reaching project goals. By definition, this consensus-oriented approach allows all team members
to have input into the project goals, as well as to identify the information needed and methods to be
employed to achieve the goals. Further, with this approach, the outcome of the proj ect is more likely
to be accepted by all parties later, resulting in a more efficient and less contentious decision-making
process.
7.3.2 Establishing the Goals of the Site Characterization Process
Establishing the decision goals of the project will ultimately determine the amount of
uncertainty to be tolerated, the area to be investigated, and the level of investigation required. The
following are examples of decision goals:
Confirm that a land area has or has not been used as an OE area in the past.
Prioritize one or more OE areas for cleanup.
Conduct a limited surface clearance effort to provide for immediate protection of nearby
human activity.
Identify if cleanup action will be required on the range or ranges under investigation (to
decide if there is a potential risk, and to make an action/no-action decision).
Identify the appropriate clearance depths and select appropriate removal technologies
for the range or ranges under investigation.
Transfer clean property for community use.
A particular investigation may address one or several decision goals, depending on the scope
of the project.
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Conducting Investigations in Phases
Most range investigations take place in phases. The first phase of the process involves determining what areas are
to be investigated. The range is divided into ordnance and explosives (OE) areas or areas of potential concern
using a variety of factors, including, but not limited to, evidence of past ordnance use and safety factors,
cost/prioritization issues, and homogeneity of the areas to be investigated.
The individual OE area investigations and clearance activities also often proceed in stages. Prior to detailed
subsurface investigation, a surface removal action is usually conducted to ensure that the property is "safe" for the
subsurface investigations. The subsurface investigations themselves often take place in stages. The first is a
nonintrusive stage that uses geophysical detection equipment designed to detect subsurface anomalies. Generally,
positional data are collected as the geophysical survey is being conducted. The second stage involves processing
of data to co-locate geophysical data with geographic positional data points identified with a Global Positioning
System (GPS). The third stage, called anomaly reacquisition, is designed to verily the location of anomalies.
Finally, anomaly excavation is conducted, and the results are fed back into the anomaly identification process.
Anomaly excavation includes a verification of clearance using geophysical detectors.
7.4 Stage 2: Preparing for the Investigation: Gathering Information To Design a
Conceptual Site Model and Establishing Sampling and Analysis Objectives
Once the decision goals of the investigation are identified, five steps provide the foundation
for designing the sampling and analysis plan that will provide the information required to achieve
the desired decision. These five steps result in the project objectives:
Developing a working hypothesis of the sources, pathways, and receptors at the site
(conceptual site model, or CSM)
Developing preliminary remediation goals (PRGs)
Comparing known information to the CSM, and identifying information needs
Identifying project constraints (schedules, resources, milestones, and regulatory
requirements)
Identifying remedial objectives
These steps are iterative, so both the PRGs and the CSM will likely change as more
information is gathered. Documentation of the CSM is explained at the conclusion of this section.
7.4.1 The Conceptual Site Model (CSM)
The CSM establishes a working hypothesis of the nature and extent of OE contamination and
the likely pathways of exposure to current and future human and ecological receptors. A good CSM
is used to guide the investigation at the site. The initial CSM is created once project decision goals
are defined and historical information on range use and the results of previous environmental
investigations are gathered. It then continues to evolve as new data about the site are collected. In
other words, as information is gathered at each stage of the site characterization process, the new
data are used to review initial hypotheses and revise the CSM. The CSM describes the site and its
environmental setting, and presents hypotheses about the types of contaminants, their routes of
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migration, and potential receptors and exposures routes. Key pieces of initial data to be recorded
in the CSM include, but are not limited to:
The topography and vegetative cover of various land areas
Past ordnance-related activities (e.g., ordnance handling, weapons training, ordnance
disposal) and the potential releases that may be associated with these activities (e.g.,
buried munitions, dud-fired UXO, kick-outs from OB/OD areas)
Expected locations and the depth and extent of contamination (based on the OE
activities)
Likely key contaminants of concern
Potential exposure pathways to human and ecological receptors (including threatened
and endangered species)
Environmental factors such as frost line, erosion activity, and the groundwater and
surface water flows that influence or have the potential to change pathways to receptors
Human factors that influence pathways to receptors, such as unauthorized transport of
UXO
Location of cultural or archeological resources
The current, future, and surrounding land uses
The ability to develop a good working hypothesis of the sources and potential releases
associated with OE will depend on your understanding the ordnance-related activities that took place
on the land area to be investigated, the primary sources of OE contamination, the associated release
mechanisms, and the expected OE contamination. Tables 7-1 and 7-2 summarize these
characteristics for typically expected ordnance-related activities. Table 7-3 describes the elements
of the firing range that should be located on your CSM.
Table 7-1. Ordnance-Related Activities and Associated Primary Sources
and Release Mechanisms
Ordnancc-Rclatcd Activity
Primary Source
Release Mechanisms
Ordnance storage and
transfer
Ammunition pier
Mishandling/loss (usually into water)
Storage magazine
Mishandling/loss, abandonment, burial
Ammunition transfer point
Mishandling/loss, abandonment, burial
Weapons training
Firing points
Mishandling/loss, abandonment, burial
Target/impact areas
Firing
Aerial bombing targets
Dropping
Range safety fans
Firing, dropping
Troop training
Training/maneuver areas
Firing, intentional placement (minefields),
mishandling/loss, abandonment, burial
Bivouac areas
Mishandling/loss, abandonment, burial
Ordnance disposal
Open burn/open detonation
areas
Kick-outs, low-order detonations
Large-scale burials
Burial
Chapter 7. Site/Range Characterization 7-7
December 2001
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1 Table 7-2. Release Mechanisms and Expected OE Contamination
2
Release Mechanism
r.xpccled Oil ( oiiiiimiiiiiiitiii
3
Mishandling/loss
Fuzed or unfuzed ordnance, possibly retrograde, bulk OE, OE
4
Abandonment
residue
5
Burial
6
Firing or dropping - complete detonation
OE debris (fragmentation), OE residue
7
Firing or dropping - incomplete detonation
OE debris (fragmentation), pieces of OE, OE residue
8
Firing or dropping - dud fired
UXO
9
Intentional placement
Mines (usually training), booby traps
10
Kick-outs
OE Debris, OE components, UXO
11
Low-order detonations
OE debris (fragmentation), pieces of OE, OE residue
12 Table 7-3. Example of CSM Elements for Firing Range
13
Range Configuration
Description
OE Concerns
14
Range fan
The entire range, including
firing points, target areas, and
buffer areas
All of those listed below, depending upon area
15
Target or impact area
The point(s) on the range to
which the munitions fired
were directed
Dud-fired UXO, low-order detonations with
munition fragments and containing munition
constituents that may be reactive or ignitable;
munition constituents
16
Firing points
The area from which the
munitions were fired
Munition constituents from propellants; buried
or abandoned munitions.
17
Buffer zone
Area outside of the target or
impact area that was designed
to be free of human activity
and act as a shield for
munitions that do not hit
targets
Same as target or impact area, but likely of less
density than UXO and, therefore, munition
constituents
18 Figures 7-2 and 7-3 in Section 7.4.7 illustrate the configuration of a typical firing range.
19 The process of constructing the CSM involves mapping data obtained from historical
20 records, conducting an operational analysis of the munition activity, and analyzing the ordnance-
21 related activities that occurred on the site. Historical information on the type of activity that took
22 place and the munitions used will be particularly important to help you identify patterns in the
23 distribution of ordnance and the depth at which it may be found. As shown in Table 7-1, if the site
24 was used as a proj ectile range, you would expect to find fired ordnance (including dud-fired rounds)
25 primarily in the target area, buried munitions at the firing point, dud-fired rounds along the proj ectile
26 path, and a few shells in the buffer zone. Ranges used for different purposes have different firing
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patterns and different distributions of OE. At a troop training range, you might find buried
munitions scattered throughout the training area if troops decided to bury their remaining munitions
rather than carry them out with them.
The boundaries of suspected contamination, the geology and topography, and the areas of
potential concern should be delineated during this process. Using the historical data as inputs, three-
dimensional operational analyses of the anticipated locations of OE are developed that address the
expected dispersion of munitions and range fan areas as well as the maximum penetration or burial
depths of the munitions used at the site. Using these data sources, you can develop an assessment
of the ordnance-related activities that were conducted to develop a full picture of what is likely to
be found at the site.
The purpose of developing this early CSM is to ensure that the collection of initial
information will be useful for your investigation. If the conceptual understanding of the site is poor,
you may need to conduct limited preliminary investigations before you develop the sampling and
analysis plan. Such investigations could include a physical walk-through of the area, collection of
limited geophysical data, or collection of additional historical information. In any case, you should
anticipate revising the CSM at least once in this early planning phase as more data are gathered.
Specific data regarding OE that should be addressed in a CSM include, but are not limited
to:
Ordnance types
Ordnance category (e.g., unfired, inert, dud-fired)
Filler type
Fuze type
Net explosive weight of filler
Condition (e.g., intact, corroded)
Location (coordinates)
Depth (below ground surface)
Compass bearing
7.4.2 Preliminary Remediation Goals
Preliminary remediation goals (PRGs)
for a munitions response are the preliminary
goals pertaining to the depth of that response
action and are used for planning purposes.
PRGs are directly related to the specific media
that are identified in your CSM as potential
pathways for OE exposure (e.g., vadose zone,
river bottom, wetland area). The PRGs for
response depths for munitions are a function of
the goal of the investigation and the reasonably
anticipated land use on the range. For example,
Preliminary Remediation Goals (PRGs)
PRGs provide the project team with long-term targets
to use during analysis and selection of remedial
alternatives. Chemical-specific PRGs are goals for the
concentration of individual chemicals in the media in
which they are found. For UXO, the PRG will
generally address the clearance depth for UXO.
Source: U.S. EPA. Risk Assessment Guidance for
Superfund (RAGS), Volume 1, Human Health
Evaluation Manual, Part B, Interim, December 1991.
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if the goal of the investigation is to render the land surface safe for nonintrusive investigations, then
the PRGs will be designed to promote surface removal of OE from the land area. Therefore, the
PRGs will require that no OE remains on the surface of the land. On the other hand, if the goal of
the investigation is to establish final response depths to protect human health from OE hazards, then
the PRGs will be based on the reasonably anticipated future land use. The PRGs in this instance
may be to ensure that no OE is present in the top 10 feet of the subsurface or above the frost line.
The PRGs may change at several points during the investigation or at the conclusion of the
investigation, as more information becomes available about the likely future land use, about
geophysical conditions that may cause movement of OE, or about the complexity and cost of the
response process. The PRGs may also change during the remedy selection process as the team
makes its risk management decisions and weighs factors such as protection of human health and the
environment, costs, short-term risks of cleanup, long-term effectiveness, permanence, and
community and State/Tribal preferences.
The first step in establishing the PRGs is to determine the current and reasonably anticipated
future land use. While OE response depth PRGs are conceptually easier to understand than
chemical-specific PRGs, widely accepted algorithms and extensive guidance have been developed
to establish chemical- and media-specific PRGs depending on the land use. Identifying the
appropriate PRGs for OE sites can be a complex and controversial process. One approach you may
consider is to use the DDESB default safety standards for range clearance as the initial PRGs until
adequate site-specific data become available.
DDESB safety standards establish
interim planning assessment depths that are
based on different land uses, to be used for
planning until site-specific data become
available. In the absence of site-specific data,
these standards call for a clearance depth of 10
feet for planned uses such as residential and
commercial development and construction
activities. For areas accessible to the public,
such as those used for agriculture, surface
recreation, and vehicle parking, the DDESB
recommends planning for response depth of 4
feet. For areas with limited public access and
areas used for livestock grazing or wildlife
preserves, the DDESB recommends planning for a response depth of 1 foot.104 In all cases, the
standards call for a response depth of 4 feet below any construction. (See Chapter 6 for a more
detailed description of DDESB standards.) None of these removal depths should be used
automatically. For example, if site-specific information suggests that a commercial or industrial
building will be constructed that requires a much deeper excavation than 10 feet, greater response
104DoD Directive 6055.9, DoD Explosives Safety Board (DDESB) and DoD Component Explosives Safety
Responsibilities, July 29, 1996.
Chapter 7. Site/Range Characterization 7-10 December 2001
DoD/EPA Interim Final Management Principles on
Standards for Depths of Clearance
Per DoD 6055.9-STD, removal depths are determined
by an evaluation of site-specific data and risk analysis
based on the reasonably anticipated future land use.
In the absence of site-specific data, a table of
assessment depths is used for interim planning
purposes until the required site-specific
information is developed.
Site-specific data are necessary to determine the
actual depth of clearance.
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depth must considered. In addition, if the response depth is above the frost line, then DDESB
standards require continued surveillance of the area for frost heave movement.105
Site-specific information may also lead to the decision that a more shallow response action
is protective. For example, if historical information and results of geophysical studies suggest that
the only OE to be found is within the top 1 foot of soil, then the actual munitions response will
obviously address the depth where munitions are found (e.g., 1 foot).
You should consider a variety of factors
when identifying the reasonably anticipated
future land use of the property. Current and
long-term ownership of the property, current
use, and pressure for changes in future use are
some of the important considerations.106 The
text box on the following page lists a number of
other possible factors. In the face of
uncertainty, a more conservative approach,
such as assuming unrestricted land use, is
prudent. In determining the reasonably
anticipated future land use at a Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) facility, you should consider
not only the formal reuse plans, but also the nature of economic activity in the area and the historical
ability of the local government to control future land use through deed restrictions and other
institutional controls. Several sources of information aboutplanned and potential land use atBRAC
sites are available, including base reuse plans.
DoD/EPA Interim Final Management Principles on
Land Use
Discussions with local planning authorities, local
officials, and the public, as appropriate, should be
conducted as early as possible in the response process
to determine the reasonably anticipated land use(s).
These discussions should be used to scope efforts to
characterize the site, conduct risk assessments, and
select the appropriate response.
'"'Department of Defense, Explosive Safety Submissions for Removal of Ordnance and Explosives (OE) from
Real Property, Memorandum from DDESB Chairman, Col. W. Richard Wright, February 1998.
106USEPA, OSWER Directive No. 9355.7-04, Land Use in the CERCLA Remedy Selection Process, May 25,
1995.
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Factors To Consider in Developing Assumptions About Reasonably Anticipated Future Land Uses
Current land use
Zoning laws
Zoning maps
Comprehensive community master plans
Population growth patterns and projections
Accessibility of site to existing infrastructure (including transportation and public utilities)
Institutional controls currently in place
Site location in relation to existing development
Federal/State land use designations
Development patterns over time
Cultural and archeological resources
Natural resources, and geographic and geologic information
Potential vulnerability of groundwater to contaminants that may migrate from soil
Environmental justice issues
Location of on-site or nearby wetlands
Proximity to a floodplain and to critical habitats of endangered or threatened species
Location of wellhead protection areas, recharge areas, and other such areas
7.4.3 Assessment of Currently Available Information To Determine Data Needs
The site-specific objectives of the investigation are ultimately based on acquiring missing
information that is needed to make the required decision. In order to establish the objectives of the
investigation, it is necessary to first identify what is known (and unknown) about the OE area. Your
investigation will focus on what is not known, and key questions will improve your understanding
of the elements of the risk management decision that is to be made (such as explosive potential of
the ordnance, pathways of exposure, and likelihood of exposure), and the costs, effectiveness, and
risks associated with remediation. The following are typical questions with which you will be
concerned:
What types of ordnance were used on the range?
What are the likely range boundaries?
Is there evidence of any underground burial pits possibly containing OE on the site?
At what depth is the OE likely to be located?
What are the environmental factors that affect both the location and potential corrosion
of OE?
Is there explosive residue in the soil?
Is there explosive residue in ordnance fragments?
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7.4.3.1 Historical Information on Range Use and Ordnance Types
Historical data are an important element
in effectively planning site characterization.
Because many ranges and other ordnance-
related sites have not been used in years, and
because many ranges encompass thousands of
acres of potentially contaminated land,
historical information is critically important in
focusing the investigation.
Sources of Historical Data
National Archives
U.S. Center of Military History
History offices of DoD components such as the
Naval Facilities Command Historian's Office and
the Air Force Historical Research Agency
Repositories of individual service mishap reports
Smithsonian Historical Information and Research
Center
Real estate documents
Historical photos, maps, and drawings
Interviews with base personnel
Historical information can be obtained
from many sources, including old maps, aerial
photographs, satellite imagery, interviews with
former or current personnel, records of military
operations, archives of range histories and types
of munitions used, and records from old ammunition supply points, storage facilities, and disposal
areas. Historical information is important to determining the presence of OE, the likely type of
ordnance present at the range or OE area, the density of the ordnance, and the likely location (both
horizontal and vertical) of the ordnance. (See "Sources and Resources" at the end of this chapter.)
Historical information is important for
assessing the types of munitions likely to be
found on the range, their age, and the nature of
the explosive risk. Potential sources of this
information include ammunition storage
records, firing orders, and EOD and local law
enforcement reports. This information can be
used to select the appropriate detection tools
and data processing programs to be used during
the characterization, as well as to establish
safety procedures and boundaries based on
anticipated explosive sensitivity and blast
potential. Historical information based on past
UXO and scrap finds may provide data about
the type, size, and shape of the OE items on the
range, which could simplify OE identification
and clarify safety requirements during the
detection phase. Such historical data could
help investigators plan for the potential explosive hazards (e.g., thermal, blast overpressure, or
fragmentation grenades, or shock hazards), which will dictate separation distance requirements for
excavation sites, open detonation areas, and surrounding buildings; public traffic routes; and other
areas to be protected.
Munition Burial Pits
Underground munitions burial pits present unique
challenges to a site characterization. Frequently, the
existence of burial pits is not known; if they are known
to exist, their exact locations may not be known. Many
munitions burial pits are so old that records do not exist
and individuals who were aware of their existence at
one time are no longer alive. An example of an old
munitions burial pit is the Washington, DC, Army
Munitions Site at Spring Valley. This site was last used
for military purposes during World War I and was
developed as residential housing beginning in the
1920s. In 1993, OE was found, and removal and
remedial actions were performed. However, in 1999,
an additional cache of ordnance was found adjacent to
a university on the former installation, necessitating
emergency removal actions.
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Historical information is also necessary for estimating the probable locations of UXO in the
range or OE area under investigation. This information will affect the phasing of the investigation,
the technical approach to detection and discrimination of anomalies, the extent of sampling required,
the cost of remediation, and the safety plan and procedures used. There will be some areas where,
given the site conditions, extent, or type of UXO present, physical entry onto the site or intrusive
investigations will be too dangerous. In some cases the known density of UXO likely at the OE area
will lead to a decision to not clear the area because of the high number of short-term risks.
Historical information is needed in order to estimate the location of potential OE
contamination, both to focus the investigation (and identify likely OE areas) and to reduce the
footprint of potential UXO contamination by eliminating clean areas from the investigation.
Identifying areas of potential UXO contamination may be more difficult than is at first apparent.
For decades, many facilities have served a number of different training purposes. Although an
impact area for a bombing range may be reasonably clear, the boundaries of that area (including
where bombs may have accidentally dropped) are often not clear. In addition, land uses on military
bases change, just as they do in civilian communities around the country. Training activities using
ordnance may have taken place in any number of locations. In some cases, land uses will change
and a building or a recreational area, such as a golf course, will be built over an OE area. Munitions
may have been buried at various locations on the base, sometimes in small quantities, without the
knowledge or approval of the base commanders.
While historical information is more likely to be used to determine the presence (as opposed
to the absence) of OE, comprehensive and reliable historical information may make it possible to
reduce the area to be investigated or to eliminate areas from OE investigation. Early elimination of
clean areas on bases where a lot of range-related training activity took place may require a higher
degree of certainty than on bases where there was no known ordnance-related training activity. For
example, an isolated forested wetland might be eliminated from further investigation under certain
circumstances. This might be possible if an archives search report indicates the area was never used
for training or testing, it was never accessible by vehicle, and these assumptions can be documented
through a series of aerial photographs, beginning at the time the base was acquired by the military
through the time of base closure. Alternatively, potential OE areas on bases with a history of a
variety of ordnance-related training activities, and large amounts of undocumented open space (or
forested lands), may be more difficult to eliminate.
Historical data are often incorporated into an archives search report, a historical records
search report, or an inventory project report, management tools that are often compiled by OE
experts. These reports incorporate all types of documents, such as memoranda, letters, manuals,
aerial photos, real estate documents, and so forth, from many sources. After an analysis of the
collected information and an on-site visit by technical personnel, a map is produced that shows all
known or suspected OE areas on the site.
7.4.3.2 Geophysical and Environmental Information
Depending on the level of detail required for the investigation, additional information might
be gathered, such as:
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1 Results of previous investigations that may have identified both UXO and explosives-
2 contaminated soil.
3 Geophysical data that show the movement (and therefore location) of UXO, the potential
4 corrosion of OE containers/casings, and the ability of detection equipment to locate
5 UXO.
6 Information about geophysical conditions that will affect the movement, location, detection,
7 and potential deterioration of ordnance and nonordnance explosives may be available on-site from
8 previous environmental investigations (e.g., investigations conducted on behalf of the Installation
9 Restoration Program). The significance of this information is discussed in more detail in Chapter 3.
10 A limited list of specific types of information that may be important (depending on the
11 purpose of the investigation) is provided in Table 7-4. Some of the information may be so critical
12 to the planning of the investigation that it should be obtained during the planning phase and prior
13 to the more detailed investigation. Other information will be more challenging to gather, such as
14 depth and flow direction of groundwater. If the necessary information is not available from previous
15 investigations, it will likely be an important aspect of the OE area investigation.
16 Table 7-4. Potential Information for OE Investigation
17
Information
Purpose for Which Information Will Be Used
18
19
Background levels of ferrous
metals
Selection of detection technology. Potential interference with detection
technologies, such as magnetometers.
20
Location of bedrock
Potential depth of OE and difficulties associated with investigation.
21
Location of frost line
Location of OE. Frost heave potential to move OE from anticipated depth.
22
Soil type and moisture content
Penetration depth of OE. Potential for deterioration/corrosion of casings.
Potential for release of munition constituents.
23
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Depth and movement of
groundwater
Potential for movement of OE and for deterioration/corrosion of
containment. Potential for leaching of munition residues.
25
26
Location of surface water,
floodplains, and wetlands
Potential location of explosive material. Potential pathway to human
receptors; potential for movement of OE and for deterioration/corrosion of
munition casings; potential leaching of munition residues; selection of
detection methods.
27
Depth of sediments
OE located in wetlands or under water. Location, leaching, and corrosion
of OE; selection of detection methods.
28
Topography and vegetative cover
Potential difficulties in investigation, areas where clearance may be
required. Selection of potential detection technologies.
29
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Location of current land
population
Potential for exposure.
31
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Current use of range and
surrounding land areas
Potential for exposure.
33
34
Information on future land use
plans
Potential for exposure.
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7.4.4 Project Schedule. Milestones. Resources, and Regulatory Requirements
Other information used to plan the investigation includes the proposed project schedule,
milestones, resources, and regulatory requirements. These elements will not only dictate much of
the investigation, they will also determine its scope and help determine the adequacy of the data to
meet the goals of the investigation. If resources are limited and the tolerance for uncertainty is
determined to be low, it may be necessary to review the goals of the investigation and consider
modifying them in the following ways:
Reduce the geographic scope of the investigation (e.g., focus on fewer OE areas)
Focus on surface response rather than subsurface response
Reduce the decision scope of the investigation (e.g., focus on prioritization for future
investigations, rather than property transfer)
In considering the schedule and milestones associated with the project, it is important to
consider the regulatory requirements, including the key technical processes and public involvement
requirements associated with the CERCLA and RCRA processes under which much of the
investigation may occur, as well as any Federal Facility Agreements (FFAs) or compliance orders
that are in place for the facility. (See Chapter 2, "Regulatory Overview.")
7.4.4.1 Resources
Many factors affect the scope and therefore the costs of an investigation. Although large
range size is often associated with high costs, other factors can affect the scope and costs of an
investigation:
Difficult terrain (e.g., rocky, mountainous, dense vegetation)
High density of OE
Depth of OE
Anticipated sensitivity of OE to disturbance or other factors that may require
extraordinary safety measures
Key factors to consider when estimating the cost of the investigation include the following:
Site preparation may include vegetation clearance, surface UXO removal, and the
establishment of survey control points. If there is little vegetation at the site and/or if the
UXO detection can be conducted without removing the vegetation, the costs can be
significantly reduced. In addition, limiting the vegetation clearance can also reduce the
impacts on natural and cultural resources, as discussed in the next text box.
Geophysical mapping requires personnel, mapping, and navigation equipment. The
operational platform for the selected detection tool can have a maj or impact on the costs
of a site characterization.
The data analysis process requires hardware and software to analyze the data gathered
during the geophysical mapping and to reduce background noise and classify anomalies.
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Data analysis can be conducted in real time during detection or off-site following the
detection, with the latter generally being more expensive than the former.
Anomaly investigation includes anomaly reacquisition and excavation to determine
anomaly sources and to test the working hypotheses. Excavation can be very expensive;
the greater the number of anomalies identified as potential UXO, the higher the cost.
Vegetation Clearance
In addition to the high monetary costs of preparing an area to be cleared of UXO, the environmental costs can also
be very high. If the project team decides that vegetation clearance is necessary in order to safely and effectively
clear UXO from a site, they should aim to minimize the potentially serious environmental impacts, such as
increased erosion and habitat destruction, that can result from removing vegetation. The following are three land
clearing methodologies:
. Manual removal is the easiest technique to control and allows a minimum amount of vegetation to be removed
to facilitate the UXO investigation. Tree removal should be minimized, with selective pruning used to enable
instrument detection near the trunks. If trees must be removed, tree trunks should be left in place to help
maintain the soil profile. Manual removal results in the highest level of potential exposure to UXO of the
personnel involved and should not be used where vegetation obscures the view of likely UXO locations.
Controlled burning allows grass and other types of ground cover to be burned away from the surface without
affecting subsurface root networks. The primary considerations when using controlled burning are ensuring
that natural or manmade firebreaks exist and that potential air pollution is controlled. Favorable weather
conditions will be required.
. Defoliation relies on herbicides to defoliate grasses, shrubs, and tree leaves. Manual removal of the remaining
vegetation may be necessary. Sensitivity of groundwater and surface water bodies to leaching and surface
runoff of herbicides will be important considerations.
Because the costs of investigation activities are based in large part on the acreage of the area
to be characterized, most methods used to reduce the cost of the investigation involve reducing the
size of the sampling area. Some of the techniques used to reduce costs overlap with other tools
already described that improve the accuracy of an investigation. For example, a comprehensive
historical search enables the project team to minimize the size of the area requiring investigation.
Statistical sampling methods are frequently used to reduce the costs of site investigation. These
methods and the controversy over the methods are discussed in Section 7.6.
7.4.4.2 Regulatory Requirements
Regulatory requirements come from a variety of laws and regulations, both State and
Federal. The particular requirements that will be most applicable (or relevant and appropriate) to
range cleanup activities are the Federal and State RCRA requirements for hazardous waste
transportation, treatment, storage, and disposal. Other regulatory requirements may be related to
the specific pathway(s) of concern, for example, groundwater cleanup levels. Chapter 2 of this
handbook provides an overview of regulatory requirements that may apply, since knowledge of the
applicable requirements will be important to planning the investigation.
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Since many OE investigations will take place under the authority of the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), it is important to keep in
mind that even if not directly and legally applicable to the OE activity or investigation, Federal and
State laws may be considered to be "relevant and appropriate" by regulators. If the laws are
considered relevant and appropriate, they are fully and legally applicable to a CERCLA cleanup
activity.107
Important regulatory requirements that may affect both the investigation and the cleanup of
the OE area include, but are not limited to, the following:
CERCLA requirements for removal and remedial actions (including public and
State/Tribal involvement in the process)
RCRA requirements that determine whether the waste material is to be considered a solid
waste and/or a hazardous waste
Requirements concerning the transportation and disposal of solid and hazardous wastes
Regulatory requirements concerning open burning/open detonation of waste
Regulatory requirements concerning incineration/thermal treatment of hazardous waste
Other hazardous waste treatment requirements (e.g., land disposal restrictions)
Air pollution requirements
DDESB safety requirements
Other applicable Federal statutes such as the Endangered Species Act, the Native
Americans Graves Protection and Repatriation Act, and the National Historic
Preservation Act
This handbook does not present a comprehensive listing of these requirements. Chapter 2
of this handbook provides an overview of regulatory structures. Chapter 6 presents an overview of
the DDESB safety requirements.
7.4.5 Identification of Remedial Objectives
Decisions regarding cleanup have two components: the remediation goal (or cleanup
standard) and the response strategy. Remediation goals were described in the discussion of PRGs
(Section 7.4.2). The response strategy is the manner in which the waste will be managed (e.g., use
of institutional controls, removal of waste, treatment of waste once it's removed), including the
engineering or treatment technologies involved. PRGs represent the first step in determining the
cleanup standard. PRGs are revised as new information is gathered and will be a central part of final
cleanup decisions. It is equally important to identify potential cleanup technologies early in the
process so that information required to assess the appropriate technology can be obtained during the
investigation process (i.e., site findings affecting treatment selection).
The final step in planning the investigation is therefore identifying remedial objectives.
What kind of cleanup activities do you anticipate? Like the PRGs and the CSM, this is a working
hypothesis of what you will find (which may change later), the volume of material that you must
10740 CFR Section 300.400(g), National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan.
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1 deal with, the media with which it will be associated (if it is explosive residue), and the nature of
2 the technology that will be used to conduct the cleanup. Early screening of alternatives to establish
3 remedial action objectives is important. Identifying appropriate alternatives may direct the
4 geophysical investigations to help determine if a particular technology, such as bioremediation, will
5 work at the site. Chapter 4 has a substantial discussion of technologies.
6 Finally, in addressing remedial objectives at the site, you will want to consider the disposal
7 options for what may be an enormous amount of nonexplosive material. Typical range clearance
8 activities excavate tons of trash and fragments of ordnance. In addition, open burning or detonation
9 will leave additional potentially contaminated materials and media to be disposed of. Some of the
10 trash, such as target practice material, may be contaminated with hazardous waste. Some of the
11 metal fragments may be appropriate for recycling. Information collected during the investigation
12 will be used to assess not only the treatment and the potential for recycling of explosive and
13 nonexplosive residue, but also the disposal of other contaminated materials and media from the site.
14 7.4.6 The Data Quality Objectives of the Investigation
15 7.4.6.1 Developing DQOs
16 You now have the information necessary to develop the data quality objectives of the
17 investigation. The DQOs will reflect the information that you require to achieve the decision goals
18 identified at the beginning of the planning phase. DQOs are based on gaps in the data needed to
19 make your decision. They should be as narrow and specific as possible and should reflect the
20 certainty required for each step of the investigation. Obj ective statements that are carefully crafted,
21 with regulator involvement and community review, will help ensure that discussions at the end of
22 the investigation are about the risk management decisions, not about the relevance or quality of the
23 data.
DoD/EPA Interim Final Management Principles on DQOs
Site-specific data quality objectives (DQOs) and QA/QC approaches, developed through a process of close and
meaningful cooperation among the various governmental departments and agencies involved at a given CTT
military range, are necessary to define the nature, quality, and quantity of information required to characterize each
CTT military range and to select appropriate response actions.
24 Examples of typical DQOs may include the following:
25 Determine the outer boundaries of potential UXO contamination on a range within plus
26 or minus feet.
27 Determine, with percent probability of detection at percent confidence level, the
28 amount of UXO found in the top 2 feet of soil.
29 Verify that there are no buried munitions pits under the range ( percent probability
30 of detection, percent confidence level).
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Determine with percent certainty if there is UXO in the sediments that form the river
bottom.
Determine the direction of groundwater flow with percent certainty.
The DQOs for your site will determine the amount and quality of data required, as well as
the level of certainty required. Which statements are appropriate for your site will depend on the
previously identified goals of the investigation, the information that is already known about the site,
and the acceptable levels of uncertainty.
7.4.6.2 Planning for Uncertainty
To a significant degree, data quality objectives will depend on the project team's and the
public's tolerance for uncertainty. Ultimately, the amount of uncertainty that is acceptable, although
expressed in quantitative terms, is a qualitative judgment that must be made by all of the involved
parties acting together. For example, it may be possible to quantify the probability that a detector
can find subsurface anomalies. However, that probability will be less than 100 percent. The
acceptability of a given probability of detection (e.g., 85 percent or 60 percent) will depend on a
qualitative judgment based on the decision to be made.
As in any subsurface investigation, it is impossible to resolve all uncertainties. For example,
regardless of the resources expended on an investigation, it is not possible to identify 100 percent
of OE on a range. Likewise, unless the entire range is dug up, it is often impossible to prove with
100 percent certainty that the land area is clean and that no OE is present. The project team will
need to decide whether uncertainties in the investigation are to be reduced, mitigated, or deemed
acceptable. Planned land use is an important factor in determining the acceptable level of
uncertainty. Some uncertainties may be more acceptable if the military will continue to control the
land and monitor the site than if the site is to be transferred to outside ownership.
Uncertainties can be reduced through process design, such as a thorough sampling strategy,
or through the use of stringent data quality acceptance procedures. Uncertainties can also be reduced
by planning for contingencies during the course of investigation. For example, it may be possible
to develop decision rules for the investigation that recognize uncertainties and identify actions that
will be taken if the investigation finds something. A decision rule might say that if X is found, then
Y happens. (In the simplest example, if any anomalies excavated prove to be ordnance, either
ordnance fragments or UXO, then a more intensive sampling process will be initiated.)
The results of uncertainties can be mitigated in a variety of ways, including by monitoring
and contingency planning. A situation in which some uncertainties were mitigated occurred at Fort
Ritchie Army Garrison, a BRAC facility. OE contamination was suspected beneath buildings that
were constructed decades ago and were located on property designated for residential development.
Because the buildings were to be reused following the land transfer, regulators chose not to require
an investigation beneath the buildings because it would have necessitated razing them. As a risk
management procedure, legal restrictions were established to ensure Army supervision of any future
demolition of these buildings. The presence of OE under buildings on land slated for transfer is an
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uncertainty the project team at Fort Ritchie chose to accept. Risks are mitigated through the use of
institutional controls.
Finally, uncertainties in the investigation may be deemed acceptable if they will be
insignificant to the final decision. Information collected to "characterize the site" should be
considered complete when there is sufficient information to determine the extent of contamination,
the proposed response depth, and the appropriate remedial technology. If information has been
collected that makes it clear that action will be required, it may not be necessary to fully understand
the boundaries of the range or the density or distribution of OE prior to making the remediation
decision and starting response activities. Some amount of uncertainty will be acceptable, since the
information required will be obtained during the response operation. (Note: This scenario assumes
that there is sufficient information both for safety planning and for estimating the costs of the
remediation.)
7.4.7 Documentation of the CSM
The data points of a CSM are usually documented schematically and supplemented by a table
and a diagram of relationships. The simplistic example of a CSM in Figure 7-2 illustrates the types
of information often conveyed in a CSM. Depending on the complexity and number of OE areas
to be investigated, the CSM may be required to show several impact areas as well as overlapping
range fans. A CSM may also be presented from a top view (also called a plan view), as illustrated
in Figure 7-3, and overlaid with a map created using a GIS.
Eap*d*d Law D*naltv UJCO
15 h.
AroiindwaPrr Dlrvdlon
Figure 7-2. Conceptual Site Model: Vertical View
Chapter 7. Site/Range Characterization 7-21
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1 Figure 7-3. Conceptual Site Model: Plan View of a Range Investigation Area
2 7.5 Stage 3: Designing the Sampling and Analysis Effort
3 The discussion that follows outlines major considerations in the development of your
4 sampling and analysis plan. Keep in mind, however, that the foundation of your sampling and
5 analysis plan rests on your conceptual site model (see Section 7.4.1).
6 Developing the data collection plan is often the most difficult part of the UXO investigation.
7 Given the size of the ranges and the costs involved in investigating and removing UXO, judgments
8 of acceptable levels of uncertainty often come into conflict with practical cost considerations when
9 determining the extent of the field investigation.
10 Sampling and measurement errors in locating OE on your range will come from several
11 sources:
12 Inadequacy of detection methods to locate and correctly identify anomalies that may be
13 potential OE
14 Inappropriate extrapolation of the results of statistical sampling to larger areas
15 Measurement errors introduced in laboratory analysis (either on-site or off-site)
16 Given that no subsurface investigation technique can eliminate all uncertainty, the sampling design
17 (and supporting laboratory analysis) should be structured to account for the measurement error and
18 to ensure that the data collected are of a known quality.
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Field sampling activities include the following basic considerations:
Explosives safety concerns, safety planning, and Explosives Safety Submissions (see
Chapter 6)
Detection technologies that are matched to the characteristics of the site and the UXO
and to the objectives of the investigation (see Chapter 4)
Specification of QA/QC measurements
Determination of the quantity and quality of data needed and data acceptance criteria
Determination of how, when, and where data will be collected
Appropriate use of field analysis and fixed laboratory analysis to screen for explosive
residues
There are typically four types of data collection methods employed during UXO
investigations:
Nonintrusive identification of anomalies using surface-based detection equipment
Intrusive removal of ordnance (usually to verify the results of geophysical investigations)
Soil sampling of potential munition residues
Environmental sampling to establish the basic geophysical characteristics of the site (e.g.,
stratigraphy, groundwater depth and flow), including background levels.
The following decisions are to be made when designing the data collection plan:
Establishment of your desired level of confidence in the capabilities of subsurface
detection techniques
How to phase the investigation so that data collected in one phase can be used to plan
subsequent phases
Establishment of decision rules for addressing shifts in investigation techniques
determined by field information
The degree to which statistical sampling methods are used to estimate potential future
risks
How to verify data obtained through the application of statistical sampling approaches
The types of field analytical methods that should be used to test for explosive residues
The appropriate means of separating and storing waste from the investigation
Information required for the Explosives Safety Submission
The design of the sampling and analysis effort usually includes one or more iterations of
geophysical studies, which incorporate geophysical survey data processing and anomaly
investigation to obtain a level of precision that will help you achieve your project objectives.
Depending on your project objectives, more extensive geophysical studies may be necessary to
evaluate the potential for OE impacts atthe site. For example, if your project objective is to confirm
that an area is "clean" (free from UXO), and you detect a UXO item during your first geophysical
sweep of the ground surface, you can conclude that the area should not be considered clean, and you
must modify your objective. However, no additional data collection is necessary at this point.
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Conversely, your objective may be to determine the depth of OE contamination. In this
example, although you are using the combination of detection tools and data processing techniques
deemed appropriate for your site by your project team, you encounter interference from previously
undetected metallic objects (e.g., agricultural tools) just under the ground surface. You may have
to conduct a secondary geophysical study using another detection system that is not as sensitive to
interference from metallic objects near the ground surface. If you believe the particular problem is
localized, you may dig up the tools and try again.
The design of the sampling and analysis effort should recognize that fieldwork takes place
in stages. The first stage will often be a surface response effort to render the OE area under
investigation safe for geophysical investigation. A second stage will field test the detection
technologies that you plan to use to verify QA/QC measurement criteria and establish a known level
of precision in the investigation. The subsequent stage will involve the iterative geophysical studies
discussed above. Observations in the field could cause a redirection of the sampling activities.
The bullets and discussion below address five important elements of the design of the
sampling and analysis effort:
Selection of detection technologies
Operational analysis of the munitions activities that took place at the site
Selection of the methodology for determining the location and amount of both intrusive
and nonintrusive sampling
Development of QA/QC measures for your sampling strategy
Use of both fixed lab and field screening analytical techniques
7.5.1 Identification of Appropriate Detection Technologies
Selection of the appropriate detection technology is not an easy task, as there is not one best
tool that has the greatest effectiveness, ease of implementation, and cost-effectiveness in every
situation. Rather, a combination of systems that include sensors, data processing systems, and
operational platforms should be configured to meet the site-specific conditions. The project team
should develop a process to identify the best system for the particular site.
The site-specific factors affecting the selection of appropriate technologies include the
following:
The ultimate goals of the investigation and the level of certainty required for UXO
detection
The amount and quality of historical information available about the site
The nature of the UXO anticipated to be found on-site, including its material makeup and
the depth at which it is expected to be found
Background materials or geological, topographical, or vegetative factors that may
interfere with UXO detection
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Site-specific information should be used with information about the different detection
systems (see Chapter 4) to select the system most appropriate for the project. Three key factors in
selecting a detection technology are effectiveness, ease of implementation, and cost.
The effectiveness of a system may be measured by its proven ability to achieve detection
objectives. For example, the probability of detection and the false alarm rate (or the ability to
distinguish ordnance from nonordnance) affect a detection system's ability to achieve the obj ectives
of an investigation. The science of OE detection has improved significantly over the past decade;
however, the limited ability to discriminate between ordnance and nonordnance remains a serious
deficiency. (See Chapter 4 for a discussion of detection systems.)
The ease of implementation, although a characteristic of the technology, is influenced by
the project requirements. For example, a towed operational platform (typically a multisensor array
towed behind a vehicle) may not be implementable in mountainous and rocky terrain. For another
site, implementability might mean that a single detection system has to work on all types of terrain
because of budgetary or other constraints.
Detection system costs generally
depend on the operational platform and the
data processing requirements. For example,
hardware costs are higher for an airborne
platform than for a land-based system, but an
airborne platform can survey a site much
faster than aland-based system, thus reducing
the cost per acre. Similarly, digital
georeferencing systems cost more than a GIS
that can be used to manually calculate the
position of anomalies, but the time saved by
digitally georeferencing anomaly position
data, and the associated potential reduction in
errors, may speed the process and save money
in the end.
7.5.2 UXO Detection Methods
Until the Jefferson Proving Ground
Technology Demonstration (JPGTD) Project
was established in 1994 to advance the state
of OE detection, classification, and removal,
"Mag and Flag" had been the default UXO
detection method, with only marginal
improvement in its detection and
identification capabilities since World War II.
Using Mag and Flag, an operator responds to
audible or visible signals representing
What Is the Effectiveness Rate of UXO Detection
Using Existing Technologies?
The answer to this question is centered around the
definition of "detection." Debates over the answer to this
apparently simple question reflect underlying values
about how to conduct a UXO investigation and what
costs are "worthwhile" to incur.
UXO objects are "seen" as underground anomalies that
must be interpreted. It is often difficult to distinguish
between UXO, fragments of OE, other metallic objects,
and magnetically charged rocks, boulders, and other
underground formations. This inability to discriminate,
and the resulting high number of false positives, is a
contributing factor to the high cost of UXO clearance.
The effectiveness of a detection technology is
intrinsically tied to the ability of the sensor to
discriminate between OE items and other subsurface
anomalies. The more sensitive the detector, the more
anomalies are found. Unless you intend to dig up every
anomaly, only by reducing false alarms can you increase
sensitivity and, therefore, the probability of detection.
DoD/EPA Interim Final Management Principles on
UXO Detection
The critical metrics for the evaluation of the performance
of a detection technology are the probabilities of
detection and false alarms. Identifying only one of these
measures yields ill-defined capability. Of the two,
probability of detection is a paramount consideration in
selecting a UXO detection technology.
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anomalies as detected by a hand-held magnetometer (or other detection device such as an EM
instrument), and places flags into the ground corresponding to the locations where signals were
produced. While Mag and Flag has improved with advances in magnetometry, it produces higher
false alarm rates than other available technologies. This is particularly true in areas with high
background levels of ferrous metals. In addition, the Mag and Flag system is highly dependent on
the capabilities of the operator. Efficiency and effectiveness have been shown to trail off at the end
of the day with operator fatigue or when the operator is trying to cover a large area quickly. Because
Mag and Flag is conducted manually, the data obtained are neither replicable nor easily verifiable.
In order to verify the data or excavate anomalies, an operator or excavator needs to go over the same
area again with a magnetometer. Because of these limitations and the availability of more reliable
systems, the use of Mag and Flag is decreasing. However, under certain conditions, such as difficult
terrain (e.g., mountainous, densely forested), and in nonferrous soils, Mag and Flag may be the best
method for detecting UXO.
Under the JPGTD program, developers test and analyze UXO detection technologies such
as magnetometry, electromagnetic induction, ground penetrating radar, and multisensor systems.
Emerging technologies such as infrared, seismic, synthetic aperture radar, and others are tested and
developed at JPGTD. A full discussion of each of these technologies is provided in Chapter 4.
While many detection technologies have an adequate probability of identifying anomalies
beneath the ground surface, for the most part, they cannot accurately distinguish between ordnance
and nonordnance, such as ferrous rocks. In addition, they often cannot distinguish dud-fired
munitions, fragments from fully exploded munitions, and anomalies caused by non-ordnance-related
sources, such as waste metals or ferrous rocks. A resulting higher number of false positives
increases the number of anomaly excavations required, both during the QA/QC process and during
the response process. Unless false positives can be positively identified as nonordnance items, they
are likely to be excavated during the investigation or response phase, a time-consuming and costly
undertaking. Therefore, minimizing false alarms can greatly reduce the cost of and time needed for
the project.
The primary goal of Phase IV of the JPGTD was to improve the ability to distinguish
between ordnance and nonordnance. While progress has been made in distinguishing UXO from
clutter such as UXO fragments, additional work is still needed to further advance target
discrimination technologies, to make them commercially available, and to increase their use. With
reliable and readily available target discrimination technologies, false alarm rates should be greatly
reduced, thereby significantly reducing the costs of UXO investigations. A number of data
processing/modeling tools have been developed to screen nonordnance targets from raw detection
data. These discrimination methods typically rely on a comparison of the signatures of targets with
a variety of sizes and shapes against a database of known UXO and clutter signatures. Additional
information about data processing for UXO discrimination is provided in Chapter 4.
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Identifying UXO Locations
In the past, the primary method used by UXO personnel to identify the location of anomalies was to manually mark
or flag the locations at which UXO detection tools produced a signal indicating the presence of an anomaly. If
operators wished to record the UXO location data, they would use GIS or other geographic programs to calculate
the UTM (Universal Transverse Mercator) grid coordinates for eachflag. Since the development of automatic data-
recording devices and digital georeference systems, data quality has improved significantly. Using digital
geophysical mapping, a UXO detection device identifies the anomaly, and a differential global positioning system
locates the position of the anomaly on the earth's surface. The accuracy of the positional data depends upon site
conditions such as vegetative cover that could interfere with the GPS satellite. Under ideal conditions, however,
the differential GPS can be accurate to within several centimeters. The data are then merged and the location of
each anomaly is recorded. Therefore, flags are not needed to record and find the location of the UXO. Because
digital geophysical mapping records location data automatically, the risk of an operator missing or misrecording
a location, as occurs when operators manually record anomaly locations based on analog signals, is minimized, and
the data can be made available for future investigations and for further data processing. However, the potential
exists for analyst errors in the merging of the anomaly and positional data. Therefore, anomaly reacquisition is
employed to verify the field data (see Section 7.7 for a discussion of anomaly reacquisition).
DoD/EPA Interim Final Management Principles on Data Recording
A permanent record of the data gathered to characterize a site and a clear audit trail of pertinent data analysis and
resulting decisions and actions are required. To the maximum extent practicable, the permanent record shall include
sensor data that is digitally recorded and georeferenced. Exceptions to the collection of sensor data that is digitally
recorded and georeferenced should be limited primarily to emergency response actions or cases where their use is
impracticable. The permanent record shall be included in the Administrative Record. Appropriate notification
regarding the availability of this information shall be made.
1 7.6 Methodologies for Identifying OE Areas
2 The previous discussions have addressed issues related to preparation for sampling and
3 analysis. The next two sections offer ideas about methodologies you may use to identify OE areas.
4 7.6.1 Operational Analysis of Munitions Activities
5 In the design of a good sampling and analysis plan, one of the most important considerations
6 for locating UXO may be an operational analysis of the type of weapon system (e.g., mortar,
7 artillery) used on the range. Army field manuals, for example, provide data that allow the
8 calculation of areas of probable high, medium, and low impact in a normal distribution. Using
9 available operational information, it is possible to assess the most likely distribution of UXO for a
10 particular weapons activity and to plan a sampling strategy that optimizes the probability you will
11 find UXO that may be present.108
108The process of using operational analysis to design a CSM-based sampling plan is described more fully in
the paper Conceptual Site Model-Based Sampling Design, presented to the UXO Countermine Forum 2001 by Norell
Lantzer, Laura Wrench, and others.
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7.6.2 Use of Statistically Based Methodologies To Identify UXO
The next key element of your sampling plan will be to select the quantity and location of
samples of the area to be sampled. In reality, there are three questions to be answered:
Where to deploy your detection
equipment
Where and how many anomalies are
to be excavated to see what you
have actually found
How to use the information from
detection, anomaly reacquisition,
and excavation to make a decision
at your site
Given the size of the ranges investigated, these
questions are often answered through the use of
a variety of statistical sampling approaches.
This section addresses four topics
pertinent to statistically based sampling: the
rationale for statistical sampling, how DoD
currently uses the data from such sampling
programs, regulator concerns with the use of
statistically based data, and recommendations
on appropriate use of these data to make
appropriate closure decisions for a range.
7.6.2.1 Rationale for Statistically Based
Sampling
Statistically based sampling was developed to address the limitations of noninvasive UXO
detection technologies and the use of those technologies on the large land areas that may make up
a range. Current methodologies for identifying anomalies in a suspected UXO area have various
limiting deficiencies, as described previously (see Section 7.5.1). The most common deficiencies
include low probability of detection and low ability to differentiate between UXO and/or fragments
and background interference (objects or natural material not related to ordnance). Thus, most
detection technologies have a moderate to high false alarm rate. This means that there is a high
degree of uncertainty associated with the data generated by the various detection methods. No
analogous situation exists for identifying compounds usually found at conventional hazardous waste
sites. The problem of highly uncertain anomaly data is magnified for three reasons:
The areas suspected of containing UXO could be hundreds or even thousands of acres;
therefore, it is often not practicable to deploy detection equipment over the entire area.
Terms Used in Statistical Sampling
Because many familiar terms are used in slightly
different ways in the discussion of statistical sampling,
the following definitions are provided for clarification:
Detection - Determining the presence of geophysical
anomalies targets from system responses (UXO Center
of Excellence Glossary, 2000, and OEW contractors).
Discrimination - Determining the presence of UXO
from non-UXO from system responses or post-
processing (OEW contractors).
Sampling - The act of investigating a given area to
determine the presence of UXO. It may encompass
both the nonintrusive detection of surface and
subsurface anomalies and excavation of anomalies.
Location - Determination of the precise geographic
position of detected UXO. Includes actions to map
locations of detected UXO. (UXO Center of
Excellence Glossary, 2000).
Recovery - Removal of UXO from the location where
detected (UXO Center of Excellence Glossary, 2000).
Identification/evaluation - Determination of the
specific type, characteristics, hazards, and present
condition of UXO (UXO Center of Excellence
Glossary, 2000).
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Even within sectors suspected of containing UXO, it is often not practicable to excavate
all detected anomalies during sampling to confirm whether they are in fact UXO.
Excavation to the level appropriate for the future land use is normally done during the
remediation phase.
When detection tools detect anomalies in areas where it is not known if ordnance has
been used, it is difficult to know (in the absence of excavation) if the detected anomaly
is in fact ordnance.
Statistically based sampling methods were developed to address the issue of how to effectively
characterize a range area without conducting either nonintrusive detection or intrusive sampling on
100 percent of the land area. Statistically based sampling methods extrapolate the results of small
sample areas to larger areas.
7.6.2.2 Statistical Sampling Tools
A variety of statistical sampling methodologies exist, each serving a different purpose, and
each with its own strengths and weaknesses. The two common statistical sampling tools historically
used by DoD are SiteStats/GridStats and the UXO Calculator. The general principles of the two
approaches are similar. First, the sector is evaluated to determine if it is homogeneous. If it is not
homogeneous, a subsector is then evaluated for homogeneity, and so forth, until the area to be
investigated is determined to be homogeneous. The sampling area is divided into a series of grids
and detection devices used to identify subsurface anomalies. The software, using an underlying
probability distribution, randomly generates the location and number of subsequent samples within
a grid, or the user can select the location of subsequent samples. Based on the results of each dig,
the model determines which and how many additional anomalies to excavate, when to move on to
the next grid, and when enough information is known to characterize the grid. (See the following
text box for a discussion of homogeneity.)
Statistical Sampling Using SiteStats/GridStats
SiteStats/GridStats (Site/Grid Statistical Sampling Based Methodology) is a computer program that combines
random sampling with statistical analysis. The controversy over this method is the use of random sampling to
detect UXO. Unlike traditional chemical pollutants, UXO is rarely, if ever, predictably distributed across a given
area. However, random sampling assumes uniform distributions, making it an inappropriate technique for sampling
UXO contamination unless homogeneity can be proven.
A grid is located within a (presumed) homogeneous sector (typically 50 x 50, 100 x 100, or 100 x 200 feet) that
is cleared of vegetation and scanned using a detection device selected for the particular site. Anomalies are marked,
and if fewer than 20 anomalies are detected within a grid, then all anomalies are excavated. When more than 20
anomalies are detected, 25 to 33 percent of them are selected for excavation based on a combination of statistical
sequential probability ratio test (SPRT) and ad hoc stopping rules. Once the anomalies are identified, results are
fed into the software program. The software then uses principles of random sampling to determine which anomalies
to excavate next, which grids to sample next, and so forth. The software determines when an adequate portion of
the site has been sampled and the investigation is complete. Finally, based on the investigation of a sufficient
number of grids within a number of sectors, the density of UXO is extrapolated to the entire range.
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The Importance of Homogeneity
The applicability of statistical sampling depends on whether the sector being sampled is representative of the larger
site. Statistical sampling as incorporated in SiteStats/GridStats and UXO Calculator assumes that a sector is
homogeneous in terms of the likelihood of UXO being present, the past and future land uses, the types of munitions
used and likely to be found, the depths at which UXO is suspected, and the soils and geology. Because statistical
sampling assumes an equal probability of detecting UXO in one location as in another, if the distribution of UXO
is not truly homogeneous, the sampling methodologies could overlook UXO items. Environmental conditions such
as soils and geology affect the depth and orientation at which munitions land on or beneath the ground surface.
If, on one part of a range, munitions hit bedrock within a few inches of the ground surface, they will be much closer
to the surface (and probably easier to detect) than others that hit sandy soil on top of deeper bedrock. In addition,
different types and sizes of munitions reach greater depths beneath the surface.
Attempts to assess homogeneity can include, but should not be limited to, the following activities: conducting
extensive historical research about the types of munitions employed and the boundaries of the range, surveying the
site, or using previously collected geophysical data.
There are two main differences between SiteStats/GridStats and the UXO Calculator. First,
the technologies typically used for input differ. SiteStats/GridStats is most commonly used with a
detection tool or combination of tools, whereas UXO Calculator is used with both a detection tool
and a digital geophysical mapping device. Second, SiteStats/GridStats produces a UXO density
estimate based only on the statistical model. The data from SiteStats/GridStats are then input into
OECert, a model that contains a risk management tool as well as a screening-level estimator for the
cost of remediation.109
The SiteStats/GridStats results are generally presented as having a confidence level that is
based on a set of assumptions and may not be justified. The UXO density estimates are often used
as input to OECert to evaluate the public risk and to cost-out removal alternatives. The OECert
model compares the costs of remediation alternatives to the number of public exposures likely under
each remediation scenario. The model then develops recommendations that minimize remediation
costs. The risk levels used for the recommendations are acceptable to the U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers (USACE).
UXO Calculator also estimates UXO density, but the program contains an additional risk
management tool that allows the operator to input an assumed acceptable UXO density based on
land use, assuming UXO distribution is homogeneous within a sector. UXO Calculator then
calculates the number of samples required to determine if this density has been exceeded. However,
acceptable UXO target densities are neither known nor approved by regulators. As with
SiteStats/GridStats, the sample size obtained is also based on an assumption of homogeneity within
a sector. The UXO Calculator software contains a density estimation model, risk management tool,
and cost estimator tool. The risk management tool requires assumptions about land use and from
that information assumes a value for the number of people who will frequent a site. The justification
of the land use assumptions and the resulting population exposure are not well documented.
109"Site/Grid Statistical Sampling Based Methodology Documentation," available at USACE website:
www/hnd/usace.army.mil/oew/policy/sitestats/siteindx.htm.
Chapter 7. Site/Range Characterization 7-30
December 2001
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1 Table 7-5 summarizes these two tools and their strengths and weaknesses. Table 7-6
2 provides a general summary of statistical sampling methodologies. Table 7-6 identifies four
3 statistical sampling methodologies and summarizes their strengths and weaknesses and the
4 applications for which they are used.
5 Table 7-5. Comparison of Statistical Sampling Tools
Inli-nsil\
6
S;illl|)lill!£
Simiglhs iind
of
7
\kMho picul l)ol) I so
8
uxo
Determines the size of
Investigates a very small
Low
Used with digital
9
Calculator
the area to be
investigated in order to
meet investigation goals,
confidence levels in
ordnance contamination
predictions, and UXO
density in a given area.
area to prove to varying
levels of confidence that a
site is "safe" for transfer.
All computations are based
on an assumption of sector
homogeneity with respect
to UXO distribution.
geophysical mapping data.
Used to make a yes/no
decision as to the presence
or absence of ordnance.
Used to determine
confidence levels in
ordnance contamination
predictions.
10
Site Stats/
Random sampling is
Potentially huge gaps
Low
Designed for use with
11
GridStats
based on a computer
program. Usually less
than 5% of a total site is
investigated and 25-33%
of anomalies detected are
excavated.
between sampling plots,
very small investigation
areas, no consideration of
fragments or areas
suspected of contamination.
Relies on a rarely valid
assumption that UXO
contamination is uniformly
distributed. Hot spots may
not be identified.
Mag and Flag data.
Reduces the required
amount of excavation to
less than 50% of levels
required by other
techniques. Used by DoD
to extrapolate results to
larger area.
Chapter 7. Site/Range Characterization
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December 2001
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1 Table 7-6. Comparison of Statistical Sampling Methodologies*
2
3
Sampling
Methodology
Description
Strengths and Weaknesses
IiiU'iimU of
Coverage
Typical DoD I so
4
5
Fixed pattern
sampling
Survey conducted along evenly spaced grids. A
percentage of the site (e.g., 10%) is
investigated.
Even coverage of entire site. Gaps between
plots can be minimized.
Medium
Useful for locating hot spots
and for testing clean sites.
6
7
Hybrid grid
sampling
Biased grids investigated in areas suspected of
contamination or in areas with especially large
gaps between SiteStats/GridStats sampling
plots.
Compensates for some of the limitations of
SiteStats/GridStats. Relies on invalid
assumption that UXO contamination is
Uniformly distributed.
Medium
Used to direct sampling
activity to make site
determinations.
8
9
Transect
sampling
Survey conducted along evenly spaced
transects.
Used in areas with high UXO concentrations.
Medium
Useful for locating
boundaries of high-density
UXO areas.
10
11
Meandering
path sampling
Survey conducted along a serpentine grid path
through entire site using GPS and digital
geophysical mapping.
Reduced distances between sampling points;
environmentally benign because vegetation
clearance is not required. Digital geophysical
mapping records anomaly locations with
improved accuracy.
Medium
Used to direct sampling
activity to make site
determinations in
ecologically sensitive areas.
12 *Any of these sampling methodologies may include limited excavation of anomalies to verify findings.
Chapter 7. Site/Range Characterization
7-32
December 2001
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1 7.6.2.3 USACE's Use of Statistically Based Sampling Results
2
The USACE statistical tools and methodologies are used to determine the following:
3
4
5
6
7
When sufficient sampling has been conducted within a grid
How many grids within a sector need to be investigated
How many sectors need to be investigated
The UXO density for the range under investigation
The response depth and land use for the site
8 While the results of statistical sampling should be only one of many inputs considered when making
9 a risk management decision, there are instances where it has appeared to be the only basis for the
10 decision. Consequently, where this has occurred, EPA and State regulators have generally rejected
11 the proposed risk management decision (e.g., no action, response to a 1-foot depth) because of the
12 inadequate foundation of the information used to make the decision.
Use of Statistical Sampling to Assess Risk at Fort Ritchie Army Garrison
USACE contractors conducted a site characterization of Fort Ritchie Army Garrison, some of which was to be
turned over to private ownership for residential development. This site characterization consisted of investigations
of approximately 50 100 x 100-foot grids, which represented approximately 7 percent of the identified UXO area.
SiteStats/GridStats identified that 95 percent of the UXO was located within 1 foot of the ground surface. Using
OECert, contractors determined that the appropriate remedy for this site was surface clearance.
However, regulators expressed concern about the adequacy and reliability of SiteStats/GridStats and OECert
methods, and the investigation was revised to include over 700 smaller grids, many of which have irregular shapes.
It is expected that these new grid parameters will more accurately reflect site conditions and account for
heterogeneity. The remedy was revised to include cleanup to a depth of 4 feet in all areas slated for industrial/
commercial and residential use, cleanup to 1 foot in a heavily wooded area with high probability of UXO, and deed
restrictions on the entire identified UXO area. In addition, the Army will clear areas to be developed in the future
to a depth of 4 feet. This approach is expected to save money in the future by reducing vulnerability to frost heave,
the severity of restrictions, monitoring efforts, and mobilization costs for construction support.
13 7.6.2.4 Regulator Concerns Regarding the Use of Statistical Sampling Procedures
14 The use of statistical sampling is a source of debate between the regulatory community (EPA
15 and the States) and DoD.110 Faced with large land areas requiring investigation, and the high costs
16 of such investigation, DoD has used several statistical approaches to provide an estimate of the UXO
17 density at a site as a basis for selecting remedies or making no-action decisions. Regulatory
18 concerns have generally focused on four areas: (1) the inability of site personnel to demonstrate that
19 the assumptions of statistical sampling have been met, (2) the extrapolation of statistical sampling
20 results to a larger range area without confirmation or verification, (3) the use of the density estimates
"""Interim Guidance on the Use of SiteStats/GridStats and Other Army Corps of Engineers Statistical
Techniques Used to Characterize Military Ranges." Memo from James E. Woolford, Director, EPA Federal Facilities
Restoration and Reuse Office, to EPA Regional Superfund National Policy Managers, January 19, 2001.
Chapter 7. Site/Range Characterization 7-33
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in risk algorithms to make management decisions regarding the acceptable future use of the area,
and (4) the use of statistical sampling alone to make site-based decisions. Criticisms of statistical
sampling have centered around the use of the statistical tools embodied in the SiteStats/GridStats,
and UXO Calculator. However, some of the criticisms may be applicable to other statistical
methods as well. Criticisms include the following:
Statistical sampling is based on
assumptions that the area being
sampled is homogeneous in terms
of the number of anomalies,
geology, topography, soils, types of
munitions used and depths at which
they are likely to be found, and
other factors. Often, too little
information is known to ensure that
the assumptions on which statistical
sampling is based are met, and the
procedures used to test sector
homogeneity are not effective
enough to detect sector non-
homogeneity.
Statistical procedures used in
SiteStats/GridStats to determine when the sector has been sufficiently characterized and
to test sector homogeneity are not statistically valid.
In practice, statistical procedures are often overridden by ad hoc procedures; however,
the subsequent analysis does not take these into account.
The use of statistical techniques often results in the sampling of a relatively small area
in comparison with the size of the total area suspected of contamination. The small
sampling area may not necessarily be representative of the larger area.
The ability of statistical sampling to identify UXO in areas where OE activities occurred
is questionable.
The capabilities of statistical methods to identify hot spots are limited.
A nonconforming distribution may not be identified by the program and thus not be
adequately investigated.
The distances between sampling grids are often large.
Relying exclusively on actual UXO effectively ignores UXO fragments as potential
indicators of nearby UXO.
Confidence statements based on the assumed probability distribution do not account for
uncertainties in the detection data.
Confidence statements also relate to an expected land use that is not carefully justified.
Results of confirmatory sampling are not presented or summarized in a manner that
allows a regulator to evaluate the quality and limitation of the data that are used in the
risk management algorithms.
There is no sensitivity analysis of the applicability of the risk management tools to the
input parameters. For example, there is nothing analogous to EPA's "most probable,"
DoD/EPA Interim Final Management Principles on
Statistical Sampling
Site characterization may be accomplished through a
variety of methods, used individually or in concert
with one another, and including, but not limited to,
records searches, site visits, or actual data acquisition,
such as sampling. Statistical or other mathematical
analyses (e.g., models) should recognize the
assumptions imbedded within those analyses. Those
assumptions, along with the intended use(s) of the
analyses, should be communicated at the front end to
the regulator(s) and the communities so the results may
be better understood. Statistical or other mathematical
analyses should be updated to include actual site data
as it becomes available.
Chapter 7. Site/Range Characterization 7-34 December 2001
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"most exposed individual," and "worst case" assumptions for baseline risk assessments
at Superfund sites.
7.6.2.5 Recommendations on the Use of Statistical Sampling
In general, regulatory agencies believe that statistical sampling is best used as a screening
tool or to provide preliminary information that will be confirmed during the clearance process.
Statistically based sampling tools, when used in conjunction with other tools, may be used for the
following purposes:
Prioritizing range areas for thorough investigation and/or clearance
Analyzing the practicality and cost of different clearance approaches, as well as the
usefulness of different remedial alternatives
Establishing the potential costs of clearance for different land uses
Facilitating a determination of which land uses may be appropriate following
remediation, and the levels and types of institutional controls to be imposed
Regulatory agencies also believe that statistical sampling alone should not be used to make no-action
decisions. Other significant data also will be required, including the following:
Extensive historical information
Groundtruthing (comparing the results of statistical sampling to actual site conditions)
of randomly selected areas to which results will be extrapolated
Even the use of historical and groundtruth information, combined with statistical sampling results,
will be suspect when the presence of ordnance fragments suggests that active range-related activities
occurred in the past. Range investigation practices are evolving, but many regulatory and technical
personnel agree that statistical sampling tools must be used in conjunction with the other elements
of the systematic planning process (including historical research). In examining the use of statistical
sampling tools, you should consider the following:
The assumptions on which statistical sampling techniques are based should be both
clearly documented and appropriate to the particular site under investigation.
The density estimates from the statistical sampling procedure should be carefully
scrutinized and computed using statistically correct algorithms.
Any risk estimates based on computer algorithms (e.g., OECert) should be adequately
documented for regulatory review.
Given the size of many OE areas, it is likely that some form of statistical sampling will be
used at your site. Decisions regarding the acceptability of statistical sampling involve the following
issues:
The nature of the decision to be made
Agreement on the criteria on which the decision will be made
Agreement on the assumptions and decision rules that are used in the statistical model
Chapter 7. Site/Range Characterization 7-35 December 2001
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The level of confidence in the detection technology
The use and amount of anomaly reacquisition to verify findings of detection technology
The presentation of these data, summarized in an appropriate format
The quality and quantity of information from historical investigations
7.7 Incorporating QA/QC Measures Throughout the Investigation
Quality assurance and quality control should be incorporated into every aspect of your
investigation. Begin planning for quality at the start of a project by developing DQOs and standard
operating procedures (SOPs). Throughout the process, all data should be managed so as to provide
an auditable trail of all data points and every geophysical anomaly detected.
The QA/QC requirements for OE investigations differ from other types of investigations
because of the unique characteristics of OE and the tools available for characterizing OE sites. For
example, the probability of detection when using any detection system depends on site-specific
conditions; therefore, the technology and its capability (performance criteria) must be established
for each site at which it will be used. You can determine the effectiveness only by conducting tests
of the technology on seeded areas representative of the range itself, and by using the sampling
methods to be used in the actual investigation. Similarly, because of the complexities of operating
detection systems and analyzing detection data, and the potential ramifications of mischaracterizing
an area as clear, operator and analyst skills and capabilities are of paramount importance. Therefore,
all personnel working on a site must be qualified and appropriately trained, and certified to work on
the site using the detection system selected. Specific QA/QC measures that should be taken include:
Development of data quality objectives - DQOs should clearly relate to the data being
collected and to the decisions being made. The DQOs should state the acceptable levels
of uncertainty and provide acceptance criteria for assessing data quality.
Sampling and analysis plan - The geophysical survey and the intrusive investigation
should be based on a comprehensive CSM. The sampling methods should consider
release mechanisms and weapons systems. All primary sources should be addressed and
follow-up searches should be performed.
Geophysical prove-out - The geophysical prove-out is used to select the geophysical
equipment to be used. In this process, the accuracy of the geophysical equipment is
assessed in conditions representative of the actual field conditions, sampling methods to
be used, and targets likely to be encountered at specific depths. In general, detection
instruments are calibrated in the field using QC grids in areas that have geology and
topography similar to the area being investigated. QC grids are seeded with statistically
significant numbers of buried target items. Using the detection system selected for the
area of concern, the detection team investigates the QC grid and makes a calculation to
determine a meaningful confidence interval for the detection capability and statistical
support for clearance certification (e.g., a 90 percent probability of 85 percent detection).
Depending on the project goals, if the confidence interval and the probability of
detection for the project cannot be achieved, the detection equipment may need to be
better calibrated or changed, the detection system operators may need additional training,
or the project goals may need to be reconsidered.
Chapter 7. Site/Range Characterization 7-36
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Geophysical certification - All members of the geophysical survey team are certified
for their ability to meet prove-out performance results to ensure precision of geophysical
data. An example of certification for surface sweeps would be "search effectiveness
probability validation," which is used to test the team and the detection equipment. In
search effectiveness probability validation, the area being investigated is "salted" with
controlled inert ordnance items that are flagged or collected as the sweep team proceeds
through the salted area. The number of planted items collected is compared with the
total number of planted items, and a percentage for search effectiveness probability is
calculated.
Site preparation - Prior to the geophysical survey, the site is prepared by setting survey
stakes and by removing all metallic debris that could mask subsurface anomalies. In this
process, all ordnance-related items found on the surface are documented and proved.
Geophysical survey - The output of the geophysical survey is geophysical and
positional data about subsurface anomalies encountered. The results of the survey are
affected by the method used to collect positional data and by the performance of the field
team. Quality control is conducted on the geophysical survey using several mechanisms:
(1) confirmation of proper functioning of detectors, (2) field surveillance to confirm
adherence to SOPs, and (3) independent resurvey of a portion of the area under
investigation. UXO survey teams may independently perform distance or angular
measurements two times to identify deviations resulting from human error. For
geophysical mapping performed without digital geophysical reference systems,
Universal Transverse Mercator (UTM) grid coordinate values created in GIS or other
geographic programs are verified by QC teams using a differential GPS to ensure correct
target locations.
Anomaly identification - The merged geophysical and positional data are analyzed to
identify and locate anomalies. The QC aspects of anomaly identification include
accurately merging data points, incorporating feedback from intrusive investigations, and
applying objective criteria to the identification process.
Anomaly reacquisition - Areas in which anomalies were initially detected are
reexamined, and the estimated anomaly location is flagged. This process helps to ensure
the accuracy of the anomaly location and depth data.
Anomaly excavation - Sources of anomalies are identified and excavated, and the
cleared hole is then verified by a detector. Results are fed back into the anomaly
identification process. Quality control is then conducted over the entire area to ensure
that anomalies have been excavated.
7.8 Selecting Analytical Methods
Two approaches may be used to determine the presence and concentration of munitions and
munition residues in the environment. One approach is to conduct analysis in the field. This
approach generates quantitative and qualitative data, depending on the exact method chosen, the
compounds present, and their concentration range. The other approach is to collect samples in the
field and analyze the samples in a laboratory. The laboratory can be either an on-site mobile
laboratory or an off-site fixed laboratory. However, all shipments of materials with elevated
Chapter 7. Site/Range Characterization 7-37
December 2001
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1
2
concentrations of explosives must be conducted under Department of Transportation hazardous
material transportation requirements.
3 The integrated use of both on-site field methods and laboratory methods provides a
4 comprehensive tool for determining the horizontal and vertical extent of contamination, identifying
5 potential detonation hazards, indicating the volume of contaminated media requiring remediation,
6 and determining whether remediation activities have met the cleanup goals.
7 Field analysis provides nearly immediate results, usually in less than 2 hours, at lower costs
8 than laboratory methods. However, field methods are less accurate than laboratory methods,
9 especially near the quantitation limit. They also have lower selectivity when the samples contain
10 mixtures of explosive compounds, and they are subject to more interferences. For these reasons, a
11 fixed percentage of samples, between 10 and 20 percent of the total samples, should be sent to a
12 laboratory for additional analysis.
13 7.8.1 Field Methods
14 Because of the heterogeneous distribution of explosive compounds in the environment, field
15 analytical methods can be a cost-effective way to assess the nature and extent of contamination. The
16 large number of samples that can be collected, combined with the relative speed with which data can
17 be generated using field analysis, allows investigators to redirect the sampling during a sampling
18 event.
19 TNT or RDX is usually present in explosives-contaminated soils. Studies of sampling and
20 analysis at a number of explosives-contaminated sites reported "hits" of TNT or RDX in 72 percent
21 of the contaminated soil samples collected and up to 94 percent of water samples collected that
22 contained munition residues.111'112 Another source113 reported that at least 95 percent of the soils
23 contaminated with secondary explosive residues contained TNT and/or RDX. Thus, the use of field
24 methods for both of these compounds can be effective in characterizing explosives contamination
25 at a site.
26 Two basic types of on-site analytical methods are widely used for explosives in soil:
27 colorimetric and immunoassay. Colorimetric methods generally detect broad classes of compounds,
28 such as nitroaromatics, including TNT, or nitramines, such as RDX, while immunoassay methods
29 are more compound-specific. Water samples can also be analyzed in the field for TNT and RDX
30 using a continuous-flow immunosensor and fiber-optic biosensor. Most on-site analytical methods
31 have a detection range at or near 1 mg/kg for soil and 0.07 to 15 //g/L for water.
111 A.B. Crockett et al., U. S. Environmental Protection Agency, Field Sampling and Selecting On-Site Analytical
Methods for Explosives in Soils, EPA/540/R-97/501, November 1996.
112A.B. Crockett et al., U. S. Environmental Protection Agency, Field Sampling and Selecting On-Site Analytical
Methods for Explosives in Water, EPA/600/S-99/002, May 19, 1999.
113Thomas F. Jenkins et al., U.S. Army Cold Regions Research and Engineering Laboratory, Laboratory and
Analytical Methods for Explosives Residues in Soil, Hanover, NH.
Chapter 7. Site/Range Characterization 7-38
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Field methods can be subject to positive matrix interferences from humic substances found
in soils. For colorimetric methods, these interferences can be significant for samples containing less
than 10 mg/kg of the target compound. In the presence of these interferences, many immunoassay
methods can give sample results that are biased high compared to laboratory results. Commonly
applied fertilizers, such as nitrates and nitrites, also interfere with many of these methods.
Therefore, it is considered good practice to send a percentage of the samples collected to a fixed
laboratory for confirmatory analysis.
Colorimetric methods treat a sample with an organic solvent, such as acetone, to extract the
explosives. For example, for soil, a 2 to 20 gram sample is extracted with 6.5 to 100 mL of acetone.
After 1 to 3 minutes, the acetone is removed and filtered. A strong base, such as potassium
hydroxide, is added to the acetone, and the resulting solution's absorbance at a specific light
wavelength is measured using a spectrophotometer. The resulting intensity is compared with a
control sample to obtain the concentration of the compound of interest.
Colorimetric methods, though
designated for a specific compound, such as
TNT or RDX, will respond to chemically
similar compounds. For example, the TNT
methods will respond to TNB, DNB, 2,4-DNT,
and 2,6-DNT. The RDX methods will respond
to HMX. Therefore, if the target compound,
TNT or RDX, is the only compound present,
the method will measure it. If multiple
compounds are present, they will show a
response relative to the target compound,
adding to the concentration of the target
compound being quantified.
The various immunoassay and
biosensor methods differ considerably.
However, the underlying basis can be
illustrated by one of the simpler methods.
Antibodies specific for TNT are linked to solid
particles. The contaminated media are
extracted and the TNT molecules in the extract
are captured by the solid particles. A color-
developing solution is added. The presence
or absence of TNT is determined by comparing
it to a color card or a field test meter.
Whereas colorimetric methods will
respond to other chemically similar
compounds, immunoassay methods are more
specific to a particular compound. For
Examples of Field Analytical Methods
The EXPRAY Kit (Plexus Scientific) is the simplest
colorimetric screening kit. It is useful for screening
surfaces and unknown solids. It can also be used to
provide qualitative tests for soil. It has a detection
limit of about 20 nanograms. Each kit contains three
spray cans:
EXPRAY 1 - Nitroaromatics (TNT)
EXPRAY 2 - Nitramines (RDX) and nitrate
esters (NG)
EXPRAY 3 - Black powder, ANFO
EnSys Colorimetric Test Kits (EPA SW846 Methods
8515 and 8510) consist of separate colorimetric
methods for TNT and RDX/HMX. The TNT test will
also respond to 2,4-DNT, tetryl, and TNB. The
RDX/HMX test will also respond to NG, PETN, NC,
and tetryl. It is also subject to interference from the
nitrate ion unless an optional ion exchange step is used.
The results of these kits in the field correlate well with
SW846 Method 8330.
DTECH Immunoassay Test Kits (EPA SW846
Methods 4050 and 4051) are immunoassay methods
for TNT and RDX. Immunoassay assay tests are more
selective than colorimetric test kits. The results are
presented as concentration ranges. These ranges
correlate well with SW846 Method 8330.
The EPA Environmental Technology Verification
Program (www.epa.gov/etv) continues to test new
methods.
Chapter 7. Site/Range Characterization 7-39
December 2001
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1 example, the TNT immunoassay methods will also respond to a percentage of TNB, 2,4-DNT, and
2 2,6-DNT when multiple nitroaromatic compounds are present. The RDX immunoassay method has
3 very little response (less than 3 percent) to other nitramines such as HMX.
4 The explosive compounds that can be detected by colorimetric and immunoassay methods
5 are indicated in Table 7-7. In addition, TNT and RDX can be detected and measured in water
6 samples using biosensor methods.
7 Table 7-7. Explosive Compounds Detectable by Common Field Analytical Methods
8
Compound
Colorimetric Test
Immunoassay Test
9
Nitroaromatics
10
2,4,6-Trinitrotoluene (TNT)
X
X
11
1,3-Dinitrobenzene (DNB)
X
12
1,3,5-Trinitrobenzene (TNB)
X
X
13
2,4-Dinitrotoluene (2,4-DNT)
X
14
2,6-Dinitrotoluene (2,6-DNT)
X
X
15
4-Amino-2,6-dinitrotoluene (4AmDNT)
X
16
Methyl-2,4,6-trinitrophenylnitramine (Tetryl)
X
17
Nitramines
18
Hexahydro-1,3,5 -trinitro-1,3,5 -triazine (RDX)
X
X
19
Octahy dro -1,3,5,7 -tetranitro -1,3,5,7 -tetrazocine (HMX)
X
20 7.8.2 Fixed Lab Methods
21 Explosive compounds such as TNT and RDX, as well as the impurities created during their
22 manufacture and their environmental transformation compounds, are classified as semivolatile
23 organic compounds (SVOCs). However, these compounds have a number of important chemical
24 and physical properties that make their analysis by methods used for other SVOCs problematic. For
25 example, if the concentration of energetic/explosive compounds is high enough (approaching 10
26 percent or less, depending on the specific compound), the possibility of detonation increases with
27 the preparation of samples for analysis. Extreme caution must be employed when using gas
28 chromatography methods for the analysis of these compounds. These compounds are also very
29 polar; thus, the use of the nonpolar solvents used in typical semivolatile analytical methods is not
30 feasible.
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7.8.2.1 EPA Method 8330n4
Samples containing or suspected of
containing explosive compounds are usually
analyzed using high-performance liquid
chromatography (HPLC) with ultraviolet
detection. If explosive compounds are
detected, then the samples must be rerun using
a second, different HPLC column for
confirmation. The currently approved EPA
method is SW-846 Method 8330, which
provides for the detection of parts per billion
(ppb) of explosive compounds in soil, water,
and sediments. The compounds that can be
detected and quantified by Method 8330 are
listed in the text box to the right.
Samples can be extracted with methanol
or acetonitrile for TNT, but acetonitrile is
preferred for RDX. The sample extracts are
injected into the HPLC and eluted with a
methanol-water mixture. The estimated
quantitation limits in soil can range from 0.25
mg/kg to 2.2 mg/kg for each compound. The
estimated quantitation limits in water can range
from 0.02 to 0.84 //g/L for low-level samples
and 4.0 to 14.0 //g/L for high-level samples.
7.8.2.2 EPA Method 8095ns
Method 8330, described above, is the
standard EPA test method for explosive
compounds. However, Method 8330 has a
number of problems associated with it. These
problems include high solvent usage, multiple
compound coelutions (one or more compounds
coming out at the same time) in sample
matrices with complex mixtures, and long run
times. In order to address these problems, EPA
Compounds That Can Be Detected and Quantified
by SW-846 Method 8095 (EPA)
1,3-Dinitrobenzene (DNB)
1,3,5-Trinitrobenzene (TNB)
2-Amino-4,6-dinitrotoluene (2AmDNT)
2-Nitrotoluene
2,4-Dinitrotoluene (2,4-DNT),
2,4,6-Trinitrotoluene (TNT)
2,6-Dinitrotoluene (2,6-DNT)
3,5-Dinitroaniline
Nitrobenzene
Nitroglycerine
3-Nitrotoluene
4-Amino-2,6-dinitrotoluene (4AmDNT)
4-Nitrotoluene
Hexahydro-l,3,5-trinitro-l,3,5-triazine (RDX)
Methyl-2,4,6-trinitrophenylnitramine (Tetryl)
Nitrobenzene
Octahydro-l,3,5,7-tetranitro-l,3,5,7-tetrazocine
(HMX)
Pentaerythritol tetranitrate (PETN)
Compounds That Can Be Detected and Quantified
by SW-846 Method 8330 (EPA)
1,3-Dinitrobenzene (DNB)
1,3,5-Trinitrobenzene (TNB)
2-Amino-4,6-dinitrotoluene (2AmDNT)
2-Nitrotoluene
2,4-Dinitrotoluene (2,4-DNT)
2,4,6-Trinitrotoluene (TNT)
2,6-Dinitrotoluene (2,6-DNT)
3-Nitrotoluene
4-Amino-2,6-dinitrotoluene (4AmDNT)
4-Nitrotoluene
Hexahydro-l,3,5-trinitro-l,3,5-triazine (RDX)
Methyl-2,4,6-trinitrophenylnitramine (Tetryl)
Nitrobenzene
Octahy dro -1,3,5,7 -tetranitro -1,3,5,7 -tetrazocine
(HMX)
114SW-846 Method 8330, Nitroaromatics and Nitramines by High Performance Liquid Chromatography
(HPLC), U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Revision 0, September 1994.
115Method 8095, Explosives by Gas Chromatography, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Revision 0,
November 2000.
Chapter 7. Site/Range Characterization 7-41
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Method 8095 has been proposed as an alternative analytical method. Method 8095 uses gas
chromatography with electron capture detection (see text box). It can detect and quantify the same
compounds as Method 8330. In addition, Method 8095 can also detect and quantify 3,5-
dinitroaniline, nitroglycerine, and pentaerythritol tetranitrate (PETN).
Samples are extracted using either the solid-phase extraction techniques provided in Method
3535 (for aqueous samples) or the ultrasonic extraction techniques described in Method 8330 (for
solid samples). Acetonitrile is the extraction solvent. Further concentration of the extract is only
required for low detection limits. The extracts are inj ected into the inlet port of a gas chromatograph
equipped with an electron capture detector. Each analyte is resolved on a short, wide-bore, fused-
silica capillary column coated with polydimethylsiloxane. Positive peaks must be confirmed on a
different chromatography column.
7.8.2.3 Other Laboratory Methods for Explosive Compounds
Two other methods can be mentioned briefly. The first is a CHPPM method for explosives
in water. It is a gas chromatography electron capture detection method developed by Hable et al.
in 1991. Although it is considered to be an excellent method, it is not commercially available. The
second, SW-846 Method 8321, is an LC-MS method that is available at a few commercial
laboratories. Explosives are not the target analytes for which the method was developed; however,
the method claims to be applicable to the analysis of other nonvolatile or semivolatile compounds.
7.8.2.4 EPA Method 7580116
In addition to explosive compounds, other materials used in military ordnance present
hazards to human health and the environment. White phosphorus (P4) is a toxic, synthetic substance
that has been used in smoke-producing munitions since World War I. Due to the instability of P4
in the presence of oxygen, it was originally not considered an environmental contaminant. However,
after a catastrophic die-off of waterfowl at a U.S. military facility was traced to the presence of P4
in salt marsh sediments, it was discovered that P4 can persist in anoxic sedimentary environments.
Method 7580, gas chromatography with nitrogen/phosphorus detector, may be used for the
analysis of P4 in soil, sediment, and water samples. Two different extraction methods may be used
for water samples. The first procedure provides sensitivity on the order of 0.01 //g/L. It may be
used to assess compliance with Federal water quality criteria. The second procedure provides for
a sensitivity of 0.1 The extraction method for solids provides a sensitivity of 1.0 //g/kg.
Because this method uses the nitrogen/phosphorus detector, no interferences have been reported.
Because P4 reacts with oxygen, sample preparation must be done in an oxygen-free
environment, such as a glove box that has been purged with nitrogen. Samples are extracted with
either diethyl ether (low water method), isooctane (high water method), or degassed reagent
1^Method 7580, White Phosphorus (P,) by Solvent Extraction and Gas Chromatography, U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency, Revision 0, December 1996.
Chapter 7. Site/Range Characterization 7-42
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water/isooctane (solids). The extracts are then injected into the gas chromatograph that has been
calibrated with five standards.
7.8.2.5 EPA Method 314.0ni
The presence of the perchlorate anion in groundwater and surface waters that are used for
drinking water has become a concern. Until recently, a suitable method for analyzing for the
perchlorate anion was not available. EPA Method 314.0, the Determination of Perchl orate in
Drinking Water Using Ion Chromatography, is the standard method for perchlorate analysis. Due
to the possibility of interferences at the low sensitivities of this method, identification of perchlorate
should be confirmed by use of a laboratory fortified matrix sample.
To detect and quantify perchlorate, a 1.0 mL volume of sample is introduced into an ion
chromatograph. The perchlorate anion is separated and quantified using a system that comprises
an ion chromatographic pump, sample inj ection valve, guard column, analytical column, suppressor
device, and conductivity detector.
7.9 Developing the Site Response Strategy
Most of this chapter has focused on the essential components of the systematic planning
process that will be used to devise the sampling and analysis strategy appropriate for your site. The
question remains - what do you do with this information?
The information from your site investigation will be documented in an investigation report
(called a remedial investigation report in the CERCLA program and a RCRA Facility Investigation
in the RCRA program). In the standard CERCLA process addressing chemical contamination, this
information will be evaluated with a site-specific risk assessment to determine whether the
concentrations of chemicals present at the site provide a potential risk to human health and the
environment and whether pathways between chemicals present at the site and potential receptors will
expose receptors to unacceptable levels of risk. When evaluating the munition constituents of OE,
the standard risk assessment process will be used.118
When evaluating the information associated with an OE site (UXO, explosive soil, and
buried munitions), two questions are asked:
Is any OE present or potentially present that could pose a risk to human health or the
environment?
What is the appropriate site response strategy if OE is present or potentially present?
Three fundamental choices are evaluated:
1 "Method 314.0, Determination of Perchlorate in Drinking Water Using Ion Chromatography, U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency, Revision 1.0, November 1999.
118U.S. EPA, Risk Assessment Guidance for Superfund (RAGS), Volume 1, Human Health Evaluation Manual,
PartB, Interim, September 1991.
Chapter 7. Site/Range Characterization 7-43
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- Further investigation is required.
- Response action is required (either an active response such as clearance or
containment, or a limited response such as institutional controls and monitoring).
- No action or no further action is required.
7.9.1 Assumptions of the Site Response Strategy
The site response strategy is based on several basic assumptions built on discussions with
DoD OE experts:
There is no quantifiable risk level
for OE exposure below which you
can definitively state that such
potential exposure is acceptable.
This is because exposure to only
one OE item can result in
instantaneous physical trauma. In
other words, if the OE has a
potential for exposure, and a
receptor comes into contact with it
and the OE explodes, the result will
be death or injury. Unlike
noncarcinogenic chemicals, OE
does not have an acceptable risk level that can be quantified, above which level there is
a risk that injury will occur. Unlike carcinogenic chemicals, there is no risk range that
is considered to be acceptable. Explosive risk either is or is not present. It is not
possible to establish a threshold below which there would be no risk, other than the
absence of OE. Therefore, no attempt is made to quantify the level of explosive risks.
Once OE is determined to be present or potentially present, a response action will be
necessary. This response action may involve removal, treatment, or containment of OE,
or it may be a limited action such as the use of institutional controls and monitoring. In
any case, whenever the response action will leave OE present or potentially present on-
site after the action is complete, some kind of institutional controls will be required.119
What Does "Unacceptable Risk" Imply?
If there is no acceptable risk level, does that mean 100
percent cleanup at all sites?
The short answer is no. Institutional controls (ICs) will
be used along with the active response when that
response allows a land use that does not provide for
unrestricted use. ICs may be used as the sole response
in those circumstances where the CERCLA decision
process finds that active response actions are
impracticable or unsafe.
11'Institutional controls are non-engineered measures designed to limit exposure to hazardous substances,
pollutants, or contaminants that have been left in place and that are above levels that support unrestricted use. They are
sometimes referred to by the broader term "land use controls." The latter term encompasses engineered access controls
such as fences, as well as the institutional or administrative mechanisms required to maintain the fence.
Chapter 7. Site/Range Characterization 7-44 February 2002
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EPA/DoD Interim Final Management Principles on Land Use and Clearance
Because of technical impracticability, inordinately high costs, and other reasons, complete clearance of CTT
military ranges may not be possible to the degree that allows certain uses, especially unrestricted use. In
almost all cases, land use controls will be necessary to ensure protection of human health and public safety.
Land use controls must be clearly defined and set forth in a decision document.
Final land use controls for a given CTT range will be considered as part of the development and evaluation
of response alternatives using the nine criteria established under CERCLA regulations (i.e., the National
Contingency Plan, or NCP), supported by a site characterization adequate to evaluate the feasibility of
reasonably anticipated future land uses. This will ensure that land use controls are chosen based on a detailed
analysis of response alternatives and are not presumptively selected.
A no-action alternative (i.e., not even institutional controls are required) will usually be
selected only where there is a high level of certainty that no OE is present on-site. The
selection of "further investigation" will usually occur when the site information is
qualitatively assessed and deemed sufficiently uncertain that proceeding to some sort of
response action (or no action) is inappropriate.
The final decision at the site (no action, or selection of a type of action) is formally
evaluated through whatever regulatory process is appropriate for the site. For example,
if your decision is to be made under the CERCLA remedial process, you would use the
nine CERCLA criteria to evaluate the acceptability of a no-action decision and to select
appropriate response actions (including depth of response or containment, or limited
response actions such as institutional controls and monitoring).
7.9.2 Attributes of the Site Response Strategy
It will not be necessary to create a new report to document your site response strategy. The
site response strategy is not a new document or a new process. Rather, it is the pulling together of
the information from your investigation to set the stage for the next steps in the OE management
process at your site. The site response strategy can be developed whenever there is enough
information available to make the decision you were initially trying to make (or to determine that
additional information is necessary). The site response strategy can be documented through a
number of existing documents, including:
The work plan for the next stage of work (if more investigation is necessary).
The conclusion section of the RI (if no action is recommended).
The feasibility study (if a response action is planned).
Key attributes of the site response strategy include the following:
1 It uses a weight-of-evidence approach to decision making. Converging lines of
evidence are weighed qualitatively to determine the level and significance of uncertainty.
In the process of developing a site response strategy, information is gathered from a
variety of sources - historical data, facility and community interviews, surface
inspections, geophysical inspections, and land use and planning information. Decisions
Chapter 7. Site/Range Characterization 7-45 December 2001
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are based on a qualitative analysis of the data collected. The gathering of this
information takes place during the site characterization phase.
2. The site response strategy may be determined using varying levels of data at
different points in the data collection process and is thoroughly integrated with the
site characterization process. It is not a separate step. The project team is asked to
examine the weight of evidence present, and the amount of uncertainty present, at any
stage in your data collection process to determine the next course of action (e.g., more
investigation, response, institutional controls only, or no action). Three examples are
used to illustrate this point:
If historical information from multiple sources over continuous timeframes provides
sufficient certainty that no OE is present, then it may not be necessary to conduct
geophysical studies to detect OE and determine the depth and boundaries of the OE.
If there is uncertainty as to whether ordnance with explosive potential is present, or
is present at depths that could lead to exposure, then extensive geophysical
investigations may be required to determine the presence or absence of OE and the
depth at which it may be found.
If ordnance with explosive potential is known to be present at a depth where human
exposure is likely, then it may not be necessary to conduct extensive geophysical
studies to determine if factors are present that would cause OE to migrate.
3. The purpose of the site response strategy is to enable the project team to make a
risk management decision (the remedy selection process). The site response strategy
considers information gathered in the site characterization phase that validates and/or
changes the conceptual site model. The type and location of OE, the availability of
pathways to potential receptors, the accessibility of the site(s) to receptors, and the
current, future, and surrounding land uses are assessed to determine the type and
magnitude of risks that are associated with the site(s). The site response strategy informs
the risk management process, which compares the risks associated with clearance with
those of exposure management (through physical or institutional controls). The strategy
then uses the appropriate regulatory processes (e.g., CERCLA, RCRA, SDWA, etc.) to
determine the final remedy at the site.
Figure 7-4 provides an overview of the process of developing a site response strategy and
the various types of investigations, uncertainties, and decisions that go into the development of a site
response strategy. The figure illustrates typical investigation and decision scenarios. The reader
should note that there are no endpoints on this flow chart, since the stage that follows the site
response strategy is either further investigation or evaluation of potential remedies. The discussion
that follows outlines in more detail the series of questions and issues to be weighed at each decision
point.
Chapter 7. Site/Range Characterization 7-46
December 2001
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Historical Research
1) Archival Research
2) EOD Incident Report
3) Aerial Photos
4) Base/Community Interviews
5) Surface Observation
Qualitative Assessment of
Uncertainties-Weight of Evidence
Consider: How many sources of data
are available, are there
inconsistencies in the data, is
information available over time?
Conduct Historical
Research
Does
availability and
quality of historical
information suggest
moderate to high
levels of
ncertainty?
Is there
ny evidence tha
ordnance may have
been used or
isposed of at th
site?
Geophysical ordnance detection
studies
Studies to detect potential presence,
type, depth and boundaries of OE.
May include detection, anomaly
clearance, QA/QC, statistical
sampling (see Chapter 7.0)
Geophysical studies of potential
movement and migration (may be
conducted simultaneously with
detection studies)
Studies to examine factors that may
cause ordnance to move (e.g., frost
line, stratigraphy, depth to
groundwater, etc.) (See Chapter 3.0)
Conduct
geophyscial
studies (detection)
< No
'
Yes-
Qualitative Assessment of
Uncertainties-Weight of Evidence
Consider: Are measurement quality
objectives being met by historical
information and geophysical
studies? Are measurement quality
objectives set at a level that
supports a high level of certainty?
Are the
boundaries of
the area
known?
Have
brdnance or fragments
been detected that suggest
a type of ordnance capable
of explosive
damage?
No action or limited action
(e.g., institutional controls
and monitoring)
Use regulatory decision
process (e.g., CERCLA
nine criteria, RCRA
DDESB, DERP) to make
risk management decision
Do you
ave a high leve
of confidence in
results of the
geophysical
studies?
Are
additional
geophysical studies
technically and
economically
ractical?
Conduct additional
geophysical
studies as required
by gaps/
uncertainties
Potentially change
PRG/land use.
Implement appropriate
institutional controls.
Use regulatory decision
process to make risk
managment decision.
Figure 7-4. Developing a Site Response Strategy
7-47
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Conduct additional
geophysical
studies as required
by gaps/
uncertainties
-Yes
Conduct
geophysical
studies (migration)
Are factors
resent that coul
cause ordnance to
migrate toward areas
of human
activity ">
No action or limited action
(e.g., institutional controls
and monitoring)
Use regulatory decision
process (e.g., CERCLA
nine criteria, RCRA,
DDESB, DERP) to make
risk management decision
Do you
have a high
level of confidence
in the results of
geophysical
studies?
Are
additional
geophysical studies
technically and
economically
ractical?
Qualitative Assessment of
Uncertainties-Weight of Evidence
Consider: Are measurement quality
objectives being met by historical
information and geophysical
studies? Are measurement quality
objectives set at a level that
supports a high level of certainty?
Potentially change PRG/
land use. Implement
appropriate institutional
controls. Use regulatory
decision process to make
risk managment decision.
Potential for ordnance exposure to human activity
7-48
Is the Nv
planned
'land use compatible"1
with the depth at
which ordnance is oi>
N. may be
*\found?/^
Is the
/depth at whicn\
ordnance is found
likely to bring it into
contact with any
human
Xactivity^/
Qualitative Assessment of
Uncertainties-Weight of Evidence
Consider: Are measurement quality
objectives being met by historical
information and geophysical
studies? Are measurement quality
objectives set at a level that
supports a high level of certainty?
No action or limited action
(e.g., institutional controls
and monitoring).
Use regulatory decision
process (e.g., CERCLA
nine criteria, RCRA,
DDESB, DERP) to make
risk management decision
Conduct clearance activities or
change land use. Use regulatory
decision process (e.g., CERCLA
nine criteria, RCRA, DDESB,
DERP) to make risk management
decision. Implement appropriate
deed restrictions and other
controls.
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7.9.3 Questions Addressed in the Development of the Site Response Strategy
In developing your site response strategy, you will address four issues. These four issues
parallel the factors addressed in a typical risk assessment, but the process differs significantly from
a risk assessment in that after the initial question (presence or absence of ordnance) is addressed,
the focus of the remaining questions is to develop a response strategy to support the risk
management approach.
7.9.3.1 Determining the Presence of Ordnance with Explosive Potential
The central question addressed here
is whether ordnance with explosive
potential is present or may be present at
your site. As discussed earlier, the response
to this question is a simple yes or no
answer. A former firing range in which the
only type of ordnance used was bullets will
probably be found to have no explosive
risk. (There may of course be risks to
human health and the environment from
munition constituents such as lead, but such
risks are addressed in a chemical risk
assessment.) Larger ordnance items (e.g.,
bombs, projectiles, or fuzes) will have an
explosive risk if present or potentially
present as OE.
As discussed in Chapters 3 and 4
and in preceding sections of this chapter, in
your investigation to determine the
presence or potential presence of OE you would consider multiple sources of information, including
historical information (see box above) and a variety of geophysical studies. An initial gathering of
historical information will be necessary to create the conceptual site model that will guide both
intrusive and nonintrusive studies of the site. Visual reconnaissance may also be appropriate to
identify evidence of range activity and to highlight areas for further investigation. Finally, various
types of geophysical studies may be used to locate potential OE.
7.9.3.2 Identifying Potential Pathways of Exposure
Once the actual or potential presence of OE has been established, you will then need to
identify the potential exposure routes. The essential question in this phase is whether the ordnance
that is found in the area is, or could be, at a depth that will bring it into contact with human activity.
In the site characterization, you established the preliminary remediation goal (PRG), which specifies
the depth to which clearance will be required to support the anticipated land use. Using historical
information and geophysical data, you should consider two questions:
Establishing the Presence or Absence of OE Using
Historical Data
Mission of the facility and/or range
Actual use of facility and/or range over time
Types of ordnance associated with the mission and
actual use
Accessibility of the facility and ranges to human activity
that could have resulted in unplanned burial of excessed
ordnance or souvenir collecting
Portability of UXO (facilitating unplanned migration to
different parts of the facility)
Sources of Information
Archive reports
EO incident reports
Interviews with base personnel and surrounding
community
Aerial photographs
Newspaper reports
Chapter 7. Site/Range Characterization 7-49
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Has ordnance, fragments of
ordnance, or explosives-
contaminated soil been detected,
suggesting the presence of OE? (Is
there ordnance with explosive
potential?)
Is this material found at a depth that
is shallower than the PRG (and
likely to bring it into contact with
human activity)?
If the ordnance is not found at a depth
that is shallower than the PRG, additional
geophysical studies may be necessary to
determine if there are factors that may cause
ordnance to move (e.g., frost line or
stratigraphy). (See Chapter 3 and earlier in this
chapter.)
Factors To Be Evaluated in Identifying Potential
Pathways of Exposure
In addition to the information highlighted in the
previous box (regarding the historical uses of, and
likely ordnance at, the site), factors that affect
pathways of exposure include:
Current and future land use, and depth to which
land must be clear of OE to support that land use;
level of intrusive activity expected now and in the
future
Maximum depths at which ordnance is or may be
found, considering the nature of the ordnance
Location of frost line
Erosion potential
Portability of type of ordnance for souvenir
handling and illegal burial
Potential that excessed ordnance may have been
buried
If ordnance is found to be present or potentially present, you may need additional
geophysical information in order to ensure that the boundaries of the range and the density of
ordnance are well understood for the purposes of assessing the complexity (and cost) of remediation.
7.9.3.3 Determining Potential for Human Exposure to Ordnance
The potential for human exposure is
assessed by looking at the types of human
activities that might bring people into contact
with OE. Key issues for determining the
potential of human receptors to come into
contact with OE include:
About Portability
The potential of exposure to OE through human
activity goes beyond the actual uses of ranges.
Potential exposures to OE can also occur as a result of
human activity that causes OE to migrate to different
locations. Examples of such common human activities
include:
Burial of chemical protective kits (containing
chemical waste material) by soldiers in training
exercises.
Transport of UXO as souvenirs to residential areas
of the base and off base by soldiers or civilians.
Depth of ordnance and exposure
pathways of concern
Potential for naturally caused
migration to depths of concern
Accessibility of areas where
ordnance is known or suspected to
be present to workers, trespassers,
etc.
Potential for intrusive activity (e.g., construction in the OE area)
Current and potential future ownership of the site(s)
Current and potential future land use of the site(s) and the surrounding areas (including
potential groundwater use)
Potential portability of the OE (for potential human-caused migration off range)
Chapter 7. Site/Range Characterization 7-50
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During the final phase of the analysis, you should consider information and uncertainties
from all phases of the investigation to determine whether there is a risk at the depth of concern. If
the planned land use is not compatible with the depth at which ordnance is or may be found, then
two options are possible:
Remediate to a depth appropriate for the planned land use.
Change the planned future land use to be consistent with the depth of cleanup.
Both of these decisions will be made during the risk management decision process under the
applicable regulatory framework (e.g., CERCLA or RCRA). Unless you have a high level of
certainty that remediation will clear the land for an unrestricted land use, appropriate institutional
controls will be required.
7.9.3.4 Considering Uncertainty
In every stage of site characterization, including the development of a site response strategy,
a qualitative evaluation of uncertainty will help you decide the level of confidence you have in the
information collected to determine your next steps. No single source is likely to provide the
information required to assess the level of certainty or uncertainty associated with your analysis.
Therefore, your qualitative uncertainty analysis will rely on the weight of the evidence that has
converged from a number of different sources of data, including historical information (archives,
EOD incident reports, interviews, etc.), results of detection studies and sampling, results of other
geophysical studies, assessment of current and future land use, and accessibility of OE areas.
7.10 Making the Decision
The Interim Final Management Principles agreed to by senior DoD and EPA managers
(described in and provided as an attachment to Chapter 2, "Regulatory Overview") establish a
framework for making risk management decisions. These principles state that "a process consistent
with CERCLA and these management principles will be the preferred response mechanism used to
address UXO at a CTT range." The principles go on to state that response actions may include
CERCLA removal or remedial activities, or some combination of these, in conducting the
investigation and cleanup.
7.11 Conclusion
A focus of this chapter has been on planning your investigation. In the course of the
investigation, the initial plan will undoubtedly change. The conclusion of the investigation should
result in answers to the questions posed in the data quality objectives at a level of certainty that is
acceptable to the DoD decision makers, the regulators, and the public.
The purpose of this chapter has been to take you through the planning and design of the UXO
investigation to the development of a site response strategy. As pointed out in the introduction, this
chapter has focused primarily on UXO and energetic materials, not the environmental contamination
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of media by munition constituents. Chapter 3 describes common chemicals of concern that are
found in association with OE areas. Typically, the approaches used to investigate explosive
compounds will not differ substantially from other environmental investigations of hazardous
wastes, pollutants, and contaminants, except that safety considerations will require more extensive
health and safety plans and generally be more costly since the potential for UXO in the subsurface
must be considered.
The development of a site response strategy is based on the Interim Final Management
Principles, which call for investigation and cleanup actions to be consistent with both the CERCLA
process (either removal or remedial activities, or a combination of these) and the principles
themselves. The actual selection of a response will be conducted through the risk management
processes defined by the CERCLA removal and remedial programs (or the RCRA Corrective Action
Program).
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1
SOURCES AND RESOURCES
2 The following publications, offices, laboratories, and websites are provided as a guide for
3 handbook users to obtain additional information about the subject matter addressed in each chapter.
4 Several of these publications, offices, laboratories, or websites were also used in the development
5 of this handbook.
6 Publications
7 American Society for Testing and Materials. Guide E1689-95 Standard Guide for Developing
8 Conceptual Site Models for Contaminated Sites, 2001.
9 Crockett, A.B., H.D. Craig, T.F. Jenkins, and W.E. Sisk. Field Sampling and Selecting On-site
10 Analytical Methods for Explosives in Soil, Paper presented at U. S. EPA F ederal F acilities F orum,
11 November 1996.
12 Crockett, A.B., H.D. Craig, and T.F. Jenkins. Field Sampling and Selecting On-site Analytical
13 Methods for Explosives in Water, Paper presented at U.S. EPA Federal Facilities Forum, May 19,
14 1999.
15 Wilcox, R. G. Institutional Controls for Ordnance Response, Paper presented at UXO F orum, May
16 1997.
17 Information Sources
18 Joint UXO Coordination Office (JUXOCO)
19 10221 Burbeck Road, Suite 430
20 Fort Belvoir, VA 22060-5806
21 Tel: (703) 704-1090
22 Fax: (703) 704-2074
23 http://www.denix.osd.mil/UXOCOE
24 U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
25 U.S. Army Engineering and Support Center
26 Ordnance and Explosives Mandatory Center of Expertise
27 P.O. Box 1600
28 4820 University Square
29 Huntsville, AL 35807-4301
30 http://www.hnd.usace.army.mil/
31 Department of Defense Explosives Safety Board (DDESB)
32 2461 Eisenhower Avenue
33 Alexandria, VA 22331-0600
34 Fax: (703)325-6227
35 http://www.hqda.army.mil/ddesb/esb.html
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1 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
2 Superfund Risk Assessment
3 http://www.epa.gov/superfund/programs/risk/index.htm
4 Guidance Documents
5 U.S. Air F orce, Headquarters, Air F orce Center for Environmental Excellence. Technical Services
6 Quality Assurance Program, Version 1.0, August 1996.
7 U. S. Army Corps of Engineers. Interim Chemical Data Quality Management (CDQM) Policy for
8 USAGE HTRWProjects, December 8, 1998.
9 U.S. Army Corps ofEngineers. Technical Project Planning (TPP) Process, Engineer Manual 200-
10 1-2, August 31, 1998.
11 U.S. Department of Defense. DoD Ammunition and Explosives Safety Standards, DoD 6055.9-
12 STD, July 1999.
13 U.S. EPA. Compliance with Other Laws (Vols 1 & 2), August 8, 1988.
14 U.S. EPA. Guidance for Conducting Remedial Investigations and Feasibility Studies Under
15 CERCLA, Interim Final, PB89-184626, October 1989.
16 U.S. EPA. Risk Assessment Guidelines for Superfund (RAGS), Volume I Human Health
17 Evaluation Manual, Part A, Interim Final, December 1989.
18 U.S. EPA. Risk Assessment Guidance for Superfund (RAGS), Volume I Human Health
19 Evaluation Manual, Part C (Risk Evaluation of Remedial Alternatives), Interim, October 1991.
20 U.S. EPA. Risk Assessment Guidance for Superfund (RAGS), Volume I Human Health
21 Evaluation Manual, Part B, Interim, December 1991.
22 U.S. EPA. Guidance for Data Usability in Risk Assessment (Part A), PB92-963356, April 1992.
23 U.S. EPA. Guidance on Conducting Non-time-critical Removal Actions Under CERCLA, PB93-
24 963 402, August 1993.
25 U.S. EPA. Risk Assessment Guidance for Superfund (RAGS), Volume I Human Health
26 Evaluation Manual, Part D (Standardized Planning, Reporting, and Review of Superfund Risk
27 Assessments), Interim, January 1998.
28 U.S. EPA. EPA Guidance for Quality Assurance Project Plans, EPA QA/G-5, February 1998.
29 U.S. EPA. Guide to Preparing Superfund Proposed Plans, Records of Decision, and Other
30 Remedy Selection Decision Documents, PB98-963241, July 1999.
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1 U.S. EPA. Institutional Controls and Transfer of Real Property Under CERCLA Section
2 120(h)(3)(A), (B) or (C), February 2000.
3 U.S. Navy. Environmental Compliance Sampling and Field Testing Procedures Manual,
4 NAVSEA T03OO-AZ-PRO-OO10, July 1997.
5 Sources of Data for Historical Investigations
6 Air Photographies, Inc.
7 (aerial photographs)
8 Route 4, Box 500
9 Martinsburg, WV 25401
10 Tel: (800) 624-8993
11 Fax:(304)267-0918
12 e-mail: info@airphotographics.com
13 http://www.airphotographics.com
14 Environmental Data Resources, Inc.
15 (aerial photographs; city directories; insurance, wetlands, flood plain, and topographical maps)
16 3530 Post Road
17 Southport, CT 06490
18 Tel: (800) 352-0050
19 http://www.edrnet.com
20 U.S. Geological Survey, EROS Data Center
21 (satellite images, aerial photographs, and topographic maps)
22 Customer Services
23 47914 252nd Street
24 Sioux Falls, SD 57198-0001
25 Tel: (800)252-4547
26 Tel: (605) 594-6151
27 Fax:(605)594-6589
28 e-mail: custserv@edcmail.cr.usgs.gov
29 http://edc.usgs.gov/
30 National Archives and Records Administration
31 National Cartographic and Architectural Branch
32 College Park, MD
33 http://www.nara.gov
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U.S. Department of Agriculture, Natural Resources Conservation Service
(national, regional, and some state and local data and maps of plants, soils, water and climate,
watershed boundaries, wetlands, land cover, water quality, and other parameters)
14th and Independence Avenue
Washington, DC 20250
http://www.nrcs.usda.gov/
Repositories of Explosive Mishap Reports
Army
U.S. Army Safety Center
5th Avenue, Bldg. 4905
Fort Rucker, AL 36362-5363
U.S. Army Technical Center for Explosives Safety (maintains a database of explosives accidents)
Attn: SIOAC-ESL, Building 35
1C Tree Road
McAlester, OK 74501-9053
e-mail: sioac-esl@dac-emh2. army. mil
http://www.dac.army.mil/esmam/default.htm
Navy
Commander, Naval Safety Center
Naval Air Station Norfolk
375 A Street, Code 03
Norfolk, VA 23511
Tel: (757) 444-3520
http://www.safetycenter.navy.mil/
Air Force
Air Force Safety Center
HQ AFSC/JA
9700 G Avenue SE
Kirtland AFB, NM 87117-5670
Tel: (505) 846-1193
Fax:(505)853-5798
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