oEPA
EPA 600/R-11/052 | July 2011 | www.epa.gov/ord
United States
Environmental Protection
Agency
Report on the
2010 U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA)
Decontamination Research and
Development Conference
Office of Research and Development
National Homeland Security Research Center
-------
EPA-600-R-11-052
Report on the
2010 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
Decontamination Research and Development Conference
National Homeland Security Research Center
Office of Research and Development
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
Research Triangle Park, NC 27711
-------
Disclaimer
The United States Environmental Protection Agency, through its Office of Research and
Development's National Homeland Security Research Center, funded and managed this effort
through EP-C-07-015 with Eastern Research Group. This report has been peer- and
administratively reviewed and has been approved for publication as an Environmental Protection
Agency document. It does not necessarily reflect the views of the Environmental Protection
Agency. No official endorsement should be inferred.
Questions concerning this document or its application should be addressed to:
Emily Snyder, Ph.D.
National Homeland Security Research Center
Office of Research and Development (E-343-06)
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
109 T.W. Alexander Dr.
Research Triangle Park, NC 27711
(919)541-1006
snyder.emily@epa.gov
i
-------
Foreword
Following the events of September 11, 2001, the mission of the United States Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) was expanded to address critical needs related to homeland security. Presidential
Directives identify EPA as the primary federal agency responsible for the country's water supplies and for
decontamination following a chemical, biological, and/or radiological (CBR) attack.
As part of this expanded mission, the National Homeland Security Research Center (NHSRC) was
established to conduct research and deliver products that improve the capability of the Agency to carry
out its homeland security responsibilities. As this research was being conducted and others in the
homeland security research community were also conducting research in this area there became a need for
a forum to discuss the outcomes of this research and encourage collaboration among the community. The
EPA Decontamination Conference was established in 2005. Since then, five EPA Decontamination
Conferences have been held and a report has been generated summarizing each of these conferences.
This year's report features an executive summary, a summary of the plenary session, the technical
speakers' abstracts, their corresponding question and answer session and their presentations.
NHSRC has made this publication available to facilitate collaboration among the homeland security
research center and help the response community prepare for and recover from disasters involving
biological/chemical/radiological contamination. This research is intended to move EPA one step closer to
achieving its homeland security goals and its overall mission of protecting human health and the
environment while providing sustainable solutions to our environmental problems.
Jonathan Herrmann,
Director, National Homeland Security Research Center
li
-------
Acknowledgments
The Environmental Protection Agency's National Homeland Security Research Center (NHSRC) would
like to acknowledge the plenary speakers, Dr. Paul Anastas and Congressman David Price, at the 2010
Decontamination Conference. In addition, NHSRC would like to acknowledge the technical program
speakers for providing the abstracts as well as the presentations published in this report. NHSRC would
also like to acknowledge the Eastern Research Group for drafting the remaining portions of the report.
Lastly NHSRC would like to acknowledge Dr. Lukas Oudejans from its Decontamination and
Consequence Management Division for review of the executive summary.
111
-------
Executive Summary
The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) held the "2010 EPA Decontamination Research and
Development Conference" to enable participants from throughout the world to discuss decontamination
related advances through science and engineering. In addition to the Plenary Session, the meeting
addressed nine topic areas:
• Field Activities and Large-Scale Demonstrations,
• Cross-Cutting Recovery Activities,
• Tools and Guidance Development, Fate and Transport Research Activities Informing Recovery
(Cross-Cutting),
• Activities to Support Wide-Area Biodecontamination,
• Persistence of Biological Agents and Other Bio-related Decontamination and Disposal Research,
Radiological Recovery Research Activities, and
• Operational Considerations for Decontamination and Chemical Warfare Agent Recovery
Research.
Plenary Session
Dr. Paul Anastas, the Assistant Administrator at EPA's Office of Research and Development, and the
Honorable David Price, the Congressman from North Carolina's 4th District, opened the conference. Dr.
Anastas emphasized the need for collaboration and innovation when developing solutions to
decontamination issues. He stated that the conference provided an important forum for participants to
share their overarching views of decontamination needs and concerns, as well as the details of their state-
of-the-art techniques, technologies, and research needs. As the keynote speaker, Congressman Price
provided perspective on the policy and budget issues that affected research programs at the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) and EPA. He noted that most government agencies and programs were facing
budget cuts, including EPA programs supporting homeland security. Congressman Price cautioned that
economic recovery and political decisions would ultimately influence future budgets, but he did not
believe that long-term budget prospects were debilitating.
Field Activities and Large-Scale Demonstrations
The first three speakers in this session discussed activities and findings from decontamination events.
First, a speaker described decontamination technologies (amended bleach and detergent) used during a
response to a gastrointestinal anthrax case in Durham, New Hampshire. He noted that responders needed
to evaluate the unique characteristics of each event when identifying appropriate decontamination
methods. The second speaker presented a case study in which chlorine dioxide gas was used to
decontaminate the ductwork of a Biosafety Level 2/3 laboratory prior to renovation. The third described
source reduction activities at four facilities after the 2001 anthrax incidents and discussed lessons learned
during these activities.
The last three speakers in this session described ongoing or planned demonstration projects. Two speakers
provided information about projects aimed at addressing the restoration and recovery of transportation
centers. One demonstration project sought to develop, identify, and/or select a set of plans, procedures,
and technologies for the rapid recovery of major transportation facilities following a release of a chemical
warfare agent or other highly toxic chemicals. The other demonstration project tested the ability to deploy
a stabilizing coating on a train car and a contamination control barrier in a subway system tunnel. These
technologies would be used in a radiological event to prevent the spread of contamination. The final
demonstration project sought to evaluate the efficacy of numerous decontamination methods and
IV
-------
sampling methods, to conduct an economic analysis of a response, and to test the coordination of an
interagency response to a biological agent release.
Cross-Cutting Recovery Activities
This session began with two presentations on decontamination concerns for water supply systems. The
first of these presentations was an overview of several NHSRC studies focused on treating water and
decontaminating water system infrastructure contaminated by biological and chemical agents. In the
second presentation, a speaker described EPA efforts to develop a guide for water utilities responding to
contamination events. This guide contained information about the containment, treatment, and disposal of
large amounts of contaminated water.
During the remaining four presentations in this session, speakers provided information about various
workgroup and agency activities. One speaker discussed the Threat Agent Disposal work group and two
workshops focused on disposal issues related to recovery after a radiological dispersion device (RDD)
event or a wide area anthrax event in an urban area. Other speakers provided information about current
and ongoing work of the Validated Sampling Plan Work Group and the United Kingdom's Government
Decontamination Service. The last speaker discussed the formation of the U.S.-Canada bilateral
Technical Working Group and the role of this group in response and restoration efforts.
Tools and Guidance Development
The three presentations in this session described tools and guidance documents developed to assist in
event response and recovery. The first speaker discussed the Analyzer for Wide-Area Restoration
Effectiveness (AWARE) decision support tool and presented an analysis of different hypothetical anthrax
release scenarios. The second described a Web-based, multiuser, interactive tool that allows
implementation of the decision process flowchart provided in the draft document "Planning Guidance for
Recovery Following Biological Incidents." The third speaker discussed the Department of Homeland
Security's (DHS's) Protective Action Guides, developed for communities affected by nuclear and
radiological incidents. These Protective Action Guides offer an approach for late-phase (long-term)
recovery. The third speaker discussed optimization approaches, potential issues associated with late-phase
recovery, and the need for more specific guidance on how to implement the optimization process.
Fate and Transport Research Activities Informing Recovery (Cross-Cutting)
Four speakers presented findings from research addressing the fate and transport of contaminants. Two
speakers described projects that involved sampling for Bacillus thuringiensis var. kurstaki (Btk), a
common pesticide with physical and biological properties similar to Bacillus anthracis. One of these
projects involved sampling in and around buildings after an outdoor release of Btk. The results provided
insight into spore infiltration into buildings as a function of building type and meteorological and land use
variables. A separate but similar study was presented in which spore contamination characteristics were
evaluated after the release of Btk in transit stations, including a limited comparison of the efficacy of
different sample types in detecting levels of contamination. A third speaker described ongoing work
related to outdoor dispersion, deposition, adhesion, and reaerosolization of particles as well as their
subsequent infiltration into buildings. The last speaker described the Brooklyn Traffic Real-Time
Ambient Pollutant Penetration and Environmental Dispersion (B-TRAPPED) study. The B-TRAPPED
study sought to provide a better understanding of the transport of airborne particulate pollutants in a
heavily populated urban neighborhood, from the sources on the streets, down the street canyon, and into
and within the adjacent buildings.
v
-------
Activities to Support Wide-Area Biodecontamination
Researchers from government agencies and private industry gave six presentations on the
decontamination of biological threat agents. These presentations discussed findings from studies
evaluating the efficacy of various physical, liquid, foam, and fumigation methods for decontaminating
Bacillus spores from a variety of common indoor and outdoor surfaces. Data from these studies will
inform the development of decontamination strategies for response and recovery events. In addition to
Bacillus spores, one of these studies also evaluated the persistence and decontamination efficacy of five
fumigant and four liquid technologies against Brucella suis, Francisella tularensis, vaccinia virus (a
surrogate for the smallpox virus), and Yersinia pestis on various materials. All of the technologies in this
study were effective against all of these bioagents. Another of these studies sought to evaluate the
decontamination efficacy and the cost comparison for several methods of cleaning spores from the
heating, ventilation, and air conditioning system. Results from this study are not yet available.
Persistence of Biological Agents and Other Bio-related Decontamination and Disposal
Research
Eight presentations addressed additional concerns associated with the decontamination of biological
agents. The first presentation discussed a method to deposit Bacillus spores onto various material surfaces
using a metered dose inhaler. The deposition amount and repeatability were measured. Ultimately this
deposition method will provide consistent deposition for benchtop decontamination and detection
experiments. The second speaker discussed tests conducted to determine the effect of simulated sunlight
on the persistence of B. anthracis on different materials. He also evaluated the persistence of Brucella
suis (a Category B Centers for Disease Control and Prevention agent) and freeze-dried vaccinia virus (a
surrogate for the variola virus, which causes smallpox) deposited on various materials under various
environmental conditions. These tests confirmed that these agents can persist for extended periods of time
depending on the environmental conditions and materials, and that decontamination of these materials
may be necessary.
Three of the presenters described the development of new test methods. The first described a novel cell-
based assay for detection of functional ricin. This assay could be used to determine the efficacy of
disinfectants and to confirm findings in recently completed ricin decontamination studies. The other two
presenters discussed the development of standardized methods for efficacy testing of liquid
decontaminants against biotoxins and for testing disinfectants against foreign animal diseases on
nonporous surfaces.
Three additional presentations discussed findings from biological agent decontamination studies. One
speaker described results from a study that employed a three-step-method to test the sporicidal efficacy of
six disinfectants on two different carrier surfaces contaminated with B. atrophaeus. Another speaker
presented findings from a project to evaluate multiple disinfectant strategies for their effectiveness at
inactivating Newcastle disease virus on mechanical equipment. Test data showed that current methods
recommended for agricultural disease response were not sufficient and additional research was required to
provide effective recommendations for the field. The third speaker described a bench-scale landfill flare
system developed to study the destruction of Geobacillus stearothermophilus spores, a surrogate for B.
anthracis. This presentation included information regarding the design of the flare system, problems
encountered during setup of this system, sampling methods, spore losses throughout the system, and
preliminary data on flare spore destruction.
VI
-------
Radiological Recovery Research Activities
The nine presentations in this session discussed issues associated with radiological contamination (and
decontamination). Two speakers provided updates on programs regarding radiological contamination.
One speaker provided an update on the EPA Agency Airborne Spectral Photometric Environmental
Collection Technology (ASPECT) program, which assists first responders by providing an aerial tool to
collect photographic, chemical, and physical (infrared and gamma radiation) information quickly and
relay this information directly to decision-makers in the field. Another speaker discussed Defence
Research and Development Canada, Ottawa's radiological research program, which was investigating
problems associated with large-area contamination resulting from an RDD incident.
Three presentations addressed the fate and transport of radiological contamination. One presentation
provided findings from a study of the interactions of cesium, resulting from a simulated RDD incident,
with urban materials. This presentation also provided recent results on modeling and experimental studies
for RDD radionuclide chelators. Another presentation discussed a bench-scale research project seeking to
understand the association between drinking water pipe material and surrogate (nonradioactive) isotopes
for cesium, strontium, and cobalt. This project also examined mechanisms of attachment and the
efficiency of water decontamination/treatment methods. The third presentation described a series of
experiments intended to investigate the interactions of cesium chloride with variety of urban surface
materials.
Two speakers described research into the efficacy of decontamination technologies. One research project
focused on the identification and evaluation of chelating agents that could improve the radiological
decontamination efficiency of an existing commercial decontamination foam. Researchers in this study
sought to modify this foam so that it would be effective for the removal of cesium, strontium, and cobalt
from a variety of common urban surface materials. The second speaker discussed NHSRC's Technology
Test and Evaluation Program (TTEP), in which a series of performance evaluations of commercial, off-
the-shelf radiological decontamination technologies to gauge their effectiveness in the removal of cesium
from concrete were recently completed.
Disposal of waste resulting from a radiological contamination event is an important consideration for
restoration and recovery. A presenter described an EPA effort to provide a first-order estimate of waste
resulting from an RDD event including decontamination activities. This estimate has been used in RDD
response planning activities and exercises. The methodology used to generate this estimate allows further
examinations of scenario-specific categorized waste amounts as a function of radiation acceptance levels
and cleanup goals. Another presenter described a series of tests conducted to evaluate the removal of
radionuclides and other hazardous components from liquid decontamination wastes.
Operational Considerations for Decontamination
The impact of decontamination technologies on treated materials, especially electronic equipment, was
the topic of three presentations. The first presentation described a project that evaluated the effect of
lowering the relatively humidity on the sporicidal effectiveness of chlorine dioxide gas and corrosive
effects associated with the use of chlorine dioxide. Experiments found that as relative humidity decreased,
the concentration x time (CT) needed to reach 100 percent sporicidal efficacy increased. Corrosion effects
were found to be independent of CT but were dependent on the relative humidity. The other two
presentations examined the impact of chlorine dioxide and hydrogen peroxide fumigation on electronic
equipment. These two projects provided objective assessments of fumigation-induced damage of
electrical components, materials, and subsystems.
Vll
-------
Chemical Warfare Agent Recovery Research
During this session, one speaker provided an overview of basic research programs in decontamination
funded through the U.S. Army Research Office. The remaining five speakers described issues associated
with the decontamination of chemical warfare agents. One speaker discussed a chemical testing
methodology that provided a new approach for evaluating decontaminant performance on porous or
complex surfaces. Another speaker described a series of experiments assessing the fate and behavior of
chemical agents on building surfaces and in the surrounding air as a function of temperature, surface
concentration, and construction material. Two speakers provided results from experiments and projects to
assess decontamination strategies for various chemical warfare agents, including vapor and/or liquid
sarin, mustard agents, and VX, found on different building material surfaces. Another speaker described a
demonstration of rapid, effective knockdown and neutralization of chemical warfare agent simulant
aerosol releases using electrostatically charged decontaminant sprays. This demonstration project also
sought to explore and optimize spray system parameters that will improve knockdown and neutralization.
Findings from this project indicated that a release mitigation spray safety system could remove airborne
contaminants from an accidental or intentional release and could protect personnel and limit the spread of
contamination.
-------
Table of Contents
Disclaimer i
Foreword ii
Acknowledgments iii
Executive Summary iv
List of Abbreviations xii
1 Introduction 1
2 Plenary Session 2
2.1 Protecting Human Health and the Environment through Innovation 2
2.2 Keynote Speaker 3
3 Field Activities and Large-Scale Demonstrations 7
3.1 Case Study: Decontamination of a Community Building Containing Low Concentrations of
Bacillus Anthracis Spores, Durham, New Hampshire 7
3.2 Decontamination of a Facility and HVAC System Ductwork using Chlorine Dioxide Gas 8
3.3 Source Reduction Following the 2001 Anthrax Attacks: Lessons Learned 9
3.4 An Overview of the Chemical Restoration Operational Technology Demonstration (OTD)
Project 10
3.5 Two Recent Proof of Principle Tests of Deployable Countermeasures to Support Recovery
of Critical Mass Transit Facilities 11
3.6 Bio-Response Operational Testing and Evaluation (BOTE) 12
4 Cross-Cutting Recovery Activities 13
4.1 National Homeland Security Research Center Water Treatment and Infrastructure
Decontamination Research 13
4.2 Draft Containment and Disposal of Large Amounts of Water: A Support Guide for Water
Utilities 13
4.3 Threat Agent Disposal: Disposal Issues Following a CBRN Incident Based on RDD and
Anthrax Waste Disposal Workshops 14
4.4 Update on the Validated Sampling Plan Work Group 15
4.5 Developing an Effective CBRN Decontamination Capability 16
4.6 U.S.-Canada Bilateral Technical Working Group (TWG) for CBRN Response and Recovery 16
5 Tools and Guidance Development 18
5.1 Analysis of Decontamination Strategies Following a Wide-Area Biological Release in a
Metropolitan Area 18
5.2 Interactive Decision Framework for Consequence Management 19
5.3 Optimization Approaches and Issues Associated with Late-Phase Recovery Following
Radiological or Nuclear Events 19
IX
-------
6 Fate and Transport Research Activities Informing Recovery (Cross-cutting) 21
6.1 Transport of Bacillus Thuringiensis var. Kurstaki (Btk) from an Outdoor Release
into Buildings 21
6.2 Transport of Bioaerosols into a Regional Transport System 22
6.3 Mitigation and Containment of Contaminant Spread 23
6.4 The Brooklyn Traffic Real-Time Ambient Pollutant Penetration and Environmental
Dispersion (B-TRAPPED) Study 24
7 Activities to Support Wide-Area Biodecontamination 26
7.1 Assessment of Liquid and Physical Decontamination Methods for Surfaces Contaminated
with Bacillus Spores 26
7.2 Evaluation of COT Products for Decontamination of Bacillus Spores 28
7.3 Evaluation of Peroxide-Based Solutions for Facility Decontamination by Owner/Occupants... 29
7.4 Inactivation of Bacillus Anthracis Spores on Indoor and Outdoor Building Surfaces using
Commercially-Available Liquid Sterilant Technologies 30
7.5 Inactivation of Bioagents through Natural Attenuation, Liquid Decontamination,
or Fumigation 31
7.6 High/Low Tech Approaches to HVAC Decontamination 32
8 Persistence of Biological Agents and Other Bio-related Decontamination and
Disposal Research 34
8.1 Persistence of Selected Biological Agents 34
8.2 Disinfection of Mobile Equipment after an Emergency Poultry Disease Outbreak 35
8.3 Testing Sporicidal Efficacy of Six Disinfectants on Carrier Surfaces Contaminated With
B. Atrophaeus Spores 36
8.4 Development of a Novel Bioassay for Detection of Functional Ricin 37
8.5 Biotoxin Test Method Development 38
8.6 Development of Test Methods for Determining the Efficacy of Disinfectants against
Foreign Animal Disease Viruses on Nonporous Surfaces 39
8.7 Destruction of Spores in a Bench-Scale Landfill Flare System 40
8.8 Development of an Aerosol Deposition Method for Bacillus Spores 41
9 Radiological Recovery Research Activities 42
9.1 Simulated Cesium Radiological Dispersal Devices for Deposition, Dose, and
Decontamination Studies 42
9.2 EPA Spectral Photometric Environmental Collection Technology: Gamma Emergency
Mapper Project 43
9.3 Radiological Decontamination of Urban Surfaces using Selective Isotope-Sequestering
Agents 43
9.4 Performance Evaluation of Decontamination Technologies for Dirty Bomb Cleanup 44
9.5 The Evolution of Radiological Decontamination at DRDC Ottawa 46
9.6 Persistence of Surrogate Radioisotopes on Drinking Water Infrastructure and the
Effectiveness of Decontamination Methods 46
x
-------
9.7 Evaluating Cesium Contamination of Urban Building Materials: Two Instrumental
Approaches 47
9.8 Impact of RDD Decontamination Strategies on Quantities and Characteristics of
Resulting Waste and Debris 48
9.9 Treatment of Liquid Wastes from Radiological Decontamination 49
10 Operational Considerations for Decontamination 51
10.1 Impact of CT and Relative Humidity on Efficacy and Material Effects of Chlorine Dioxide 51
10.2 Methodology for Quantitative Analysis of the Impact of Decontamination on Electronic
Equipment 52
10.3 Assessment of the Impact of CI02 and H202 Decontamination on Electronic Equipment 54
11 Chemical Warfare Agent Recovery Research 56
11.1 Evaluating Strategies for CWA Decontamination of Indoor Facilities 56
11.2 Test Methodology for the Assessment of Chemical Warfare Agent Decontamination
Performance on Porous or Complex Surfaces 57
11.3 Basic Research Needs in Decontamination 57
11.4 Knockdown and Neutralization of Aerosolized Chemical Agent Simulants using Charged
Decontaminant Sprays 58
11.5 Study of the Release of Pesticides from Building Materials 59
11.6 Assessment of Fumigants for Decontamination of Surfaces Contaminated with Chemical
Warfare Agents 60
Appendix A Agenda A-l
Appendix B List of Participants B-l
Appendix C Presentation Slides C-l
XI
-------
List of Abbreviations
ASFV African swine fever virus
ASPECT Airborne Spectral Photometric Environmental Collection Technology
AWARE Analyzer for Wide-Area Restoration Effectiveness
BDR building decontamination residue
BOTE Bio-response Operational Testing and Evaluation
Btk B. thuringiensis var. kurstaki
BSL Biosafety Level
B-TRAPPED Brooklyn Traffic Real-Time Ambient Pollutant Penetration and Environmental
Dispersion
°C degrees Celsius
CBRN chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear
CDC Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
CFU colony-forming unit(s)
C102 chlorine dioxide
cm2 square centimeter
COT commercial off-the-shelf
CSFV classical swine fever virus
CT concentration and time values
CWA chemical warfare agent
DCMD Decontamination and Consequence Management Division
DHS U.S. Department of Homeland Security
DNDO Domestic Nuclear Detection Office
DOD U.S. Department of Defense
DOE U.S. Department of Energy
DRDC Defense Research and Development Canada
DTRA Defense Threat Reduction Agency
ECBC Edgewood Chemical Biological Center
EPA U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
ERT Environmental Response Team
°F degrees Fahrenheit
FAD foreign animal disease
FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation
FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency
FMDV foot and mouth disease virus
GB sarin
GD soman
GDS U.K. Government Decontamination Service
GEM Gamma Emergency Mapper
H202 hydrogen peroxide
HD mustard agents
HEPA high-efficiency particulate air
hr hour
HVAC heating, ventilation, and air conditioning
IND Improvised Nuclear Device
Xll
-------
IBRD
Interagency Biological Restoration Demonstration
LANL
Los Alamos National Laboratory
LC/MS
liquid chromatography/mass spectrometry
m
meter
m2
square meter
MDI
metered dose inhaler
mg
milligram
mg/L
milligrams per liter
mL
milliliter
mVHP
modified vaporous hydrogen peroxide
NAS
National Academy of Sciences
NBIC
National Biosurveillance Integration Center
ng/mL
nanograms per milliliter
NHSRC
National Homeland Security Research Center
NRC
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
NYCT
New York City Transit
ORD
Office of Research and Development
OSHA
Occupational Safety and Health Administration
OTD
Operational Technology Demonstration
PM
particulate matter
PPE
personal protective equipment
PSU
Personal Sampling Unit
ppm
parts per million
ppmv
parts per million by volume
R&D
research and development
RCRA
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
RDD
radiological dispersal device
RH
relative humidity
RTP
Research Triangle Park
SNL
Sandia National Laboratory
TOF-SIMS
time-of-flight secondary ionization mass spectrometry
TSM
three-step method
TSP
trisodium phosphate
TWG
Technical Working Group
U.K.
United Kingdom
U.S.
United States
uv
ultraviolet
VHP
vaporous hydrogen peroxide
WMD
weapon of mass destruction
XPS
x-ray photoelectron spectroscopy
Xlll
-------
1 Introduction
This report summarizes presentations and
discussions from the "2010 U.S Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) Decontamination
Research and Development Conference," which
was held April 13-15 in Durham, North
Carolina. The technical content of this report is
based entirely on information and discussions
from the workshop.
The workshop consisted of 53 speaker
presentations organized in nine sessions,
followed by brief question and answer periods.
Dr. Paul Anastas, the Assistant Administrator
for EPA's Office of Research and Development
(ORD), opened the Plenary Session and the
Honorable David Price, Congressman, 4th
District, North Carolina, served as the keynote
speaker. Approximately 150 workshop
participants represented federal, state, and local
government agencies and laboratories;
international organizations (five countries other
than the United States); academia; and the
private sector.
This report provides an overview of the Plenary
Session and summarizes each presentation
within the 9 sessions. Each presentation
summary consists of the abstract provided by the
speaker and a review of the brief question and
answer period. The speakers' presentation slides,
which include additional detailed information,
are found in Appendix C of this report.
This report is organized by topic session and
supporting information as follows:
• Section 2 summarizes the Plenary Session.
• Sections 3-11 contain the presentation
abstracts and question and answer period
summaries for each of the nine topic
areas/sessions: Field Activities and Large-
Scale Demonstrations, Cross-Cutting
Recovery Activities, Tools and Guidance
Development, Fate and Transport Research
Activities Informing Recovery (Cross-
Cutting), Activities to Support Wide-Area
Biodecontamination, Persistence of
Biological Agents and Other Bio-related
Decontamination and Disposal Research,
Radiological Recovery Research Activities,
Operational Considerations for
Decontamination, and Chemical Warfare
Agent Recovery Research.
• Appendix A provides the meeting agenda,
which lists the presentations and speakers in
chronological order, as the presentations
occurred during the workshop.
• Appendix B lists the workshop participants.
• Appendix C includes presentation slides for
speakers who approved distribution.
1
-------
2 Plenary Session
Ms. Cynthia Sonich-Mullin, chair of the Plenary
Session, welcomed the conference participants
and presenters. She noted that conference
attendance has grown each year. This year,
attendees represented a range of domestic and
international agencies and organizations,
including attendees from multiple EPA offices,
the United Kingdom, Canada, and Singapore.
She also noted that presentations would include
discussions of not only decontamination
research and development, but also field
activities and demonstrations, cross-cutting
decontamination recovery activities, tool and
guidance development, and operational
considerations. Biological, chemical, and
radiological agents and contaminants were to be
the focus.
Ms. Sonich-Mullin also pointed out that, over
the years, this conference has been extremely
beneficial in building relationships, developing
collaborations, and sharing information to
further homeland security and decontamination
research programs. At EPA, researchers have the
daunting task of conducting research that will
provide the scientific basis for operations and
decision-making related to EPA's mission.
These researchers strive to find innovative
solutions and responses to contamination events
which may result from terrorist attacks or natural
disasters. EPA research alone, however, cannot
address the many issues involved in preparing
for, responding to, and recovering from
contamination events, so, EPA welcomed this
opportunity to collaborate and share
information.
2.1 Protecting Human Health and the
Environment through Innovation
Dr. Paul Anastas, Assistant
Administrator, EPA, ORD
The National Homeland Security Research
Center (NHSRC) began hosting the
Decontamination Research and Development
Conference in 2005. Dr. Paul Anastas reiterated
the important role that the conference has played
in bringing together researchers and decision-
makers from both the public and private sectors
and from around the world. He stated that the
conference exemplifies the collaboration and
innovation needed for this group to come
together and meet their mission. Participants not
only provide an overarching view of
decontamination needs and concerns, but also
discuss the details of the state-of-the-art
techniques, technologies, and research needs.
The conference is geared toward facilitating
scientific exchange, as illustrated by the
participation of EPA, the Department of Defense
(DOD), the Department of Energy (DOE), the
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
(CDC), and the many other organizations
represented. These organizations have a shared
mission in decontamination research and
practice. This conference allows individuals in
these organizations to discuss their everyday
activities and ensure that their work is broadly
known among the larger community. Dr.
Anastas noted that silence is the enemy of
progress; therefore, this conference is essential
for sharing knowledge and fostering progress.
Dr. Anastas reviewed EPA's missions in
relationship to homeland security. EPA is the
primary federal agency responsible for the
decontamination and remediation of indoor and
outdoor areas affected by chemical, biological,
and radiological contaminants. EPA's
responsibilities also include decontamination of
water. EPA's ORD, specifically NHSRC, is
responsible for ensuring that their research
supporting decontamination and remediation
efforts is relevant and timely. ORD and NHSRC
focus on finding solutions to the many homeland
security challenges faced by EPA and others.
In seeking solutions, researchers often measure,
monitor, review, and characterize problems. At
some point, however, the only reason to
understand a problem is to inform a solution. Dr.
Anastas said that a solution-oriented approach to
2
-------
decontamination research is essential. This
approach, Dr. Anastas felt, is a refreshing
departure from the typical tendency to
understand and quantify a problem at the
expense of developing solutions. If research
efforts to quantify and understand a problem
exceed the research necessary to find a solution,
then that research has not met EPA goals. Dr.
Anastas noted that NHSRC research focuses on
homeland security, but often has broader
applications to EPA's mission to protect the
environment.
Dr. Anastas emphasized the importance of
applying a systems approach to decontamination
problems. Researchers have decades of
experience in approaching problems in a
fragmented way, such as by environmental
media (i.e., water, air, land) or by industrial
sector. The more researchers fragment problems,
he stated, the greater the risk of unintended
consequences. For example, a solution for one
medium may result in greater challenges for
another medium. Not until researchers consider
entire systems and examine how threats flow
from one medium or sector to another can they
understand the breadth of the problems. This
approach also creates greater degrees of freedom
for the solutions. Many of the presenters at this
conference apply a systems approach.
According to Dr. Anastas, a systems approach
and perspective allows for resiliency. Resiliency
is often discussed, but not deeply understood.
When asking, "What is the nature of a resilient
system?" researchers can discuss characteristics
and describe what a resilient system might be.
Researchers, however, still try to understand the
basic characteristics of resilient systems so they
can design a resilient system.
Dr. Anastas noted as a strength the ability of
NHSRC research to respond quickly to the EPA
response community's needs. He provided the
decontamination of anthrax in Danbury,
Connecticut, as an example. For this
decontamination, field personnel needed a
method to determine if optimum
decontamination conditions were being met.
These conditions dictate the efficacy of the
selected decontamination technology. NHSRC
researchers provided a novel technique they had
recently evaluated to meet this need.
Subsequently, an incident of anthrax
contamination occurred in New Hampshire. Due
to communication and collaboration, responders
in New Hampshire were aware of the new
assessments of decontamination techniques used
in the Connecticut remediation. Preliminary
results from the NHSRC research in Connecticut
informed the New Hampshire response. This
example highlights the importance of not only
testing, but also information sharing.
Many approaches exist to address the challenges
faced in homeland security. Dr. Anastas felt,
however, that a mindset of innovation is
essential. He stated that innovation involves
more than polishing existing approaches;
innovation means finding new approaches to
address problems. Dr. Anastas quoted EPA
Administrator Lisa Jackson from her speech at
the National Press Club about the essential role
of innovation in EPA's mission: "I have no
interest in leading an agency that only tells us
what we can't do. I want to work together on the
things that we can do." In assessing how
researchers engaged an innovative spirit, Dr.
Anastas emphasized his belief that innovation
was essential for success.
In closing, Dr. Anastas emphasized the need to
share and discuss research needs and knowledge.
He also noted the need to discuss data gaps and
uncertainties, which are the catalysts of
innovation. An upcoming demonstration project
at Idaho National Laboratory, which will involve
multiple agencies working together to find
innovative solutions, exemplifies the type of
work needed to find solutions to
decontamination issues.
2.2 Keynote Speaker
Honorable David Price,
Congressman, 4th District, North
Carolina
The Honorable David Price serves as the
Congressman for the 4th District in North
Carolina, which includes the Research Triangle
Park (RTP) area and surrounding communities.
He thanked NHSRC for inviting him to serve as
3
-------
keynote speaker for the Decontamination
Research and Development Conference. He
noted that he did not have in-depth knowledge
of the scientific issues faced by the participants;
rather, he would provide perspective on the
policy and budget issues that affect research
programs.
Previously, Congressman Price was involved in
the nine-year process to design and build EPA's
RTP facility. The RTP facility is the largest
facility ever designed and built by EPA. More
recently, Congressman Price sat on the
committee that funded EPA research budgets
and supported EPA's mission to research
climate change and ensure clean air and water.
His committee regularly met with EPA
representatives about budgetary needs.
Congressman Price examined the programs and
policies that addressed homeland security and
prepared first responders for terrorist events and
natural disasters.
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is
the third-largest institution in the Executive
Branch, but DHS does not encompass all aspects
of homeland security. DHS receives a portion of
the total budget allocation to homeland security.
DOD and the Department of Health and Human
Services also receive funding. As the lead
agency in addressing exposure concerns, EPA
also receives a portion of the homeland security
budget. Other EPA funding not designated as
homeland security funding has also funded
research relevant to homeland security.
For fiscal year 2011, Congressman Price stated,
EPA's portion of the homeland security budget
will be reduced. Reductions will be seen in
research, development, and technical support
activities funded through EPA's homeland
security research program. Research on
materials decontamination and disposal, threat
assessment, and sampling and analytical
methods helps fill critical knowledge gaps and
enhances abilities to respond and recover from
homeland security events. Some of the
homeland security funding reductions are the
result of non-recurring investments and transfer
of programs to other areas. However, budgets
throughout EPA have been reduced, so all
funding requests will require thoughtful and
careful scrutiny.
Congressman Price acknowledged that
conference participants were most concerned
about how homeland security budget reductions
affect chemical, biological, and radiological
agent and contaminant decontamination
research. Budget questions themselves are
important, but Congressman Price noted that
budget discussions also provide a broader view
of the range of research activities and the
decisions about priorities.
The DHS Science and Technology Directorate
oversees a variety of research and development
programs related to security threats. The overall
DHS research portfolio is slated for reductions
in 2011. The chemical and biological program
remains the largest research and development
program, followed by explosives, then
radiological and nuclear research. Congressman
Price mentioned ongoing projects of possible
interest to participants, such as efforts to develop
a handheld biological agent detector to classify
unknown samples. Researchers are also
developing a technology that would screen for
multiple pathogens in environmental, food,
water, animal, plant, and human clinical
samples. The innovations group is moving
forward with a demonstration project that will
place miniaturized chemical agent detectors into
personal monitoring devices. This demonstration
project will examine the process of creating a
ubiquitous network for chemical agent detection.
The group responsible for test and evaluation
standards is developing performance standards
for chemical and biological detection equipment
and is developing guidance for first responders
to chemical and biological incidents.
Congressman Price noted that these projects are
of interest because they focus on advanced
warning systems and support for first
responders.
When the Science and Technology Directorate
was established within DHS in 2003, Congress
was concerned about setting research and
development priorities, establishing mission-
oriented research, and ensuring that research was
complementary rather than redundant.
4
-------
Congressman Price noted that the capstone
integrated project teams are a key effort initiated
by the Science and Technology Directorate.
These teams include the end users of research
findings. These end users helped identify
existing capability gaps and establish research
and development priorities. The first responder
product team comprises end users from the fire
fighting community. Fire fighters are concerned
about chemical and biological agent detection.
Congressman Price noted that research
initiatives should directly impact the identified
capability gaps.
DHS also oversees two programs related to
biological threat surveillance: BioWatch and the
National Biosurveillance Integration Center
(NBIC). DHS is currently developing the third
generation of BioWatch detector technology,
intended to provide automated detection
capabilities for high-priority biological threat
agents. In response to technical questions and
concerns about the underlying rationale for
BioWatch, the National Academy of Sciences
(NAS) assessed the program. NAS specifically
considered the cost of airborne surveillance
systems versus public health benefits.
Congressman Price noted that this assessment
was recently completed; NAS concluded that
early warning and detection were
complementary to public health assessments. In
addition, NAS concluded that an early warning
system in the absence of public health
assessment would be ineffective. NAS also
noted serious concerns raised by state and local
partners. These partners lacked confidence in the
BioWatch technology and worried about
receiving insufficient support, as well as the lack
of coordination between agencies. NAS also
warned about the technological difficulties
associated with developing BioWatch. Given
these concerns, Congressman Price noted,
funding for BioWatch needed careful
consideration
NBIC was originally designed to act as a central
resource for collecting and sharing information
about biological threat agents. Under current
budget proposals, NBIC would work to integrate
state-level research on biosurveillance.
Congressman Price felt that this shift in the
NBIC focus highlighted efforts to enhance
surveillance in the public health arena. Based on
North Carolina's expertise in this area, the
Office of Health Affairs is working with the
state to develop an integrated health surveillance
system that could be replicated in other states.
The Water Security Initiative is a relatively
small program. Budget proposals, however,
included an approximately 40 percent reduction
in funding. Congressman Price felt that this
proposed budget cut for this program, combined
with a proposed increase in the BioWatch
budget, highlighted inconsistencies in funding
approaches toward water and air research. He
noted that the budget committees needed to
carefully review the proposed funding to ensure
appropriate budget allocations for biological
threat agent research.
DHS founded the Domestic Nuclear Detection
Office (DNDO) in 2005 to improve capabilities
to detect and report unauthorized attempts to
import, process, store, develop, or transport
radiological or nuclear materials. DNDO
supports DHS's research and development for
nuclear detection, but the 2011 budget proposed
moving a portion of this research to the
Directorate of Science and Technology. The
program would receive a moderate funding
increase for programs such as mobile stand-off
detection systems, replacement technologies for
existing helium-based technologies, and
innovative tools for inspection environments.
Congressman Price noted that the overall DNDO
strategy has shifted from fixed-unit detection to
more mobile and deployable systems, such as
human-portable radiation detector systems for
field deployment, long-range radiation detection
capabilities, and operational testing and
evaluation processes for other detection systems.
Increased funding was also proposed for DNDO
training and exercise programs for federal, state,
and local law enforcement and first responders.
Congressman Price concluded with an overview
of the budget process and budget concerns. In
most cases, budgets will remain flat or be
reduced. A modest increase, however, has been
proposed for DHS. This increase would fund
improved aviation security (e.g., enhanced
5
-------
screening technologies in airports) and resolve
outstanding costs from previous national
disasters, such as Hurricane Katrina. The DHS
budget also includes the BioWatch third
generation procurement, consolidation of DHS
headquarters, and personnel cost-of-living
increases. These additional expenses exceed the
increased funding. Congressman Price noted that
most agencies are facing budget pressures. The
Appropriations Committee is completing budget
and oversight hearings and is beginning to
discuss the details of the annual funding bills.
Congressman Price anticipated that the difficult
budget decisions and the political situation
would lead to a more contentious appropriations
process than normal. He emphasized the need
for Congress to focus on legitimate questions
and priorities in order to write the best allocation
bill possible.
Question and Answer Period
• Given the cuts in funding for 2011, were
future cuts (e.g., 2012 and beyond) likely or
would budgets remain flat?
The answer to this question, said
Congressman Price, depends upon many
contingencies. In general, the constrained
budget environment will probably continue,
and the economic and political environment
will dictate how these constraints are
manifested. The general state of the
economy is the overriding challenge faced
by Congress. Addressing the economy in the
short and long term consists of three
components: recovery, financial regulatory
reform, and fiscal balance. Congressman
Price noted that tension exists regarding the
best approach to addressing the budget
concerns. In the short term, Congress has
increased funding in some areas and
research budgets have benefited. Congress
has also realized that ongoing homeland
security functions are necessary. In the long
term, however, the current spending rate
cannot continue; the administration is slowly
working toward building a balanced budget,
which requires difficult decisions about
future funding. Congressman Price
cautioned that economic recovery and
political decisions will ultimately influence
future budgets. Overall, he believed, the
long-term budget constraints are not
debilitating.
• The programs noted as important to
homeland security primarily address
surveillance, detection, and protection. This
conference, however, focused on
decontamination issues. Would future
funding continue to focus on protection or
was an increase in decontamination
research possible?
Congressman Price has been struck by the
disproportionate nature of some of the
budget reductions. He and his staff will
critically review the impact of funding
reductions to ensure that the budgetary sub-
committee fully understands the
ramifications of these reductions.
Congressman Price feels that the rationale
for these cuts was inadequate. Efforts to
address waterborne threats and to enhance
decontamination capabilities are
complementary to other aspects of homeland
security, so Congressman Price will
continue to carefully assess the proposed
research funding allocations.
6
-------
3 Field Activities and Large-
Scale Demonstrations
3.1 Case Study: Decontamination of a
Community Building Containing
Low Concentrations of Bacillus
Anthracis Spores, Durham, New
Hampshire
Ted Bazenas, EPA, Region 1
There are no presumptive decontamination
strategies for anthrax. Each case is unique and
requires a careful evaluation of many factors to
achieve protection of public health. This case
study will include a presentation of the incident
chronology of the Durham, New Hampshire,
gastrointestinal anthrax infection case. At this
incident, the Unified Command used data from
environmental sampling, epidemiology, medical
science, and unpublished research to inform the
decision process, leading to the selection of
decontamination methods and strategies for the
interior of a ministry building adjacent to the
University of New Hampshire Campus in
Durham. Photographs and discussion of the
implementation of the decontamination methods
will be presented. The authors acknowledge the
contributions of others at the EPA Region 1
Office and the New Hampshire Department of
Environmental Services; the EPA National
Decontamination Team; ORD, NHSRC; CDC
and the National Institute for Occupational
Safety and Health; the National Guard 12th Civil
Support Team, Concord, New Hampshire; and
the New Hampshire Department of Health and
Human Services.
In this case study, the selected decontamination
method for low concentrations of anthrax spores
was spray application of an amended bleach
solution (one part bleach, eight parts water, and
one part white vinegar at pH 6.0 to 7.0) for a 10-
minute contact time, followed by a detergent
solution (bleach/trisodium phosphate/vinegar)
scrub with a sponge or brush. All surfaces
washed with these solutions received a final
rinse with clean water. Residual water was
collected with a wet/dry high-efficiency
particulate air (HEPA) vacuum. This method
was applied to vertical and horizontal surfaces,
including floors, ceilings, and walls.
Carpeted surfaces were first vacuumed with a
wet/dry HEPA vacuum, then sprayed with the
amended bleach solution (10-minute contact
time), followed by a final wet/dry HEPA
vacuuming. Smaller durable items were
submerged in a large container of amended
bleach for 10 minutes, then rinsed with water.
Porous items such as books, paper, clothing, and
furniture were sprayed with amended bleach for
a 10-minute contact time. At the discretion of
the property owner, items damaged in the
decontamination process were discarded and
disposed of as solid waste per New Hampshire
state regulations. Post-decontamination sample
collection for anthrax spore culture is under
consideration.
Unpublished research conducted by NHSRC
explored various combinations of
decontamination solutions and cleaning
methods. Although this specific combination
was not part of the research, use of these
decontamination solutions and methods on
porous and non-porous surfaces that were
contaminated with high levels of Bacillus
atrophaeus (approximately 7-log) spores should
result in a 3 - to 4-log reduction of spores. At the
much lower levels of spores (20 to 400 colony-
forming units (CFU)) identified in this case
study, these methods would likely result in
reduction of spores to levels below public health
concern (e.g., nondetect).
The readily available, easily applied
decontamination approach used here provides a
viable method for Bacillus anthracis spore
reduction from surfaces. The approach uses
easily attainable equipment and materials, does
not require specialized equipment, and can be
accomplished with minimal training. Such an
approach significantly enhances our ability to
respond to a wide-area anthrax event to reduce
spore loads and potentially successfully
remediate areas of low contamination.
7
-------
Question and Answer Period
Conference participants posed no questions at
the conclusion of the presentation.
3.2 Decontamination of a Facility and
HVAC System Ductwork using
Chlorine Dioxide Gas
Mark Czarneski, ClorDiSys
Solutions, Inc.
This case study presents the use of chlorine
dioxide gas to decontaminate the ductwork of a
pharmaceutical manufacturing facility prior to
renovation. The ductwork was contaminated
with penicillin and had to be decontaminated
prior to use for other nonmanufacturing
proposes. The facility was being renovated to
build a new training facility. Many samples
were taken in rooms and duct work and many
positive penicillin samples were taken from the
duct work. Removing the ductwork would
have been costly due to the special procedures
that the contractors would require for safety.
Decontaminating the ductwork first meant that
the demolition contractors would not need to
have special personal protective equipment
(PPE) or to follow safety precautions.
This presentation will start with a discussion of
the facility's need to decontaminate the
ductwork before renovation. Methods for
connecting the chlorine dioxide gas generator to
the ductwork will be described, as well as
methods used to contain the gas during
decontamination. Background information on
the gas's efficacy will be presented to illustrate
the target parameters that were established.
Methods for testing the efficacy of the
decontamination will also be discussed. Pictures,
figures, and graphs will be used where
appropriate.
Results of the decontamination cycle will be
shared, showing the success of the
decontamination. Benefits of using chlorine
dioxide gas will be discussed, including its
material compatibility, excellent distributive
properties, and ability to withstand temperature
gradients.
This case study is significant because ductwork
is not easy to decontaminate thoroughly using
most agents. Thorough decontamination by
manual methods is extremely costly, time-
consuming, potentially dangerous if harmful
organisms are present, and not completely
effective. Ductwork is also a haven for many
organisms that are sucked into the exhausts or
returns during normal functionality. In the
context of homeland security, if a commercial
property were to suffer a biological attack, both
the building and its heating, ventilation, and air
conditioning (HVAC) system and ductwork
would require thorough decontamination.
Question and Answer Period
• How did you sample for penicillin?
ClorDiSys conducted the fumigation
because of a concern about penicillin acting
as an allergen. Allergen fragments are
thought to be capable of causing an allergic
reaction, so the fumigation must address
penicillin as a whole and as fragments.
The building's owner conducted sampling
for penicillin before and after fumigation.
ClorDiSys Solutions, Inc., however, has
previous experience with chemical
fumigations and has found that a target
chlorine dioxide concentration of 7,000 parts
per million (ppm)-hours was sufficient to
breakdown the beta-lactams. A conference
participant noted that the chlorine dioxide
would oxidize the penicillin into small
fragments.
• Was environmental sampling conducted
subsequent to fumigation?
Sampling conducted after fumigation
reported no positive results.
• Seven positive detections were found in the
HVAC system. How many samples were
collected in total?
Czarneski was unsure about the total number
of samples collected. Most of the positive
detections were found in the HVAC systems
because the rooms were cleaned prior to the
fumigation, but the HVAC system could not
be cleaned.
8
-------
• What was the target relative humidity (RH)?
Steam generators raised the RH to the target
range of 65 to 70 percent.
• Did steam generation occur during
fumigation with chlorine dioxide or did
steam generation cease once the target
concentrations were reached?
The steam generators operated only until the
RH reached the target level. Steam
generation did not occur during the chlorine
dioxide generation. Monitoring for RH also
did not occur during the gas generation.
• Was the facility equipment removed prior to
fumigation?
Equipment remained in the facility during
fumigation.
• The presentation indicated that the
equipment in the facility showed no visible
signs of degradation after fumigation. Did
the owner test or run this equipment to
ensure that the equipment remained
functional? If so, what were the results?
Czarneski indicated that he spoke with the
owner one and six months after the
fumigation and all equipment remained
functional.
• Indoor sampling detected no chlorine
dioxide after the venting period. Did the
fumigation system include scrubbers to
remove chlorine dioxide from the air during
venting?
During fumigation, the HVAC system was
blocked to re-circulate the chlorine dioxide
during treatment. When venting, the HVAC
system was reopened and allowed to vent
the chlorine dioxide without treatment. The
building was located in a campus area with a
limited number of neighbors who could be
affected by the vented chlorine dioxide.
Czarneski noted that monitoring for chlorine
dioxide leaks occurred throughout the
fumigation process to ensure public safety.
• When was the fumigation conducted?
The fumigation occurred in 2009.
3.3 Source Reduction Following the
2001 Anthrax Attacks: Lessons
Learned
Dorothy Canter, Dorothy Canter
Consulting LLC
Following the 2001 biological terrorism attacks,
source reduction consisted of removing essential
items for offsite treatment (and returning them
for reuse) and removing nonessential items for
ultimate disposal, either as waste or through
recycling. For highly-contaminated facilities,
source reduction activities also included physical
cleaning and/or chemical pre-treatments of the
surfaces of materials that remained
on site and of the interior structure. In the post-
200 1 cleanups, a number of different methods
were used to treat essential and nonessential
items. Two offsite methods were used for items
designated as essential: gamma ray or ion beam
irradiation and treatment in an ethylene oxide
(EtO) sterilization chamber. Five methods were
employed for nonessential items: EtO
sterilization followed by recycling, on site
surface decontamination followed by either
recycling or disposal in a hazardous waste
landfill, hazardous waste incineration, medical
waste incineration, and steam sterilization. Pre-
treatment of interior surfaces and items was also
conducted at a number of sites at which
fumigations were performed.
This paper will address source reduction
activities at four facilities following the 2001
anthrax attacks—namely, the Capitol Hill
Anthrax Site, the Department of State mail
facility, the U.S. Postal Service Trenton
Processing and Distribution Center, and the
Department of Justice mail facility. Key lessons
learned from these activities will be presented,
including the need to limit the removal of
nonessential items before the main
decontamination process.
Question and Answer Period
Conference participants posed no questions at
the conclusion of the presentation.
9
-------
3.4 An Overview of the Chemical
Restoration Operational
Technology Demonstration (OTD)
Project
Mark D. Tucker, Sandia National
Laboratories
The Chemical Restoration OTD is a
collaborative project between Sandia National
Laboratories, Lawrence Livermore National
Laboratory, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, and
Pacific Northwest National Laboratory that is
funded by DHS's Directorate of Science and
Technology. The primary objective of this
project is to develop, identify, and/or select a set
of plans, procedures, and technologies for the
rapid recovery of major transportation facilities
following a release of a chemical warfare agent
or other highly toxic chemicals. The primary
focus is on the recovery of major airports; Los
Angeles International Airport is being used as a
representative facility. By conducting in-depth
analyses at one facility, this project is examining
in detail many factors that must be considered in
a recovery operation.
Objectives of this project include:
• Application of an end-to end systems
approach for recovery of critical
transportation facilities following a chemical
agent release, including elements such as:
o Planning tools
o Cleanup guidelines
o Decontamination methods
o Sampling and analysis methods
o Decision support, analysis, and
simulation tools
o Waste management guidelines.
• Pre-planning of the recovery process at a
representative critical transportation facility.
• Addressing data, technology, and capability
gaps critical to conducting recovery
operations.
• Executing the developed plans and
procedures in a series of workshops,
tabletop exercises, and a final
demonstration.
• Transfer of the systems approach and pre-
planning capabilities to other critical
transportation facilities.
The effort in this project has been focused in
three areas:
• A systems analysis to gain a comprehensive
understanding of the complex recovery
process and identification of technology,
capability, and data gaps for this process.
• Development of both generic and site-
specific plans for facility recovery, including
a comprehensive remediation guidance
document, an interactive decision
framework for decision-makers to follow,
and a simulation tool to estimate the time
and costs of recovery using various
resources and remediation strategies.
• A series of focused experimental and
technology development efforts to fill data,
information, and technology gaps critical for
recovery operations.
Work in these three areas has provided a greater
understanding of the recovery process (i.e.,
improved knowledge), the development of plans
and procedures for recovery following a
chemical agent release (i.e., improved planning),
and development of better methods to conduct
the recovery process (i.e., improved operations).
Efforts conducted by this project have (1)
allowed a greater understanding of the end-to-
end recovery process; (2) developed
comprehensive generic and site-specific plans
for recovery, including planning aids such as a
comprehensive and interactive decision
framework and a simulation tool to estimate
time and cost for recovery; and (3) filled data
and technology gaps critical for recovery
operations. The project has also worked
extensively with other agencies at the local,
10
-------
state, and federal levels to address this difficult
problem.
The plans and procedures developed by this
project are expected to begin to fill the critical
need for better methods for recovery of critical
facilities following the release of a chemical
warfare agent or other highly toxic chemicals.
Question and Answer Period
Conference participants posed no questions at
the conclusion of the presentation.
3.5 Two Recent Proof of Principle
Tests of Deployable
Countermeasures to Support
Recovery of Critical Mass Transit
Facilities
Robert Fischer, Lawrence Livermore
National Laboratory
The Subway Safety Initiative, currently
underway in New York City, is charged with
developing recovery plans for the rapid
restoration of critical transportation
infrastructure in the event of a terrorist attack
involving the dispersal of radioactive materials.
In conjunction with developing recovery plans,
two critical countermeasure proof of principle
demonstrations were conducted in 2009. The
proof of principle demonstrations were designed
to test the efficacy of (1) stabilizing a
radioactively contaminated train car for transport
and (2) deploying a contamination control
barrier in a subway system tunnel.
The first proof of principle demonstration
addressed stabilization of a typical Metro North
rail car in preparation for transit to a recovery
facility for full decontamination. The testing
included application of two different sprayable
stabilization agents (a temporary fixative and a
strippable coating) and the physical covering of
the car in plastic wrap. Qualitative assessment of
contamination control was made using UV
active contamination simulation powders. The
testing demonstrated the feasibility of using
plastic wrapping materials and fixatives in
combination and individually. The results
indicated that it is possible to contain and
stabilize a single rail car and indentified areas
where further improvements would need to be
made before the methodology could be
considered a deployable countermeasure.
The second proof of principle demonstration
tested the efficacy of deploying contamination
control barriers in subway tunnels. Recovery
plans being developed for New York City
Transit (NYCT) assume that sections of the
subway system can effectively be isolated from
one another as a precursor to staged
decontamination. A test was designed to
determine if a simple plastic barrier could be
rapidly installed into a subway tunnel and
provide an adequate barrier for contamination
control. The barrier installation was
accomplished by in-house NYCT emergency
response teams. Once installed, the barrier was
subjected to smoke and pressure tests. The tests
determined that such barriers, if properly
constructed, could withstand minimal pressure
gradients consistent with that achieved for
asbestos abatement. Methods for improving the
installation process were captured for inclusion
into the next generation of deployable
countermeasures.
Efforts to use the wrapping of rail cars and the
installation of barriers in subway tunnels in
NY CT proved potentially effective as steps in
controlling contamination from an RDD. More
detailed and comprehensive tests are needed
before these methods can be considered
deployable.
Being able to (1) isolate portions of subway
systems and (2) fix contamination on rail cars so
that they can be relocated for decontamination is
critical to developing return-to-service
strategies. The strategies outlined here take
advantage of capabilities already in place in the
transit systems.
Question and Answer Period
Conference participants posed no questions at
the conclusion of the presentation.
11
-------
3.6 Bio-Response Operational
Testing and Evaluation (BOTE)
Shannon D. Serre, EPA, National
Homeland Security Research Center
The BOTE Project is a collaborative effort
between EPA, DHS, CDC, DOD, and the
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) designed
to operationally test and evaluate biological
(anthrax) incident response from public
health/law enforcement response through
environmental remediation. The project will
involve coordination between On-Scene
Coordinators and Special Teams, EPA
researchers from NHSRC, and several EPA
Program Offices to demonstrate the restoration
of a facility at full scale after the wide-area
release of a biological threat agent. The project
will assess the effectiveness of numerous
decontamination methods within the facility and
include establishment of an Incident Command
System, sampling, decontamination including
waste treatment and disposal (solid and liquid),
facility clearance (including risk
assessment/communication), and economic
analysis. This project is currently being planned
by a cross-agency/cross-government project
team, and testing is expected to be conducted in
September 2010 at a facility located at Idaho
National Laboratories.
The BOTE Project has four main objectives:
• To exercise and evaluate coordination of an
interagency response to a biological agent
release indoors.
• To conduct and evaluate field-level studies
of various biological agent decontamination
technologies/protocols.
• To conduct and evaluate sampling strategies
and plans.
• To conduct an economic analysis of the
incident response.
This presentation will focus on the planning
aspects of Objective 2.
Question and Answer Period
• If decontamination were ineffective, how
would the facility be restored for subsequent
testing rounds?
Post-decontamination sampling will be used
to assess the reduction in spore levels and
efficacy. The spore level, however, should
be similar from round to round.
• What sampling was proposed at the onset of
the study to establish a baseline and
between testing rounds to assess efficacy?
The facility had been cleaned after a recent
project, so no baseline sampling was
planned before testing began. Serre noted
that the participant had raised a good point,
which the researchers will consider, about
the need to establish a baseline for
comparison.
• What pre- and post-sampling methods were
planned? What were the method detection
limits?
Pre- and post-sampling methods have not
yet been defined and the test plan is under
development.
• What was the proposed method for
depositing spores in the test facility?
A group with previous experience in the
facility will conduct the deposition. The
specific deposition method—point source or
HVAC system—will be discussed with this
group.
12
-------
4 Cross-Cutting Recovery Activities
4.1 National Homeland Security
Research Center Water Treatment
and Infrastructure
Decontamination Research
Scott Minamyer, EPA, NHSRC
The Water Infrastructure Protection Division of
EPA's NHSRC conducts research to enhance the
nation's ability to detect, mitigate, and recover
from chemical, radiological, or biological
contamination in drinking water and wastewater
systems. This presentation provides an overview
of several NHSRC studies focused on treating
water and decontaminating water system
infrastructure contaminated by biological and
chemical agents. NHSRC water treatment and
decontamination research is intended to (1)
increase knowledge regarding the treatability of
chemical, biological, and radiological
contaminants most likely to be used to
contaminate drinking water supplies; (2) identify
which priority contaminants will adsorb and
persist on wetted water infrastructure surfaces;
and (3) determine the capabilities of water
treatment and decontamination technologies to
remove or destroy biological and chemical
contaminants that do persist.
Question and Answer Period
• To experience an effect, the consumer would
need to contact a high concentration of
toxins. Was this level of exposure possible?
Available research regarding biotoxins
indicated that the presence of biotoxins in
the water supply was a concern.
• Several specific inorganic contaminants,
including arsenic and mercury, were
mentioned. Using a generic treatment
approach, such as flushing or changing pH
to address arsenic contamination, resulted
in low decontamination levels, which was
not surprising. Contaminant-specific
technologies such as precipitation
technologies were available for arsenic and
were much more effective,. Would future
research include more contaminant-specific
technologies?
Minamyer agreed that more effective
decontamination methods exist. This project
evaluated typical decontamination methods.
Additional research into contaminant-
specific decontamination methods, the
method requirements, and the method
efficacy is underway.
• Has a tool or method been developed to
determine the level of dirt and/or rust in an
old pipe? This kind of tool would be useful.
Minamyer said that no such tool has been
developed. He thought that developing such
a tool would be impossible because of the
differences in water pipes around the nation
(e.g., age, pipe material, pipe size).
4.2 Draft Containment and Disposal
of Large Amounts of Water: A
Support Guide for Water Utilities
Marissa Lynch, EPA, Office of Water
Contamination of a drinking water, wastewater,
or storm water system with chemical, biological,
or radiological contaminants may require water
utilities to contain and/or dispose of large
amounts of water. In 2008, the Critical
Infrastructure Partnership Advisory Council
Water Sector Decontamination Working Group
identified the need for guidance on containment
and disposal of decontamination waste,
including large amounts of water and associated
solid wastes for the water sector. In response,
EPA is developing a draft support guide for
water utilities on containment, treatment, and
disposal of large amounts of water to help
utilities respond to all-hazards contamination
event(s). The decontamination and recovery
process for a water system following a
contamination incident will vary on a case-by-
case basis. Therefore, water utilities need
information that can be adapted to specific
situations and incidents, as appropriate, during
planning and rapid decision-making.
13
-------
EPA's Water Security Division leveraged
existing information, including current guidance,
relevant regulations, response tools,
technologies, ongoing research efforts, relevant
research reports, and case studies to develop the
draft support guide for water utilities. This
information was compiled and evaluated for
applicability to water sector decontamination.
The draft guide includes the following:
• An overview on containment, treatment,
and disposal of contaminated water from
a CBR event.
• Types of containment, treatment
methods and disposal options.
• Decision trees that can be adapted for
containment, treatment, and disposal
options depending on the nature of the
contamination incident.
• Information on applicable regulatory
requirements.
Four contaminant classes are addressed in the
draft support guide:
• Chemical contaminants, including
petroleum and hydrophobic compounds,
chemical warfare agents, heavy metals,
and pesticides.
• Biological contaminants, including
bacteria, viruses, and protozoa
• Biotoxin contaminants, including plant
toxins, bacterial toxins, algal toxins, and
fungal toxins.
• Radiological contaminants, including
alpha, beta, and gamma emitters.
In addition, the guide also provides a disposal
checklist and summarizes risk communication
needs during containment and disposal of large
amounts of water.
This presentation will provide an update on EPA
efforts to develop and disseminate this support
guide to help prepare utilities to respond to all-
hazards contamination events.
Question and Answer Period
• Can users apply the guidelines to treatment
of decontamination wastewater? If so, were
specific treatment technologies suggested?
This participant noted that offsite treatment
is often a challenge and wondered what
onsite treatment technologies were
suggested.
Lynch indicated that the information
contained in the guidelines could be applied
to decontamination wastewater treatment.
The guidelines provide specific suggestions
for treatment technologies and examples
could be identified by reviewing the
guidelines.
4.3 Threat Agent Disposal: Disposal
Issues Following a CBRN Incident
Based on RDD and Anthrax Waste
Disposal Workshops
Paul Kudarauskas, EPA, Office of
Emergency Management
As part of EPA's continuing efforts to enhance
the nation's readiness to handle the
environmental impacts of terrorist use of
chemical, biological, or radiological threat
agents, EPA convened a Threat Agent Disposal
work group to strengthen its understanding of
the issues surrounding the disposal of threat
agent-derived waste following a wide-area
chemical, biological, or radiological terrorist
event. Because disposal of threat agent-derived
waste is one of the Agency's primary issues,
EPA has initiated a series of efforts to engage
stakeholders to help identify the issues and
concerns that need to be considered in advance,
not in the confusion surrounding an actual
incident.
This presentation will summarize two
workshops that discussed the transportation and
disposal capabilities in the response to attacks
involving (1) an RDD and (2) anthrax in an
urban area. The first workshop was based on
Liberty RadEx held in Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania; the second was based on the
14
-------
Interagency Biological Demonstration held in
Seattle, Washington. Each workshop involved
interviews and discussions with the private
sector, state and local governments, and the
federal government.
Question and Answer Period
Conference participants posed no questions.
4.4 Update on the Validated Sampling
Plan Work Group
Dino Mattorano, EPA Office of
Emergency Management
The Validated Sampling Plan Work Group is an
interagency work group that was established to
address concerns with sampling and analysis for
Bacillus anthracis. Group participants include
CDC, EPA, DOD, FBI, National Institute for
Standards and Technology, and DHS. The Work
Group's objectives are to develop guidance and
a decision support process for selecting specific
methodologies that provide a level of confidence
in the sampling and analytical results during an
incident.
This presentation will briefly describe the
Validated Sampling Plan Work Group as well as
its current and ongoing work, including an
interagency environmental sampling strategy.
Question and Answer Period
• Given the almost random nature of
contamination in the Hart Senate Office
Building, would the protocols be effective in
characterizing random contamination and
identifying outliers? At the Hart Senate
Building, contamination was found in one
office because a letter shared a mail bag
with the letter that contained the spores.
In the test facility, the gradient ranged from
101 to 104. In the Hart Senate Office
Building, high concentrations were found in
the Daschle suite, and then concentrations
tapered off. Mattorano noted that the method
had succeeded in identifying contamination
in the Hart Senate Office Building; however,
investigators had information about the
spore-containing letter and the movement of
this letter.
• Did the preferred sampling method depend
on the inoculation method?
Wet versus dry dissemination mattered less
than the surface material characteristics
(e.g., carpet versus nonporous surface). For
example, vacuum methods were best for
collecting samples from carpets, whereas
wipes were best for collecting samples from
clean, dry surfaces.
• Which sampling strategy was preferred—
random or grid approach?
The size of the facility was one factor in
selecting an approach. The grid approach
worked well, but a random approach worked
better when no information existed about the
extent of contamination. Mattorano noted
that establishing a grid in a facility could be
simple. He felt no easy answer existed to the
question of preferred strategy.
• How did the number of samples collected in
a specified area impact the confidence in
clearance? This participant noted that
Mattorano's presentation referenced 99
percent confidence that 95 percent of the
spores had been cleared.
Mattorano noted that much of the
confidence level was based on hot spots and
the number of samples and the confidence
level depended on the size of the hot spot. A
smaller hot spot (e.g., 3 inches [7
centimeters] in diameter) required more
sampling than a larger hot spot (e.g., 10 feet
[3 meters] in diameter). Mattorano noted
that results for small and large hot spots
were similar. He also noted that some
statisticians and others disagreed that a hot
spot approach was appropriate.
• What were the sampling efficiencies of the
various sampling methods?
Quite a number of studies have evaluated
the efficiencies of various sampling
methods. Mattorano referenced a project that
involved reviewing the published and
unpublished data regarding sampling
15
-------
efficiencies. Findings were summarized in a
table, which he has a copy of, but the table
has not been publicly released. Mattorano
noted that the CDC Laboratory Response
Network documents also include a summary
table of this information.
4.5 Developing an Effective CBRN
Decontamination Capability
Hasmitta Stewart, Government
Decontamination Services
The Government Decontamination Service
(GDS) is now part of the U.K.'s Food and
Environment Agency and is responsible for
ensuring that the U.K. has an effective
decontamination capability to respond to
chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear
(CBRN) attacks or major accidental releases of
hazardous materials. Decontamination services
are operationally delivered using a framework of
private companies (suppliers) that work in a
range of industrial sectors including nuclear
decommissioning, clinical decontamination, oil
exploration, remediation of industrial spills and
the demolition of industrial sites. As releases of
CBRN materials are rare, GDS leads a program
of work to develop operational capabilities
within the U.K. and its protectorates using a
combination of theoretical case studies, learning
from industrial accidents, exercises, CBRN
incidents, and scientific research and
development projects. As no one country has
practical experience of all areas of CBRN
decontamination in civilian environments, active
international collaboration is of central
importance to GDS's capability development
strategy. Although a decontamination capability
is in place, continued research and development
coupled with clear exploitation plans and
exercises are required to drive forward both the
capacity and capabilities likely to be required in
the recovery phase of an incident.
Question and Answer Period
• GDS and EPA have worked together and
shared information for many years. EPA is a
response agency with a research function,
the participant felt, whereas the recent GDS
move seems to have positioned GDS's
response functions within a research facility.
Did this move change GDS's ability to
collaborate with researchers and affect
research projects?
Stewart replied that GDS's relationship with
researchers remains a work in progress.
• The pathways for addressing chemical
agents appeared straightforward. The
pathways for addressing biological agents,
however, presented a number of issues.
Examples of options for addressing
biological agents included medical
countermeasures, prophylactics, vaccines,
and PPE. How does GDS plan to address
biological agents?
At the moment, GDS is focused on assessing
supplier deployment of response
technologies. The biological agent pathway
certainly needs additional attention and
consideration.
• In working with U.S. contractors, EPA has
found a reluctance to use prophylactics.
EPA has strongly recommended vaccines
and antibiotics, but overcoming this
reluctance has been difficult.
In the U.K., research laboratories have been
asking questions about obtaining and using
prophylactics, which implies an interest in
using these methods to address biological
concerns.
4.6 U.S.-Canada Bilateral Technical
Working Group (TWG) for CBRN
Response and Recovery
G. Blair Martin, EPA, Air Pollution
Prevention and Control Division
DHS and EPA have collaborated to develop a
draft charter for a Technical Working Group
(TWG) to serve as the basis of negotiations of
bilateral agreements with other countries. The
TWG would provide a mechanism for sharing
both response and research and development
(R&D) expertise and experience in the event of
a CBRN incident.
The concept of a TWG was initiated and
developed during the 2001 anthrax incidents in
the United States. The membership of each
16
-------
TWG was tailored to provide appropriate
support to the incident commander for the
particular situation. Some of the same expertise
has been engaged in response to the "natural
anthrax" incidents in the United States and
United Kingdom. As a result, the TWG concept
has been expanded to consider its potential to
engage the expertise of multiple countries in the
event of other CBRN incidents. DHS and the
Canadian Defense Research and Development
Command have negotiated a bilateral agreement
for mutual assistance in response to CBRN
incidents. As a part of this agreement, a U.S.-
Canada TWG was formed. The TWG
membership includes representatives from both
the response and R&D community, with a
permanent co-chair from each of the two
communities. The TWG will have a core group
from each community to provide continuity.
However, other members may be added or
substituted to address a specific CBRN issue
most effectively. This presentation will describe
the present state of development and
membership of the TWG. The presentation
concludes that the TWG is a useful approach for
mutual cooperation in the event of a CBRN
incident.
This is the first bilateral agreement to establish a
TWG for support of CBRN response and
restoration from a CBRN incident. The
agreement establishes the relative roles for both
the response and R&D communities to work
collaboratively to support such an effort. DHS
anticipates negotiating bilateral agreements with
other countries, including the United Kingdom
and Australia, based on this model.
Question and Answer Period
• Given the complexities of response and
recovery efforts, a participant asked if
Martin recommended creating TWGs that
specialized in chemical, biological, and
radiological issues or creating a single
TWG that covered all issues.
EPA's ORD designed the TWG to cover all
concerns—chemical, biological,
radiological, and measurement. The
individuals on the TWG would have access
to experts in a variety of subject areas. In
response to an event, the TWG could then
convene expert subgroups that could address
issues and identify appropriate responses.
• Has EPA had the opportunity to use the
TWG?
Martin noted that the TWG is beginning to
form and has not responded to an incident.
However, the St. Johns Hospital fumigation
(conducted in August 2008) provides an
example of an effective TWG. The TWG,
which included experts from outside
government, was on site during the
fumigation and addressed both regulatory
and technical issues as they arose. As a next
step in developing the TWG, Martin
suggested that the group conduct a tabletop
exercise that more fully discusses the
specifics of a response action. A meeting
participant agreed that a number of tabletop
exercises existed and would benefit from
TWG input.
17
-------
5 Tools and Guidance Development
5.1 Analysis of Decontamination
Strategies Following a Wide-Area
Biological Release in a
Metropolitan Area
Robert Knowlton, Sandia National
Laboratories
National Planning Scenario number 2 concerns a
wide-area release of a biological agent used as a
weapon of mass destruction to impart casualties
in a major metropolitan area. Anthrax is a
potential agent, as it may be released as an
aerosol, has the potential to be persistent in the
environment, is not easily detected, and may
cause significant casualties and fear. The anthrax
letter attacks in 2001 are an example of the
consequences that can occur from even a
relatively small amount of the material released
into the air. The cleanup effort for the 2001
anthrax attacks cost hundreds of millions of
dollars and took several years in some cases to
reoccupy the contaminated facilities. A wide-
area metropolitan release can be devastating, and
the need to optimize the time and minimize the
cost of the response and recovery effort is great.
To plan for the restoration and recovery efforts
that would follow a potential wide-area release
of anthrax in a metropolitan area, Sandia
National Laboratories has developed a decision
support tool called the Analyzer for Wide-Area
Restoration Effectiveness, or AWARE.
AWARE is a comprehensive software product
that facilitates the development of cost and
timeline estimates for the restoration and
recovery efforts. The activities accounted for in
the AWARE toolset include: initial screening
sampling and laboratory analysis;
characterization of sampling and laboratory
analysis; decontamination processes, including
surface treatment and fumigation, waste
handling, and disposal; and clearance sampling
and laboratory analysis. Critical inputs to the
model are the resources available to perform
these activities, such as the number of sampling
teams available, the laboratory throughput
capacity, the rate of application of surface
decontamination treatments, the number of
fumigation units available, the number of
decontamination teams available, and the costs
associated with these activities and labor rates.
An analysis of different hypothetical anthrax
release scenarios will be presented. Tradeoffs
related to decontamination strategies will be
analyzed, such as varying the amount of surface
treatment versus fumigation in the cleanup
process and the optimal number of
decontamination resources necessary to reduce
the timeline for restoration. Chokepoints in the
system will be identified and discussed. An
analysis of homeowner-implemented
decontamination methods in residential areas
will also be presented.
Results of these studies should be of value to
those decision-makers who may be faced with
the burden of planning a response and recovery
effort following a wide-area anthrax release in a
metropolitan area.
Question and Answer Period
• EPA Regions III, IV, and V have completed
a gap analysis for a similar response
scenario. A participant suggested that
Knowlton compare the Sandia National
Laboratory (SNL) effort to the EPA effort.
The two groups approached
decontamination differently and applied
different assumptions. This participant
thought that a comparison of assumptions
and findings would be useful. The EPA
regions concluded that the decontamination
effort would take two years.
This participant provided specific comments
on the SNL assumptions regarding sample
collection and decontamination approach.
The SNL effort assumed that 2 million
samples would be required during
decontamination efforts. The Brentwood
Postal Facility, which consisted of 14
18
-------
million cubic feet of interior space, required
only 4,000 environmental clearance
samples, which did not provide 95 percent
coverage. All 4,000 samples were negative.
This participant felt that the assumption of
2 million samples could be greatly reduced.
The participant also noted that the EPA
regions assumed collection and analysis of
2,000 samples per day. The SNL approach
assumed that all exterior decontamination
would be complete before interior
decontamination began. This participant felt
that exterior decontamination would be
conducted to create corridors that allowed
movement without causing further
contamination. Interior decontamination
would then begin and occur simultaneously
to additional exterior decontamination.
Exterior decontamination might also include
exclusion zones or satellite zones that would
become smaller as decontamination
progressed.
Knowlton stated that the SNL effort was
intended as a planning tool. He agreed that
the concerns raised should be addressed
during use in an operational setting.
5.2 Interactive Decision Framework
for Consequence Management
Robert Greenwalt, Lawrence
Livermore National Laboratory
In May 2009, EPA and DHS jointly released a
draft document Planning Guidance for Recovery
Following Biological Incidents, developed by
the Subcommittee on Decontamination
Standards and Technology, Committee on
Homeland and National Security, within the
Biological Decontamination Standards Working
Group of the National Science and Technology
Council. Included is a description of the
biological agent incident-response decision
process in the form of a flowchart that "arranges
the response activities in a specific sequence and
provides the decision-maker ... with a guide to
key decisions ... and tasks ... that need to be
accomplished during a response." In addition,
the Interagency Biological Restoration
Demonstration (IBRD) Program has developed
an extended framework, also in flowchart form,
that provides additional details for selected steps
within the general decision process.
This presentation demonstrates a Web-based,
multiuser, interactive implementation of the
extended decision process flowchart. The
presentation provides decision-makers with a
tool to document decisions as they are made, to
inquire what decisions are outstanding, and
generally to track progress of the response. The
process can be viewed in several ways,
including the basic flowchart form and by
incident command system role. The decision-
making process can also be customized "on the
fly," should this be necessary.
The multiuser Web interface uses a standard
Web browser, communicating with a database
back end, to present current status information
and let the user update incident status
information. The tool will lead the management
and technical staff through the tasks that need to
be accomplished and record rationale and
information available for each decision.
Using this tool can help decision-makers work in
accord with a national-level consensus
document, as well as synchronize actions and
progress across all involved agencies.
Question and Answer Period
Conference participants posed no questions.
5.3 Optimization Approaches and
Issues Associated with Late-
Phase Recovery Following
Radiological or Nuclear Events
S. Y. Chen, Argonne National
Laboratory
Following the terrorist acts of September 11,
2001, preparations for responding to similar
future activities have been underway throughout
the world. For radiological or nuclear events,
response scenarios focus on the use of RDDs or
Improvised Nuclear Devices (INDs). In 2008,
DHS issued a series of Protective Action Guides
to address all response phases (i.e., early,
intermediate, and late phases). These guides
recognize the need for a process to "optimize" a
19
-------
multifaceted approach to late-phase (long-term)
recovery for affected communities. This paper
discusses optimization approaches and possible
issues associated with the recovery process.
Events associated with RDDs or INDs have been
extremely rare, and they offer very limited
relevant information. Yet it is possible to gain
some insight into possible response scenarios by
reviewing some large-scale nuclear incidents of
the past. These events include the Three-Mile-
Island nuclear event of 1979 in the United
States, the Chernobyl nuclear event of 1986 in
Ukraine (former Soviet Union), and the cesium
source accident of 1987 in Goiania, Brazil.
Releases from these events and the subsequent
responses offer insights into the potential
cleanup issues associated with the aftermath of
RDD or IND events.
While DHS's "optimization" approach is
reasonable for addressing late-phase recovery
activities, extensive effort is needed to develop
more specific stepwise guidance, including: (1)
formulating applicable national policies, (2)
advancing research and development in
characterizing contamination and cleanup
technologies, (3) improving understanding and
ascertaining potential radiological impacts and
implications, (4) developing effective decision-
making processes, and (5) opportunities for
stakeholder involvement. These elements must
be considered when developing a robust
optimization framework.
This work suggests a path toward optimization
of environmental cleanup activities in the
aftermath of an RDD or IND event (that will be
directed to specific event-related situations).
This process will also bring about a harmonious
and consistent approach that considers other
non-event-related situations that are addressed
under current statutory requirements (including
the EPA's Superfund Program). The future
results are intended to complement the DHS
Protective Action Guides on radiological
response to events involving RDDs or INDs.
Question and Answer Period
• What were the most important factors in
determining the time and cost requirements
for remediation efforts?
Chen noted that lower cleanup limits
resulted in higher costs. Optimization works
to balance competing factors such as lower
cleanup limits and higher costs. Chen noted
that the Superfund program has a funding
mechanism, so lower cleanup levels could
be achieved without a direct impact to
taxpayers. No such funding mechanism
exists for addressing remediation after a
terrorist event. Chen felt there is a need to
establish priorities regarding health concerns
and funding.
20
-------
6
Fate and Transport Research Activities Informing Recovery
(Cross-cutting)
6.1 Transport of Bacillus
Thuringiensis var. Kurstaki (Btk)
from an Outdoor Release into
Buildings
Kristin Omberg (presenting for
Sheila Van Cuyk, Los Alamos
National Laboratory)
Understanding the fate and transport of
biological agents in the environment will be
critical to recovery and restoration efforts after a
biological attack. Los Alamos National
Laboratory (LANL) conducted experiments in
the Seattle, Washington, and Fairfax County,
Virginia, areas to study agent fate in urban
environments. As part of their gypsy moth
eradication efforts, Washington State and
Fairfax County have sprayed Bacillus
thuringiensis var. kurstaki (Btk), a common
organic pesticide, for a number of years.
Because Btk shares many physical and
biological properties with Bacillus anthracis, the
results from these studies can be extrapolated to
a bioterrorist release. Many of the spray zones
are located in or near urban areas.
Work in Fairfax County, Virginia, in 2008
showed viable Btk in buildings near spray areas.
The 2009 study will present the combination of
modeling and experimentation used to assess
methods to determine whether a building is
contaminated after spraying Btk. We have
collected samples from within nine buildings
located inside or immediately adjacent to a spray
block. A strategy of combined probabilistic
sampling and targeted sampling was used, with a
goal of reducing numbers of samples while still
allowing a determination with reasonable
confidence that a building is contaminated. The
goal is to rapidly "rule in" a building as
contaminated.
Several different types of buildings were
sampled, including older commercial buildings
with relatively "leaky" construction and HVAC
systems and newer commercial buildings with
more recent, "tight" construction and newer
HVAC systems. In addition, a commercial
building was sampled that did not have an
HVAC system; this building pulled in no air
from the outside.
The results from experimental data and
simulations from the sampled buildings will be
presented to gain insights into infiltration into
buildings as a function of building type and
meteorological and land use variables. By using
available indoor models for contaminant
transport, an understanding of the importance of
human tracking of materials sprayed outside the
building into the building is identified.
This work will present a summary of the results
from building samples collected adjacent to Btk
spray areas, as well as a methodology for
collecting samples in order to determine rapidly
whether a building is contaminated following a
biological attack. We will present strategies that
will allow confidence in sampling results with
fewer samples than the traditional probabilistic
approach. In addition, we have developed "rules
of thumb," elucidated from the data, based on
key building characteristics.
Question and Answer Period
• Were templates used to ensure consistent
sample sizes?
Omberg used templates for swipe samples.
For irregularly shaped vacuum samples,
Omberg used measuring tapes to outline
sampling areas.
• What evidence supports the conclusion that
the HVAC system was responsible for spore
movement? Only a limited number of
samples were collected within the building.
Modeling results supported the conclusion
that the HVAC system was responsible for
spore movement. Assuming a perfect HVAC
filter and spore infiltration at the building
entries, the model predicted eventual spore
21
-------
dispersal throughout the building by the
HVAC system.
• Was the model verified? If not, what
evidence supports the modeling results?
Omberg answered that the model had not
been verified but is based on NIST's
CONTAM model. She mentioned additional
samples that were collected during the
study, but were not included in the
presentation. In rooms without people or
HVAC vents (e.g., fire suppression rooms,
telecommunications rooms), samples were
negative. In rooms with only the HVAC
system or tracking by people as a source
(e.g., interior bathrooms), samples were
positive. However, Omberg could not
distinguish between spore transport via the
HVAC system versus tracking.
• Was any air sampling conducted?
Omberg collected outdoor air samples along
the sides and roofs of the buildings, but did
not collect air samples inside the buildings.
• What was the sample size for each of the
different sample types collected?
Omberg collected four types of samples.
The bootie samples consisted of individual
booties. The vacuum sock samples averaged
7 square meters (m2) and were no larger than
9 m2. The swipe samples were 100 square
centimeters (cm2). For the 3H trace evidence
collection filters, study participants collected
as much of the HVAC filter as possible, up
to 2 tablespoons of dirt.
6.2 Transport of Bioaerosols into a
Regional Transport System
Michael Dillon, Lawrence Livermore
National Laboratory
Intentional and controlled releases of Btk to
control gypsy moth infestations have provided
an opportunity to test characterization equipment
and sampling methodologies, as well as gain
information on movement of this species within
the environment. This study took advantage of
these natural experiments to characterize how
Btk was transported to and penetrated into an
urban regional transit system. A particular focus
of this study was to improve the scientific
understanding of the fomite/vector pathway
(transport on objects and people)—including this
pathway's contribution to measurable airborne
concentrations within the transit vehicles. This
experiment also provided an initial assessment
of Btk contamination characteristics in transit
stations, including a limited comparison of the
efficacy of different sample types in detecting
station contamination.
Airborne measurements of total particulates and
aerosol size distributions were made with
Anderson Impactors, total particulate samples,
and Personal Sampling Units (PSUs). Surface
samples were made with swipes and settling
plates. Over 600 total samples were collected.
Sample processing followed protocols
established and vetted in previous DHS-
sponsored gypsy moth studies.
Mass transit stations and vehicles can be
contaminated via a wide area release. Significant
airborne contamination appears to be possible
via fomite/vector transport. Correlation between
presence of surface contamination and detection
based on aerosol sampling was not always good.
This work demonstrates that distant releases can
contaminate transit stations and that fomite
transport may play an important role in the
spread of contamination. The observation that
aerosol collectors did not always detect areas
with measurable surface contamination suggests
that transit system characterization should
include a variety of measurement methods and
that surface sampling or other more aggressive
methods should be considered.
Question and Answer Period
• What was particle size distribution?
Obtaining information about particle size
was difficult because the sample signal was
low. Sampling indicated that viable spores
were present, but overall results were
inconclusive. Dillon hopes to conduct
additional sampling.
22
-------
• Was the spore preparation treated to
enhance or alter transport?
Dillon responded that the spore preparation,
which was used for outdoor releases, was
not altered. This preparation was likely
designed to fall quickly and to remain in
place. Previous study findings, however,
indicated that this type of spore preparation
aged and resuspended over time.
• A participant noted that the study probably
used spores in a pesticide preparation. This
participant felt that data on particle decay
are critical. How were conclusions
regarding aerosols drawn in the absence of
particle decay data?
Dillon did not analyze the aerosols as they
were released from the spray bottles, but
hoped to do so in the future. He agreed that
analysis of quantitative data was not
possible. This study examined qualitative
information and found that some degree of
airborne transport occurred. In a train car
with one contaminated person, positive
samples were found even though no direct
contact occurred between the contaminated
person and the sampler. This observation
indicated that, at a minimum, a short-term
aerosolization pathway existed. Similarly,
but less conclusively, positive samples were
also found in locations not likely to be
directly contacted by people or objects.
• Did the lack of a correlation between air
and surface sampling results provide further
evidence that transport occurred by fomites
and not aerosolization?
Dillon agreed that the study suggested that
fomites were a concern. The study, however,
was not designed to provide a definitive
conclusion about transport, either for the
specific study scenario or for more broad
applications. Evidence indicated that fomites
and people were major transport pathways
that were not currently addressed. Dillon
noted that the contamination patterns found
during this study indicated that some level
of airborne transport was occurring and
strongly pointed to fomites as a concern.
6.3 Mitigation and Containment of
Contaminant Spread
Jacky Rosati, EPA, NHSRC
The purpose of the containment research
conducted by EPA's NHSRC, Decontamination
and Consequence Management Division, is to
provide information on the behavior, fate, and
transport of contaminants. This information can
be used to minimize the spread of
contamination, minimize exposure to the public
and responders, and support the development of
decontamination techniques and disposal
decisions.
We are investigating outdoor dispersion,
deposition, adhesion, and reaerosolization of
particles as well as their subsequent infiltration
into buildings. We are also investigating the
indoor re suspension and tracking of indoor
particles, a particularly important way that
contamination was spread throughout the Hart
Senate Office Building. We are evaluating
bioaerosol samplers to determine how effective
these samplers are at detecting the presence and
spread of biological contaminants. We are
investigating the infiltration of particles into
residential and commercial buildings, both in the
field and in the laboratory. We are also trying to
determine the forces and environmental
conditions that cause particles to adhere and
release from surfaces.
This research will inform remediation measures,
as well as sampling techniques, and can be used
to help mitigate spread and exposure in future
incidents.
Question and Answer Period
• Was contaminant spread via vehicle tires
considered?
Rosati noted that this study did not evaluate
contaminant spread from vehicles. She
hoped, however, to include vehicles in
future work.
• If different decontamination efficacies were
examined, how would the result from this
study be integrated into definitions of
efficacy?
23
-------
Rather than discuss decontamination
efficacy, Rosati noted the importance of
appropriate sampling in decontamination.
Collection of characterization samples from
the wrong location could result in
incomplete remediation of the contaminated
site. Rosati hoped that this study would
provide data to better define the extent of
contamination. In responding to the World
Trade Center, EPA received questions about
the methods used to determine
contamination spread. For example, how did
EPA know that contamination did not reach
Brooklyn? Rosati aimed to provide data that
supported EPA's responses to these types of
questions. If EPA were able to define the
extent of contamination better, then less
decontamination might be required.
6.4 The Brooklyn Traffic Real-Time
Ambient Pollutant Penetration
and Environmental Dispersion (B-
TRAPPED) Study
Russell Wiener, EPA, NHSRC
The B-TRAPPED study sought to develop a
better understanding of the transport of airborne
particulate pollutants in a heavily populated
urban neighborhood, from the sources on the
streets, down the street canyon, and into and
within the adjacent buildings. Concerns about
homeland security have resulted in a need for
better understanding of urban dispersion near an
accidental or intentional release of hazardous
materials on a nearly instantaneous timescale.
This study was designed to help develop a
simplified model of urban aerosol transport
relevant to human exposure in the near field of a
release.
Components of the B-TRAPPED study included
laboratory evaluations of the sampling
technologies, wind tunnel studies of the
atmospheric boundary layer flows in a simulated
neighborhood, a modest micro-scale urban field
study, and comprehensive theoretical modeling
of the major mechanisms of particulate matter
(PM) source release, transport, dispersion,
surface flux, and infiltration processes. The B-
TRAPPED field study was conducted in the
residential Sunset Park neighborhood of
Brooklyn, New York, in May 2005. The study
site was chosen to represent a typical urban
population center where high-density housing is
in close proximity to major traffic arteries. The
study applied spatially and temporally
synchronized and concurrent observations of PM
concentration and meteorological variables in
multiple monitoring locations within a busy
metropolitan urban residential area.
This study sought to measure dispersion in the
street canyon, infiltration into the adjacent
buildings, and concentrations within the
structures simultaneously. Urban dispersion,
contaminant infiltration, and indoor exposures
are closely related phenomena. The results
intend to accomplish the following:
• Delineate and visualize how a plume that is
generated by customary (e.g., traffic),
accidental (e.g., spill), or intentional (e.g.,
terrorist attack) means near or on the major
roadway travels downwind and presents
potential inhalation hazards at various
locations and in both outdoor and indoor
environments.
• Determine how time-series data of aerosol
concentrations measured at a fixed site can
be used to discern and describe the
characteristic "wave" forms of plumes
generated at a source (major roadway)
traveling to downwind receptor locations in
an urban environment when temporal
autocorrelation analysis is applied.
• Determine the infiltration flux rate that can
predict the degree of indoor exposure risk
for certain harmful materials of outdoor
origin using cross-correlation analyses of
concurrent indoor-outdoor concentration
time series.
• Characterize temporal and spatial PM
concentration fluctuation and distribution
patterns in the urban street canyon and their
relationship to reference wind patterns and
investigate their potential implications in
exposure risk assessment.
24
-------
• Determine the influence of meteorological
variables on the transport, dispersion, and
infiltration processes.
• Characterize the relationships between the
building parameters and the infiltration
mechanisms and identify the dominant
mechanisms involved in the infiltration
process.
• Evaluate the effectiveness of a shelter-in-
place area for protection against outdoor-
released PM pollutants.
• Use wind tunnel and computational fluid
dynamics simulations to determine the
predominant airflow and pollutant
dispersion patterns within the neighborhood.
Question and Answer Period
Conference participants posed no questions.
25
-------
7
Activities to Support Wide-Area Biodecontamination
7.1 Assessment of Liquid and
Physical Decontamination
Methods for Surfaces
Contaminated with Bacillus
Spores
Shawn P. Ryan, EPA, NHSRC
This intra-agency collaborative project was
conducted to evaluate the effectiveness of a
decontamination strategy, both individual and
combined steps, used to successfully remediate a
wooden shed contaminated with Bacillus
anthracis spores. The contamination was the
result of a drum maker working with untreated,
contaminated animal skins. The overall
objective was to develop practical, easy-to-
perform decontamination procedures that might
be useful during a wide-area response and
recovery event due to contamination with B.
anthracis spores.
The study was designed to assess the
effectiveness of several liquid and physical
methods for decontaminating porous and
nonporous materials that had been contaminated
with a specific amount (approx. 7-log) of B.
atrophaeus spores (a surrogate for B. anthracis)
via dry aerosol deposition. The decontamination
treatment steps were applied individually and in
combination. The full procedure tested involved
the following sequence of steps: (1) vacuuming
surfaces with a wet/dry vacuum containing a
HEPA-rated filter; (2) wetting the surface with a
liquid decontaminant and reapplying as
necessary to maintain wetness for a period of 10
minutes; (3) scrubbing the surface using a brush
(or sponge for painted wallboard) wetted with a
detergent solution; (4) rinsing the surface with
water using a garden hose (or sponge for painted
wallboard); (5) vacuuming residual standing
water from horizontal surfaces with the wet/dry
vacuum containing a HEPA-rated filter; (6)
completely covering the surface with the same
liquid decontaminant used in Step 2 for the
desired contact time (e.g., 30 to 60 minutes); (7)
rinsing the entire surface with water using a
garden hose (or sponge for painted wallboard);
and (8) vacuuming residual standing water from
horizontal surfaces with the wet/dry vacuum
containing a HEPA-rated filter. Chemical
decontaminants tested included a pH-adjusted
bleach solution (about 6,000 ppm available
chlorine and pH of 6.5-7.0) and Clorox® Clean-
up® disinfectant cleaner with bleach. The
procedures were tested on coupons (14-inch by
14-inch pieces of bulk material) positioned
either horizontally (h), representing a floor or
ceiling, or vertically (v), representing a wall.
The materials included latex-painted wallboard
(h, v), carpet (h), rough-cut wood (v), sealed
deck wood (h), and concrete (h, v). Sampling
was done using wet wipes or vacuum socks in
accordance with field sampling protocols.
The full decontamination procedure (Steps 1-8)
or a truncated procedure (Steps 1-5), which
included the use of pH-adjusted bleach, resulted
in a greater than 6-log reduction in detectable
viable spores (with the exception of concrete in
the vertical position). The vacuuming step alone
(Step 1) resulted in a slight measurable reduction
in spores from the materials' surfaces. Rinsing
with water (Step 4) or scrubbing with a
detergent solution followed by rinsing (Step 3
and 4, and 5 for horizontal surfaces) resulted in a
1- to 4-log reduction in spores from the surfaces,
and all of the removed spores were found viable
in the rinsate. The use of Clorox® Clean-Up® in
place of pH-adjusted bleach when using the
eight-step decontamination procedure resulted in
a greater than 6-log reduction in the spore
population, with a high percentage of viable
spores found in the rinsate (i.e., minimal
sporicidal activity of the chemical
decontaminant at the conditions tested,
especially on vertical surfaces).
The study demonstrated that the greatest spore
reductions from the coupon surfaces were
achieved by using the eight-step procedure with
a 30-minute contact time for the pH-adjusted
bleach application (Step 6), or the first five
decontamination steps (or four for horizontal
surfaces). In all tests, viable spores were found
in the rinsate. Within these tests, the 10-minute
26
-------
application of pH-adjusted bleach (Step 2)
appeared to be the single most effective step.
Although the effectiveness of the pH-adjusted
bleach spraying was not determined individually
in this study, Step 2 apparently produced at least
a 3- to 4-log reduction of spores on all materials
under the application conditions used. The
addition of other physical removal methods (i.e.,
HEPA vacuuming, washing with a detergent
solution and rinsing) resulted in slight to modest
levels of decontamination, but also transferred
contamination across media. However, even
though the vacuuming step (Step 1) was
determined to reduce spore load by less than 1-
log (considerably less in some cases), the
materials tested here were pre-cleaned before
use in the study (i.e., they did not contain soil
and grime). Accordingly, in field applications,
vacuuming may provide the benefit of reducing
background soil and grime, which would
probably reduce the sporicidal activity of the
chemical decontaminants.
This study determined the effectiveness of
practical, easy-to-perform decontamination
procedures for surfaces contaminated with B.
anthracis spores. These results are intended to
inform the development of decontamination
strategies for wide area response and recovery if
the need arises. Additional laboratory work
employing these results at larger-scale is
currently ongoing to develop field-relevant,
readily accessible decontamination options for
indoor and outdoor areas. The results have
recently been used in the development of a
recommended decontamination strategy by EPA
Region 1 for the remediation of a facility on the
University of New Hampshire campus
contaminated with natural B. anthracis spores
resulting from the use of drums made with
untreated animal hides.
Question and Answer Period
• A participant asked Ryan to comment on
mixing bleach and detergent.
Ryan noted that the procedure moving
forward includes mixing bleach and
detergent, specifically TSP. Preliminary
studies indicated that the bleach-TSP
mixture was at least as sporicidal as pH-
adjusted bleach alone.
• Vacuuming resulted in less than a log
reduction in spores. Could you explain the
vacuuming procedure?
A vacuum with a 10-inch squeegee
attachment was pulled down each coupon
three times. An up-and-down or back-and-
forth motion was not used.
• What was the range of spore concentrations
on the coupons after the first exposure?
Ryan targeted concentrations within a log of
107, so the typical range was 5 / 1 ()' to 5 /
107 with a few outliers at higher
concentrations.
• How was the laboratory decontaminated
after each release and treatment?
Coupons were inoculated and treated in a
stainless steel spray chamber, which was
decontaminated with pH-adjusted bleach
between tests. Initially, chlorine gas off-
gassing was an issue. Researchers wore
respirators to prevent exposure. Ryan noted
that everything required decontamination,
including water tanks.
• In the 2001 responses, bleach
decontamination on personnel resulted in
some burns. As a result, EPA relied on
mechanical decontamination with soap and
water. Did an opportunity exist to apply
findings from this study to field operations,
particularly decontaminating personnel
leaving a hot zone?
This study found that soap and water alone
resulted in limited spore load reductions.
However, Ryan noted that the spore loading
in this study was high. During field
operations, the suit material would impact
efficacy, with some materials more easily
decontaminated than others. Overall, soap
and water rinsing, without scrubbing, was
insufficient for full spore removal. A follow-
on study is evaluating amended bleach and
length of time for full removal and
inactivation of spores. A participant noted
that mechanical removal simply moves
spores from one location to another, so spore
tracking is a concern when setting up
mechanical decontamination.
27
-------
7.2 Evaluation of COT Products for
Decontamination of Bacillus
Spores
Jason Edmonds, U.S. Army
A significant gap in technology preparedness
exists with regard to federal response to a wide-
area release of biological agents such as B.
anthracis spores. In 2001, release of just a few
letters containing anthrax spores resulted in the
contamination of several building interiors,
including U.S. Postal and Distribution Centers in
Brentwood, District of Columbia; Trenton, New
Jersey; and American Media Inc. in Boca Raton,
Florida. Despite heavy contamination levels of
several building interiors, remediation was
achieved successfully by fumigation with
chlorine dioxide or vaporous hydrogen peroxide
(VHP). A wide-area release and contamination
of outdoors and building exteriors is likely to
consume the entire U.S. remediation capacity,
requiring years to clean up and resulting in
incalculable economic losses due to a lack of
effective cleanup response. Additional rapid,
effective, and economical decontamination
methodologies with the capability to be
employed in wide areas (indoor and/or outdoor)
are required to meet future challenges and
national preparedness goals. In addition to well-
documented fumigation-based cleanup efforts,
agencies responsible for mitigating
contaminated sites have employed alternative
methods for decontamination, including
combinations of disposing of contaminated
items, vacuuming, and employing a shared set of
mechanical and chemical approaches
(scrub/wash and pH-adjusted bleach). If proven
effective, a pressure-wash-based removal of
anthrax spores in the runoff from building
surfaces using readily available equipment will
significantly increase the nation's readiness to
meet the restoration and cleanup challenges
resulting from a wide-area biological release.
We have begun investigating the efficiency and
efficacy of three commercial off-the-shelf
(COT) decontamination products to
decontaminate large 4 foot by 4 foot panels
composed of exterior materials common to
building structures: pressure treated lumber,
brick, and stainless steel. The large panels are
seeded with biological agent and then undergo a
decontamination process, maintaining a contact
time of 30 minutes with the COT product. The
brick, and pressure-treated lumber panels are
then processed by vacuum (or wiped with a
Dacron wipe in the case of stainless steel).
Colony-forming units (CFU) are then counted
and statistical analysis is performed to determine
the amount of agent killed and/or removed from
the panels by using the spray system.
Our preliminary data suggest that the degree of
efficacy is dependent on the building material as
well as the biological agent being removed, and
we are witnessing a six-log reduction in CFU
collected after the decontamination process.
Question and Answer Period
• Was an amended bleach solution used?
Edmonds responded that a pH-adjusted
amended bleach solution was used.
• Did the reported log reductions account for
spores in the rinsate? How was the runoff
neutralized?
The reported log reductions included the
inactivated spores and the spores in the
rinsate. Edmonds noted that researchers
were unable to grow culturable colonies
from the spores in the runoff. The required
decontaminant amounts changed daily based
on factors such as temperature and RH, and,
in turn, the required amount of
neutralization buffer changed daily. A
decision was made to forgo a neutralization
buffer and instead collect samples as quickly
as possible after the initial runoff.
• How did the differences in the B. globigii
and B. subtilis spore impact
decontamination ?
Edmonds referred this question to Rastogi.
Rastogi responded that the material
preparation technique resulted in a large
number of nonviable B. globigii spores—
only 10 percent of B. globigii spores were
viable. Rastogi noted that extraneous
materials were present in the preparation. He
did not know how these extraneous
28
-------
materials impacted decontamination. The
material preparation technique for B.
subtilis, however, resulted in only a small
number of nonviable B. subtilis spores—
approximately 99 percent of B. subtilis
spores were viable. Rastogi noted that
regardless of the surface material, studies
found greater B. globigii spore recovery
compared to B. subtilis.
• A participant asked if Edmonds or others
had tried excising or abrading the surface to
improve recovery.
Edmonds had considered methods for
improving recovery by dislodging spores,
similar to a carpet cleaner. To his
knowledge, however, these technologies
were not available.
7.3 Evaluation of Peroxide-Based
Solutions for Facility
Decontamination by
Owner/Occupants
Paula Krauter, Sandia National
Laboratories
In support of the IBRD program, we are
evaluating methods that may be useful for
decontamination of residences, small businesses,
and other small facilities that are not heavily
contaminated and are a low-level priority for
cleanup. The remediation of a large number of
contaminated facilities will likely be a limiting
step in the recovery of an urban area following a
wide-area release of a biological warfare agent
due to the limited number of resources. A
potential option for remediation of residences
and small businesses is to provide training,
resources, and instructions for using a simple
liquid decontamination material. EPA has
developed and evaluated the use of pH-amended
bleach for self-decontamination; we are
evaluating another common household cleaning
agent—peroxide.
Several peroxide materials were evaluated for
efficacy against Bacillus atrophaeus, including
3, 4, 6, and 7.9 percent hydrogen peroxide;
solutions of 3, 4, 6, and 7.9 percent hydrogen
peroxide with buffer and activator, and STERIS
SporKlenz™. Neutralizers for the peroxide
materials were identified and basic efficacy tests
were conducted to select the two best peroxide
materials to test in the aerosol chamber.
SporKlenz™ and a simple activated-peroxide
formula (4 percent H202 with an activator) were
chosen for further evaluation. Decontamination
products will probably need to be supplied in
bulk quantities from the manufacturer during an
incident and, potentially, a simple formulation
could be requested and provided to
neighborhoods. An aerosol chamber was
equipped with ceramic tile, vinyl tile, stainless
steel, plastic, and a table and chair. B.
atrophaeus spores were dispersed throughout the
test chamber by a fluidized-bed generator. All
surfaces in the test chamber were sprayed with
the decontamination solutions using a garden
sprayer. Following a 30-minute contact time,
samples were taken from the various surface
materials and evaluated for viable spore
concentration. Air samples were taken from the
test chamber to determine the concentration of
aerosolized spores during cleanup and whether
any airborne spores remained following the
decontamination procedure.
Our intent was to evaluate the application of the
decontamination material in a room-size aerosol
chamber while monitoring the concentration of
airborne spores during the decontamination
procedure. Activated peroxide solutions and
H202/peracetic acid solutions are effective
sporicides on nonporous surfaces and are
reasonable materials for owner/occupant
decontamination. However, important issues
surrounding the safety of those conducting the
decontamination process and the thoroughness
of the process remain. Spore-particle movement
in air currents and/or thermals confounded the
settling velocity predictions. Without suitable
secondary containment, airborne spore particles
will potentially increase the contaminated zone.
Workers should be aware of the potential for
tracking spores out of the contamination zone.
An important consideration for owner/occupant
decontamination is to provide decontamination
workers with knowledge and materials to protect
themselves while limiting the spread of
contaminants.
29
-------
Question and Answer Period
• What is the shelf life ofperoxide once
activated?
The solution we used was only evaluated for
a single, same-day use. Stabilizers may
prolong its activity.
• Were samples collected outside the sample
chamber?
No samples were collected outside the
chamber, but Krauter would like to collect
these samples in the future. Krauter noted
that the chamber had a standard entry zone.
• How was the chamber decontaminated
between experiments?
The chamber was lined with spray nozzles.
After an experiment, the nozzles sprayed the
chamber with DF-200. The DF-200 spray
was followed by a rinse and full dry.
• Was fogging considered to minimize
exposure?
Krauter agreed that fogging was a good idea.
She noted that the area size and mixing
mechanism are important for fogging. For
this study, Krauter wanted to evaluate a
simple technology, so decontamination was
conducted with a garden sprayer.
• In neighborhoods, how important is outdoor
decontamination ?
Outdoor decontamination remains a
substantial concern. Fate and transport,
Krauter felt, will inform outdoor
decontamination decisions. However, data
gaps in understanding fate and transport
remain, such as how tightly spores stay on
the ground or the air flow required to move
spores. Indeed, Krauter felt that many
questions regarding outdoor
decontamination remain. A participant noted
that most people spend 80 to 90 percent of
their time in controlled indoor environments.
In general, office environments are more
controlled than home environments.
Considering outdoor exposure is important,
but outdoor contaminant concentrations
decrease rapidly due to factors such as
dilution. Although indoor concentrations are
likely lower initially, the exposure times
would be much longer.
• Were other peroxide formulations
considered? A participant noted the
different characteristics of various peroxide
formulations.
Krauter stated that she was interested in
gathering more information about the
different formulations, which implied that
she had not considered these formulations in
selecting a decontamination agent.
7.4 Inactivation of Bacillus Anthracis
Spores on Indoor and Outdoor
Building Surfaces using
Commercially-Available Liquid
Sterilant Technologies
Worth Calfee, EPA, NHSRC
Two research efforts were conducted to evaluate
the efficacy of commercially available liquid or
foam-based sporicidal technologies to
decontaminate building materials dosed with
spores of Bacillus anthracis and/or Bacillus
subtilis. The technologies tested include
DioxiGuard™, Calcium polysulfide, Oxonia
Active®, Minncare® Cold Sterilant, SanDes, pH-
adjusted bleach, CASCAD™ Surface
Decontamination Foam, Decon Green®,
EasyDECON 200, SporKlenz RTU®, and
Peridox®. The building materials tested include
industrial-grade carpet, decorative laminate,
galvanized metal ductwork, painted wallboard
paper, painted cinder block, bare wood, stainless
steel, glass, aluminum, porcelain, granite,
concrete, brick, asphalt, treated wood, topsoil,
and butyl rubber. Technologies were tested
against a >7 log challenge of Bacillus spores.
Methods of spray, application rates, and contact
times were determined according to vendor-
specific recommendations.
Application methods, contact times,
neutralization data, and efficacy data for these
technologies will be presented. Briefly, efficacy
values ranged from <1 log reduction to >7 log
reduction (total kill) on these materials.
Nonporous materials were generally more easily
decontaminated than porous materials. For the
30
-------
majority of technologies, spore inactivation was
most challenging on treated wood, bare pine
wood, and topsoil. Liquid sterilants with
hydrogen peroxide, hydrogen peroxide plus
peracetic acid, or hypochlorous
acid/hypochlorite as active ingredients were
most efficacious. Technologies with chlorine
dioxide or calcium polysulfide as the active
ingredient were least effective at inactivating
Bacillus spores.
Data presented here were generated to give
decontamination professionals valuable input for
decisions regarding remediation of outdoor areas
contaminated with infectious biological agents
such as Bacillus anthracis spores.
Question and Answer Period
• Were spores characterized for physical
traits (e.g., adhesion properties)? This
participant also noted that 30 percent spore
recovery from brick was unusual.
Calfee noted that Battelle prepared the
spores following standard operating
procedures. Standard operating procedures
were also followed for the test methods used
for this study (which were peer-reviewed
and accepted methods). Calfee noted that
sonication was used to improve spore
recovery.
• Did a correlation exist between material
compatibility with the decontaminants and
efficacy?
All of the decontaminants were compatible
based on a qualitative evaluation of material
effects. The technologies had no effect on
the materials themselves. Calfee noted that
the material surfaces (e.g., asphalt, concrete)
affected decontamination.
• What were the technology application
methods?
The application methods varied based on the
technology, though they followed
manufacturer recommendations.
• Why were different decontamination
methods used for the indoor and outdoor
tests? This participant thought that
comparing a single technology in an indoor
and outdoor setting would have been useful.
Calfee referred this question to Wood.
Wood responded that indoor and outdoor
tests were different projects funded by
different sources. EPA internally funded the
indoor materials test and the
decontamination technologies were selected
with stakeholders' input. Wood noted that
the indoor tests began approximately 1 year
before the outdoor test.
7.5 Inactivation of Bioagents through
Natural Attenuation, Liquid
Decontamination, or Fumigation
Harry Stone, Battelle
EPA's NHSRC investigated persistence of
Brucella suis, Francisella tularensis, vaccinia
virus (a surrogate for the smallpox virus), and
Yersinia pestis on various materials, and the
decontamination efficacy including the same
bioagents with the addition of Bacillus anthracis
Ames spores. For efficacy testing, four
fumigation technologies (chlorine dioxide, two
brands of hydrogen peroxide, and methyl
bromide) and four liquid technologies (pH-
adjusted bleach, chlorine dioxide solution, and
two brands of hydrogen peroxide-phosphoric
acid solutions) were evaluated with regard to
their ability to decontaminate various materials
that were spiked with bioagent. The persistence
of viable bioagents and the decontamination
efficacy of various technologies were evaluated
by comparing the bioagent recovered from
building materials after treatment (passage of
time or decontamination) to bioagent recovered
from building materials at time zero or a positive
control condition.
The methods used include the following steps:
• The bioagent is prepared.
• Material coupons (generally 1.9 by 7.5
centimeters) are inoculated with
approximately 1.0 x 107 culturable bioagent
per coupon, generally applied as 10 * 10
microliter droplets.
31
-------
• The coupons are allowed to sit for various
specified times under specified
environmental conditions.
• Decontamination test coupons are exposed
to the fumigant or liquid decontamination
for specified contact times at specified
environmental conditions.
• Decontamination is halted by aeration of the
chamber (fumigants) or chemical
neutralization (for liquids).
• Coupons are extracted, the extracts serially
diluted, the dilutions cultured, and the
colony- or plaque-forming units are
enumerated.
• Efficacy is evaluated by comparing the
enumerated bioagent recovered from
positive control coupons (or time zero for
persistence) to the enumerated bioagent
recovered from test coupons.
The persistence of the bioagents on various
building materials varied by organism and
material type. All bioagents persisted at least
seven days (168 hours) on at least one building
material. While only low levels (101 CFU) of F.
tularensis and Y. pestis were recovered from any
material after seven days, 106 CFU of B. suis and
105 plaque-forming units of vaccinia virus were
recovered at seven days from computer
keyboard keys.
All of the fumigant and liquid technologies
tested were efficacious against all of the
bioagents tested. For many, but not all,
decontamination technology-material-bioagent
combinations, no viable bioagent was recovered
after decontamination at the tested conditions.
Scientifically defensible persistence and
decontamination efficacy data for a range of
bioagents are useful to inform planning for
response and decontamination after natural
occurrences or intentional releases of bioagents.
The results also show that both persistence and
decontamination of bioagents are influenced by
environmental conditions and the materials with
which the agents are in contact.
Question and Answer Period
• A participant asked for clarification
regarding the units for the reported
fumigant concentrations.
Stone noted that the values represented
concentration times time (CT). A value of
9,000 parts per million by volume (ppmv)
represented a three-hour contact time at
3,000 ppmv. Stone agreed that typically CT
values were reported as ppmv-hr.
• What was basis for selecting particular
ppmv values for each technology?
For the most part, EPA worked with the
manufacturers to identify target ppmv
values. For methylene bromide, the target
ppmv value was based on previous EPA
testing.
• A participant noted that RH was important
for decontamination, but the data for the
STERIS hydrogen peroxide system did not
include RH information.
Stone responded that the STERIS system
included a built-in humidity control system
that dehumidified the room and kept the RH
below the microcondensation level.
7.6 High/Low Tech Approaches to
HVAC Decontamination
Brian Attwood, EPA, NHSRC
The aim of this work is to evaluate the
decontamination efficacy as well as the
economic costs associated with several methods
of cleaning the HVAC system of a building
contaminated with Bacillus anthracis
(commonly known as anthrax) spores. The high-
tech method employed will be fumigation with
hydrogen peroxide vapor (and possibly chlorine
dioxide gas). The low-tech method will involve
mechanical cleaning and liquid sporicide
application based on techniques currently used
in the commercial duct cleaning sector.
A section of galvanized metal ductwork will be
assembled in EPA's Research Triangle Park
facility for decontaminant testing. The
configuration of the ductwork will be chosen to
32
-------
represent a typical commercial building HVAC.
Selected sections of the ductwork will be
contaminated with aerosol-deposited bacterial
spores.
The ductwork will then be subjected to the
different decontamination methods, after which
the contaminated sections of ductwork will be
sampled to determine how many viable spores
remain. Sections not initially contaminated will
also be tested for cross-contamination. In
addition to looking at the decontamination
efficacy of each method, other factors such as
the cost of application and the logistical
feasibility of a large-scale application of the
method will be evaluated. Provided that efficacy
is proven in the spot contamination tests, the
project will culminate in an actual aerosol
release within the ductwork to provide a more
realistic decontamination challenge.
In the event of a wide area release of a
biological agent, the choice of decontamination
method will depend on the clearance, costs, and
time goals for that scenario. The results of this
work will provide information on how the
above-mentioned high- and low-tech methods
can be employed to meet those goals.
Question and Answer Period
• Historically, mold remediation efforts used
different methods for decontamination, such
as chlorine dioxide and ozone. Were the
lessons learned from this industry
considered?
Attwood noted that chlorine dioxide and
ozone fumigation are sophisticated
technologies, and initially testing focused on
low-tech options. Mold remediation
historically included mechanical cleaning
followed by treatment with biocides, which
were biostatic. Attwood thought that
mechanical cleaning could apply to spore
removal. The biocides, however, have not
been proven effective for anthrax spores.
For the immediate future, testing will focus
on proven sterilants. Wood noted that initial
screening of spore treatment with ozone has
been completed. A report summarizing
findings is available and additional testing
with ozone is planned.
• Are there plans to evaluate a dirty duct?
For the moment, testing involves clean
ducts. Attwood agreed that testing a dirty
duct would provide comparison information
and should be considered.
33
-------
8 Persistence of Biological Agents and Other Bio-related
Decontamination and Disposal Research
8.1 Persistence of Selected Biological
Agents
Joseph Wood, EPA, NHSRC
The data on how long certain biological threat
agents may persist under various environmental
conditions are sparse. Persistence is affected by
RH, temperature, sunlight, and the material with
which the agent is associated. In the event of a
release of a biological agent, having an
understanding of how long the agent may
survive in the environment can assist officials in
making decisions about decontamination.
Although Bacillus anthracis is known to survive
in the environment for decades, laboratory tests
were conducted to determine how simulated
sunlight (UVA/UVB) affects its persistence on
different materials. Tests were also conducted to
determine the persistence of Brucella suis (a
Category B Centers for Disease Control agent)
and freeze-dried vaccinia virus (a surrogate for
the variola virus, which causes smallpox) under
various environmental conditions and materials.
In general, the agents were inoculated (~107 to
10s organisms per coupon) onto 1.9 x 7.5 cm
coupons, or in the case of soil, 1 cm high by 3.5
cm diameter Petri dishes. The contaminated
materials were then exposed to the
environmental condition being examined (a
combination of low or high RH, ambient or low
temperature, with or without simulated sunlight)
for a particular time period. The agent was then
extracted from the test coupons and quantified
via plating techniques. To benchmark the
results, the agents were also recovered from
positive control coupons at time zero, or in the
case of the B. anthracis tests, after the same time
period as the test coupons, but without
UVA/UVB exposure.
Tests with simulated sunlight were conducted
with B. anthracis and B. suis at levels of
-70 microwatts UVB/cm2, -100 microwatts
UVA/cm2, and no UVC. These tests were
conducted with UV lamps alternating 12 hours
on and off to simulate diurnal conditions.
In the tests with B. anthracis using simulated
sunlight at ambient conditions, viable agent was
recovered on topsoil, concrete, and wood at the
longest elapsed time point tested (56 days). Less
than a one log reduction was observed for
topsoil at 56 days. Although the agent was least
persistent on glass, there were still a few
coupons from which anthrax was recovered after
28 and 56 days' exposure to simulated sunlight.
For the B. suis tests, the agent persisted beyond
28 days at both room and low temperature
conditions (with no simulated sunlight) on
aluminum, glass, and soil but was less persistent
on bare concrete. With simulated sunlight, the
persistence of B. suis diminished on all
materials, but the effect was less pronounced on
soil.
In the vaccinia tests, the agent was most
persistent at the low temperature and low RH
conditions. At the low temperature/low RH
condition, the virus persisted beyond 56 days on
all four materials tested (glass, galvanized metal,
painted cinder block, and carpet).
These tests confirm that these agents can persist
for extended periods of time depending on the
environmental conditions and materials, and that
decontamination may be necessary.
Question and Answer Period
• What type of bulb was used to simulate
light? This participant noted that metal
halide bulbs simulate ultraviolet light best,
but they become very hot.
The study used ReptiSun® bulbs (used in
reptile terrariums) as the UV-A and UV-B
source. Three bulbs were placed about 1 foot
34
-------
above the test coupons. UVC was also
measured.
• Could the instability of the virus at a high
RH be related to the use of a freeze-dried
preparation?
Wood noted that this study did not evaluate
the mechanisms contributing to instability,
but the results were consistent with work
completed by Shawn Ryan, which indicated
that RH was a more important factor than
temperature.
8.2 Disinfection of Mobile Equipment
after an Emergency Poultry
Disease Outbreak
Eric R. Benson, Department of
Bioresources Engineering and
Department of Animal and Food
Science, University of Delaware
The main stages involved in managing an
emergency poultry disease outbreak for avian
influenza, exotic Newcastle disease, and other
highly contagious poultry diseases include
surveillance, quarantine, depopulation, disposal,
and disinfection. Agricultural tractors, skid steer
loaders, and other equipment are extensively
used during the depopulation and disposal
portions of the response. Movement of
contaminated equipment has been implicated in
the spread of disease in previous outbreaks. One
approach to equipment disinfection is to power-
wash the equipment, treat it with a liquid
disinfectant, change any removable filters, and
let it sit idle for several days. Experimental
results show that liquid-applied disinfectants
may not be suitable for this application.
In this project, multiple disinfectant strategies
were individually evaluated for their
effectiveness at inactivating Newcastle disease
virus on mechanical equipment seeded with the
virus. A small gasoline engine was used to
simulate typical mechanical equipment. A high
titer of LaSota strain Newcastle disease virus
was applied and dried onto a series of metal
coupons. The coupons were then placed on both
interior and exterior portions of the engine.
Liquid disinfectants were not effective at
disinfecting the engine and positive virus
samples were recovered. Placing the equipment
in a tent and applying the disinfecting agent via
indirect thermal fog showed a decrease in
overall virus titer. A combination of direct and
indirect thermal fog was more effective than
liquid-applied or indirectly-applied thermal fog.
Cold fogging and electrostatic fogging were also
tested and shown to have some reductions in
virus titer, but neither method was entirely
satisfactory. Only one combination of test agent
and application method (direct fog Virocid®)
was able to reliably disinfect interior and
exterior surfaces of equipment.
Test data show that current methods
recommended for agricultural disease response
are not sufficient. One combination of test agent
and application method has significant health
concerns and would not be recommended for
field use. Additional research is required to
provide effective recommendations for the field.
Question and Answer Period
• As a point of reference, if decontamination
of the virus was attempted with high
temperatures and humidity alone, what
temperature and contact time would be
needed for successful decontamination?
At 56 degrees Celsius (°C), only a few
seconds were needed for inactivation of
avian influenza and similar viruses. As the
temperature decreased, additional time
would be required. Benson noted that the
study was conducted in ambient
temperatures ranging from 70 degrees
Fahrenheit (°F) to 90 °F.
• If heat alone was successful at
decontaminating the virus, why was surface
scrubbing necessary? Was harnessing the
heat from a vehicle's engine or placing
heaters in buildings a viable option? This
participant wondered about the need to
introduce chemical decontamination if heat
was sufficient.
Benson noted that a typical engine
compartment is greasy with high organic
loads, which complicates decontamination.
35
-------
In other areas of a vehicle, temperatures are
closer to ambient levels. Accordingly,
decontamination beyond heating was
necessary. Using chemicals reduced the time
needed to complete decontamination.
Initially, researchers considered simply
letting the temperature rise in a building, but
allowing a building to heat takes time.
Depopulation equipment needed to be
cleaned and moved as fast as possible to the
next location.
• What concentration was achieved in the
tents?
Chlorine dioxide concentrations were
approximately 200 ppm. Benson did not
have the ppm concentrations for the other
fumigants.
• In developing protocols for farm equipment
decontamination, a participant noted, the
Canadian Food Inspection Agency had
issues dealing with the dirt load, manure,
and equipment size (e.g., front loaders, skid
steers, dump trucks). This participant noted
that a recent response included three days to
simply clean a skid steer to remove the
grime, grit, and dirt embedded in the treads
before decontamination could occur.
• Another participant noted that a person
from the U.S. Army research laboratory had
recently visited the EPA laboratory. This
person described prototype testing
conducted using a large chamber designed
to decontaminate tanks. This participant felt
that the technology might be useful for
agricultural or wide-area decontamination.
Benson noted that states often oversee low
pathogen responses, so funding and resource
availability is often a concern. In a high-
pathogen response, federal agencies are
more likely to be involved and military
resources are more accessible. A participant
mentioned an advanced technology
demonstration that examined vehicle
decontamination methods beyond labor-
intensive scrubbing methods. This
participant believed that the U.S. Army is
testing a technology that resembled a large
mobile car wash. The mobility of this
technology, however, is limited.
• A participant commented that the porous
surfaces found in agricultural settings are a
substantial problem. Was porous surface
testing conducted?
Some porous surface testing was completed
approximately two years ago. Benson agreed
that porous surface decontamination is
difficult. Only a citric acid decontaminant
reliably meets the test objectives for both
porous and nonporous materials. Benson
noted that the impact of poor recovery on
the results was unclear. Observed decreases
in pathogen concentrations may have been
the result of decontamination or poor
recovery.
8.3 Testing Sporicidal Efficacy of Six
Disinfectants on Carrier Surfaces
Contaminated With B. Atrophaeus
Spores
Bruce Hinds, Defense Threat
Reduction Agency
This presentation will discuss a decontamination
technology study supporting the IBRD program.
The DISCRETE Zeus study employed a three-
step method (TSM) to test the sporicidal efficacy
of six disinfectants on two different carrier
surfaces contaminated with Bacillus atrophaeus.
The carrier surfaces used were stainless steel and
ceramic. The disinfectant/test articles used were
Peridox®, CASCAD®, SporKlenz RTU®,
EasyDECON®, Decon Green®, and MDF-200®.
Microbiology-grade water was used as a
negative control and pH-amended bleach (pH 7
±0.1) was used as the positive control.
Qualification of the spore suspension was
achieved by conducting acid resistance and
microscopic analysis tests. The carriers were
inoculated with the test spores (1.10 x 107 CFU
to 2.80 x 107 CFU) using a spore suspension.
The carriers were then dried overnight (at least
12 hours at room temperature). The exposure
time for the TSM was 30 minutes, and the
carriers went through three different steps to
recover any spores. The results of the testing
36
-------
indicated that when using the stainless steel
carrier, the log kill of all test articles and
positive control was within 7 ± 0.5, and these
values were not significantly different from each
other (ANOVA, a = 0.05). For the ceramic
carrier, the values of log kill were statistically
significant as a group. Further pair-wise
comparison using Tukey's Honestly Significant
Difference Test and Fisher Least Significant
Difference Test was done to identify pairs that
were statistically significant or otherwise.
Study data will aid the IBRD program in making
informed decisions regarding wide area
decontamination technologies
Question and Answer Period
Conference participants posed no questions.
8.4 Development of a Novel Bioassay
for Detection of Functional Ricin
Vipin Rastogi, U. S. Army, Edgewood
Chemical Biological Center
Ricin toxin, found in the bean of the castor plant,
is one of the most toxic and easily produced
plant toxins. Ricin is a lectin consisting of two
polypeptide chains, the A chain and the B chain,
linked by a disulfide bond. The active A chain
can catalytically remove adenine on the 28S
RNA subunit of eukaryotic ribosomes, resulting
in cessation of protein synthesis and cell death.
Current methods for detection of ricin include
immunological, in vitro translation inhibition,
and general cellular toxicity assays. The present
study was initiated with the objective of
developing a novel bioassay for detection of
functional ricin. Recently, a cell-based assay
expressing green fluorescent protein under the
control of cytomegalovirus promoter was
reportedly used for detecting low levels of ricin
(Halter et al. 2009, Assay and Drug Dev. Tech.
7: 356-365). However, this assay has not been
developed as a high-throughput method.
An engineered mammalian HeLa cell line (with
an inducible gene expression system) was stably
transfected with a luciferase gene, resulting in
inducible expression of the gene. The expression
of luciferase in the engineered cell line was
repressed in the presence of the antibiotic
doxycycline, and in its absence was induced by
> 1,000-fold. A typical assay in a 96-well plate
contained 10E4 cells in a volume of 100
microliters and an aliquot (25 microliters) of
ricin, which was added at the start of luciferase
induction. Luciferase was assayed after a 24-
hour incubation at 37 °C, and its expression was
inhibited by the presence of very low levels of
ricin (20 to 50 picograms per 125 microliters).
Utility of the cell-based assay was investigated
following decontamination of steel coupons
contaminated with crude ricin (<1 percent active
ricin by weight). No active ricin was detected
after a 30-second exposure with a l:20-diluted
bleach or 250 ppm chlorine dioxide. However,
about 80 percent ricin was detected following
treatment with 1 percent hydrogen peroxide
under the same conditions.
A novel cell-based assay for detection of
functional ricin has been developed. This assay
can be used to determine the efficacy of
disinfectants used for ricin contamination.
Cellular toxicity is elicited only in presence of
functional holo-ricin. Current immunological
and other chain-based methods do not provide
conclusive evidence for the presence of
functional ricin. Availability of the novel
bioassay developed in this study will permit
detection and the development of a high-
throughput method for detecting very low
amounts of functional ricin (<0.4 nanograms per
milliliter), and this assay could be used as a
confirmatory test in ricin decontamination
studies.
Question and Answer Period
• Was the assay specific to ricin? The
presentation indicated that the assay could
be applied to other dual component toxins.
The assay was specific to binary toxins that
had a binding component event followed by
inhibition that caused changes in protein
synthesis, either by breaking the elongation
factor or disrupting the ribosome.
• Were other biotoxins tested?
This study evaluated only ricin.
37
-------
What were the effects of the
decontamination agent on the assay? Field
applications would not include a
neutralization step.
Rastogi indicated that neutralization served
as a control for the contact time. Rastogi
also found that without a 1:50 dilution, the
cells were affected. He also noted that the
decontamination agent itself was toxic to the
cells. Some degree of dilution was therefore
necessary before conducting the assay. Even
with a 1:50 dilution, Rastogi noted that the
assay sensitivity was approximately 0.2
nanograms per milliliter.
Was dilution conducted after neutralization?
Rastogi confirmed that dilution occurred
after neutralization.
Was heat inactivation of ricin studied?
Rastogi had not conducted research
regarding heat inactivation of ricin. He
agreed that heat would likely destroy the
three-dimensional structure and result in loss
of function.
How was the known amount of ricin
determined for the calibration?
The crude ricin was compared to a known
sample of pure ricin to determine the
amount of ricin in the crude sample.
Would cells uptake protease, for example,
and would that uptake interfere with the
assay?
Rastogi had not evaluated whether proteins
were readily transported across the cell
membrane. He speculated that protein
transfer across the cell membrane would not
occur.
Why was a HeLa cell line used in the study?
The study considered human toxicity issues,
and therefore involved use of a human cell
line. Rastogi noted that other researchers
were examining nonhuman cell lines.
A participant noted the importance of using
sound cell lines and cell cultures. How
stable was the manipulated cell line? How
many subcultures were possible before
degradation occurred?
Rastogi noted that the cells remained stable
as long as subculturing was possible. The
HeLa cell line has been stable for about 60
years: it originated in the 1950s and
researchers continue to use it in 2010. A
cycle of growing cells, freezing, growing,
and freezing was possible. Approximately
one to two weeks were required to move
from frozen to usable cells.
8.5 Biotoxin Test Method
Development
Linda C. Beck, Naval Surface
Warfare Center, Dahlgren Division
The Naval Surface Warfare Center, Dahlgren
Division, has been working to develop
standardized test methods for determining the
efficacy of liquid decontaminants against bio-
warfare agents on hard or porous surfaces. The
method requirements include testing liquid
contaminants at an increased challenge level
with reduced contact times, testing on a wide
range of materials, and testing with minimal
manipulation of the sample. The need for
reproducible assays and standard methods for
testing is recognized within the DOD and EPA
test communities. The objective of this project is
to develop, standardize, and verify a method for
evaluating the efficacy of liquid decontaminants
on surfaces and coatings for select biological
toxins. The Center's recently developed test
method for the evaluation of the efficacy of
liquid and gaseous decontaminants on bacterial
spores was modified and applied to develop the
biotoxin sampling procedure. The differences
between spores and biotoxins were considered
prior to modification of the protocol.
Electrochemiluminescence immunoassay was
selected as the method of analysis for the protein
biotoxins and enzyme-linked immunosorbent
assay was used for the molecular toxins.
Analysis of the data generated: (1) standard
curves; (2) baseline recovery data on four
military-relevant surfaces; (3) percent recovery
of C. botulinum Type A toxin complex, ricin,
aflatoxin, and T-2 mycotoxin on four surfaces
38
-------
after treatment with the liquid decontaminants
10 percent bleach, DF-200, or HTH. The
procedures were verified and validation testing
was performed. Verification was successfully
completed by repetitive sampling and analysis.
Preliminary testing for validation was
accomplished by comparing the reproducibility
of the test results using a different method of
analysis, liquid chromatography/mass
spectrometry, at an alternate laboratory
(Dugway Proving Ground). The method
generated provides a standard for efficacy
testing of liquid decontaminants against
biotoxins that will be recommended for
incorporation into the TOP 8-2-061. The results
could also impact the concept of operations for
the decontamination of protein and molecular
biotoxins and could be leveraged by additional
hazard mitigation projects.
Question and Answer Period
• How were the decontaminant liquids applied
to the coupons?
The decontaminant liquids were placed on
the coupons with micropipettes.
• Were analyses (i.e., liquid
chromatography/mass spectrometry
[LC/MS]) of the disinfection results
conducted at Dugway Proving Ground
facilities?
Beck followed a standard process for
removing the biotoxins from the coupons.
Beck analyzed resulting samples using
electrochemiluminescence and ELISA
immunoassay methods. Beck also provided
samples to Dugway Proving Ground, where
they were analyzed by LC/MS.
• Were any indications of disinfection
byproducts identified?
This study did evaluate disinfection
byproducts.
• A participant noted that hand application of
extremely toxic substances seemed
dangerous and potentially countered
Occupational Safety and Health
Administration (OSHA) regulations. Was
hand application the preferred method?
Beck noted that the study used only very
small concentrations of the toxic substances.
Concentrations were: 2 nanograms/milliliter
(ng/mL) ricin, 10 ng/mL botulinum toxin, 16
ng/mL aflatoxin, and 10 ng/mL T-2
mycotoxin. Researchers conducted testing
under a hood and wore appropriate PPE.
Overall, they followed regulations for
worker safety.
• What was the mass of the toxins applied to
each coupon?
The toxins were applied by volume—50
microliters. Calculations were necessary to
translate the volume into a mass.
• Was the ELISA immunoassay method
commercially available or developed for this
study?
The ELISA immunoassay was commercially
available through AgraQuant.
• Most of the tests were conducted with pure
preparations. How would inorganics
interfere with results?
Beck did not have information about
inorganic interferences.
8.6 Development of Test Methods for
Determining the Efficacy of
Disinfectants against Foreign
Animal Disease Viruses on
Nonporous Surfaces
Peter W. Krug, Foreign Animal
Disease Research Unit, Agricultural
Research Service, U.S. Department
of Agriculture
Foreign animal disease (FAD) agents are a
major economic threat to the United States that
could potentially cost billions of dollars in lost
revenue, culled livestock, and environmental
cleanup if FAD agents are introduced into U.S.
agriculture. Preventing the accidental or
intentional introduction of these agents into the
country is vital, but once introduced, rapid
response and recovery from FAD outbreaks
requires effective disinfection of contaminated
premises and equipment. Standardized
methodologies for testing disinfectant efficacy
39
-------
against FAD agents on surfaces and fomites are
lacking.
To develop and validate basic methodologies for
evaluating disinfectant efficacy, we selected
three representative viruses: foot and mouth
disease virus (FMDV), a small, nonenveloped
RNA virus; classical swine fever virus (CSFV),
a small, enveloped RNA virus; and African
swine fever virus (ASFV), a large, enveloped
DNA virus. In our approach, high-titer virus
stocks (107to 10s 50 percent tissue culture
infective dose) are dried on nonporous surfaces
and exposed to a liquid disinfectant. After a
predetermined contact time, the disinfectant is
neutralized and the virus is titered on susceptible
cells to detect infectious virus post-disinfection.
FMDV and ASFV were both recovered with
minimal titer loss when dried on stainless steel
and plastic surfaces. In contrast, CSFV titers
decreased by up to three orders of magnitude as
a result of the drying process. Next, we tested
various concentrations of three disinfectants
against each virus on nonporous surfaces.
Sodium hypochlorite was efficacious for all
three viruses at specific concentrations and
contact times. Citric acid was effective against
FMDV and ASFV but did not disinfect CSFV at
the tested concentrations. As expected, the
surfactant sodium dodecylbenzene sulfonate was
ineffective against the nonenveloped FMDV.
A concentration of 1000 ppm sodium
hypochlorite applied for a 10-minute contact
time is an effective antiviral disinfectant on
stainless steel and polystyrene surfaces. Under
the same conditions, 2 percent citric acid is
effective against FMDV and ASFV.
This methodology enables standardized testing
of disinfectants against FAD viruses from
nonporous surfaces. Optimization of virus
recovery from wood is the focus of our current
research on porous surface disinfection. These
techniques will be used for testing disinfectants
against other high-priority FAD viruses on
porous and nonporous surfaces.
Question and Answer Period
• Was the percent recovery from the
neutralized disinfectants evaluated?
When conducting a disinfection assay, all
recovery controls were conducted with a
mixture of the disinfectant and neutralizing
agent. The values presented represent the
percent recovery from the mixture.
8.7 Destruction of Spores in a Bench-
Scale Landfill Flare System
Dana Wimsatt, EPA, NHSRC
Incinerators and hazardous waste landfills are
unlikely to be able to accept all the building
decontamination residual (BDR) from a large-
scale bioterrorism attack. As a result, BDR will
likely be sent to municipal solid waste landfills.
The concern with BDR disposal in these
landfills is that the BDR may contain viable
spores that can become reaerosolized in landfill
gas systems, pass through landfill gas flares, and
be emitted to the atmosphere. Therefore, it is
imperative to determine under what conditions
landfill gas flares will destroy these spores.
A bench-scale landfill flare system was
developed to study the behavior of Geobacillus
stearothermophilus spores, a surrogate for
Bacillus anthracis. In this system, spores in
solution are aerosolized using a collision
nebulizer. The aerosolized spores go through a
diffusion dryer and into a chamber where they
are mixed with nitrogen. An SKC Biosampler is
used to obtain a pre-flare spore concentration.
Methane is then introduced to the system to
create simulated landfill gas. This mixture enters
a flare housed in an open top Pyrex enclosure
with an integral stainless steel exhaust system.
The exhaust system with associated HEPA filter
and pump cools the exhaust, dilutes any released
methane with outside air, and collects remaining
spores in a second Biosampler to obtain a post-
flare spore concentration.
Information regarding the design of the flare
system, problems encountered, sampling
methods, spore losses throughout the system,
and preliminary spore destruction results will be
presented. Specific issues encountered include:
40
-------
drying of phosphate buffer saline that clogged
the Biosampler nozzles and decreased sampling
efficiency; flow limitations due to flare size; and
fluid breakthrough from the Biosampler into the
mass flow meter.
The reduction of G. Stearothermophilus spores
in this bench-scale landfill flare system will help
decision-makers recommend potential disposal
options.
Question and Answer Period
• Was evidence of destroyed spores found?
No evidence of destroyed spores was found.
• If the landfill gas was not flared, would a
hazard exist?
A researcher—Morton Barlaz—at North
Carolina State examined reaerosolization of
spores in building waste. He found that
spores could reaerosolize if building wastes
were placed in a situation where landfill gas
formed. Wimsatt thought that
reaerosolization was possible if the landfill
gas was not flared.
8.8 Development of an Aerosol
Deposition Method for Bacillus
Spores
Sang Don Lee, EPA, NHSRC
A method was developed to deposit Bacillus
spores onto various material surfaces for
biological decontamination and detection studies
using a metered dose inhaler (MDI). These
spores were deposited onto common indoor and
outdoor surfaces, and the deposition amount and
repeatability were measured. The MDI was
loaded with Bacillus subtilis spores (0.05 and
0.5 wt percent), which served as a surrogate for
Bacillus anthracis. A separate apparatus was
developed to reproducibly deposit spores from
an MDI onto surfaces of various sizes and
material types with control over the location and
amount deposited. Five different material
surfaces (aluminum, galvanized steel, wood,
carpet, and painted wallboard paper) were tested
for B. subtilis spore deposition. These tests
showed that more than 106 viable spores could
be deposited onto surfaces with less than a 50
percent coefficient of variation, depending on
the surface types. The current method can be
varied to produce the wide range of spore
deposition amounts from 105 to 10s spores per
cm2. Benchtop decontamination and detection
experiments will benefit from this spore particle
deposition method.
Question and Answer Period
Conference participants posed no questions at
the conclusion of the presentation.
41
-------
9 Radiological Recovery Research Activities
9.1 Simulated Cesium Radiological
Dispersal Devices for Deposition,
Dose, and Decontamination
Studies
Mark Sutton, Lawrence Livermore
National Laboratory
Nonradioactive cesium was explosively
dispersed to simulate a cesium-137 RDD.
Unique facilities at Lawrence Livermore
National Laboratory enabled indoor and outdoor
explosive testing combined with physical,
chemical, and dose-related analysis. Cesium
deposition and diffusion studies allowed dose to
be examined as a function of particle size
distribution, surface loading, distance from the
explosion, and depth of penetration into
concrete.
Sampled urban building material (particularly
relating to mass transit systems) and surrogates
were characterized using a full suite of chemical
and surface analyses. The samples were then
positioned in both vertical and horizontal planes
and explosively contaminated with stable solid
cesium chloride. Cesium deposition and
diffusion were measured using laser ablation
inductively coupled plasma mass spectrometry.
Cesium diffusion into concrete pores was
comparable with hydrated concrete, suggesting
that RH greatly affects diffusion. While urban
grime did not affect cesium speciation and
migration into surfaces, urban grime could
physically block or hinder transport below the
concrete surface. The presence of grime did not
chemically affect cesium speciation or mobility,
but results did show that grime could physically
hinder cesium transport to the concrete surface
below. We have studied the dose consequences
from deposited ground-shine, as well as the
reduction in dose with respect to both the
distance from ground-zero and the diffusion of
contaminants into concrete surfaces.
This work may aid in decision-making between
destructive and nondestructive decontamination
techniques to minimize residual dose
consequences during restoration-phase response
activities. In addition, by understanding the
contamination at the surface and below, we were
able to better understand the behavior of
selective chelating agents. Such decontamination
agents effectively bind radionuclides while
leaving infrastructure intact, resulting in more
rapid return-to-service, waste minimization, and
decreasing exposure times for decontamination
workers.
Question and Answer Period
• Specific chelators for cesium were not
mentioned. Is information about the modeled
chelators available for release?
Specific information regarding the chelators
is unavailable due to a pending patent
application.
• Are any cesium chelators available
commercially?
Sutton noted that cesium is difficult to
chelate. Some research has evaluated
sorbing cesium onto a material, but Sutton
did not have specific information about the
chelating material.
• Were particles larger than 10 microns
measured?
No particles larger than 10 microns were
measured.
• Was cesium diffusion through the concrete
expected at a pre-Manhattan Project
building?
Sutton indicated that the observed diffusion
was due to RH and not precipitation.
• When using a chelator, how much time was
needed for the chelator to penetrate 1
centimeter (cm) into the material and bind
with the cesium?
Time requirements depended on the
application method. Sutton noted that
42
-------
chelator medium also affected the time
requirements. For example, media that could
be pushed into the contaminated surface,
foams, or clay poultices to draw out
moisture more readily penetrated the
contaminated surface. Sutton noted that
drawing the chelators back out of the surface
was also necessary.
• Are any HotSpot data available?
Sutton did not have immediate access to
these data, but they are available.
9.2 EPA Spectral Photometric
Environmental Collection
Technology: Gamma Emergency
Mapper Project
John Cardarelli, EPA, Office of
Emergency Management
The EPA Airborne Spectral Photometric
Environmental Collection Technology
(ASPECT) program provides assistance to the
first responder by providing an aerial tool to
collect photographic, chemical, and physical
(infrared and gamma radiation) information
quickly and to relay this information directly to
decision-makers in the field. Since 2001,
ASPECT has assisted the response community
in over 100 incidents ranging from ammonia
releases to recent radiological deployments
supporting Region 2 and Region 6. The
ASPECT aircraft is located near Dallas, Texas,
and is "wheels-up" within one hour of
activation. Up to six 2-inch by 4-inch by 16-inch
Nal(Tl) detectors and two 3-inch by 3-inch
LaBr3(Ce) detectors are among the suite of
detectors mounted in the aircraft.
EPA initiated the ASPECT Gamma Emergency
Mapper (GEM) project in 2008 to improve
airborne gamma-screening and mapping
capability for ground-based gamma
contamination following a wide-area RDD,
fallout from an IND attack, or an effluent release
following a nuclear power plant disaster. This
essential asset can support Homeland Security in
events of national significance and assist EPA
with environmental surveys for potassium,
uranium, and thorium at Superfund sites. The
ASPECT GEM committee consists of members
from the EPA special teams, academia, Region
2, and the Department of Energy. This
presentation provides (1) the preliminary report
on at least one Superfund site in Region 2 and a
brief summary of a recent survey of abandoned
uranium mines in New Mexico (Region 6), (2)
specifics about the technology's radiological
(and chemical) detection capabilities, (3)
minimum detectable activities, and (4)
limitations.
Question and Answer Period
• DOE calibrated their systems by flying over
test ranges with known radiation levels at 1
meter above the surface. How did EPA
calibrate this system?
EPA followed the DOE flight patterns over
Lake Mohave near Las Vegas. EPA also
conducted tests at another lake bed. EPA
conducted pressurized ion chamber and soil
sample characterization at this site to
estimate background levels.
• Had EPA considered using a helicopter
instead of a plane?
Operating a plane was more cost-effective.
By flying over an area two or three times, a
fixed-wing plane achieved the same minimal
detectable activity as a helicopter.
9.3 Radiological Decontamination of
Urban Surfaces using Selective
Isotope-Sequestering Agents
Konstantin Voichek (presenting for
Pervez Azmi, Environment Canada,
Emergency Sciences and
Technology Section)
This study focused on the identification and
evaluation of sequestering agents that could be
used to improve the radiological
decontamination efficiency of an existing
commercial decontamination product. More
specifically, the work was performed to develop
a decontamination formulation that would be
effective for the removal of cesium, strontium,
and cobalt from a variety of common urban
surface materials.
43
-------
Several sequestering agents were selected for the
study, including polycarboxylic acids for cobalt
and strontium and ammonium salts and
ferrocyanides for cesium. Liquid-phase tests
were conducted first to determine binding
efficiencies of the sequestering agents towards
Cs, Sr, and Co. Based on results of these tests,
decontamination experiments on urban material
surfaces were conducted using material coupons
spiked with each target contaminant. Concrete,
painted steel, ceramic tile, dry wall, marble,
granite, anodized aluminum, and galvanized
steel were on the list of the tested surfaces. All
experiments were conducted using
nonradioactive surrogates. Analysis was
performed by inductively coupled plasma/mass
spectrometry. Test results revealed an improved
effectiveness when the sequestering agents were
added to the formulation. The next step in the
development of the product will be to perform
tests using radiological isotopes.
A benefit of this formulation is that it can be
incorporated into a commercial product used for
chemical and biological decontamination. The
resulting mixture can therefore be used to deal
with the chemical, biological, and radiological
agents at once.
Question and Answer Period
• How were the coupons prepared? Were
coupons treated with the isotope
surrogates? How long were contaminants
present on the coupon surface prior to
decontamination ?
The coupons consisted of urban materials in
5 cm by 5 cm squares. These coupons were
spiked with cesium, cobalt, and strontium
solutions in pre-determined concentrations.
Aqueous solutions were used for "wet"
contamination and methanol-based
suspensions were used to mimic "dry"
contamination. After a 24-hour drying
period, decontamination was performed.
Consistent with current surface
decontamination protocols for foam, the
foam remained in contact with the
contaminated surface for 30 minutes. The
coupons were rinsed with water and then
analyzed for contaminants. Volchek noted
that the effects of both the drying time and
the exposure time on decontamination
efficacy have been evaluated.
9.4 Performance Evaluation of
Decontamination Technologies
for Dirty Bomb Cleanup
John Drake, EPA, NHSRC
A primary EPA responsibility is cleaning up and
restoring urban areas affected after an accidental
or intentional release of radiological materials.
These releases could include terrorist incidents,
such as an RDD or "dirty bomb." To prepare for
such an event, EPA's NHSRC is conducting
performance evaluations of commercial, off-the-
shelf radiological decontamination technologies.
NHSRC's Technology Test and Evaluation
Program recently completed a series of
performance tests of five mechanical
technologies to gauge their effectiveness in the
removal of cesium from concrete. NHSRC is
now in the process of testing five chemical-
based technologies and is also evaluating the
efficacy of common household cleaners for
decontamination of surfaces typically found in
residential settings. The emphasis is on "low-
tech" methodologies, which tend to be simple,
low-cost, and easy to use, and can be transported
and deployed quickly, requiring only minimal
support services or infrastructure. The
experimental procedures used and the results of
the completed tests will be presented, as well as
a status report for two ongoing projects. The
results of these evaluations are also being made
available to the larger homeland security
community for use in developing cleanup
guidance and to support decisions concerning
the selection and use of decontamination
technologies for large outdoor environments
contaminated with specific radiological threat
agents.
For each evaluation, 15 cm x 15 cm unpainted
concrete coupons were contaminated with
cesium-137 at a level of approximately 1
microcurie per coupon, measured by gamma
spectroscopy, and then placed in a test stand
designed to hold nine coupons in a vertical
orientation to simulate the wall of a building.
44
-------
Each technology was applied to the wall, so that
each coupon was treated for approximately 15
seconds. The coupons were then removed from
the wall and the residual contamination was
measured.
The decontamination efficacy attained by each
technology was determined in terms of percent
of contaminant removed and decontamination
factor, which compares the surface
contamination measured before versus after
using the equipment.
Deployment-related parameters measured
included the rate at which the technologies can
be used to decontaminate a vertical surface,
level of production of secondary waste, the
effect of the technology on the texture or finish
of the concrete surface, and utility and operator
skill requirements. A limited evaluation of cross-
contamination was performed.
The decontamination factor for technologies
tested ranged from 1.6 to 41.0, with a
decontamination rate from 1 to 5 m2/hr. The
impact on the surface finish of the concrete
substrate ranged from "no impact" to
"noticeable roughness."
The work produced data that can be used by
response planners and operations personnel to
make scientifically informed decisions regarding
decontamination feasibility and methods.
Question and Answer Period
• Was resuspension from pressure washing
assessed? Were the device controls
sufficient to prevent contaminant migration
to clean wall surfaces?
The study included control coupons,
including blank coupons for assessing cross-
contamination. Little cross-contamination
was observed on the blank coupons.
• Was redeposition of radionuclides on the
ground surface considered?
No data were included in the report.
However, swipe samples were collected
during tent decontamination, which occurred
between the different technology tests.
• Did the vacuum hoses become hot?
The vacuum collection vessels, but not the
hoses, became hot. Drake indicated that this
was an operational consideration.
• How was the exhaust air from the vacuum
treated?
A cascade of HEPA filters was used to treat
the exhaust air. Drake indicated that these
filters were effective.
• How long did the contamination remain on
the coupons prior to decontamination?
A study of the residence time for cesium
chloride applied by wet deposition reported
no measurable difference in
decontamination efficacy between seven and
28 days. This study used a seven-day
residence time.
• Were environmental conditions controlled?
Testing was conducted in a dry climate. The
coupons were kept at a known temperature
and RH throughout the process.
• Were publicly available cleaners (i.e.,
cleaners that could be purchased at a
grocery store or hardware store) evaluated?
Studies of publicly available cleaners are
beginning, said Drake. These studies aim to
inform the public about actions they can
take to minimize exposure when they return
to their homes.
• Have discussions about scaling up these
technologies occurred? For example,
automation might make the technologies
available for cleaning a large building.
Current application rates are not acceptable
for implementing these technologies in a
real-world RDD response. Drake indicated
that more information is needed before these
technologies can be scaled up.
45
-------
9.5 The Evolution of Radiological
Decontamination at DRDC Ottawa
Marc Desrosiers, Defense Research
and Development Canada
Defence Research and Development Canada
(DRDC) Ottawa has been involved in
radiological decontamination operation and
research for several years for the Canadian
Forces. We are now using our expertise and
unique facilities to investigate the problem of
large-area contamination that could be a result of
an RDD; the lessons learned in this research on
either the civilian or the military side can be
beneficial to either, due to the similarity of the
problems.
DRDC Ottawa, with its partners, has continued
to develop procedures, techniques, and testing
protocols for simulating various situations faced
during radiological decontamination. The work
started with radiologically-contaminated liquid
solutions and small test plates and progressed to
larger test plates and structures (vehicles and
houses) and the use of fine (respirable) dry
particles. The progression and use of the
different contaminants is shown through a
description of the following experiments:
military vehicle decontamination, urban
decontamination, absolute decontamination
efficacy, "Little House in the Prairie," and
decontamination of sensitive Canadian military
equipment.
During the progression of these experiments,
DRDC Ottawa has continued to develop its
procedures for processing (grinding and
separation based on particle size), contaminating
(contamination of test plates), and detecting
(surface vs. subsurface) a variety of short-half-
life radioisotopes.
This work may lead to new decontamination
techniques, optimization of existing techniques,
and development of new modeling tools such as
the Decontamination Decision Tool to support
the Canadian Forces in choosing the best
approach for decontamination in the field. (This
tool is also proposed to be used by first
responders and to be expanded to serve as a
radiological assessment tool.)
The above work is leading to a databank of
information on contaminated environments and
factors that can affect radiological cleanup.
DRDC Ottawa is using this information to
support a variety of projects and initiatives, such
as the Canadian Forces decontamination project
team and RDD contamination Interaction with
Urban Surfaces CRTI projects.
Question and Answer Period
• A participant asked if the data regarding
contaminant residence time are available.
Contaminant residence time was examined.
Desrosiers indicated that he would provide
these data to this participant.
• Would follow-on work consider waste
generation concerns?
Waste generation was not considered for this
study, but follow-on work planned to
examine waste generation. Desrosiers noted
that, based on mission objectives, waste
generation was typically not as important to
the military. When creating a tool for first
responders in a civilian population, waste
generation is a consideration.
9.6 Persistence of Surrogate
Radioisotopes on Drinking Water
Infrastructure and the
Effectiveness of Decontamination
Methods
Jeff Szabo, EPA, NHSRC
The persistence of cesium, cobalt, and strontium
on common drinking water infrastructure has not
been thoroughly examined. Furthermore, it is
unknown whether these compounds can be
decontaminated if they do persist. Therefore,
bench-scale research was undertaken to
understand how surrogate isotopes for cesium,
strontium, and cobalt associate with drinking
water pipe material. Mechanisms of attachment
and the efficiency of decontamination methods
were examined.
Drinking water infrastructure surfaces were
conditioned in biofilm annular reactors with
Cincinnati tap water. Unlined iron coupons were
46
-------
allowed to corrode before contact with the
surrogate isotopes. Surrogate cesium, cobalt, and
strontium solutions were pulse-injected and
allowed to contact the coupons for one hour. The
reactors were flushed and coupon samples were
harvested over the next month to establish
persistence. Coupon and bulk phase samples
were analyzed with inductively coupled plasma.
If persistence was observed, decontamination
was undertaken with methods such as flushing,
increasing disinfectant levels, and changing
water quality parameters.
Cesium was not detected on the coupons, but
cobalt formed an insoluble precipitate which
was difficult to decontaminate. Lowering pH
was the only method that resulted in significant
decontamination, but lowering pH also dissolved
some of the pipe scale. Strontium was observed
to persist on corroded iron, but the mechanisms
at work and decontamination methods are still
being determined. Strontium experiments will be
completed in August 2010.
Cesium persistence on the iron coupons was not
observed, but cobalt formed an insoluble
precipitate that was difficult to remove.
Strontium experiments are ongoing, but
association with iron coupons has been
observed. Persistence on cement-lined material,
which is another common form of drinking
water infrastructure, will be examined in the
future.
This work is significant because the persistence
of radioisotopes on drinking water infrastructure
needs to be well understood, so that
decontamination techniques can be formulated
in the event of contamination.
Question and Answer Period
• Did the study consider a range of pHs for
removing the cobalt from the coupons?
Decontamination experiments were
conducted at high and low pH, but cobalt
was removed only at a low pH.
• A participant noted that removing the
coupons from the biofilm reactor changed
the oxidation environment. How was this
change addressed?
Szabo noted that drinking water with a
disinfectant present provides a stronger
oxidative environment than air, but air
contact could not be completely avoided.
Szabo minimized contact with air as much
as possible during sample transport and
storage.
• Was cesium adherence to silt considered?
A great deal of literature regarding cesium
adherence to silt is available from sources
such as DOE. For example, studies have
examined cesium in ground water and its
association with clays and silts. Szabo was
interested in cement-lined pipes because
similarities between adherence in pipes and
ground water are possible.
9.7 Evaluating Cesium Contamination
of Urban Building Materials: Two
Instrumental Approaches
Julia Barzyk, EPA, NHSRC
Cesium contamination is an issue after nuclear
power plant accidents, RDD events, and IND
events. We are conducting a series of
experiments to investigate the interactions of
cesium chloride with a variety of urban surface
materials. A potential method of
decontamination will also be evaluated.
Radioactive cesium is used in medicine and
industry. Our work uses stable cesium-133 in the
form of cesium chloride to contaminate
powdered building material samples such as
concrete, asphalt, brick, and limestone.
Questions of interest are: (1) Is the nature of
contamination acquired on each material time-
dependent? (2) What are the mechanisms of
cesium adsorption to surface materials? (3) Is
rinsing contaminated materials with water an
effective method of decontamination?
Powdered building material of each variety will
be suspended in a solution of 0.05M cesium
chloride for one-day, one-week, five-week, and
10-week time intervals before separation by
filtration. Additionally, a portion of each of the
10-week samples will be rinsed with water. All
47
-------
resulting samples will be analyzed using time-
of-flight secondary ionization mass spectrometry
(TOF-SIMS). This technique allows the relative
quantification of cesium concentrations among
samples. Supporting data may be collected using
x-ray photoelectron spectroscopy (XPS), which
provides information on the bonding status of
cesium in material samples. Because powdered
samples can be analyzed on both TOF-SIMS and
XPS, no processing of the samples after
equilibration and separation is required.
Completion of this work will provide
information directly relevant to decision-making
regarding cesium contamination such as the
effects of material type and time on the
magnitude and nature of cesium contamination
and the effectiveness of water decontamination.
Question and Answer Period
• A participant noted that Barzyk had
described adsorption by mass, for example,
milligrams of cesium per kilogram of
crushed brick. In real-world
decontamination events, adsorption is based
on surface area. How does adsorption
expressed as a mass relate to adsorption
expressed as a surface area? For example,
what is the surface area associated with 1
gram of powdered brick?
Barzyk prepared samples by crushing the
materials to create a powder and then
passing the powder through a series of
sieves. This process generated uniform
samples with similar surface areas and
allowed for comparison of cesium
adsorption across materials. The powder
form reduced mass transfer impacts and
allowed Barzyk to focus on chemical
reactions. A participant added that surface
area is an important factor in cesium
adsorption, but this study focused on the
differences in cesium bonding based on
chemical reactions rather than differences in
surface area.
9.8 Impact of RDD Decontamination
Strategies on Quantities and
Characteristics of Resulting
Waste and Debris
Paul Lemieux, EPA, NHSRC
Determining waste characteristics and disposal
pathways for waste and debris resulting from an
RDD and subsequent waste management
activities will probably contribute a significant
portion of the overall remediation effort in terms
of time and costs. Selected decontamination
techniques, whether they involve chemical
treatment, strippable coatings, abrasive removal,
or aqueous washing will influence the amount
and types of waste generated and the rate at
which the waste is generated. The aim of this
effort is to examine the effect of mitigation
decisions on waste disposal activities.
This presentation describes a methodology to
develop a waste inventory based on
commercially available Geographical
Information System software, overhead satellite
imagery analysis, and a spreadsheet tool that
allows the impact of different decontamination
approaches on resulting waste quantities to be
investigated. Based on the aforementioned waste
estimation methodology, a sensitivity analysis
shows the impacts of decontamination strategies
on waste quantities and characteristics.
The ultimate goal of this effort is to provide a
simplified framework that could be used in the
early stages of an RDD response so that an
integrated decision-making approach that
includes both decontamination and disposal
considerations can be used to formulate
remediation strategies.
Question and Answer Period
• A participant noted that the study did not
include a cleanup level. This participant
suggested that Lemieux consider cleanup
levels in the analysis. As previously
mentioned during the conference, cleanup
levels are a substantial factor in determining
decontamination costs. Using a cleanup
level approach, Lemieux could assume that
some material with low-level contamination
would remain in place, which would reduce
disposal costs.
48
-------
• The cost information considered only
disposal costs, and not transportation costs.
A participant noted the importance of
transportation when comparing disposal
costs at a Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act (RCRA) facility to disposal
costs at a local facility. Adding
transportation costs could double or triple
the overall disposal costs. This participant
thought that including transportation costs
in estimates would provide useful
information.
Lemieux agreed and noted that the disparity
between RCRA disposal costs and low-level
waste disposal costs is due to the range of
activities required for addressing different
types of waste.
• A participant noted that Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC) requirements drove
clean-up costs associated with radiological
wastes. Recently, NRC began evaluating
blended waste streams based on limitations
associated with low-level radioactive waste
sites. This step, felt the participant,
represented NRC's recognition of the need
to evaluate more options for radiological
waste disposal.
9.9 Treatment of Liquid Wastes from
Radiological Decontamination
Konstantin Volchek, Environment
Canada
The decontamination of soil, water, or buildings
following either an industrial accident or
sabotage involving hazardous CBRN agents
usually results in the generation of contaminated
wastes. Many of the decontamination
technologies currently available use water-based
formulations. The volumes of wastewater can be
quite large. These wastewaters may contain
residual toxic agents, their degradation
byproducts (which may also be toxic),
surfactants, suspended solids, and other
materials that may not be suitable for discharge
into the environment. This situation would
normally require transportation of the
wastewater to an offsite treatment facility. The
transportation of large volumes of hazardous
liquid waste has inherent risks and expenses.
The larger the volume of the wastewater, the
greater the factors associated with offsite
treatment. The goal of this study was to
investigate the feasibility of an onsite
concentration of liquid decontamination wastes
to reduce the volume and make transportation
for final treatment or disposal easier.
The authors conducted a series of tests for the
removal of radionuclide and other hazardous
components from liquid decontamination
wastes. A combined membrane
filtration/adsorption process was shown to be
effective in treating waste streams containing
various contaminants. Based on test results, a
mobile treatment process was developed.
Process performance is discussed and
recommendations for future development are
given.
An alternative to offsite treatment would be to
process the wastes on site using mobile
treatment systems. Such systems would
concentrate the contaminants of liquid wastes
and minimize waste volumes.
The logistics of reducing the volume of
wastewater generated from CBRN
decontamination activities using a mobile on-site
process has been shown to be feasible. The
reduced volume of wastewater ensures safer
transport to the final waste treatment facility and
decreases final disposal costs.
Question and Answer Period
• What throughput could be achieved with
these membranes?
Volchek noted that the membranes had large
pore sizes. He recorded a throughput of up
to 250 liters per square meter per hour. At
this rate, a 2 m2 membrane would have a
throughput of approximately 0.5 cubic
meters (m3) of mechanically pretreated
water per hour. Much lower throughputs
would occur with untreated water.
• For the surfactant technology, detectors are
needed to monitor changing isotope
49
-------
concentrations in water and to allow for
adjustments in the surfactant flow to meet
these changes. Does this type of
sophisticated detector exist?
This study did not evaluate techniques to
detect isotope concentrations and adjust
surfactant flow accordingly. Rather, data
were available to determine how much
rejection was expected at given surfactant
levels and optimize the system. For
example, if the optimal surfactant level was
1 to 2 grams, but only 0.5 grams were
present, then surfactant could be added to
the system to achieve optimal conditions.
Volchek felt that future research could
evaluate the use of modeling and detection
technologies to select optimal surfactant
concentrations
50
-------
10 Operational Considerations for Decontamination
10.1 Impact of CT and Relative
Humidity on Efficacy and Material
Effects of Chlorine Dioxide
John Y. Mason, Sabre Technical
Services, LLC
Historical research has shown that achieving and
maintaining 75 percent RH is critical for the
effectiveness of chlorine dioxide gas against
spore-forming microorganisms when
decontaminating structures. Although chlorine
dioxide is considered by many to be the standard
for decontamination of structures, achievement
of this parameter can be difficult and has been
associated with corrosive effects on certain
steels and soft metals. The objective of this work
was to evaluate whether RH can be lowered
without impacting the sporicidal effectiveness of
chlorine dioxide gas and to evaluate any
associated corrosive effects.
Exposure studies were conducted in a laboratory
chamber capable of maintaining target RH and
chlorine dioxide levels, as well as during 10 full-
scale building decontaminations. RH conditions
were measured throughout the duration of each
exposure by HOBO® Model U12-011
temperature and RH data loggers manufactured
by Onset Computer Corporation. Chlorine
dioxide levels were monitored by a gas sample
collection method that is a modification of
OSHA Method ID-202 and a titration method
that is a modification of Method 4500-C102-E
APHA.AWWA from Standard Methods for
Water and Wastewater, 20th edition. Sporicidal
efficacy was evaluated using commercially-
produced Bacillus atrophaeus spore strips,
environmental antimicrobial efficacy was
evaluated using drywall coupons with bacteria
embedded in the gypsum core, and material
effects on corrosion coupons were evaluated
qualitatively and quantitatively via visual
inspection and gravimetric analysis.
A series of exposure studies showed that as RH
levels decrease, the CT needed in order to reach
100 percent sporicidal efficacy increased
following a second order polynomial standard
curve. At the lowest RH level tested (45 percent
RH), 100 percent kill of spore strips and
embedded environmental vegetative organisms
was achieved at a CT of 12,000 ppmv-hours.
Corrosion effects were found to be independent
of CT but RH-dependent. At RH values of less
than 48 percent, corrosion was not observed on
even the most sensitive test samples at CT
values exceeding 12,000 ppmv-hours. The
demonstrated ability to decontaminate buildings
at RH levels below 48 percent with no
observable corrosive effects broadens the
applicability of chlorine dioxide gas as a
sterilant or decontaminant.
Question and Answer Period
• There is a strong push to remove and
replace drywalls in homes. Is fumigation an
option?
Only a few people believe that bacteria are
an issue. Mason noted several conditions
pointing to bacteria as a possible source:
calcium sulfate, organic matter, increased
biogenic gas concentrations with increased
RH and temperature, and findings in
cultured samples. Mason is working to
gather evidence supporting a bacterial
source.
• Mason noted that Sabre was working on a
project at an approximately 250,000-square-
foot condominium complex with roughly
200 units. Removal and replacement of the
drywall would require an estimated 2.5
years. For comparison, Sabre fumigated and
repopulated a hospital in less than 10 days.
• A participant noted that Mason had
presented data on the efficacy of a lower RH
and an increased CT on bacteria in drywall.
What is the applicability of a lower RH and
increased CT to spores? Has standard
testing been conducted?
51
-------
Mason has not tested a low RH and
increased CT approach to decontaminating
spores. He noted that others have conducted
low RH testing.
• Sabre is working on a prototype system that
could fumigate a 5 million cubic foot
structure. Do those 5 million cubic feet
assume a big, box-shaped building or a
more complex building with many small
spaces (e.g., office, hotel)?
This technology applies to more complex
spaces, such as apartment buildings. Mason
referred to a Sabre project at a six-story
condominium complex with roughly 200
units and many small spaces. The piping and
electrical trains also required treatment,
which added to the complexity of the
project. Sabre is also working on a project at
a 47-story condominium complex.
• Did the costs presented include waste
management and disposal?
The type of response influences the waste
management and disposal costs. A virulent
pathogen is handled differently than
bacteria, Mason noted. When working in
private homes, people have valuable
belongings that must be recovered.
However, impacts to porous materials are
unpredictable. Valuables are removed from
homes and treated outside, a labor-intensive
process. For virulent pathogens, removal is
unnecessary because treatment damages
materials one way or another. Mason noted
that Sabre has achieved a CT of 100,000 in a
75,000-cubic-foot structure. Accordingly, he
felt, chlorine dioxide fumigation of
weaponized spores is plausible.
10.2 Methodology for Quantitative
Analysis of the Impact of
Decontamination on Electronic
Equipment
G.E. Derkits, Alcatel-Lucent
Principal goals of the work at Alcatel-Lucent
were to introduce reproducibility, quantitative
methods, and traceability into the study of
decontamination impacts on electronic
equipment, in order to provide objective
information to the agencies of the U.S.
government responsible for decontamination
oversight.
The methods used were adapted from best
practices in the field of electronic and
telecommunication system environmental
testing. Specific methods applied to this
investigation included:
• Standard test vehicles. Personal computers
were chosen as test vehicles because they
are highly standardized. High competition
among computer vendors provides up-to-
date technology and well-characterized
equipment. Low unit cost allows an
experiment to use enough replicates to
reduce the effects of random variation.
Standard industry software is available to
precisely characterize hardware failures.
• Quantitative correlative information. The
use of pure metal coupon process monitors
was adapted from ASTM standard test
methods for calibrating mixed flowing gas
test chambers for environmental testing of
electronic equipment. The materials of the
coupons are source-traceable. The effect of
each exposure was measured by the weight
gain of coupons of aluminum, copper, tin,
and silver using a precision microbalance
calibrated using National Institute of
Standards and Technology-traceable
methods and a reproducibility and
repeatability study. The corrosion mass gain
of the coupons was then used as a
quantitative measure of the harshness of
exposure conditions that could be related to
a figure of merit derived from chamber test
conditions.
• Quantitative failure data. Objective
assessment of system failure was performed
using industry standard PC Doctor®
software, which applies software-driven
tests to each subsystem of the PC to define
"failure." Use of this software replaces a
subjective opinion with a reproducible
objective datum: "Pass = 0" or "Fail = 1."
52
-------
• Replacing visual inspection with high-
resolution photographs of a pre-specified set
of test points covering major subsystems and
the full span of relevant materials allowed
an objective visual comparison from unit to
unit and throughout the test duration. For
some degradation modes, such as cut-edge
corrosion, this practice also resulted in
quantitative information, as the position of
the edge of the corrosion pattern with
respect to the stamped metal edge can be
measured and the degree of corrosion over
time can be compared with the results of
similar images of samples exposed to more
typical harsh environments such as salt-fog
tests.
• Damage progression was quantitatively
assessed by performing the PC Doctor® test
protocol repeatedly at regular intervals over
an extended period of time to gauge the
repeatability of the assessment and to look
for progressive degradation, which is known
to occur in corrosion. The number of failed
tests per month was tracked over six months
after the exposure; it was shown, in the case
of chlorine dioxide decontamination, to be a
monotonically increasing function of time,
with a slope related to the harshness of the
exposure represented as a figure of merit
equal to the concentration of chlorine
dioxide multiplied by the exposure time and
the RH or, alternatively, to the coupon mass
gain.
• Root cause analysis was adapted from
industry protocols. In our method, a
complete destructive physical analysis of
failed subunits down to the materials level
was performed to establish the root cause of
failure.
The adoption of standard industrial practices for
environmental reliability studies to assess the
impact of decontamination using chlorine
dioxide and hydrogen peroxide has resulted in a
set of data and conclusions that can be
quantified and are demonstrably repeatable and
objective.
This work provides a description of the
methodology used to create a quantifiable
objective assessment of the impact of biological
agent decontamination on electronic equipment.
Until this study, the results in this field were
qualitative and subjective. We have advanced
the state of art of biodecontamination studies
and improved the quality of information used by
U.S. government agencies for the evaluation of
fiimigant technologies.
Question and Answer Period
• Were smaller test volumes considered, for
example testing circuit boards rather than
whole computers?
For this study, Derkits wanted to evaluate a
whole system. The metal coupon testing
conducted as part of this study provided
more detailed information. In addition, PC
Doctor® software was available for the
whole system to identify failure points.
Derkits also collected data regarding
specific subsections on a circuit board. For
example, chlorine dioxide at a high RH
strongly attacked tin-based solder. Derkits
stated that a great deal of detailed data
existed, so he was more interested in the
larger issues.
• To what extent did just-in-time
manufacturing impact the study variables
and results?
Just-in-time manufacturing meant that Dell
received deliveries from different vendors,
each of which used different designs. For
example, one of the DVD players evaluated
was clearly designed differently than the
others, even though all the test computers
were ordered together. However, the basic
form was similar regardless of design, so the
impacts of these design differences were
smaller than might be expected. A
participant noted that 2,700 Dell computers
delivered to a hospital in a single shipment
included a number of design differences.
• Will future work include power-off
conditions to prevent thermals?
The experiments reported included both
power-off and power-on conditions. Derkits
53
-------
agreed that power-off is a more controlled
state and recommended turning off
electronics during practical fumigations. He
noted that the computers turned themselves
off for a number of uncontrollable reasons
(e.g., different thermal detectors, various
subsystems).
10.3 Assessment of the Impact of CI02
and H202 Decontamination on
Electronic Equipment
M.L. Mandich, Alcatel-Lucent
DHS's Science and Technology Directorate and
the Environmental Protection Agency's National
Homeland Security Research Center are
interested in the effects of decontamination
technologies on electronic equipment under
multiple fumigation conditions. This work
provides extensive information on the impact of
fumigation with chlorine dioxide (C102) or
hydrogen peroxide (H202) on prototypical
complex electronic equipment.
Test vehicles consisting of Dell computers and
exposure coupons were subjected to chlorine
dioxide and hydrogen peroxide vapor using an
exposure test matrix designed to investigate the
effects of CT, RH, and equipment power state
under conditions suitable for each fumigation
technology. This test matrix included two
different hydrogen peroxide technologies—
STERIS VHP® and BIOQUELL HPV—plus
gaseous chlorine dioxide generated using a
ClorDiSys Solutions Inc. gas generation system.
Test vehicles exposed to both chlorine dioxide
and hydrogen peroxide exhibited fumigation-
induced degradation at the system and
subsystem level. Results of post-exposure
performance monitoring using objective
pass/fail criteria showed that the number of hard
and intermittent failures increased over a
timeframe of months following fumigation.
Visual inspection revealed corrosion of multiple
materials, including aluminum, steel, silver, and
plated copper, as well as bleaching of cables and
extensive particulate formation in chlorine
dioxide-exposed computers. Hygroscopic
corrosion products were formed, posing both
immediate and long-term reliability problems.
No obvious corrosion was observed visually for
the hydrogen peroxide-fumigated computers.
For chlorine dioxide, there was a marked
correlation of the extent of damage with CT and
RH conditions. Very high humidity conditions
(> 85 percent RH), outside of normal use for
chlorine dioxide fumigation, were particularly
deleterious.
Extensive failure mode analyses were performed
for observed subsystem failures, especially those
associated with connectors and optical disk
drives. These failure mode analyses revealed: (1)
many gold-plated connectors were heavily
corroded as a result of chlorine dioxide
decontamination, and (2) both fumigants,
particularly hydrogen peroxide, caused
deleterious damage to passive optics, especially
those fabricated with plastic optical materials. In
both examples, the use of COT components in
the test computers contributed to their
vulnerability to fumigation.
Significant, in-depth data are now available on
the impact of chlorine dioxide and hydrogen
peroxide fumigation on electronic equipment.
Both fumigants caused damage that was
observed to have deleterious short- and long-
term effects on hardware performance, as well
as on the reliability of key components. This
damage was observed under normal-use
conditions for both fumigants; however, the
most significant impact was seen for harsher
chlorine dioxide fumigation conditions. On this
basis, chlorine dioxide fumigation in >75
percent RH conditions should be avoided,
provided biological agent kill can be achieved.
Material choices used in these test computers
were a significant reason for the extent of
fumigation-induced damage. In many cases,
these choices are made for cost-saving reasons
in the COT market.
This work provides an objective assessment of
chlorine dioxide and hydrogen peroxide
fumigation-induced damage of electrical
components, materials, and subsystems typical
of complex electronic equipment. These results
can be used to estimate potential outcomes in a
field decontamination scenario for equipment
such as computers, telecommunications
54
-------
equipment, and data servers, as well as civilian
and military equipment using complex electrical
and optical components. The results also can be
used to guide material, design, and fabrication
choices for electronic equipment where
robustness to harsh fumigants is required.
Question and Answer Period
• What scrubbing agent was used for the
chlorine dioxide?
EPA conducted the scrubbing and could
provide this information.
• Based on the reported results, a participant
suggested adding data recovery as a step in
the decontamination. This participant also
suggested disposing of electronic equipment
as an e-waste stream.
• Hard drive failures were not mentioned.
Were data stored on hard drives
recoverable?
Some hard drive failures were found five to
seven months after fumigation. The failures
tended to occur in areas where data were
stored. Frequent use areas on the drive were
more susceptible to failure.
• What technology was used to generate
chlorine dioxide? Was free chlorine
measured?
A ClorDiSys system generated the chlorine
dioxide. Monitoring for chlorine gas
occurred. No detections were reported.
• Were some of the plastic polymers more
susceptible to the fumigants than others?
Reverse-engineering the plastics and
evaluating their susceptibility was beyond
the project scope. Mandich noted that the
optical plastics industry uses a large number
of different plastics, so differences in
susceptibility to fumigants are a concern.
Mandich speculated that the type of plastic
would influence susceptibility.
• Have research findings been compared to
results from real-world fumigations events?
Mandich did not have information regarding
equipment impacts observed after
fumigation. A participant noted that a paper
has been published regarding hydrogen
peroxide and chlorine dioxide exposures in a
pharmaceutical plant. EPA's Office of
Pesticide Programs allows restricted access
to this paper.
• Limited anecdotal data are available
regarding equipment operation in postal
facilities after decontamination, noted a
participant. In Trenton, the mail-sorting
equipment was replaced and the damage
from fumigation was compared to exposure
to sea salt. The participant noted that
computers are easily replaced, but postal
facilities and hospitals contain high-value
equipment. How is this equipment
protected?
In the telecommunications industry,
equipment has a 20- to 25-year life
expectancy. Some conditions hasten failure
(e.g., high sulfur, sea salt). This study found
highly accelerated degradation conditions
associated with fumigation, even compared
to high sulfur and sea salt environments. To
Alcatel-Lucent, these findings raised
important concerns for infrastructure
preparedness. Mandich noted that the
fumigants essentially created highly
accelerated stress tests.
55
-------
11 Chemical Warfare Agent Recovery Research
11.1 Evaluating Strategies for CWA
Decontamination of Indoor
Facilities
Adam H. Love, Consultant to
Lawrence Livermore National
Laboratory
Executing an efficient restoration and recovery
process after a civilian facility is contaminated
with a chemical warfare agent (CWA) requires
understanding the full range of decontamination
strategies and where these strategies are
expected to be most effective. As part of a DHS-
funded effort to improve the preparedness for
facility restoration after a chemical release, a
range of relevant decontamination strategies has
been evaluated experimentally for surfaces
contaminated by vapor and/or liquid sarin (GB),
mustard agents (HD), and VX.
Experiments at Lawrence Livermore National
Laboratory have applied actual CWA to surfaces
at controlled-vapor or liquid-surface loading and
then measured the residual contamination
following a series of different decontamination
approaches on a selection of typical indoor
surfaces. Volumetric decontamination
approaches evaluated utilized both hot air
ventilation and hot/humid air ventilation. Liquid
and foam decontaminant surface treatments
(bleach, DF-200, CASCAD, and DeconGreen)
were evaluated for their ability to reduce the
residual surface contamination. Control
experiments with no active decontamination
were also performed to evaluate the relative
benefit of the decontamination strategies versus
the no treatment option.
While each of the decontamination strategies is
effective under some specific conditions, there is
no one universal decontamination approach that
is effective and efficient for the entire facility
restoration process. Therefore, an efficient
facility restoration will likely employ a range of
decontamination strategies based on an
understanding of agent/substrate interaction and
the efficacy of the decontamination approaches
for the event-specific contamination conditions.
Improving the understanding of the efficacy of
various decontamination strategies for a range of
indoor materials greatly facilitates the
restoration process by:
• Identifying materials that are easily
decontaminated.
• Identifying materials that should be
removed.
• Determining the most appropriate
decontamination approach for the
contamination scenario and agent/material
combination.
• Understanding what is necessary for waste
disposal.
Applying this information to a well-organized
and thoughtful Remediation Action Plan enables
a more rapid and economical facility restoration.
Question and Answer Period
• Were tests conducted for agents that entered
the material surface, but were released
weeks later?
Love noted that polymer diffusion generally
followed a pattern of penetration and slow
release. The liquids placed on a material
surface penetrated the polymer. A two-phase
diffusion process then occurred. In the first
phase, the liquid near the surface was
released. The second phase included the
diffusion-limited release of the agent that
had penetrated further into the polymer.
• What was the extraction process?
Love covered the coupons with a methylene
chloride solution, then sonicated the coupon
and solution for 15 minutes.
56
-------
11.2 Test Methodology for the
Assessment of Chemical Warfare
Agent Decontamination
Performance on Porous or
Complex Surfaces
Paul Brister, Clean Earth
Technologies, LLC
Currently, there are no accepted methods
available to test CWA decontaminant
performance on porous materials. Conventional
panel (surface) methods typically assess either
contact or vapor hazards post-decontamination
and provide information on the effectiveness of
the application method rather than the efficacy
of a particular decontaminant. Current panel
testing methods need to be improved to allow
the best achievable result, providing a better
understanding of parameters that affect
decontamination performance on varying
surfaces, particularly porous or complex
surfaces.
Clean Earth Technologies, LLC, has developed
a chemical testing methodology for the
assessment of decontaminant performance on
porous or complex surfaces. The presented
method introduces a new approach for
evaluating decontaminant performance on
porous materials. The method can be used in
parallel with conventional testing methodology
(e.g., stirred reactor or panel testing) or used
independently to assess performance on porous
or complex surfaces. The design of the
experiment gives "best case" efficacy data for a
decontaminant, which will provide aid in
selection of decontaminants for a given
scenario/surface or give baseline, or best
achievable, data for CONOPS development. The
method was designed to control variables to
ensure that decontamination
performance/efficacy is the dependent variable.
Control of variables is achieved by eliminating
the dependence of critical parameters such as
decontamination loading rates and challenge
levels and focusing on decontamination
performance parameters (penetration and
neutralization rates).
Experimental data showed that conventional
decontamination application rates are not
sufficient for removal of CWAs from porous
materials, due to varying localized
concentrations of contaminant (high challenge
levels). The new method eliminates this variable
by supplying the decontaminant in excess,
allowing a determination of how a
decontaminant penetrates and neutralizes a
challenge. The presented method was tested
against varying porosities, materials,
decontaminants, chemical simulants, and agents,
and at varying reaction times. Those data and
subsequent conclusions will be presented.
By providing scientifically defensible test
methodology to quantitatively evaluate CWA
decontaminant efficacy on porous surfaces, the
end user is in a better position to compare
products and processes, resulting in more
efficient testing, easier data interpretation for the
user, and lower cost.
Question and Answer Period
• A participant asked for clarification about
decontaminant- versus diffusion-limited
reactions, as described by Brister. This
participant thought that reactions occurring
in the stir reactor were decontaminant-
limited.
Brister agreed that reactions occurring in the
stir reactor were not diffusion limited.
Brister and the participant disagreed that
slow reductions after a single application of
the decontaminant represented a diffusion-
limited reaction and more rapid reductions
after multiple decontaminant applications
represented decontaminant-limited
reactions.
11.3 Basic Research Needs in
Decontamination
Jennifer Becker, U. S. Army
Research Office
The battlefield environment is highly complex
and diverse, and the war fighter needs integrated
protection from chemical hazards—chemical
and biological warfare agents as well as
common hazardous chemicals, which might
include combustion products, radioactive
materials, and heavy metals. Innovative research
57
-------
concepts combined with novel procedures in
many different areas of chemical and biological
defense and decontamination can be leveraged
to provide new capabilities for protecting the
war fighter and first responder. For years the
Army and DOD have invested in fundamental
research in catalysis, surface chemistry, and
organized assemblies. The goal of the Army
Research Office's Organic and Inorganic
Chemistry program is to seed scientific and far-
reaching technological discoveries in chemistry
that enhance Army and DOD capabilities. The
program has a balance of opportunity-driven
research and needs-based research focused on
the development of a molecular-level
understanding of catalytic reactions,
fiinctionalized surfaces, and organized
assemblies that will provide the foundation for
creating new materials and processes to protect
the soldier from hazardous chemicals and
materials. This research has led to the
development of new catalysts for destruction of
hazardous materials, an understanding of
reaction mechanisms on surfaces, and novel
colloids and assemblies for decontamination.
Recent work has also focused on the
development of multi-functional, biomimetic,
and higher-ordered materials. These research
investments in fundamental science have led to
novel biotechnology-based and nanotechnology-
based materials that are now being investigated
in chemical and biological defense research
programs. The new technologies and lessons
learned can be used to design revolutionary new
capabilities.
An overview of current basic research programs
in decontamination and transitions of basic
research efforts will be described.
Question and Answer Period
Participants posed no questions.
11.4 Knockdown and Neutralization of
Aerosolized Chemical Agent
Simulants using Charged
Decontaminant Sprays
Rita Betty, Sandia National
Laboratory
The purpose of this work was to demonstrate
rapid, effective knockdown and neutralization of
CWA simulant aerosol releases using
electrostatically-charged decontaminant sprays,
and to explore and optimize spray system
parameters that will improve aerosolized CWA
simulant knockdown and neutralization.
Modeling of threat agent release conditions has
produced a comprehensive understanding of
airborne threat vapor/particle distribution and
concentrations and particle fallout over time.
Potential airborne exposure levels can be
compared to target safe exposure levels to
determine orders of magnitude reduction in
initial threat agent exposure level required to
attain safe exposure levels, i.e., required
neutralization efficacy.
Aerosolized test method: A 14.5-cubic-meter
aerosol test chamber is filled with aerosolized
chemical/biological warfare agent simulant for
long enough to achieve airborne aerosol
concentrations at customer-defined threat
densities. Aerosol samples are collected
throughout the simulant charging process, using
aerosol samplers (impingers) with iso-octane as
the collection medium. An electrostatically
charged DF-200 spray is deployed for a set
duration—one or two minutes—using pre-
determined spray system parameters such as
nozzle air pressure, liquid pressure, etc. Test
spray parameters are based on results of nozzle
spray characterization profiles. Charged
decontaminant spray droplet sizes are an average
of 30 micrometers, dispersed at a spray density
of about 120 grams per cubic meter. Aerosol
simulant concentrations are again measured
immediately after the end of the charged DF-200
spray deployment, and at selected times
following the charged spray deployment.
Sampled aerosolized CWA simulant will
solubilize in the organic iso-octane collection
medium phase, thus separating from the aqueous
58
-------
DF-200, quenching the decontamination
reaction, and providing an aerosolized simulant
concentration measurement representative of the
timeframe from which the sample was collected.
Chemical agent simulant collected in the iso-
octane is analyzed by gas chromatography.
Results are reported as aerosol concentration
(gm/m3) and plotted versus test time (minutes).
All spray system parameters are monitored and
tracked electronically by a data acquisition
system.
Experimental testing demonstrates rapid,
effective knockdown and neutralization of
aerosolized chemical/biological warfare agent
simulants from initial, high-threat levels,
decreasing by orders of magnitude
corresponding to inhalation exposure levels
below the LD50. Results demonstrate a decrease
greater than three orders of magnitude in
aerosolized CWA simulant
(diphenylchlorophosphate) concentration within
five minutes of charged DF-200 spray
deployment.
In progress is an initial toxicological survey to
assess the potential respiratory effects of
inhalation exposure to aerosolized DF-200 spray
densities and droplet sizes representative of
those deployed by this technology. Preliminary
results may be available for presentation at this
conference.
Sandia has demonstrated rapid, effective
knockdown and neutralization of aerosolized
CBW agent simulants using charged DF-200
sprays. The technology may be applied to
provide protection and minimize contamination
in a variety of military and civilian venues.
Of significance is the potential use of this
fundamental technology in numerous
applications including mitigation and
neutralization of chemical/biological weapon
releases. A release mitigation spray safety
system will remove airborne contaminants from
an accidental or intentional release to protect
personnel and limit the spread of contamination.
Question and Answer Period
Participants posed no questions at the conclusion
of the presentation. The presenter utilized the
full duration allotted for this presentation and
Q&A.
11.5 Study of the Release of Pesticides
from Building Materials
Genevieve Thouin, SAIC Canada
Decontamination of impacted facilities may be
necessary following terrorist attacks or industrial
accidents to enable safe reoccupancy. Very
limited information and no suitable standards
exist, however, for determining safe
contamination levels for reoccupancy. As part of
a project to set decontamination standards for
buildings and structures affected by chemical
and biological terrorism, this work focused on
studying the fate and behavior of chemical
agents of concern on building surfaces and in the
surrounding air.
In order to assess the health hazards linked to
specific decontamination limits, a series of
experiments involving the release of four
pesticides from different surface materials was
studied under different conditions. The relation
between their concentration on the surface and
their concentration in the air was investigated as
a function of temperature, surface concentration,
and construction material. The release of toxic
byproducts was also monitored and analyzed.
Several evaporation, sublimation, and desorption
models were applied to the data.
The highest concentrations detected in the vapor
phase were similar to the ideal saturation
concentrations for lindane, diazinon, and
malathion. Results obtained for carbofuran,
however, were 500 times greater than the ideal
saturation concentrations based on the vapor
pressure data found in the literature. Vapor-
phase concentrations exceeded the time-
weighted averages for lindane, diazinon, and
malathion.
The levels of decontamination required to
establish a "safe" working environment were
estimated based on the experimental results. A
59
-------
model for ventilated work environments was
developed based upon Nielsen's evaporation
model and experimental data to provide vapor-
phase concentration and time estimates.
The contamination of a small surface with
semivolatile toxic organic compounds can lead
to levels of concern in the air of an enclosed
space. The levels of decontamination required to
ensure safe concentrations in the air may have to
be extensive. Though some compounds show
saturation behaviors close to ideal, others, such
as carbofiiran, present interactions with surfaces
that are very nonideal. Vapor-phase
concentrations of such compounds can be
several orders of magnitude greater than what
would be expected based on their sole vapor
pressure. It is therefore very hard to predict the
behavior of compounds of concern based only
on usual physicochemical properties without
specific compound-surface interaction data.
The results of this study are used in conjunction
with complementary studies to establish cleanup
standards for chemical agents. Once the
experimental and modeling work has been
developed into standards, a broad range of
personnel from first responders to top-level
decision makers will use these standards. Special
emphasis will be placed on using standards and
associated models for post-remediation
clearance of facilities and for determination of
potential usage of facilities following a
contamination event. Consequently, standards
will be made available in condensed format for
use in emergency response scenarios.
Question and Answer Period
• Were control samples collected?
Control samples were collected. No
pesticides or compounds that would
interfere with results were detected.
11.6 Assessment of Fumigants for
Decontamination of Surfaces
Contaminated with Chemical
Warfare Agents
Emily Snyder, EPA, National
Homeland Security Research Center
The aim of this work was to evaluate steam and
vaporous hydrogen peroxide modified with
ammonia (mVHP®) for decontamination of four
different indoor building material surfaces
(decorative laminate, industrial-grade carpet,
galvanized metal, and ceiling tile) contaminated
with one of four selected chemical warfare
agents (HD, GB, VX, and thickened soman
[GD]). This work investigated this efficacy as a
function of operational conditions (two
generation or flow rates for each fiimigant and
two concentrations of mVHP®) and determined
the material compatibility of these technologies.
A test chamber was designed and fabricated to
accommodate the two decontamination systems.
Approximately 1 milligram of agent was applied
to 2- by 5-centimeter sample coupons, and these
coupons were placed into the test chamber for
decontamination. During the positive control
tests, fiimigant was not introduced into the test
chamber. Samples were removed from the
chamber at specified time periods and analyzed
for the amount of residual agent remaining on or
within the sample. All decontamination
efficacies were calculated relative to the positive
controls.
Results from the steam efficacy testing indicate
that for both feed rates (1.5 and 3 kilograms per
hour), steam was efficacious (>99 percent
efficacy for most material-agent-exposure time
combinations) in removing the surface
contamination for all agents; however,
detectable amounts of GB, thickened GD, and
VX were found in the condensate. In addition,
the steam impacted both the carpet and the
ceiling tile materials, most significantly
dissolving the ceiling tile.
The mVHP® fumigant was very effective at
removing HD from the surfaces and removed a
significant portion of the VX from the surfaces
tested (81 to 89 percent efficacy at 400 minutes
60
-------
exposure time). The efficacy of mVHP® against
HD appeared to be affected by flow rate of the
fumigant (34 versus 340 liters per minute)
through the chamber more than the fumigant
concentration (250 vs. 350 ppmv of VHP).
Lastly, the mVHP® fumigant did not impact the
appearance of most of the materials, only
causing a white residue to form on the
galvanized metal.
Steam was effective at removing every agent
tested from the selected materials, but scaling up
this fumigation technology could be problematic
due to the presence of the GB, thickened GD,
and VX in the condensate. The presence of these
agents in the condensate indicates that if the
steam fumigation were used to decontaminate
the interior of a facility or section of a facility,
there would likely be re-distribution of these
agents onto other surfaces. However, the
nondetectable levels of the agents on the
procedural blanks directly adjacent to the test
coupons indicate that steam might be a suitable
decontamination method if it were used in small
areas where the condensate could be collected,
such as a steam cleaner.
These tests indicate that mVHP® is efficacious
against HD surface contamination, but presence
of the agent in the vapor indicates that the HD
may not be completely reacting with the mVHP®
during fumigation. Longer exposure times need
to be tested to determine if this fumigant can be
efficacious against VX.
This work provides an assessment of how steam
and mVHP® performed under certain operational
conditions that are representative of what would
be used in the field. This work also provides
insight on how these technologies could best be
implemented in the field. EPA decontamination
teams will use this information when providing
technical assistance to states and localities when
they are selecting remediation technologies for a
contaminated site. This work also provides
insight into how these technologies should be
implemented in the field.
Question and Answer Period
• What kind of carpet was used for testing?
An industrial-grade nylon carpet was used.
61
-------
Appendix A Agenda
United States
JiUkMIl Environmental Protection Agency
Decontamination and Consequence Management Division and National
Decontamination Team
2010 U.S. EPA Decontamination Research
and Development Conference
Hilton Raleigh Durham Airport
Durham, NC
Agenda
DAY 1: TUESDAY, APRIL 13, 2010
PLENARY SESSION
Protecting Human Health and the Environment through Innovation Dr. Paul Anastas,
Assistant Administrator, EPA/ORD
Plenary Speaker Honorable David Price, Congressman, 4th District, North Carolina
FIELD ACTIVITIES AND LARGE SCALE DEMONSTRATIONS
Case Study: Decontamination of a Community Building Containing Low Concentrations of Bacillus
Anthracis Spores, Durham, New Hampshire Ted Bazenas, EPA/Region 1
Decontamination of a Facility and HVAC System Ductwork
using Chlorine Dioxide Gas Mark Czarneski, ClorDiSys Solutions Inc.
Source Reduction Following the 2001 Anthrax Attacks: Lessons Learned Dorothy Canter,
Dorothy Canter Consulting LLC
An Overview of the Chemical Restoration
Operational Technology Demonstration (OTD) Project .. MarkD. Tucker, Sandia National Laboratories
Two Recent Proof of Principle Tests of Deployable Countermeasures to Support Recovery of
Critical Mass Transit Facilities Robert Fischer, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
A-l
-------
DAY 1: TUESDAY, APRIL 13, 2010 (Continued)
FIELD ACTIVITIES AND LARGE SCALE DEMONSTRATIONS (continued)
Bio-Response Operational Testing and Evaluation (BOTE) Shannon D. Serre, EPA/ORD/NH5RC
CROSS-CUTTING RECOVERY ACTIVITIES
National Homeland Security Research Center WaterTreatment and
Infrastructure Decontamination Research Scott Minamyer, EPA/ORD/NHSRC
Containment and Disposal of Large Amounts of Water:
A Support Guide for Water Utilities Marissa Lynch, EPA/OW
Threat Agent Disposal: Disposal Issues Following a CBRN Incident Based on RDD and Anthrax
Waste Disposal Workshops Paul Kudarauskas, EPA/OSWER/OEM
Update on the Validated Sampling Plan Work Group Dino Mattorano, EPA/OSWER/OEM
Developing an Effective CBRN Decontamination Capability Hasmitta Stewart
Government Decontamination Service (Fera)
US-Canada Bilateral Technical Working Group (TWG) for
CBRN Response and Recovery G Blair Martin, EPA/ORD/APPCD
TOOLS AND GUIDANCE DEVELOPMENT
Analysis of Decontamination Strategies Following a Wide-Area
Biological Release in a Metropolitan Area Robert Knowlton, Sandia National Laboratories
Interactive Decision Framework for Consequence Management Robert Greenwalt
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
A-2
-------
DAY 2: WEDNESDAY, APRIL 14, 2010
TOOLS AND GUIDANCE DEVELOPMENT (continued)
Optimization Approaches and Issues Associated With Late-Phase Recovery
Following Radiological or Nuclear Events S.Y. Chen, Argonne National Laboratory
FATE AND TRANSPORT RESEARCH ACTIVITIES INFORMING RECOVERY (CROSS CUTTING)
Transport of Bacillus Thuringiensisvar. Kurstaki (Btk) From an
Outdoor Release into Buildings Kristin Omberg for Sheila Van Cuyk, Los Alamos National Laboratory
Transport of Bioaersols into a Regional Transit System—
Implications for Characterization Michael Dillon, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
Mitigation and Containment of Contaminant Spread Jacky Rosati, EPA/ORD/NHSRC
The Brooklyn Traffic Real-Time Ambient Pollutant Penetration and
Environmental Dispersion (B-TRAPPED) Study Russell Wiener, EPA/ORD/NHSRC
ACTIVITIES TO SUPPORT WIDE AREA BIODECONTAMIN ATION
Assessment of Liquid and Physical Decontamination Methods for
Surfaces Contaminated With Bacillus Spores Shawn P. Ryan, EPA/ORD/NHSRC
Evaluation of COT Products for
Decontamination of Bacillus Spores
Evaluation of Peroxide-Based Solutions for
Facility Decontamination by Owner/Occupants
Jason Edmonds, DOD, U.S. Army
Paula Krauter, Sandia National Laboratories
A-3
-------
Concurrent Sessions
ACTIVITIES TO SUPPORT RADIOLOGICAL RECOVERY
Inactivation of Bacillus anthracis Spores on Indoor
and Outdoor Building Surfaces Using Commercially-
Available Liquid Sterilant Technologies
Worth Calfee EPA/ORD/NH5RC
Simulated Cesium Radiological Dispersal Devices for
Deposition, Dose, and Decontamination Studies
Mark Sutton, Lawrence Livermore, National Laboratory
Inactivation of Bioagents by Natural Attenuation,
Liquid Decontamination, or Fumigation
Harry Stone, Battelle
EPA Spectral Photometric Environmental Collection
Technology: Gamma Emergency Mapper Project
John Cardarelli, EPA/OSWER/OEM/NDT
High/Low Tech Approaches to HVAC
Decontamination
Brian Attwood, EPA/ORD/NH5RC
Radiological Decontamination of Urban Surfaces
Using Selective Isotope-Sequestering Agents
Konstantin Volchekfor Pervez Azmi, Emergency Sciences
and Technology Section, Environment Canada
PERSISTENCE OF BIOLOGICAL AGENTS AND
OTHER BIO-RELATED DECONTAMINATION
Performance Evaluation of Decontamination
Technologies for Dirty Bomb Cleanup
John Drake, EPA/ORD/NHSRC
Persistence of Select Biological Agents
Joseph Wood, EPA/ORD/NH5RC
The Evolution of Radiological Decontamination at
DRDC Ottawa
Marc Desrosiers, Defense Research and Development
Disinfection of Mobile Equipment after an
Emergency Poultry Disease Outbreak
Eric R. Benson, Department of Bioresources Engineering
and Department of Animal and Food Science, University
of Delaware
RADIOLOGICAL RECOVERY
RESEARCH ACTIVITIES (Cont'd.)
Testing the Sporicidal Efficacy of Six Disinfectants on
Carrier Surfaces Contaminated with B. Atrophaeus
Spores
Bruce Hinds, Defense Threat Reduction Agency
Persistence of Surrogate Radioisotopes on Drinking
Water Infrastructure and the Effectiveness of
Decontamination Methods
JeffSzabo, EPA/ORD/NHSRC
Development of a Novel Bioassay for Detection of
Functional Ricin
Vipin K. Rastoqi, R&TDirectorate, US Army-ECBC
Evaluating Cesium Contamination of Urban Building
Materials: Two Instrumental Approaches
Julia G. Barzyk, EPA/ORD/NHSRC
Biotoxin Test Method Development
Linda C. Beck, Naval Surface Warfare Center, Dahlgren
Division
Impact of RDD Decontamination Strategies on
Quantities and Characteristics of Resulting Waste
and Debris
Paul Lemieux, EPA/ORD/NHSRC
Development of Test Methods for Determining the
Efficacy of Disinfectants against Foreign Animal
Disease Viruses on Nonporous Surfaces
Peter W. Krug, Foreign Animal Disease Research Unit,
Agricultural Research Service, United States Department
of Agriculture
Treatment of Liquid Wastes From Radiological
Decontamination
Konstantin Volchek, Environment Canada
A-4
-------
DAY 3: THURSDAY, APRIL 15, 2010
PERSISTENCE OF BIOLOGICAL AGENTS AND OTHER
BIO-RELATED DECONTAMINATION AND DISPOSAL RESEARCH
Destruction of Spores in a Bench-Scale Landfill Flare System (20 min.) Dana Wimsatt
EPA/ORD/NHSRC/DCMD
Development of an Aerosol Deposition Method for Bacillus Spores Sang Don Lee,
EPA/ORD/NHSRC
OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR DECONTAMINATION
Impact of CT and Relative Humidity on Efficacy and Material
Effects of Chlorine Dioxide John Y. Mason, Sabre Technical Services, LLC
Methodology for Quantitative Analysis of the Impact of
Decontamination on Electronic Equipment (30 min.) G. E. Derkits, Alcatel-Lucent
Assessment of the Impact of Cl02 and H202
Decontamination on Electronic Equipment M. L. Mandich, Alcatel-Lucent
CHEMICAL WARFARE AGENT RECOVERY RESEARCH
Evaluating Strategies for CWA Decontamination of Indoor Facilities Adam H. Love,
Consultant to Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
Test Methodology for the Assessment of Chemical Warfare Agent Decontaminant
Performance on Porous or Complex Surfaces Paul Brister, Clean Earth Technologies, LLC
Basic Research Needs in Decontamination Jennifer Becker, U.S. Army Research Office
Knockdown and Neutralization of Aerosolized Chemical Agent
Simulants Using Charged Decontaminant Sprays Rita Betty, Sandia National Laboratories
Study of the Release of Pesticides from Building Materials Genevieve Thouin, SAIC Canada
Assessment of Fumigantsfor Decontamination of Surfaces
Contaminated With Chemical Warfare Agents Emily Snyder, EPA/ORD/NHSRC
EPA FACILITY TOURS
A-5
-------
Appendix B List of Participants
AEPA
United States
Environmental Protection Agency
Decontamination and Consequence Management Division and National Decontamination Team
2010 U.S. EPA Decontamination Research
and Development Conference
Hilton Raleigh Durham Airport
Durham, NC
Attendee List
Nancy Adams, PhD
110 Waterloo Station Drive
Cary, NC 27513
919-460-7726
Email: nhadams64@gmail.com
*Paul Anastas
Assistant Administrator
Office of Research and Development
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
Email: anastas.paul@epa.gov
* Brian Attwood
Chemical Engineer
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
109 TW Alexander Drive (E343-06)
Durham, NC 27711
919-541-5626
Email: attwood.brian@epa.gov
*Julia Barzyk
DCMD/NHSRC
ORISE postdoc at EPA
109TW Alexander Drive
Research Triangle Park, NC 27711
919-541-2482
Email: barzyk.julia@epa.gov
Charles Bass
Chemical and Biological Technologies
Defense Threat Reduction Agency
8725 Kingman Road - Stop 6201
Fort Belvoir, VA 22060
703-767-3371
Email: charles.bass@dtra.mil
*Ted Bazenas
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
1 Congress Street - Suite 100
(OSRR02-2)
Boston, MA 02114
617-918-1230
Email: bazenas.ted@epa.gov
*Linda Beck
Scientist
Chemical, Biological, and Radiological
Concepts & Experimentation
Naval Surface Warfare Center,
Dahlgren
4045 Higley Road - Suite 345
Dahlgren, VA 22448-5162
540-284-0016
Email: linda.c.beck@navy.mil
^Jennifer Becker
U.S. Army Research Office
P.O. Box 12211
Research Triangle Park, NC 27709
919-549-4224
Email: jennifer.j.becker@us.army.mil
*Eric Benson
Bioresources Engineering
University of Delaware
242Townsend Hall
Newark, DE 19716
302-275-2131
Email: ebenson@udel.edu
Doris Betancourt
Microbiologist
IEMB/APPCD
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
109 TW Alexander Drive, E (305-03)
Research Triangle Park, NC 27711
919-541-9446
Email: betancourt.doris@epa.gov
*Rita Betty
Member of Technical Staff
Sandia National Laboratories
P.O. Box 5800 (0734)
Albuquerque, NM 87185
505-284-4160
Email: rbetty@sandia.gov
Eletha Brady-Roberts
DQA
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
26 W. Martin Luther King Drive (NG16)
Cincinnati, OH 45268
513 569-7662
Email: roberts.eletha@epa.gov
*Paul Brister
Senior Research Chemist
Clean Earth Technology, LLC
13695 Rider Trail North
Earth City, MO 63045
314-222-4640
Email: pbrister@cleanearthtech.com
*Speaker
B-l
-------
Lance Brooks
R&D/CBD
Department of Homeland Security
S&T
S&T CBD Stop 0201
245 Murray Lane
Washington, DC 20528
202-254-5768
Email: lance.brooks@dhs.gov
Amanda Brown
Debris Policy Specialist
DHS-FEMA
1549 North Carolina Avenue, NE
Washington, DC 20002
314-322-0545
Email: amandalbrown47@gmail.com
Michael Brown
Systems Engineering & Integration
Los Alamos National Laboratory
Group D-3, MS K551
Los Alamos, NM 87545
505 667-1788
Email: mbrown@lanl.gov
Jay Burcik
Chemist
USSS-TSD
950 H Street, NW
Washington, DC 20223
202-395-921°
Email: iav.burcik(a)usss.dhs.gov
Joan Bursey
Chemist
Senior Environmental Employment
Program
Decontamination and Consequence
Management Division/ NHSRC
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
109 TW Alexander Drive E343-06
Research Triangle Park, NC 27711
919-541-2253
Email: bursey.joan@epa.gov
Jonathan Caddick
UK Government Decontamination
Service
Building 14 MoD Stafford
Stafford, Staffordshire ST180AQ
United Kingdom
+44 (0)1785 216345
Email:
jonathan.caddick@gds.gsi.gov.uk
*Worth Calfee
Microbiologist
National Homeland Security Resource
Center
DCMD
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
109 TW Alexander drive MD E343-06
Research Triangle Park, NC 27709
919-541-7600
Email: calfee.worth@epa.gov
Philip Campagna
Chemist
Emergency Response Team/TIFSD
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
2890 Woodbridge Avenue (MS101)
Edison, NJ 08837
732-321-6689
Email: campagna.philip@epa.gov
*Dorothy Canter
Dorothy Canter Consulting LLC
19 Maplewood Park Court
Bethesda, MD 20814
240-743-9247
Email: dorothy@
dorothycanterconsulting.com
Erica Canzler
Bio-Coordinator
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
1200 Pennsylvania Avenue NW
(5104A)
Washington, DC 20460
202-564-2359
Email: canzler.erica@epa.gov
Joseph Cappello
Research Scientist
CUBRC, Inc.
4455 Genesee Street
Buffalo, NY 14225
716-592-7331
Email: cappello@cubrc.org
*John Cardarelli II
Health Physicist
OEM/NDT
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
4900 Olympic Boulevard ERL
Erlanger, KY 41018
513-487-2423
Email: cardarelli.john@epa.gov
Kimberly Chapman
Vice President, Sales & Marketing
Morphix Technologies
2557 Production Road
Virginia Beach, VA 23454
757-43i-226o
Email: kchapman@morphtec.com
*S.Y. Chen
Manager
Environmental Science Division
Argonne National Laboratory
9700 South Cass Avenue - Building 240
Argonne, IL 60439
630- 252-7695
Email: sychen@anl.gov;
pruitteb@anl.gov
Margaret Chong
Env.Engineer/OSC
Response and Prevention
Branch/ERRD
U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency - Region 2
2890 Woodbridge Ave MS-211
Edison, NJ 08837
732-906-6904
Email: chong.margaret@epa.gov
Adrian Clark
Dstl
Porton
UK Ministry of Defence
Detection Department-
Building 6 Porton Down
Salisbury, Wilts SP40JQ
United Kingdom
+44 (0)1980 613203
Email: ajclark@dstl.gov.uk
Patricia Collett
Microbiologist
STC/ECBC
Edgewood Road
Edgewood, MD 21040
410-436-5526
Email: patricia.collett@us.army.mil
*Mark Czarneski
Director of Technology
ClorDiSys Solutions Inc
PO Box 549
Lebanon, NJ 08833
908-236-4100
Email: markczarneski@clordisys.com
*Speaker
B-2
-------
Joseph Dalmasso
Apex Laboratories Inc
PO Box 794
Apex, NC 27502
919 775 7616
Email: apexlabs@mindspring.com
Jim Daloia
Response Team Leader
Response and Prevention Branch
Emergency and Remedial Response
Division
U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency - Region 2
2890 Woodbridge Avenue
Edison, NJ 08837
908-482-1047
Email: daloia.james@epa.gov
Timothy Dean
Microbiologist
IEMB/APPCD
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
109 TW Alexander Drive (E305-03)
Research Triangle Park, NC 27711
919-541-2304
Email: dean.timothy@epa.gov
*Gustav Derkits
Alcatel-Lucent
600 Mountain Avenue - Room 1E-241
Murray Hill, NJ 07974
1-908-582-7050
Email: gus.derkits@alcatel-
lucent.com
William Deso
Program Manager
Science & Technology Directorate
First ResponderTechnology Program
U.S. Department of Homeland
Security
10904 Elon Drive
Bowie, MD 20720
202-254-6748
Email: william.deso@dhs.gov
*Marc Desrosiers
Defence Scientist
DRDC Ottawa
3701 Carling Avenue
Ottawa, ON K1A0Z4
Canada
613-949-2739
Email: marc.desrosiers@drdc-
rddc.gc.ca
- Michael Dillon
NARAC Assessor
NARAC
Lawrence Livermore National
Laboratory
7000 East Avenue (L-103)
Livermore, CA 94551
925-422-6180
Email: dill0n7@llnl.gov
*John Drake
Environmental Engineer
National Homeland Security Research
Center
Decontamination & Consequence
Management/ORD
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
26 Martin Luther King Drive, W (NG-
24)
Cincinnati, OH 45268
513-235-4273
Email: Drake.John@epa.gov
*Jason Edmonds
Research Biologist
Department of Defense, US Army
5183 Blackhawk Road
RDCB-DRB-D
APGEA, MD 21010
4104367348
Email: jason.edmondsi@us.army.mil
Victor Engleman
President
EAI
3129 Carnegie Place
San Diego, CA 92122
858-452-0835
Email: EAITEC@aol.com
*Robert Fischer
Group Leader
Lawrence Livermore National
Laboratory
7000 East Avenue (L-620)
P.O. Box 808
Livermore, CA 94551
925-422-3004
Email: fischer7@llnl.g0v
Richard Fitzpatrick
Senior Research Scientist
CUBRC, Inc.
4455 Genesee Street
Buffalo, NY 14225
716-592-7529
Email: fitzpatrick@cubrc.org
Karin Foarde
Director, Microbiology
RTI International
3040 Cornwallis Rd
Research Triangle Park, NC 27709
919-541-8018
Email: kkf@rti.org
*Robert Greenwalt
Program Leader
Lawrence Livermore National
Laboratory
7000 East Avenue (L-064)
Livermore, CA 94550
925-423-9414
Email: greenwalti@llnl.gov
Nancy Hammond
Chief, Environmental & Explosive
Safety
Hazardous, Toxic & Radioactive Waste
Engineering
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
10 South Howard Street (CENAB-EN-
Hl)
Baltimore, MD 21201
410-962-2714
Email:
Nancy.E.Hammond@usace.army.mil
Andrew Hemmert
Graduate Student
University of North Carolina at Chapel
Hill
B928 Kenan Labs
Chapel Hill, NC 27599
919 962-7576
Email: hemmert@email.unc.edu
*Bruce Hinds
Chief, Instrumentation Fielding
Diagnostics
Counter WMD Testing
Defense Threat Reduction Agency
1680 Texas Street, SE (CXTD)
Albuquerque, NM 87117
505-853-5722
Email: bruce.hinds@abq.dtra.mil
*Speaker
B-3
-------
William Hoppes
Scientist
Global Security
CBRNE Countermeasures (S) Program
Lawrence Livermore National
Laboratory
PO Box 808, MS L-172
Livermore, CA 94551-0808
925-422-0158
Email: hoppesi@llnl.gov
Mario lerardi
Homeland Security Team Leader
Waste Characterization Branch
Materials Recovery and Waste
Management Division
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
Office of Resource Conservation and
Recovery
1200 Pennslyvania Avenue, NW
(5304P)
Washington, DC 20460
703-308-8894
Email: ierardi.mario@epa.gov
Peter Jutro
Deputy Director for Science and Policy
National Homeland Security Research
Center
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
1200 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
(8801R)
Washington, DC 20460
202-564-3331
Email: jutro.peter@epa.gov
Lawrence Kaelin
National Decontamination Team
OSWER/OEM
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
2890 Woodbridge Avenue
building 205 - Room 201
Edison, NJ 08837
732-452-6454
Email: kaelin.lawrence@epa.gov
Melissa Kaps
Program Analyst
Waste Characterization Branch
Materials Recovery and Waste
Management Division
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
1200 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
(5304P)
Washington, DC 20460
703-308-6787
Email: kaps.melissa@epa.gov
SuYinKee
Environmental Protection Division
National Environment Agency,
Singapore
Environment Building
40 Scotts Road, #12-00
Singapore 228231
+65 67319054
Email: kee_su_yin@nea.gov.sg
Lyndsey Kelly
Health Physicist
Office of Air and Radiation
Radiation and Indoor Environments
National Laboratory
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
P.O. Box 98517
Las Vegas, NV 89193
702-784-8270
Email: Kelly.Lyndsey@epa.gov
Carlton (Jeff) Kempter
Senior Advisor
Antimicrobials Division
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
1200 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
(7510P)
Washington, DC 20460
703-305-5448
Email: kempter.carlton@epa.gov
*Robert Knowlton
Staff member
Sandia National Laboratories
1515 Eubank, SE (MS 0734)
Albuquerque, NM 87185
505-844-0080
Email: rgknowl@sandia.gov
Gregory Knudson
Technical Security Division
USSS
10515 Lawyers Road
Vienna, VA 22181
7°3-3i9-04°8
Email: gbknudson@aol.com
Diane Kotras
Director, Biodefense Policy
Homeland Defense
OSD (Policy)
2600 Defense Pentagon
Washington, DC 20310
703-697-5647
Email: diane.kotras@osd.mil
*Paula Krauter
Environmental Engineer
Chemical & Biological Systems
Sandia National Laboratories/DOE
P.O. Box 969 9406
Livermore, CA 94550
925- 294-6165
Email: pkraute@sandia.gov
*Peter Krug
Research Microbiologist
Agricultural Research Service
Foreign Animal Disease Research Unit
United States Department of
Agriculture
40550 Route 25
Orient, NY 11957
631-477-4458
Email: Peter.Krug@ars.usda.gov
*Paul Kudarauskas
Deconologist
OSWER/National Decon Team
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
1200 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
(5104A)
ARN B517M
Washington, DC 20460
202-564-2415
Email: kudarauskas.paul@epa.gov
Patrick Lambert
Head, Field Work and Response Unit
Environment Canada
335 River Road
Ottawa, ON K1A0H3
Canada
613-991-1110
Email: patrick.lambert@ec.gc.ca
Johannes Lee
Department Manager
Arcadis
4915 Prospectus Drive - Suite F
Durham, NC 27713
919-544-4535
Email: Johannes.Lee@arcadis-us.com
Laura Lee
Plum Island Animal Disease Center
P.O. Box 848
Green port, NY 11944
6313233262
Email: laura.lee@ars.usda.gov
*Speaker
B-4
-------
*Sang Don Lee
Environmental Scientist
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
109 TW Alexander Drive
Research Triangle Park, NC 27711
919-541-4531
Email: lee.sangdon@epa.gov
*Paul Lemieux
Chemical Engineer
Decontamination and Consequence
Management Division/ NHSRC
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
109 TW Alexander Drive E343-06
Research Triangle Park, NC 27711
919-541-0962
Email: lemieux.paul@epa.gov
Wee Teck Lian
Singapore Civil Defence Force
91, Ubi Avenue 4
Singapore 408827
(+65) 68483310
Email: LIAN_Wee_Teck@scdf.gov.sg
*Adam Love
Principal Scientist
Johnson Wright, Inc.
3730 Mt Diablo Boulevard- Suite 230
Lafayette, CA 94549
925-403-6200
Email: adam.love@johnsonwright.net
*Marissa Lynch
Environmental Engineer
Threat Analysis, Prevention &
Preparedness
Water Security Division
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
1200 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
(4608T)
Washington, DC 20460
202-564-2761
Email: lynch.marissa@epa.gov
Kunapuli Madhusudhan
Chief Scientist & Program Manager
CET, LLC
101 North Chestnut Street - Suite 101
Winston Salem, NC 27101
336-397-1900
Email:
kmadhusudhan@cleanearthtech.com
*Mary Mandich
CTO Reliability
Alcatel-Lucent
600 Mountain Avenue - Room 1E-347
Murray Hill, NJ 08836
908-582-3396
Email: Mary.Mandich@alcatel-
lucent.com
*G. Blair Martin
Associate Division Director
Air Pollution Prevention and Control
Division
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
109 T.W. Alexander Drive (E343-04)
Research Tringle Park, NC 27711
919-541-7504
Email: martin.blair@epa.gov
Kenneth Martinez
Deputy Director
DSHEFS
CDC NIOSH
4676 Columbia Parkway (MS R12)
Cincinnati, OH 45226
513-841-4428
Email: KMartinez@CDC.GOV
Byron Mason
Program Specialist
Regulations and Policy
Public Assistance DHS/FEMA
500 C Street, SW
Washington, DC 20472
202-646-4368
Email: Byron.Mason@dhs.gov
Karen Mason
COO and General Counsel
Sabre Technical Services
1891 New Scotland Road
Slingerlands, NY 12159
518-514-1572
Email:
pmorrison@sabretechservices.com
*John Mason
President
Sabre Technical Services
1891 New Scotland Road
Slingerlands, NY 12159
518-514-1572
Email:
pmorrison@sabretechservices.com
*Dino Mattorano
Industrial Hygienist
Office of Emergency Management
National Decontamination Team
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
26 West Martin Luther King Drive
(ERL)
Cincinnati, OH 45268
513-487-2424
Email: mattorano.dino@epa.gov
Katrina McConkey
Cubic Applications
5695 Kings Centre Drive - Suite 300
Alexandria, VA 22315
919-929-3646
Email: katrina.mcconkey@cubic.com
Sara Metzger
Scientist
Arcadis
4915 Prospectus Drive - Suite F
Durham, NC 27711
919-541-0447
Email: sara.metzger@arcadis-us.com
James Michael
Chief, Waste Characterization Branch
Materials Recovery and Waste
Management Division
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
1200 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
(5304P)
Washington, DC 20460
703-308-8610
Email: michael.james@epa.gov
Leroy Mickelsen
Enginer
OEM/NDT/OSWER
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
109 TW Alexander Road (E343-06)
Durham, NC 27711
919-541-1356
Email: mickelsen.leroy@epa.gov
Wendy Mills
Contractor
U.S. Army Research Office
P.O. Box 12211
Research Triangle Park, NC 27709
919-549-4235
Email: wendy.y.mills@us.army.mil
*Speaker
B-5
-------
*Scott Minamyer
Environmental Scientist
NHSRC/Water Infrastructure
Protection Division
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
26 West Martin Luther King Drive (NG-
16)
Cincinnati, OH 45268
513-569-7175
Email: minamyer.scott@epa.gov
Jennifer Mosser
Environmental Engineer
Office of Air and Radiation/ORIA
Radiation Protection Division
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
1200 Pennsylvania Ave, NW (6608J)
Washington, DC 20460
202-343-9466
Email: mosser.jennifer@epa.gov
Duane Newell
Chemist
OSWER/OSRTI-ERT
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
4220 South Maryland Parkway
Boulevard D - Suite 800
Las Vegas, NV 89119
702-784-8015
Email: newell.duane@epa.gov
Sean Nolan
Bull and Associates/DTRA A&AS
9006 Stratford Lane
Alexandria, VA 22308
571-303-2107
Email:
sean.nolan_contractor@dtra.mil
*Kristin Omberg
Systems Engineering & Integration
Decision Applications
Los Alamos National Laboratory
PO Box 1663 (MSK551)
Los Alamos, NM 87545
Lukas Oudejans
NHSRC/DCMD
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
109 TW Alexander Drive (E343-06)
Research Triangle Park, NC 27711
919-541-2973
Email: oudejans.lukas@epa.gov
Bruno Pagnani
HVAC Engineer
Dynamac Corporation
1910 Sedwick Road - Building 100 -
Suite B
Durham, NC 27713
919-544-6428 x-17
Email: bpagnani@dynamac.com
Shawn Park
Program Manager
Boeing Company
5301 Bolsa Avenue (*H45N-E404)
Huntington Beach, CA 92547-2099
714-896-1606
Email: shawn.h.park@boeing.com
Cayce Parrish
OHS/Office of the Administrator
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
1200 Pennsylvania Avenue (1109A)
Washington, DC 20460
202-564-4648
Email: parrish.cayce@epa.gov
Brooke Pearson
Cubic Applications
5695 King Center Drive - Suite 300
Alexandria, VA 22315
703-924-3050
Email: brooke.pearson@cubic.com
Yan Da Png
Singapore Civil Defence Force
91 Ubi Ave 4
Singapore 650170
(+65)68483323
Email: png_yan_da@scdf.gov.sg
Bob Poirier
Senior Research Technologist
Research and Development
Allen Vanguard
658 Ross Glen Drive, SE
Medicine Hat, Alberta T1B3X4
Canada
403-977-2122
Email:
Bob.Poirier@allenvanguard.com
^Honorable David Price
Congressman
4th District, NC
Alex Proescher
Senior Scientist
Johns Hopkins Applied Physics
Laboratory
11100 Johns Hokins Road
Laurel, MD 20723-6099
443-778-2827
Email: alex.proescher@jhuapl.edu
*Vipin Rastogi
Senior Research Biologist
Research & Technology Dir.
Biociences
US ARMY - ECBC
E-3150 Kingscreek Street, N (RDCB-
DRB-D)
Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD 21010
410-436-4856
Email: vipin.rastogi@us.army.mil
Srujana Reddy
General Engineer
Naval Surface Warfare Center,
Dahlgren
4045 Higley Road - Suite 345
Dahlgren, VA 22448
540-653-9657
Email: srujana.reddy@navy.mil
Juan Reyes
Deputy Associate Adminstrator
OHS
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
1200 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
(1109A)
Washington, DC 20460
202-564-6978
Email: reyes.juan@epa.gov
Karen Riggs
Manager
Battelle
505 King Avenue
Columbus, OH 43201
614-424-7379
Email: riggsk@battelle.org
Marcy Rockman
AAAS Science and Technology Policy
Fellow
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
- National Homeland Security
Research Center
1200 Pennsylvania Avenue (8801R)
Washington, DC 20460
202-564-0372
Email: rockman.marcy@epa.gov
*Speaker
B-6
-------
Elizabeth Rohonczy
National Manager Emergency Projects
Operations Branch
Program Delivery Division
Candian Food Inspection Agency
1400 Merivale Road
Ottawa, Ontario KiA 0Y9
Canada
613-773-5373
Email: liz.rohonczy@inspection.gc.ca
*Jacky Rosati
NHSRC/DCMD
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
109 TW Alexander Drive (E343-06)
Research Triangle Park, NC 27711
919-541-9429
Email: rosati.jacky@epa.gov
Dan Rowe
JPM-Decon/JRAD
50 Tech Parkway - Suite 209
Stafford, VA 22556
540-288-3132, Ext 203
Email: drowe@jrad.us
Richard Rupert
OSC/OEM/HSCD
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
701 Mapes Road
Fort Meade, MD 20755
410-305-2611
Email: rupert.richard@epa.gov
*Shawn Ryan
Division Director
Decontamination and Consequence
Management Division
National Flomeland Security Research
Center
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
109 TW Alexander Drive (343-06)
Research Triangle Park, NC 27711
919-541-0699
Email: ryan.shawn@epa.gov
Jonathon Sabol
BioDefense Team 5606
SAIC
P.O. Box 68 - Gunpowder Branch
Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD 21010
410-436-6063
Email: jon.sabol@us.army.mil
Gregory Sayles
Acting Deputy Director for
Management
Office of Research and Development
National Flomeland Security Research
Center
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
26 W. Martin Luther King Drive (NG-
16)
Cincinnati, OFI 452068
513-569-7607
Email: sayles.gregory@epa.gov
Megan Schuette
On-Scene Coordinator
U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency - Region 7
901 N 5th Street
Kansas City, KS 66101
913-551-7630
Email: schuette.megan@epa.gov
^Shannon Serre
Chemical Engineer
NHSRC/DCMD
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
109 TW Alexander Drive (E343-06)
Research Triangle Park, NC 27278
919-541-3817
Email: serre.shannon@epa.gov
Ramona Sherman
Quality Assurance Manager
NHSRC
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
26 West Martin Luther King Drive
(NG24B)
Cincinnati, OFI 45268
513-569-7640
Email: sherman.ramona@epa.gov
Roy Sieber
Vice President
ERG
14555 Avion Parkway - Suite 200
Chantilly, VA 20151
703-633-1614
Email: roy.sieber@erg.com
Eunice Sim
DSO National Laboratories
20 Science Park Drive
Singapore, 118230
+65 68712908
Email: ssoohoon@dso.org.sg
*Emily Snyder
Radiological Team Lead
DCMD/ORD/NHSRC
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
109 TW Alexander Drive (343-06)
Research Triangle Park, NC 27711
919-541-1006
Email: snyder.emily@epa.gov
Cynthia Sonich-Mullin
Acting Director, NFISRC
Immediate Office
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
26 W. Martin Luther King Drive (NG31)
Cincinnati, OFI 45268
513-569-7923
Email: sonich-mullin.cynthia@epa.gov
Robert C Spencer
Flealth Protection Agency
Level 8 Queen's Building
Bristol Royal Infirmary
Marlborough Street
Bristol, Avon BS28FIW
England
+44(0)117 342 3242
Email:
robert.spencer@UFIBristol.nhs.uk
Meg Stapleton
Research Scientist
CUBRC, Inc.
4455 Genesee Street
Buffalo, NY 14225
716-592-7331
Email: stapleton@cubrc.org
Larry Stearns
Principal Engineer
URS Corporation
1421 Montgomery Road
Allison Park, PA 15101
412-292-8923
Email:
lawrence_stearns@urscorp.com
*Hasmitta Stewart
UK Government
Decontamination Service (Fera)
MoD Stafford
Beaconside
Stafford, Staffordshire ST180AQ
Uniterd Kingdom
+44 (o) 1785 216307
Email:
hasmitta.stewart@gds.gsi.gov.uk
*Speaker
B-7
-------
*Harry Stone
Battelle
10300 Alliance Road - Suite 155
Cincinnati, OH 45242
513-362-2600 Ext. 12
Email: stoneh@battelle.org
*Mark Sutton
Scientist
Lawrence Livermore National
Laboratory
PO Box 808, MS L-188
Livermore, CA 94551
925-424-2137
Email: sutton18@llnl.gov
* Jeffrey Szabo
Environmental Engineer
NHSRC/WIPD
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
26 W. Martin Luther King Drive (NG-
16)
Cincinnati, OH 45268
513-487-2823
Email: szabo.jeff@epa.gov
Yian Kim Tan
DSO National Laboratories
20 Science Park Drive
Singapore, 118230
+(65) 6871 2887
Email: tyiankim@dso.org.sg
*Genevieve Thouin
Project Manager
SAIC Canada
60 Queen Street - Suite 1516
Ottawa, Ontario KiP 5Y7
Canada
613-991-1119
Email:
genevieve.thouin@saiccanada.com
Maggie Tra beau
Research and Development Manager
Sabre Tech Services, LLC
1891 New Scotland Road
Slingerlands, NY 12159
518-514-1572
Email:
mtrabeau@sabretechservices.com
Anna Tschursin
Environmental Protestion Specialist
Waste Characterizxation Branch
Materials Recovery and Waste
Management Division/OSWER
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
1200 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
(5304P)
Washington, DC 20460
703-308-8805
Email: tschursin.anna@epa.gov
*Mark Tucker
Member of Technical Staff
Chemical and Biological Technologies
Sandia National Laboratories
PO Box 5800
Albuquerque, NM 87185-0734
505-844-7264
Email: mdtucke@sandia.gov
Richard Vojtech
Program Manager
Domestic Nuclear Detection Office
Transformational & Applied
Research Directorate
Department of Homeland Security
245 Murray Lane, SW DNDO Stop
0550
Washington, DC 20528-0550
202-254-7109
Email: richard.vojtech@dhs.gov
*Konstantin Volchek
Head, Environmental Restoration,
ESTS
Science and Technology/EOALRSD
Environment Canada
335 River Road
Ottawa, ON KiA 0H3
Canada
613-990-4073
Email: konstantin.volchek@ec.gc.ca
Claire Wells
Chemical Engineer
Naval Surface Warfare Center,
Dahlgren
4045 Higley Road - Suite 345
Dahlgren, VA 22448
540-284-0097
Email: claire.wells@navy.mil
*Russell Wiener
Physical Scientist
DCMD
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
109 TW Alexander Drive (D205-03)
Durham, NC 27711
919-541-1910
Email: wiener.russell@epa.gov
Steven Wilkinson
Emergency Response Section
Investigative Chemistry Laboratory
Curtin University
ChemCentre
South Wing, Building 500
Bentley, WA 6102
Australia
+61894229930
Email:
swilkinson@chemcentre.wa.gov.au
George Wilson
NBCTechnologyTransition Manager
NSWDG
1636 Regulus Ave nue
Virginia Beach, VA 23461
757-893-2297
Email: george.wilson@cox.net
*Dana Wimsatt
Graduate Student
ORD/NHSRC/DCMD
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
109 T.W. Alexander Drive
Research Triangle Park, NC 27711
919-541-0371
Email: williams.dana@epa.gov
*Joseph Wood
Research Engineer
ORD/NHSRC/DCMD
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
109 T.W. Alexander Drive
Research Triangle Park, NC 27711
919-541-5029
Email: wood.joe@epa.gov
Scott Wright
Senior Health Scientist
PRMSB/DTEM/DHHS
Agency for Toxic Substances and
Disease Registry
4770 Buford Hwy, NE (F62) - Room
08042
Atlanta, GA 30341
770-488-3343
Email: svw3@cdc.g0v
*Speaker
B-8
-------
Norman Yanofsky
Portfolio Manager
Centre for Security Science
Directorate Science & Technology
Public Security
Defence Research & Development
Canada
Vanier Building
222 Nepean Street- 11th Floor
Ottawa, Ontario KiA 0K2
Canada
613-944-8161
Email: norman.yanofsky@drdc-
rddc.gc.ca
Alice Young
Chemist
Naval Surface Warfare Center,
Dahlgren
4045 Higley Road - Suite 345
Dahlgren, VA 22448
540-653-9158
Email: alice.young@navy.mil
Donn Zuroski
FOSC/Emergency
Response/Superfund
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
75 Hawthorne (SFD9-2)
San Francisco, CA 94105
415-71-6829
Email: zuroski.donn@epa.gov
Support Provided by
Sarah Dun
Technical Writer
ERG
110 Flartwell Avenue
Lexington, MA 02421
Deb Tanis
Senior Conference Coordinator
ERG
110 Flartwell Avenue
Lexington, MA 02421
Laurie Stamatatos
Workshop Coordinator
ERG
110 Flartwell Avenue
Lexington, MA 02421
*Speaker
B-9
-------
Appendix C Presentation Slides
c-i
-------
Case Study: Decontamination of a
Community Building Containing Low Concentrations of
Bacillus Anthracis Spores, Durham, New Hampshire
Ted Bazenas, EPA/Region 1
Presentation not available for distribution
-------
Decontamination of a Facility and HVAC System Ductwork
Using Chlorine Dioxide Gas
Mark Czarneski, ClorDiSys Solutions Inc.
-------
Mark Czarneski
ClorDiSys Solutions, Inc
CDRR
AISLE
115. 51
n
103A
CDRH
A13LE
no
iSSl
=3t
#5^=1I ItrrrffltfrTi II TStf—ill I
2010 U.S. EPA Decontamination Research
and Development Conference
Hilton Raleigh Durham Airport
Durham, NC
April 13-15, 2010
E
nTTT
Decontamination of a Facility and
HVAC System Ductwork using
Chlorine Dioxide Gas
@ 252. O0S
0
CCDRR
aNTL
114
MFG
57854
256. 95
112
HFG
57854
154. ee
WP77
Mark A. Czarneski
Director of Technology
D ClorDiSys
L) ClorDiSys
Overview
1. Registration I Background
2. Reasons, Requirements & Choices
3. Equipment I Facility Setup
4. Pictures of Setup
5. Readings
6. Concerns & Conclusions
-------
Mark Czarneski
ClorDiSys Solutions, Inc
l) ClorDiSys
Current Sterilizer (Sporicides)
Registration with
US-EPA as of January 2009
More than 5000 antimicrobial products are
currently registered with the US-EPA.
Only 40 agents are registered as a Sterilant.
Agent
Quantity
Ethylene Oxide
24
Sodium Chlorite (chlorine dioxide)
4
Hydrogen Peroxide Based
12
Total
40
http://www.epa.gov/oppad001/chemregindex.htm
L) ClorDiSys
Current Sodium Chlorite
(Chlorine Dioxide) Sterilizer Registration
Company
Produce Name
Registration
#
Ingredient
%
Sterilization Use
Alcide Corp
Alcide Exspor
4:1:1 - Base
1677-216
1.520%
Immerse in solution for 10
hours @ 20 deg C
ClorDiSys Solutions,
Inc.
CSI CD
Cartridge
80802-1
72.8%
Follow System Operations
Guide Chlorine Dioxide
gas @ 10 mg/L for 15 min
Englehard Corp
Aseptrol S10-
Tab
70060-19
20.8%
Immerse or soak in 1000 ppm
solution for min 1 hour
Pharmacal Research
Laboratories Inc
CLIDOX-S
BASE
8714-8
0.85%
1:3:1 Dilution for 5 hours @
25 deg C
For Anthrax cleanup Under Section 18 of FIFRA, EPA exempted Sabre Technologies
from any provision of EPA registration requirement for sale or use. 4
http://www.epa.gov/oppad001/chemregindex.htm
-------
Mark Czarneski
ClorDiSys Solutions, Inc
U ClorDiSys http://www.epa.gov/oppad001/chemregindex.htm
Current Hydrogen Peroxide Based
Sterilizer Registration
Company
Produce Name
Registration #
HP %
Other
Use
Ark em a Inc
Peroxal 70 Bio
335-233
70%
Non.
Not listed on label
Advanced Sterilization
Products
Sterrad Hydrogen Peroxide
71871-3
59%
Non.
see equipment manual
Clean Earth
Technologies
Peridox
81073-1
24%
1.2% Peroxyacetic acid
Immerse in 4% solution for 45 minutes
Ecolab Inc
Oxonia Active
1677-129
27.5%
5.8%Peroxyacetic acid
Circulate, coarse spray or flood 5 % solution for
6 hours @20 deg C, 20 min @50 deg C or5 min
@ 80 deg C
Ecolab Inc
Vortexx
1677-158
6.9%
4.4%Peroxyacetic acid and
3.3%Octanoic acid
Circulate, coarse spray or flood solution for 30
min @20 deg C followed by sterile or potable
Minntech Corp
Actril Cold Sterilant
52252-7
0.8%
0.06% Peroxyacetic acid
Immerse in solution for 5.5 hours @20 deg C
Minntech Corp
Minn care Cold Sterilant
522524
22%
4.5%Peroxyacetic acid
Immerse in 100X dilution solution for 11 hours @
20 deg C
Steris Corp
Steris-Hydrogen
Peroxide Sterilant
58779-3
31%
none
For sterilization of empty, pre-
cleaned, sealed enclosures up to
40 ft3 apply 2.2 grams of product
per minute for 90 minutes
Steris Corp
Spor-Klenz RTU Cold
Sterilant
1043-119
1.0%
0.08% Peroxyacetic acid
Hold in sterilizing solution for minimum of 5.5 hrs
Steris Corp
GW002 Tertiary Blend
1043-121
35%
none
Hold in sterilizing solution for minimum of 8 hrs
Steris Corp
Vaprox Hydrogen
Peroxide Sterilant
58779-4
35%
none
see equipment manual (Dec
2002) (May 2000 said same as
above)
Steris Corp
Vaprox Hydrogen
Peroxide Sterilant
1043-123
59%
none
see equipment manual
L) ClorDiSys
Reasons for Decontamination
> Penicillin work performed in facility
> Change Facility function
>Some people allergic to penicillin residues
> Positive samples in 2 labs + throughout the HVAC system
> Option 1
> DEMOLISH - costly to demolish entire building then rebuild
> Option 2
> DECONTAMINATE - under $100,000
-------
Mark Czarneski
ClorDiSys Solutions, Inc
IU ClorDiSys
Facility Layout and samples
> 90 sample taken
Si 6 Positive Swab tests in
room areas
> 7 Positive samples in
supply and exhaust duct
rsrk
work
ante;
57854
40, 95©
ANTE
57054
IMEM
A
Negative Results
O Results above LLD (0.115 Results above LLD (0.115 meg/wipe), but less than LOQ
• Results above LOQ (0.386 meg/wipe)
l) ClorDiSys
Equipment and Costs
> 41,000 cu ft (1161 cu m)
>12 generators
>40 chlorine cylinders
>40 Fans
>15 steam generators
> 1 EMS CD Gas Sensor Module
> 3/8" gas inject tubing
> V" gas sample tubing
> Extension Cords
> Duct Tape
> 2 ft Wide Tape
>4 people
> 3 day on site
> 2 day off site
Total
Decontamination
Cost $ 72,694
-------
Mark Czarneski
ClorDiSys Solutions, Inc
l) ClorDiSys
Requirements for Decontamination
> Previous studies demonstrated penicillin (beta lactam)
inactivation with 7000 ppm-hrs.
> Achieve medium concentrations levels
3mg/L (1086ppm)
> Hold for long time to achieve minimum 7000 ppm-hrs
7 hours
> Decontaminate production area and HVAC system (supply
and exhaust)
Have NO positive samples when complete
I D ClorDiSys
Time Line (How Long is the whole Process?)
> Day 1 arrive in morning
> Uncrate generator & sensors
> Run sample tubing
> Place Fans & Humidifiers
> Seal all entry /exit areas
> Run injection tubing
> Place signage
> Day 2 arrive in morning
> Start RH humidification
9:00am
> Start CD gassing
9:50am
> Reach minimum target (3mg/L)
12:45pm
> Maintain / increase / hold
5:30 pm
> Aerate start
5:30 pm
> Finish Decon, Safe to enter
7:45 pm
> Day 3 arrive in morning
> Clear area (less than 0.1 ppm)
10
> Remove equipment and re-crate
-------
Mark Czarneski
ClorDiSys Solutions, Inc
U ClorDiSys
CD Gas Generation Technology
> Performed in solid phase (no liquids)
> Gas generated on demand
> Gas generated at 100mg/L (36,200 ppm)
> Use concentration 0.1mg/L - 100mg/L
> Easily scalable to ANY volume
> Simple to replace consumables
> Small, Medium and Large portable generators
> Photometric measurement of
concentration at multiple points
> Real Time
> Repeatable
> Accurate
> US-EPA Validated Measurement
d
L) ClorDiSys
Injection and Sample
Points
Sample
Point #
12 Sample Point Location
1
Inside room 109
2
Inside room 110
3
Inside room 113
4
Inside room 117
5
Inside room 120
6
Inside room 104
7
Inside room 102
10
Inside room 115
14
Inside room 114
15
Inside room 117
16
Inside a HVAC return vent in room
115
17
Inside a HVAC supply vent in room
103
24 Injection Points
3 Injects inside room 109
Inside room 112
3 injects inside room 117
2 injects inside room 114
Inside room 115
Inside room 116
2 injects inside room 111
2 injects inside room 130
inside room 103
In-between rooms 118 and 119
Inside room 121
Inside room 103A
Inside room 103
Inside room 107
Inside room 102
inside room 128
Inside room 123
-------
Mark Czarneski
ClorDiSys Solutions, Inc
20
116
106
ULDCKERT
57954
63. 00
¦
# Injection Points
# Sample Points
ill
MFG
57054,
252. 0(
17 HVAC Supply / Return
IDS©
CCDRR
A7054
57054
112
MFC
WP77
EXT
D ClorDiSys
Readings in mg/L
Time
SP#1
SP#2
SP#3
SP#4
SP#5
SP#G
SP#7
SP#10
SP#14
SP#15
SP#16
SP#17
10:50 AM
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
11 15 AM
0 5
0.5
0 6
0.5
0.2
0.2
0.5
01
0.8
0.7
0.7
0.4
11:45 AM
1 8
1.8
2.1
1.9
1.9
1.9
1.8
0 9
2.0
1.9
1 9
16
12:15 PM
2.8
2.9
2.8
3.0
3.0
3.0
2.8
1.9
2.8
2.7
2.6
2.5
12:45 PM
3.4
3.3
3.6
3.4
3.4
3.4
3.1
2.3
3.4
3.2
3.3 2.5
1:15 PM
3.9
3.9
3.9
3.9
3.9
3 9
3.5
2.9
34
3.4
3.2
3.3
1 45 PM
4.2
4.2
4.3
4.1
4.1
4.2
3 6
3 0
4.2
3.7
3 7
3.6
2:15 PM
4 5
4.6
4.6
4.3
4.3
4.4
4.0
3.4
4 3
4.1
3.7
4 1
2:45 PM
5 0
4.9
5.4
4.6
4 6
4.8
4 1
48
5.0
4.5
5.0
4.5
3:15 PM
5.0
4.9
5 1
4.8
4.6
4.7
4.2
4.3
5.0
4.6
4.8
4.4
3:45 PM
5.0
5 0
5.2
4.8
4.6
4.8
4.2
4.0
5 0
4.5
4.6
4.6
4:15 PM
5.1
5.1
5.1
4.5
4.6
4.5
4.1
3.9
4.8
4.1
4.1
4.5
4:45 PM
5.1
5 1
5.2
4.5
4 6
5.0
4.2
3.9
5.2
4.2
4.5
4.7
5:15 PM
4.9
4.9
5 0
4.2
4.4
5.0
4.2
4 0
5.2
4 0
4.5
4.7
5:30 PM
4.7
4.7
4.8
3.9
4.2
4.9
4 1
4.1
5.1
3.7
4.5
4.7
5:45 PM
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0 0
0.0
0.0
0 0
0.0
0 0
0.0
6:15 PM
0.0
0 0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0 0
0 0
0.0
0.0
0.0
6:45 PM
0.0
0.0
0.0
0 0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0 0
0.0
0 0
0.0
14
0.0
-------
Mark Czarneski
ClorDiSys Solutions, Inc
IU ClorDiSys
Reading in PPM-Hrs
Time
SP#1
SP#2
SP#3
SPU
SP#5
SP#6
SP#7
SP#10
SP#14
SP#15
SP#16
SP#17
11:15AM
45 3
45 3
54.3
45.3
18 1
18.1
45.3
9.1
72.4
63 4
634
36 2
11:45 AM
208.2
208 2
244 4
2172
190 1
190.1
208 2
90.5
253 4
235.3
235 3
181.0
12:15 PM
416.3
425 4
443.5
443.5
443.5
443 5
416.3
253 4
434 4
416.3
407 3
534 0
371 1
12:45 PM
561 1
561 1
579 2
5792
579.2
579 2
534.0
380.1
561 1
534 0
452 5
1 15 PM
660 7
651.6
678.8
660 7
660.7
660.7
597 3
470 6
615 4
597.3
588.3
524 9
1:45 PM
733.1
733.1
742.1
724 0
724 0
733.1
642.6
534 0
687 8
642.6
624 5
624 5
2:15 PM
787.4
796.4
805.5
760.2
760.2
778.3
687.8
579.2
759 3
705.9
669 7
696.9
2:45 PM
859.8
859.8
905.0
805.5
805.5
832.6
733.1
742.1
841 7
778.3
787.4
778.3
3:15 PM
90S 0
886.9
950 3
850.7
832.6
859.8
751.2
823.6
905.0
823.6
886.9
805.5
3:45 PM
905.0
896.0
932 2
868.8
832 6
859 8
760.2
751.2
905 0
823 6
850 7
814 5
4:15 PM
" 914.1
914 1
932 2
841.7
832 6
841 7
751 2
715 0
886 9
778 3
787 4
823 6
4-45 PM
923 1
923 1
932.2
814.5
832.6
859.8
751 2
705 9
905.0
751.2
778.3
832 6
5:15 PM
905 0
905 0
923.1
7874
814.5
905 0
760.2
715 0
941 2
742 1
814.5
850.7
5:30 PM
868.8
868.8
886.9
733.1
778.3
896.0
751.2
733.1
932.2
696.9
814.5
850.7
5:45 PM
425.4
425.4
434.4
353.0
380.1
443.5
371.1
371 1
461.6
334 9
407 3 425.4
6:15 PM
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
6:45 PM
0.0
0.0
0 0
0 0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
7:15 PM
0.0
o~o
0 0
0.0
0 0
0.0
0.0
0.0
6.6
0.0
o~o
0.0
7.45 PM
0 0
0.0
l^-l
0 0
0.0
0.0
0 0
nr ¦
0.0
0 0
0 0
0 0
Total PPM-hrs
10117 9
10099 8
|l 0443-7
KS484.4
9484.4
9900.7
8760 4
[7373 5|
10172 2
8923.3
9249 1
9068.1
9465 average
Highest
Lowest Exposure time, this
1) ClorDiSys
Concerns During the Process
> Reaching all areas of HVAC supply and exhaust
> Bumped HVAC blower every 30-60 minutes
> Leakage in HVAC room
> Room 117 (raw concrete and untreated surfaces)
-------
Mark Czarneski
ClorDiSys Solutions, Inc
l) ClorDiSys
Conclusions
> No physical residue observed
> Had Leakage from HVAC units to HVAC room
> No visible indication of material degradation on any electronics
> No affects to HVAC system (blowers, condenser coils, heating
elements, control dampers, duct work material, diffusers, duct
mounted smoke detectors)
> Had some material corrosion (some scissors & tape dispenser)
> Medium Chlorine Dioxide Concentrations
Average concentration 3-5mg/L (3200 - 1800 ppm)
>7873 Lowest PPM-Hrs
>10,443 Highest PPM-Hrs
> 9465 Average PPM-HRs n
ID ClorDiSys
For more information contact:
Mark A. Czarneski
PO Box 549
Lebanon, NJ 08833
Phone: 908-236-4100
Fax: 908-236-2222
e-mail:
markczarneski@cloridsys.com
Revision Date: March 30, 2010
18
-------
Source Reduction Following the 2001 Anthrax Attacks:
Lessons Learned
Dorothy Canter, Dorothy Canter Consulting LLC
-------
Source Reduction Following 2001
Anthrax Attacks: Lessons Learned
EPA Decontamination Research and
Development Conference
April 13, 2010
Raleigh Durham Airport, NC
Dorothy A. Canter, PhD
Carlton Kempter
Richard Rupert
Overview
• Background on source reduction
• Source reduction at four facilities following 2001
anthrax attacks
• Comparison of processes at facilities
• Lessons learned
2
-------
Source Reduction
• Source reduction is the process for decreasing the
amount of contamination in a facility prior to main
decontamination activities
• Goals of source reduction are to:*
reduce the number of items and/or materials present
ensure that any matter that might inhibit decontamination is
removed, and
generally reduce the levels of contaminant that may be present
*DHS-EPA. 2009. "Planning Guidance for Recovery Following Biological
Incidents." p. 101.
Source Reduction
Main Activities
• Removal and off-site treatment of essential items for
eventual re-use by owners
• Removal of non-essential items for ultimate off-site
treatment/disposal either as waste or through re-
cycling
• Pretreatment of identified hot spots within facility
-------
Determiifirig Extent of Source
Reduction Activities
Key factors
• Degree of contamination in specific areas of facility
• Amount of materials within contaminated areas
needing removal
Essential items
Non-essential items that may decrease effectiveness of
decontamination activities (e.g., porous materials)
• Nature and degree of remediation to be performed
• Resources/time frame allotted for cleanup
ssential Items
Examples
Irreplaceable electronic files stored only in
contaminated facility
Irreplaceable documents
Items of significant historic or monetary value
High value works of art
Designated personal property
Certain vehicles
-------
Non-essential Items
Examples
• Recyclable (e.g., metal items, batteries,
fluorescent lights)
• Non-recyclable
Site debris (includes items selected on basis of
cost/benefit analysis)
Office equipment, furnishings, carpeting, tools,
books/catalogues, foodstuffs, janitorial supplies, etc.
Industrial chemicals
Activities at
Four Facilities with Fumigations
Capitol Hill Anthrax Site
US Department of Justice (DOJ) Mail Facility
US Postal Service (USPS) Trenton Processing
& Distribution Center (P&DC)
US Department of State (DOS) Mail Facility
Fumigations were performed in all four facilities but
differed in extent, fumigant used, approach to
conducting fumigations
-------
Capitol Hill Anthrax Site
• Essential items
Items critical to Congressional business operations,
personal items of significance (self-selected)
Treatment: Off-site in ethylene oxide (EtO) sterilization chamber
Amount: 3250 bags
Cost: -784K
Duration: -10 weeks
Packages, private mail (e.g., FedEx) large office items,
mail equipment, etc.
Treatment: Off-site in trailer using chlorine dioxide fumigation
Amount: 4300 packages
Cost: ~ $615K
Duration: 6-7 weeks
CapTtoTHill Anthrax Site
• Essential items (continued)
High value artwork
Treatment: hand cleaned, HEPA-vacuumed, cleared
by environmental sampling
Drummed mail
Sent to US Postal Service facility in Lima, OH, for
irradiation
Vehicles
HEPA-vacuumed, then treated with bleach solution
-------
Capitol Hill Anthrax Site
Non-essential items
Debris/solid waste, PPE, decontamination water
Treatment
Fort Detrick military base (under special exemption from State of MD)
Medical waste incineration (most items)/municipal waste incineration (large
objects, PVC-containing materials) — 300,000 lbs
Wastewater treatment followed by steam sterilization of decontamination
water
Cost: $127K (treatment plus transport costs)
Commercial medical waste incineration at facility in VA (mainly furniture) -
300 cu. yds.
Steam sterilization of metal items at FL facility followed by recycling
Mail Facility
Essential items
FOIA documents, certified mail receipts, CFRs, computer
disks, notebooks, rubber stamp inserts for Omation machine
Treatment: Off-site in EtO sterilization chamber
Amount: 12 Gaylord boxes
Non-essential items
• Porous items (mainly paper, but also modular work stations
and furniture)
Off-site medical waste incineration
Amount: 5 truckloads
Duration: 1.5 mos. (entire remediation took 2.5 mos.)
Total cost: $120K ($464K for entire cleanup)
-------
DSP
renton P&DC
• Materials for re-use (mail, personnel items) sent off-site for
ion beam or gamma irradiation
Did not use EtO sterilization process
• PPE and items sent for off-site treatment in
Medical waste incinerator (preferred)
Autoclave
• Large metal soffit panels under roof removed prior to
fumigation process sent to hazardous waste landfill
• Cost and duration data not available
13
PCS Mail Facility
Nearly all materials, including HVAC system,
removed from facility prior to fumigation with
vaporized hydrogen peroxide
Decision following cost-benefit analysis of treatment
options
Surfaces of large fixed items and interior of facility
then pre-treated prior to fumigation
Five different decontamination technologies used
for removed essential and non-essential items
Duration: 9 mos. (16 mos. for entire remediation)
Cost: $4.3M ($8.6M for entire cleanup)
f
iVm
ra
t
-------
m
ipo^R^Rnfems Removed
from DOS Mail Facility
i i
Item
Decontamination
Technology
Final
Disposition
Type
Category
Subcategory
Description
Essential
Irreplaceable documents, diplomatic mail pouches
Treatment in
ethylene oxide
sterilization
chamber
Returned for
reuse
Recycling
facilities
Nonessential
Recyclable items
Metal items
Carts, HVAC components,
machines, piping, files
systems, desks
Universal
wastes
Batteries, fluorescent
lights
On-site treatment
with SporKlenz®,
environmental
sampling
Non-recyclable
Items
Industrial
chemicals
Paraformaldehyde,
flammable liquids
(hazardous waste)
Ammonium bicarbonate,
ethylene glycol (non-
hazardous waste)
Hazardous waste
incineration
Subtitle C
landfill
Site debris
Small items (PPE, wood,
paper, computers)
Medical waste
incineration
Subtitle D
landfill
Large items (insulation,
furniture, carpeting)
Steam sterilization
Comparison of Source Reduction
Activities
Process
Capitol Hill
Anthrax
Site
DOJ mail
facility
Trenton
P&DC
DOS
mail
facility
Off-site irradiation
+
+
Off-site EtO sterilization
+
+
+
Off-site chlorine dioxide fumigation
+
On-site decontamination followed by
clearance environmental sampling
+
+
Medical waste incineration
+
+
+
+
Municipal waste incineration
+
Steam sterilization
+
+
Hazardous waste incineration
+
On-site pretreatment/placement in
hazardous waste landfill
+
Cost
>$1.53M
$120K
NA
$4.3M
-------
Lessons Learned from 2001
Anthrax Attacks
• Source reduction is often a very time-consuming
process
• Need for stringent consensus definition for essential
items, including exhaustive list of non-essential items
Important and highly cost-effective preparedness activity
• Need for consistent plans for essential item
identification, removal, treatment and return as
separate mission within overall remediation process
Important to take needed time to do it right
Value in having independent quality control contractor perform
essential item inventory
17
from 2001
Anthrax Attacks
• Key role of electronic data management in
addressing essential items
Photographing, tagging/bagging, tracking, returning items
Positioning of biological indicators in containers undergoing
EtO sterilization and results from their culture after treatment
• Need for increased supervision of, and coordination
among, teams performing source reduction activities
• Requirement to transport all items (essential and
non-essential) removed from site in compliance with
DOT requirements
18
-------
ultimate Lesson Learned
Limit Removal of Non-Essential Items
Prior to Main Decontamination
Process
(Optimum decontamination approach will
significantly reduce extent/duration of
source reduction)
Special Thanks
Richard Orlusky, US Postal Service
Thomas Sgroi, US Department of State
-------
Contact Information
Dorothy A. Canter, Ph.D.
Dorothy Canter Consulting LLC
240-743-9247
dorothy@dorothycanterconsulting.com
Questions?
-------
An Overview of the Chemical Restoration Operational Technology
Demonstration (OTD) Project
Mark D. Tucker, Sandia National Laboratories
Presentation not available for distribution
-------
Two Recent Proof of Principal Tests of
Deployable Countermeasures to Support Recovery of
Critical Mass Transit Facilities
Robert Fischer, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
-------
LLNL-PRES-427147
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
Two Recent Proof of Principle Tests of
Deployable Countermeasures to Support
Recovery of Critical Mass Transit Facilities
April 13,2010
Metro-North Railroad New York City Transit
2010 US EPA Decontamination
Research and Development Conference
Robert Fischer (LLNL), Annmarie Wood-Zika (LLNL), Dr. Charles
Burrus (NYCT), Michael Gemelli (NYCT) Michael Metz (NYCT), Anne
Kirsch (MNR), William Welch (MNR), Igor Grahovac (DOHMH)
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, P. O. Box 808, Livermore, CA 94551
This work performed under the auspices of the U.S. Department of Energy by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory under Contract DE-AC52-07NA27344
-------
Acknowledgements
¦ New York City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene
¦ Metropolitan Transportation Authority
• Metro North Railroad
- Safety and Security Department
- RESORT Team
• New York City Transit
- Department of Security
- NYCT WMD HazMat Team
¦ Vendors
• InstaCote Inc.
• CT Packaging Systems Inc.
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory IIL-
LLNL-PRES-427147
-------
The Subway Safety Initiative Project Mission -
Rapid Return to Service
¦ Actions to be taken to prevent the spread of contamination
¦ Identification of methods to isolate sections of the transit system to
contain the spread of contaminants
¦ Identification of process to install barriers and filtration systems
¦ Identification and evaluation of tunnel sealing devices
¦ Offsite locations for the decontamination of equipment
¦ Recommendations for first responder actions that will speed the
recovery process
Provide MTA the information, plans, and equipment
recommendations to help ensure
NYC metropolitan region
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
LLNL-PRES-427147
-------
Subway Safety Initiative
Demonstrations
Metro-North Railroad
Rolling Stock Stabilization
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
LLNL-PRES-427147
Proof of Principle
New York City Transit
NYCT Tunnel Barrier Installation
Ik
-------
Train car stabilization proof of
principle test
Metro-North Railroad
Test was conducted on June 25th and 26th, 2009
Participants: LLNL, MNR RESORT, Vendor Reps
Location: Stamford Rail Maintenance Facility
Primary Objectives:
• Test ability to wrap a rail car in shrinkable plastic for
transportation to a designated recovery facility
• Demonstrate qualitatively the efficacy of two stabilization
techniques
Motivation:
• The remediation of contaminated and potentially
contaminated rolling stock is an important aspect of
transit agency return to service strategy
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
LLNL-PRES-427147
I
-------
Metro North Railroad
¦ MNR is the second largest
regional railroad in the U.S.
¦ Daily ridership of 281,000
¦ Grand Central Terminal is the
destination of more than 80%
of all passengers
¦ 1,229 rail cars
¦ 120 stations
¦ 384 route miles
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
LLNL-PRES-427147
Metro-North Railroad
fHnulct.
flermrte fiiwrfc
iDover Plains»
Vunt
Metropolitan TranaporlBl Ion Authority
MTA Metro-North
Railroad ,
(Appaiactilan Trail
I Sultan. NY Spring Voloyi
Aidiley-on-j
DottoFarj/
QUltM
-------
Metro North RESORT Team
Railroad
Equipment
Specialized
Onsite
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
LLNL-PRES-427147
liiJ Metro-North Railroad
An integral part of the test
was to use MNR response
personnel
The RESORT Team is
comprised of MNR
volunteers that have
specialized knowledge to
secure and shutdown
critical MNR equipment
and facilities
Team is trained to perform
operations in a variety of
hazardous environments
Ir
-------
Two stabilization agents were selected for testing
InstaCote - CC Wet
• Non permanent wetting agent
designed to stabilize
particulate contamination
InstaCote - CC Strip
• A vinyl acrylic latex strippable
coating
• Designed to be used alone or
in combination with CC Wet
InstaCote
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
LLNL-PRES-427147
-------
UV active contamination simulation powders were used to
evaluate effectiveness of stabilization techniques
Two types of UV active
contamination simulation
powders manufactured by Risk
Reactor were used
• PDT-06 - larger heavier
particulate simulant
• PXT-07 - lighter smaller
particulate simulant
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
LLNL-PRES-427147
-------
Shrink wrap was used to completely
encapsulate the rail car
Commercially available
Durashield shrinkable
polyethylene sheeting
(7 mil)
Heat sensitive tape for
seams
Purchased in a 40 foot
wide 150 foot long roll
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
LLNL-PRES-427147
-------
Rolling Stock Stabilization: Applied to M-6
Multiple Unit (MU) Rail Car
¦ Used on MNR New Haven
Line
¦ 48 in use
¦ Manufactured in 1993
¦ Middle car selected
because pantograph
expected to create
wrapping challenges
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
LLNL-PRES-427147
-------
Rolling stock stabilization proof of principle process
¦ Setup contamination surrogate test areas on car
¦ Apply stabilization agents
¦ Wrap car
¦ Unwrap car
¦ Evaluate stabilization agent effectiveness
¦ Remove stabilization
¦ "Survey'Vinspect surfaces and surrounding areas
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
LLNL-PRES-427147
-------
Contamination simulation zones- side to be stabilized
Contamination Areas (red)
Target area for application of stabilization agents (green)
Zone 1
CC Wet
Zone 2
CC Wet 1st
Followed
by CC Strip
Zone 3
CC Strip
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
LLNL-PRES-427147
-------
Applying contamination simulant to rail car for
stabilization tests
Simulant was brushed on to car surface
Contamination Control Plastic
Zone # 1 Behind Plastic Tarp
(not shown)
Zone # 3
Zone # 2
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
LLNL-PRES-427147
-------
Contamination zones were created to test a variety of
surfaces and two different simulants
PXT-07 contamination
simulant applied
Buffer area no
simulant applied
PDT-06 contamination
simulant applied
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
LLNL-PRES-427147
-------
Contamination simulation zones (untreated side) no
stabilization agents to be applied
Contamination simulation powder applied to three areas of
roughly the same dimension and location as the treated side of car
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
LLNL-PRES-427147
-------
Application of Stripcoat (CC Strip) and
Wetting Agent (CC Wet)
Application of Stripcoat
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
LLNL-PRES-427147
Application of Wetting Agent
-------
Wrapping process
Layout
wrap
Lifting wrap
into place
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
LLNL-PRES-427147
Placement
Guides
of
Securing wrap
on far side of
18
-------
Wrapping process - continued
Covering
car
~
Securing with
strapping
Using propane heat
gun to seal seams
Securing
ends
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
LLNL-PRES-427147
-------
Wrapping process - completed
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
LLNL-PRES-427147
-------
Stabilization techniques significantly reduced contaminant
transfer
Zone 1 (Treated Side) interior plastic surface wipe
Very little simulant
transfer observed on
plastic from treated
side of car
Zone 4 (Untreated Side) interior plastic surface wipe
Substantial simulant
transfer from surface of
car to plastic on
untreated side of car
Test methods
¦ Swipes from
inside of
plastic wrap
(shown)
¦ Vibration test
¦ Large area
wipes from
plastic
sheeting
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
LLNL-PRES-427147
-------
Car surface materials interacted differently with strippable
coating
Difficult to remove from
window gasket
The stripcoat adhered
tenaciously to the red panel
Removed easily from stainless
steel side panels
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
LLNL-PRES-427147
-------
Pre-treatment had a positive affect on removal efficiencies
In area without
pretreatment (zone 1) a
substantial amount of
simulant was observed in
joint area after removal of
stripcoat
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
LLNL-PRES-427147
Pretreatment with CC Wet
resulted in a complete
removal of strip coat (and
simulant) from joint in zone 2
without tearing
23
-------
Rolling stock stabilization proof of principle
conclusions
¦ Shrink wrapping a rail car appears to be feasible
¦ Application of fixative prior to wrapping greatly reduces
the potential for contamination to migrate
¦ Strippable coating behaved differently on various
surfaces
¦ Strippable coatings used with wetting agents showed
better coverage and penetration of cracks and crevices
¦ Use of UV active simulants as contamination
surrogates was useful determining effectiveness of
stabilization agents
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
LLNL-PRES-427147
-------
Tunnel barrier deployment
proof of principle test
¦ Test was conducted on August 5th, 2009
¦ Participants: LLNL, NYCT WMD HazMat Team
¦ Location: NYCT Ninth Ave Station
¦ Primary Objectives:
• Construct a plastic contamination control barrier in
NYCT tunnel utilizing readily/commonly available
materials
• Test the efficacy of the constructed barrier
¦ Motivation:
• Post event achievement of positive contamination
control will be required prior to restart of transit
operations
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
LLNL-PRES-427147
^3
New York City Transit
-------
The New York City Subway System ® New York city transit
World's 4th largest subway
system
Average daily ridership of 5.2
million
6,400 subway cars
26 service lines run over 600
miles of track
468 stations
Operates 24/7-365
New York
City Subway
Legend
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
LLNL-PRES-427147
Service schematics
=. Trt"
BRONX
\%x
MANHATTAN
QUEENS
.y "sw
, BROOKLYN
|r,A-
20\
I'luv^G ^ "
_ >/ " R
ftjsfy
'¦ «v V
1 \\ \\ ¦*» ¦
W \ \\ -A*'
%r
26
-------
NYCT barrier placements to mitigate further system
contamination
¦ Strategically placing
barriers in tunnels to
prevent the spread of
contamination or to
isolate parts of the
system
¦ Place tunnel barriers at
key locations on directly
impacted lines
¦ Locations pre-selected
Isolation Plan Study Area
O Stations
Subway lines by division
IND
BMT
IRT
After Event
Indirectly Impacted
^¦^Directly Impacted
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
LLNL-PRES-427147
-------
NYCT WMD HazMat Team
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
LLNL-PRES-427147
Comprised of more than
100 volunteers from
several departments within
NYCT
Trained to respond to
WMD events that may
impact the NYCT system
Team members receive
extensive training in
hazardous materials
response
Participate in frequent drills
and exercises
I
28
-------
A station no longer used for passenger service was
selected as the test site (NYCT 9th Avenue Station)
Single track
Construct two barriers
approximately 15 ft. apart
After construction the
space between the barriers
was to be pressurized and
filled with smoke
Differential pressure to be
measured
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
LLNL-PRES-427147
-------
Location specific challenges typical of NYCT tunnels
¦ Multiple utility lines
¦ Third rail
¦ Roadbed
¦ Cableways
¦ Less than pristine
conditions
¦ For safety reasons no wall
penetrations allowed (Test
Constraint)
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
LLNL-PRES-427147
-------
In a subway environment the preparation of surfaces
proved to be extremely Important
Walls cleared of any large
debris
Cleaning solution applied to
surfaces
Grime and particles made it
challenging to get an effective
bond with the tape
A tape seal applied to the walls
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
LLNL-PRES-427147
-------
The interface between the barrier and roadbed is a key
sealing point
A major challenge was creating
a base for the barrier where it
intersected with the road bed
A wood foundation was
constructed to create the base
for the barrier to be attached
¦ NYCT Hazmat crews displayed
amazing ingenuity and
creativity in solving this
complicated problem
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
LLNL-PRES-427147
-------
Creating a temporary support structure to span the
width of the track
The wall had to span a
distance of about 15 feet wide
by a height of 16 feet
To provide a readily adaptable
wall support zip poles were
used
This technique is widely used
in the asbestos abatement
industry
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
LLNL-PRES-427147
-------
Subway tunnels contain a wide variety of utility conduits
A variety of utilities pass
through tunnel areas
Ventilation pathways must
also be sealed
An effective barrier needs to
allow for multiple
penetrations
Creating an effective seal in
these conditions can be
challenging
I
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
LLNL-PRES-427147
I
34
-------
All primary sealing surfaces were checked and
re nforced
¦ Expanding foam was added
to any open space
All equipment removed
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
LLNL-PRES-427147
-------
In order to establish whether a seal had been established the
space between the walls was pressurized
A smoke generator was
placed between the barriers
A blower was connected to
the barrier wall
A differential pressure gage
probe was inserted into the
wall
The smoke generator was
turned on and the pressure
rise was monitored
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
LLNL-PRES-427147
36
-------
Barrier was successfully tested to a differential pressure
of .085 column inches (water gauge)
¦ NYC standard for asbestos
containments is -0.02
inches
The barrier ultimately failed
in a location where water
was constantly seeping
onto a tape seal
The ability of the barrier to
survive pressure changes is
critical in the subway
environment
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
LLNL-PRES-427147
-------
NYCT barrier proof of principle conclusions
Successfully demonstrated that a containment
barrier can be placed into an NYCT tunnel
Long term survivability of barrier not tested
Total time to build
• First barrier 3.5 hours
• Second barrier 2 hours
Numerous operational improvements were
captured
Additional testing of barriers recommended
• More complicated tunnel section
• The use of inflatable barriers
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
LLNL-PRES-427147
38
-------
SSI proof of principle conclusions
¦ Proof of principle demonstrations provide a
valuable real world check on remediation
techniques
¦ Great benefit in combining decontamination
science with the operational know how possessed
by transit agencies
¦ Fills the gap between science based efficacy
testing and operational applicability
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
LLNL-PRES-427147
-------
Back-up Slides
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
LLNL-PRES-427147
-------
Untreated side of car was used to compare relative
effectiveness of stabilization
Contamination control
plastic removed after
application
Zone 6
Zone 5
Zone 4
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
41
LLNL-PRES-427147
I
-------
Two different application techniques were tested and then
results were compared
L1
Zone #3 PDT-06 Simulant n
interface between painted
surface and aluminum after
treatment with strip coat
Note incomplete penetration
of joint area as compared to
wetting agent below
Zone #2 Green color is from dye in
wetting agent indicating good
penetration in interface region
Simulant PXT-07 showing bright
white under UV light
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
LLNL-PRES-427147
42
-------
Preparing to shrink wrap car
Plastic sheeting to "catch" contamination
resuspended during wrapping exercise
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
LLNL-PRES-427147
Control swipes taken to monitor
migration from target areas
-------
Protecting shrink wrap from tearing during covering
Plastic tarp to
cover pantograph
Pantograph down and in
locked position
Rooftop insulators
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
LLNL-PRES-427147
-------
Rolling stock stabilization proof of principle
conclusions
¦ Use of UV active contamination simulants
• Choice of simulant very important
- One simulant used did not adhere to car body
• Good for qualitative use only, hard to draw any
major efficacy implications without further testing
-Chemical interaction
- Concentration used
- Representativeness to actual contaminant
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
LLNL-PRES-427147
-------
Barrier construction techniques based on common
industry designs for D&D projects
¦ Since no nailing was allowed
focus was on the selection of
| w W My
tapes and glues
FSPx If *\ 1
¦ Expanding foam used as
Rr ' ^
sealant
„ i
¦ Telescoping pressure sensitive
Bpfv i' |1|V
poles used to form support
wmrm w
frame
PJPf I ¦
vmirn 1 ? M /
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
LLNL-PRES-427147
-------
NYCT barrier proof of principle conclusions
¦ Additional testing of barriers recommended
• More complicated tunnel section
• The use of inflatable barriers
• Ability to withstand changing pressure
gradients overtime
¦ Operational considerations
• In real emergency tracks may be removed
• Nailing in walls and ceilings permitted
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
LLNL-PRES-427147
-------
Bio-Response Operational Testing and Evaluation (BOTE)
Shannon D. Serre, EPA/ORD/NHSRC
-------
Serre
oEPA
United Stales
Environmental Protection
Agency
Bio-Response Operational
Testing and Evaluation
(BOTE)
Shannon D. Serre
April 13, 2010
Office of Research and Development
National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequence Management Division
Collaborators
Office of Research and Development
National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequence Management Division
1
-------
Serre
svEPA
United S
Environmental Protection
Agoncy
Key Participants
LTC Niklas Putnam
DTRA
Study Coordinator
Shawn Ryan
EPA/ORD
Program Manager
Lance Brooks
DHS/S&T
Program Manager
Exercise
Mike Nalipiiiski, EPA
Angie Weber, CDC
Stephen Morse, CDC
Decon
Shannon Serre, EPA
Sampling
Dino Mattorano, EPA
Angie Weber, CDC
Stephen Morse, CDC
v j
Office of Research and Development
National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequence Management Division
Economics
Paul Lemieux, EPA
svEPA
United S
Environmental Protection
Agoncy
Overall Objective
The overall objective of the Bio-Response
Operational Testing & Evaluation Project is to
operationally test and evaluate biological incident
response from health/law enforcement response
through environmental response (remediation).
Office of Research and Development
National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequence Management Division
-------
INL Facility
Environmental Protection %J
Agoncy
Office of Research and Development
National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequence Management Division
Office of Research and Development
National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequence Management Division
Floor Schematic
Commercial ' ' [
: .» L._vJiSy: s rBB"—
* *- •* ~ * ¦* j«E] i «JS253»
. 2 ® I
v Mail Room
*, 2
-------
Serre
svEPA
United S
Environmental Protection
Agoncy
Decon Assessment Study
Objective
• To conduct and evaluate field-level facility remediation
studies of various decontamination technologies/protocols
over 3 Rounds.
A Round is defined as:
-Facility contamination/distribution of spores
-Pre-decontamination sampling
-Application of specified decontamination procedure (s)
-Post-decontamination sampling
-Post-test analysis (assessment of effectiveness)
-Reset facility for next round of testing
Office of Research and Development
National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequence Management Division
svEPA
United S
Environmental Promotion
Agoncy
Decon Assessment Study
Round 1
Contamination
•First Floor - 102 spores/ft2
•Second Floor - 106 spores/ft2
Round 1 - Medium Tech/Capacitv
•Lead time to get supplies
•Specialized equipment and expertise
Office of Research and Development
National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequence Management Division
-------
Serre
svEPA
United S
Environmental Protection
Agoncy
Decon Assessment Study
Round 2
Contamination
•First Floor - 102 spores/ft2
•Second Floor - 106 spores/ft2
Round 2 - Low Tech/Capacitv
•Relatively simple to implement
•Supplies are readily available
•Minimal prep time
•Minimal skill required
Office of Research and Development
National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequence Management Division
svEPA
United S
Environmental Promotion
Agoncy
Decon Assessment Study
Round 3
Contamination
•First Floor - 102 spores/ft2
•Second Floor - 106 spores/ft2
Round 3 - High Tech/Capacitv
•Full facility approach
•Highly specialized equipment and expertise
Office of Research and Development
National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequence Management Division
-------
Serre
Waste/Wash Water Decon
Environmental Protection
Agoncy
Waste/wash water may be generated
-Decon technologies
-PPE Decon line
One or two decontamination methods will be selected and
tested
Test sampling strategies and analysis
Develop a testing strategy to verify that the water is
disinfected prior to disposal
Generate a lessons learned document on collection,
sampling, storing and treatment of the washwater
Office of Research and Development
National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequence Management Division
**5?^ Post-Test Analysis
Environmental Protection
Agoncy
Efficacy of decontamination methods
Documentation of operational parameters
-Time requirements
-Labor hours
-Waste generation
-Adverse impacts on the facility
Economic Analysis
-Capture data from studies
-Assessment of cost of application of technology
-Estimator for future events
Office of Research and Development
National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequence Management Division
6
-------
Serre
svEPA
Conclusions
Environmental Proloctior
Agoncy
. BOTE exercise will provide:
. Information on the efficacy of several decontamination
methods
. Information on the time requirements, labor requirements,
waste generated, and adverse impacts on the facility
. Information that can be used to estimate costs associated
with a decontamination approach
. Data that can be used to help guide decision making for
future events
Office of Research and Development
National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequence Management Division
12
7
-------
National Homeland Security Research Center Water Treatment and
Infrastructure Decontamination Research
Scott Minamyer, EPA/ORD/NHSRC
-------
&EPA
United Stales
Fnvl'onnwmtnl Protection
Agoncy
National Homeland Security Research Center
Water Treatment and Infrastructure
Decontamination Research
Scott Minamyer, Kim R. Fox, Hiba S. Ernst
US EPA Decontamination Research and Development Conference
April 13, 2010
r Office of Research and Development
—
National Homeland Security Research Center
Center Director
Associate Director
Deputy Director for
Management
r
Decontamination and
Consequence
Management Division
Water Infrastructure
Protection Division
Science...
Chemistry/Physical Sciences
T oxicology/PhysioIogy
Mathematical Modeling
Engineering
Biology/Microbiology
Radiation Sciences
Public Health
Environmental Sciences
Communication
... Applied to Solve Problems
Water Security
Detection
Decontamination
Disposal
Exposure Assessment
Threat and Hazard Assessment
Risk Assessment/Cleanup Goals
Analytical and Sampling Methods
Technology Testing and Evaluation
Cincinnati, OH Research Triangle Park, NC Washington, DC Las Vegas, NV
-------
Minamyer
oEPA
Water Infrastructure Protection
Division
Conducts applied research to secure the nation's
drinking water and waste water systems from
threats and attacks
-Prevention, detection, containment, and
decontamination
-Produces tools, procedures, methodologies,
technology evaluations, models, and
decontamination techniques
Works with EPA's primary water security
stakeholders — both internal and external
-
Office of Research and Development
National Homeland Security Research Center
oEPA
UnitPii Slates
ssr-1— Public Water Systems
Treatment
NjisWufleiT^
81
Storage
Source
Intake
Booster
Storage
Pumping
Station
F°ur 1. Source 4. Transmission,
Components 2. Treatment Distribution &
3. Storage Pumping Facilities
-
Office of Research and Development
National Homeland Security Research Center
2
-------
Minamyer
oEPA
Treatment Versus Decontamination
If a contamination event occurs, it may be necessary to treat
water, decontaminate infrastructure, and dispose of
wastes/residuals from any response activity
h
Treatment refers to the removal, inactivation,
or destruction of contaminants in water
Decontamination refers to the removal or
destruction of residual contaminants adhered to
wetted surfaces in the drinking water plant,
distribution system, or post-service connections
such as building plumbing, water heaters, and
filtration devices
Office of Research and Development
National Homeland Security Research Center
55
¦ ' < =
jr
oEPA
Unifr-ii States
Fnylronmomtol Protection
Agnncy
Impacts of Contamination Events
Chemical, biological, or radiological
contamination events or attacks on drinking
water and wastewater infrastructure could
have devastating public health, economic, and
social impacts
Consequences may include denial of water for
additional vital services such as firefighting.
food preparation, sanitation, agriculture, and
industiy
r
Office of Research and Development
National Homeland Security Research Center
-------
Minamyer
oEPA
Potentially Impacted Resources
Introduction of harmful agents into a drinking water distribution
system has the potential to contaminate:
- Drinking water over a relatively large service area
- Storage tanks
- Pipes and pumps used to convey the water
- Service connections to buildings
-Water-consuming appliances, such as water heaters
1 Attacks could also impact drinking water
treatment plants, wastewater treatment
facilities, and storm and sewer systems
-
Office of Research and Development
National Homeland Security Research Center
vvEPA
Biofilins and Corrosion
Wnitpd Slates
Fnylronmomtol Protection
Agnncy
Complicating decontamination is the propensity of some
contaminants to adhere to corroded pipes or biofilms on the pipe
walls, potentially prolonging the impact of the contamination by
sloughing off into the water over time after the incident
r Office of Research and Development
O
4
-------
Minamyer
oEPA
Treatment and Decontamination Research
Identify which priority chemical, biological, or
radiological (CBR) contaminants will attach to
wetted surfaces and how they can best be
remediated
Determine the efficacy of typical water
infrastructure decontamination technologies to
destroy or remove chemical and radiological
contaminants
- Dr. Jeff Szabo Presentation on Persistence and
Decontamination of Surrogate Radioisotopes from
Drinking Water Infrastructure (Weds 3:50 PM)
Determine inactivation and removal capabilities
of typical water treatment and disinfection
technologies for biological contaminants
f
t
Office of Research and Development
National Homeland Security Research Center
oEPA
Treatment and Decontamination Research
cont.
Expand treatability information on contaminants
most likely to be used to contaminate drinking
water supplies and systems
Develop models for developing/evaluating
distribution system decontamination strategies
r
Office of Research and Development
National Homeland Security Research Center
-------
Minamyer
Treatment and Decontamination Research
Multi-Year Planning
For current multi-year planning (next 3-5 years) the Division is
considering potential new research to address five areas of
need:
- Agent fate and transport research and modeling
- Persistence of contaminants on pipes and infrastructure
- Decontamination and treatment protocols and technologies
- Appropriate cleanup levels and verification methodologies
- Treatment/disposal of wastewater associated with the
decontamination process
-
Office of Research and Development
National Homeland Security Research Center
oEPA
Unifr-ii Slates
Fnylronmomtol Protection
Agnncy
Water Treatment
Inactivation of Bacterial Bioterrorism Agents
-
Studies conducted in collaboration with U.S. Centers for Disease
Control
Screening studies of chlorine inactivation:
- Bacillus anthracis
- Brucella spp.
- Burkholderia spp.
- Francisella tularensis
- Yersinia pestis
Studies on the effect of strain
variability on resistance to
chlorination:
- Burkholderia pseudomallei
- Francisella tularensis
Office of Research and Development
National Homeland Security Research Center
6
-------
Minamyer
oEPA
Inactivation of Bacterial Bioterrorism Agents
Cont.
Free Chlorine CT values (mg/L x min)
pH 7, 99.9% reduction
~ Burkbolderia mallei M9
U B. pseudomaltei ATCC
1688
~ Brucella melitensis ATCC
23456
B B. suis EAM562
¦ Y, pestis Harbin
D Yersinia pestis A1122
m Francisella tularensis LVS
~ F. tularensis NY98
~ B. anthracis Sterne
spores
a B. anthracis Ames spores
x 200
o 100
25C
h
Office of Research and Development
National Homeland Security Research Center
oEPA
WnitPil Slates
Fnylronmontol Protection
Agnncy
Chlorine Inactivation of Anthrax Spores in
Decontamination Wash Water
Bench-scale study to determine the effectiveness of chlorine to
inactivate anthrax spores in wash water generated during building
decontamination activities
The National Response Team has recommended a procedure for
the chlorine treatment of wash water containing anthrax spores:
- Bleach and vinegar at doses resulting in a solution
containing 1% hypochlorite and having a pH of 7
- The procedure was established based on results of
previous studies using distilled water
- Wash water represents a different matrix for which
the effectiveness of chlorine is not well known
r
Office of Research and Development
National Homeland Security Research Center
-------
Minamyer
oEPA
Chlorine Inactivation of Anthrax Spores in
Decontamination Wash Water Cont.
Wash water may contain components that
increase chlorine demand-impacting the
inactivation of B, anthracis spores
- For previous incidents and in some locations,
wastewater treatment plants would not accept
the wash water even after treatment
Inactivation study will be conducted using
wash water that represents incident cleanup
activities
Will be field-tested as part of the BOTE
Project
h
Office of Research and Development
National Homeland Security Research Center
oEPA
Unifr-ii Slates
Fnylronmomtol Protection
Agnncy
Pilot-scale Adherence and Decontamination
Study
r
• Pilot-scale evaluations conducted at the EPA Test and Evaluation
Facility in Cincinnati
• Tested adherence and various decontamination approaches for
five contaminants (arsenic, mercury, Bacillus subtilis, diesel fuel,
and chlordane)
• Cement-lined ductile iron pipe coupons
-With and without biofilm
• Various flow rates and parameters
• All tested contaminants have a strong
tendency to adhere to cement-lined
ductile iron pipe surfaces
Office of Research and Development
National Homeland Security Research Center
8
-------
Minamyer
oEPA
Pilot-scale Adherence and Decontamination
Study Results
-
Contaminants
Decontamination Method
Decontamination
Efficiency
Qualitative
Performance
Arsenic
Water flushing
-7-51%
Average
Low pH
6-36%
Average
Phosphate buffer
-24 16%
Poor
Acidified potassium
permanganate
54-61%
Good
NW-310/NW-400
46 - 65%
Good
Floran Biogrowth Remover
/ Catalyst
63 - 67%
Good
Floran Top Ultra / Catalyst
23 - 68%
Average
Mercury
Water flushing
19 - 46%
Average
Low pH
21 - 23%
Average
Acidified potassium
permanganate
72 - 96%
Excellent
Bacillus subtilis
Water flushing
-29 --11%
Poor
Shock chlorination
94 - 96%
(1.2-1.4 log removal)
Average
Diesel fuel
Water flushing
36 - 38%
Average
74% (for clear PVC pipe)
Good
Surfonic TDA-6
>91%
Excellent
78% (for clear PVC pipe)
Good
Chlordane
Surfonic TDA-6
89-91%
Excellent
99% (for clear PVC pipe)
Excellent
Office of Research and Development
National Homeland Security Research Center
oEPA
WnitPil Slates
Fnylronmomtol Protection
Agnncy
Building Plumbing System
Decontamination
Interagency project with National Institute for Standards and
Technology (NIST)
Studied both adherence and decontamination of chemical and
biological contaminants in plumbing materials in bench scale, pilot
scale, and full scale setups
Numerous tests conducted:
- Various combinations of contaminants and
plumbing system materials
- Different flow conditions and configurations
- Coupons, small pipe sections, full scale pipe
loops, and water heater tanks
-
Office of Research and Development
National Homeland Security Research Center
9
-------
Minamyer
oEPA
Building Plumbing System Decontamination
Cont.
Contaminants tested included diesel fuel, gasoline, toluene,
strychnine, cyanide, phorate, mercuric chloride, E. coli, Bacillus
anthracis, Bacillus thuringiensis, and Ricin
Plumbing system materials were copper, galvanized iron, PVC or
chlorinated polyvinyl chloride (C-PVC), rubber, and brass
• Surfaces included water pipes (with and without
scale and/or biofilm), fittings, valves, and water-
using appliances
• Final reports are being edited for publication
%
-
Office of Research and Development
National Homeland Security Research Center
oEPA
Unifr-ii Slates
Fnylronmomtol Protection
Agnncy
Water Quality Modeling Research
Research objective
-Develop accurate mathematical
models for contaminant transport to
inform decontamination decisions
Products
-Models for adsorption/desorption
-Models for attachment to biofilms
-Models for reaction with chlorine
Impact
-Tools will be available to help
support decontamination research
-New models will improve
consequence assessment modeling
and sensor placement optimization
<5P
Ł* I
ltachmei}(^»\ ^
detachment
!?"lk v 61
Schematic of pipes showing pipe wall layer
where contaminants can adsorb to corrosion
products or attach to biofilms
¦
Office of Research and Development
National Homeland Security Research Center
10
-------
Minamyer
NHSRC Water Treatment and Decontamination
c-j uui pronrotion
Research Summary
Presented a snapshot of water security treatment and
decontamination studies conducted by NHSRC
Research results support:
- The water sector, including drinking water and wastewater utilities
• Improved ability to deal with crisis incidents
• Multiple benefits for standard operations
- Office of Water and Department of Homeland Security
The Center is continuing CBR water treatment and infrastructure
decontamination research, with input from key stakeholders
-
Office of Research and Development
National Homeland Security Research Center
oEPA
Uniirr) States
Fnvifonfnontol Protection
Agnncy
Questions ?
minamyer.scott@epa.gov
NHSRC Web Site
www. e pa. gov/ nhsrc
r Office of Research and Development
11
-------
Containment and Disposal of Large Amounts of Water:
A Support Guide for Water Utilities
Marissa Lynch, EPA/OW
-------
v>EPA
United States
Containment and Disposal of Large
Amounts of Water: A Support Guide for
Water Utilities
2010 U.S. EPA Decontamination
Research and Development Conference
Durham, NC - April 13, 2010
Marissa Lynch
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Ground Water and
Drinking Water
Laura Jones, Kimberly Ogren, and Shalini Jayasundera
CSC
v>EPA Overview
United States
Environmental Protection
Agency
Problem statement:
• The Water Sector has identified gaps in decontamination
tools, guidance, and research as related to water security
Objectives:
• Provide background on CIPAC Water Sector Decontamination
Strategy
• Provide an overview of WSD efforts - Development of
Containment and Disposal of Large Amounts of Water: A
Support Guide for Water Utilities in response to Issue 1,
Recommendation 2 of the CIPAC Water Sector
Decontamination Strategy
April 13, 2010
-------
A CIPAC Water Sector Decontamination
Recommendations
Agency
• Who: WSD, SCC, & GCC
• Strategic Plan - October
2008 "
• Priority Issues (16)
• Recommendations (35)
Critical Infrastructure Partnership Advisory Council
Water Sector Decontamination Working group
RECOMMENDATIONS AND
PROPOSED STRATEGIC PLAN
WATER SECTOR DECONTAMINATION PRIORITIES
FINAL REPORT
OCTOBER 2008
[ April 13, 2010
3
&EPA Priority Decontamination Issues
United States
Agency
1 Containing and/or disposing of large amounts
of water
2
Near-term, practical solutions
3
Decontamination procedures for infrastructure
in treatment plants
4
Decision-making frameworks for
decontamination
5
Decontamination procedures for distribution
system
April 13, 2010 4
-------
4>EPA Priority Decontamination Issues, continued
United States
Environmental Protection
Agency
6 Outreach and training to utilities, partners,
and stakeholders
7 Utility communications to the public and
others on decontamination
8 Cleanup levels
9 Treatment procedures for contaminated
water and wastewater
10 Agent fate and transport
April 13, 2010
4>EPA Priority Decontamination Issues, continued
United States
Agency
11 Clarifying roles and responsibilities for
decontamination and treatment
12
Process for regulatory waivers/suspensions
13
Resources and assets for decontamination
and treatment
14
Laboratory analysis
15
Health and safety assessment for water and
wastewater treatment plant staff
16
Overarching decontamination needs*
* Identified by the Working Group but not included in recommendations
April 13, 2010 6
-------
v>EPA Disposal Guidance for the Water Sector
United States
Environmental Protection
Agency
CIPAC Decontamination Strategy Issue 1,
Recommendation 2
• Issue: Water Sector needs guidance on containment and/or
disposal of large amounts of contaminated water
• Recommendation: Revise existing
guidance or develop new guidance
for containment and disposal of
decontamination waste, including
large amounts of water and
associated solid waste
April 13, 2010
*>EPA
United States
Environmental Protection ¦
Agency
Containment and Disposal of Large
Amounts of Water: A Support Guide
for Water Utilities
April 13, 2010
-------
4>EPA Development Progress
United States
Agency
• White Paper
¦ Completed March 2009
¦ Reviewed by Internal Work Group
• Annotated Outline
¦ Reviewed by Internal Work Group and Stakeholders
(Remediation & Recovery Workshop)
• Draft Guide
¦ Select chemical, biological, and radiological (CBR)
contaminants
¦ Completed October 2009
¦ Reviewed by Internal WorkGroup
¦ Additional chemical contaminant groups and biotoxins
¦ In progress
¦ Reviewed by Internal WorkGroup
April 13, 2010 9
v>EPA Internal Work Group
United States ¦
Environmental Protection
Agency
• Work Group established in early 2009 to review and
contribute to development of the guide.
• Members include personnel from:
¦ ow
¦ OHS
¦ ORD-NHSRC
¦ OSWER - NDT, ORCR
¦ ORIA
¦ EPA Regions - Region 3
¦ OGC
¦ OSCs - Region 3 & Region 7
April 13, 2010
-------
v>EPA Support Guide Overview
United States ¦ 1
Environmental Protection
Agency
Scope
• Decision-making framework for disposal of CBR-confaminated water
• Overview of containment, treatment, and disposal options for drinking
water, wastewater, and stormwater systems
• Reference guide for development of a system-specific disposal plan for
contaminated water
• Disposal of solids not included - sufficient guidance available from other
EPA offices
Audience
• Primary - drinking water, wastewater, and stormwater utilities
• Secondary - decision makers involved with planning and disposal at the
federal, state, local, and tribal levels
April 13, 2010
&EPA Organization of the Guide
United States ^
environmental rruiecnon
Agency
1. Introduction
2. Containment and Disposal as Part
of Remediation and Recovery
3. Containment and Treatment of
Water
4. Disposal of Water
"'I . A
5. Storage and Transportation
1 M5P1
Appendices:
A. Risk Communication
B. Potential Treatment Methods
-Lj
C. Sample Disposal Checklist
D. Resources
E, Summary of Applicable Laws and
Regulations
F. References
April 13, 2010
12
-------
oEPA
Flowcharts
United States
Environmental Protection
Agency
Overview flowchart
of containment,
treatment, and
disposal
Separate,
expanded decision
trees for drinking
water systems and
wastewater/
storm water
systems are in the
guide
April 13, 2010
&EPA Contaminants Included
United States
Agency
• Sixty-nine contaminants of concern to the Water Sector
¦ Chemical
¦ Biological
¦ Biotoxin
¦ Radiological
• Selection of Contaminants
¦ Reviewed other areas in water security to identify appropriate
contaminants
¦ Received input on contaminants at the Remediation and
Recovery Workshop
April 13, 2010 14
-------
v>EPA Contaminants Included, continued
United States
Environmental Protection
Agency
Chemical
Biological
Biotoxin
Radiological
Hydrophobic
Bacteria
Algal Toxins
Alpha
Compounds
Viruses
Fungal Toxins
Beta
Pesticides
Protozoa
Bacterial Toxins
Gamma
Heavy Metals
Plant Toxins
Chemical Warfare
Agents
April 13, 2010
4>EPA Next Steps
United States
Agency
• Completion of internal review
• Review by external stakeholders - NACWA, WEF,
ASIWPCA, AWWA
• Determination of appropriate release
¦ Web site
¦ Access restrictions
• Projected completion in July 2010
| April 13, 2010
16
-------
4>EPA Thank You
United States
Agency
Thank you for your time and attention.
If you have any questions, please contact me at:
Lynch.Marissa@epa.gov
202-564-2761
April 13, 2010
17
-------
Threat Agent Disposal: Disposal Issues Following a CBRN Incident
Based on RDD and Anthrax Waste Disposal Workshops
Paul Kudarauskas, EPA/OSWER/OEM
-------
Kudaruskas
m mk \ US Environmental Protection Agency
| Office of Emergency Management
Threat Agent Disposal
Disposal Issues Following a CBRN Incident
Based on RDD and Anthrax Waste Disposal Workshops
Paul G. Kudarauskas
National Decontamination Team
Deconologist andT&D Specialist
April 13-15, 2010
2010 Decontamination Conference
EPA NHSRC - RTP, NC
Agenda
EPA Roles & Responsibilities
Threat Agent Disposal Work Group
Waste Disposal Workshops
Workshop Findings
¦ IBRD (Anthrax)
¦ Liberty RadEx (RDD)
Discussion
filip
i
-------
Kudaruskas
AV>d Sta,
s> m "«
| 1 EPA's Roles and Responsibility
K3
CBR threats are considered real risks to U.S.
security
EPA-specific responsibilities regarding
decontamination and disposal
Authorities:
¦ Homeland Security Presidential Directives
¦ HSPD-10: Biodefense for the 21st Century
¦ HSPD - 22: Domestic Chemical Defense (classified)
¦ National Response Framework
¦ ESF 10 - Oil and Hazardous Materials Response
<->EPA
2
-------
Kudaruskas
Aied st/)f
C^l^l THREAT AGENT DISPOSAL WORKGROUP
\w/
¦ EPA has identified three preparedness gaps related to terrorist
events involving chemical, biological or radiological (CBR) threat
agents
¦ Decontamination, Laboratory, and Disposal capacity
¦ Summer 2008 EPA convened the Threat Agent Disposal (TAD)
workgroup to examine the issue of disposal after a CBR event
¦ Significant barriers to disposal given the volume of waste
resulting from a wide-area and/or multiple simultaneous attacks
¦ The TAD workgroup, lead by OHS & ORCR was comprised of
representatives from several EPA offices and regions
\vEPA
EMERGENCY
WRESPONSES
WASTE DISPOSAL
State regulated
Case-by-Case
3
-------
Kudaruskas
/JSS
{$^21 TYPICAL SOURCES OF WASTE
\IPrdy
He# fuel elements
NPP Operabon
H
Reprocess^
Fuel elenwni fabrication
NPP Decommissioning
HLW
HifltHfiwi waste
(vririfSml)
~
Medicate, industry,
research
SF
Spam lue!
UJLW
low- art!
intermediate-
level waste
.11
aiifj
Intenm storage
TRU
Long-live'd
intermediate-
lew* waste
SF/HLW
i 1
TRU
—ml
Interim storage
Gecto^rai j^pcW
Repository for SHHLjWILW
--m-
Inl&nm storage
L/ILW
Geetopeal disposal
IUpa*itOfy ton LHLW
Situations we have
little or no
experience with
4
-------
Kudaruskas
St9f
(•l TAD Working Group Overview
¦Purpose:
¦ Examine the issue of disposal after a CBR-threat agent
event
¦Objectives:
1 .Identify the types and quantities of wastes typically
generated in CBR threat agent events,
2.Examine existing disposal options for that waste based
on current statutory and regulatory conditions, and
3.Examine barriers that the EPA encounters in
disposing waste
v5/EPA
EMERGENCY
^RESPONSE >!
AV>dSt,
I THREAT AGENT DISPOSAL WORKGROUP
Developed rough estimates of the order of magnitude of wastes that
would be generated in a "typical" CBR event.
In order to examine the barriers to disposal of waste generated in a
wide-area terrorist attack, the TAD workgroup established general
categories of waste based on an operational field approach
Category
Definition of Waste
1
Uncontaminated Waste (Solid Waste)
II
Verified Decontaminated/Treated Waste
III
Not Verified Decontaminated/Treated Waste
IV
Contaminated Waste
V
Decontamination Effluent/By-Products
VI
Problematic Waste
5
-------
Kudaruskas
AiedSfc
Barriers to Treatment & Disposal
¦The release of CBR agents introduces a host of challenges
related to the treatment and disposal of waste contaminated
with these agents.
¦Potential barriers and associated definitions identified for this
effort include:
¦ Regulatory I Statutory
¦ Policy / Guidance
¦ Technical I Scientific
¦ Socio-political
• Capacity
Threat Agent Disposal
Workshops
6
-------
Kudaruskas
Aiod St9,
nTtiSk*-
isSuZzJ Workshop Approach
¦ Key waste facility owners, haulers, waste associations,
and service providers and relevant officials at the local,
state, and federal levels
¦ Representation of waste-disposal ecosystem that included
transportation, disposal, treatment, and regulatory
components
¦ Include representatives from all relevant organizations,
companies, and agencies involved with the handling and
disposal of all forms of waste in order to provide a
comprehensive picture of waste management from the
initial response phases through the recovery phase.
¦ Baseline Assessment Interviews
v5/EPA
EMERGENCY
^RESPONSE >!
Aiod St9
/W'».
Workshops
\IPrdy
¦A series of three workshops
¦Each workshop focused on a specific
stakeholder group:
1. Waste facility owners, haulers, associations;
2. State and local agencies; and
3. Federal agencies
¦Identify and prioritize major concerns of each
group
¦Identify major concerns and needs to
support recovery and restoration efforts
vvEPA
EMERGENCY
^RESPONSE >!
7
-------
Kudaruskas
Ated Sf4y
Threat Agent Disposal Workshop
Anthrax - Based on the IBRD Scenario
jj.ed Sf#
/a'*
rs. ^ S
i Anthrax Workshop Objectives
Current state of preparedness for disposal of
anthrax-contaminated materials;
Capabilities, requirements, and limitations to
respond to and recovery from an anthrax
incident;
Issues of and barriers to disposal of biological
agent-contaminated waste; and
Develop a prioritized list of issues to be
addressed.
8
-------
Kudaruskas
St9f
g Workshop w/ Waste Facility Owners,
Haulers, Associations, and Service Providers
The individuals invited to the workshop represent
the private sector and a small cross section of
local public sector waste management and
regulatory authorities in the Seattle urban area.
Priority Issues:
¦ Planning
¦ Regulatory status of waste
¦ How is "clean verified"
¦ Education/Training
v5/EPA
EMERGENCY
^RESPONSE >!
^.ed Sty
Workshop w/ State and Local Participants
Six state and local agencies represented the City
of Seattle, King County, Snohomish County, and
the State of Washington participated
Priority Issues:
¦ Regulatory Ownership
¦ Behavior of Anthrax in Landfill Environment
¦ Lessons Learned
¦ Treatment in Place
9
-------
Kudaruskas
AV>d Sta,
if spu
/
Workshop w/ Federal Participants
¦Representatives from Fort Lewis, EPA
Headquarters and the Region 10 Office, and the
U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA)
participated in the Federal Workshop.
Priority Issues:
¦ Template/Decision Framework
¦ Research
¦ Waste Treatment and Disposal Pathway/
Regulations on Decontamination Agents
<->EPA
Threat Agent Disposal Workshop
RDD - Based on the Liberty RadEx Scenario
High
explosives
Radioactive materials
10
-------
Kudaruskas
AVidSt,,
Workshop Objectives
Understand the current state of preparedness (including
roles and responsibilities) in waste management and
disposal in the case of a RDD urban incident
Identify the issues and barriers of transportation, treatment,
and disposal of RDD waste (short- and long-term) and
priorities for addressing those issues
Develop a template for a City of Philadelphia waste
disposal management plan in case of a RDD urban
incident
Provide valuable information on waste disposal for
the Liberty RadEx /&epa^
Aiod St,
5> ¦
^IPrOS^
| Issues for Private Sector Participants
Regulatory Restrictions/Agreements/ Exceptions
Issues
Response Pre-planning
Scientific/Technological Issues
Communications
v'/EPA
11
-------
JOS
Ł | Issues for State and Local Participants
^blPrdtS^
¦ Waste Disposition Jurisdiction Issues
¦ Regulatory Restrictions/Agreements/ Exceptions
Issues
¦ Scientific/Technological Issues
¦ Ultimate Disposition Capacity Issues
¦ Communications Issues
{ Issues for Federal Participants
¦ Waste Disposition Jurisdiction Issues
¦ Regulatory Restrictions/Agreements/
Exceptions Issues
¦ Scientific/Technological Issues
¦ Ultimate Disposition Capacity Issues
/&EPA^
a EMERGENCY M
^RESPONSEX'
-------
Kudaruskas
13
Discussion
¦ Need/Interest for an interagency effort to finalize
issues/gaps, including through possible interagency
efforts?
¦ Disposition Capacity
¦ Regulatory Restrictions/Agreements/
¦ Waste Disposition Jurisdiction Issues
¦ Scientific/Technological Issues
¦ Need/Interest to address the dispo
issues in other exercises?
Suggestions for future consideratic
or collaboration of the TAD WG?
-------
Kudaruskas
AiedSfc
m
1 Contact Information
Paul G. Kudarauskas
Deconologist and T&D Specialist
USEPA - National Decon Team
Office: 202-564-2415
Email: Kudarauskas.Paul@epa.gov
f tit/Niiw** in hi (Unttinr*M,
EMERGENCY
jk RESPONSES
Questions?
Comments?
Criticisms?
14
-------
Update on the Validated Sampling Plan Work Group
Dino Mattorano, EPA/OSWER/OEM
-------
Mattorano
Update on the Validated
Sampling Flan Work Group
Dino Mattorano, MS, CIH
CDR/USPHS
National Decontamination Team
Office of Emergency Management
Dr. Randolph Long
Deputy Division Director
Chemical and Biological Division
Science & Technology Directorate
-------
Validated Environmental
Sampling Efforts
May 2006 hearing on Anthrax was
conducted before a House Subcommittee
• Based on GAO Report on Anthrax Detection
(GAO-05-251)
DHS assumed leadership role
• in developing interagency sampling strategy
Interagency working group (Validated Sampling Plan WG)
•DHS, EPA, CDC, DOD, FBI, NIST, and National Lab representatives.
Draft strategic plan outlines:
• agency responsibilities, milestones, required funding
• develop validated guidance for environmental bio sampling/analysis
across all phases of response
-------
Mattorano
Plan addresses the following major categories of activity:
• Sample collection methods for surface and air,
• Maintain sample integrity during transportation/storage
• Sample processing and analysis
• Sampling strategy
• Sampling and analysis plan exercise
• External peer review
-------
9
Sample Collection Methods and Strategics to
Characterize and Clear Biological Contamination
213--S
DISCOVERY OF EVENT
•Suspicious Material
•Report of medical
symptoms
•Detection of an agent by
environmental surveillance
system
~ L.
First
Response
Forensic
Investigation
•>Sample Strategy
> Sample Collection
>Sample Transportation
> Sample Analysis
Public Health
Investigation
Confirmed ID
•>Sample Strategy
> Sample Collection
— >-Sample Transportation
->Sample Analysis
CHARACTERIZATION
Site Contamination
Characterization
j ••••> Sample Strategy
> Sample Collection
— •—> Sample Transportation
> Sample Analysis
Decontamination
CLEARANCE
Re-Characterization
Yes
: "^Sample Strategy
J*-Sample Collection
...—¦•^~Sample Transportation
Sample Analysis
Viable Agent?
No
Site Clearance
¦wmw
¦It
-------
y»jj
¦ Validation
~ "Validation is the confirmation by examination and the provision
of objective evidence that the particular requirements for a
specific intended use are fulfilled." (ISO 17025)
¦ Sampling Strategy
~ a set of operating precepts and diagnostic tools
including sample collection methods; packaging and shipping
protocols; recovery, extraction, and analytical methods; and statistical
analysis packages
combined to confidently answer specific hypotheses
sampling strategy describes general guidance informed by a decision
support process
¦ Sampling Plan
~ a documented approach for field execution that captures
specific combination of operating precepts
diagnostic tools used for a given scenario to answer a specific
hypothesis.
¦ sampling plan, collection, recovery, transport (sample integrity), iBil
extraction and analysis refer to specific methodologies.
-------
Mattorano
Status of Sampling Strategy
• Joint EPA-CDC product (approx 100 pp)
• Edition 1 has been completed (fall 09):
• Response roles and responsibilities
• Development of sampling plan
• Worker safety and health
• Sample collection
• Sample documentation and data management
• Interface with laboratory networks
• Implementation of sampling plan
• Edition 2 (targeted for July 2010 completion) will:
• Incorporate sampling decision trees via contextual vignettes
• Improve organization
• be more robust tool for responders
-------
^7
Sampling Plan Exercise
Mattorano
VSP WG adopted as definition of "sampling plan:"
a documented approach for field execution
of operating precepts and diagnostic tools
specific hypothesis." A sampling plan is
addresses the sampling and analytical req
is formulated in accordance with the guidance of the sampling strategy.
• Objective: contaminate building, develop and execute sampling plan in
accordance with sampling strategy,,assess adequacy of approach
• Conducted exercise with B. atrophaeus at INL Sep 2007 and Sep 2008
• Enabled exercise of tools such as Visual Sample Plan and BROOM
-------
Mattorano
¦ I ¦ .O j
Statistically Defensible Sampling
Problem:
• How Many Samples Are
Needed?
• What is the Optimal Sampling
Approach?
To
Characterize magnitude and
extent of contamination?
Evaluate effectiveness of
decontamination?
Confidently demonstrate
cleanliness?
Visual Sample Plan Tool
-------
\w—
SL\ Visual Sample Plan (VSP)
Mattorano
SB
PR
Data Quality Objectives (DQO)
based systematic planning
software:
- to determine number and location of
samples
- to ensure confident, statistically
defensible decisions
- to perform statistical and data quality
assessment in support of decision
making process.
~ Sponsored by DHS, DOE, EPA,
DoD, UK, CDC
~ Free VSP Download at
http://dqo.pni.gov/vsp
\
-------
Building Restoration Operations
Optimization Model (BROOM)
Software to improve the efficiency of restoration
operations and enhance decision making
¦ Desktop
~ Design Sampling Plans
~ Access Sampling Results
~ 2D and 3D Visualization
~ Contamination Maps
~ Confidence Maps
¦ PDA
~ Display Facility Floor Plan
~ View Sampling Plan
~ Collect Surface, Bulk, and
Filter Samples
-------
Q
BROOM and VSP Integration
Visual Sample Plan
BROOM
j
SU.;.**!-!
i
• -jfi.
m
-------
Sampling plans and aids evaluated in practice
(2007 and 2008)
w
Abandoned but functional building civil Support Teams and First Responders
used for tests trained to conduct sampling
-------
¦jft BROOM
File Edit
A
Q Surface Samples
Concentration
Units: CFU/cm2
O null
O zero
~ 10"2
O 1 0"1
0 10°
O 101
» 102
A Negative
A Positive
Doors
I | Rooms
n Boundary
0 44555501-03. dwg (lines)
I—i PBF-632_floor_1b.jpg
'—'' (image)
Characterization sampling Test 4
Mattorano
• URNJia
oo
CD ••
ki ^ m ICD
i
J
I—D? TP ®
© ®
@ i0 qra
Ki ŁD
0 Q Q
CP
Lobby
101A
© (I)
INL2 Test4 Char
Building F'BF-632
Floor 1
(6.64 m.. 13.68 m l
o an ipies
Samples
i
i u.o I .'Jo hivi. odviny...ouiidue
10:32:25 AM: Saving... Surf ace
Dino Mattorano - Inb,,, '3 Intranet Home Page
Microsoft PowerPoint .
BROOM
,Jf? 10:33 AM
-------
¦jp BROOM
File Edit
Layers
0 Surface Samples
Clearance sampling Test 4
Mattorano
Quantity Measured
Units: CFU
O null
O zero
• 10-2
O 1 O"1
0 10°
O 101
O 102
A Negative
A Positive
Doors
f~l Rooms
n Boundary
0 44555501-03. dwg (line:
i—I PBF-632_floor_1b.jpg
'—'' (image)
D 33®.
&
FUHMACE
Q
•lm- i'J V-IP-11
m*
© ®
L
#1
© ®
Lobby
101A @
@
-------
Mattorano
Overall
¦ Collected 3,000 samples in 3 weeks
¦ 60 CST / first responders
¦ Analysis done on-site by DOD 9th AML
~ Both culture and per (10%)
¦ Some samples sent to CDC LRN (50 total)
¦ Successfully achieved dissemination gradient
¦ Successfully characterized contamination
¦ Successfully demonstrated decontamination
of facility
-------
NF \
-A-1| Observations from previous studies and eVOTTts
EPA summarized Bacillus anthracis related sampling and
decontamination efforts based on available published and unpublished
literature.
• 15 historical events were summarized
• Lessons learned from each event were captured
PNNL and NIST summarized previous Bacillus anthracis (or simulant)
chamber and controlled studies, and provided recommendations for a
future controlled study.
• Purpose was to characterize performance of methods for collecting,
storing and/or transporting, extracting, and analyzing samples from
surfaces contaminated by Ba or related simulants.
• Summary of previous studies shows significant gaps in the
performance information.
-------
0 1
mi
1
On-going Activities
Mattorano
• Controlled chamber study to improve statistics on
swab/wipe sampling limit of detection
• Development of algorithm to estimate uncertainty
across entire sampling and analysis process
• Studies on sample transportation and storage protocols
• Improved sampling and analysis methods
• Refinement of sampling strategy document
-------
Sampling and analysis data are only psnrt
of the solution
Sampling data are acquired to
inform decisions
Decision makers must assess
risk pursuant to decisions
DHS and EPA completed in 2009
document outlining risk optimization
and management approaches
to guide response and recovery
efforts
DRAFT
Planning Guidance for
Recovery Following
Biological Incidents
Homeland
Security
-------
Developing an Effective CBRN Decontamination Capability
Hasmitta Stewart, Government Decontamination Service (Fera)
-------
Stewart
Developing an Effective CORN Decontamination
Capability
U.S. EPA Decontamination Research &
Development Conference
April 2010
Dr Hasmitta Stewart
,eH#'
The Food and Environment
Research Agency
G
jk Government
Contents
• Background to Fera and GDS
• GDS Specialist Supplier Framework
• Development of decontamination capability
fem#'
UK Gavemrmini
The Food and Environment Deconlamfnallori
Research Agency
G
-------
Stewart
GDS Background
• GDS established as an Executive Agency of
DEFRA in October 2006
• Merged with Central Science Laboratory and
three other Defra regulators in April 2009 to form
the Food and Environment Research Agency
• Extensive network of contacts throughout UK
science base (Central Government, Dstl, HPA,
universities, private industry)
feIt#'
The Food and Environment
Research Agency
G
JK Gowrnrnoi
GDS Primary Functions
1. To provide advice, guidance and assistance on
decontamination related issues to responsible authorities in
their contingency planning for, and response to, CBRN (and
HAZMAT) incidents;
2. To maintain and build on the GDS Framework of specialist
suppliers and ensure that responsible authorities have access to
their services if the need arises;
3. To advise central Government on the national capability for the
decontamination of buildings, infrastructure, transport and open
environment, be a source of expertise in the event of a CBRN
incident or major release of HAZMAT materials.
fera,,//
The Food and Environment
Research Agency
G
-------
Stewart
Drivers for GDS
• UK Counter-terrorism Strategy (CONTEST)
http://securitv-homeoffice.aov.uk/news-publications/publication-search/science-
technoloqv/Science-Technoloqv-strateqy/index.html
• National Risk Assessment (NRA)
http://www.cabinetoffice.qov.uk/media/348986/nationalriskreqister-2010.pdf
fea#'
The Food and Environment
Research Agency
G
IK Gowmrnont
tocontamifialion
CONTEST - The 4 Pillars
Prevent
Pursue
Protect
Prepare
fera,,//
The Food and Environment
Research Agency
Reduce
threat
Reduce risk
Reduce
vulnerability
G
UK GavemrnoJii
-------
Stewart
National Risk Assessment
Mufor I nckialTiol
Attacks on
CrowdcKt
Plootin
wn ¦ onyanuoruM
Ir..n
Cynof /Mteickn
A:i i, h-
infmwuaufB
/ Armrool
\ D)Mtaa« /
fera
Relative Likelihood
The Food and Environment
Research Agency
G
jk Govemmortt
Development of Specialist Supplier Framework
•12 Specialist Suppliers with capabilities across the
CBR spectrum;
•Technologies routinely deployed in commercial use
•24 / 7 emergency response
•Security clearance (Company specific)
Challenge is to move these contractors from their
civil environments to CBRN environment (also major
HAZMAT)
fem#'
UK Gavemrmini
The Food and Environment Decontamfnallori
Research Agency
G
-------
Stewart
Development of Specialist Supplier Framework
Normal Environment
CT Environment
Industrial chemical spills and
asbestos removal
->
Deliberate releases of
chemical warfare agents
Clinical sterilisation and oil
extraction
->
Anthrax remediation
(dispersion of Bacillus
anthracis)
Nuclear power station
maintenance and
decommissioning
-»
Radiological dispersal &
improvised nuclear devices
feS#'
P
The Food and Environment
Research Agency
m ¦¦ UK Govemroorrt
Dooartemifiallm
Stages in the Development
Decontamination Capability
1. Routine work
2. Counter-terrorism paper-based exercises
3. Counter-terrorism practical exercises
4. Addressing gaps in Framework
fem#'
UK Gavemrmini
The Food and Environment Deconlamfnallon
Research Agency
G
-------
Stewart
Routine Work
p
m UK Gowrnrrvoni
Oeconha.'Tiif.alir.f,
The Food and Environment
Research Agency
Specialist Supplier Framework
Chemical
•Chemical contractors routinely deal with chemical spills and
routine HAZMAT incidents
• Some specialised decontamination technologies available
- current response limited to hazardous material
containment and removal
•Demolition of contaminated buildings and industrial sites
•PPE capability
fera^y
The Food and Environment
Research Agency
G
UK Gavemrmwil
Deconlaminaliorv
-------
Stewart
Specialist Supplier Framework
• Relative of a deceased man contacted Health
Protection Agency
• GDS received a request from a local authority
• Employment history indicated access to potential
hazardous chemicals
• Back garden chemistry laboratory
feja#'
The Food and Environment
Research Agency
G
jk Government
-------
Stewart
GDS paper-based exercises
The Food and Environment
Research Agency
G
jk Government
GDS scenarios
• Based on National Risk Assessment and CBRN
scenario vignettes
• Real world
• Paper based exercises
• Practical exercises
• Operational analysis
fem#'
UK GavemrnoJil
The Food and Environment Pf?cu
Research Agency
G
-------
Stewart
GDS paper-based exercises
• Ex HYDRATION - Vesicant release inside sports
stadium
• Ex STREETWISE - Radioisotope release in a
busy city centre
• Ex PIPE CLEAN - Vesicant release in
underground rail system
• Ex MAY FIRST- G Nerve agent release in
enclosed space
• Ex WOOLSORTER - Biological release in
enclosed space
The Food and Environment
Research Agency
G
jk Government
Exercise Hydration
NO PARKING
WRECTORS OMIY
-------
Stewart
Exercise Hydration
• Sunday 2nd December 2007.
• 43,000 fans attending Premiership soccer game.
• Broadcast live by Sky TV throughout the world.
• Three incidents occur just before half time.
fea#'
The Food and Environment
Research Agency
G
IK Gowmrnont
tocontamifialion
Exercise Hydration cont.
Sulphur Mustard released from soft drink bottles in
three different areas in the stadium causing
extensive contamination
fera
34®'
UK Gavemrmini
The Food and Environment Deconlamfnallon
Research Agency
G
-------
Stewart
-------
Stewart
Seating Area
-------
Stewart
willow water *
Exercise Hydration cont.
Gap
Effect
Action
Management, transport
& disposal of chemical
wastes.
Delays remediation and
significantly increases
costs
A specific Waste management
contractor recruited on the GDS
Framework who has sufficient
resource and capacity to be able
to deal with this issue
Limited knowledge of
the interaction of H with
common building
surfaces
Inability to assess:
production of toxic by-
products; depth of H
penetration
Inaccurate assessment
of risk to environment
and human health
R& D projects assessing CWA
absorption onto common building
surfaces
Limitations of current
detection equipment
No confidence in
ascertaining if
decontamination has
been effective
To be addressed by the counter
terrorism CBRN S & T
programme
-------
Stewart
Exercise Hydration cont.
Specific Recovery Issues
• Sampling and monitoring data from the
emergency phase
• Tolerability of Residual Hazards
• Availability of technical solutions from industry
• Use of military assets (assumed by contractors)
• R&D to close capability gaps
General Recovery Issues
Irrespective of the nature of the incident, the
following issues always come up:-
• Who pays?
• Lack of adequate insurance cover
• Waste management
• Multi-agency information sharing
• Media handling
• Management of expectations around the
decontamination process, cost and timescale
The Food and Environment
Research Agency
The Food and Environment
Research Agency
-------
Stewart
GDS Practical Exercises
fem^'
P
lL ¦¦
.>c--^cinl,jnil-i i n
The Food and Environment
Research Agency
Support to First Responders
• Mass decontamination structures
• Emergency service high-value assets
fera,,//
The Food and Environment
Research Agency
P
m UK Gavemmonl
-------
Stewart
GDS Practical Exercises
In preparation
• Release of G- nerve agent simulant in
office environment
• Release of Bacillus anthracis surrogate
in office environment
• Underground train systems - proposed
C,B and R
fea#'
The Food and Environment
Research Agency
G
IK Gowmrnont
tocontamifialion
Filling in gaps to the Framework
• Supply chain resilience
• Support directory
fera,,//
The Food and Environment
Research Agency
G _
Dcconlaminalirjn
-------
Stewart
Supply Chain resilience
Objectives
• Assess and hopefully improve supply chain resilience in
relation to each supplier's ability to respond to a CBRN
incident.
• Map the supply chain of each supplier (in respect of
equipment/PPE, services and staff),
• Identify any overlap between suppliers, and recommend
appropriate further action in response to the risks and
issues identified.
feja#'
The Food and Environment
Research Agency
G
jk Government
Support Directory
The directory is intended to identify companies who
have a role in the Chemical, Biological or Nuclear
Industries who can offer support and assistance, or who
work in a critical area of decontamination such as
laboratory analysis or contaminated waste storage,
transportation or disposal.
fera,,//
The Food and Environment
Research Agency
G
UK Gavemrmwil
Deconlamirtaliorv
-------
Stewart
Filling the gaps!
Science/Technology Capability
JK Government
The Food and Environment
Research Agency
Thank you
• Questions?
fera,,//
The Food and Environment
Research Agency
P
» UK Government
Decontamination
-------
Stewart
Government Decontamination Service
MOD Stafford
Beaconside
Stafford
Staffordshire
ST18 0AQ
England
For Information
08458 501323
www.gds.gov.uk
The Food and Environment
Research Agency
C
"N
¦¦ UK Govemrmmt
^#1 Hi
9 Si'.11 v 'CU
-------
US-Canada Bilateral Technical Working Group (TWG) for
CBRN Response and Recovery
G Blair Martin, EPA/ORD/APPCD
-------
Martin
U.S. - Canada Bilateral Technical Working
Group on CBRN Response and Recovery
By: Lance Brooks, Department of Homeland Security
Norman Yanofsky, DRDC Canada
G. Blair Martin, U.S. EPA, Office of Research and Development
John Cardarelli, U.S. EPA, National Decon Team
Presented at: 33rd AMOP Technical Seminar on Environmental
Contamination and Response
Halifax, Nova Scotia
June 7-9, 2010
BACKGROUND
• Concept of the TWG developed during 2001 B. antrhacis
(B.a.) response
• Provided advice to:
¦ Incident Commander
¦ On-Scene Coordinator
¦ Program Offices
• The TWG provided advice in four ways
¦ Document review
¦ Periodic meetings and teleconferences
¦ Recommendation of special studies
¦ On-site observation of the fumigation
RESEARCH & DEVELOPMENT
Building a scientific foundation for sound environmental decisions
l
-------
BACKGROUND
• Document review
¦ Federal Insecticide Fungicide and Rodenticide Act
(FIFRA)
• Remediation Action Plan (RAP)
• Sampling and Analysis Plan (SAP)
• Ambient Air Monitoring Plan (AAMP)
¦ RAP - process and treatment conditions
¦ SAP - process parameters and indicators
¦ AAMP - ambient health and safety monitoring
• Meetings and teleconferences
¦ Document comment resolution
¦ Process issue resolution
RESEARCH & DEVELOPMENT
Building a scientific foundation for sound environmental decisions
BACKGROUND
• Recommended special studies
¦ Process conditions
¦ Equipment design and functionality
¦ Performance issues
• On-site support during fumigation
¦ Pre-fumigation assessment of facility
¦ Observation of process installation
¦ Evaluation of comments on RAP and SAP
¦ Monitored progress of fumigation
¦ Provided advice on issue resolution
¦ Consultation with the Incident Commander
¦ Post-fumigation assessment of facility
RESEARCH & DEVELOPMENT
Building a scientific foundation for sound environmental decisions
-------
Martin
TWG OBSERVATIONS
• Whole is greater than the parts
¦ Diverse backgrounds provide innovative thinking
¦ However, challenging to forge a working solution
¦ Compromise and creativity necessary
¦ But don't try to think too far outside the box
• Communication is a key
¦ Face to Face meetings are ideal, but present logistic
and scheduling challenges
¦ Direct orientation on building characteristics is
essential
¦ Teleconferences can resolve some issues
¦ On-site document review expedites communication
RESEARCH & DEVELOPMENT
Building a scientific foundation for sound environmental decisions
TWG OBSERVATIONS
• TWG Membership
* Provide relevant expertise in 8 to 12 members
* Prior TWG experience desirable
* Scientific and technical support for clients
* Response expertise essential
• On-site TWG provides many benefits
¦ Understanding of process implementation
¦ Ability to advise Incident Commander on technical issues
¦ Advice on response to regulatory issues
¦ Direct interface with regulators, if necessary
¦ Suggest remedial actions when process conditions difficult
RESEARCH & DEVELOPMENT
Building a scientific foundation for sound environmental decisions
3
-------
Martin
FUTURE ROLE OF THE TWG
• For an Incident of National Significance a permanent
TWG could provide valuable assistance
® Ideally TWG should be on site for the duration of the
event - or at critical periods
• DHS/DTRA meeting with Australian CBRN counterparts
• Concept of bilateral TWG discussed
• Provide a greater range of resources for a response
• EPA representative asked to take lead
• Developed draft charter with Australian lead
• Discussed with Australia, UK and Canada
• DHS lead in developing international agreements
RESEARCH & DEVELOPMENT
Building a scientific foundation for sound environmental decisions
FUTURE ROLE OF THE TWG
• U. S. - Canada Agreement on Cooperation in Science and
Technology for Critical Infrastructure protection and Border
Security
¦ Chemical and Biological Detection and Defense Cooperative
Activity Agreement - June 1, 2004
¦ Technical Annex 2, January 31, 2010:
• CBRN Technical Working Group (TWG) for Remediation
• Incorporates draft TWG Charter
• Biennial meetings rotating geographically
• Coordinate with other meetings
• Provides access to both R&D and response experts
• Potential for other agreements:
¦ Bilaterals: United Kingdom or Australia
¦ Consequence Management Group of the QUAD
RESEARCH & DEVELOPMENT
Building a scientific foundation for sound environmental decisions
4
-------
FUTURE ROLE OF THE TWG
• Project Points of Contact
• United States:
• Lance Brooks, DHS, S&T
• Debbie Dietrich, EPA, OHS
• Cindy Sonich-Mullin, EPA, ORD
• Canada:
• Norman Yanofsky, DRDC Center for Security
Science
• EPA technical co-leads
• John Cardarelli, EPA, NDT
• Blair Martin, EPA, ORD
RESEARCH & DEVELOPMENT
Building a scientific foundation for sound environmental decisions
FUTURE ROLE OF THE TWG
• First meeting held before Decon Conference
• April 12. 2010
• EPA facility at Research Triangle Park, NC
• Initial TWG Members - core group to guide efforts
• U.S.
• Shawn Ryan, EPA, ORD - biological decon
• Emily Snyder , EPA, ORD - chemical and radiological decon
• Paul Lernieux. EPA, ORD - waste disposal
• Hiba Ernst - water issues
• Tonya Nichols - risk assessment
• Canada
• Patrick Lambert, Environment Canada
• Konstantin Volchek, Environment Canada
• Membership will be expanded to provide additional expertise on the
specific CBRN issue
RESEARCH & DEVELOPMENT
Building a scientific foundation for sound environmental decisions
-------
Analysis of Decontamination Strategies Following a
Wide-Area Biological Release in a Metropolitan Area
Robert Knowlton, Sandia National Laboratories
-------
Analysis of Decontamination Strategies
Following a Wide-Area Biological Release
in a Metropolitan Area
Robert Knowlton, Wayne Einfeid, and Mark Tucker
Sandia National Laboratories
Albuquerque, New Mexico
Sandia National Laboratories
Sandia is a multi-program laboratory operated by Sandia Corporation,
a Lockheed Martin Company, for the United States Department of Energy
under Contract DE-AC04-94AL85000.
Problem Statement
National Planning Scenario 2 deals with one or
more aerosol releases of anthrax in one or
more large metropolitan areas. There may be
10's of thousands of people affected,
thousands of buildings impacted, 10's of
square kilometers contaminated, and billions
of dollars in economic consequences.
Decontamination will be a significant
challenge.
-------
National Response to the 2001 Anthrax Letter
Attacks Was Costly and Time Consuming
Postal facilities, senate buildings, and
news organizations were contaminated
Very little experience decontaminating
large indoor facilities
CDC reports that over 125,000 samples
were tested at LRN laboratories costing
$25-30 mil.
Many facilities were closed for years
and restored at great cost
- Capitol Hill (4 mo, $42 mil.)
- Brentwood (26 mo, $130 mil.)
- US Postal Facilities (3+ yr, $800M)
A National Planning Scenario 2 response would be extremely complex and costly
Interagency Biological Restoration Demonstration
(IBRD) for Wide-Area Biological Release
The IBRD project has the following
objectives:
• Develop comprehensive guidance for
restoration and recovery following a National
Planning Scenario 2 attack, considering
civilian/military cooperation
• Evaluate the technology gaps that exist today
• Develop technology, where appropriate, to fill
these gaps, with an emphasis on saving time
and money in the restoration process
• Decision support tools have provided
valuable capability
IBRD Program Managers:
* Lance Brooks, DHS-S&T
• Ryan Madden, DoD-DTRA
Laboratory Participants:
* Sandia National Laboratories
~ Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
~ Pacific Northwest National Laboratory
Project funded by the Department of
Homeland Security - Science & Technology
and the Department of Defense - Defense
Threat Reduction Agency
I,
-------
Knowlton
A Suite of Decision Support Tools for Response and Recovery
PATH prioritizes
facilities and areas for
AWARE provides
the capability to
evaluate
decontamination
strategies
Pre-event Planning
Post-event Response
Hazard release
detected or
jisiiftpprted B
ADVISER is a response and
restoration decision
framework
GIS Engine collects & organizes
all relevant facility/area
information
IMAAC, BioWatch, Early
Characterization, used for initial
estimates of contaminated area
BROOM is used for data
collection/management/analysis
during all phases of restoration
AWARE an jRESTORe define and
m 11 hi wui U^remediation resources,
tactics; provides time and cost
estimates
Questions Asked by Decision Makers
Following a wide-area release:
resources available to restore the area will
likely be limited
• the time to complete restoration will likely
be lengthy, possibly years
Decision makers will want to know:
How long will the cleanup take so that
businesses will be functional again?
How much money and resources can the
feds provide?
Where do those resources get applied?
If additional resources were available,
could the restoration be done in less time?
What are the choke points in the process?
First Responders
& Sampling
Laboratory Analysis
Analyzer for Wide-Area Restoration Effectiveness (AWARE)
Has the capability to address these issues
Decontamination
-------
AWARE Capability
MgE i _>* < [
\ Utilizes Google Maps
Imagery
AWARE can import plume maps (e.g.,
IMAAC) or the user can scribe an area
of interest. Then a built-in building
database is mined to determine the
extent of possible
damage/contamination (e.g., area,
number of buildings, square footage
of indoor contamination, critical
infrastructure assets).
_
_
AWARE Capability
AWARE addresses the Consequence Management phase of response and
recovery, encompassing the following activities:
Once a site has been sampled, the
sampling teams can move on to
the next site even though the lab
results are not complete
not begin until
screening is complete
Decontamination does
not begin until all
laboratory analyses
are complete
fumigation is
prescribed by the user
based on degree of
Decontamination
(including surface decon,
fumigation & waste disposal)
Clearance sampling
does not begin until
decon is complete
Characterization
(including the ability to use
confidence-based statistical
sampling design)
Clearance
(including the ability to use
confidence-based statistical
sampling design)
Initial screening sampling
(consistent with BioWatch
Phase 2 sampling)
Decision rules are applied
within the AWARE resource
allocation and timeline
algorithms
-------
AWARE Capability
Users input information on available resources,
such as:
• Number of sampling teams available
• Number of samples needed for characterization
and clearance (answer the question: what
confidence is needed to assess if it is clean
enough for re-occupancy?)
• Laboratory throughput rate (# samples/day)
• Rate of surface treatment for decon
• Number of fumigation units available for decon
AWARE Capability
The approach to decontamination planning has the following assumptions:
- Outdoordecon occurs before indoor decori (to limit fomite transport)
- Buildingsare characterized as small, medium or large for the purpose of
scoping fumigation resources and time (the user sets the specifications)
- The degree to which a building
is contaminated is assumed to
have some relationship with
whethersurface treatmentor
fumigation will be employed
- The relative degree of
contamination in buildings is
assumed to be a normal
statistical distribution
- User supplied metrics
determinethe selection of
surface treatment vs
fumigation based on degree of
contamination
Relative Degree of Contamination in Buildings
The amount of spore infiltration into
buildings is highly uncertain
10
-------
Case Study A
• Hypothetical release scenario for Seattle
Remediation Units > i. ./
define
cleani
sequer
re
This hypothetical scenario has the
following characteristics:
• ~6 km2 outdoor area contaminated
• 1700+ buildings potentially contaminated
•1000+ residential buildings
• 50M+ ft2 of indoor area potentially
contaminated
> \ \ Ą/ / • » J •*#3.
Bbsx k Va \Jr a 7' i \ i ,
¦r \\ jy\} \ , v jj \\x-v y ,1 ' 1
m&tCy 11/> \ o 'ji
'iL
11
Case Study A
• Reasonable assumptions for resource allocations were assigned to this
scenario (e.g., only judgmental sampling during characterization,
confidence-based sampling during clearance (95% confidence that 95% of
the area is safe for re-occupancy))
• A key decon parameter input relates to the fact that only 3 large-scale
fumigation units exist in the US at this time
The apportionment of
surface treatment vs
fumigation is shown at
right
Surface Treatment
Relative Degree of Contamination in Buildings
12
-------
Knowlton
Case Study A
HJJ
| Remcdntion Unit Schedule
The gap betv
disposal an
due to ina
decon re
1
Time to complete
decon is approximately
550 days!
time (days)
e Remediation Ur
1 Bars represent the following activities:
| ~ Screening
Total time to restore
Seattle is approximately
1150 days!
I
e gap between decon
id clearance is due to
juate sampling &
Durces
Case Study B
Ail other parameters were kept the same as Case Study A, with the
exception that the number of fumigation units was increased by a factor
of 4
The apportionment of
surface treatment vs
fumigation is shown at
right
[
] Surface Treatment
Fumigation
II
? Very Low
Low
/
\ • »
| \ f ?
\ >
y
4 -3 -2 -1
0 12 3 4
Relative Degree of Contamination in Buildings
14
-------
Case Study B
| R«med>«tion Unit Schedule
max-
With 4 times more fumigation
units, the gap is considerably
narrower between waste
disposal and the start of decon,
total decon time is now 230
days, total restoration time is
still the same due to sampling &
laboratory analysis shortfalls
Case Study C
What if there were a risk-based standard for anthrax cleanup that was
greater than "zero culturable growth on all environmental samples"?
What if fumigation was only warranted for highly contaminated areas?
All other parameters kept the same as in Case Study B
The apportionment of
surface treatment vs
fumigation is shown at
right
[
] Surface Treatment
Fumigation
Relative Degree of Contamination in Buildings
16
-------
Case Study C
ia-1 :
Remediation Unit Schedule
With more surface treatment
and less fumigation, decon is
"200 days, total restoration time
is ~1000 days; clearance is still
the long pole in the tent
17
Case Study D
What if more sampling teams were available and the laboratory
throughput rate were increased , how would that affect the schedule?
For this scenario, 4 times more sampling teams (120 total) and 4 times the
laboratory throughput rate (1200 samples per day) were assumed
All other parameters kept the same as in Case Study C
The appc
surface
fumigatio
Note:
With over 50M square feet of building space, nearly 6
square kilometers of area, and a probability-based
statistical sampling design criteria for clearance that
supports a 95% confidence that 95% of the area is clear
for re-occupancy, there are over 1,000,000 samples to
collect!
Relative Degree of Contamination in Buildings
-------
Case Study D
Remediation Unit Schedule
With more
greater laI
rate, dec
Note:
• In meetings with decision makers in the Seattle
area, they are pushing for a 6 month cleanup time
for many business functions, due to the fact that
most leases have a force majeure clause that allows
businesses to vacate after 6 months! Obviously,
additional resources or policy changes would be
needed to accommodate this request, if even
possible (e.g., let owners perform decon).
storation
430 days
19
Decontamination Scenario Analysis
m
Characterization Phase
Clearance Phase
:
The PATH/AWARE tool can be used interactively to:
* identify resource deficiencies and chokepoints in the
system
* perform trade-off scenarios by varying the available
resources
* re-order the priorities for restoration activities, etc. to
yield an optimal time and cost for re-occupancy
20
-------
Additional AWARE Capabilities
Output from AWARE includes:
• Cost estimates
•Timelines by restoration phase
• Summary reports that document the
scenario and restoration activity estimates
3f-0ucs Summary
21
Take Away Message
• Response and recovery following a National Planning Scenario 2 incident
will be quite costly and time consuming
• The PATH/AWARE decision support tool provides insight to decision
makers, for pre-planning and post-incident consequence management
activities
• These tools provide a means of estimating resource requirements (e.g.,
number of fumigation units needed, laboratory throughput capacity, etc.)
and may provide the basis for a more efficient response and recovery
effort (e.g., reducing cost and time)
• Analyses with tools like PATH/AWARE may lead to policy changes
• These tools would be beneficial to decision makers in multiple
jurisdictions and agencies/departments; however, a transition pathway
has yet to be defined and supported
22
-------
Backup
Slides
23
GIS and Database Capabilities in PATH/AWARE
Think Geo Geographical Information
System (GIS)
¦ Fully-functional GIS
¦ Utilizes Google map suite
¦ Custom graphical user interface
(GUI) elements
Microsoft's Structured Query Language
(SQL) database
¦ Secure network access
¦ Large data storage
¦ Tax assessor data, HSIP data,
HAZUS data, etc.
Enabling software chosen not only for
functionality, but also so there are no
licensing costs to end users
-------
PATH Capabilities
The PATH module allows decision makers to
prioritize critical infrastructure for
restoration
Critical infrastructure objectives associated
with restoration include:
Maintain public health
Maintain public safety
Maintain economy
Minimize environmental impact
Maintain national security
Protect property
Prioritization is performed by weighting
objectives and associated functions while
considering dependencies and special
conditions (e.g., work-arounds)
Reporting results in a number of formats,
including:
¦ Graphical
¦ Summary PowerPoint presentation
The PATH methodology may be
used for any hazard, not just bio
-------
Interactive Decision Framework for Consequence Management
Robert Greenwalt, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
Presentation not available for distribution
-------
Optimization Approaches and Issues Associated With
Late-Phase Recovery Following Radiological or Nuclear Events
S. Y. Chen, Argonne National Laboratory
-------
Chen
Argonne
' NATION A1
... for a brighter future
UChicago^
Argonne
Office of
llMlClRIP
Nillosal Council on RadtaUen Pralsctioe & MiaiuremenSs
Optimization Approaches and Issues
Associated with Late-Phase
Recovery Following Radiological or
Nuclear Events
Presented at
2010 US EPA Decontamination Research
and Development Conference
April 12-15, 2010
Durham, North Carolina
S.Y. Chen, PhD, CHP
Environmental Science Division
Argonne National Laboratory, Argonne, IL
T.S. Tenforde, PhD
National Council on Radiation Protection and
Measurements, Bethesda, MD
€
B
RDD and IND May Derive
from Many Sources
"Radiological Dispersal Device"
(RDD) refers to any method
used to deliberately disperse
radioactive material in the
environment in order to cause
harm.
"Improvised Nuclear
Device" (IND) refers to any
device incorporating
radioactive materials
designed to result in the
dispersal of radioactive
material or in the formation
of nuclear-yield reaction.
llMIClRlP
Nation! Council an RaAstHn Protection & Measurements
/
x>
9
i. !' -} -
gonnej
i
-------
Chen
The Radiological Emergency Response
and Management Are Represented in
Three Sequential Phases
NCRP
Nitloul Council w RadMttwi PrattctiM i Measurement '
Early Phase
• Within hours to i
• Control oT frourc
• Stabilize the environment
• Early phav PAGs
Time 0
llncktont Occur«fl|
Argonnej
Intermediate Phase
• Between weeks to months
• Source release under contra
• Environmonl stabilized
• Intermediate phase PAGa
• Between
months to years
• Return o
• Latepha
wlronment to unrestricted use
e PAG {under development)
Time Line from Incident
Guidelines on Radiological
Consequence Management
Are Being Developed
Protective Actions
Activities that may be conducted in response to a nuclear incident in
order to reduce or eliminate exposure to members of the public to
radiation or other hazards.
Protective Action Guides (PAGs)
The projected dose(s) to a reference individual from an accidental
release "of radioactive material at which a specific protective action to
reduce or avoid that dose is expected to be warranted.
Operational Guidelines
Operational guidelines are levels of radiation or concentrations of
radionuclides that can be accurately measured by radiation
detection and monitoring equipment, and then related to Protective
Action Guides to quickly determine if actions for protection of the
public need to be implemented.
J
IimIcIrIpI
National Council on RadUtto Protection S Measurements v°*'
2
-------
Chen
IimIcIrIp
Latest Protective Action Guides (PAGs) Issued By the
Department of Homeland Security for RDD and IND*
PHASE
Protective Action
PAG
Early
Sheltering-in-place or
evacuation of the public
Administration of
prophylactic drugs -
potassium iodine
Administration of other
prophylactic drugs or
decorporation agents
1 to 5 rem projected dose
5 rem projected dose to child
thyroid
Intermediate
Relocation of the public
Food interdiction
Drinking water interdiction
2 rem projected dose first year.
Subsequent yeas, 0.5 rem/y
projected dose.
0.5 rem projected dose or 5 rem to
any individual organ or tissue in
the first year, whichever is limiting.
0.5 rem projected dose in the first
year
*The final version of the guidance, Planning Guidance for Protection and Recovery Following Radiological Disposal Device
(RDD) and Improvised Nuclear Device (IND) Incidents, was published by DHS in Federal Register, Vol. 73, No. 149
(August 1, 2008). It is to be noted that it does not contain a PAG for the Late Phase.
Argonnej
The DHS Guidance Lacks A PAG
for the Late Phase
llMlClRlPl
& Measurement
I
What is needed: Guidance on long-term (late-phase) cleanup
following an event
What is recommended: Site-specific optimization process for
reaching the cleanup criteria (in lieu of a specific PAG)
Why: Extreme flexibility needed to address wide-range impacts
and effort for the cleanup in various scenarios
How: Involving stakeholders in reaching acceptable cleanup
criteria
Remaining issues: In need of specific framework and
mechanism to support the optimization process
3
-------
Chen
The "Optimization" Process Requires
A Multi-Faceted Effort
¦ Key Considerations
- Pubic Health
- Social Economies
National Security
- Public Welfare
r Communication
¦ Decision Process
- A Graded Approach
Qualitative and Quantitative Assessments
- Evaluation of Remedial Options
• Cost-Benefit Analysis
• Technology Evaluation
• Short- and Long-Term Feasibility
• Land Use Options
- Stakeholder Involvement
- Implementation of the Decision
llMlClFtlPf
Assessing Potential Impacts for the
Late-Phase Actions Involves Many
Complex Issues
llMIClRlPl
Cleanup Criteria (i
Relevant Issues and
Competing Factors
•Wide-area cleanup issues
•Availability of effective cleanup
technologies
•Non-specific cleanup criteria
(long term health risks)
•Accommodation with existing
cleanup statutory requirements
•Waste generation and disposal
issues
•Potential cleanup costs
•Inexperience in managing the
late-phase activities
•Competing priorities of the society
4
-------
Chen
Recent Reports on Long-Term !mc|B.Ie!
Recovery
¦ GAO Report (JAN 2010) - Report to Congressional Committees
"COMBATING NUCLEAR TERRORISM - ACTIONS NEEDED
TO BETTER PREPARE TO RECOVER FROM POSSIBLE
ATTACKS USING RADIOLOGICAL OR NUCLEAR
MATERIALS"
¦ Homeland Security Affairs Journal, Paper (JAN 2010) - S.Y.
Chen and T.S. Tenforde
"OPTIMIZATION APPROACH TO DECISION MAKING ON
LONG-TERM CLEANUP AND SITE RESTORATION
FOLLOWING A NUCLEAR OR RADIOLOGICAL TERRORISM
INCIDENT"
Issues Identified IimIcIrIpI
i Measurement
The Nation's current preparedness for recovery phase
is deficient
Inadequate research focus on radiological events
Existing technology base, although extensive, does not
necessarily address event-specific situations
Current decision-making process for recovery (i.e., site
cleanup) may not be well suited for event situations
The "optimization" approach will need to incorporate
many factors to reach (multi-faceted) cleanup
decisions
Need to develop a national disaster recovery strategy
I
4
gonne*
5
-------
Chen
Cleanup of Urban Area
Presents Special Challenges
llMIClRIP
National Council oa RmSmimd PralecUoa I Meaturemen
Statutory cleanup requirements such as
CERCLA have applied mostly to non-
urban areas
No clear federal guidance on long-term
recovery phase
Policy on radioactive waste disposal
may not be applicable
Recovery effort faces competing
priorities
Returning the society to "normalcy"
becomes the top priority
Argonnej
IimIcIrIpKX
Technology for Wide-Area Cleanup is Yet to
Be Fully Tested and Proven
Key Considerations
¦ Applicability
¦ Availability
¦ Efficacy
¦ Efficiency
¦ Reliability
¦ Life-Cycle Costs
¦ Secondary Waste Generation
¦ Long-Term Considerations
a
6
-------
Chen
Lessons Learned from
Past Events
Level 7 Large offsite release with
widespread health and environmental
effects. Example: Chernobyl Event
(1986), Ukraine.
Level 6 Significant offsite release
requiring full implementation of
planned countermeasures.
Example: Kyshtym event at Mayak
(1957), former Soviet Union.
Level 5 Limited offsite release
requiring partial implementation
of planned countermeasures.
Example: Three Mile Island
accident (1979), United States
IMICIRIP
Naliocal Council m RaAslwn Protection & Measurements
7-Major Accident
6 - Serious Accident
5 - Accident With Wider Consequences
4 - Accident With Local Consequences
3 - Serious Incident
2 - Incident
1 - Anomaly
0 - Deviation (No Safety Significance)
International Nuclear Event Scale (IAEA)
Past Experiences Offer
Valuable Lessons
S Q 0) OXQ KC3S
©
WTPIINATIONAI ATOMIC fWRGV AQCHCY. VIENNA. »S88
IimIcIrIpI
National Council on Radiation Protection ft Measurements
Goiania. Brazil
Incident occurred in 1987, involving
Cs-137 as source
Total 1,375 Ci; 1,200 Ci recovered
4 deaths and many injured
Total waste volume 3,500 m3
Took 3 months to complete
decontamination on main area of
0.4 mi2 (or 1 km2)
7 houses demolished
Contaminated soils removed
42 houses decontaminated
- High pressure water jet outside
- Vacuum cleaning inside
- Various chemical methods
used
7
-------
Chen
Past Experiences Offer
Valuable Lessons (Cont'd)
(Source: BBC News)
*1 Council on RuMUm ProlMllw A Measurements
Chernobyl. Ukraine
Nuclear power plant accident in
1986
About 380 MCi released (43 MCi J-
131 and 2.3 MCi Cs-137); 400
times the atomic bomb release at
Hiroshima, Japan in WWII
56 people died and 4,000 estimated
latent cancer deaths
Very widespread contamination
Cs contamination presented a
major challenge
About 90% Cs retained in soil for
the first 5 years
High-pressure washing reduced
doses by 10-40%
Other technologies showed various
levels of effectiveness
Argonnej
Further Developments Needed
NCRP
NjmuI CoukiI n Raluiw Prolectioa 1 MeavuremenU v
Policy Development - Need to Address Emergency Situation
- Property Condemnation
- Economic Assistance.
Radioactive Waste Generation, Storage and Disposal
- Cleanup Requirement against Current Statutory Policies
Scientific Research and Technology Development
- Short-Term vs. Long-Term Contamination
- Environmental Fate and Transport in Urban Setting
- Technology Involving the Wide-Area Contamination
Understanding the "Real World" Problems
Potential Impacts and Implications
- Assessing Magnitude of Impacts
- Impacts Implications on Land-Use, Technical Feasibility, Costs, Cost-
Effectiveness, and Public Acceptance
Stakeholder Involvement
Desire to Return Life to Normalcy in Timely Manner
- Perception of Residual Radioactivity
- Potential Cleanup Costs Involved
8
-------
Chen
Current Federal Cleanup Guidance 11\||CIRIP
Is Part of the Optimization Process
¦ Current Cleanup Guidance
- EPA CERCLA (i.e., Superfund) cleanup
- NRC License Termination Rule (10 CFR 20, Subpart E)
- DOE cleanup of nuclear weapons complex
¦ Major Differences with Event-Related Situations
- Incident vs. non-incident situations
- Urban vs. rural contamination
- Above ground vs. subsurface contamination
- Cleanup costs and funding mechanisms
- Applicability of current regulatory requirements
- Allocation of other priorities vs. long-term health risks
- Involvement of different stakeholder groups
More Recovery Exercises Needed
llMlClRl
National Council on RadMUon Protection & Measurements '
Liberty RadEx
National Tier 2 Full-Scale Radiological Dispersion Device Exercis
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania April 26-30,2010
Lead Agency: EPA
(ESF #10)
Liberty RadEx...what is it?
Liberty RadEx is a national exercise sponsored and designed by the US Environmental Protection
Agency {EPA) to practice and test federal, state and local assessment and cleanup capabilities in the
aftermath of a radiological dispersion device (also known as a RDD or "dirty bomb") incident in an
urban environment. Most exercises only focus on the first hours and days of a response. Liberty
RadEx is unique in that participants will practice their "post-emergency" phase responsibilities and
coordination, and work with stakeholders and the public to plan for community recovery. Liberty
RadEx provides the opportunity to share information and procedures while strengthening relationships
among federal, state and local partners in Pennsylvania and adjoining states.
EPA Mobile Command Post
Cleanup and assessment
Exercising the National Response Framework (NRF):
Unfortunately, disasters can happen anywhere. The NRF was written to ensure a consistent national
response and coordinate the roles and responsibilities of the local, state, and federal government
during large and small disasters. The Department of Homeland Security National Exercise Program
(NEP) is designed to test the nation's ability to respond to natural and man-made disasters.
El land) of the incident;
i/SArmycofpt ng radiological assessment, hazardous
ire, infrastructure restoration, public
land hazardous materials response; and
lnity recovery.
4
Q(&xdGLx.
9
-------
Chen
Related NCRP Publications
llMlClRlPl
Nillnnal Council on Radullen Prolectlna & Measurements
Reports Published
¦ Report No. 138, Management of Terrorist Events Involving Radioactive Material
(2001)
¦ Commentary No. 19, Key Elements of Preparing Emergency Responders for
Nuclear and Radiological Terrorism (2005)
¦ Commentary No. 20, Radiation Protection and Measurement Issues Related to
Cargo Scanning with Accelerator-Produced High-Energy X Rays (2008).
¦ Report No. 146, Approaches to Risk Management in Remediation of Radioactively
Contaminated Sites (2004)
Report Under Development
¦ Report on Responding to Radiological and Nuclear Terrorism: A Guide for
Decision Makers.
Recommendations
llMlClRlP
» RldlllMII PlOlKtlM A MUUIICIMnh
Develop Further Guidance on for Optimization Process
- Principles and Approach to Optimization
Key Components and Parameters
- Technical Basis and Requirements
- Implementation Procedures
Develop Case Examples
Develop National Disaster Recovery Strategy
Identify and Address Relevant Issues
- Address Policy Needs
- Fill Technical Gaps and Provide Assessment Tools
- Vet the Issues through Recovery Exercises (lor RDD)
• Liberty RadEx (April 2010, Lead by EPA)
Obtain Lessons Learned
10
-------
Transport of Bacillus Thuringiensis Var. Kurstaki (Btk)
From an Outdoor Release Into Buildings
Kristin Ombergfor Sheila Van Cuyk, Los Alamos National Laboratory
-------
Van Cuyk
Tnmspon of BrjdJJiJs thurjrjcperjsls
m kuj'smid (Bik) irum un Ouidooi'
RefcriSfe Inio
Sheifilp^nf Cuyk, Ph.Dr—
Ins Engineering and Integration Group
Los Mamos National Laboratory
Sprit l" 2010
Los Alamos
NATIONAL LABORATORY
IM-I3R 10-02013
Operated by Los Alamos National Security, LLC for DOE/NNSA
Gypsy Moths
The culprit...
... looks pretty harmless.
Los Alamos
national lAtoftATQW' UNCLASSIFIED Images from www.acgov.org and www.forestrylmages.org slide 2
Operated by Los Alamos National Security, LLC for NNSA
l
-------
Van Cuyk
Consequences of gypsy moths
1 *¦ - re.
f* |S/f "% v *
rjv j!, '•*' j rj» / ™ • -V:
" .^LlK *» >¦_"'' A.»
• LosAlamos
national iftioKAtOxT UNCLASSIFIED
Slide 3
Operated by Los Alamos National Security, LLC for NNSA Hk
Biological warfare (on gypsy moths)
Bacillus thuringiensis
var. kurstaki (Btk)
I <
5\.Zm
1 (Jin
Bt toxin crystals
- U
u 'A
i < &
Los Alamos
NATIONAL iA»O*AT0*V
Operated by Los Alamos National Security, LLC for NNSA
UNCLASSIFIED
T4BS&
2
-------
Van Cuyk
Btk spraying provides a unique opportunity to study
environmental fate following a biological release
¦ Btk shares many physical and biological properties with
Bacillus anthracis
¦ Bounding scenario—other agents likely less persistent
¦ May not be an ideal release scenario
Droplets are very large
Droplet size distribution estimated (log-normal assumed)
Clumping is desirable
Wind speed, direction only known at regional scale;
conditions unstable; local wind fields and turbulence not
known
¦ Adequate for evaluating environmental fate
/-\
/—•)
Los Alamos
Operated by Los Alamos National Security, LLC for NNSA
JNiVS^
Interagency Biological Restoration Demonstration (IBRD)
¦ US Department of Homeland Security & Defense Threat Reduction Agency
¦ Develop policies, approaches, methods, plans and applied technologies to restore
large urban areas, Department of Defense installations and critical infrastructure
following the release of a biological agent
¦ Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) is using spraying for gypsy moth control in
Fairfax, VA to characterize long-term fate of Btk in urban environments
How long does the agent remain viable at detectable levels?
What is the approximate magnitude and duration of resuspension?
Does the agent transport into buildings?
/-\
/—•)
Los Alamos
Operated by Los Alamos National Security, LLC for NNSA
T»VS&.
3
-------
Van Cuyk
LANL is using Fairfax, VA gypsy moth to characterize
long-term fate of Btk in urban environments
¦ Fairfax, VA, 2008
— Does Btk enter buildings?
¦ Fairfax, VA, 2009
— Develop a method to (rapidly) determine if a building has been contaminated
/-\
/—•)
Los Alamos
Operated by Los Alamos National Security, LLC for NNSA
JNiVS^
Building infiltration studies in Fairfax, VA, 2009
Evaluate sampling strategies to determine building infiltration and contamination
Develop a method for the rapid triage (rule-in) of buildings for remediation
¦ Collect building samples within one week after spraying
Sample types:
• vacuum sock (primarily floors)
• 3M trace evidence filter (HVAC)
• swipes (elevator buttons, monitors, other targeted locations)
• booty (shoe covers from samplers)
¦ One-time sample collection
¦ BROOM used to generate floor sample locations
¦ Tracking of samples using BROOM (when possible)
¦ CONTAM (Sandia National Lab) used to model building contamination
¦ PSUs placed on or near five buildings. Designed to be a positive control (turned on
before spraying, turned off during building sampling)
¦~m Samples cultured with B.t. selective media, confirmed as Btk by PCR
Los Alamos
Slide 8
3WSA
Operated by Los Alamos National Security, LLC for NNSA
4
-------
Van Cuyk
S«M0lMN2i-Nn
48 Total samples
Booty (4)
Swipe (6)
Vacuum sock (36)
3M trace evidence: (2)
/ii
/—}
Los Alamos
NATIOWAl IMOSATO**
Operated by Los Alamos National Security, LLC for NNSA
National Wildlife Federation
¦ 11100 Wildlife Center Drive, Reston,
VA
¦ Built in 2000
¦ Modern/green construction
¦ Rooftop HVAC system (2 AHUs)
¦ Three floors
¦ PSU placed on roof
S2J (SWIPE)
H2H (SWIPE)
R 2? (SWIPE)
37 Total samples
Booty (1)
Swipe (8)
Vacuum sock (26)
3M trace evidence (2)
-—i
Los Alamos
NATIOSAl i*»O*AT0*V
Operated by Los Alamos National Security, LLC for NNSA
13^1
Freddie Mac, Reston 1
¦ 1771 Business Center Drive,
Reston, VA
¦ Built in 1980s
¦ Approximately 300-400 occupants
and visitors to this location daily
¦ Three floors and six rooftop HVAC
systems
¦ No windows open
¦ Approximately 68,000 ft2
Freddie Mac, Reston 1 First level floor, delivery entrance
5
-------
Van Cuyk
Freddie Mac, Reston 2
1769 Business Center Drive, Reston, VA
Built in 1980s
Approximately 50 occupants
Three floors and two rooftop HVAC
systems
No windows open
Approximately 35,000 ft2
PSU placed on ground
22 Total samples
Booty (1)
Swipe (1)
Vacuum sock (18)
3\i u nci' evidence (2)
O
Los Alamos
tAiORATtiftlT
Freddie Mac. Reston 2 First level llcwr, sample ideations
P •MHStai
y
XJ.'l "•*'! H f
BMP.
I life
3 J
Operated by Los Alamos National Security, LLC for NNSA
3II/QinetiQ
¦ 1765 and 1767 Business Center Drive, Reston, VA
¦ Builtinl984
¦ Approximately 150-180 occupants
¦ Two buildings in one: structure, two floors
connected by stairwell
¦ Rooftop HVAC system (2 AHUs)
¦ No windows open
¦ Approximately 40,000 ft2
¦ PSU placed on roof
52 Total samples
Booty (4)
Swipe (7)
Vacuum sock (39)
3M u nci' evidence (2)
-—i
Los Alamos
NATIOHAl i*»Q*ATO«V
Operated by Los Alamos National Security, LLC for NNSA
Qinetk|/3H upper level lloor sampliftglootioEvs
SuHllpM l l i l
_
10,
11,23, M", H.
176.1 Ft us iiu-^s C rnter Drivf, VA 20190- I liner I.pvpI
lunnr Pinii
6
-------
Van Cuyk
Digital Really Trust first floor, sample locations
17 Total samples
Booty (1)
Swipe (3)
Vacuum sock (13)
/I
/—j
Los Alamos
UtMMAtg'RT
Operated by Los Alamos National Security, LLC for NNSA
Digital Really Trust
¦ 1807 Michael Faraday Court, Reston, VA
¦ Built in 1980s
¦ 2 occupants, with occasional drop-in staff
¦ Two floors
¦ No HVAC system
¦ No windows open
¦ PSU placed on roof
14 Total samples
Swipe (3)
Vacuum sock (5)
3M trace evidence (6)
Los Alamos
NATIOSAl 14»O*AT0*V
Operated by Los Alamos National Security, LLC for NNSA
Engineering Building
¦ Business Center Drive, Reston, VA
¦ Built in 1980s
¦ 4 occupants
¦ One floor with large truck bay
¦ Rooftop HVAC system
¦ Windows open
7
-------
Van Cuyk
Mason Governmental Center
¦ 6507 Columbia Pike, Annandale, VA
¦ Builtin 1980s
¦ Open 24-hrs
¦ Community rooms and Fairfax County
Police Headquarters
¦ One floor
¦ Four rooftop HVAC system
¦ Windows open
¦ PSU place at ground level
32 Total samples
Booty (2)
Swipe (5)
Vacuum sock (22)
3M trace evidence (3)
-—>
Los Alamos
(MORATORY"
Operated by Los Alamos National Security, LLC for NNSA
2009 Building Infiltration Results
Los Alamos
NATIOSAl lAtORATORV
Operated by Los Alamos National Security, LLC for NNSA
8
-------
Van Cuyk
Building Samples Results: by sample type
Total
number of
samples
Number of
positive
samples
Percent
positive
Total
224
149
66.5
3M
18
16
88.9
Booty
13
6
46.2
Swipe
33
17
51.5
Vacuum sock
160
110
68.8
—y
Los Alamos
Operated by Los Alamos National Security, LLC for NNSA
rwsm.
Building Samples Results: by location
Percent positive
3H
QinetiQ
Freddie
Mac/
Reston 1
National
Wildlife
Federation
Mason
Government
Building
Freddie
Mac/
Reston 2
Engineer -
ing
Building
Digital
Realty
Trust
All samples
46.2
67.6
81.3
68.8
77.3
64.3
64.7
Booty
50.0
0
50.0
0
100
n/a
100
Wipe
42.9
37.5
83.3
60.0
0
0
100
Vacuum
sock
46.2
76.9
83.3
72.7
77.8
80.0
53.8
3M filter
50.0
100
100
100
100
83.3
n/a
n/a indicates no samples of this type were taken from this location
^—y
Los Alamos
Operated by Los Alamos National Security, LLC for NNSA
jvjsa
9
-------
Van Cuyk
3M Trace Evidence: Inside vs. outside air by building
3M Trace Evidence HVAC Samples
~ Outside Air
iBOiil
2
Los Alamos
i*to«ATO*r
Comparison of inside air side of HVAC filter (concentration in
GFU/ML) and outside air concentration of 3M trace evidence
samples from buildings (notey-axis logarithmic scale).
Operated by Los Alamos National Security, LLC for NNSA
National Wildlife Federation
Main entrance
Quantity Measured
(CFU/ML extract)
o Nufi o io3
• Zero oiO4
• 10° ©10=
O ioi #1Q6
O io2
Sample type
©Vacuum sock
(D Swipe
10
-------
Van Cuyk
Delivery entrance
Delivery entrance
Freddie Mac, Reston 1
Sample type
Quantity Measured
(CFU/ML extract)
©Vacuum sock
(D Swipe
Q Null
• Zero
• 10°
O io3
O 10
O 105
• 106
inical room
IcOMf/AND CEN"ER
Delivery entrance
Delivery entrance
Sample type
©Vacuum sock
® Swipe
Freddie Mac, Reston 2
Quantity Measured
(CFU/ML extract)
O NuN O io3
• Zero O io4
• io° Oiqb
O ioi #1Q6
O io2
First Floor
Second Floor
11
-------
Van Cuyk
Lower level entrance
Stairwell connecting N.
"buildings" \
Electric room corridor
3H/QinetiQ, lower level
Sample type
©Vacuum sock
(D Swipe
Quantity Measured
(CFU/ML extract)
O Null
# Zero
• 10°
O 101
O io3
O ML
O 105
• io6
and "entrance"
Sample type
Quantity Measured
(CFU/ML extract)
©Vacuum sock
(D Swipe
3H/QinetiQ, upper level
• Zero
9 io°
O io1
O io2
¦'—rr~1
Lower level entrance
Cafe entrance
12
-------
Van Cuyk
Digital Realty Trust
Sample type
©Vacuum sock
(D Swipe
Quantity Measured
(CFU/ML extract)
O Nul1 O io3
• Zero q 104
• 10° Oi05
O 101 #1Q6
O io2
Ł±tt
Main entrance
Engineering building
(not to scale)
Sample type
©Vacuum sock
(D Swipe
Quantity Measured
(CFU/ML extract)
O Null
# Zero
# 10°
O 101
O
' I nading dock entrance
Operated by Los Alamos National Security, LLC for NNSA
O io3
_Q_LQi.
O 10=
• 106
Main entrance
13
-------
Van Cuyk
Mason Governmental Center
Sample type
©Vacuum sock
(D Swipe
Quantity Measured
(CFU/ML extract)
O Null
# Zero
• 10°
O 101
O io2
O io3
01Q.2.
Q iq5
• io6
5H H
Main Community Entrance
Modeling and Simulation
Sandia National Laboratory: EacDAC model of deposition in buildings
Modeled 3H/QinetiQ facility accounting for entryway, window, walls,
and HVAC flow paths
Each infiltration mechanism was isolated by fixing relevant
parameters, (e.g., increasing filter efficiency of HVAC)
Simulations run using Monte Carlo techniques (1000 scenarios/run)
Characterized deposition in terms of extent of contamination and
integrated deposition
Simulated experimental release and identify primary infiltration
mechanisms
window?
Correlated infiltration mechanism with building characteristics
HVAC
o
ps 1
° ° c
Los Alamos
NATIOSAl 14»O*AT0*V
Operated by Los Alamos National Security, LLC for NNSA
°§°o°
entryway
14
-------
Van Cuyk
Simulation parameters
¦
Experimental measurements and QUIC generated plume maps were Used to define
key parameter values
¦
Limited to modeling infiltration from initial release, does not account for tracking or
reraerosolization
¦
Ambient Conditions
Temperature = 53 - 71
¦
Release characteristics
• Large particle agglomerates, homogenous concentrations (large, elevated release)
Mean Particle size = 60pm ( Low = 20pm, High = 80pm)
3H facility exposed to steady concentrations of Sx llH g/iii3 for 8 minutes
¦
Variables
HVAC settings (e.g;, mixing, return and exhaust schedules)
Door status = 0 - 0.2.(% open)
/->
A-} »
• Los Alamos
NATIOKAI l*»o«4,J0*Y Slide 29
Operated by Los Alamos National Security, LLC for NNSA Hk
Infiltration via windows
(50 spores/m2)
Infiltration via HVAC
(690 spores/m2)
Simulated experimental release
(330,000 spores/m2)
Infiltration via ent
(330,000 spores/m2)
Operated by Los Alamos National Security, LLC for NNSA
Modeling indicates entryways are predominant
contamination mechanism
15
-------
Van Cuyk
Btk scenario results and conclusions
¦ Entryways are most likely the dominant mechanism for building infiltration
(tracking may also significantly contribute)
¦ Areas adjacent to entryways and well connected zones (e.g., reception areas,
hallways are high probability locations for surface contamination)
¦ HVAC systems act as effective distribution systems but are a poor mechanism
for infiltration
¦ Inoperable windows do not pose a significant risk of infiltration
¦ Results are representative of the experimental release conditions only. For a
weaponized release, additional experiments are needed
¦ With decrease particle size, models predict increased infiltrations, increased
HVAC contribution to infiltration, and decreased deposition within building
/-\
/—•)
Los Alamos
Operated by Los Alamos National Security, LLC for NNSA
74SS&.
Building sampling "rules of thumb"
¦ Where to sample to rapidly determine if a building is contaminated
Entryway(s)
— Primary entryways should be sampled
— Large area vacuum sock sample
• HVAC filter(s)
— If small number of HVAC, sample all filters
— If large number of HVAC or access limitations
Sample based on operational information (HVAC system on?)
Sample based on locations (lower level HVAC first, then higher)
— Sample inside air side if HVAC is designed for biological filtration (e.g.,
HEP A)
— Sample outside air side of all other or if unknown
— Sample > 1 m2 area using 3M trace evidence filter
/-\
/—•)
Los Alamos
Operated by Los Alamos National Security, LLC for NNSA
T»VS&.
16
-------
Van Cuyk
Summary
¦ Experimental testing shows ability to collect viable sample from all entryways using
vacuum sock sampling
¦ Modeling and testing support entryways as dominant mechanism of infiltration
following agent release
¦ Rules of thumb for sampling of buildings allow for a rapid method to quickly "rule in" a
building as contaminated following a bioagent release
Vacuum sample large area of main entryways
Sample HVAC filter (outside air side of filter unless HEPA, then inside air side)
/-\
/—•)
Los Alamos
Operated by Los Alamos National Security, LLC for NNSA
T»VS&.
Acknowledgements
¦ Defense Threat Reduction Agency,
¦
Fairfax County, VA
Chemical & Biological Defense Applied
~ Mr. Troy Shaw, Mr. Frank Finch and
Technologies Division
Mr. Larry Nichols
¦ Los Alamos National Laboratory
¦
National Wildlife Federation
~ Mr. Steve Johnsen
~ Alina Deshpande
~ La Verne Gallegos-Graves
¦
3H Technologies/QinetiQ
~ Attelia Hollander
Mr. Dan Ayed
• Kristin Omberg (Project Lead)
¦
Freddie Mac
~ Larry Ticknor
P. Scott White
¦
Digital Realty Trust
~ Mr. Bobby Lambert
¦ S andi a N ati onal L ab or at ori es
~ David Franco
~ Nate Gleason
~ Bob Knowlton
Brad Melton
~ Nerayo Teclemariam
¦ P acific N orthwest N ati onal L ab or at ory
• Brent Pulsipher
)
• Los Alamos
NATIONAL lAiO«ATO*V
Slide 34
Operated by Los Alamos National Security, LLC for NNSA
T4XSA
17
-------
Van Cuyk
Thank you
Los Alamos
i*to«ATO*r
Operated by Los Alamos National Security, LLC for NNSA
TslfS®.
Ie6
spores
Los Alamos
NATIONAL 14»O*AT0*V
Operated by Los Alamos National Security, LLC for NNSA
Simulation Results: Deposition map of 3H for
infiltration via entryways
¦ Avg. integrated
concentration = 330,000
spores/m2
¦ High levels of
contamination (multiple
entryways, minimal
filtration effects)
¦ Widespread
contamination (multiple
entryways)
¦ Infiltration via entryways
results in significant
levels of interior
contamination
' enario deposition map
18
-------
Van Cuyk
Simulation Results: Deposition map of 3H for
infiltration via the HVAC system
¦ Avg, integrated
concentration = 690
spores/m2
¦ Low levels of surface
contamination (large
particles are effectively
filtered out)
Widespread
contamination in well
connected areas
¦ Infiltration through the
HVAC may significantly
contribute to indoor
contamination; the HVAC
is an effective distribution
system
Surface contamination
Single scenario deposition map
1000
spores
Avg. deposition map
Los Alamos
i*to«ATO*r
Operated by Los Alamos National Security, LLC for NNSA
TslfS®.
1000
spores
Los Alamos
NATIOSAl 14»O*AT0*V
Operated by Los Alamos National Security, LLC for NNSA
Simulation Results: Deposition map of 3H for
infiltration via windows
¦ Low levels of
contamination
(inoperable windows,
large particles)
¦ Avg, integrated
concentration = 50
spores/m2
¦ Localized contamination
in locations with large
window areas
¦ Infiltration through
windows does not
significantly contribute to
building contamination
scenario deposition map
Avg. deposition map
19
-------
Transport of Bioaersols Into a Regional Transit System—
Implications for Characterization
Michael Dillon, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
Presentation not available for distribution
-------
Mitigation and Containment of Contaminant Spread
Jacky Rosati, EPA/ORD/NHSRC
-------
Rosati
oEPA
United Stales
Environmental Protection
Agency
Mitigation and Containment of
Contaminant Spread
Jacky Ann Rosati and Russ Wiener
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
National Homeland Security Research Center
Decontamination and Consequence Management Division
nOS u Jr. 1 August 19, 2010
unice oi Research and Development
National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequence Management Division
&EPA
United Slates
Environmental Protection
Agency
Movement of a Particle based Agent
Release
Dispersion
Infiltration
Deposition
'ResuspensionN
& Tracking
Exposure
Office of Research and Development
National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequence Management Division
1
-------
Rosati
svEPA
Protection
Release & Dispersion
Controlled Release Studies (wind tunnel)
• Large scale PM based contaminant release
• Outdoor conditions (wind, dew, etc)
ja
Deposition & reentrainment on outdoor surfaces
• Efficiency of ambient samplers
Office of Research and Development
National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequence Management Division
oEPA
Protection
Release & Dispersion
100' x 60'
(4m x 4m cross-section)
Office of Research and Development
National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequence Management Division
-------
Rosati
&EPA
United Stales
Ewlronm*ntal Protection
Agoncy
Release & Dispersion
Field Studies
• Traffic emissions surrogate for outdoor released agent
• Characterize concentration movements with varied distance
from highway
*
• Model urban transport, dispersion, and infiltration
• Determine extent of decontamination required
Office of Research and Development
National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequence Management Division 4
oEPA
Unilod Stales
Eiwlronfnontol Protection
Agency
Release & Dispersion
Field Study Site
in Brooklyn, NY
Office of Research and Development
National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequence Management Division 5
3
-------
Rosati
svEPA
United Stales
Environmental Protection
Agoncy
Release & Dispersion
Wind Speed vs. Infiltration Time
(Second Floor Back Room)
2500
sSE- 2000
a 1500
'5 iooo
500
Wind Speed (m/s)
Office of Research and Development
National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequence Management Division 6
SEPA
United Stylos
Environmental Protection
Agnncy
Infiltration
• How is infiltration to the indoors affected by:
• Building design,
• Ambient conditions
• Building shell
*
• Determine best way to mitigate penetration
• Minimize human exposure and decontamination
Office of Research and Development
National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequence Management Division 7
4
-------
Rosati
Two Compartment Chamber for Infiltration Studies
&EPA
United Stales
Environmental Protection
Aguncy
Office of Research and Development
National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequence Management Division
Office of Research and Development
National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequence Management Division
oEPA
Uniloii Slates
Environmental Protection
Agency
Infiltration
Exterior commercial walls to
separate the compartments
5
-------
Rosati
svEPA
United Stales
Environmental Protection
Agnncy
¦a
a>
i
a>
(0
a>
(S
Ph
^9
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
Removal of Particles from Infiltrating Air
By Building Shell
0.02
0.5
Microns
Office of Research and Development
National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequence Management Division
svEPA
United S
Environmental Protection
Agoncy
Surface Deposition
Understand how materials deposit on and adhere to surfaces:
• Outdoor (bldg materials, road, vegetation, soil)
• Indoor (flooring, windows, walls)
*
Speed of clean up (likelihood of resuspension)
• Likelihood of tracking
• Sampling method
• Decontamination method
Office of Research and Development
National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequence Management Division
-------
Rosati
&EPA
Adhesion
•Atomic Force Microscopy (AFM) used to determine particle
adhesion forces to complex surfaces,
•Surface roughness data obtained.
•Data correlated to develop removal and sampling efficiencies
Ł
•Advise appropriate sampling methods.
• Assess reaerosolization and exposure risk
Office of Research and Development
National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequence Management Division
&EPA
United Slates
Environmental Protection
Agency
AFM probe
Surfa«
AFM probe
AFM tip with
particles adhered
Surface roughness,
elasticity
Office of Research and Development
National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequence Management Division
7
-------
Rosati
1000 -
500 -
300 -
200 -
100 -
z
50 -
a
30 -
p
o
20 -
b
io -
5 -
3 -
2 -
Thornburg, Han and Rosati, AAAR, 2007
C, G, V C, G, V C, G, V
Si02 Bg ATD
C = Carpet G = Glass V = Vinyl
Combined electrostatic
and
van der Waals forces
Silicon dioxide (Si02)
and Arizona Test Dust
(ATD) adhesion forces
mainly meniscus van
der Waals forces.
Bacillus globulii (Bg)
spores and polystyrene
latex spheres - lowest
forces due to negative
surface charge and
hydrophobic nature
Si02 and ATD adhesion
to glass high due to
material similarity
SEPA
United Sidles
Environmental Protection
Agoncy
Resuspension and Tracking
• Resuspension and tracking of particulate matter (PM)
primary modes of movement indoors - e.g., anthrax
attack/cleanup at Hart Senate Office Building
• Experiments conducted to characterize:
• resuspension and tracking
• impact of environmental conditions
• Computational particulate fluid dynamics (CPFD ) model
developed from experimental data
X
Guide response to particle based release
Office of Research and Development
National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequence Management Division 15
8
-------
Rosati
&EPA
s
»l
Stepping on Particle Contaminated Surface
• Particles picked up by foot surface during uplift
• Dust falls from bottom of foot/shoe surface
• Rotating motion causes turbulence under foot
• Flow rapidly moves toward front of foot
• Cotton socks and Tyvek booties pick up significantly
more particles than rubber soled shoe.
• More particles adhesion/drop - more re-entrainment
I Office of Research and Development
| National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequence Management Division 16
Resuspension
Field and Chamber Tests
• Used real world 'dirty' carpet, seeded carpet and
seeded flooring surfaces.
• Walking and concurrent sampling.
S T
-------
Rosati
&EPA
Tracking
Characterize tracking of particles from outdoors
to indoors
1 Determined how non-airborne materials move
around and become 'available' for resuspension
Office of Research and Development
National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequence Management Division
&EPA
United Slates
Environmental Protection
Agency
Field Work - Evaluation of tracking at
indoor sites using 'track off carpet at
entrances.
Segment 4
121 m m 131 m
0 Q 0 Q 171'
Segment 2
Segment 1
9 in2 grid for
Micro Vac
samples
Chamber Work - Similar
setup to field work but
controlled envir onment
with 'seeded' shoes.
Office of Research and Development
National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequence Management Division
10
-------
Rosati
&EPA
Tracking
• 40-80% of mass on shoe transferred to carpet
on first step after loading
• Subsequent steps transfer ~ 2% each
• -1% of mass in carpet transferred to shoe at
each step
• PM tracking dependent on weather conditions,
i.e., wetness of tracked material.
Office of Research and Development
National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequence Management Division
&EPA
United Slates
Environmental Protection
Agency
Exposure
1 1J 1 ""j
II ' E KB
IK'- > rifi
l 1' i M
[ I iHMk
¦ ^ -
" - ¦ ^
Heated breathing mannequin
Office of Research and Development
National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequence Management Division
11
-------
Rosati
&EPA „
Exposure
3-D model of human respiratory system
Office of Research and Development
National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequence Management Division
Un ilprt Steles
Questions??
By working in multiple areas - comprehensively gather data to
answer questions about contaminant spread, spread mitigation
and public protection
DISCLAIMER:
The views expressed in this presentation are those of the authors and do not necessarily
reflect: the views or policies of the U.S. EPA
Office of Research and Development
National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequence Management Division 23
12
-------
The Brooklyn Traffic Real-Time Ambient Pollutant Penetration and
Environmental Dispersion (B-TRAPPED) Study
Russell Wiener, EPA/ORD/NHSRC
-------
Wiener
V/
EPA
United Stales
Eiwironm«W9l Protection
Agency
The Brooklyn Traffic Real-Time Ambient Pollutant
Penetration and Environmental Dispersion
(B-TRAPPED) Study
Journal of
Environmental
Monitoring
Themed issue: A real-time study of
airborne particulate dispersion in
urban canyons.
JEM 11:12:2113-2206 (Dec. 2009)
Russell W. Wiener, Ph.D.
The 2010 US EPA Decontamination Research and
Development Conference, April 14, 2010, Raleigh, NC
Office of Research and Development
National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequence Management Division
U-
r_
II III: 11
itSCFuWul
oEPA
United Stales
Environmontal Protection
Agoncy
The Brooklyn Traffic Real-Time
Ambient Pollutant
Penetration and Environmental
Dispersion
(B TRAPPED) Study
Russell W. Wiener, Ph.D.
Disclaimer:
Although this work has been funded wholly by the United States
Environmental Protection Agency, it does not necessarily reflect the
views of the Agency. Mention of trade names or commercial products
does not constitute endorsement or recommendation for use.
Office of Research and Development
National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequence Management Division
vtED Sjp
Si pRCfl&
-------
Wiener
~EPA 3-D View of Plume 100 uCi/m2 Zone
n 1
TOPOFF4 National Level Exercise FRMAC
Source: TOPOFF4 National Level Exercise FRMAC
Office of Research and Development
National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequence Management Division
TOPOFF4 RDD Event Plume
Ot action
TOPOFF4 National Level Exercise FRMAC
Unituri Slates
Ewironiriontal Protection
Agency
Source: TOPOFF4 National Level Exercise FRMAC
Office of Research and Development
National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequence Management Division
2
-------
Wiener
&EPA
United Stales
Environmental Protection
Brooklyn Traffic Real-Time Ambient
Pollutant Penetration & Environmental
Dispersion Field Study Site
SUNSET PARK
Office of Research and Development
National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequence Management Division 4
Google Earth
\>EPA Sampling Locations
UniMSuln M.
Office of Research and Development
National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequence Management Division
-------
Wiener
&EPA
Sampling Locations
Google Earth
II h K' .
TRL 10
Office of Research and Development
National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequence Management Division
&EPA Concentration distribution by
time and location
Urwlofj Slates
Environmental Protection
Agoncy
0.025
0015
OB01
~ B02
Ł003
XB05
X BOB
*B07
~ B09
B10
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24
Sampling time (h)
4
-------
Wiener
&EFA Atmospheric Boundary Layer Wind
United Sidles ¦¦¦ %/ %/
Environmental Protection rr* 1 * j 1 HiT * 11 1 | n f 11
Iunnel with Neighborhood Model
Office of Research and Development
National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequence Management Division 8
Atmospheric Boundary Layer Wind
Tunnel with Neighborhood Model
Office of Research and Development
National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequence Management Division
-------
Wiener
&EPA
Atmospheric Boundary Layer Wind Tunnel with
Neighborhood Model - Laser Light Sheet
Office of Research and Development
National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequence Management Division
&EPA
United Slates
Environmental Protection
Agency
CFD Model Layout
y = 2.5 H
> Wind
direction
I I
I I
a
3 H
I I
•¦e
2H
n h
_L «
1.3 H
I I
* 8 H
t
Note: II is the height of the 3 story building
I Office of Research and Development
| National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequence Management Division
6
-------
Wiener
&EPA
Coefficient of Pressure from CFD in the
(A) y/H Vi 2.5 Plane and (B) x/H XA 0 plane
Y/H
Office of Research and Development
National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequence Management Division
oEPA
Unilwl Slates
fnvlronfnoprtol Protection
Computational Fluid Dynamic
Dispersion Modeling Performed on
Neighborhood Simulation
U/Uo=1
Office of Research and Development
National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequence Management Division 13
7
-------
Wiener
&EPA
-10
Mean velocity vectors
measured using LDV
at z/H = 0.5
l ~
I
I
\
a to
X/H
Office of Research and Development
National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequence Management Division
&EPA
United Slates
Ewironiriontal Protection
Agency
"Infinite" Line Source Concentration
A) Avenue B
(x = 0.67H)
Office of Research anu ueveiupumiu
National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequence Management Division
B) Avenue C
(x = 10.3H
%
8
-------
Wiener
&EPA
I Stales
y
Townhouse Schematic by floor
m 1
Office of Research and Development
National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequence Management Division
&EPA
UnilmJ Stales
Environmental Protection
Agoncy
Vertical Profile of Townhouse
Natural infittfation pathways
2nd noof
• ¦I j
Bfcl
c, f~Z ^-"1«
' ""B* t3-
Ground
level
^Mixing
Ian*
1st floor
STDJ io~c.
Portable
fitter
4-
np
II -r
Basement
workspace
mi am
Office of l\e»ean.ii aim ucvciujjiiicui
National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequence Management Division
9
-------
Wiener
Infiltration Rate vs Rooftop
Environmental Protection
Wind Speed
0 005
- C 003
0.002
0.001
12 3 4
Mean rooftop wind speed (ms-1)
Office of Research and Development
National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequence Management Division
&EPA
United Slates
Eiwlronfnontal Protection
Agoncv
e 0-6
0.4
S 0 2
Mean rooftop-level wind speed vs.
PM concentration fluctuation Intensity
y=3 257?)r'™
fl3 = 0
~ 107m
A 330m
* 370m
Power
1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5
Mean rooftop-level wind speed, JFK NWS (m s 1}
Concentration fluctuation intensity is the ratio of the standard deviation (SD) of
the concentration time-series data to the time-averaged mean concentration
Office of Research and Development
National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequence Management Division
10
-------
Wiener
0.4
0,2
S 0
5
O)
5 *02
o
-0.4
-0.6
-0.8
-8000 -6000 -4000 -2000 0 2000 4000 6000 8000
Lag (s)
Lag Time for Infiltration of
Particles into Townhouse
&EPA
United Stales
Environmental Protection
Agoncy
I Office of Research and Development
| National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequence Management Division
&EPA
United Stales
Envlronfnonts
Agoncy
35000
30000
tr-
E
r 25000
S 20000
15000
10000
5000
Particle Concentrations
I Outdoors
~ First floor front room
~ Shelter-in-p!ace area
EL
JZL
3 4
Field study day
I Office of Rracaii^u anu L/Cv ciupiiicni
| National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequence Management Division
11
-------
Wiener
svEPA
ii rroiectlon
US EPA's Aerosol Test Facility
(ATF)
at Research Triangle Park, NC
•Wind tunnels, chambers, and
laboratories aerosol testing.
•Responsible for PM2 5 Standard
STRAPPED
-Brooklyn Traffic Real-Time Ambient Pollutant
Penetration and Environmental Dispersion Study
Office of Research and Development
National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequence Management Division
&EPA US EPA's Aerosol Test Facility
United Suits ^
(at Research Triangle Park, NC)
United S
Environmental Promotion
Agoncy
Why do we need an ATF?
- Develop quantitative standards for aerosol measurement
• Biological, Toxic, or Radiological particles
• Quality assurance for existing methods
- Develop and evaluate dispersion models to determine human
exposure
- Provide predictive models for wide area contamination and
decontamination
• Development
• Validation
Office of Research and Development
National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequence Management Division
12
-------
Wiener
&EPA
United Stales
Environmental Protection
Aerosol Wind Tunnel
¦ Office of Research and Development
| National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequence Management Division
oEPA
i™!™*'.™, US EPA's Aerosol Test Facility at Research
Agency */
Triangle Park
Aerosol Test Facility Research Areas
-Human exposure measurement
-Indoor Air Studies
-Ambient Air and Field Studies
- Exposure Simulation
-Aerosol infiltration and penetration studies
Office of Research and Development
National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequence Management Division 25
13
-------
Wiener
&EPA
Human Exposure Test Dummies
K
'
Office of Research and Development
National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequence Management Division
&EPA
United Slates
Ewironiriontal Protection
Agency
Partnership Opportunities
Study fluid and aerosol motion to base
scientific decisions
-Only large aerosol wind tunnel in the US
-Scaled for adult human exposure testing
using heated-breathing manikins
Ability to design and test
-Monitors and Sampling Technologies
-Models of human exposure
-Dispersion models
-Field and laboratory studies for wide area
decontamination and prediction
Office of Research and Development
National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequence Management Division
14
-------
Assessment of Liquid and Physical Decontamination Methods for
Surfaces Contaminated With Bacillus Spores
Shawn P. Ryan, EPA/ORD/NHSRC
-------
Ryan
"EPA
Wl
United Stales
Environmental Protection
Agoricy
Assessment of Liquid and Physical
Decontamination Methods for
Environmental Surfaces Contaminated
with Bacillus Spores
Shawn P. Ryan1. M. Worth Calfee1, Leroy Mickelsen2, Stephen Tomasino3,
Carlton Kempter3, Mike Nalipinski4, Curtis Snook2, Ted Bazenas4,
Dahman Touati5, Stella Payne5, and Matt Clayton5
1 US EPA/ORD/National Homeland Security Research Center
2 US EPA/OS WER/OEM/National Decontamination Team
3 US EPA/Office of Prevention, Pesticides and Toxic Substances
4 US EPA/Region 1 (New England)
5 ARCADIS-US, Inc.
April 14, 2010
Office of Research and Development r
National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequence Management Division
oEPA Capability Enhancement: Effective
Unituri Slates
Environmental Protection
Agency
Surface Decon Procedures
How effective are surface decontamination procedures for
materials contaminated with Bacillus spores?
Office of Research and Development
National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequence Management Division
-------
Ryan
Project Purpose/Objectives
Environmental PfcrtflCtlon » 1 *
Challenge/Need:
- Decontamination of complex surfaces using liquid disinfectants/sterilants
and physical methods
Objectives:
- Quantitative measurement of residual viable spores
• Surfaces
• Rinsate
• Air samples
- Determination of log reduction (LR)
- Development of a combination of procedural steps providing the
desired effectiveness and applicability
Office of Research and Development
National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequence Management Division
oEPA General Laboratory Sporicidal
Efficacy Studies - Other Studies
Spore suspension
Liquid inoculation
Treatment
- Spray application
- Immersion
- Fumigation
Neutralization
Extraction
Analysis of colony forming units
Calculation of log reduction
sprayer
coupons
Office of Research and Development
National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequence Management Division
2
-------
Ryan
Office of Research and Development
National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequence Management Division
&EPA Surface Decon Procedure
Based upon Danbury, CT Shed
Unituri Slates
Ewironiriontal Protection
Agency
1) Vacuum
2) Wet with pH-adjusted bleach solution (10 minutes)
3) Wash with detergent solution (TSP)
4) Rinse with water
5) Vacuum standing water
6) Maintain wet with pH-adjusted bleach solution (e.g., 30 or 60 minutes)
7) Rinse with water
8) Vacuum standing water
Office of Research and Development
National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequence Management Division
oEPA Field Application of Surface
Decontamination Methods
• Combinations of methods
- Surface decontamination
- Fumigation
• Field Decontamination
-Danbury, CT shed (surface)
- Danbury, CT house (surface/fumigation)
-Capitol Hill (surface/fumigation)
- AMI facility (fumigation)
- P&DC's (surface/fumigation)
3
-------
Ryan
&EPA
Surface Decon Procedure:
Field ^ Lab
Complex application procedures
- Quality Assurance/Quality Control (QA/'QC)
• Data quality indicators for vacuuming, bleach spraying, rinsing with
water and scrubbing with a brush or sponge
• Repeatability
• Reliability
Development of novel test methods
- Aerosol deposition of spores on surfaces
- Spray chamber for controlled decon application
- Collection of rinsate and air sampling
- Use of field sampling methods
- Material coupon sizes suitable for decon and field sampling methods
Office of Research and Development
National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequence Management Division
&EPA
United Slates
Ewironiriontal Protection
Agency
Test Materials
Contamination:
- Bacillus atrophaeus (ATCC 9732) spores deposited onto surfaces
Spore preparation as cited in Brown et al., App. Environ. Microbiol. 2007, 73 (3) 707.
- Target recovery of 1E7 viable spores/sampled area (1 sq ft)
Materials (14 in x 14 in):
Painted Dry Wall
(vertical and horizontal)
stainless Stee
(Contamination Control)
k Wood
(horizontal)
Rough-cut Wood
(vertical)
Office of Research and Development
National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequence Management Division
-------
Ryan
Office of Research and Development
National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequence Management Division
• Wet wipe (PBS with 0.05% Tween-20)
• Complex materials
- Porous
• Rough
• Smooth
- Hard, non-porous (smooth)
&EPA
Vacuum sock
Sampling Methods?
oEPA Sampling Method Comparison for
Aerosol Deposition
United Slates
Environmental Protection
Agency
l.E+08
O l.E+07
Q.
E l.E+06
re
¦35 l.E+05
3
U. l.E+04
O
l.E+03
U)
*5 l.E+02
>
< l.E+01
l.E+00
Wipe Sampling
~ Vacuum sampling
stainless painted
steel wallboard
carpet rough-cut Sealed concrete
wood deck wood
Office of Research and Development
National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequence Management Division
5
-------
Ryan
&EPA
Experiment Timeline
Day 0
Day 1
Day 2
Day 3
Day 4
r
Coupon
Preparation
M
Coupon
Contamination
Decon
Application
Sampling
Coupon
Drying
J
Analysis
Recovery of
Rinsate and
Air Samples
Analysis
Office of Research and Development
National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequence Management Division
&EPA
United Slates
Environmental Protection
Agency
Spray Chamber
Office of Research and Development
National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequence Management Division
-------
Ryan
svEPA
United S
Environmental Protection
Agoncy
Full 8-Step Surface
Decon Procedures Results
c
¦B 5
u
13
"O
-------
Ryan
&EPA
l.E+05
l.E+04
d l.E+03
l.E+02
1 E+01
l.E+OO
8-Step and 5-Step Surface
Decon Procedures: Rinsate
I Concrete-v
I Concrete-h
I Painted Wallboard-v
I Painted Wallboard-h
Rough-cut Wood-v
~ Carpet-h
¦ Deck Wood-h
Full 8-Step
5-Step
Office of Research and Development
National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequence Management Division
oEPA Surface Decon Procedural Step
Unituri Slates
Ewironiriontal Protection
Agency
Results: Physical Methods
c
5 5
u
3
oi 4
cc
ca
o
¦ Concrete-v
~ Concrete-h
¦ Painted Wa!!board-v
~ Painted Wa!!board-h
Rough-cut Wood-v
~ Carpet-h
~ Deck Wood-h
Vacuum
Wash/Rinse
Rinse
Office of Research and Development
National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequence Management Division
8
-------
Ryan
&EPA
Surface Decon Procedural
Step Results: Rinsing or
Washing/Rinsing
l.E+08
l.E+07
l.E+06
l.E+05
l.E+04
l.E+03
l.E+02
l.E+01
1.E+00
Wash/Rinse
Concrete-v
Painted Wallboard-v
Rough-cut Wood-v
I Deck Wood-h
Rinse
¦ Concrete-h
~ Painted Wallboard-h
~ Carpet-h
Office of Research and Development
National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequence Management Division
&EPA
United Stales
EnvironfTiflfital Protection
Agency
Surface Decon Procedural
Step Results: Vacuuming
All wet/dry vacuums were fitted with a HEPA-rated filter
Air samples were taken from vacuum exhausts
In 50% of tests, viable spores were detected in the
exhaust samples
Office of Research and Development
National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequence Management Division
-------
Ryan
Summary
Environmental Protection »
8-step and 5 -step procedures effective for surface decontamination for
materials tested (>6 log reduction; no viable spores from surfaces)
10 minute pH adjusted bleach step determined to produce the highest log
reduction on the surfaces, but only a 2- to 4- log reduction
-Viable spores recovered in the rinsate (rinse or wash/rinse after bleach)
Vacuuming resulted in minimal (<1 log) reduction in surface contamination
- Potential to aerosolize spores (spread contamination)
- Potential usefulness to remove gross contamination (e.g., dirt)
Rinsing resulted in a 1- to 3 log reduction; washing (with detergent solution)
resulted in minimal or no added log reduction, in general
- Clean materials used in this study
Office of Research and Development
National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequence Management Division
&S& Next Steps
Eiwlrofiiriflntal Protection
iont»l Protection
Agency
Effective surface decontamination demonstrated; however, viable spores in
air samples and rinsate provide potential for spread of contamination
• Focus of additional testing:
- Revised procedure to attempt to increase spore inactivation (use of
detergent plus pH adjusted bleach solution)
- Reduce number of steps, time, and labor
-Testing at larger scale with aerosol release
Office of Research and Development
National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequence Management Division 19
10
-------
Ryan
svEPA
Future Testing
Environmental Proloctior
Agoncy
• Optimization of pH-adjusted bleach/surfactant solution spray
application rate and frequency
-Objective: complete inactivation of viable spores; decrease labor time/cost
• Effectiveness as a function of surface contamination amount
-Does a 2 log reduction starting from 1E7 spores correlate to complete
inactivation when starting loading is <1E2?
• Assessment of re-aerosolization on surface decontamination methods
-Need for air cleaning or fumigation?
• Scale-up testing on facility
-Biological-response Operational Test and Evaluation (BOTE) Project
Office of Research and Development
National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequence Management Division
20
svEPA
Environmental Proloctior
Agnncy
Questions?
Office of Research and Development
National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequence Management Division
21
11
-------
Ryan
The Wide-area Perspective
Łnvlfonrn«nti»l Protection
B. anthracis spore contamination in 23 public facilities
-Timeline of restoration: years
-Cost or restoration: reported upwards of $1B
Advancements in decontamination capabilities
StHttm Auc«l(
-Mr w,
"hium
Significant data gaps for wide area consequence management
Office of Research and Development
National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequence Management Division
&EPA
United Slates
Ewironiriontal Protection
Agency
Example of Material
Preparation: Concrete
' ' J
%
Office of Research and Development
National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequence Management Division
12
-------
Ryan
svEPA
Inactivation of
Bacillus anthracis Ames Spores
Spraying with pH-adjusted bleach (10 min contact time)
painted concrete
painted wallboard paper
galvanized metal duct
decorative laminate
glass
bare wood
carpet
Log Reduction
Office of Research and Development
National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequence Management Division
13
-------
Evaluation of COT Products for Decontamination of Bacillus Spores
Jason Edmonds, DOD, U.S. Army
-------
Edgewood Chemical Biological Center
BioDefense Team
RDECOM
rmoni
EDGEWOOD
DEFENSE
Evaluation of COT Products for Decontamination of
Bacillus Spores
Jason Edmonds, Jonathan Sabol, and Vipin Rastogi
BioDefense Branch, Biosciences Division, Research and Technology Directorate,
US Army - ECBC APGEA, MD 21010
jason.edmondsl @us.army.mil
410-436-7348
04/13/2010
-------
Edgewood Chemical Biological Center
BioDefense Team
RDECOM
rmoni
EDGEWOOD
DEFENSE
• How well does laboratory testing predict effectiveness of
COTS decon technologies for field or exterior surface
decontamination?
- Interagency Biological Restoration Demonstration
• Are quantitative methods permitting efficient and
effective decontamination of large surfaces available for
efficacy assessment?
-------
BioDefense Team
Edgewood Chemical Biological Center
RDECOM
Sealing buildings and irregular objects is common
rmorii
EDGEWOOD
DEFENSE
Tug boat
Multi-level apartment
building
Disclaimer: Several images in this presentation were shamelessly pilfered
from the internet and I do not claim ownership.
Whole neighborhoods
Department stores
-------
;^CALa,° -
^«DECOWV^
BioDefense Team
Edgewood Chemical Biological Center
RDECOM
mon
EDGEWOOD
DEFENSE
Enclosing a larger area for gassing is much more difficult than it looks
•F'SWZS. -
J* > i [, »' *
13IS
m
! \
x k
II,.
•Logistical issues:
•Evacuating millions of people
•Sealing individual buildings both
exterior and interior
•Gassing large volumes of space
and objects
Disclaimer: Several images in this presentation were shamelessly pilfered
from the internet and I do not claim ownership.
-------
rmorii
BioDefense Team
Edgewood Chemical Biological Center
RDECOM
EDGEWOOD
DEFENSE
Spraying building exterior surfaces with high
pressure decontaminants poses special issues
as well
Volume of chemicals needed
- Environmental impact
Large surface area
Contact time
• Many manufacturers recommend
several hours of contact time for effective
decontamination
-------
Edgewood Chemical Biological Center
BioDefense Team
RDECOM
rmoni
EDGEWOOD
DEFENSE
• 4 foot X 4 foot panels
- Brick veneer
- Stainless steel
- Pressure Treated (PT) lumber
• Decon Solutions
- Ultra Clorox Germicidal Bleach (0.6% Sodium hypochlorite)
- Peridox (3.8% Hydrogen peroxide, 0.2% Peroxyacetic acid)
- CASCAD (9.5% Dichloroisocyanuric acid)
• Application on panels with use of a low pressure backpack sprayer
- Think "fine mist" setting at car wash
- Contact time of 30 continuous* minutes
-------
rmorii
EDGEWDDD
DEFENSE
BioDefense Team
Edgewood Chemical Biological Center
RDECOM
Secured to holder with clamps
Sits on acrylic shelf
Soln. collects under the
panel in a tray
• OSB backing
• 1X6 boards cut to 48" long
• Secured to OSB via 1.25"
deck screws on both ends
of board
-------
BioDefense Team
Edgewood Chemical Biological Center
RDECOM
mon
EDGEWOOD
DEFENSE
iiiiii
OSB backing
T-304 NO. 2B Finish 20
GA stainless steel
1X2 foot panels
Secured to OSB via liquid
nails
-------
;^CALa,° -
^«DECOWV^
BioDefense Team
Edgewood Chemical Biological Center
RDECOM
mon
EDGEWOOD
DEFENSE
King William brick veneer
• Brick-it
OSB backing
Metal grid secured to OSB
via liquid nails
Brick veneer secured to
metal grid via liquid nails
-------
;^CALa,° -
^«DECOWV^
BioDefense Team
Edgewood Chemical Biological Center
RDECOM
mon
i
EDGEWOOD
DEFENSE
Filter for
capturing
spores removed
from panels
Carboy for
recording volume
of decon solution
used on each
panel
-------
;^CALa,° -
^«DECOWV^
BioDefense Team
Edgewood Chemical Biological Center
RDECOM
Crushed Carboy
Plugged Filter
mon
EDGEWOOD
DEFENSE
Standing Soln
-------
BioDefense Team
Edgewood Chemical Biological Center
RDECOM
• Vacuum crushes carboys due to debris
clogging filters
• New protocol for counting CFUs which have
been removed from the panels via run-off
• 25 ml removed from collection tray
• From 1-3L total depending on
panel type and solution
• Sample pushed through filter & washed
with water to remove decontaminant
• Spores extracted and plated
rmorii
EDGEWOOD
DEFENSE
-------
BioDefense Team
Edgewood Chemical Biological Center
RDECOM
Sample Flow Chart
mon
EDGEWOOD
DEFENSE
10'9 spores seeded onto panels
Dry Sampling control
Water/Decon treatment
Panel alone is sampled 25 mL sample from 1-3 L Panel is sampled
without any treatment. No total volume of run-off is a^er treatment and
run-off. collected a^er dry t'me-
-------
BioDefense Team
Edgewood Chemical Biological Center
RDECOM
Control Preliminary Results
Total B. subtilisspores seeded onto panels
•2.94E+09
•1280 individual 10f.il droplets
• 2.83E+06 spores per droplet
Spore collection
•Vacuum socks for lumber and brick
•Polyurethane wipes for steel
rmorii
EDGEWOOD
DEFENSE
-------
BioDefense Team
Edgewood Chemical Biological Center
RDECOM
Control B. subtilis
Log CFU Recovered
Steel Panel
PT Lumber Panel
Brick Veneer Panel
Positive Control
(Sampling Only)
2.90E+07
3.80E+02
1.07E+03
Water control
(Spraying)
7.49E+06
5.27E+04
5.00E+02
• B. subtilis spores seeded onto each panel - 2.94E+09
• Recovery from lumber and brick by sampling from no spray controls is low (<0.01 %) -
not conducive to decon efficacy measurements
rmorii
EDGEWOOD
DEFENSE
-------
BioDefense Team
Edgewood Chemical Biological Center
RDECOM
Control B. atrophaeus sub
globigii (BG)
Steel Panel
PT Lumber Panel
Brick Veneer Panel
Positive
(No spraying)
1.7E+09
3.1E+07
2.1E+07
Water control
(Spraying)
1.7E+09
3.3E+07
4.4E+08
• 2.94E+09 Total BG spores seeded onto each panel
• Sampling efficiency 1 - 90%
rmorii
EDGEWOOD
DEFENSE
-------
BioDefense Team
Edgewood Chemical Biological Center
RDECOM
Bacillus atrophaeussub.
Dry panel control
Spores Recovered Untreated Panels
% Recovery
Spores Recovered
Steel
76%
1.7E+09
Brick
1%
2.1E+07
Lumber
1%
3.1E+07
Spores Inoculated onto panel 2.3E+09
• Purpose of the Dry Control is to determine recovery efficiency of untreated panels
• Recovery from untreated panels is sufficient to allow for 6 log reduction (LR)
• Poor recovery from porous surface -1 % or 2-logs less
• Inaccessible or very poor recovery efficiency of vacuum socks
rmorii
EDGEWOOD
DEFENSE
-------
BioDefense Team
Edgewood Chemical Biological Center
RDECOM
Bacillus atrophaeussub.
Run-off Recovery
Spores Recovered from Runoff
% Recovery
Spores Recovered
Steel
24%
5.5E+08
Brick
8%
1.7E+08
Lumber
16%
3.8E+08
Spores Inoculated onto panel 2.3E+09
Presence of high number of viable spores in the run-off demonstrates their removal from the
panels
Spraying action (no decontaminant) mechanically dislodges spores from the panels
rmorii
EDGEWOOD
DEFENSE
-------
BioDefense Team
Edgewood Chemical Biological Center
RDECOM
Sample Flow Chart
mon
EDGEWOOD
DEFENSE
10'9 spores seeded onto panels
Dry Sampling control
Water/Decon treatment
Panel alone is sampled 25 mL sample from 1-33 L Panel is sampled
without any treatment. No total volume of run-off is a^er treatment and
run-off. collected a^er dry t'me-
-------
BioDefense Team
Edgewood Chemical Biological Center
RDECOM
Bacillus atrophaeussub.
Water T reatment
Spores Seeded
onto Panels
Total Spores
Recovered from
Steel
Reduction in
Recovery from
Steel
Total Spores
Recovered from
Brick
Reduction in
Recovery from
Brick
Total Spores
Recovered from
Lumber
Reduction in
Recovery from
Lumber
2.3E+09
1.7E+09
0.1 Log
4.4E+08
0.7 Log
3.3E+07
1.8 Log
• Virtually no reduction in CFU recovery from steel and brick panels post water
treatment
• Slight reduction in CFU recovery from lumber panels after water treatment
• Not a result of run-off
rmorii
EDGEWOOD
DEFENSE
-------
BioDefense Team
Edgewood Chemical Biological Center
RDECOM
Bacillus atrophaeussub.
Bleach Treatment
Spores Seeded
onto Panels
Total Spores
Recovered from
Steel
Reduction in
Recovery from
Steel
Total Spores
Recovered from
Brick
Reduction in
Recovery from
Brick
Total Spores
Recovered from
Lumber
Reduction in
Recovery from
Lumber
2.2E+09
1.0E+04
5.8 Log
5.0E+01
8.7 Log
2.6E+04
5.9 Log
Approximately 6-LR in number of viable spores from stainless steel and lumber
>8-LR in number of viable spores from brick panels by bleach treatment
rmorii
EDGEWOOD
DEFENSE
-------
BioDefense Team
Edgewood Chemical Biological Center
RDECOM
Bacillus atrophaeussub.
Peridox Treatment
Spores Seeded
onto Panels
Total Spores
Recovered from
Steel
Reduction in
Recovery from
Steel
Total Spores
Recovered from
Brick
Reduction in
Recovery from
Brick
Total Spores
Recovered from
Lumber
Reduction in
Recovery from
Lumber
2.0E+09
4.2E+03
6.3 Log
6.8E+01
9.2 Log
1.8E+01
8.1 Log
5-LR in number of viable spores from stainless steel after Peridox treatment
Eight and nine log reductions in CFUs recovered from lumber and brick panels
respectively
rmorii
EDGEWOOD
DEFENSE
-------
;^CALa,° -
^«DECOWV^
•J?
cc
o
o
BioDefense Team
Edgewood Chemical Biological Center
RDECOM
Reduction in Available Spores for
Recovery After Decontamination
Treatment
10.0
9.0
8.0
7.0
6.0
5.0
4.0
3.0
2.0
1.0
0.0
Water "Bleach ¦Peridox
Steel
Brick
Surface Material
Lumber
mon
EDGEWOOD
DEFENSE
Reminder: Higher the Number - Fewer the spores recovered from panels
-------
BioDefense Team
Edgewood Chemical Biological Center
RDECOM
Efficacy measurements
• Multiple means of measuring efficacy and efficiency.
- Relative to initial panel after seeding
• Numbers presented in this presentation
- Relative to theoretical panel contamination levels
after subtracting water treatment
- Relative to dry sampling which takes into
consideration recovery efficiency of available
technologies
rmorii
EDGEWOOD
DEFENSE
-------
yRDECO^l
mon
BioDefense Team
Edgewood Chemical Biological Center
RDECOM
FAQs EDBEWOaD
DEFENSE
Stainless steel is a non-porous, flat surface, why do you see less
decontamination from stainless steel than from brick and lumber?
- It is necessary to distinguish between decontamination and
availability
- There are fewer recoverable spores/CFUs available on brick and
lumber panels after treatment
• Spores (viable and non-viable) are pulled into cracks and
crevices of brick and lumber and are not recovered
• Poor sampling/recovery technology for porous materials
• Deposition method may provide protective factor for spores
• Difficulty in keeping stainless steel continuously wet
- Not as applicable to our study compared to larger areas such as
buildings
• All of the above
-------
BioDefense Team
Edgewood Chemical Biological Center
RDECOM
FAQs
• If spores are not recoverable, are they viable or non-viable dead?
• How much risk does the unrecoverable spores pose?
- Currently developing experimental approaches to determine the viability of
unrecoverable spores
- The number of unrecovered spores may change as technology advances in
coming months and years
rmorii
EDGEWOOD
DEFENSE
-------
FflDECOW^
BioDefense Team
Edgewood Chemical Biological Center
RDECOM
Summary
mon
EDGEWOOD
DEFENSE
•Efficacy efficiencies can only be accurately measured using species specific
spores.
•We do observe a six log decrease in recoverable CFUs from stainless steel
panels using either bleach or Peridox.
•On porous materials, Peridox out performs bleach under our pre-determined
conditions and constraints not consistent with manufacturer's
recommendations
•Eight log and nine log reduction respectively on lumber and brick panels
for Peridox compared to six and 8.7 log reductions for bleach respectively.
•Decontamination attempts similar to our design could potentially be used as a
short term mitigation technique.
•There is a need for an improvement in sampling technology for porous
materials.
-------
BioDefense Team
Edgewood Chemical Biological Center
RDECOM
Support
mon
EDGEWOOD
DEFENSE
Dr. Vipin Rastogi
Stephen Blum
Jonathan Sabol
Maegan Lay
?\RTAf
Defense Threat Reduction Agency Department of Homeland Security
-------
Evaluation of Peroxide-Based Solutions for Facility
Decontamination by Owner/Occupants
Paula Krauter, Sandia National Laboratories
-------
Krauter
IHTHACtNCV aiOLOCICAL
AUTOMATION DfMONS THAT ION
Evaluation of Peroxide-Based Solutions for
Facility Decontamination by Owner/Occupants
2010 US EPA Decontamination Research
and Development Conference
April 13-15, 2010
Sandia National Laboratories
Paula Krauter, Mark Tucker, Wayne Einfeld,
Mollye Wilson, Matt Tezak, Ashley Allen,
Dan Lucero, Brandon Servantes & Andres Sanchez
Sandia is a multiprogram laboratory operated by Saridia Corporation, a Lockheed martin company, for the United States
Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration under contract DE-AC04-AL8500
-------
The American National Standards Institute:
9/11 Commission Report
Krauter
Stated that "the private secto
the critical infrastructure
largely unprepared for a terrorist attack. In the
event of a large-scale outdoor bioterrorism incident,
resources will become
decontamination, that
remediation by non- professional contractors, may
become necessa
2
-------
National Exercise Planning Scenario #2
INllNACfNCV IIOIOGICAI
IUTMAIION DlMONSf RATION
• Two aerosol releases of weaponized
Bacillus anthracis spores: one in
metropolitan Seattle and another just
off the Fort Lewis installation.
• The plumes are modeled by the
National Atmospheric Release Advisory
Center facility using weather
conditions.
• The IBRD scenario encompasses a large,
diverse environment: hundreds of
indoor and outdoor areas require
decontamination
The Operations section of the Unified Command is faced with a large
number of potentially contaminated buildings which would overwhelm
available resources
Redmond
Bremerton
Burien
Puyallup
Olympia
ffit3QQ3 MI In,- nnH i.-.r 11 Ml
-------
Objective
Krauter
Objective: To conduct a small-scale
demonstration of the occupant-performed
decontamination
To implement occupa
decon several issues
resolved:
Criteria for selection of facility
> Mechanism to train workers
> Documented procedure
> Decon materials availability
> Method to judge success
-------
Outline
Krauter
• Investigate Self-Decon Approaches
- Identify alternative decontaminants to bleach
> Conduct decontaminant screening tests
> Develop self-decon procedure for alternative
decontaminant
• Conduct Self-Decon Demonstration
> PPE
> Materials
> Evaluate self-decon procedure
> Measure impact of decon on spore resuspension &
tracking
-------
&({ fn.'* \W
O
o\
o
INTIHACINCV ilOlOGIC Al
IIUTO(l AIION DlMONlf AATION
Krauter
Investigate self-decon approach
1. Define requirements for an
efficacious peroxide-based material
-Verify the concentration of the
active ingredient in the decon
material
2. As a precursor (agent qualifier) for
the chamber test we tested decon
material efficacy against spores with
appropriate neutralizer to separate
biostatic from biocidal decon
materials
3. Presume a contamination level lower
than ~106 spores/cm2 for self-decon
application.
Identify
alternatives to
bleach that are
efficacious,
readily
obtained, safe
and easy to use
-------
Peroxide Solutions Were Chosen as a
Alternative to pH amended-Bleach
Activated peroxide is formed from the
reaction of hydrogen peroxide and an
activator (tetraacetylethylenediamine,
TAED):
OOH -> RC—OOH + L
The result is two sporicidal species:
• Hydrogen peroxide (low efficacy)
• Peracetyl compound e.g., peracetic acid
(high efficacy)
• "Tide™ with Bleach" is an example of a
commercial product utilizing this chemistry
>The breakdown
products are oxygen
and water
> Less corrosive than
bleach
> Used in detergents
and other products
> Activated peroxides
are simple and
commercially
available.
D. Martin Davies and Michael E. Deary "Kinetics of the hydrolysis and perhydrolysis of tetraacetylethylenediamine, a peroxide bleach activator" J. Chem.
Soc., Perkin Trans. 2, 1991, pages 1549 - 1552. DOI: 10.1039/P29910001549
7
-------
MM Screening Tests: SporKlenz™ and activated peroxide were efficacious
against 106 B. atrophaeus spore concentrations
>An activator is necessary
for efficacy
>A simple peroxide-based
material includes 3-4% H202,
activator (TAED) and buffer
>Ready to use SporKlenz™
>Other commercially
available peroxide-based
products include but are not
limited to Peridox™, Cascad
SDF™, Easy Decon 200™,
MinCare™ and Oxonia™
Decon agent
composition
With Decon Agent
With Decon Agent +
neutralizer
(CFU log (10)/mL tSD)
(CFU log (10)/mL tSD)
3% H202
6.44 + 0.06
6.43 + 0.03
4% H202
6.43 + 0.04
6.45 + 0.03
6% H202
6.15 + 0.01
6.40 + 0.002
7.9% H202
5.61 + 0.06
6.53 + 0.02
3% H202 +
activator+buffer
0 + 0
6.41 + 0.01
4% H202 +
activator+buffer
0 + 0
6.43 + 0.01
6% H202 +
activator+buffer
0 + 0
6.42 + 0.006
7.9% H202 +
activator+buffer
0 + 0
6.41 + 0.03
SporKlenz™
0 + 0
6.12 + 0.02
8
-------
Krauter
Chemical Hazards Considerations
INTIHACINCV IIOLOGICAt
fttSTOftATION DIMONSfMATION
* Hydrogen peroxide Airborne Exposure Limits:
-OSHA Permissible Exposure Limit: 1 ppm (TWA).
-ACGIH Threshold Limit Value: 1 ppm (TWA).
* Acetic acid airborne exposure limits:
-OSHA: 10 ppm (PEL)
-ACGIH: 15 ppm (STEL)
Ventilation System: A system of local and/or general exhaust is
recommended to keep employee exposures below the Airborne
Exposure Limits.
For this test the decon material usage rate ~1L per 12 m2
Exposure time ~7-10 min
9
-------
Workers must meet environmental safety
& health standards
Krauter
— hazardous waste operations and emergency
response training as required n 20 Code of
Federal Regulations (CFR) 1910.120,
— medical surveillance as required in 20 CFR
1910.120(b),
- respirator protection required in 20 CFR
1910.134,
- biological/chemical agent training,
— be familiar with decontamination procedures,
and
- use certified personal protective equipment as
specified by National Institute for Occupational
Safety and Health (NIOSH).
10
-------
Outline
• Investigate Self-Decon Approaches
- Identify methodology to select appropriate facilities
- Identify alternative decontaminants to bleach
> Conduct decontaminant screening tests
> Develop self-decon procedures for alternative
decontaminant
• Conduct Self-Decon Demonstration
> Location
> Materials
> Evaluate self-decon procedure
> Measure impact of decon process on spore
resuspension & tracking
-------
Krauter
Decon Process Using Peroxide-Based Solutions
INTIHACINCV 1IOLOGICAI
AUTOMATION DEMONSTRATION
We used the following decon process for our demonstration:
• HEPA filters for 1 |um particles were placed in ventilation system.
• Test chamber was equipped with ceramic tiles, vinyl tiles, stainless
steel tiles, desk and chair.
• Non-essential materials and porous materials were removed.
• HEPA-filtered vacuum was used to pre-clean all surfaces. Filters
were disposed of as hazardous waste.
• Selected a peroxide-based decon material.
• Sprayed the interior of the building with the solution according to
the manufacturer's direction.
• Kept the surfaces wet with the decon solution for manufacturer's
recommended time period (30 minutes). No rinsing.
• Pending results of post-treatment sampling decontamination might
need to be repeated in some locations.
USEPA/NDT DECONTAMINATION ANALYTICAL AND TECHNICAL SERVICE (DATS) CONTRACT NUMBER: EP-W-06-089 TDD No. TO-02-07-10016. After Action
Report Danbury Anthrax Incident. September 19, 2008. Kelly Smith (Dynamac Corp.)Michael J. Nalipinski, EPA/OSC
-------
o\
o
INllNACfNCV ItOLOClCAl
IUTMAIION DlMONSf RATION
Aerosol Chamber
The aerosol chamber was chosen
because of available instrumentation and
ability to disperse a well mixed spore
cloud ( ~4 log (10))
Surface Area- 35.7 m2
Volume- 14.5 m3
r
_
The chamber was outfitted with vinyl, ceramic
and stainless steel tiles and a table and chair
13
-------
Krauter
Decon Process- HEPA Vacuum
Pre-clearied all surfaces using a HEPA-filtered vacuum.
Filters were disposed of as hazardous waste.
14
-------
I
Decon Process- Liquid spray application
Krauter
Spray the interior of the chamber
with the solution using a garden
sprayer.
One application kept the surfaces
wet for 30 minutes.
Usage rate ~ 1L per 12 m2
15
-------
t UR64
6
t
oil
e>l
Krauter
Post-treatment wipe samples
•Wipe samples were collected 30 min
after the decon materials was applied.
•The wipes were placed into a sterile
neutralizer solution.
16
-------
Krauter
Both peroxide-based solutions were efficacious
SAMPLE TYPE
PRE-DECON
CONTROL
(activated peroxide)
CFU log (10)/ cm2
Activated-
peroxide
POST-DECON
CFU log (10)/ cm2
PRE-DECON
CONTROL
(SporKlenz™)
CFU log (10)/ cm2
SporKlenz™
POST-DECON
CFU log (10)/ cm2
Vinyl
4.49 + 0.11
0 + 0
4.35 + 0.15
0 + 0
Ceramic
4.47 + 0.18
0 + 0
4.48 + 0.09
0 + 0
Stainless steel
4.60 + 0.07
0 + 0
4.31 + 0.08
0 + 0
Chair
4.49
0±0
4.43
0±0
Desk
4.43 + 0.26
0±0
4.26 + 0.03
0±0
17
-------
Decon Personnel Contamination
Krauter
ACTIVITY
PERSON 1
PERSON 2
CFU log (10)/ cm2
CFU log (10)/ cm2
Before start of test
0
0
After spore deposition and 20 h settling. After
collecting positive control samples.
1.68
2.70
After vacuuming chamber
2.50
3.34
After applying decon spray to chamber
1.98
2.59
After collecting test samples.
Clean Tvvek suits worn to collect test samples.
0.69
0.07
18
-------
Exposure Hazards: Spore counts in chamber air
ACTIVITY
CEILING
CENTER
BOTTOM
(CFU log (10)/L air)
(CFU log (10)/L air)
(CFU log (10)/L air)
Background
0.03
0
0
After dispersion & 20 h
settling. Chamber closed.
3.13
2.33
3.07
After collection of
reference samples
1.16
1.09
0.81
During beginning of
vacuuming, ventilation on
0.77
0.57
0.20
Near ending of vacuuming,
ventilation on
0
0.03
0.03
15 min after decon spraying
0
0
0
During beginning of sample
collection, ventilation on
0
0
0
Near ending of sample
collection, ventilation on
0
0
0.63
Temperature differences from inside (21.3 °C) and outside (20.2 °C) the test
chamber may have kept some spores from settling
Opening the chamber door caused air-mixing and airborne spores migrated
outside the chamber
Ventilation system should be on to maintain a negative pressure in the room 19
-------
Krauter
Conclusions
> Temperature differences between inside and outside
the building and electrostatics will keep a proportion of
spores from settling.
>Turning on ventilation systems and keep negative
pressure will keep spores in building.
>Workers can become contaminated and transport the
contamination into a clean area.
> Peroxide-based solutions are effective sporicides for
non-porous surfaces.
20
-------
Issues that need consideration in future^
demonstrations
Air quality, biological: evaluate spore-particle movement
while conducting self-decontamination procedure
— Personnel exposures
— Evaluate air concentrations inside & outside facility during process
Air quality, chemical: monitor air during recommended
process for concentrations of chemical compounds
Test self-decon protocols on additional materials e.g.,
porous materials
Persistence of decontamination reagent
— Protection from secondary contamination
-------
Krauter
Acknowledgements
* Dr. Brooke Pearson, Cubic Applications, Information Operations
* Bruce Hinds, DTRA
* Dr. Shawn Ryan, EPA/NHSRC
* Kathleen Judd, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory
* John Brockmann, Sandia Engineering Sciences Center
This work is a part of the Interagency
Biological Restoration Demonstration (IBRD) that is co-sponsored by:
DTRA, CB Technologies (Ryan T. Madden, Program Manager)
DHS, Science and Technology (Lance Brooks, Program Manager)
This project was funded by DTRA
22
-------
Inactivation of Bacillus anthracis Spores on Indoor and Outdoor
Building Surfaces Using Commercially-Available
Liquid Sterilant Technologies
Worth Calfee EPA/ORD/NHSRC
-------
Calfee
v>EPA
United Stales
Environmental Protection
Agency
Inactivation of Bacillus anthracis Spores on Indoor and
Outdoor Building Surfaces using Commercially-
Available Liquid Sterilant Technologies
M, Worth Calfee and Joe Wood, US EPA
T. Kelly, J. Rogers, Y. Choi, Battelle
Office of Research and Development
National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequence Management Division
SEPA
United States
Environmental Protection
Agency
How effective are currently-available liquid
sporicides at decontaminating materials
contaminated with Anthrax spores?
1
1
Office of Research and Development
National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequence Management Division
-------
Calfee
v>EPA
Protection
Overview and Objectives
Wide-area bioterror attack
• Evaluate liquid sporicides
• Decon of surfaces
• Bacillus anthracis (Ames)
Office of Research and Development
National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequence Management Division
SEPA
United States
Environmental Protection
Agency
Outline
• Test methods
- Inoculation, neutralization, extraction, samples, data
• Part 1 - Indoor Material Tests
- Coupon Materials
- Liquid sterilant technologies
- Chemistry and spray/application approach
- Results
• Part 2 - Outdoor Material Tests (DTRA Funded)
- Coupon Materials
- Liquid sterilant technologies
- Chemistry and spray/application approach
- Results
• Conclusions
Office of Research and Development
National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequence Management Division 3
2
-------
Calfee
oEPA
United Stales
Environmental Protection
Agency
Test Methods - Overview
Coupon
Inoculation
Office of Research and Development
National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequence Management Division
SEPA
Uniti
Envi
Agei
IS?
United States
Environmental Protection
Agency
Test Methods - Overview
Coupon
Inoculation
Application &
Exposure
Office of Research and Development
National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequence Management Division
-------
Calfee
oEPA
United Stales
Environment;
Agency
Test Methods - Overview
Coupon
Inoculation
Application &
Exposure
Neutralization &
j Extraction
Office of Research and Development
National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequence Management Division
SERA
United Slates
Environmental Protection
Agency
Test Methods - Overview
Coupon
Inoculation
Application &
Exposure
^Neutralization &
Extraction
Dilution &
Plating
Office of Research and Development
National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequence Management Division
4
-------
Calfee
oEPA
United Stales
Environmental Protection
Agency
Technology Spray Devices
Handheld
Garden Sprayer
Generic Spray
Bottle
Dual-Component
Sprayer
Office of Research and Development
National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequence Management Division
SEPA
United States
Test Methods - Exposure & Extraction
Tests conducted in -317 liter glove
box at ~ 23°C and < 70% RH
Extractions: After contact time, coupons and runoff placed in 50 mL conical
tube containing 10 mL phosphate buffered saline (with 0.1% Triton X 100) and
neutralizer, orbital shaker 15 minutes, 200 rpni.
- Except brick, asphalt, granite, concrete: sonicated for 45 minutes
Office of Research and Development
National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequence Management Division
-------
Calfee
v>EPA
United Stales
Environmental Protection
Agency
Test Methods - Neutralization
• Neutralization of sporicidal chemical
- Step 1 - Determine the volume of each sporicide retained by each
coupon material
Office of Research and Development
National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequence Management Division 10
SEPA
United Slates
Environmental Protection
Agency
Test Methods - Neutralization
• Neutralization of sporicidal chemical
Step 2 - Incremental testing of neutralize!' with the previously-determined volume
Bacillus anthracis Ames
OJ
c
Code
Treatment
Inoculum (CFU)
Observed
(CFU/mL)
Total (CFU)bc
Avg Total (CFU)
% of Control
A9
Triton X-100 + Spores (Control)-3
9.47E+C7
1.10E+07
1.10E+08
A10
CASCAD SDF + 0.5% STS + Spores-1a
9.47E+07
9.80E+06
1.01E+08
7?
A11
CASCAD SDF +0.5% STS + Spores-2a
9.47E+07
1.02E+07
1.05E+08
1.06E+08
102.14%
A12
CASCAD SDF +0.5% STS + Spores-3a
9.47E+07
1.09E+07
1.12E-K38
A13
CASCAD SDF +1.0% STS + Spores-1a
9.47E+07
9.87E+06
1.01 E+08
A14
CASCAD SDF + 1.0% STS + Spores-2a
9.47E+07
8.63E+06
8.87E+07
9.24E+07
89.15% ;
A15
CASCAD SDF +1.0% STS + Spores-3a
9.47E-K37
8.47E+06
8.71 E+07
A16
CASCAD SDF + 1.5% STS + Spores-13
9.47E+07
9.43E+06
9.69E+07
A17
CASCAD SDF +1.5% STS + Spores-2a
9.47E+07
8.77E+06
9.02E+07
9.46E+07
91.23%
A18
CASCAD SDF +1.5% STS + Spores-3a
9.47E+0 7
9.40E+06
9.66E+07
Office of Research and Development
National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequence Management Division 11
6
Test Material
Average Deposition'Runoff
Weight (g)
Noil-Po rows
Stainless Steel
0.11
Glass
0.23
Aluminum
0.23
Porcelain
0.56
Granite
0.28
Average
0.28
Porous
Concrete
0.75
Brick
1.40
Asphalt Paving
0.60
Treated Wood
1.59
Butyl Rubber
Average
0.46
0.96
-------
Calfee
oEPA
United States
Test Methods - Neutralization
Neutralization of sporicidal chemical
Step 2 - Incremental testing of neutralize!' with the previously-determined volume
Bacillus anthracis Ames
Observed
(CFU/mL)
10QE+00
Total (CFU)
O.OOE+OO
Inoculum (CFU)
ftvg Total (CFU)
% of Control
Spore s-1
Q.OOE+OU
: ¦. J I: H I.
i. jjC-Jli
. J ;L -IL
CASCAD SDb
0.5% STi\+ Spores-1
: : j e ¦::
; jjf ¦( c
CASCAD S
+ 0.5% STS
Spores-2
H--j.
i. M it-jM
L
CASCAD S
+ 0.5% STS
Spores-3
V -V_I i: -V;
:< 401--K
Ion X-1
i F F -¦ i'
1 VFHF
CASCAD SiF +1
nton X-1
I i:lF--;7
i nF,HT
CASCAD SiF +1
STS +,
:• -JJC ' A
1 01E+08
1 02E+07
1 05E+08
CASCAD SIF + 1.
Spores-3
l J:'F~I/
1.12E-H38
y y7E-J>,
I J L - L I:
:ascad s
+ 1.5% STS
Spore s-1
5 :FF
a.biib-HJb
CASCAD SD
+1.5% ST
Spores-2
t ¦:/ F -Fh
a 71E 407
3 43E-HJ6
CASCAD SDF
1.5% S
+ Spores-3
3.02E40/
3.40E-»€6
Office of Research and Development
National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequence Management Division
SEPA
United States
Environmental Protection
Agency
Test Methods - Samples
5 Positive Controls 5 Test Samples
**>
Procedural Blank
Lab Blank
Spike Control
Office of Research and Development
National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequence Management Division
-------
Calfee
v>EPA
Protection
Test Methods - Data
United States
Environmental Protection
Agency
Percent Recovery (positive controls): spores recovered / spores
spiked
CFU
Recovery = —Contro' x100
y CFU
inoculum
Efficacy (log reduction) calculation: mean of log values for positive
controls - mean of log values for test coupons
Efficacy = (log CFUcn) - (log CFUtn)
Office of Research and Development
National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequence Management Division
RlftMl
SEPA
United States
Environmental Protection
Agency
Part 1 - Indoor Materials
I Office of Research and Development
| National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequence Management Division
8
-------
Calfee
v>EPA
United States
Environmental Protection
Agency
Coupon Materials and Orientation
Office of Research and Development
National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequence Management Division 16
SEPA
United Slates
Environmental Protection
Agency
Liquid Sterilant Technologies
Technology
• DioxiGuard™
• pH-Adjusted Bleach
• Calcium Polysulfide
•CASCAD™ SDF
• Oxonia Active
• Minncare® Cold Sterilant
• SanDes
Vendor
Frontier Pharm.
Clorox Corp.
VGS, Inc.
Allen Vanguard
Ecolab Inc.
Minntech Corp.
DTI-Sweeden AB
Office of Research and Development
National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequence Management Division
-------
Calfee
*>EPA
United Stales
Environmental Protection
Agency
Chemistry and Application
Technology
Chemistry
Contact time
Non-porous
Porous
DioxiGuard
Chlorine dioxide
10
10
pH-adjusted Bleach
Hypochlorite,
hypochlorous acid
60
60
Calcium polysulfide
Calcium polysulfide
60
60
CASCAD SDF
Hypochlorite,
hypochlorous acid
30
30
Oxonia Active
Peroxide,
peracetic acid
60
60
Minncare Cold
Sterilant
Peroxide,
peracetic acid
10
30
SanDes
Chlorine dioxide
70
70
Office of Research and Development
National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequence Management Division 18
oEPA
United States
Environmental Protection
Agency
Results - Recovery from Indoor Materials
Material
Average Percent Recovery
B. anthracis
B. subtilis
Carpet
98
46
Decorative Laminate
72
52
Galvanized Ductwork
73
49
Painted Wallboard Paper
66
15
Painted Cinder Block
95
36
Bare Pine Wood
18
4
Glass
66
49
Office of Research and Development
National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequence Management Division 19
10
-------
Calfee
*>EPA
United Stales
Environmental Protection
Agency
B. anthracis
Log Reduction - Indoor Materials
Sporicidal Technology
Test Material
Dioxi Guard
pH-
Adj listed
Bleach
Calcium
Polysulfide
CASCAD
SDF
Oxonia
Active
Minncare
Cold
Sterilant
SanDes
Carpet
1.8
7.4
7.0
>7.8
0.1
Laminate
2.6
7.4
>7.6
>7.6
0.2
Ductwork
1.0
>7.6
>7.9
>7.8
0.1
Wallboard
0.7
4.8
>7.4
>7.5
0.2
Painted Block
1.8
7.3
>7.8
>7.9
>8.1
0.3
Bare Wood
0.8
0.8
0.1
2.8
4.6
5.4
0.4
Glass
2.5
-0.0
>7.9
>7.7
>7.8
4.7
Complete Kill
Office of Research and Development
National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequence Management Division
oEPA
United StBtes
Environmental Protection
Agency
B. subtilis
Log Reduction - Indoor Materials
Sporicidal Technology
Test Material
Dioxi Guard
pH-
Adjusted
Bleach
Calcium
Polysulfide
CASCAD
SDF
Oxonia
Active
Minncare
Cold
Sterilant
SanDes
Carpet
0.9
>7.6
>7.4
>7.9
0.6
Laminate
0.3
>7.3
>7.7
>7.9
1.4
Ductwork
-0.7
>7.6
>7.6
>7.9
0.8
Wallboard
0.7
>6.1
>6.7
>7.46
0.6
Painted Block
-0.5
>7.2
>7.1
>7.3
>7.9
0.5
Bare Wood
0.3
0.7
-0.1
1.3
5.2
6.0
0.7
Glass
0.3
0.3
>7.5
>7.0
>8.0
0.2
I B Complete Kill
Office of Research and Development
National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequence Management Division
11
-------
Calfee
*>EPA
United Stales
Environmental Protection
Agency
B. anthracis vs. B. subtilis - Indoor Materials
Sporicidal Technology
Test Material
Dioxi Guard
pH-
Adj listed
Bleach
Calcium
Polysulfide
CASCAD
SDF
Oxonia
Active
Minncare
Cold
Sterilant
SanDes
Carpet
Laminate
~
Ductwork
*
Wallboard
*
Painted Block
¦**¦
Bare Wood
Glass
*
*
H LR of B.a. < B.s. | No data
Complete kill for both B.a. & B.s.
U LR of B.a. > B.s. | LR of B.a. = B.s.
Office of Research and Development
National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequence Management Division 22
oEPA
United States
Environmental Protection
Agency
B. anthracis vs. B. subtilis - Indoor Materials
Sporicidal Technology
Test Material
Dioxi Guard
pH-
Adjusted
Bleach
Calcium
Polysulfide
CASCAD
SDF
Oxonia
Active
Minncare
Cold
Sterilant
SanDes
Carpet
Laminate
Ductwork
Wallboard
Painted Block
Bare Wood
H LR of B.a. < B.s. | No data
Office of Research and Development
National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequence Management Division 23
12
-------
Calfee
v>EPA
United States
Environmental Protection
Agency
Part 2 - Outdoor Materials
Office of Research and Development
National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequence Management Division
inhuming
SEPA
United Slates
Environmental Protection
Agency
Coupon Materials
Office of Research and Development
National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequence Management Division
13
-------
Calfee
*>EPA
United Stales
Environmental Protection
Agency
Liquid Sterilant Technologies
Technology
• pH-adjusted Ultra-germicidal Bleach
• CASCAD SDF
• Decon Green
• EasyDECON
• Spor-Klenz RTU
• Peridox RTU
* no vendor agreement
all liquids sprayed from a distance of 12 inches
Office of Research and Development
National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequence Management Division
Vendor
Clorox*
Allen Vanguard
STERIS*
EFT Holdings Inc.
STERIS*
Clean Earth Technologies
oEPA
United StBtes
Environmental Protection
Agency
Chemistry and Application
Technology
Chemistry
Contact time
Non-porous
Porous
pH-adjusted
Germicidal Bleach
Hypochlorite /
hypochlorous acid
60
60
CASCAD SDF
Hypochlorite /
hypochlorous acid
30
60
Decon Green
Peroxide
60
60
Easy Decon 200
Peroxide
30
60
SporKlenz RTU
Peroxide,
peracetic acid
30
60
Peridox
Peroxide,
peracetic acid
30
60
Office of Research and Development
National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequence Management Division
14
-------
Calfee
*>EPA
United Stales
Environmental Protection
Agency
Results - Recovery from Outdoor Materials
CO
3
O
s-
O
7"
S
O
Z
CO
3
O
s-
O
Oh
Material
Percent Recovery
(6. anthracis)
Stainless steel
64
Glass
77
Aluminum
76
Porcelain
70
Granite
59
Concrete
11
Brick
31
Asphalt
56
Treated wood
10
Butyl rubber
30
I Office of Research and Development
| National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequence Management Division
oEPA
United StBtes
Environmental Protection
Agency
Results Summary
CO
3
O
s-
O
T"
S
O
Z
Test Material
Quantitative Efficacy (log reduction)
Clorox Ultra
Germicidal
Bleach
(60 minutes)
CASCAD
SDF
(30/60 minutes)
Decon
Green
(60 minutes)
Easy
DECON
200
(30/60 minutes)
SporKlenz
RTU
(30/60 minutes)
Peridox
(30/60 minutes)
Stainless Steel
>7.7
>7.7
>6.7
Glass
>7.8
>7.7
>7.8
Aluminum
>7.9
>7.8
>7.8
>7.8
>7.8
Porcelain
>7.8
>7.7
>7.8
>7.7
Granite
>7.6
>7.6
>7.5
>7.6
>7.4
Concrete
6.3
>6.9
4.0
1.0
1.4
Brick
>6.9
>7.4
>7.5
>7.3
4.0
Asphalt Paving
3.6
>7.6
3.0
1.6
2.6
7.2
Treated Wood
1.9
>7.0
1.9
0.8
6.1
>7.0
Butyl Rubber
>7.0
>6.8
>6.9
>7.0
>7.4
>6.7
Office of Research and Development
National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequence Management Division
I Complete Kill
15
-------
Calfee
*>EPA
United Stales
Environmental Protection
Agency
Conclusions
Spore recovery is dependent upon material type
Efficacy is dependent upon material type
Differences in technology effectiveness are most apparent on
'difficult to decon' materials
B. subtilis is a good (not perfect) surrogate for B. anthracis decon
studies, could be dependent upon decontaminant
Minncare (10 or 30 min) demonstrated the highest efficacy on
indoor materials, CASCAD (30 or 60 min) on outdoor materials
Office of Research and Development
National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequence Management Division
16
-------
Simulated Cesium Radiological Dispersal Devices for Deposition,
Dose, and Decontamination Studies
Mark Sutton, Lawrence Livermore, National Laboratory
-------
Sutton
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
Simulated Cs Radiological Dispersal Devices for
Deposition, Dose and Decontamination Studies
April 14th 2010
I
Mark Sutton1
Robert P. Fischer1, Jared L. Dominick1, Dianne D. Gates-Anderson1,
Walt W. McNab1, Jeremy J. Gray2, Qinhong Hu3, Brian E. Viani4
1 Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, P. O. Box 808, Livermore, CA 94551
This work performed "nderthe auspices of the U.S. Department of Energy by
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory under Contract DE-AC52-07NA27344
UCRL-POST-231956
-------
Presentation
¦ Background
¦ LLNL Capabilities
¦ Explosive tests
¦ Deposition and fate
¦ Dose
¦ Decontamination
¦ Acknowledgements
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
UCRL-POST-231956
Sutton
I
M. Sutton, LLNL *
-------
Background
Sutton
The rapid and efficient cleanup after an RDD is crucial to
subsequently limit the potential for panic, fear and economic
disruption, and to decontaminate the affected area for potential
reuse.
¦ Not only will the decontamination of surfaces be necessary, but
also the consideration of the release of radiation into the water
supply or in aerosolized form into the air.
¦ First responders and HazMat cleanup teams must be prepared to
decontaminate infrastructure, environments and the population.
¦ The longevity of some radionuclides in the environment deems that
large areas would require eventual decontamination and/or
demolition.
¦ Post-RDD cleanup and demolition costs would be very high,
estimated in excess of several billion dollars.
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory IIL
UCRL-POST-231956 M. Sutton, LLNL
-------
Sutton
Cs-137
¦ Produced from uranium fission in reactors
¦ Undergoes beta decay (1.18 MeV), half-life of 30.1 years.
¦ Found in radiotherapy devices, thickness and density gauges, food
irradiators and gemstone treatment equipment,
¦ Activities typically range from 1 to 1,000 Ci.
¦ Most sources contain highly soluble cesium chloride (CsCI)
powder, incorporated in disks, rods, seeds or lead containers.
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
UCRL-POST-231956
M. Sutton, LLNL
-------
Sutton
137CsCI
Dissolves to form Cs+ ions that are behave conservatively, i.e.
highly mobile in fractured material.
¦ Soluble under all pH regimes and generally does not precipitate in
natural systems.
¦ May undergo ion exchange with other cations in zeolite materials,
and may be incorporated into layered mica sheets over long time
periods.
¦ May be transported deep inside porous urban building material,
where it may become trapped and difficult to remove.
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
UCRL-POST-231956 M. Sutton, LLNL
I
-------
Sutton
Cs RDD
Researchers at LLNL have investigated the chemistry and material
science of urban materials, including grime and carbonation layers
present in urban transit systems.
¦ Deposition and fallout from a Cs-137 RDD may present an
immediate danger to first responders and clean up teams, as well
as persons within the vicinity. A fraction of the Cs-137 particles
formed during the event may be respirable.
¦ In order to simulate and better understand the processes involved
in deposition, dose and surface interactions of Cs RDDs in urban
environments, non-radioactive Cs-133 has been used at unique
LLNL facilities that enable indoor and outdoor explosive testing
combined with physical, chemical and dose related analysis.
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
UCRL-POST-231956
M. Sutton, LLNL
-------
LLNL Explosive Test Capabilities
Sutton
¦ LLNL's Site 300 experimental test site is situated in foothills
approximately 15 miles from the main Laboratory site.
¦ 7,000 acres, used since 1955 to perform high explosive research in
support of LLNL missions.
¦ In addition to outdoor
testing, the site also
houses a 28,000 sq-ft
indoor explosive testing
facility (Contained Firing
Facility).
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
UCRL-POST-231956
M. Sutton, LLNL
-------
LLNL Explosive Tests
Sutton
Sampled urban building material, grime layers (particularly relating
to transit systems) and surrogates were characterized using a full
suite of chemical and surface analyses.
CM Spot HV WD Mag MFW Preistre
SSD 50 25 0 kV 10 3 mm 1600>0 16 mm0 96 Terr
Samples were then loaded into
holders and attached to blast shields
in both vertical and horizontal planes.
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
UCRL-POST-231956
M. Sutton, LLNL
-------
LLNL Explosive Tests
Sutton
The samples were located at 10, 20 and 30 feet from the device
containing approx 1 kg 133CsCI(s) and C-4 explosive.
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
UCRL-POST-231956
M. Sutton, LLNL
-------
Additional LLNL Explosive Tests
Sutton
We have also performed outdoor RDD simulations with Cs-133
that allow the study of weather conditions and greater deposition
distances. These outdoor tests contained more cesium and more
C-4 than the indoor test compared to indoor tests.
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
UCRL-POST-231956
M. Sutton, LLNL
-------
Sutton
Deposition
Cs deposition and diffusion data were measured using SEM/EDS
and laser ablation inductively coupled plasma mass spectrometry
(LA-ICP-MS).
¦ Cs diffusion into concrete pores was comparable with hydrated
concrete, suggesting relative humidity greatly affects diffusion.
¦ The presence of grime did not chemically affect Cs speciation or
mobility (as determined by sorption experiments), but results did
show that grime could physically hinder Cs transport to the
concrete surface below.
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
UCRL-POST-231956
M. Sutton, LLNL
-------
Sutton
Deposition
SEM/EDS results showed a particle density of approx 9,500
particles/mm2, with an average diameter of 6 microns.
SEM/EDS images of contaminated surfaces CsCl deposition, particle density, and false color image for particle counting
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
UCRL-POST-231956 M. Sutton, LLNL
IV
-------
Sutton
Fate and Transport
The cement core samples were cut vertically, and transverse laser
ablation was performed to investigate the depth of penetration into
the concrete.
¦ Cesium was detected beyond 1 cm depth after samples had
equilibrated for 32 days between deposition and analysis.
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
UCRL-POST-231956
M. Sutton, LLNL
-------
Fate and Transport
Sutton
Diffusion was modeled to fit experimental data and the difference
between the regression and diffusion model was assumed to be
embedded Cs from the explosion.
O)
o>
E
o
10000
1000
100
10
Explosive
impingement
~ B2-2-8
¦ B3-4-16
Regression
Diffusion model
5 10
Depth into sample (mm)
15
¦ The migration into the concrete is believed to be due to diffusion,
with Cs+ carried in to the pores by the ambient relative humidity
present between deposition and analysis (21-99 %RH over 32d).
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
UCRL-POST-231956
M. Sutton, LLNL
14
-------
Fate and Transport
Sutton
By understanding the diffusive transport fraction, embedded
fraction and original cesium load from the explosion, we were able
to calculate the air-suspended fraction.
¦ Not deposited
¦ Embedded
¦ Diffusive transport
¦ One third of the cesium was suspended, one quarter was
explosively driven into the cement, the remainder underwent
diffusion into the concrete, making decontamination problematic.
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
UCRL-POST-231956 M. Sutton, LLNL 10
-------
Sutton
Dose
A 9-stage cascade impactor was used to sample air from the CFF
chamber both 5 and 10 minutes after the explosive test.
The results were converted from mg/m3 Cs to activity using a
specific activity of 88 Ci/g (thus allowing contamination estimates
to be made from a non-radioactive test).
The results show a
significant portion of the
respirable particles are
within the 9-10 um
range.
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
"a
0
ts
j)
o
O
CO
> I
3 °
< E
a) •
n
TO
L_
Q.
CO
a)
CC
250
200
150
100
5 Minutes
10 Minutes
0.7 1.1 2.1 3.3 4.7 5.8 9
Size Fraction Filter Cut-Off (p,m)
UCRL-POST-231956
M. Sutton, LLNL
IV
16
-------
Sutton
Dose
LLNL's HotSpot model was used to examine ground shine
depostion and dose variation with distance.
Swipe samples taken from the explosive test were converted to
dose values and plotted similarly (DCF from FGR 11, 12,
ICRP-30).
2.0
I
c
E
E 1-5
CD
O 1.0
o
CD
c
w 0.5
¦o
c
o o.o
0
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
— HotSpot Model
~ CFF Swipes
100 200 300
Distance from blast (m)
400
UCRL-POST-231956
M. Sutton, LLNL
17
-------
Decontamination Development
Sutton
Separately, chemical thermodynamic and structural modeling has
aided in the determination of more effective decontamination
agents.
The use of selective chelators
allows for the rapid and efficient
removal of radionuclides, while
also leaving infrastructure intact,
reducing waste generation, dose
and exposure time.
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
UCRL-POST-231S56 M. Sutton, LLNL
Such agents are capable of binding radionuclides to a higher
degree of selectivity when compared to traditional chelating
technology, over a wide pH and decon ratio.
-1
log [Chelator #3, M]
-------
Caveat and Summary
Sutton
While our non-radioactive Cs RDD simulation was perhaps
unrealistically large with respect to total Cs-137 activity, the work
does provide insight into the science of surface interaction,
deposition, dispersion, dose and decontamination needed to
prepare for protection and response against such a device.
¦ The work aids decision making between destructive and non-
destructive decontamination techniques to minimize residual dose
consequences during restoration-phase response activities
¦ The work also provides experimental data that is used to validate
models.
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
19
UCRL-POST-231956 M. Sutton, LLNL
I
-------
Acknowledgements
Sutton
Hotspot: National Atmospheric Release Advisory Center, LLNL
Author Affiliations:
1 Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Livermore CA 94550
2Pacific Biosciences, Menlo Park CA 94025
3University of Texas, Arlington TX 76019
4Simbol Mining Corp., Pleasanton CA 94566
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
UCRL-POST-231956
M. Sutton, LLNL
-------
Inactivation of Bioagents by Natural Attenuation, Liquid
Decontamination, or Fumigation
Harry Stone, Battelle
-------
Battelle
The Business of Innovation
Inactivation of Bioagents by
Natural Attenuation, Liquid
Decontamination, or Fumigation
Harry Stone,* William Richter,* Morgan
Wendling,* Kim Weber,* James Rogers,* Andrew
Phipps,* and Shawn Ryan^
*Battelle
UJ.S. EPA, National Homeland Security Research Center
Acknowledgment and Disclaimer
• Battelle performed the work presented here as a contractor to the U.S.
Envir onmental Protection Agency.
• The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, through its Office of Research and
Development, funded and managed this investigation through a Blanket Pur chase
Agreement under General Services Administr ation contract number
GS23F0011L-3 with Battelle. This document has been subjected to the Agency's
review and has been approved for presentation. Note that approval does not
signify that the contents necessarily reflect the views of the Agency.
• Mention of trade names or commercial products in this document or in the
methods referenced in this document does not constitute endorsement or
recommendation for use.
• Questions concerning this presentation or its application should be addressed to
Shawn P. Ryan, National Homeland Security Research Center, Office of
Research and Development, U.S. Envir onmental Protection Agency, Mail Code
E343-06, Research Triangle Park, NC 27711,919-541-0699
>. 2
-------
Stone
Biological Agents, Materials, and
Decontamination Technologies
Biological Agents (5)
Bacillus arithracis Ames spores
Brucella suis Biotype I
Francisella tularensis LVS
Vaccinia virus ATCC VR119
Yersinia pestis GO 92
Materials (11)
Aluminum
Keyboard keys (computer)
Carpet
Painted joint tape
Decorative laminate
Galvanized metal
Painted concrete
Wood
Glass
Ceiling tile
Cellulose
Decontamination Technologies (10)
Fumigant technologies (5)
Sabre: C102
STERIS VHP®: H202
BIOQUELL Clarus® C: H202
BIOQUELL Clarus® S: H202
Methyl bromide
Liquid technologies (5)
pH amended bleach
Exterm: C102 (aqueous)
Oxonia Active® : H202 / peroxyacetic acid
Spor Klenz Ready-to-Use: H202 / peroxyacetic
acid
DuPont Viikon® S: potassium peroxomonosulfate,
sodium dodecylbenzene sulphonate, and sulfamic
acid
Internal Standard Operating
Procedure for Efficacy Testing
• Coupons: -1.9 x 7.5 cm (except keyboard key, small glass, and cellulose)
• Inoculation: 10 x 10 pL drops, ~1 x 107 viable organisms/coupon (except
vaccinia ~1 x 108);
persistence measured from application
- dry one hour (except spores dried overnight) before decontamination
Expose to decontaminant
Extract coupons with 10 mL of PBS (spores, add 0.1% Triton X-100),
agitated for 15 minutes
Serial dilution and plating to determine CFU or PFU
Efficacy: log reduction equals the mean log density of control carriers
minus the mean log density of test carriers
-------
Stone
Attenuation of Biological Organisms
Over Time
-•-Brucella suis, keyboard
Francisella
tularensis, keyboard
Vaccinia
virus, keyboard
- Yersinia pestis, painted
joint tape
0 hr 2 hr 4 hr 8 hr 3 days 7 days
Time After Application of Organism to Coupon
Persistence was at ambient laboratory conditions (21.5°C ± 3.5°C; 24% to 60% RH)
At laboratory conditions tested, viable Brucella suis, Francisella tularensis, vaccinia
virus, and Yersinia pestis were recovered from at least one material at 7 days
Brucella suis and vaccinia virus were most persistent (highest residual viable
organisms over time) at the conditions tested
B. anthracis Ames: Sabre CI02 Fumigation
(3000 ppmv x 3 hr, 24°C-25°C, 85% - 95% RH)
Material
Control
Decon
Mean CFU (SD)
Mean CFU (SD)
Glass (5 mm x 5 mm),
4.70x10°
0
lx 107 spores applied
(1.13x10°)
Painted Concrete,
3.89 xlO7
6.61 x 102
lx 10s spores applied
(1.18 xlO7)
(1.48 xlO3)
Galvanized Metal,
4.68x10°
0
lx 10s spores applied
(2.00x10°)
Decorative Laminate,
3.58 xlO7
0
lx 10s spores applied
(1.18 xlO7)
Cellulose Insulation,
4.83 x 107
5.07 x 102
lx 10s spores applied
(2.13 x 107)
(3.24 x 102)
Particle Board,
3.53 x 106
0
lx 10s spores applied
(3.25 x 106)
Industrial Carpet,
4.31 x 107
0
lx 10s spores applied
(8.43 x 106)
Plate Glass,
3.90 xlO7
0
lx 10s spores applied
(9.24 x 106)
Sabre C102 at 3000 ppmv for 3 hi' (high humidity) is efficacious against B.
anthracis Ames spores on all materials tested with no viable spores recovered
from most materials tested
-------
Stone
B. anthracis: Sabre CIO.
Fumigation
-40% RH:
75%RH:
-40% RH.
75%RH:
-40% RH:
75% RH.
-40° o RH:
-75% RH:
Aluminum
Aluminum
Keyboard
Keyboard
Carpet
Carpet
Joint tape
Joint tape
/
40% RH
1
4000 6000
CT, ppmv-hr
C102 has lower efficacy at low RH (40%) than at higher RH (75%) against B.
anthracis Ames spores on certain materials; carpet may retain moisture
STERIS VHP® 500 ppmv HP Fumigation
Results for B. anthracis
-500 ppmv,
-500 ppmv.
-500 ppmv.
- 500 ppmv
-500 ppmv
500 ppmv
- 500 ppmv
500 ppmv
- 500 ppmv
-500 ppmv
- 500 ppmv
Aluminum
Keyboard
Carpet-a
Carpet-b
Joint tape
Laminate
Ductwork
Concrete
Wood
Glass
Ceiling tile
CT, ppmv-hr
Steris VHP fumigation yields high log reductions of B. anthracis from all materials
tested in 4 hours with a 500 ppmv fumigation cycle
-------
Stone
B. anthracis: STERIS VHP Fumigation
Results for at the 200-250 ppmv compared
to 500 ppmv
- 200-2 5 0 ppmv; Aluminum
- 500 ppmv. Aluminum
-200-250ppmv. Keyboard
-500 ppmv Keyboard
-200-250ppmv. Carpet
500 ppmv. Carpet
-200-25 Oppmv, Joint tape
500 ppmv Joint tape
400
CT, ppmv-hr
Effectiveness of STERIS VHP fumigation of B. anthracis spores in the range
tested appeared to be independent of how CT was achieved (whether
concentration or time was varied).
B. anthracis: Methyl Bromide 320 mg/L
Fumigation (36°C, 75% RH)
Painted Concrete
Cellulose
- Laminate
-Galvanized Metal
- Carpet
-Glass
-Tile
- B. subtilis, Glass
2200 2400 2600
CT, mg/L-Hr
• At 320 mg/L for 9 hours contact time, methyl bromide was efficacious against B.
anthracis but not against B. subtilis for materials and conditions tested
.. 10
-------
Stone
B. anthracis: BIOQUELL Clarus C 150 ppmv
HP Fumigation, 180 min Contact Time
• Spike amount 1.08 x 107 CFU/coupon
• Fumigate 10 min at 8 g/min; dwell at 0.8 g/min (150 ppmv cycle)
Material
Mean RecoveredB. anthracis (CFU/coupon)
Positive Test
Control Coupon
Mean Log
Reduction
Laminate
7.18 ± 3.60 x 106
0.00 ± 0.00
/<86± 0I)0~X
Ductwork
2.86 ± 1.71 x 106
0.00 ± 0.00
\6_46i 0.00/
Carpet
5.42 ± 0.75 xlO6
8.63 ± 16.6 x 104
4*55 ± Tm
Concrete
8.51 ±2.94 x 106
4.99 ± 10.6 x 103
5.46 ±2.07
Wood
5.25 ± 1.46 x 105
7.95 ± 9.18 x 103
2.16± 0.64
Glass
6.17 ± 0.72 xlO6
0.00 ± 0.00
6.79 ± 0.00
Ceiling tile
6.66 ± 1.63 x 105
0.00 ± 0.00
5.82 ±0.00
•Clarus C 150 ppmv HP fumigation - complete kill of B. anthracis on
nonporous materials and greater than 6-log kills at 180 min
•Viable spores recovered from some porous or absorbent materials after
fumigation
B. suis: Sabre Fumigation Results
for 50-100 ppmv CI02 (23°C)
/
s # &
..r J*' ^ ^ *
JS>
o
Material and Contact Time
140% RH
75% RH
Sabre CIO, fumigation at 50 - 100 ppmv at 120 min contact time is efficacious against B.
suis at 75% RH
75% RH for C102 fumigations results in higher log reduction against B. suis than 40% RH
». 12
-------
Stone
B. suis: STERIS VHP 500 ppmv
Fumigation Results
Contact Time Material
Mean Recovered!?, suis (CFU/coupon)
CFU/coupon
(Spike amount 7.03 x 107 - 8.80 x 107)
Positive Test
Control Coupon
Mean Log
Reduction
60 min
Aluminum
3.76 ± 1.62 xlO7
2.40 ±2.73 x 102
5.76 ±1.11
Keyboard
3.32 ±0.51 x 107
8.68 ±9.31 x 101
6.25 ± 1.17
Carpet
7.43 ± 3.65 x 105
0.00 ±0.00
5.87 ±0.00
Joint tape
4.02 ±2.01 x 104
0.00 ±0.00
4.60 ±0.00
90 min
Aluminum
5.06 ± 0.59 xlO7
0.00 ±0.00
7.70 ± 0.00
Keyboard
5.01 ± 1.05 x 107
0.00 ±0.00
7.70 ± 0.00
Steris VHP fumigation at 500 ppmv - complete kill of B. suis on all
materials tested at 90 min
k. 13
B. suis: BIOQUELL Clarus C 150
ppmv HP Fumigation Results
Mean Recovered B. suis
(CFU/coupon)
(Spike amount 3.5 \ 107)
Contact
Time
Material
Positive
Control
Test
Coupon
Mean Log
Reduction
180 min
Aluminum
Keyboard
Carpet
Joint tape
1.50 ± 0.64 x 107
2.24 ± 0.93 x 107
7.06 ± 1.30 x 10s
2.17 ± 0.25 x 10s
0.00 ±0.00
0.00 ±0.00
0.00 ±0.00
0.00 ±0.00
7.18 ±0.0
7.35 ±0.0
6.85 ±0.0
6.34 ±0.0
• Clarus C 150 ppmv HP fumigation - complete kill of B. suis on all
materials tested at 180 min contact time
>. 14
-------
Stone
F. tularensis: Sabre 50-100 ppmv CI02
(23°C, 75% RH) Fumigation Results
Contact
Time
120 min
Mean Recovered F. tularensis (CFU/coupon)
(Spike amount 6.77 x 107)
Material
Aluminum
Keyboard
Carpet
Joint tape
Positive
Control
2.39 ±1.41x10°
3.86 ± 0.82 xlO4
7.01 ± 9.14 xlO5
0.00 ±0.00
Test
Coupon
0.00 ±0.00
0.00 ±0.00
0.00 ±0.00
0.00 ±0.00
Mean Log
Reduction
6.38 ±0.00
4.59 ±0.00
5.85 ±0.00
Not calculable
Sabre C102 fumigation at 50 - 100 ppmv, 75% RH, is efficacious against F.
tularensis
High natural attenuation was observed on certain materials over the period of
testing
F. tularensis: STERIS VHP 200-
250 ppmv HP Fumigation
Contact
Time
Material
Mean Recovered F. tularensis
(CFU/coupon)
(Spike amount 1.91 x 10s)
Positive Test
Control Coupon
90 min
Aluminum
Keyboard
2.18 ±0.91 x 106
5.55 ± 1.57 xlO5
• STERIS VHP 200 - 250 ppmv HP fumigation - complete kill on both
materials tested at 90 min contact time
h. 16
-------
Stone
F. tularensis: Sioquell Clarus S 150
ppmv HP Fumigation Results
Mean Recovered /•'. tularensis
(CFU/coupon)
(Spike amount 1.65 - 1.77 x 108)
Contact
Time
30 min
Material
Carpet
Joint tape
Aluminum
Keyboard
Positive
Control
3.00 ± 0.69 xlO6
4.01 ± 4.82 xlO3
6.63 ± 2.76 xlO4
1.30 ± 1.21 xlO6
Test
Coupon
0.00 ± 0.00
0.00 ± 0.00
0.00 ± 0.00
0.00 ± 0.00
Mean Log
Reduction
6.48 ± 0.00
3.60 ± 0.00
4.82 ± 0.00
6.11 ± 0.00
Clarus S 150 ppmv HP fumigation - complete kill of F. tularensis on all
materials tested at 30 min contact time
Vaccinia: Sabre 250 ppmv CI02 Fumigation
with 30 min Contact Time (22°C, 76% RH)
Control
Decon
Mean PFU (SD)
Mean PFU
Glass (small)
3.22 x 104 (3.12 x 103)
0
Painted Concrete
3.25 x 105 (5.45 x 104)
0
Galvanized Metal
2.95 x 105 (9.11 x 104)
0
Decorative Laminate
2.32 xlO5 (1.53 xlO4)
0
Cellulose Insulation
3.67 xlO5 (3.12 xlO5)
0
Particle Board
1.10 xlO5 (1.30 xlO4)
0
Industrial Carpet
2.98 xlO5 (8.74 xlO4)
0
No viable vaccinia virus was recovered from any material tested after Sabre 250
ppmv C102 fumigation for 30 min contact time
>. 18
-------
Stone
Vaccinia: STERIS VHP HP 200-250
ppmv Fumigation Results
Contact
Time
30 min
60 min
Material
Aluminum
Keyboard
Carpet
Joint tape
Aluminum
Keyboard
120 min Aluminum
Mean Recovered Vaccinia Virus (PFU/coupon)
(Spike amount 5.99 - 9.64 x 106)
Positive Test
Control Coupon
2.50 ± 1.59x10°
2.43 ± 0.60 xlO5
1.34± 1.79 xlO4
1.75 ± 0.65 xlO4
Ml ±0^22xl05'
8.50 ± 1.37 xlO4
1.64± 0.42 x 106
1.42 ±0.32x10'
1.49 ±0.48x10'
0.00 ± 0.00
0.00 ± 0.00
L25lTa2TxIoI
0.00 ± 0.00
Mean Log
Reduction
5.26 ±0.11
4.23 ±0.16
4.13 ±0.00
4.24 ± 0.00
5.06 ±0.08
4.93 ± 0.00
.v.C u.iCn in
4.70 ± 0.09
• STERIS VHP 200 - 250 ppmv HP fumigation - complete kill on all
materials tested except aluminum at 90 min contact time
• Hypothesize that hydrogen peroxide may react with aluminum,
reducing efficacy; near complete kill on aluminum at 120 min
Vaccinia: BIOQUELL Clarus C 150
ppmv HP
Contact
Time
Material
Keyboard
Carpet
180 min Aluminum
Joint tape
Glass
Mean Recovered Vaccinia virus (PFU/coupon)
(Spike Amount 3.52 - 9.64 x 107 PFU/coupon)
Positive Test
Control Coupon
7.74 ± 3.90 x 10"
3.93 ± 1.88 x 104
1.59 ± 0.59 xlO7
1.09 ± 0.45 xlO5
1.60 ± 0.54 xlO7
0.00 ±0.00
0.00 ±0.00
0.00 ±0.00
0.00 ±0.00
0.00 ±0.00
Mean Log
Reduction
5.89 ±0.00
4.59 ±0.00
7.20 ± 0.00
5.04 ± 0.00
7.20 ± 0.00
• No viable vaccinia virus was recovered from any material tested after Clarus C
150 ppmv HP fumigation for 180 min contact time
>. 20
-------
Stone
Y. pestis: Sabre CI02 Fumigation
Results
Mean Recovered II pestis (CFU/coupon)
(Spike Amount 1.56 - 2.30 x 107 CFU/coupon)
Contact
Positive
Test
Time
Material
Control
Coupon
0 min
Aluminum
9.54 ± 5.52 xlO3
Not applicable
Keyboard
6.16 ± 6.09 x 103
Not applicable
Carpet
5.04 ± 2.64 x 106
Not applicable
Joint tape
0.00 ± 0.00
Not applicable
30 min
Aluminum
0.00 ± 0.00
0.00 ±0.00
Keyboard
4.00 ± 7.24 x 101
0.00 ±0.00
Carpet
1.05 ± 1.10 x 106
0.00 ±0.00
Joint tape
0.00 ± 0.00
0.00 ±0.00
• Sabre C102 fumigation at 50 - 100 ppmv, 75% RH: no viable Y. pestis
recovered from any material after a 30 min contact time
«. 21
Y. Pestis: STERIS VHP 200-250
ppmv HP Fumigation
Mean Recovered 1' pestis
Contact
Time
Material
Spike Amount
(CFU/coupon)
(CFU/coupon)
Positive Test
Control Coupon
Mean Log
Reduction
90 min
Aluminum
3.83 x 106
3.29 ± 0.52 xlO4 0.00 ±0.00
4.52 ± 0.00
Keyboard
3.83 x 106
4.13 ± 1.57 x 102 0.00 ±0.00
2.62 ± 0.00
• STERIS VHP 200 - 250 ppmv HP fumigation - complete kill of Y.
pestis on both materials tested at 90 min contact time
• High levels of natural attenuation of Y. pestis result in low
calculated log reductions
h. 22
-------
Stone
Y. pestis: BIOQUELL Clarus C 150
ppmv HP Fumigation
Contact
Time
Material
Mean Recovered II pestis (CFU/coupon)
(Spike Amount 9.07 x 106 CFU/coupon)
Positive Test
Control Coupon
Mean Log
Reduction
180 min Aluminum
Keyboard
Carpet
Joint tape
3.02 ± 0.71 xlO4
4.56 ± 1.53 x 105
2.14 ± 0.93 xlO3
4.29 ± 2.76 x 103
0.00 ±0.00
0.00 ±0.00
0.00 ±0.00
0.00 ±0.00
4.48 ±0.00
5.66 ±0.00
3.33 ±0.00
3.63 ±0.00
• No viable Y. pestis was recovered from any material tested after Clarus C 150
ppmv HP fumigation for 180 min contact time
B. anthracis Ames: pH Amended
Bleach (5,000 ppm) Solution (20°C)
- Carpet
- Concrete
- Glass
Laminate
- Galvanized
Metal
- Particle
Board
10 20 30
Contact Time (min)
40
pH amended bleach effective against B. anthracis Ames with 30 min contact time
on all materials tested; contaminated surface was soaked in liquid
>. 24
-------
Stone
B. anthracis Ames: Exterm 1,000
ppm CI02 (20°C)
Carpet
Particle Board
Laminate
Contact Time, min
• Exterm Cl02 solution effective against B. anthracis Ames with 120 min contact
time on all materials tested; contaminated surface was soaked in liquid
25
B. anthracis Ames: Spore-Klenz
Hydrogen Peroxide - Peracetic Acid
(20X)
10 20 30
Contact Time, Min
Glass (B. anthracis)
Painted Concrete
Carpet
Galvanized Metal
Particle Board
Decorative Laminate
Glass (B. subtilis)
• Spor Klenz Ready-to-Use solution effective against B. anthracis Ames with 30
min contact time on some materials tested; limited effectiveness on galvanized
metal and painted concrete; contaminated surface was soaked in liquid
• Preliminary results - data currently under review
-------
Stone
B. anthracis Ames: Oxoriia Active
Hydrogen Peroxide - Peracetic Acid
(20°C)
9.00
:.oo
7.00
§ 6.00
2.00
1.00
0.00
30
10
60
Contact Time, Min
• Glass (B. anthracis)
—¦—Painted Concrete
A Carpet
—Galvanized Metal
—Particle Board
Decorative Laminate
Glass (B. subtilis)
Oxonia Active solution effective against B. anthracis Ames with 60 min contact time on most
materials tested; limited effectiveness on painted concrete; contaminated surface was
soaked in liquid
Preliminary results - data currently under review
B. anthracis: Virkon S (1%)
Decontamination Method Demonstration
Virkon S
Time
Neutralizer
Average Log
Density
(CFU/mL)
Average Log
Reduction
No
30 min
None (tubes 1-3)
6.83
n/a
Yes
30 mill
None (10-12)
6.97
-0.14
No
60 min
None (tubes 1-3)
6.16
n/a
Yes
60 mill
None (10-12)
5.89
0.27
• Virkon S 1% solution not effective against B. anthracis Ames with 30 or 60 min
contact time in suspension test
l 28
-------
Summary
• At laboratory conditions tested, viable Brucella suis, Francisella
tularensis, vaccinia virus, and Yersinia pestis were recovered from at
least one material at 7 days
• Brucella suis and vaccinia virus were most persistent (highest residual
viable organisms over time) at the conditions tested
• Application all fumigants (Sabre C102, STERIS VHP, and BIOQUELL
Clarus C and S) at conditions tested resulted in reduction in recovered
viable B. anthracis, B. suis, F. tularensis, vaccinia virus, and Y. pestis;
exposure of B. anthracis to methyl bromide resulted in reduction in
recovered viable organisms
• Fumigant efficacy varied from low to high, depending on concentration of
the fumigant, contact time, materials on which agent was deposited, and
conditions, e.g., temperature and RH
• Application of amended bleach, Exterm" were highly efficacious against
B. anthracis under conditions and on materials tested; Oxonia Active®,
Spor-Klenz Ready-to-Use were highly efficacious against B. anthracis
under conditions tested for some, but not all, materials tested
• DuPont Virkon ® S as tested was not efficacious against B. anthracis in 30
and 60 min suspension tests
-------
EPA Spectral Photometric Environmental Collection Technology:
Gamma Emergency Mapper Project
John Cardarelli, EPA/OSWER/OEM/NDT
-------
Cardarelli
EPA Air
Environ
Gamma Emergency Mapper Project
Decontamination Workshop
Research Triangle Park, NC
April 14, 2010
John Cardarelli II1, Mark Thomas1, Tim Curry1, Scott Faller2,
1 National Decontamination Team
2 Radiological Emergency Response Team
1
Outline
¦ Background:
¦ ASPECT GEM
¦ GEM Team
¦ Radiation
detection technology
and survey
¦ Recent Surveys/MDA
¦ Accomplishments
¦ Future Work
ASPECT Aircraft & Program
Purpose and Goal
-------
Cardarelli
Rockwall
Garland Rowiett
Farmers
Branch^
Irving
n City
Grand
Arlington Prairie
Glenn ;
Heights
Mansfield
Aircraft Platform
AeroCommander 680 FL/G Platform
- Base of Operation: Waxahachie, Texas
- IFR/GPS Equipped
- High Quality Filtered Power
- STC Camera Holes in the floor
Crew: Two Pilots, One Operator, All
Commercial/ATP Rated
Speeds:
- Data Collection at 100 kts
- Cruise at 180 - 200 kts
Range/Aloft Time:
- Range 1,100 NM
- Aloft Time 4 - 6 hours
Service Altitude:
- Data Collection at 500 to 2,000 ft AGL
- Cruise at 20,000 ft (with
Supplemental Oxygen)
Ground Needs - Standard FBO
Deployments and Responses
ASPECT Statistics
49 Emergency
Responses
14 SEAR
Deployments
12 NSSE
Deployments
7 PEMA Activations
20 Special Projects
LEGEND
Responses
Deployments
Special Projects
2
-------
wrfmy Airborne Spectral Photometric Environmental
Collection Technology
The primary mission of
ASPECT is to provide
information to the first
responder in a form that
timely, useful, and
compatible with existing
infrastructures.
ASPECT can provide
infrared & photographic
images with geospatial
chemical and radiological
information.
01 ASPECT GEM ^
"Gamma Emergency Mapping" Project
Purpose: To improve the US EPA airborne
gamma-screening and mapping
capability of ground-based gamma
contamination following a wide-area
radiological dispersal device (RDD) or
improvised nuclear detonation (IND) attack.
Goal: To develop the most advanced gamma-
radiation detection capability mountable
within an Aero Command 680 FL airframe.
www.epaosc.net/aspectgem
-------
Cardarelli
EPA
NDT
RERT
ERT
ORIA
^ Regions 2, 5, 6
ASPECT GEM Project
Univ. of Iowa
ASPECT Pilots
States (NM)
DOE AMS
NGA
NDT: National Decontamination Team
RERT: Radiological Emergency Response Team
ERT: Environmental Response Team
ORIA: Office of Radiation and Indoor Air
DOE: Department of Energy, Aerial Measurement
System
NGIA: National Geospatial Intelligence Agency
NM: New Mexico State
Emergency Response
Homeland Security
Remedial Characterization
Climate Monitoring
xirgir j fg? vi" ti *
rjh •/—
Users/Partners include EPA, NGA, DHS-IP, DOE-AMS
The primary role of the ASPECT program is emergency
response. In recent years this role has expanded to
include participation in homeland security events and
geographical/radiological characterization of remedial
sites. Additional roles may include climate monitoring
including C02 characterization.
4
-------
Radiation Detection Technology
Solutions RS-500
3 2"x4"xl6" Sodium Iodide
1 3"x3" Lanthanum Bromide
2 RS-500 units on aircraft
Advance Digital
Cardarelli
Typical Environmental Survey
Field of Vre\
5
-------
Cardarelli
-------
-------
Cardarelli
Typical Gamma-Ray Spectrum
Name
TotCount
Potassium
Uranium
Thorium
Man-Made
MM High
Cs-137
Uranium Hig,.
Low Energy
4000
Channel
Uranium Decay Chain
The Uranium-238 Decay Chain
Atom c Nurraer
82 S3 S4 SS 8
-------
Cardarelli
Average Concentrations
Material
Uranium Thorium
(pCi/g) (pCi/g)
Potassium
(pCi/'g)
Granite
Sandstone
Cement
Limestone concrete
Sandstone concrete
Wall board
By-product gypsum
Natural gypsum
Wood
Clay brick
U deposits in Grants area
600 to 2,000
27 pCi
y
ZK N
Parameter Cone 3
eU (pCi/g)
¦ < 1.0000
1 III
5.0000 : 6.0000
1.0000 : 2,0000
¦1
6,0000 : 7.0000 1
2,0000 : 3,0000
¦r
7,0000 : 8.0000
3,0000 : 4,0000
¦i
8.0000 : 9.0000
4,0000 : 5,0000
¦
> 9.0000
9
-------
Cardarelli
Sigma Values (Excess Uranium)
A Less man -6 0 & -2.0 to +20 M
Greater than +6 0
Normal Distribution &
Sigma Values
Standard deviation (a, sigma)
represents the spread of the
data about the mean. In this
survey, the mean value (net
"excess eU") was zero.
1 a = 68.27% of the data
2 a = 95.45% of the data
3 CT = 99.73% of the data
4 a = 99.99366% of the data
5 a = 99.99994% of the data
6 a = 99.999999% of the data
1760 keV (21aBi) eU
2615 keV { Tl)
Sigma Values (Excess Uranium)
^ Less Wart -6 0 -2 0 to *2 0 ^ Greater than +6.0
0 -6.0 to -4.0 *20 to *4.0
0 -4 0 to -2 0 (||) *4.0 to *6 0
Greater likelihood of excess eU
10
-------
Cardarelli
Sigma Values (MMGC)
Google Earth Display
11
-------
Cardarelli
Google Earth Display - Main Menu
&
¦
» !is»ch
IU
¦»¦•' UP
'iSEsmi
bH* KM.
» D«U -Strnrm
b
« n*
» P«fr SantMwU
~ «Ł 3>vtaE*5tl»a
<4 t>irt*IWk™i
labeU
- 0 ¦•* PlW
* P3 ita
0SB flMtt
n XtOMnyi
h PIP A
n 9 ¦¦oiiK
» NA«m.
If El ft fl«fc.Y
' U'|f nU km 4»*luy*d l>n Oct. 1
Uu««h 1i\ 16th 1009 it lli. H«v Ibueii uu lit ivy (.ml SPA hgiw e «,4 ¦-!». B»»
K««l«n [i»f ini.u At lbu|>M CaimrtEy Th» ISA AfSICT iy«r information
Available Airborne Sansor Suit® Pat.
Flight Planning and Coogl* Display Tool
tU'Jit Mtaaun-f • m fatvluwi, '.'T
- Pud i'lrvtu Lu.il id Oft
- D»,l iunw Lii... l:< tire
^8*4Jtoaaa-tiJiM-it Oct
-fi ~"& Ex»ur«Me Tjn 1 knj
» d"i KMCouts Ti*n 1 jmz
* Ll^ft UW*D««r*w(»WS»f .
» D« CMUCar 1ft
* IT.I* iJnramSim>ti>R3
« n«> st*™*
*i O"®1 -faWCartsHMrtBlDw
.. n*M
-is* aw«* rixMPi
Google Earth Display - Aerial
3^31 Photo Menu
12
-------
Google Earth Display - Individual
Color Aerial Photo Selection
1
m
Minimum Detectable
Activity
110
knots
300 ft AGL + 3 s sliding avg
500 ft AGL + 5 s sliding avg
3 sigma
activity
(mCi)
Exposure at
1m
(mR/hr)
6 sigma
activity
(mCi)
Exposure at
1m
(mR/hr)
3 sigma
activity
(mCi)
Exposure at
1m
(mR/hr)
6 sigma
activity
(mCi)
Exposure at
1m
(mR/hr)
Cs-137
2.6
0.84
5.2
1.7
10
3.2
20
6.4
Co-60
1.4
1.8
2.8
3.6
5.2
6.7
10.4
13.5
1 mCi = 37 MBq
1 mR » 0.01 mSv
6 2x4x16 Nal Detectors
2 3x3" La Br Detectors
Average background exposure rate ranges
between 0.005 to 0.020 mR/hr
-------
Typical Cs-137 & Co-60
Sources/Applications
Application
Isotope
Min Activity
(mCi)
1mCi = 37MBq
Typical
(mCi)
Max
Activity
(mCi)
IAEA
Class
Moisture Density
Gauge
Cs-137
8
10
11
Fill-level, thickness
gauges
Cs-137
Brachytherapy - low
dose rate
Cs-137
Well Logging
Cs-137
50
60
10
500
1,000 2,000
65
700
2,000
Spinning Pipe Gauges
Cs-137
Dredger Gauges
Cs-137
Co-60
Blast Furnace
1-137
1-137
1-137
b-60
2,000 2,000
200
2000
250
760
1,000 1,000
100 3,000
1,000 5,000
100 5,000
5,000
10,000
2,600
2,000
40,000
5,000
10,000
Current ASPECT MDA
Cs-137 2.4 @ 3a
Co-60 1.4 @ 3a
I
h
__ 'Ci
M
| What's a Dangerous
Source?
1 mCi = 37 MBq
Radionuclide
Activity associated with a
Dangerous Sources (mCi)
Co-60
Cs-137
lr-192
Ra-226
Tc-99m
800
3,000
2,000
1,000
2,100
A 'danaerous source' is defined by the IAEA as "a
source that could, if not under control, give rise to
exposure sufficient to cause severe deterministic
pffprfc "
e"eLLb Current ASPECT MDA
Cs-137 2.4 @ 3a
Co-60 1.4 @ 3a
-------
Cardarelli
Accomplishments
since January 2009.
Signed MOU with DOE
Pending MOUs with New Mexico, NGA and DHS IP
6 Radiological Deployments
- Balloon Festival, Rose Bowl, Sugar Bowl, Uranium
Surveys, Superfund sites
Procured additional equipment
Expanded technology to ground-based activities
Active applied R/D program
- novel signal processing techniques; hybrid systems
Lesson Learned corrections
- LaBr gain shift, improved satellite transmission service,
incorporated radar altimeter, faster product development,
more flexible data management capabilities
Future Work
¦ Calibrate system with 8 Nal detectors
¦ Cross calibrate ASPECT GEM with DOE
¦ Accelerated data exchange products
(e.q. real-time contour mapping)
¦ Communicating uncertainties with
maps
¦ Strengthen ground-based systems to
be consistent with ASPECT GEM
capabilities
¦ Strengthen deployment protocol with
DOE on Homeland Security missions
15
-------
ASPECT
Contact Information
Primary Contact
Mark Thomas (Primary Contact) 816-718-4271
Thomas. markKaeoa.gov
Tim Curry (Primary Contact) 816-718-4281
Currv.timothviaena.gov
John Cardarelli (GEM Contact) 513-487-2423
Cardareiii.iohniaena.gov
National Decontamination Team 800-329-1841
Regional Contacts
Region I
617-223-7265
Region II
732-548-8730
Region III
215-814-9016
Region IV
404-562-8700
Region V
312-353-2318
Region VI
866-372-7745
Region VII
913-281-0991
Region VIII
303-293-1788
Region IX
415-744-2000
Region X
206-553-1263
Cardarelli
-------
Cardarelli
Considerations
+
Comparing Results?
¦ Use in-situ measurement techniques
¦ Laboratory results not true
comparison to airborne results due to
the way the samples are processed.
¦ Ground-based exposure rates
measurements must subtract cosmic
radiation contribution to compare with
airborne exposure rate
measurements.
17
Background radiation (radon)
Secular equilibrium assumption
Soil moisture and precipitation
Topography
Spatial effects
-------
Secular Equilibrium
(key assumption)
StM-ulur
Equilibrium
Same activity (cps) or
concentration (pCi/g)
Activity A: of relatively shortlived radionuclide daughter (12 * c ' t) a* a
function of time t with initial condition A_»u 0. Activity of daughter builds
up to thai of the parent in above seven half-lives {^71*2). Thereafter, daughter
decays at the same rate it is produced (Aj = A |). and secular equilibrium
is said to exist.
http://www.flickr.com/photos/mitopencourseware/3707241882/sizes/o/in/set-72157621182283632/
ASPECT Uses Five Primary
Sensors/Systems:
- An Infrared Line Scanner to
image the plume
- A High Speed Infrared
Spectrometer to identify and
quantify the composition of the
plume
- Two Gamma-Ray
Spectrometer Packs for
Radiological Detection
- High Resolution Digital Aerial -
Cameras
- A High Throughput Satellite
Data System (SatCom)
-------
Cardarelli
Compound
Representative Compound
Detection Limits
1,3 Butadiene
Ethylene Dibromide
Ethanol
Ethylene Oxide
Formic Acid
Hydrogen Chloride
Isopropanol
Methanol
Methyl Ethyl Ketone
Methylene Chloride
N-Butyl Acetate
Estimated 10 Meter 30 Meter
LOD Thick Plume Thick Plume
(ppm*M) (ppm)
| Representative Compound
^ Detection Limits
Compound
PEL
(ppm)
IDLH
(ppm)
Estimated
LOD
(ppm*M)
10 Meter Thick
Plume
(ppm)
30 Meter Thick
Plume
(ppm)
Nitric Acid
2
25
73
7.3
2.4
Ozone
0.1
5
75
7.5
2.5
Phosgene
0.1
5
7.6
0,8
0.3
Propylene Oxide
100
400
169
16.9
5.6
Sulfur Hexaflouride
1000
Nd
1.0
0.1
0.03
Trichloroethylene
100
1000
34
3.4
E
3
Triethyl phosphate
Nd
ESS
0.5
0.2
Vinyl Chloride
1
Nd
150
15.0
5,0
GA (Tabun)
Very Low
13.5
1.35
0.45
GB (Sarin)
Very Low
9.0
0.9
0.3
GD Soman
Very Low
7.7
0.8
0.3
HD (Mustard)
Very Low
40
4.0
HN (Mustard)
Very Low
45
1
i
19
-------
Cardarelli
Program ASPECT
Aerial Photography
¦ 12.5 MPixel High Resolution Digital Camera
¦ Independent and/or Slaved to IR Data
Collection
¦ Rectified for Inclusion into GIS
20
-------
High/Low Tech Approaches to HVAC Decontamination
Brian Attwood, EPA/ORD/NHSRC
-------
Attwood
oEPA
United Stales
Environmental Protection
Agency
High/Low Tech Approaches
to HVAC Decontamination
Brian Attwood
Office of Research and Development
Decontamination and Consequences Management Division, National Homeland Security Research Center
oEPA
United Stales MA. I A-u
Introduction
What is the best way to decontaminate a
biologically contaminated building,
specifically the HVAC system?
r Office of Research and Development
1
-------
Attwood
&EPA
United Stales
Environmental Protection
Agoncy
Introduction
• How to define the "best" solution?
• Is it the:
cheapest $$$
fastest
r Office of Research and Development
oEPA
Unilwl Slates
Possible Approaches
"High tech" - fumigation
"Low tech" - mechanical
cleaning and disinfection
r Office of Research and Development
Decontamination and Consequence Management Division, National Homeland Security Research Center
2
-------
Attwood
&EPA
High Tech
low waste
turn-key solution
low availability
high tech costs
vs Low Tech
• high availability
• high labor cost
• high waste
• under development
-
Office of Research and Development
Decontamination and Consequence Management Division, National Homeland Security Research Center
&EPA
Decontamination Challenge
Unituri Slates
Ewironiriontal Protection
Agency
. 03/18/1010
/
r Office of Research and Development
3
-------
Attwood
&EPA
United Stales
Environmental Protection
Agoncy
Efficacy Data on Galvanized Metal
pH-amended bleach - 10 minute contact time (1)
• VHP - 250 ppm for 90 miri? (2)
• Chlorine dioxide - 9000 ppm-hr (3)
i-EPA (2006), Evaluation of Spray-Applied Sporicidal Decontamination Technologies,
EPA 600-R-06-146
¦ STERIS VHP registration label
3EPA (2006), Evaluation of Sporicidal Decontamination Technology: Sabre Technical Services
Chlorine Dioxide Gas Generator, I P \ 600-R-06-048
¦
Office of Research and Development
Decontamination and Consequence Management Division, National Homeland Security Research Center
v>EPA
Lab Experiments
Unituri Slates
Environmental Protection
Agency
Contaminate short duct run with bacterial spores, e.g.
Bacillus subtilis
all orientations contaminated
aerosol deposition
r Office of Research and Development
4
-------
Attwood
SEPA
Lab Experiments
United S
Environmental Protection
Agoncy
Apply decontamination procedure
Apply pH-adjusted bleach using garden
sprayer keeping wet for 10 minutes
Fumigate with VHP at 250 ppm for 90
minutes
Fumigate with C102 at 3000 ppm for 180
minutes
-
Office of Research and Development
Decontamination and Consequence Management Division, National Homeland Security Research Center
SEPA
Lab Experiments
United S
Environmental Protection
Agoncy
Sample for residual contamination
Optimize decontamination procedure
- re-wetting frequency
number of access points
concentration/flow rate of fumigant
-
Office of Research and Development
Decontamination and Consequence Management Division, National Homeland Security Research Center
5
-------
&EPA
Oriitpd Sialob j ¦
Field Testing
• Full-scale testing at INL in the fall
r Office of Research and Development
v>EPA
Field Testing
Unituri Slates
EnvironfTiflfital Protection
Agency
High tech
- entire building fumigated
Low tech
- ilexi-duct removed
- rooms and ductwork deconned
Sampling
h
Office of Research and Development
Decontamination and Consequence Management Division, National Homeland Security Research Center
-------
Attwood
svEPA
United Sla(os g ¦
ar"" Conclusion
• The relative effectiveness of the two
approaches will be evaluated
The "best" approach will likely depend on the
situation
-
Office of Research and Development
Decontamination and Consequence Management Division, National Homeland Security Research Center
7
-------
Radiological Decontamination of Urban Surfaces Using Selective
Isotope-Sequestering Agents
Konstantin Volchek for Pervez Azmi, Emergency Sciences and
Technology Section, Environment Canada
Presentation not available for distribution
-------
Performance Evaluation of Decontamination Technologies
for Dirty Bomb Cleanup
John Drake, EPA/ORD/NHSRC
-------
Drake
SEPA
United States
Environmental Protection
Agency
Performance Evaluation of Decontamination
Technologies for Dirty Bomb Cleanup
Decontamination Research and Development Conference
RTP, NC 13 April 2010
John Drake NHSRC/DCMD
Office of Research and Development
National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequent Management Division
-------
Drake
WEPA Evaluation of "Mechanical" Decontamination
Environmental Protection . . .
Agency Technologies
Focus on "mechanical" technologies with
vacuum assist for effluent capture
Built full scale test facility: 9x9 ft vertical wall
holds 9 concrete coupons
-Tested five technologies
• CS Unitec (sander)
• River Technologies (rotating water-jet)
• Empire Blast (abrasive blast)
• Dust Director (wire brush)
• Dust Director (diamond flap wheel)
- Dry run to adjust to tool behavior
- Data analyses completed
- Reports underway
The "Wall" under construction
I Office of Research and Development
I National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequent Management Division
-------
Drake
vvEPA
United States
Environmental Protection
Agency
Experimental Approach
w
Deposit contaminant on coupons
Measure contamination levels before
and after application of decontamination
technology
Apply decon technology in a realistic
manner (e.g. using the same application
techniques as would be used in the field)
Evaluate
- Decon Factor DF = A0/Af
- Percent Removal %R = (1-Af/A0) * 100%
• A0= activity before application of decon technology
• Af = activity after application of decon technology
-Speed (ft2/hr)
Operational parameters (difficulty, infrastructure, skill level, etc)
- Other (deployed cost, availability, shelf life, etc)
Wmk
Office of Research and Development
National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequent Management Division
-------
Drake
• Applied as mist of 2.5 mL of aqueous
solution (2.6 mg/L)
• Target activity of 53 pCi/m2 (pCi per coupon)
• Activity measured with intrinsic germanium
detectors
• Perfect homogeneity not critical because
total surface activity measured
3EPA
United States
Environmental Protection
Agency
Cesium (Cs)-137 Deposition
and Measurement
Nitrogen
I Office of Research and Development
I National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequent Management Division
-------
vvEPA
United States
Environmental Protection
Agency
Full Scale Test Facility
Radiological
enclosure at INL
9x9 ft wall with
inset coupons
Office of Research and Development
National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequent Management Division
-------
Drake
3EPA
United States
Environmental Protection
Agency
Dry run to adjust to tool behavior
Each tool was used in a "dry run" to gain
operator skill and adjust to appropriate
pressure and traverse speed
- Blank coupons treated with dye before dry
run for visual feedback during operation
The same operator performed all dry runs
as well as actual tests
Coupon with dye before/after dry run
Office of Research and Development
National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequent Management Division
-------
Drake
Dust Director - Steel Brush
United States
Environmental Protection
Agency
Percent removed (avg): 38%
Decon Factor (DF): 1.6
I Office of Research and Development
I National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequent Management Division
Preliminary Data - Do not distribute
-------
Drake
vvEPA
United States
Environ
Agency
Environmental Protection RjVer Technologies (rotating water-jet)
Percent removed (avg): 36%
Decon Factor (DF): 1.6
I Office of Research and Development
I National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequent Management Division
-------
Drake
vvEPA
united states CS Unitec (sander)
Environmental Protection
Agency
Percent removed (avg): 54%
Decon Factor (DF): 2.3
Office of Research and Development
National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequent Management Division
-------
Drake
vvEPA Dust Director - Diamond Wheel
United States
Environr
Agency
Decon Factor (DF): 14
Percent removed (avg): 89%
Before
Office of Research and Development
National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequent Management Division
Preliminary Data - Do not distribute
-------
Drake
«epa
united states EmpireBlast (abrasive blast)
Environmental Protection 1 * *
Agency
Percent removed (avg): 96%
Decon Factor (DF): 41
iS
w.
I Office of Research and Development
I National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequent Management Division
Preliminary Data - Do not distribute
After
-------
Drake
&EPA
United States
Environmental Protection
Agency
Summary of Results - Decontamination Efficacy
Decontamination
Technology
Pre-Decon
Activity
|jCi / Coupon
Post-Decon
Activity
|jCi / Coupon
%R
DF
DD Wire Brush
1.16 + 0.05
0.72 + 0.09
38 + 7
1.6 + 0.2
DD Diamond Flap Wheel
1.13 + 0.07
0.12 + 0.09
89 + 8
14 + 8.5
CSU Sander
1.15 + 0.07
0.53 + 0.12
54+10
2.3 + 0.7
RT Rotating Water-jet
1.13 + 0.03
0.72 + 0.05
36 + 4
1.6 + 0.09
EB Grit Blaster
1.17 + 0.04
0.03 + 0.03
96 + 3
41 +21
Office of Research and Development
National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequent Management Division
-------
Drake
*>EPA Summary of Results - Operational Performance
United States *
Environmental Protection
Agency
Parameter
Grinding Technologies
Ablative Technologies
Decontamination rate
Approximately 1-3 m2/hr
Approximately 5 m2/hr
Applicability to irregular
surfaces
Irregularities kept some heads from
making good contact with the surface;
the more aggressive the head the
greater the final contact area
Very applicable as surface is receiving a
pressurized blast of abrasive or water;
independent of surface terrain
Skilled labor
requirement
Brief training session
Brief training session
Utilities required
110v for both grinder and vacuum
High pressure air compressor, hot water
pressure washer
Extent of portability
Very portable
Equipment requirements more significant,
hoses would allow access to most
locations
Set-up time
30 minutes
2 days to assemble equipment, but once
together set-up would be minimal
Secondary waste
management
Very little waste; vacuum very effective in
dust collection
Water spray control difficult; safety
concern; grit blasting vacuum worked
well
Surface damage
Sander & Wire Brush - minor visible
surface damage, discoloration Diamond
Flap Wheel - top 1-2mm of coupon
removed leaving exposed aggregate
Rotating Water-jet - no visible surface
damage
Grit Blaster - 1-2 mm of coupon surface
removed leaving exposed aggregate
I Office of Research and Development
I National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequent Management Division
-------
Persistence of Select Biological Agents
Joseph Wood, EPA/ORD/NHSRC
-------
Wood
*>EPA
United Stales
Environmental Protection
Agency
Persistence of Select Biological Agents
EPA:
Joseph Wood
Battelle:
Tom Kelly, Harry Stone, Daniel Chappie, James
Rogers, Young Choi, Morgan Wendling
Presented to US EPA Decontamination Research Conference
Research Triangle Park, NC
April 14, 2010
Office of Research and Development
National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequence Management Division 0
*>EPA
United States
Environmental Protection
Agency
Acknowledgements
• Peer reviewers of quality assurance/test plans and test
reports
• EPA National Decon Team
• TRIO (Task force on research to inform and optimize)
• Stakeholders
Office of Research and Development
National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequence Management Division
1
-------
Wood
*>EPA
United Stales
Environmental Protection
Agency
Outline
Persistence of Bacillus anthracis with exposure to simulated
sunlight
Persistence of freeze-dried vaccinia virus
Persistence of Brucella suis
Office of Research and Development
National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequence Management Division
oEPA
Prt
Why were these tests conducted?
Data are sparse
United StBtes
Environmental Protection
Agency
Quantify effect of relative humidity (RH), temperature, sunlight,
and the material with which the agent is associated
Understanding of how long the agent may survive in the
environment will assist officials in making decisions about
decontamination
Office of Research and Development
National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequence Management Division
-------
Wood
*>EPA
United Stales
Environmental Protection
Agency
Persistence of B. anthracis with exposure to
simulated sunlight
Office of Research and Development
National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequence Management Division 4
SEPA
United States
Environmental Protection
Agency
Background for Anthrax Sunlight Tests
• Although B. anthracis is known to survive in soil for decades,
minimal data are available to quantify the effect of sunlight over
time on different materials
• Laboratory tests were conducted to determine/quantify how
simulated sunlight affects its persistence on different materials,
including soil
Office of Research and Development
National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequence Management Division 5
3
-------
Wood
*>EPA
United Stales
Environmental Protection
Agency
Anthrax Test Methods
• Bacillus anthracis (Ames) and Bacillus subtilis
• Glass, bare pine wood, unpainted concrete, topsoil
-Coupon dimensions 1.9 x 7.5 cm (except soil - Petri dish)
• Four time points tested
• 108 CFU/coupon
Office of Research and Development
National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequence Management Division 6
*>EPA
United States
Environmental Protection
Agency
Anthrax Test Methods
• Replicates, controls, and blanks
• Tests conducted in class III BSC glovebox at ~ 23°C and
< 70% relative humidity
• Extraction procedures
-Soil procedures: supernatant subject to heat shock following
orbital shaker
Office of Research and Development
National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequence Management Division 7
4
-------
Wood
oEPA
United Stales
Environmental Protection
Agency
Anthrax Test Methods
Dilution plating of extraction liquid
Loss of spores in terms of log reduction (LR)
-mean of log values for positive controls - mean of log values
for test coupons
Office of Research and Development
National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequence Management Division
SEPA
United Slates
Environmental Protection
Agency
Anthrax Test Methods
Coupon
inoculation
h
nnpi|
1
Exposure to UV-A/B to
simulate sunlight
1
-m
Extraction
Plating,
Analysis
Office of Research and Development
National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequence Management Division
-------
Wood
v>EPA
United Stales
Environmental Protaction
Agency
Anthrax Test Methods
• UV-A/B exposure: 12 hours on, 12 hours off each day
• UV-B level -70 microwatts/cm2
• UV-A level -100 microwatts/cm2
Figures from Choi, Y., Kelly, T., Rogers, J., and Wood, J. Effects of Simulated Sunlight on the Persistence of Bacillus anthracis
Spores on Outdoor Materials, presented at American Society of Microbiology Biodefense and Emerging Diseases Meeting, Baltimore MD, 2010.
Office of Research and Development
National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequence Management Division
SEPA
United Stales
a—.*—- |_Qg recjuction 0f b. anthracis and
B. subtilis after 56 days
6. anthracis
B. subtilis
Glass
4.7 ± 0.9
5.3 ± 1.2
Wood
1.5 ± 0.6
i—'
GO
1+
Q
Ka
Concrete
1.5 ± 0.6
2.2 ± 0.1
Topsoil
0.2 ± 0.2
0.2 ±0.1
Office of Research and Development
National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequence Management Division
-------
Wood
oEPA
United Stales
Environmental Protection
Agency
7-
6
C 5-|
©
Log reduction B. anthracis exposure to
simulated sunliqht - all data
o ^
3
"U 3
©
0-
-1 -
wood
concrete
topsoil
0 10 20 30 40 50 60
Elapsed time (days)
Office of Research and Development
National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequence Management Division
SEPA
United States
Environmental Protection
Agency
Persistence of freeze-dried
vaccinia virus
Office of Research and Development
National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequence Management Division
-------
Wood
v>EPA
United Stales
Environmental Protection
Agency
Vaccinia - Variola Background
• Vaccinia virus is a surrogate for variola, the CDC Category A
virus agent causing small pox
• Variola may be more stable and aerosolizable freeze-dried
• Often fatal (30%)
• Contagious, no known treatment, potential for epidemic
Office of Research and Development
National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequence Management Division "14
SEPA
United Slates
Environmental Protection
Agency
Vaccinia Test Methods
• Materials: glass, galvanized metal, painted cinder block,
industrial carpet
• Environmental conditions: room (-22 °C) and low (~ 6 °C)
temperature at high (~ 90%) and low (-10%) relative humidity
• Four time points
• Inoculation: 107 PFU of vaccinia virus inoculated onto each
coupon, kept at -80 °C overnight, then freeze-dried (app. 2-4
h)
• Extraction: 15 minutes on orbital shaker w/ phosphate buffer
solution
Office of Research and Development
National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequence Management Division 15
8
-------
Wood
*>EPA
United Stales
Environmental Protection
Agency
Vaccinia Test Methods
Dilutions of extract on plates of African Green Monkey kidney
cells
Plaque Forming Unit (PFU) assay
5 positive control coupons, 5 test coupons, 1 lab blank, and 1
procedural blank; also 1 spike control per test day
Office of Research and Development
National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequence Management Division
oEPA
United StBtes
Environmental Protection
Agency
Persistence of freeze-dried
vaccinia virus (in days)
Glass
Galvanized
metal
Painted
cinder block
carpet
Room
temperature,
low RH
>42
>42
>42
14-21
Room
temperature,
high RH
3-7
1-3
1-3
<1
Low
temperature,
low RH
>56
>56
>56
>56
Low
temperature,
high RH
14-21
7-14
21-42
21-42
< - not detected at shortest time interval tested
> - detected at longest time interval tested data in red more than 103 PFU detected
Office of Research and Development
National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequence Management Division
9
-------
Wood
*>EPA
United Stales
Environmental Protection
Agency
Persistence of Brucella suis
Office of Research and Development
National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequence Management Division 18
oEPA
United States
Environmental Protection
Agency
Background Brucella suis
• B. suis selected by TRIO workgroup
• CDC Category B agent
• Vegetative bacterium
• Naturally transmitted zoonotic disease (Brucellosis)
• Low infectious dose, easily aerosolized
• Low lethality, but hard to treat
• First standardized weaponry for biological agents by US
military used B. suis
Office of Research and Development
National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequence Management Division 19
10
-------
Wood
v>EPA
United States
Environmental Protaction
The M33 500-lb biological cluster bomb, which held
Brucella suis.
From: Chemical and Biological Defense Command Historical
Office of Research and Development Research and Response Team. Aberdeen Proving Ground, Md.
National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequence Management Division 20
SEPA
United States
Persistence of Brucella suis
Methods similar to tests with B. anthracis except as follows:
Brain heart infusion agar as growth medium
Materials: Aluminum, glass, unpainted concrete, topsoil,
wood
-Test matrix: Room and low temperature, with and without
simulated sunlight
Office of Research and Development
National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequence Management Division
11
-------
Wood
oEPA
United Stales
Environmental Protection
Agency
Persistence of B. suis (days)
Aluminum
Concrete
Glass
Soil
Wood
Room
temperature
>28
<7
> 28
>28
< 21
Room
temperature,
UV-A/B
7-10
<1
1-2
>14
Not tested
Low
temperature
>28
7-14
>28
>28
>28
Low
temperature,
UV-A/B
>5
<1
>2
>14
Not tested
< - not detected at shortest time interval tested > - detected at longest time interval tested
more than 104 CFLJ detected
Office of Research and Development
National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequence Management Division
SEPA
United States
Environmental Protection
Agency
Persistence of B, suis in soil
Room T, no UV-A/B
• Room T, UV-A-B
-A- Low T, no UV-A/B
V Low T, UV-A/B
~
T
f
5 10 15 20 25 30
Elapsed time (Days)
Office of Research and Development
National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequence Management Division
12
-------
Wood
*>EPA
Protection
For more info
United States
Environmental Protection
Agency
See www.epa.gov/nhsrc for reports on these tests
Office of Research and Development
National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequence Management Division
oEPA
United StBtes
Environmental Protection
Agency
Take Home Messages
Persistence affected by material and environmental
conditions
For anthrax directly exposed to simulated sunlight for 56
days, essentially no impact when in soil, and less than 2 log
reduction on wood and concrete
Even with sunlight, higher temperatures and RH, B. suis and
freeze dried small pox virus may still be viable up to a week
or more on some materials
With cold temperatures and no sunlight, B. suis may survive
over a month, or months for variola
Office of Research and Development
National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequence Management Division
13
-------
The Evolution of Radiological Decontamination at DRDC Ottawa
Marc Desrosiers, Defense Research and Development
-------
The Evolution of Radiological Decontamination at DRDC
Ottawa
Presented By: Marc Desrosiers
Prepared By: Marc Desrosiers
April 2010
¦ Jbl Defence R&D R et D pour la defense
¦^1 Canada Canada
Canada
Desrosiers
V
Introduction
Size and complexity of experiments
Measurement techniques
Example of Results
Defence R&D Canada • R et D pour la defense, Canada
-------
Desrosiers
Size and complexity
Defence R&D Canada • R et D pour la defense, Canada
Urban Surfaces:
/ Started with Small Surfaces
Defence R&D Canada • R et D pour la defense, Canada
-------
Desrosiers
Defence R&D Canada • R et D pour la defense, Canada
Moved to Larger
Test Plates (RADPRO, WIS GER)
no
CF Decontamination of Sensitive
Equipment (DOSE)
Question: How do you decontaminate sensitive (fragile)
equipment?
- C7 Scope, Laptop and Blackberries
- Some type of equipment have very special procedures
for cleaning due to coatings
Performed an experiment only looking at dry
contamination.
- Results showed that dry particles could be
decontaminated using simple methods such as
compressed air or vacuuming.
- Also showed that wiping with wet cloth did not
perform as well
Defence R&D Canada • R et D pour la defense, Canada
..
-------
Desrosiers
Ra7 CF DOSE
Defence R&D Canada • R et D pour la defense, Canada
Ri>
Y CF DOSE continued
Forced us to develop protocols and procedures
to deal with dry particle contamination.
- Handling
- Grinding
- Sizing
- "Concentration"
Defence R&D Canada • R et D pour la defense, Canada
-------
Desrosiers
Moved to a larger structure
Vehicle Decontamination Experiments at
DEP, Bourges France & FoA, Umea Sweden
32' (9.8 m)
Defence R&D Canada • R et D pour la defense, Canada
Defence R&D Canada • R et D pour la defense, Canada
-------
Desrosiers
V
no
Measurement techniques
Defence R&D Canada • R et D pour la defense, Canada
During the CF and Civilian (Urban) work
continued to develop our Measurements
Methods
• "One good thing about radiation it is easy to measure, one bad thing about
radiation is that it is easy to measure"
* Started with simple instruments:
- Beta/Gamma Contamination probes (pancake probes)
- Dose rate probes
Defence R&D Canada • R et D pour la defense, Canada
RD
-------
Desrosiers
V
no
Current Measurement Techniques
HPGe for pre and post gamma measurements
Thermo SVG2 for pre and post beta measurement
— Use gamma spectrometry or dose rate as a indication of total contamination
"Fixed" and "Unfixed"
— Use beta readings as indication of the surface contamination, "Unfixed"
Defence R&D Canada • R et D pour la defense, Canada
GM-tube Measurement "Cage'
(DEP, Bourges France)
Defence R&D Canada • R et D pour la defense, Canad
-------
Desrosiers
Measurement
Mobile
Microspec
3"x3" Nal
HPGe and ISO-CART
Collimated Pb Shield
Defence R&D Canada • R et D pour la defense, Canada
v
Ri>
Results
Defence R&D Canada • R et D pour la defense, Canada
-------
Desrosiers
Experimental Results: WIS Urban Material
Decontamination and RADPRO Trial
5
\
i
\^
s?
20.00 -
Concrete Tile Brick
—»—Water W.ash ¦—RADPRO -—DRDC Foam —WISFoam — WXSWater
Defence R&D Canada • R et D pour la defense, Canada
V
Ri>
Experimental Results: RADPRO Trial
Absorption of Wet Contaminants
Readinds j|iSWHr|
Theoretical Astaal
Ratio
Brick
22.95
17.36
0.76
Conr.rete
22.95
4.65
0.2
Ceramic
22.95
1.4
0.02
Note: The above values were estimated by comparing the measured
dose rate to the calculated dose rate expected for the amount of
contamination being used. The contamination method for all three
materials was identical, but not recorded.
Defence R&D Canada • R et D pour la defense, Canada
-------
Desrosiers
Experimental Results: ADEM
nTy' Decontamination of Contamination (24Na)
applied Dry/Wet on Concrete
nsJ
Residual Contamination for Dry and Wet Decontamination
~ Dry Decon
Wet Uecon
« 2D
Activity on Plate (keq)
Defence R&D Canada • R et D pour la defense, Canad
•V
Ri>
Vehicle (AMX-10) Decontamination
DEP, Bourges France
End of Contamination
Moved to Decon Pad
Begin / End Spraying Foam
Begin / End Spraying Watei
Vehicle moved fr
)tn Decon pad
Elapsed Time (min)
Defence R&D Canada • R et D pour la defense, Canada
-------
Desrosiers
Little House on the Prairie: Brick
Brick Gamma Measurement Results
Defence R&D Canada • R et D pour la defense, Canada
v
Ri>
Radiological Dispersal Device (RDD)
Contamination Interactions with Urban
Surfaces (CRT!-06-0156RD)
Dry RDD contamination that has not been affected by environmental conditions can
easily be decontaminated to very low levels.
However, below we see the combined effects of having a water soluble contaminate on
a porous surface:
Very Hard, _
Total Removal
Ł S
*3 -2 *0
I g. I
a & I
Hard, —
Surface Removal
Medium,
Chemical
Easy,
Vacuum
COST
HigliRH
LowRH
Time of
Decontamination
Defence R&D Canada • R et D pour la defense, Canada
-------
Desrosiers
¦V
no
Conclusion
Defence R&D Canada • R et D pour la defense, Canada
Important lessons learned from previous
experiences that are important
Type of contamination is important
- Chemical form
- Activity (Bq) and Concentration (Bq/cm2)
- Particulate Size (physical size)
Material type/structure is important
- Porous/non-Porous
- Different chemical compositions
- Surface conditions: clean, dirty, rough, vertical, horizontal
Environmental conditions
- Dry, rain, humidity, snow
Measurements
- Radiation is easy to measure, but do we have the right interpretation of the
me asurements ?
- Quantitative analysis of the results can get complicated
Regulatory Limits
- Limits already exist but unclear how they would apply in a RDD situation
Defence R&D Canada • R et D pour la defense, Canada
-------
Desrosiers
Decontamination Decision Tool (DDT)
L^
Will be designed to help the soldier make decisions in the field to reduce the
risks (i.e. health (dose) consequences) from contamination
The desired specifications for the tool are:
- Determine the characteristics of the contamination
- Have information on CF Equipment, from aircraft to boots
- Determine the health risk (dose) from the contamination
- Determine the protective measures
Decontamination and
PPE Decision Tool (DDT)
DtFENSE
Future Flow Chart
-------
Desrosiers
no
DDT
Select the contaminated object
from the drop down menu.
(Vrw tnr team nut una nMcnc.
0-Wa®on
Boots
iMotiilo Mctospoc
T iwil
(CADPAT Unrtorm
iHelrr*!
|C7A1
What isotope have you
identified?
ibfinikvMf*
• cimfe
^nv^r liirnduiian
1 1
Ar>24t
•Cs-137
C«-€Q
H-3
Pe-ato
fift-228
Sr-*>
Tc*99m
ta"'
1
Decoo Procedure
Alternative Procedure
Foams
low pressure law volume
MIM-fOian MwfllUMfl
C«trt%l>4Wi
Full ffvok, mbI or ryuivHlcnl
N -9S raw
Summary
Procedures and techniques have been developed
and adopted internationally.
These are also helping in the development of
testing documents for NATO and other groups
Work on the defining contamination and
decontamination difficulties continues.
DDT will be proposed for funding through
Chemical, Biological, Radiological-Nuclear, and
Explosives (CBRNE) Research and Technology
Initiative (CRTI)
Defence R&D Canada • R et D pour la defense, Canada
-------
Disinfection of Mobile Equipment After an
Emergency Poultry Disease Outbreak
Eric R. Benson, Department of Bioresources Engineering and
Department of Animal and Food Science, University of Delaware
-------
Benson
5
NEW HOLLAND
u
i- if M
¦ ¦ ' ¦ C ¦ -J* it -
aicap
VERSITYof
EIAWARE
-------
"When HPAI outbreaks occur in poultry,
the preferred eradication and control
methods are quarantine, enforcement of
movement restrictions, and depopulation
(culling) of all infected, exposed, or
potentially infected birds, with proper
disposal of carcasses and rigorous
cleaning and disinfection of farms and
surveillance around affected flocks."
Universityo* HPAI Outbreak Control
YJEIAWARE
USDA APHIS VS EMD (2007)
-------
• Control zone (3.2 km) around the farm
- Up to 50 farms
• Average 2.5 houses / farm = 125 houses
• 20% inactive houses =100 houses
• 25,000 birds x 100 houses = 2,500,000 birds
• Note number of occupied houses in area!
Universityof Sample Avian Influenza aicapC
M^EIAWARE Response Plan C
-------
• Equipment is extensively
used during response
- Depopulation equipment
- Skid steer loaders
- Tractors
• Very limited numbers
• Decon prior to
movement
• Difficult to effectively
clean in field
- Blind holes
- Hidden areas
Excavator removing part of the roof to allow access.
w
versityof Mobile Equipment
EIAWARR.
Skid steer loader constructing disposal windrow
Benson
-------
Benson
Performed as close to site as possible
Remove all heavy mud and debris prior to
decontamination
- Concentrate on undercarriage
Remove and replace select items
Agents
- Chlorine (0.5%) solution or soapy water
Lubrication when complete
w
versityof Common Recommendations
EIAWARE
-------
Benson
• Remove all filters
• Power wash to remove gross material
• Spray with liquid disinfectant
• Keep equipment in heated garage for 3
days
- Inactivate virus
- Idles equipment
TJNIVERSITYof
YjEIAWARE
Current Poultry
Recommendations
aica
-------
Benson
Objective
- Test influence of disinfectant agent and
application method on decontamination of
NDV seeded equipment
Disinfectant Agents
- Citric Acid, Peroxygen, Glutaraldehyde, H202
- Silver
Application Methods
- Liquid, Indirect thermal fog, Direct thermal
fog, Electrostatic
W
versityof Experimental Plan
EIAWARR.
-------
Benson
Engine model used to
simulate equipment
- Small scale,
repeatable
- Power washed prior
Indicator strips and/or
coupons
- Indicator strip useful
for disinfectant
presence
- Inoculated coupon for
virus inactivation
/
m
VERSITYof
EIAWARE
Engine Model
-------
Benson
Place 12* NDV
inoculated coupons
- Interior / Exterior
Apply treatment
Remove coupons
after 10 minutes
Neutralization broth
Thermal and positive
controls
Virus isolation
Removing samples from the engine
Egg inoculation
w
VERSITYof
EIAWARE
Methods and Materials
aica
-------
• Virus isolation used to assess presence
- Pooled samples
- Serial dilutions, dilutions inoculated into fve 9
-11 day old SPF eggs
- Eggs candled for 5 days
• Hemagglutination activity assessed at
termination
TJNIVERSITYof
YjEIAWARE
Virus Isolation
-------
• Neutralization index used
to compare effectiveness
• For a treatment to be
effective
- No recovered virus
- Titer of positive control at
least log 2.8 greater than All i
the titer of treated groups J\l / — T
- Titer of PC virus Ł 4.0
- Titer of treated groups <1.2
- No recovered virus =
<1012EID50/mL
(via Reed & Muench)
Neutralization Index
OAWARE
-------
• Liquid sprayer used to
apply disinfectant
- Solo backpack sprayer
- Time: 45 s
• Engine in tent
• Operator tried to
ensure coverage of
engine
• Agents
- Citric Acid (3%)
- Peroxygen
- H202 - Si
Benson
Universftyof Liquid Application aioapC
YJEIAWARE VT—
-------
Fogger directed into
tent
- Dramm Pulsfog
- Time: 2 min
Engine placed in tent
- No personnel
- SCBA
Agents
- Citric Acid (22.8%)
- Glutaraldehyde
Benson
wni
P*1
Thermal fogging unit
Thermal fog discharge directed into tent.
IV
E
VERSITYof
EIAWARE
Thermal Fog Indirect
-------
Benson
Fogger directed at
engine and allowed to
fill tent
- Dramm Pulsfog
- Direct: 45 s
- Tent: 75 s
Engine in tent
- Personnel in
- SCBA
Agents
- Citric Acid (22.8%)
- Glutaraldehyde
- H202-Silver (5%)
Directly applying the thermal fog to the engine.
m
VERSITYof
EIAWARE
Thermal Fog D rect
-------
Benson
Electrostatic
sprayer used for
direct application
- Electrostatic Spraying
Systems
- Time: 2 min
Agent
- H202 - Silv
w
VERSITYof
EIAWARE
Electrostatic
aica
-------
-C
CL
_c
b>j
c
re
si
o
Exte
nor
m
VERSITYof
EIAWARE
¦ Peroxygen Liquid
¦ Peroxygen Fog
SCL02 Fog
250
¦ 200
150
CL
CL
C
o
c
0)
O
c
100 °
50
1 2 3 4 5 S 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 18 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24
interior
TRTenor^impie
Interior complex
Indicator Strips
-------
10.0
8.0
6.0
4.0 ¦
2.0
0.0
Benson
w
SHYof
EIAWARE
Average Exterior
Average Interior
Electrostatic Cold Fog Thermal Fog D+l Thermal Fog
Indirect
Application Method
-------
X
4)
73
C
o
rc
N
=J
5.5
5
4.5
4
3.5
3
2.5
2
1.5
1
0.5
0
Benson
i Interior
1 Exterior
CO
3
CO
CNl
«N
3
CO
C-j
CM
3
"C
O
Test Agents
o
uo
CO
CM
o
rM
09
CM
O
cm
ir>
oo
CM
O
CM
w
VERSITYof
EIAWARE
Results
aica
-------
• Equipment testing has shown that
disinfection in the field may be a problem
- Difficult to achieve reliable disinfection in hard to
reach areas
- Additional work required to achieve inactivation
• Liquid application may not be as suitable as
initially thought
- Difficult to get reliable access
• Tent based fogging method ideal, but does
not provide suitable efficacy
- Direct method raises exposure concerns
TJNIVERSITYof
YjEIAWARE
Conclusions
-------
• Direct - indirect thermal fog applied
glutaraldehyde current recommendation
• Direct fogging more effective than indirect
fogging
- Higher concentrations required
• Electrostatic sprayers may improve
application, as noted with H202-Silver
TJNIVERSITYof
YjEIAWARE
Conclusions
-------
• Any Questions?
Dr. Eric Benson
Associate Professor
242 Townsend Hall
Newark DE 19716
(302)831-0256
ebenson@udel.edu
J
TJNIVERSITYof
YJEIAWARE
Questions
-------
Benson
Selected results were supported by the USDA Al CAP 2
program
- Prevention and Control of Avian Influenza in the U.S.
Selected results supported by USDA-APHIS
Cooperative Agreement Award 06-9100-1044-CA.
USDA
W
SHYof
EIAWARE
Acknowledgements
aica
-------
Benson
6.0
5.0
4.0
3.0
2.0
1.0
0.0
Exterior
~Citric Acid (3%) Liquid
Interior
¦ Peroxygen Liquid (1%)
~ H202-Silver(5%)
Univursityop L quid Treatment aicapC
YJE1AWARE VT—
-------
Benson
6.0
5.0
4.0
3.0
2.0
1.0
0.0
~ Citric Acid (22.8%)
~ Gluteraldehyde(1%)
Exterior
Interior
m
VERSITYof
EIAWARE
Thermal Fog Indirect
-------
Benson
6.0
5.0
4.0
3.0
2.0
2.0
0.0
TJmvo
Y)em
.JSITYof
EIAWARE
Exterior
¦ Citric Acid (22.8%)
5Gluteraldehyde(1%)
i H202-S (5%)
Interior
Thermal Fog Direct
-------
Benson
• Embryo Inoculation
- Broth from plates agitated and pooled
- Fluid from plates diluted using three 10-fold
serial dilutions
- Positive control materials diluted with six 10-
fold serial dilutions
- Each dilution inoculated into five, 9-11 day
old specific pathogen free (SPF)
embryonated chicken eggs
- Eggs candled daily for five days
TJNIVERSITYof
YjEIAWARE
Method and Materials
aica
-------
Hemagglutination Positive Hemagglutination Negative
• Viral presence
- Fluid collected from each egg
- Examined for hemagglutination activity
(HA) to determine viral activity
TJMVERSITYof
Y 1EIAWARE
Methods and Materials
-------
Testing the Sporicidal Efficacy of Six Disinfectants on Carrier
Surfaces Contaminated With B. Atrophaeus Spores
Bruce Hinds, Defense Threat Reduction Agency
-------
UNCLASSIFIED
Hinds
"Testing the Sporicidal Efficacy of Six
Disinfectants on Carrier Surfaces
Contaminated with B. atrophaeus Spores"
tfRED&.
Mr. Bruce A. Hinds
Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA)
Counter WMD Test Support Division -
Diagnostics Branch (CXTD)
-------
UNCLASSIFIED
Hinds
• Study was the Good Laboratory Practices (GLP) experiment
designed to test the sporicidai efficacy of six disinfectants on
carrier surfaces contaminated with (Bg)
• Lovelace Respiratory Research Institute (LRRI) conducted
the GLP study; the contract vehicle was DTRA/RD-CXT's
Test Operations, Technology and Test Support (TOTTS)
contract with Applied Research Associates, Inc. (ARA)
• The LRRI GLP experimentation phase was conducted over
the period 30 October 2008 to 9 January 2009
• The GLP study results indicated the decontamination
efficacy varied by technology and carrier surface
UNCLASSIFIED
2
-------
UNCLASSIFIED
Hinds
Test Articles and Test System
Six spray/foam-applied technologies were evaluated
Two types of carriers were "contaminated" with BWA simulant
~ Carrier surfaces represented common non-porous and
porous building materials found in an urban environment in
the pacific northwest
~ BWA simulant was provided by Dugway Proving Ground
Test Article
Test System
Decontamination Technology
BWA Simulant Carriers
BWA Simulant
Peridox®
CASCAD®
SporKlenz RTU®
Stainless Steel
Unglazed
Porcelain
(porous)
B. Atrophaeus (Bg)
EasyDECON®
(non-porous)
Decon Green
MDF-200
UNCLASSIFIED
3
-------
UNCLASSIFIED
Hinds
LRRI Facilities on KAFB
• The GLP study was conducted at the LRRI facility on
Kirtland Air Force Base, NM
LRRI's south facility, building 9200,
Area Y, Kirtland AFB, NM
The GLP study was conducted in the
laboratory inside Bldg 9255, located
behind the main facility on KAFB
UNCLASSIFIED
4
-------
UNCLASSIFIED
Hinds
Secure Storage of Test Articles
• The decontamination system components were stored in the
Test Article - Secured Material Storage (TA-SMS) room
located inside the LRRI facility on KAFB
• Each decontamination system was assigned a unique TA
number which was used throughout the GLP study
The DZ test articles
(decon systems) were
stored separately in
these lockers
• Access to the TA-
SMS was strictly
controlled
• An integrated
monitoring system
recorded all room
entries and exits
• All entries/exits
were crosschecked
with the visitor log
UNCLASSIFIED
5
-------
UNCLASSIFIED
Hinds
Test Articles (Decon Technologies)
Decon Green
PEWDOX*
UNCLASSIFIED
-------
UNCLASSIFIED
Hinds
Secure Storage of Test Systems
The test system materials (Bg, carrier materials) were stored in
the Secure Material Storage (SMS) room in the LRRI facility
Test system materials were logged in/out through a
computerized Inventory Management System
g in solution
L,
m
Bg (powder)
The Bg spores arid Bg test solution were
stored in a refrigerator located in the SMS
UNCLASSIFIED
7
-------
UNCLASSIFIED
Bg Carrier Surfaces
Hinds
Non-porous surface - stainless steel coupons, grade 304 with
2B finish and 19 gauge (1 mm) thickness
Porous surface - unglazed porcelain cubes, Brix Frammenti
black mosaic tiles, reported porosity of < 0.03%
5 mm x 5 mm x 1 mm
Stainless steel coupons
\
/ \ ,
m
\ m
•
i •
V \
\
5 mm x 5 mm x 5 mm
Unglazed porcelain cubes
UNCLASSIFIED
8
-------
UNCLASSIFIED
Experiment Design
• The study consisted of four main steps
• Qualification tests of Bg
• Microscopic and acid resistance tests were performed
• Neutralizer testing
• Neutralizers were chosen for their ability to stop the sporicidal
action of the test article (decon technology)
• Preparation of the test system
• Carriers were inoculated with a suspension of Bg spores
• Three-Step Method (TSM)
• The TSM process was used to test the sporicidal efficacy of the
test articles on porous and non-porous carries inoculated with Bg
UNCLASSIFIED
9
-------
UNCLASSIFIED
Hinds
Preparation of the Spore Suspension
The spore suspension contained between
1 x109 and 5 x 109 CFUs/mL
The acceptable dilution ratio was determined for the stock
solution
In this case, S3 was determined to have the appropriate dilution ratio
UNCLASSIFIED
10
-------
Control (no acid)
Treated with Acid
UNCLASSIFIED
Hinds
Qualification Test of Bg Suspension
• Microscopic observation test
• Spores were acceptable if less than 10% of the spores were
vegetative cells (rod shaped)
• Two-minute acid resistance test
• Spores were acceptable if the log reduction was in the range of 0 - 3
for a 2-min exposure
• Lesson Learned
^ r Acid Resistance Test
• Supply of acceptable Bg
spores was limited
• We may need to allow
time to "grow our own"
for future testing
Average log reduction for 2-min acid test was
0.363 ± 0.211 for 11 tests
UNCLASSIFIED
11
-------
UNCLASSIFIED
Neutralizer Testing
• Reaction tubes were prepared for each
neutralizer/decon material test:
Hinds
Water + LB + Bg
Neutralizer + water + Bg
Neutralizer + test article + Bg
• Lesson Learned:
The neutralizer passed the
test if these test solutions
produced results that were
within 1 log of each other
• It is important to test neutralizers
specified by the
decon technology
vendors
- even those
UNCLASSIFIED
12
-------
UNCLASSIFIED
Neutralizer Testing Results
Neutralizers tested for different test articles
Test Article
Neutralizer
Results
Peridox
Catalase (C-100, Sigma-Aldrich) in D/E Broth
PASS
CASCAD
Sodium Thiosulphate - Pentahydrate in LB Broth
FAIL
Sodium Thiosulphate - Anhydrous in LB Broth
PASS
SporKlenz RTU
LB Broth
FAIL
Catalase (IC-10042910, VWR/MP) D/E Broth
PASS
Easy DECON
LB Broth
FAIL
Catalase (IC-10042910, VWR/MP) and Catalase (C-3155, Sigma) in
D/E Broth
PASS
Decon Green
Sodium metabisulfite in microbiology grade water
PASS
MDF-200
LB Broth
FAIL
Catalase (IC-10042910, VWR/MP) and Catalase (C-3155, Sigma) in
D/E Broth
PASS
UNCLASSIFIED
13
-------
UNCLASSIFIED
3$
Three-Step Method Overview
Hinds
The acid test of the spore suspension was performed
The bacterial spore suspension was deposited on the
carriers and allowed to dry for at least 12 hours
The carriers were exposed to a sporicidal agent for a fixed
time (30 min)
The spores were removed from the carriers in three steps
of increasing dislodging strength
• Step 1: Fraction A - initial fraction
• Step 2: Fraction B - sonication
• Step 3: Fraction C - incipient germination
Fractions A, B, and C, or their appropriate dilutions, were
plated on agar and incubated (12 hrs at 37°C)
The Colony Forming Units (CFUs) were counted
- Day 1
- Day 2
j Day 3
UNCLASSIFIED
14
-------
UNCLASSIFIED
Hinds
TSM Day 1 - Prepare the Test System
Prepared the carriers
• Unglazed porcelain cubes and stainless steel coupons
• Washed with water and 95% ethanol, autoclaved
• Performed the acid test of the spore suspension
Inoculated carriers with 10jjL of spore suspension
• Microbial load of 1 x 107 to 5 x 107 spores per carrier
• Covered and let dry overnight (at least 12 hours), inside the biological
safety cabinet
Stainless
steel
coupons
Inoculated carriers
V M |
< f X & *
Unglazed
porcelain
cubes
u M(i •
7
UNCLASSIFIED
15
-------
UNCLASSIFIED
Hinds
TSM Day 2 - Tests Performed
• For each decontamination technology (test article) there were at
least 14 laboratory tests performed
• Two carrier types per test article (triplicate tests)
• Negative control (microbiology grade water, triplicate tests)
• Positive control (acidified bleach, pH 7, single test)
• The following table illustrates the minimum number of tests
performed for each test article
Carrier
Stainless Steel
Unglazed
Porcelain
Total
Test
Article Tests
3
3
6
Negative
Control Tests
3
3
6
Positive
Control Tests
1
1
2
Total Tests
7
7
14
Fractions
Plated &
Counted
21
21
42
UNCLASSIFIED
16
-------
UNCLASSIFIED
Hinds
Apply the Decon Technology
• 400|jL of the test article was added to the micro centrifuge tubes
containing the inoculated carriers
• After 30 minutes exposure time 600|jL of neutralizer was added to
stop the sporicidal action of the disinfectant
Test article and controls were added to tubes containing
inoculated carriers (porcelain cubes shown in photograph)
UNCLASSIFIED 17
30-min
exposure
time
-------
UNCLASSIFIED
TSM - Steps 1 and 2
Fraction B was
sonicated for 5 min ...
... and vortexed for 30 sec
• Fraction A
• Carrier was removed from
the first solution of test article
(or control) and neutralizer
• Fraction B
• Carrier was placed in a
second micro centrifuge tube
containing 400|jL
microbiology grade water
• Sonicated for 5 min
• Added 600|jL ice-cold LB
broth and vortexed for 30
seconds
Sterile forceps were used to remove
the carrier from Fraction A
UNCLASSIFIED
18
-------
UNCLASSIFIED
Hinds
• Fraction C
• Carrier was transferred to a third micro centrifuge tube containing
400|jL room temperature LB broth
• The tubes were placed in a rotator and ncubated for 30 min at
37°C
Fraction C was incubated in a rotator at 12 rpm
UNCLASSIFIED 19
-------
UNCLASSIFIED
Hinds
Fractions A, B, and C were Plated
• Finally, the carrier was discarded and serial dilutions of Fractions A,
B, & C were plated and incubated for at least 12 hours at 37°C
• Dilution ratios resulting in 20 to
300 CFUs were typically used for
the calculations
• Plates with counts <20 were
TFTC (too few to count)
• Plates with counts >300 were
TNTC (too numerous to count)
• For test articles and positive
controls, any number of CFUs
were counted
100|jL of the diluted solution/concentrate
was transferred to a Tryptic Soy Agar (TSA)
media plate and distributed with a spreader
UNCLASSIFIED
20
-------
UNCLASSIFIED
Hinds
Fractions A, B, and C were Plated
TSA plates were
incubated for at
least 12 hrs at
37°C
Biohazard
UNCLASSIFIED
21
-------
UNCLASSIFIED
TSM Day 3 - Count the CFUs
Hinds
The CFUs on each plate were counted
The total viable spores per each carrier were obtained by adding
the total CFUs in Fraction A, B, and C
The Log Kill for each test article (or positive control) was
calculated:
LK-LC- LS
Where
LC = Log of the average CFUs
LS = Log survival value (for tes
LK = Log Kill (average of 3 LKs obtained from 3 replicates)
UNCLASSIFIED
22
-------
UNCLASSIFIED
Results
Results
UNCLASSIFIED
23
-------
UNCLASSIFIED
Hinds
Log Kill - Stainless Steel Carrier
Log Kill for test articles and the positive control for stainless steel carrier
Test Article /
Control
Test Number
Average
Standard
Deviation
1
II
III
Peridox
6.52
7.2
6.4
6.71
0.43
CASCAD
6.44
7.19
6.95
6.86
0.38
SporKlenz RTU
7.35
7.49
7.33
7.39
0.09
EasyDECON
7.65
6.01
7.16
6.94
0.84
Decon Green
7.29
7.27
6.02
6.86
0.73
MDF-200
6.16
6.2
7.31
6.56
0.65
Acidified Bleach
6.87
6.60
7.05
6.84
0.22
UNCLASSIFIED
24
-------
UNCLASSIFIED
Hinds
Log Kill - Stainless Steel Carrier
0.00
Log of Kill (Stainless Steel Carrier)
o 4.00
Test/Control Article
~ Peridox
~ CASCAD
~ SporKlenz RTU
~ EasyDecon
~ DeconGreen
~ MDF-200
~ Acidified Bleach
Statistical analysis indicated there was no statistically
significant difference between the LK of any of the test articles
and the positive control (ANOVA, a = 0.05)
UNCLASSIFIED
25
-------
UNCLASSIFIED
Log Kill - Porcelain Carrier
Log Kill for test articles and the positive control for porcelain carrier
Test Article /
Control
Test Number
Average
Standard
Deviation
1
II
III
Peridox
7.3
6.18
4.96
6.15
1.17
CASCAD
2.15
2.2
2.09
2.15
0.06
SporKlenz RTU
4.65
4.27
4.25
4.39
0.23
EasyDECON
2.23
3.33
2.66
2.74
0.55
Decon Green
3.85
5.1
4.07
4.34
0.67
MDF-200
2.6
2.71
2.15
2.49
0.30
Acidified Bleach
3.88
3.29
3.71
3.63
0.30
UNCLASSIFIED
26
-------
UNCLASSIFIED
Log Kill - Porcelain Carrier
0.00
Log of Kill (Ceramic Carrier)
b 4.00
Test/Control Article
~ Peridox
~ CASCAD
~ SporKlenz RTU
~ EasyDecon
~ DeconGreen
~ MDF-200
~ Acidified Bleach
Statistical analysis indicated the values were statistically
different when considered as a group
Further statistical analysis was done
Hinds
UNCLASSIFIED
27
-------
UNCLASSIFIED
Tukey's HSD Test
Pair-wise analysis from Tukey's HSD Test
Hinds
Peridox
CASCAD
SporKlenz
RTU
Easy
DECON
Decon
Green
MDF-200
Acidified
Bleach
Peridox
S
S
S
S
S
S
CASCAD
S
S
NS
S
NS
NS
SporKlenz
RTU
S
S
S
NS
S
NS
Easy
DECON
S
NS
S
NS
NS
NS
Decon
Green
S
S
NS
NS
S
NS
MDF-200
S
NS
S
NS
S
NS
Acidified
Bleach
S
NS
NS
NS
NS
NS
Table shows combinations/pairs which were statistically significant (S=22)
and those in which means were not statistically significant (NS=20)
UNCLASSIFIED
28
-------
UNCLASSIFIED
Hinds
Fisher LSD Test
Pair-wise analysis from Fisher LSD Test (a more liberal analysis)
Peridox
CASCAD
SporKleriz
RTU
Easy
DECON
Decon
Green
MDF-200
Acidified
Bleach
Peridox
S
S
S
S
S
S
CASCAD
S
S
NS
S
NS
S
SporKlenz
RTU
S
S
S
NS
S
NS
Easy
DECON
S
NS
s
S
NS
NS
Decon
Green
S
S
NS
S
S
NS
MDF-200
S
NS
S
NS
S
S
Acidified
Bleach
S
S
NS
NS
NS
NS
• Table shows combinations/pairs which were statistically significant (S=28)
and those in which means were not statistically significant (NS=14)
UNCLASSIFIED
29
-------
sip*
UNCLASSIFIED
Hinds
DISCRETE ZEUS Summary
This Good Laboratory Practices (GLP) study employed a Three-Step
Method (TSM) to test the sporicidal efficacy of six disinfectants on
carrier surfaces contaminated with Bacillus Atrophaeus (Bg)
The carrier surfaces were non-porous (stainless steel) and porous
(unglazed porcelain) materials
The disinfectants/test articles were Peridox, CASCAD, SporKlenz
RTU, EasyDECON, Decon Green, and MDF-200.
• Microbiology grade water was used as a negative control
• Acidified bleach (pH 7) was used as a positive control
The experimentation phase was conducted over the period 30
October 2008 to 9 January 2009
The final report completed Feb 2009
UNCLASSIFIED
30
-------
UNCLASSIFIED
Conclusions - Non-Porous Carrier
Hinds
Stainless steel:
• The Log Kill of all test articles and the positive control were
within 7±0.5
• Based on the Analysis of Variation (ANOVA), there were
no statistically significant differences between the test
articles and the positive control
UNCLASSIFIED
31
-------
UNCLASSIFIED
Hinds
Conclusions - Porous Carrier
Unglazed porcelain
• Based on the average Log Kill
Peridox > SporKlenz RTU & Decon Green > Acidified Bleach
Acidified Bleach > CASCAD, EasyDECON, & MDF-200
• Two additional statistical analysis methods were used to
determine if the mean test article results were significantly
different from those of the acidified bleach
Tukey's HSD & Fisher LSD: Peridox > Acidified Bleach
Fisher LSD: Acidified Bleach > CASCAD
UNCLASSIFIED
32
-------
UNCLASSIFIED
Hinds
Conclusions - Porous Carrier
• LJnglazed porcelain (cont'd)
• Only 3 of 54 Fraction A solutions contained countable CFUs,
however most of the Fraction B solutions indicated a large
number of CFUs
• This indicates the test articles have the capacity to kill the spores
(with a high log kill) on the surface, but may not have sufficient
wetting or penetration characteristics to adequately kill the
spores inside the porous material
• This phenomenon has been reported by others (see note
section for references)
UNCLASSIFIED
33
-------
UNCLASSIFIED
Acknowledgements
• Mr. Ryan Madden, DTRA-CB
• Mr. Lance Brooks, DHS-S&T
• Mr. Sean Nolan, DTRA A&AS Support
• LT Col James Rohrbough, USAF, PhD
• Dr. Brooke Pearson, Cubic Applications, Inc.
• Dr. Lucy Combs-Walker, Applied Research Associates, Inc.
• Mr. Joe Wood, EPA/HSRC
• Mr. Jeff Kempter, EPA/OPP
• Dr. Yung-Sung Cheng, Hammad Irshad and Dr. Yue Zhou,
Lovelace Respiratory Research Institute
UNCLASSIFIED
34
-------
UNCLASSIFIED
Backup
Backup
UNCLASSIFIED
35
-------
PERIDOX
UNCLASSIFIED
Hinds
Clean Earth Technologies
Distributed as a concentrate and diluted with water prior to use
• Typically applied as a liquid or via
the EDS (Electrostatic
Decontamination System)
Active ingredients:
• Hydrogen peroxide
• Peroxyacetic acid
EPA registration as a
sterilant/disinfectant
Concentrate - mix with water
prior to use
PERIDOX
UNCLASSIFIED
36
-------
UNCLASSIFIED
CASCAD/SDF
Hinds
Allen-Vanguard Corporation
Three components (A, B, and C) are mixed, and then water is added
prior to application
• Typically applied as a foam, but can be applied as a liquid
• Use within 48 hours after mixing with water
Active ingredient:
• Dichloroisocyanuric
acid
No EPA registration
<=r
a k
Lab test quantities shown
|
L hi
A
Four components - (A) active component, (B) buffering
component, (C) surfactant, and water (not shown)
UNCLASSIFIED
37
-------
UNCLASSIFIED
SporKlenz RTU
Hinds
V
spor-iclxxt fiMtfr tb u«
OUT OF REACH Of CHUXW
DANGER PEUGRO
206966
2008/05
2009/05
RTU - Ready to Use
Steris Corporation
"Ready to Use" (RTU) directly from the
container
• Typically applied as a liquid
• Shelf life is 13 months from date of
packaging
Active ingredients:
• Hydrogen peroxide
• Peroxyacetic acid
• Acetic acid
EPA registration as a sterilant
UNCLASSIFIED
38
-------
UNCLASSIFIED
EasyDECON
Hinds
EFT Holdings, Inc.
Three components are mixed prior to application as a foam
(recommended), liquid, mist or fog
• Use within 8 hours after mixing
Active ingredients:
• Hydrogen peroxide
• Benzalkonium
chloride
EPA registration as a
disinfectant
Three components - (1) surfactant, (2) hydrogen
peroxide, and (3) accelerator
EasyDECON Part 2
LfiECON Part I
part 3
2 8 09425
BOOSTER
UNCLASSIFIED
39
-------
UNCLASSIFIED
Hinds
Decon Green
Steris Corporation
Three components are mixed prior to application
~ Typically applied as a liquid, but can be applied as a foam
Active ingredient:
• Hydrogen peroxide
No EPA registration
Three components - (A) surfactant, (B) hydrogen
peroxide, and (C) activators and buffers
UNCLASSIFIED
40
-------
UNCLASSIFIED
Hinds
MDF-200 Foam
• Modec, Inc.
• Three components are mixed prior to application as a foam, liquid,
spray or fog
• Use within 8 hours after
mixing
• Active ingredients:
• Hydrogen peroxide
• Benzalkonium chloride
• EPA registration as a
disinfectant
Three components - (A) surfactant, (B) hydrogen
peroxide, and (C) accelerator
UNCLASSIFIED
41
-------
Persistence of Surrogate Radioisotopes on Drinking Water
Infrastructure and the Effectiveness of Decontamination Methods
JeffSzabo, EPA/ORD/NHSRC
-------
United States
Environmental Protection
Agency
Persistence of Surrogate Radioisotopes
on Drinking Water Infrastructure and the Effectiveness
of Decontamination Methods
Jeffrey Szabo, USEPA/NHSRC
John Hall, USEPA/NHSRC
Christopher ImpelIitteri, USEPA/NRMRL
Shekar Goviridaswamy, Lakeshore Engineering
Tammie Gerke,ORISE
Office of Research and Development
I National Homeland Security Research Center, Water Infrastructure Protection Division
August 20, 2010
oEPA
United Slates
Environmental Prmoction
Agancy
Outline
• Motivation
• Experimental Design, Materials and Methods
• Experimental Results
• Conclusions
• Future Research
-------
Szabo
SEPA
United Statos
trtvifonmenta* Projection
Agancy
Motivation
• Decontamination of water infrastructure has become a
research priority for WIPD in recent years
• Radioisotope persistence on drinking water infrastructure
has been studied (U and Ra)
• Isotopes of homeland security interest are Cs, Sr and Co
• Data on Cs, Co and Sr persistence and decontamination
is scarce in the open literature
-WRF project 2981 is a notable exception
~
oEPA
United Slates
environmental PrmocHon
Agoncy
Experimental Design
• Multiple options for simulating distribution systems at EPA's Test
and Evaluation (T&E) facility
• Pilot and bench scale systems were available
• Chlorinated and chloraminated water is available
ij ' ij. '•gtfirr ju 1 i
N
2
-------
Szabo
SEPA
United States
Environmental PrcKMtian
Agancy
Experimental Design
• Experiments were performed
in a bench scale system:
biofilm annual reactor
- Allows for variation of shear
independent of flow
-60 coupons available
- Minimizes the mass of
contaminant
- Easier to clean between
experiments and can be
sterilized
~
oEPA
United Slates
Environmental Pratocllon
Agoncy
Experimental Methodology-Persistence
• Condition iron coupons in tap
water for 1+ months
• Spike reactors with stable soluble
Cs, Co or Sr salts
-CsCl, CoCl2, SrCl2
¦ Harvest coupon and bulk phase
samples over time
• Analyze by ICP-OES
-Coupon samples undergo
microwave assisted digestion
with nitric acid
• Persistence is monitored for one
month or more
r
3
-------
SEPA
United States
fc»tvifonme«ra< Protection
Agancy
Experimental Methodology-
Decontamination
• Flushing and increasing
disinfectant concentration
performed in the reactor
• Flushing is simulated by
increasing the rotational speed
of the reactor drum
• Decontamination by altering
water quality was attempted:
- High and low pH
"
oEPA
United Slates
environmental Protection
Agoncy
Experimental Methodology-ESEM
Environmental Scanning
Electron Microscopy (ESEM)
• Acquired images of the
corrosion surface
• Used to confirm the presence
or absence of cesium and
cobalt on the coupon surfaces.
• "Maps" of cesium or cobalt on
the coupon were made
• Also shows the spatial
distribution of Cs or Co
-------
SEPA
United States
Ł»tvift>nmeintal Projection
Agancy
Experimental Methodology-XAS
• Co and Sr were further
analyzed at Argonne National
Laboratory
• X-ray adsorption spectroscopy
(XAS)
- X-Ray Adsorption Near
Edge Spectroscopy
(XANES)
- Extended X-Ray Adsorption
Fine Structure (EXAFS)
• XANES=>valence/oxidation
state
• EXAFS=>bonding
http://www.aps.anl.gov/
oEPA
United States
Environmental Proioclion
Agency
Results-Cesium
• Cesium was not detected on the coupons
• Initial bulk phase concentrations of 10 and 100 ing/L
• Bulk phase concentration was constant
-Indicates no adsorption
• Lack of adsorption could be due to competing ions (i.e.
Ca2 . Mg2+)
• Literature shows that there could be very different
results with concrete lined pipe
-------
Szabo
SEPA
Results-Cesium ESEM
< Elemental mapping
showed no cesium was
present
iii L
1
1
1 w
1
:
<4
oEPA
Results-Cobalt Persistence
• Cobalt persisted for 42 days
- Likely longer
• Soluble CoCl2 formed a
precipitate upon introduction
to chlorinated water
- Online water quality sensor
tests confirmed this
• A black film formed on the
coupons one day after
injection
- Cobalt II or III?
mgl'(Kl)
mgl-'(R2)
Time After Contamination
6
-------
SEPA
United States
Ł»tvifonmeintal PrcKMtian
Agancy
12
Results-Cobalt ESEM
• Cobalt was uniformly
spread over the coupon
surface
coda
If
u
t* Jun (Ml
ISHfjff
: r
[«
1W U* IM M» Ml
liUHgy hxV
r.W Ml Ml 1M
oEPA
Results-Cobalt XAFS
• Cobalt on coupon samples
immediately after injection and
days after injection were
compared
- Standard also analyzed
• After one day in the reactor,
cobalt was in the III oxidation
state, not the II oxidation state
• Co(II) is very soluble
• Co (III) is very insoluble
• Free chlorine oxidized Co (II)
to Co (III)
_CoO (fl and PI)
7700
7750
7800
7850
13
Energy (eV)
-------
Szabo
oEPA
United States
Environmental Protection
Agancy
Results-Cobalt Decontamination
• XAS results informed the decontamination approach
• Co (III) compounds are soluble in acids (and not much
else)
• Coupons exposed to ethanol, low pH (1.3) and high
pH (14)
• Low pH removed 92% of the cobalt after 1 day of
exposure
-Sulfuric acid
• Cobalt and iron dissolution occurred
oEPA
United States
Environmental Protection
Agoncy
Res u Its-Stro nti u m
• Sr experiments are ongoing
• Sr is present in Cincinnati tap
water at 0.2-0.4 mg/L
• This has made detection of
injected Sr difficult
• It does show that strontium
can adhere
-What is it associating with?
Stronium on corroded iron coupons
Reactor 1
Reactor 2
Baseline
15
8
-------
SEPA
United States
Environmental PrcKMtian
Agancy
Results-Strontium Decontamination
• Strontium coupons were
exposed to calcium and EDTA
(0.005, 0.05 and 0.5 M pH 8)
• Calcium was ineffective
• EDTA removed 20, 60 and
90% at 0.005, 0.05 and 0.5 M
• Removal was due to
complexation of iron and
disruption of the corrosion
surface, not just removal of
strontium
16
oEPA
United Slates
Environmental Pratocllon
Agoncy
Results-Strontium XAS
• XANES and EXAFS data were collected
• XANES confirmed that Sr+2 was present, but this was
not unexpected (doesn't oxidize)
• EXAFS data is not clear. Further analysis may be
required
• Strontium is similar chemically to calcium
-Ca and Sr are adjacent on the periodic table
• Dissolution of calcite deposits (lowering pH) may
remove calcium and associated strontium
-------
Szabo
oEPA
United States
Environmental Protection
Agancy
Conclusions
• Cesium was not detected on the iron coupons
-Concrete lined may be a different story
• Cobalt did persist after oxidation
-Acid decontamination was effective, but is it a
feasible decontamination option?
• Strontium appears to persist, but what it is persisting
on is uncertain
-Changing water quality to dissolve calcite deposits is
a possible decontamination strategy
oEPA
United States
Environmental Protection
Agoncy
Future Work
• Mechanisms of Sr persistence will be examined
-This will inform the decontamination strategy
• Examine Cs, Sr and Co persistence on concrete lined
coupons
• Repeat the same experiments in chloraminated water
-Sr work has used free chlorine and chloramines
• Decontamination may focus on cleaning or
decontamination agents that meet NSF-60 standards
19
10
-------
Development of a Novel Bioassay for Detection of Functional Ricin
VipinK. Rastogi, R&TDirectorate, USArmy-ECBC
-------
Rastogi
Developnient of a Novfcl
Bioassay Detection of
^Functional Ricin i
Vipin K; Rastogi. Lalcna Wallace. Shawn Kyati],
-------
Rastogi
Viruses
Bio-wartae Agents
Replicating
Non-replicating - Toxins
Ricin Toxin
Francisella tularensis Yersinia pestis
Clostridium botulinum
(Botulinum Toxin)
Bio-weapon Toxin Characteristics
Soluble proteins produced by plants or bacteria capable of causing
damage to the host by destroying cells or disrupt cellular metabolism
Toxin
Toxic Dose (me)
Host
Botulism Type D
0.8xl0-8
Mouse
Tetanus
4x10 8
Mouse
Shigella Neurotoxin
2.3xl0-6
Rabbit
Diphtheria
6xl05
Guinea Pig
RICIN
0.2-0.5
Human
• Resemble enzymes - denatured by heat, acids, and have high biological activity (most act
catalytically) and exhibit specificity of action
• Many act intracellularly and consists of two subunits, chain A and chain B
Sinrr roi~- !& Tra/fitiov of Sofutions.
-------
Rastogi
Ricin - Ribosome Inactivating Toxins
Bacterial shiga (Stx), diphtheria (DT), Pseudomorias exotoxin (PE), and plant
ricin are from diverse sources, bat they inhibit protein synthesis and thereby
result in cell death
DT and PE causes inactivation of elongation factor - EF2
Plant ricin and Stx act as N-glucosidase, cleaving adenine from rRNA and thus
results in ribosome inactivation
Ricin is extracted from castor bean (Ricinus communis) seeds
Average lethal dose is 0.2 - 0.5 mg/person
Twice as deadly as cobra venom
The most toxic protein toxin
Consists of two subunits joined by a disulfide bridge, chain B (262 residues, 34 kD,
binds to cell membrane) and chain A (267 residues, 32 kD, internalized and serves as
a ribosome inactivating protein)
No antidote and easy to produce and procure - bio-weapon
Chain A cleaves an adenine from 28S rRNA at 4324 position near the 3'-end
This deletion preclude binding of the EF-2 and thereby stops protein synthesis
Siiice 1917- S\ Tracfition of Sotutions.
Ricin Detectiori ^jStructure-based
lmmuno- or Antibody-based Detection
- Elisa
• Limit of Detection (LOD) - 4 ng/mL
• Takes several hours and requires trained personnel
• Sandwich immunoassay LOD -1 ng/mL
Aptamers
- Oligonucleotides or peptides binding to specific target molecules
• DiNA or RNA Bind to a variety of molecules with very high affinity
• Using fluorescently labeled RNA aptamers, LOD - 14 - 300 ng/mL
Analytical Methods and Mass Spectrometry
- High Sensitivity, high specificity, and can identify and quantify ricin
- LC-ES MS (MS) or HPLC/GC-Mass Spectrometry
• High cost and sophisticated instrumentation
• 10 pmol of ricin detected and in crude preparations
Since 1917- Tracfition of SoCutions.
-------
Rastogi
Ricin Detection - BBBBBBH
Detection of Functional Catalytic chain A
- Release of adenine base from rRNA
- LOD for adenine 2.4 ng/mL after conversion to a fluorespent derivative
- HPLC-MS also used for detection of adenine
Inhibition of In vitro Protein Synthesis
- Because of high amplification, LOD in the range of 10 fg/mL
In vitro Transcription & Translation (IVT)
- Green fluorescent protein and luciferase gene vectors, expressed using wheat germ kit
- Ricin chain A resulted in inhibition of fluorescence
- The ricin LOD - 0.3 ng/mL and detection performed in a microfluidic well-in-a-well device.
- Very powerful defection system relying on cessation of protein synthesis from expression
vectors in the presence of chain
- Does not assay for functional chain B or holo-ricin!
Siiice 1917- S\ Tracfition of Sotutions.
Ricin Detectioit^CeiPbased
In vivo Protein Synthesis Inhibition
- Vero monkey cell line transfeeted with adenoviral vector expressing luciferase gene
- Luciferase gene expressed in transduced cell line, which can be easily detected by light
production using luminomefer
- Engineered cells not stable
General Cytotoxicity
- Vero monkey cell line along with MTT has be:en used
- Low linear range for response to ricin
- MTT assay relies on availability of reducing power, NADH
- Ricin mode of action is via inhibition of protein synthesis, so toxicity is not related
Protein Synthesis-based Cytotoxicity
- Vero cell line engineered with a reporter gene, green fluorescent protein (GPP) under a
constitutively expressing promoter, cytomegalovirus (CMV)
- Response to ricin in 6 hours (ICS0 =1.8 ng/mL) with a LOD of 1 ng/ml
Since 1917- Tracfition of SoCutions.
-------
Rastogi
Bioassav Concent
* ~ *ta ) + Linear hygromycin marker + pTRE-Tight-Luc vector
transactivator tlA / J r °
Mammalian Cell line
G418r marker
>
, p Ludferase
tw-Off Advanced
Doubly-transfected cell line selected
on hygromycin + G418 and grown in
selective media for four generations
in the presence of Dox (uninduced)
For luciferase expression, grow the
cells in the absence of Dox
Dox -> tTA binds to the TRE
and luciferase expression begins
1. The host cell line, HeLa Tet-
Off produces a Tet repressor
and has a G418 resistance
marker. The repressor binds
to the promoter in the
presence of Tet or Dox
2. pTRE plasmid with luciferase
gene s into this cell line along
with hygromycin linear
marker into HeLa tet-Off cell
line
3. Stable double transfectant
selected and screened for
luciferase expression or
induction in the absence of
Tet
4. Clone LWVR-2 selected on
the basis of highest ratio of
luciferase activity in the
presence and absence of Tet
Siiice 1917- S\ Tracfition of Sotutions.
Clonal! Selection
Clone #
UNINDUCED
INDUCED
Fold
Induction
Average
RLU
SD
Average
RLU
SD
1-1
32
5
56
4
2
12
42
5
43434
10239
1040
1-3
36
6
38
11
1
1-4
35
6
37
3
1
1-5
26
3
28
6
1
1-6
29
7
75
102
3
1-7
17
4
30
9
2
2-1
36
5
92
10
3
2-2
31
3
525
464
17
2-3
42
6
33
5
1
2-5
25
4
23
3
1
2-6
32
3
16
5
0
2-7
44
44
23
5
1
2-8
93
132
24
7
0
2-9
23
2
21
5
1
3-1
95
21
6644
492
70
3-3
28
6
168
52
6
3-4
31
5
53
10
2
3-5
210
41
16149
899
77
4-1
34
9
337
47
10
4-2
28
8
6182
1227
221
4-3
30
3
113
19
4
4-5
29
6
45
31
2
4-6
39
18
35
8
1
4-7
29
8
42
18
1
1. Clone LWVR-2 (1-2)
exhibited the highest fold
induction and was therefore
selected for further analysis
2. The LWVR-2 clone was very
stable, since even after
passaging for 100 times,
comparable degree of
induction was observed
3. Cell seeding at 10A4 per 100
inL volume in a 96-well
micro titer plate, ricin
addition at the time of cell
seeding, and 24 hour
induction, i.e. removal of
Dox were selected as assay
conditions
Since 1917- Tracfition of SoCutions.
-------
Ricin Sensitivit
Sensitivity of Mammalian Cells to Ricin Toxin
-~-CHO
-¦-LWVR-2
1 1 1 0-
0.1000 1.0000 10.0000 100.0000
Ricin (nanogram/mL)
In comparison to the
control CHO cell-line
(IC50 = 16-24 ng/niL), the
recombinant LWVR-2
clone is very sensitive to
the presence of
functional holo-ricin
(1C50 = 3.2 ng/mL)
Limit of detection by the
recombinant HeLa cell
line = 0.6 - 0.8 ng/inL
Only two steps for the
bioassay, seeding and
luciferase detection
within 24 hours
Siiice 1917- S\ Tracfition of Sotutrons.
Bioassay Sensitivit
1.200
1.000
0.800
y = -0.536x + 0.924
R2 = 0.917
S 0.600
0.400
U.2U0
ng/mL
Current assay based
on luciferase
expression in VRLYV-
2 cells can detect as
low as 0.25 ng/mL
ricin
Response linear
between .025 and 1.5
ng/mL
The present assay is
highly sensitive
Since 1917- Tradition of SoCutions.
-------
Bioassav based Decon ^Parameters
Test decon solutions included 1% hydrogen peroxide, 1:20th
diluted bleach, and 250 ppm chlorine dioxide solution
Decon contact times were 30 sec or 1 min
Test coupon types included steel (2x2-cm size)
An aliquot of 7.5 inL. test decon solution used per coupon
An aliquot of 2.5 inL 2M sodium thiosulfate used as a neutralizer
>80% ricin was recovered from the coupon
Neutralized test decon solution used for ricin extraction from
control coupons
Extracted ricin needed to be diluted 1:50 before bioassay testing
Siiice 1917- S\ Tracfition of Sotutions.
Bioassav-based Decori Protocol*
FLOW CHART
25 |iL Crude ricin (0.5%; 875 |jg total protein or 5 |jg ricin) spotted and dried over-night
:
f
Add 7.5 niL of decon solution
to test coupons in a 50 ml tube,
tube and add 2.5 ml of 2M Na2S204
OR 10 niL of neutralized decon sol
to control coupons in a 50 niL
1
Extracted sampled diluted 1:50
I
Performed an eight-series 1:2 serial dilutions and tested 25 |jL aliquot in a micro titer
plate well containing 100 |jL or ~10A4 LWVR-2 cells under induced condition (-DOX)
I
Perform luciferase assay after 24 hours, and read luminescence intensity using a
Promega GloMax luminometer
Since 1917- Tradition of SoCutions.
-------
Ricin Decontamination
Test Decon
Solution
Ricin Recovery
(%)
Estimated Ricin
Remaining (ng)
Comments
1:20 Diluted
80
0
No pH adjustment
bleach
250 ppm CD
97
0
No ricin detected
Solution
(LOD = <0.2 ng)
1% h2o2
94
1900
Partial Decon
• Approximately 4,8 |jg of cnide ricin was dried per steel coupon
• The contact time was 30 seconds
• LWVR-2 recombinant cell line seeded at 10A4/well and an aliquot of 25 |jL
diluted samples (ranging from 1:50 - 1:6400) added at the time of cell seeding
• Luciferase expression was analyzed 18-24 hour following ricin exposure
ince 1917- Tracfition of So Cut ions.
Current ECBC-EPA Rioassa
Unique Advantages
• Detection Based on Functional Ricin Mode of Action
• Stable Recombinant Cell-line - with an inducible gene expression system
• High-throughput and Scalable - micro-titer format
• Simple Setup - requires only two steps
• Rapid Detection - GloMax plate reader scans the plate within minutes
• Decon Protocol Developed for Using Common Disinfectants
• Low Detection Limit (<0.2 ng/mL)
• Applicable to All Binary Toxins Affecting Gene Expression
• Can be Fully Automated
• Does Not Require Highly-trained Personnel
Since 1917- S\ Tracfition of Solutions.
-------
Conclusions & Discussion
• A recombinant HeLa cell line, LWVR-2, expressing luciferase under an
inducible Tet promoter was applicable for the ricin bioassay
• The cell-line was stable as luciferase expression was unchanged even
after 100 passages
• The bioassay set up required only two steps
• The bioassay was very sensitive, as 0.2 ng/mL ricin detectable
• A decon protocol was optimized for common disinfectants
• Crude ricin was readily decontaminated with COTS disinfectants
• Future studies conducted in shortening the assay time from 18 24 h
• Additional decon solutions need to be tested
• Increase the shelf life of reagents and cell-line
ince 1917- Tracfition of So Cut ions.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
• FUNDING
EPA - NHSRC, Office of Research and Development,
RTP, NC
Future - ??
• Team
Lalena Wallace, Saumil S. Shah, and Shawn Ryan
Since 1917- S\ Tracfition of Solutions.
-------
Evaluating Cesium Contamination of Urban Building Materials:
Two Instrumental Approaches
Julia G. Barzyk, EPA/ORD/NHSRC
Presentation not available for distribution
-------
Biotoxin Test Method Development
Linda C. Beck, Naval Surface Warfare Center, Dahlgren Division
-------
Beck
Biotoxin Test Method
Development
Linda C, Beck, PhD Wynn Vo
Elaine M. Strauss, PhD R. Chris Hodge
Naval Surface Warfare Center, Dahlgren VA
WARFARE CENTERS
DAHLGREN
Distribution Statement A: Approved for Public Release;Distribution is Unlimited
Biotoxin Test Method Development
Naval Surface Warfare Center, Dahlgren, VA
OUTLINE
Background
Objective
Materials and Methods
Test Method Development and Results
Conclusions
Future Studies
Distribution Statement A: Approved for Public Release;Distribution is Unlimited
1
-------
Beck
im
Biotoxin Test Method Development
Naval Surface Warfare Center, Dahlgren, VA
BACKGROUND
DoD is working to develop standardized test methods for determining
the efficacy ofliquid decontaminants on bacterial spores and other
biowarfare agents on hard and porous surfaces
Biotoxins as weapons is an emerging threat.
There is a need to assess the efficacy of decontaminants, originally
developed for chem and bio warfare agents, as countermeasures
against biotoxins.
Accurate and precise test methods for sampling and measurement
are needed for valid comparison.
Test Operations Procedure (TOP) 8-2-061 document does not include
methods of evaluations of decons used to mitigate biotoxin hazards.
Distribution Statement A: Approved for Public Release;Distribution is Unlimited
Biotoxin Test Method Development
Naval Surface Warfare Center, Dahlgren, VA
OBJECTIVE
to develop, standardize, and verify a method
for evaluation of the efficacy of liquid
decontaminants against biotoxins on DoD
relevant surfaces and coatings
Distribution Statement A: Approved for Public Release;Distribution is Unlimited
2
-------
Beck
Biotoxin Test Method Development
Naval Surface Warfare Center, Dahlgren, VA
MATERIALS
Biotoxms
Protein: Botulinum toxin and Ricin
Molecular: T 2 Mycotoxin and Allatoxin
Coupons
Glass
Polycarbonate
JSGPM Mask Material
Aluminum 5052
CARC - Painted Steel
Decontaminants
pH adjusted bleach
HTH
DF 200
10% Bleach
Botulinum Toxin
fu
\
\
Fursarium toxin
(T2)
Distribution Statement A: Approved for Public Release;Distribution is Unlimited
Biotoxin Test Method Development
Naval Surface Warfare Center, Dahlgren, VA
METHODS
Assays to Evaluate the Biotoxins
1. Proteins
Electrochemiluminescence (ECL)
BioVeris M1M analyzer
--r
2. Molecular
ELISA Immunoassay
Stat Fax 303
D * ^C( - ~
4?
>
The % recovery was determined by comparison to the standard curve run in
parallel with the test samples
Distribution Statement A: Approved for Public Release;Distribution is Unlimited
3
-------
Beck
Biotoxin Test Method Development
Naval Surface Warfare Center, Dahlgren, VA
TEST METHOD DEVELOPMENT
Approach:
Limit of Detection
Time Course Experiments
Baseline Recoveries
Standard Curves
Lest Method
Distribution Statement A: Approved for Public Release;Distribution is Unlimited
Biotoxin Test Method Development
Naval Surface Warfare Center, Dahlgren, VA
C. botulinum Toxin Percent Recovery
BO —
~ Glass
¦ CARC
~JSGPM
~ Poly
T
Ohr 0.5 hr
I hr 3 hr
Time Course Experiments
Distribution Statement A: Approved for Public Release;Distribution is Unlimited
4
-------
Beck
Biotoxin Test Method Development
Naval Surface Warfare Center, Dahlgren, VA
140
120
> 100
o-i
rEn
Dl DI
(6) (9)
C. botulinum Toxin Recovery Using Different Swipes
rfa
nk
m
r^i
DIC DIC
(6) (9)
DIP DIP
(6) (9)
0 hr 0 hr
C(S)C(9)
Ob 0 lir
P (6) P (9)
i
rfi
1 lir 1 lir 1 k 1 hr
C(6) C(9) P(6) P(9)
DI - Direct Inoculation C - Cotton P - Polvester 6 -11.6.07 9 -11.9.07
Cotton vs. Polyester
Distribution Statement A: Approved for Public Release;Distribution is Unlimited
Biotoxin Test Method Development
Naval Surface Warfare Center, Dahlgren, VA
•••••
•••••
•••••
1. Apply toxin to
coupons
(total 50 ul)
2. Wipe coupon
surface with
cotton swipe
3. Place cotton
swipe in
buffer
4. Handshake
for 2 minutes
5. Analyze using
ECL or ELISA
Distribution Statement A: Approved for Public Release;Distribution is Unlimited
-------
Beck
Biotoxin Test Method Development
Naval Surface Warfare Center, Dahlgren, VA
Effect of HTH on Botulinum Toxin on Four Surfaces
Direct hnocuMon Control (FBST to Control (Neut to Control (Decon + Control (H20 to NeuttoDecon
PBSI) H20) Neut) Decon)
~ Polycarbonate iCARC DJSGPM ~ Glass
Botulinum Toxin: HTH
Distribution Statement A: Approved for Public Release;Distribution is Unlimited
Biotoxin Test Method Development
Naval Surface Warfare Center, Dahlgren, VA
Effect ofDE200 on Botulinum Toxin on R)ur Surfaces
140 -
120
\ 100
j so
i 60-
! 40-
20
0
Ffi
Direct hnoculation Control (PBST to
Control (Neut to
Control (Decon +
Control (H20 to
Neut to Decon
PBSI)
H20)
Neut)
Decon)
~ Polycarbonate ID CARC
~ JSGPM
~ Glass
Botulinum Toxin: DF 200
Distribution Statement A: Approved for Public Release;Distribution is Unlimited
6
-------
Beck
Biotoxin Test Method Development
Naval Surface Warfare Center, Dahlgren, VA
Effect of HTH on Ricin on Four Surfaces
Ł> 100
Direct hnoculation Control (PBST to Control (Neutto Control (Decon to Control (H20 to Test - Neut to
FBST) H20) Neut) Decon) Decon
~ Polycarbonate 1CARC DjSGPM ~Aluminum
Ricin: HTH
Distribution Statement A: Approved for Public Release;Distribution is Unlimited
Biotoxin Test Method Development
Naval Surface Warfare Center, Dahlgren, VA
Effect of DF200 on Ricin on Four Surfaces
Direct hnoculation Cbntrol (PBST to PBST) Cbntrol (Neut to H20) Control (Decon to Control (H20 to Decon) Neut to Decon
Neut)
~ Polycarbonate iCARC nJSGPM ~ Aluminum
Ricin: DF 200
Distribution Statement A: Approved for Public Release;Distribution is Unlimited
7
-------
Beck
Biotoxin Test Method Development
Naval Surface Warfare Center, Dahlgren, VA
Aflatoxin (MeOH): HTH
Directlnoc Control 1 - MeOH to Control 2 - Neutto Control 3 - Decon + Test - Neutto Decon
MeOH H20 Neut
13 Polycarbonate iCARC ~ JSGPM ~Aluminum
Aflatoxin: HTH
Distribution Statement A: Approved for Public Release;Distribution is Unlimited
Biotoxin Test Method Development
Naval Surface Warfare Center, Dahlgren, VA
Aflatoxin (MeOH): DF20O
¦a 60
Directlnoc Control 1 - MeOH to Control 2 - Neutto Control 3 - Decon + Test - Neutto Decon
MeOH H20 Neut
~ Polycarbonate iCARC ~ JSGPM ~ Aluminum
Aflatoxin: DF 200
Distribution Statement A: Approved for Public Release;Distribution is Unlimited
8
-------
Beck
Biotoxin Test Method Development
Naval Surface Warfare Center, Dahlgren, VA
T-2 (MeOH): HTH
Control 1 - MeOH Control 2 - Neut to Control 3 - Decon +
to MeOH H20 Neut
Test - Neut to
Decon
~ Polycarbonate
ICARC ~ JSGPM ~ Aluminum
T-2: HTH
Distribution Statement A: Approved for Public Release;Distribution is Unlimited
Biotoxin Test Method Development
Naval Surface Warfare Center, Dahlgren, VA
T-2 (MeOH): DF 200
> zou
R 100
150
Direct Inoc Control 1 - MeOH Control 2 - Neut to Control 3 - Decon + Test - Neut to
to MeOH H20 Neut Decon
~ Polycarbonate iCARC ~ JSGPM ~ Aluminum
T-2: DF 200
Distribution Statement A: Approved for Public Release;Distribution is Unlimited
9
-------
Beck
im
Biotoxin Test Method Development
Naval Surface Warfare Center, Dahlgren, VA
Aflatoxiii (MeOH) Polycarbonate HTH(LCMS vs. ELISA)
Direct Inoc Control 1 - MeOH to Control 2 - Neut to Control 3 - Decon + Test - Neut to
MeOH H20 Neut Decon
~ LCMS ¦ ELBA
Percent Recovery of Aflatoxin by LCMS and ELISA after
treatment with HTH on polycarbonate. The control data are
the average of duplicate runs and the test data (neut to
decon) are the average of 5 replicates.
Distribution Statement A: Approved for Public Release:Distribution is Unlimited
Biotoxin Test Method Development
Naval Surface Warfare Center, Dahlgren, VA
CONCLUSIONS
Time course experiments demonstrated that the percent recovery of Botulinum Type A
Toxin Complex is reduced (10-28%) after 3 hours suggesting that the toxin may be
denatured.
Analysis of the data from the time course experiments suggest an optimum time of 15
minutes for the method development.
Data from the protein biotoxin experiments and Aflatoxin trials show that the
decontaminants are effective against the toxins and the data support our method
development.
Data from the T-2: DF 200% recovery experiments are inconclusive because the 14 % SMS
neutralizer appears to interfere with the T-2 assay. However, the control data from the T-2
experiments support our test methodology.
The rep
Mass t
indicates t
and
> may
of analysis f
The parameters for analysis of the T2 Mycotoxin by LCMS were not fully defined, so the
data was not available for comparison.
Distribution Statement A: Approved for Public Release;Distribution is Unlimited
10
-------
Beck
Biotoxin Test Method Development
Naval Surface Warfare Center, Dahlgren, VA
FUTURE STUDIES
Our understanding of the biotoxin activity and byproducts
produced after exposure of the toxins to the
decontaminants is limited. Future studies to characterize
the byproducts and analyze the toxin activity after
decontamination would be advantageous.
Distribution Statement A: Approved for Public Release;Distribution is Unlimited
Acknowledgements
This effort was sponsored by:
• Defense Threat Reduction Agency, S&T Office
• Joint Program Manager for Decontamination
We would like to thank our colleagues at NSWCDD for
technical support, especially Max Lupton, Dan Shegogue
Ph.D., Claire Wells, Lindsay Sobota
and
Richard M. Phan; William G. Davis US Army Dugway
Proving Ground and Wesley D. Ercan brack, Abbey L.
Fausett, Jacobs Dugway Team
Distribution Statement A: Approved for Public Release;Distribution is Unlimited
DAHLGREN
11
-------
Impact of RDD Decontamination Strategies on Quantities and
Characteristics of Resulting Waste and Debris
Paul Lemieux, EPA/ORD/NHSRC
-------
Lemieux
svEPA
United S
Environmental Protection
Agoncy
Impact of RDD Decontamination Strategies
on Quantities and Characteristics of
Resulting Waste and Debris
P. Lemieux, J. Wood
EPA/NHSRC
C. Hayes, M. Rodgers
ERG
D. Schultheisz
EPA/ORIA
M.Ierardi
EPA/ORCR
Office of Research and Development
National Homeland Security Research Center
SEPA
United Stales
Environmental Protection
Agoncy
Why We Are Doing This Work?
• RDD waste issues linked with decontamination
• Waste management impacts restoration timeline
• Waste decisions need to be made early
-Pre-selection of disposal options
-Identification for triage/staging/storage areas
• Tool for Liberty RadEx to examine waste issues
Office of Research and Development
National Homeland Security Research Center 2
1
-------
Lemieux
svEPA
United S
Environmental Protection
Agoncy
Outline
Project objectives
Methodology
Results
Conclusions
Implications
Office of Research and Development
National Homeland Security Research Center
SEPA
United Stales
Environmental Protection
Agoncy
Project Objectives
• 1st order estimate of waste from RDD event
• Use commercially available software/databases
• Adjust parameters based on decon options
• Develop generic methodology for any RDD event
• Perform sensitivity analysis
Office of Research and Development
National Homeland Security Research Center
-------
svEPA
United S
Environmental Protection
Agoncy
Methodology
Impact
Areas
Plume
and
Deposition
Maps
Impact
Areas
Google
Earth Pro
HAZUS-MH
Office of Research and Development
National Homeland Security Research Center
svEPA
United S
Environmental Protection
Agoncy
Methodology
Google
Earth Pro
Impact
Areas ,
Impact
Areas,
HAZUS-MH
Outdoor
Media / „ . , „
/ Default Data
/ Surface
Deposition,
1 Mass, Area of
\ Materials in
BuildingV ImPact A1635
—Stock rV /
Plume
and
Deposition
Maps
Office of Research and Development
National Homeland Security Research Center
6
-------
Lemieux
Methodology
n^ncentrationsand ^
Google
Earth Pro
Impact
Areas ,
Impact
Areas /
HAZUS-MH
Office of Research and Development
National Homeland Security Research Center
Outdoor \
Media 7 _ „ , „
/ Default Data
/ Surface
Deposition,
1 Mass, Area of
\ Materials in
BuildingV ImPact A1635
Stock rV /
Demolition,
Decon
Decisions
Plume
and
Deposition
Maps
Waste
Estimates
-Mass
-Volume
-Activity
*'ER^ Methodology
United S
Environmental Protection
Agoncy
Concentrations
Google
Earth Pro
Outdoor
Media
Building
_Stock
Sensitivity
Analysis
(Crystal Ball)
Default Data
Surface
Deposition,
Mass, Area of
Materials in
Impact Areas
Plume
and
Deposition
Maps
HAZUS-MH
Override
Default Data
(optional)
Demolition,
Decon
Decisions
Waste
Estimates
-Mass
-Volume
-Activity
Office of Research and Development
National Homeland Security Research Center
4
-------
Lemieux
&EPA
United Stales
Environmental Protection
T0P0FF4 Scenario
• Simultaneous terrorist attacks in Portland, OR,
Phoenix, AZ, and Guam
• Oklahoma City-style truck bomb with radioactive
CsCl on board
• Exercise started at t=0 and continued until
situation had stabilized
• Long-term restoration was not addressed
Office of Research and Development
National Homeland Security Research Center 9
oEPA
Uniloii Slates
Environmental Protection
TOPOFF4 Plume Files
Zone 2 (Orange)
722,000 m2
Zone 3 (Yellow)
4,300,000 m2
Office of Research and Development
National Homeland Security Research Center 10
5
-------
Lemieux
SEPA
United Stales
Environmental Protection
Agency
Results: Example Building Stock
General and Specific Occupancy
Type
Zone 3
#
m2
Residential
4,159
705,349
Commercial
324
120,481
Industrial
76
17,998
Government
4
2,233
Education
13
7,113
TOTALS
4,576
853,174
Office of Research and Development
National Homeland Security Research Center 11
SEPA
United Stylos
Environmental Protection
Agency
Results: Outdoor Areas (1000 m2)
Media
Zone 1
Zone 2
Zone 3
Total Deposition Area
93
722
4,300
Asphalt
37
280
655
Concrete
28
211
523
Soils/V egetation
7
93
1,051
Office of Research and Development
National Homeland Security Research Center 12
6
-------
Lemieux
SEPA
United Stales
Environmental Protection
Agoncy
Adjustable Parameters
• Decisions available in tool
- Demolition/decontamination
• Decontamination technologies (includes solid/aqueous waste,
removed material per unit area)
-Washing
-Abrasive removal
-Strippable coatings
- 2 optional "generic" decontamination technologies
-"No decontamination" option
-NOTE: Decontamination factors not included at this point
Office of Research and Development
National Homeland Security Research Center 13
SEPA
United Stylos
Environmental Protection
Agrsncy
Demolition/Decon Assumptions Used
• Zone 1
-90% demolition, 10% decontamination
• Zone 2
-10% demolition, 90% decontamination
• Zone 3
-10% demolition, 90% decontamination
Office of Research and Development
National Homeland Security Research Center 14
7
-------
Lemieux
svEPA
United Stales
Environmental Protection
Agoncy
Decon Assumptions Used
Media
Zone 1
Zone 2
Zone 3
Asphalt
1" removal
1" removal - 70%
Wash - 30%
1" removal - 70%
Wash - 30%
Concrete
1" removal
1" removal - 70%
Wash - 30%
1" removal - 70%
Wash - 30%
Soil
6" removal
6" removal
6" removal
Ext. Walls
1 mm removal
1 mm removal - 20%
Wash - 80%
Wash
Roofs
1 mm removal
1 mm removal - 20%
Wash - 80%
1 mm removal - 20%
Wash - 80%
Int. Walls
1 mm removal
1 mm removal - 20%
Wash - 30%
Strip. Coat. - 50%
1 mm removal - 20%
Wash - 30%
Strip. Coat. - 50%
Floors
1" removal
1" removal
1" removal - 50%
Wash - 50%
Office of Research and Development
National Homeland Security Research Center 15
SEPA
United Stylos
Environmental Protection
Agoncy
Results: Estimated Total Waste
Media
Zone 1
Zone 2
Zone 3
Outdoor Materials
5.8
48
368
(1000 metric tons)
Building Demolition
16
15
42
(1000 metric tons)
Building Decontamination
0.2
15
27
(1000 metric tons)
Wastewater
0.013
2.1
11
(billion liters)
This roughly equals 18 % of MSW generated in OR
in 2007 and 6% of annual water usage in Portland
Office of Research and Development
National Homeland Security Research Center
8
-------
Lemieux
svEPA
United S
Environmental Protection
Agoncy
Waste Volume %
6.9%
5.4%
1.9%
6.5%
0.1%
0.0%
68.4%
Office of Research and Development
National Homeland Security Research Center
~ Asphalt
¦ Concrete
~ Soils
~ Exterior Walls
¦ Rools
~ Interior Walls
¦ Interior Floors
~ Coating Waste
¦ Demolition Waste
svEPA
United
Environmental Protection
Agoncy
Est. Solid Waste Activity by Vol % (pCi/m )
r0.1%
-0.0%
6.9%
U. / /on
"I r6.9%
18.4%^^^»LL5.0%
68.9%
Office of Research and Development
National Homeland Security Research Center
~ < 1
¦ 1 to 10
~ 10 to 100
~ 100 to 1000
¦ 1000 to 10000
~ 10000 to 100000
¦ > 100000
9
-------
Lemieux
SEPA
Est. Aqueous Waste Activity by Vol % (pCi/m5)
0.4%
United S
Environmental Protection
Agoncy
3\
~ < 1
¦ 1 to 10
~ 10 to 100
~ 100 to 1000
¦ 1000 to 10000
~ 10000 to 100000
¦ > 100000
99.6%
Office of Research and Development
National Homeland Security Research Center
svEPA
}°ncy
Results: Cost vs. Disposal Option
1500
cs
V)
o
2 ^
J c
+ a
2
0 S
u ^
1 O
§ o
&,
0
5
o
1000
500
Potential Decision Points
(considering cost while still being protective)
COST IF 100% OF WASTE IS DISPOSED AS I1RW
Below a given
activity level*,
RCRA disposal
may offer
significant cost
advantages
\
V
\
\
\
COST IF 100% OF WASTE IS DISPOSED AS RCRA SOLID WASTE
1.E+00
l.E+01
l.E+02
l.E+03
l.E+04
l.E+05
l.E+06
Maximum Activity Level to Allow for RCRA Disposal (^iCi/m3)
office of Research and Development N0TE: Assumed $300/m3 for RCRA disposal and $5000/m3 for LLRW disposal
National Homeland Security Research Center * Where RCRA disposal is protective of public health and safety 20
10
-------
Lemieux
SEPA
United Stales
Environmental Protection
Agoncy
Sensitivity Analysis: Description
• "Crystal Ball" Monte Carlo simulation software
- 1000 Iterations
• "Assumption" Variables
-% Demolition (Zones 1, 2, 3)
-% Soil sent to on-site treatment (Zones 1, 2, 3)
-Cutoff to allow waste disposal in RCRA facilities
• "Forecast" Variables
-Amount of LLRW
-Amount of RCRA solid waste
-Combined cost of disposal in RCRA + LLRW facilities
Office of Research and Development
National Homeland Security Research Center 21
svEPA
United Stales
Environmental Protection
Agnncy
Sensitivity Analysis: Contributions
Reduction in disposal cost achieved by
-Maximizing qty accepted by RCRA facilities
-Minimizing demolition
-Maximizing amt of soil not sent off as waste
NOTE: Decon costs & time not included in
analysis - would interact with demolition effect
Office of Research and Development
National Homeland Security Research Center
11
-------
Lemieux
SEPA
United Stales
Environmental Protection
Agoncy
Conclusions
• RDD waste estimation methodology developed
• Uses commercial software packages
- GIS shapefiles based on plume models or sampling
-Uses HAZUS-MH, CDMS, MS Access, MS Excel
- User-adjustable parameters to assess mitigation methodologies
• Potentially large quantity of solid & liquid waste
-Majority is low activity
-Washwater requirements may overwhelm supply
- Soil constitutes large fraction of solid waste
• Clear cutoff point indicated for disposal option recommendations
Office of Research and Development
National Homeland Security Research Center 23
SEPA
United Stales
Environmental Protection
Agoncy
Potential Implications
• Need to consider waste when selecting decontamination options
• Advantages of on-site treatment to reduce waste volumes
- Soil is prime candidate for on-site treatment
- Soil washing technology inadequacies suggest research opportunity
• Use of RCRA-permitted disposal facilities for minimally-
contaminated materials
• Use of LLRW capacity for materials contaminated at higher levels
• Future Work: Include decon, transportation costs, time in analysis;
improve waste activity estimates; additional radionuclides
Office of Research and Development
National Homeland Security Research Center 24
12
-------
Development of Test Methods for Determining the Efficacy of
Disinfectants Against Foreign Animal Disease
Viruses on Nonporous Surfaces
Peter W. Krug, Foreign Animal Disease Research Unit, Agricultural
Research Service, United States Department of Agriculture
-------
Krug
Development of Test Methods for
Determining the Efficacy of
Disinfectants Against Foreign
4 Animal Disease Viruses on
Nonporous Surfaces
Peter W. Krug, Laura J. Lee and Luis Rodriguez
Foreign Animal Disease Research Unit, Agricultural Research
Service, United States Department of Agriculture, Plum
Island Animal Disease Center, Orient Point, New York 11957
dss
USDA
Foreign Animal Diseases
• Outbreaks are costly
- FMDV outbreak in U.S. estimated > $5 Billion
• >500,000 cattle estimated destroyed in CA alone
- 1998 Netherlands CSFV eradication
• $2.3 Billion, 12 million pigs culled
- ASFV is currently moving through eastern Europe
• Prevention is critical - FMDV and CSFV are endemic
in South America - threat to US livestock
• Need for disinfection in case of introduction
- Limiting spread
- Restoration of contaminated facilities
• Stability in environment varies
- FMDV > ASFV > CSFV
-------
Krug
Foreign Animal Diseases: FMDV
• FMDV is one of the most contagious viruses on the planet
• Mortality is low but morbidity is high, wide host range
• Seven FMDV serotypes: A. O, C, Asia, Satl, Sat2, Sat3
• Vaccinations are not very cross-protective and do not offer
long-term protection
• FMD is the major animal disease preventing world trade of
animals and animal products
• High mortality associated with some control methods
• Rapid cleanup and quarantine response in a potential
domestic outbreak could save $ billions
- 2001 UK outbreak cost over $16 billion
- 7 million cattle and sheep killed
- Tourism affected
- Spread to other countries
Foot-And-Mouth Disease Virus
Family Picornaviridae
- genus aphtovirus
- Non-enveloped, small RNA
virus
Stable in environment
Resistant to surfactants
Cell entry involves low pH
fusion in endosomes
Sensitive to high and low pH,
chorine
Not very stable in meat
' I
10 0 nm
-------
Krug
Classical Swine Fever Virus
• Family: Flaviviridae
- genus: pestivirus
- enveloped, small RNA
virus
• Relatively fragile in the
environment but very
stable in meat
• Sensitive to surfactants,
acids, and hypochlorite
African Swine Fever Virus
Family: Asfiviridae
- very large DNA virus (200 nm)
- double enveloped, encapsidated
plus inner protein coat
- Intermediate stability in the
environment and very stable in
meat
- Sensitive to hypochlorite and
Iodine
-------
Krug
EPA-ARS Interagency Agreement
• EPA/OPP has been funding an IA with USDA/ARS/PIADC for
2008-2011.
• Research follows a Basic Plan and an Advanced Plan
• Objective of Basic Plan
- Develop an disinfection test method for hard, nonporous surfaces and
to test selected chemicals against high priority FAD viruses.
- Simple and Reproducible method
• Objectives of Advanced Plan
- Develop an disinfection test method for porous surfaces
- Test selected chemicals against FAD viruses on porous surfaces
- Test variations in efficacy when certain parameters are changed (e.g.,
organic load, temperature, contact time, etc.)
Modeling Disinfection in the Lab
• Most published work done in suspension
• Surface disinfection by many groups
- Many different methods
• Mostly non-porous surfaces
- Issues of loss due to drying on porous surfaces
- Extraction of virus from internal surfaces
- High titer stocks can be difficult to make
- virus dependent
-------
Krug
Nonporous Methodology: Drying
Nonporous Methodology: Drying
-------
Krug
Nonporous Methodology: Drying
\*L C
Nonporous Methodology: Disinfection
-------
Krug
Nonporous Methodology: Disinfection
Nonporous Methodology:
Neutralization and Recover
-------
Krug
Nonporous Methodology:
Inoculation of Cell Culture
Nonporous Methodology:
FMDV Detection
v \'U\\ c
: ^ "' » ** \
fmm&Mw
®N v$Cft jL* A/*'
m J T tir i
fc.vjL jEvjBy
-------
Krug
Nonporous Methodology:
ASFV Detection
Nonporous Methodology:
CSFV Detection
-------
Krug
Nonporous Methodology: Controls
Disinfectant/Neutralizer mix Virus Recovery Control
lOOOppm hypochlorite
Hypochlorite neutralizer - Fluid Thioglycollate Medium
Citric Acid neutralizer - Sodium Bicarbonate
SDBS surfactant - Sephacryl S-400 HR spin columns*
Controls for Disinfectant/Neutralizer /Media cytotoxicity and surface cytotoxicity included
Recovery of FAD Viruses from Nonporous Surfaces
¦ Titer
~Steel Recovery
~ Plastic Recovery
ASFV
-------
Krug
FMDV Disinfection Results
~ Stainless Steel Recovery ~ Stainless Steel Disinfection
0.1% Citric 0.5% Citric 1% Citric Acid 500ppm lOOOppm 0.01% SDBS 0.1% SDBS
Acid acid crm\ Hypochlorite Hypochlorite
(n=5[9])
(n=5[10])
FMDV Disinfection Results
~ Plastic Recovery ~ Plastic Disinfection
T
0.5% Citric acid 1% Citric Acid 500ppm Hypochlorite lOOOppm
(n=4[8]) Hypochlorite
(n=7[12D
-------
Krug
ASFV Disinfection Results
O
LO
S 5
U
H
>
0
y
v
ct
w .
< ¦
o»
o
~ Stainless Steel Recovery
~ Plastic Recovery
~ Stainless Steel Disinfection
~ Plastic Disinfection
1% Citric Acid
(n=5[10])
2% Citric Acid
(n=4[8])
500ppm Hypochlorite
(n=8[16]) (n=6[12])
CSFV Disinfection Results
J Stainless Steel Recovery
Stainless Steel Disinfecti
J Plastic Recovery
~ Plastic Disinfection
1% Citric Acid
2% Citric Acid
500ppm
Hypochlorite
lOOOppm
Hypochlorite
(n=2 [4]) (n=2 [4])
-------
Krug
Nonporous Disinfection Summary
• Dried FMDV and ASFV were recovered efficiently from both
stainless steel and plastic surfaces (2-log loss due to drying).
• Dried CSFV was difficult to recover from either surface, with a
3-log loss due to drying.
• 1% citric acid consistently disinfected dried FMDV on both
plastic (n=4[8]) and steel (n=5[9]) surfaces.
• lOOOppm (but not 500ppm) sodium hypochlorite inactivated
dried FMDV on both plastic (n=7[12]) and steel (n=5[10]).
• As expected, the surfactant SDBS was not effective at
inactivating FMDV.
Nonporous Disinfection Summary
• 500 ppm sodium hypochlorite was able to disinfect ASFV on
both plastic (n=6[12]) and steel (n=8[16]).
• 1% citric acid was able to disinfect dried ASFV on stainless
steel (n=5[10]) but 2% citric acid was required to disinfect ASFV
on plastic surfaces (n=4[8]).
• Dried CSFV was not completely disinfected by 2% citric acid on
either plastic or steel surfaces.
• lOOOppm (but not 500ppm) sodium hypochlorite was able to
disinfect dried CSFV from both stainless steel (n=2[4]) and
plastic (n=2[4]) .
-------
Krug
Porous Surface Disinfection
• Porous surfaces have been problematic
- virus recovery
- disinfectant penetration
- Surface cytotoxicity
Porous Surface Methodology
In development
Similar to non-porous
Birch Veneer Carriers
-------
Krug
10
Porous Surface Virus Recovery
~ 9
O
W *
o 8
M
•w
® 6
L.
> 5
¦ Titer 0 Birch Recovery
T
O
U
2 4
S 3
L.
> 2
CT
O
— 1
T
FMDV
ASFV
CSFV
Overall Summary And Path Forward
• Nonporous surface methodology in place
• Disinfectant testing successful with
representative viruses
• Porous surface methodology in development
- Some success with Citric Acid against FMDV
• Plan to test disinfectants on other FAD viruses
- AI, NDV, RPV.AHS, JEV*, VEEV*,RVFV*
-------
Krug
Acknowledgments
• PIADC
- Luis Rodriguez (ARS) - Tom Burrage (DHS-S&T)
- Laura Lee (ORISE) - Kathleen Apicelli (VIS)
- Angelique Eslami (ORISE)
• EPA
- Carlton Kempter
- Jason Duncan
• APHIS
- Nate Birnbaum
- Lori Miller
- Randall Levings
-------
Treatment of Liquid Wastes From Radiological Decontamination
Konstantin Volchek, Environment Canada
Presentation not available for distribution
-------
Destruction of Spores in a Bench-Scale Landfill Flare System
Dana Wimsatt and Jacky Rosati, EPA/ORD/NHSRC/DCMD
-------
Wimsatt & Rosati
oEPA
United Stales
Environmental Protection
Agency
Destruction of Spores in a
Bench-Scale Landfill Flare System
Dana Wimsatt and Jacky Rosati
1University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill;
2US EPA National Homeland Security Research
Center, Decontamination and Consequence
Management Division
Office of Research and Development
National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequence Management Division
Acknowledgements
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency National Homeland
Security Research Center
US EPA:
Mike Tufts
Bill Squier
Chris Pressley
Tiffany Yelverton
UNC Chapel Hill:
David Leith
Maryanne Boundy
2
-------
Wimsatt & Rosati
Overview
• Background
• Objective
• Bench-Scale Landfill Flare System Design
• Results
• Future Work
• Conclusions
3
Background—Decontamination
• 2001 Anthrax attacks highlighted the need for
effective decontamination and disposal methods of
Bacillus anthracis spores
• Decontamination of buildings produced a significant
volume of residue
• Much of the building decontamination residue will
likely be disposed in municipal solid waste landfills
-------
Wimsatt & Rosati
Background—Future Concerns
• Viable Bacillus anthracis spores could remain in the
residue
• The potential exists for
- viable spores to become re-aerosolized
- partition into the landfill gases
- pass through a landfill gas flare prior to emission
• A bench-scale system is needed to study the ability
of landfill gas flares to destroy Bacillus anthracis
spores
Objective
To design, build, and test a
bench-scale landfill flare system
to establish that it operates as
intended
6
-------
Wimsatt & Rosati
Geobacillus stearothermophilus
• Surrogate for Bacillus a nth rods
• Similarities
— gram-positive
— rod-shaped bacterium
— endospore forming
— size
— heat resistant
• One of the most heat-resistant spores, provides a
"worst case" scenario for thermal resistance
to exhaust
HEPA
Thermocouple
Port
Replaceable
Nozzle
Rota
meter
-------
Wimsatt & Rosati
Bench-Scale System Photograph
iTf-lLUrHHUallipta Diffustvll 1>I„HT
inn
System Design: Aerosollization
• Spores (2 x 1Q6 CFU/mL) in deionized
water were aerosolized using a
Collison three-jet nebulizer
• Sent through a diffusion dryer to
remove excess moisture
• Additional nitrogen was introduced
to the system
¦I
• Nitrogen-spore mixture passed
through a mixing chamber
10
-------
Wimsatt & Rosati
System Design: Inlet Biosampler
• An SKC BioSampler with ViaTrap mineral oil was used to sample
the bioaerosol
• BioSampler design
• Cold Trap:
• 50% dry ice, 50 % isopropyl alcohol
• used to prevent any ViaTrap from reaching the mass flow
meter
System Design: PID control
• A proportional-integral-derivative (PID) control was
developed in DASYLab for the pre-flare nitrogen
sources
• Ensured that the correct ratio of methane/nitrogen
reached the flare
• Bypass system: allowed system to stabilize and
assured proper flows
12
-------
Wimsatt & Rosati
System Design: Flare
Landfill gas mixture used'. 52% nitrogen
and 48% methane
Dry filtered house air was added
Mixture entered diffusion flame
Thermocouple measured flame
temperature
A methane gas detector was used to
assure safe levels
p > HEPA
Thermocouple Port
Replaceable
Nozzle
H
Rota E
meter P
System Design: Outlet Biosampler and
Exhaust System
• Post flare mixture entered
a quartz diluter where it
combined with filtered
house air
• A second SKC BioSampler
with ViaTrap mineral oil
was used to collect spores
• Flare exhaust system cooled the exhaust, diluted any released
methane with outside air, and collected any remaining spores
14
HEPA
-------
Wimsatt & Rosati
Analysis of Biosamplers
• A serial dilution spread-plate procedure was used
• Dilutions from 10"1 to 10~6
- plated in triplicate on Trypticase Soy Agar plates
• Controls
- 3 blank plates
- 3 plates with ViaTrap
- 3 plates spread with beads
• Incubated at 55°C (± 2°C) for 24 hours
Log Reduction of Spores
• CFU per extract:
CFU per extract= (average CFU) * (1/DF) * (extract volume)
where
DF, decimal factor = volume plated (mL)*tube dilution
• Log Reduction (LR) of spores:
LR = log 10(c)-log 10(t)
where c = concentration for the inlet BioSampler and
t = concentration for outlet BioSampler
16
-------
Wimsatt & Rosati
Qu
ality Cc
>ntrc
il
Measurement
Analysis Method
Accuracy
Check
Nebulizer, Additional N2,
Sierra Smart Track C100L
Molbox flow Calibration
Outlet Dilution Air
MFC
and Gilibrator
Inlet BioSampler
Omega FMA2811 MFM
± 1%
Molbox flow Calibration
and Gilibrator
N2 Flare
Hasting 200H MFM
± 1%
Molbox flow Calibration
and Gilibrator
Methane
Dwyer 2107 MFC
± 1.5%
Molbox flow Calibration
and Gilibrator
Combustion Air Flow
King 7520 Rotameter
±6%
Gilibrator
Flare Temperature
Omega Temperature
Monitor
± 1%
Thermocouple
Dilutions
Micropipettes
±1.5
In-house Biolab
Calibration
17
Preliminary Tests: Zero Tests
• Purpose: To ensure the bypass system
worked correctly
• Results: No colony growth was observed on
any of the plates from the inlet or outlet
BioSamplers
-spores were successfully contained in the
bypass system
18
-------
Wimsatt & Rosati
Preliminary Tests: Spike Tests
Purpose: To quantify the effect of products
of combustion on the outlet Biosampler
Results:
19
Preliminary Tests: Isokinetic
• Purpose: To determine whether or not
isokinetic sampling was necessary
• Results:
20
-------
Wimsatt & Rosati
Preliminary Tests: Losses
• Purpose: To quantify the spores lost between
the inlet and outlet Biosamplers due to
impaction and settling
• Results:
Full Scale Tests
• The internal flare temperature: 820-900 °F
(438-482 °C)
• No G. stearothermophilus spores were found in
the outlet BioSamplers in any runs
• Bench scale landfill flare system successfully
destroyed all spores
22
-------
Wimsatt & Rosati
Future Work
• Increase the concentration of spores
• Make additional temperature measurements
• Develop a procedure to measure spore fallout
• Test other surrogates
• Increase the size of the existing system
Conclusions
• Bench-scale landfill flare system was shown to
work as intended
• Preliminary tests determined adjustments are
needed for:
— Losses through the system
— Products of combustion in the outlet Biosampler
• Full-scale tests show a complete destruction of G.
stearothermophilus spores
24
-------
Development of an Aerosol Deposition Method for Bacillus Spores
Sang Don Lee, EPA/ORD/NHSRC
-------
Lee
ŁEPA
United Stales
Envl'on»n»ntal Protection
Development of an Aerosol Deposition
Method for Bacillus Spores
Sang Don Lee, Shawn P. Ryan, Emily Gibb Snyder
I
r Office of Research and Development
ŁEPA
United Stales
Envl'onm^ntol Proi
Presentation Outline
• Aerosol Spore Deposition Method
Background
Method
Results
Summary
• Aerosol Deposition vs. Liquid Inoculation
SEM analysis results
Summary
-
Office of Research and Development
National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequent Management Division
1
-------
Lee
vvEPA why1S an Aerosol Deposition Method
B—- for Bacillus Spores Needed?
Decontamination studies provide information on the potential
successful application of technologies/methods under various
contamination conditions (need scenarios).
Surface type
Relative Humidity
Temperature
Contamination method
Spore type
Contamination level
h
Decontamination Technologies
Office of Research and Development
National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequent Management Division
oEPA
Spore Deposition Methods
Typical sample preparation is by liquid inoculation
Existing aerosol deposition method
Gravitational settling chamber
Limitations of settling chamber method
Speed of sample preparation
Consistency
Surface spore concentration (< 107 per coupon)
t
Office of Research and Development
National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequent Management Division
-------
Lee
SERA
United States
6rwl*©nm*ntal ProMKitiwt
Ag.ncv
Requirements for New Deposition
Method
• Aerosol Deposition
• Applicable to various surfaces
• > 107 viable spores per coupon (d.a. 18 mm)
• < 50% of coefficient of variance (C.V.=Standard
Deviation/Mean)
• Fast and controllable coupon preparation
r Office of Research and Development
" ~
SEPA
ftl Stales
Fnvi'onfrwntul Proi"
Agmncv
Test Coupons
Coupon size: 18 mm diameter disc.
Surface types: carpet, metal, painted wallboard paper, wood
¦
Spore deposition source*: Metered Dose Inhaler (MDI) 0.5 wt%
Bacillus Subtilis
Material sterilization
Logistics to avoid cross contamination
pafl
h
*Metered dose inhalers (MDIs) were prepared by the aerosol science
laboratory at Edgewood Chemical and Biological Center (ECBC).
Office of Research and Development
National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequent Management Division
-------
Lee
SEPA
United States
Environmental P
Aijuncv
MDI adapter
Spore Deposition Chamber
Pyrex surface
[center aligning knob
coupon
3.8 cm
12.0 cm
distance adjusting knob
ASSEMBLY VIEW
-
Office of Research and Development
National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and (
END VIEW
END VIEW
v>EPA Test Results of Spore Deposition
on Five Surfaces (1)
ed Stales
Fnvl'onfrwntul PfOl"
Agmncv
100%
90%
2 80%
I 70%
> 60%
Coefficient of _ Standard Deviation
Variance (%) - Average
N = 3 to 5 coupons per test
X 100
n 40%
-
~ Aluminum ~ Galvanized steel ~ Wallboard paper ~ Wood ¦ Carpet
Office oi Kesearcn ana Development
National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequent Management Division
4
-------
Lee
v>ER^ Test Results of Spore Deposition
Untod Stains JT JT
Environmental PnMMJtlOft __ . v
on Five Surfaces (2)
# of
Average Spores
CV
Material
Coupons
(per coupon)
(%)
Aluminum stub
25
4.47 x107
47
Galvanized Steel
40
4.05 x107
14
Painted Wallboard paper
43
1.52 x107
14
Wood
38
6.92 x107
14
Carpet
56
3.65 x107
20
Office of Research and Development
National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequent Management Division
v>EPA
United States
Environment#! Protection
Summary of New Deposition Method
• Development of new spore deposition method
Aerosol Deposition
" Applicable to various surfaces
v' >107 viable spores per coupon
v" Less than 50% of coefficient of variance (C.V.)
Fast and controllable sample preparation
Aerosol Deposition vs. Liquid Inoculation
-
Office of Research and Development
National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequent Management Division
5
-------
Lee
SEPA
United States
6rwl»©nm*ntal Prot««tion
Ag.ncv
Aerosol Deposition vs. Liquid Inoculation
• Physical profile of deposited B. subtilis spores on various
surfaces
• Scanning Electron Microscope
• Galvanized steel, carpet, wood, painted wallboard paper
• Sample preparation by
Aerosol deposition (A): new method
Liquid inoculation (L): 100 jjL of spore suspended in
distilled water
r Office of Research and Development
National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequent Management Division
v>EPA Aerosol Deposition (A) vs.
Liquid Inoculation (L) Comparison (1)
Painted Wallboard Paper (A) Painted Wallboard Paper (L)
ASPEX personal SEM, Mag: x 17, Mode: Backscattered Electron Emission
r Office of Research and Development
National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequent Management Division
6
-------
Lee
Galvanized Steel: Liquid Inoculation
Envl'onmyrvta) Protection
mm
200 urn
LEO S440, Mag: x 19, 50, and 300, Mode: Secondary Electron Emission
Office of Research and Development
National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequent Management Division
»d Staled
'onmnnful Pror
Liquid Inoculation (L) Comparison (2)
&EPA Aerosol Deposition (A) vs.
Wood (A) Wood (L)
ASPEX personal SEM, Mag: x 100, Mode: Secondaiy Electron Emission
Office ofTResearch and Development
r
Development
National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequent Management Division
7
-------
Lee
v>EPA Aerosol Deposition (A) vs.
' p Liquid Inoculation (L) Comparison (3)
oEPA
United Sialeti
Environrrwntol PtQtMitlOn
Agancy
Summary of Aerosol Deposition vs. Liquid
Inoculation
SEM image analysis
Liquid inoculation:
Densely populated spore areas depending on surface types
Potential impact of liquid droplet on surface deposition
Aerosol deposition:
Dispersed pattern of spore deposition
But densely populated spore areas are in the center of deposition.
Similar pattern for all surface types
New method has been applied to the decontamination studies
Comparison of both deposition methods in fumigation studies
(Dr. Shawn Ryan)
r Office of Research and Development
— -
Carpet (A) Carpet (L)
ASPEX personal SEM, Mag: x 100, Mode: Secondary Electron Emission
WM Office ontesearch and Development
8
-------
Impact of CT and Relative Humidity on Efficacy and Material
Effects of Chlorine Dioxide
John Y. Mason, Sabre Technical Services, LLC
Presentation not available for distribution
-------
Methodology for Quantitative Analysis of the Impact of
Decontamination on Electronic Equipment
G. E. Derkits, Alcatel-Lucent
-------
Derkits
Alcatel-Lucent
Methodology for Quantitative
» » /» /»
1 Analysis of the Impact of
1 Decontamination on Electronic
fcr-r- .
-------
Derkits
Aim of Work Presented
This presentation is concerned with the Methodology for obtaining
quantitative analysis of the impact of decontamination on electronic
equipment, not principally with the results of the experiments, which
will be discussed by Dr. Mandich in the next talk.
Prior work on the effects of decontamination on electronic equipment
was mainly qualitative and subjective, dealt with short time scales, and
was often biased by commercial interests.
The Principle goals of the work at Alcatel-Lucent were to introduce
Objectivity,
Reproducibility,
Quantitative methods, and
Traceability into the study of decontamination impact on electronic
equipment for the purpose of providing objective information to the
agencies of the U.S. Government responsible for decontamination
oversight.
3 | Aug 2009 LGS Innovations LLC and Alcatel-Lucent - Proprietary 2009 LUCf? (
Methods
The methods used are adapted from best practices in the field of
electronic and telecommunication system environmental testing.
Specific methods applied to this investigation include:
A. Standard Test vehicles - Personal Computers (PCs) were chosen as test
vehicles because they are highly standardized1'.
B. Quantitative Correlative information - The use of pure metal coupon
process monitors was adapted from ASTM standard test methods for calibrating
mixed flowing gas test chambers for testing of electronic equipment.
C. Objective assessment of system failure was performed using industry
standard PC Doctor® software which enables the point of failure to be
identified by subsystem and sometimes by subunit.
D. Photographic Recording - Replacement of visual inspection by high
resolution (sub-mm) photographs of a pre-specified set of test points.
E. Root cause analysis has been adapted from industry protocols. In our method
a complete destructive physical analysis of failed subunits down to the
materials level has been performed to establish the root cause of failure.
F. Quantitative Assessment of Damage Progression was created by
performing the PC Doctor® tests, photometrology 21, and Destructive Physical
analytical tests repeatedly over time.
4 | Aug 2009 LGS Innovations LLC and Alcatel-Lucent - Proprietary 2009 LUCf?
2
-------
Derkits
Foundation: Designed Experiment with 3X Replication
Test
Condition
Power
State
Treatment
CI02
[ppmv]
RH %
Temp
°F
Time
Thrsl
1
Off
Sporicidal
Fumigation
3000
75
75
3
2
On
Sporicidal
Fumigation
3000
75
75
3
3
On
High RH
Fumigation
3000
90
75
3
4
On
High RH only
0
90
75
3
5
On
Low CIG2
Fumigation
75
75
75
12
6
On
Low C102, Low
RH Fumigation
75
40
75
12
7
(control)
On
Ambient
(control)
0
40
75
-
One computer from each Test Condition was submitted blind to Alcatel-
Lucent for destructive physical analysis.
5 | Aug 2009 LGS Innovations LLC and Alcatel-Lucent - Proprietary 2009
A. Standardized Test Vehicles:
Personal Computers
if*"* f & W 1*^ • n
6 | Aug 2009 LGS Innovations LLC and Alcatel-Lucent - Proprietary 2009
Alcatel Lucent ^
3
-------
Derkits
Using PCs as Experimental Test Vehicles has
Immediate Positive Consequences
Test Vehicle = PC
Objective
Standard
Diagnostics
Reproducible
Objective
Definition of
"Failjjre"
Repeatable:
Tracking
Through Time
Broad Mix of
Technologies
Current
Technology
Low Cost
Isola
Poir
Fai
tion of
it of
ure
Root Cause
Analysis
Quantified Failure
Rate by Counting
Replication:
Multiple Units
Affordable and
Compact
Reasonable
Statistics
7 | Aug 2009
LGS Innovations LLC and Alcatel-Lucent - Proprietary 2009
Alcatel * Lucent
Immersion Silver Board Finish
Ferrous metal chassis
Copper Planes and
Transmission Lines
PCs are "Complete Systems", Highly Competitive, Large Volume, Low Cost
• Contain typical electrical, optical and mechanical components
• Wide range of possible corrosion-susceptible materials
Plastics used for cables, chip packages, connector bodies, printed
circuit board laminates, CPU cooler housing, and optics
Copper heat pipes and base
of CPU Cooler
Copper metal in all connectors
even when gold plated
8 | Aug 2009 LGS Innovations LLC and Alcatel-Lucent - Proprietary 2009
Alcatel Lucent &
Aluminum fins on CPU
and video chip heat sinks
4
-------
Derkits
B. Quantitative Correlative
Information - Pure Metal Coupons
Pure Metal Coupons as Monitors allow Precision Corrosion Metrology
Pure Metal Coupons
Precise
Quantitative
Representation
of Corrosion
Corrosion
Chemistry
Reproducible
Traceability
of Mass
Measurement
to Standards
Multiple Metals,
Present in Different
Technologies
Replication:
Multiple Units
Affordable
10 | Aug 2009
LGS Innovations LLC and Alcatel-Lucent • Proprietary 2009
Reasonable
Statistics
Alcatel Lucent %
5
-------
Derkits
Pure Metal Coupons Provide Quantifiable Corrosion Monitor
Pure copper, silver, aluminum and tin metal coupons - "corrosion gas
monitors"
Quantitative Correlative information - The use of pure metal coupon process
monitors was adapted from ASTM standard'3* test methods for calibrating mixed
flowing gas test chambers for environmental testing of electronic equipment. The
material of the coupons is source-traceable. The effect of each exposure is
measured by the weight gain of coupons of Al, Cu, Sn, and Ag using a precision
microbalance calibrated using NIST-traceable standards.
11 | Aug 2009 LGS Innovations LLC and Alcatel-Lucent ¦ Proprietary 2009 "
Pure Metal Coupon Weight Gain in fjg/cm2. Error Bars Show Spread of
Weight Gains over Three Computers for Each Exposure Condition
Average Weight Gains After Exposure (ug/cm2)
35
~ Ave Copper
~ Ave Silver
~ Ave Alum
~ Ave all 3 metals
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
2 6 10 11 12 15 22
DECON Computer Number
Comparison of Visual Inspection images of the blind test sample with
the coupon weight gains enabled Alcatel-Lucent team to identify test
conditions corresponding to each PC with 100% accuracy.
Alcatel • Lucen
12 | Aug 2009 LGS innovations LLC and Alcatel-Lucent - Proprietary 2009
6
-------
Derkits
C. Objective Failure Determination
- PC Dr®
13 | Aug 2009
LGS Innovations LLC and Alcatel-Lucent - Proprietary 2009
Alcatel * Lucent
PCDoctorR Provides a Full Kit of (>300) Software and Hardware Tests
14 | Aug 2009
op-to-dalc and IraHtin fo« all ivuWv tued PC ramponrab
* Camprehrnure xn'em infer wiauon
- Englwh and Japanese avmUble
* EiasV"to-ii.«, annnnve graphical u«rt mtriface
* Accnnrc F»M Rrpliccablr L'rur fPRIT) idenoficanan
* Fast, ID--second scarf up with no in^tsILihoa tgnitfireiiB
- Test result* can be asved »o
-------
Derkits
Objective Definition of "Failure":
Section of PC-DoctorR Record for Computer #11
46 (DVD-RW Drive) Read Write Test
Y
PASS
47 (CD-R Drive) Read Write Test
Y >
^ FAIL
Warning Message: Test canceled by user. No media or
Vong media type detected
48 (DVD Drive) Linear Seek Test
Y /
PASS
49 (DVD Drive) Random Seek Test
Y /
PASS
50 (DVD Drive) Funnel Seek Test
YJ
PASS
51 (DVD Drive) Linear Read Compare Test
PASS
52 (DVD+R Drive) Read Write Test
PASS
53 (CD-RW Drive) Read Write Test
Y
fail
Warninc
wrong m
Message: Test canceled by user. No media or
idia type detected
54 (CD-ROM Drive) Linear Seek Test
Y
FAIL
Warning
wrong m
Vlessage: Test canceled by user. No media or
dia type detected
55 (CD-ROM Drive) Random Seek Test
V
FAIL
Warning
wrong n
Message: Test canceled by user. No media or
idia type detected
56 (CD-ROM Drive) Funnel Seek Test
FAIL
Warning!
wrong dh
Message: Test canceled by user. No media or
edia type detected
57 I (CD-ROM Drive) Linear Read Compare Test
58 (CD-ROM Drive) CD Audio Test
FAIL
FAIL
Warni/g Message: Test canceled by user. No media or
wrong media type detected
Warning Message: Test canceled by user. No media or
wrong media type detected
PC-DoctorR enabled an objective and repeatable definition of "failure",
free from most of the issues created by subjective or biased
determinations in earlier reports. Tests were repeated on the sample at
the EPA to allow a quantitative (counted) record to be created over
time. Slide 24 shows the results of this method.
15 | Aug 2009
LGS Innovations LLC and Alcatel-Lucent - Proprietary 2009
Alcatel * Lucent
D. Specified Test Point
Photographic Data Collection
16 | Aug 2009 LGSInnova
tions LLC and i
\lcatel-Lucent - Proprietary 2009
Alcatel Lucent ^
8
-------
Derkits
Results of Using Precision Photographic Images as Visual Inspection Method
Tracking
Through Time
Comparison
Across
Experiment
Standard Set
of Quantifiable
Images
Standardized Photographic
Visual Inspection
17 | Aug 2009
LGS Innovations LLC and Alcatel-Lucent - Proprietary 2009
Alcatel * Lucent
DECON #11
2007.09.24
DECON #11
DECON #11
2007.10.18
2008.03.03
DECON #1 1
2007.09.21
High resolution, large contrast dynamic range, and excellent color rendition
of camera enable calibrated measurement and numerical analysis of
corrosion front progression seen on slide 25.
Alcatel-Lucent
18 | Aug 2009 LGS Innovations LLC and Alcatel-Lucent - Proprietary 2009
Progressive Cut-Edge Corrosion on Back Screen Measured over time
9
-------
Derkits
E. Destructive Physical Analysis to
Identify Root Cause of Failure
Root Cause Destructive Physical Analysis Uses Modern Precision Tools
Quantifiable
Elemental
Analysis
Quantifiable
Spectroscopic
Analysis
Compare
Results Across
Experiment
and through
time
Application of High Precision
Methods such as SEM, EDX
and Optical Spectroscopy
Root Cause Destructive
Physical Analysis
20 | Aug 2009
LGS Innovations LLC and Alcatel-Lucent • Proprietary 2009
Alcatel Lucent &
10
-------
Derkits
"JAN/08
21 | Aug 2009 LGS Innovations LLC and Alcatel-Lucent - Proprietary 2009
Alcatel * Lucent &
Cross Section SEM View of DIMM Socket Connector on Motherboard
from a Computer Exposed to 3000 ppmv C102 (DECON #6)
C102 corrosion
through Au layer.
Au Layer
Ni Layer
Cu Substrate
DO 15
D001
D006
D022
D011
DO 12
% Transmission
650nm
780nm
DVD Optics Spectra Hat #1
22 | Aug 2009 LGS Innovations LLC and Alcatel-Lucent - Proprietary 2009
Alcatel Lucent &
__ Wavelength (nm)
nm
780 nm
Red denotes computer with
CD/DVD drive failures
Laser damage to
plastic coating of
quarter wave plate in
Decon 6.
Comparison of Quarter-wave Plate Transmission Spectra for DECON
DVD/CD Drives following Exposure.
11
-------
Derkits
F. Quantitative Assessment of
Damage Progression Through Time
PC Dr Repeated Measurements Demonstrate Progressive Damage
30
25
3
E
3
o
20
- 3000ppm, 90% RH, ON
- 3000ppm, 75% RH, OFF
- 3000ppm, 75% RH, ON
-75ppm,75%RH,ON
- 75 ppm, 40% RH, ON
¦ Oppm, 90%RH, ON
-Control, ambient
12 3 4
Months Elapsed After Exposure
As noted on slide 15
repeated use of PC Dr
was made over six
months on samples
retained at the EPA.
Damage to PCs continues
to accumulate for months
after exposure.
All PCs were tested
immediately after
decontamination.
Immediate failures which
occurred in high-
exposure PCs are
indicated by the "0"
month data.
24 | Aug 2009
LGS Innovations LLC and Alcatel-Lucent • Proprietary 2009
Alcatel Lucent %
12
-------
Derkits
Cut-Edge Corrosion Progression
Measured on Repeated "Visual Inspection" Photographs
Cut-edge Corrosion Measurement
G. Derkits
Standard Distance
0.68cm =
Width of 2 internal Hexagons
Hexagon Hexagon
Width Width
pxl J cm
cm pxl
Dates
Date Coriosion
Diffeiences Front A
[days] [pxl]
Corrosion
Front A
[cm]
Corrosion
Front B
[pxl]
Corrosion
Front B
[cm]
Corrosion
Front C
[pxl]
Corrosion
Front C
[cm]
67 0.34
0.005075
9/21/2007
0| 27
0.1370
19
0.0964
23
0.1167
64 0.34
0.005313
9/24/2007
3 29
0.1541
20
0.1063
25
0.1328
64 0.34
0.005313
10/18/2007
27 34
0.1806
36
0.1913
30
0.1594
64 0.34
0.005313
3/3/2008
164 55
0.2922
69
0.3666
73
0.3878
Corrosion Front Average
1
E
1
K
50 100 150 200
Time [days]
Corrosion Front Progression
measured on photographs in
slide 18 shows that damage
continues for months after
initial exposure.
Two thirds of damage occurs
from weeks to months after the
single day decontamination.
25 | Aug 2009
LGS Innovations LLC and Alcatel-Lucent - Proprietary 2009
Alcatel * Lucent
Alcatel Lucent
LGS Innovations LLC and Alcatel-Lucent - Proprietary 2009
13
-------
Derkits
Summary and Conclusions
A quantifiable objective assessment of the impact of biological
decontamination on electronic equipment is enabled by using personal
computers as test vehicles and analytical methodology adapted from
standard environmental reliability studies of telecommunications
equipment.
Until this study the results in this field were qualitative and subjective.
We have advanced the state of art of biodecontamination studies and
improved the quality of information used by U.S. Government agencies
for the evaluation of decontamination technology.
The adoption of standard industrial practice for environmental
reliability studies to assess the impact of decontamination by C102 and
H202 has resulted in a set of data and conclusions which can be
quantified and are demonstrably repeatable and objective.
The specific examples used in this presentation refer mainly to the
initial study of C102 decontamination, but the method described here
has been adopted in going forward with other studies, as well.
27 | Aug 2009 LGS Innovations LLC and Alcatel-Lucent - Proprietary 2009 LUCf? ^
Lessons Learned
1. Power=ON state is very difficult to define for intelligent systems
programmed to conserve energy.
2. Determination of in-system Relative Humidity as a function of time
throughout a run is difficult, especially near condensing conditions.
3. Corrosion Transfer among hardware test connectors can cause
spurious results.
4. In highly competitive technologies driven by cost, modern
manufacturing methods (e.g. "Just In Time") provides unexpected
variation.
5. Human "common sense" sometimes defeats even well-documented
procedures. Operators sometimes attempted to fix failures during
testing, e.g. by disconnecting and reconnecting failed memory
cards.
28 | Aug 2009 LGS Innovations LLC and Alcatel-Lucent - Proprietary 2009
Alcatel Lucent &
14
-------
Derkits
www.alcatel-lucent.com
Personal Computers are compact enough to allow repetition in test
chamber
24"x 40"
clear acrylic
door with
gasket seal
Alcatel Lucent &
30 | Aug 2009 LGS Innovations LLC and Alcatel-Lucent - Proprietary 2009
15
-------
Derkits
Weight Gain vs Exposure Suggests Surface Ion Transport Limited by RH
Ln(10*Ag Wt gain) vs Exposure
¦
¦
^ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦
¦I 2 r-
©
Ł 1.5 ¦
u>
'
-------
Derkits
Precision Elemental Content Measurement:
CI Content of Al Corrosion Particle from DECON #6
CI content of
corrosion particles
emitted by the CPU
heat sinks was
repeatedly measured
over time using
Energy-Dispersive X-
ray Analysis (EDX).
These measurements
showed a decline in
CI consistent with
the action of
processes such as
hydration and
hydrolysis occurring
long after the initial
exposure.
See slide 34 for
further information.
33 | Aug 2009 LGS Innovations LLC and Alcatel-Lucent - Proprietary 2009
Alcatel * Lucent &
Progressive Change in CI Content of Al Corrosion Comparison:
Dec 2007 vs Feb 2008
EDX Chlorine [At %] in Al Corrosion
Particles emitted by
exposed Aluminum
heat sinks change
composition through
time for months after
initial exposure,
measured by EDX, as
noted on slide 33.
Chlorine concentration
of particles indicates
that hydration and
hydrolysis processes
continue on the
surface.
D#6:Dec07, D#ll:Dec07, D#6:Feb08, D#ll:Feb08
34 | Aug 2009
LGS Innovations LLC and Alcatel-Lucent - Proprietary 2009
Alcatel Lucent %
17
-------
Derkits
NOTES designated in the slides by superscript in parentheses.
(1) PC Standardization: The descendants of the IBM PC, originally controlled by
licensing of microchannel bus and other intellectual property from IBM, are now
controlled by a variety of standards such as the PCI bus, controlled by the PCI
special interest group, http://www.pcisig.com/home .
(2) Photometrology is a technical term used since at least the 1970s to
describe the extraction of quantitative information from photographs. It is
nearly synonymous with photogrammetry, but that term is more often used in
the specialized sense of extracting three-dimensional information from aerial
photographs.
(3) ASTM B 810-01A "Standard Test Method for Calibration of Atmospheric
Corrosion Test Chambers by Change in Mass of Copper Coupons" and ASTM B
827-05 "Standard Practice for Conducting Mixed Flowing Gas (MFG)
Environmental Tests" are examples of standards adapted for decontamination
studies.
35 | Aug 2009 LGS Innovations LLC and Alcatel-Lucent - Proprietary 2009
Alcatel Lucent &
18
-------
Assessment of the Impact of C102 and H202
Decontamination on Electronic Equipment
M. L. Mandich, Alcatel-Lucent
-------
Mandich
Alcatel-Lucent
Marv Mandich. C. Xu, D. Fleming, G. Derkits, J. Franey, R. Kopf, T. Wiecek,
and W. Reents (Alcatel-Lucent)
Shawn Ryan (EPA) and Lance Brooks (DHS)
Alcatel-Lucent (LGS Innovations)
Project sponsored by EPA
-------
Outline
Mandich
1. Project overview and justification
2. Test matrix
3. Accomplishments In C102 and H202 Decontamination Studies
4. Lessons learned Including Impact of COTS (commercial Off-
The-Shelf) components
5. Conclusions and future studies
2 | April 2010 LGS Innovations LLC and Alcatel-Lucent - Proprietary 2010
Alcatel Lucent ©
-------
Mandich
Project Overview and Justification
3 | April 2010 LGS Innovations LLC and Alcatel-Lucent - Proprietary 2010
Alcatel-Lucent %
-------
Fumigation technologies are being used to decontaminate
buildings exposed to biological agents
Hart Senate Office Bldg., Washington DC
w
Curseen Morris Postal Processing and
Distribution Center, Hamilton, NJ
;¦ t* -s.
What happens to complex electronic equipment exposed to these fumigants?
4 | April 2010
LGS Innovations LLC and Alcatel-Lucent - Proprietary 2010
Alcatel-Lucent
%
-------
Development of Strategies, Guidelines and Plans to DeconJ^priinate
Equipment following a Biological Weapons Attack
¦ Response to Homeland Security President
comprehensive and coordinated response
¦ Goal: acquire specific data about impact of biodecontamination agents on
electronic equipment
¦ Fumigants studied to date:
— C102 in 90%, 75 % and 40% RH environments
— H202 (both BIOQUELL and STERIS technologies)
¦ Test Vehicle: Dell desktop computers (prototypical electronic equipment)
¦ Objectives of testing are to determine:
— impact of sporicidal C102 and H202 fumigations
— effect of humidity level during fumigation
— impact of equipment power state (ON vs. OFF) during and after fumigation
— assess impact of lower Concentration-Time exposures for remediating other
biological threat agents and in-building mold
5 | April 2010
LGS Innovations LLC and Alcatel-Lucent - Proprietary 2010
Alcatel-Lucent %
-------
Mandich
Test Matrix
6 | April 2010 LGS Innovations LLC and Alcatel-Lucent - Proprietary 2010
Alcatel-Lucent Qpj
-------
Summary of Test Matrix Conditions (3 computers testecjj^t
each condition)
Test
Equipment
Power State
During
Fumigation
Treatment
(all performed at EPA NHSRC)
Fumigant
Treatment Conditions
C102
ppmv
H202
RH %
Temp
°C
Time
(hrs)
1
On
High humidity fumigation
3000
90
24
3
2
Off
Sporicidal fumigation conditions
3000
75
24
3
3
On
Sporicidal fumigation conditions
3000
75
24
3
4
On, busy
Sporicidal fumigation conditions
3000
75
24
3
5
On
Low C102 concentration fumigation
75
75
24
12
6
On
Low C102 concentration and
low RH fumigation
75
40
24
12
7
On
BIOQUELL HPV
41 g (30 vol-%)
>90
29
2
8
Off
BIOQUELL HPV
41 g (30 vol-%)
>90
29
2
9
On
STERIS VPH
250 ppmv
32
29
4
10
Off
STERIS VPH
250 ppmv
32
29
4
11
On
High RH only (no C102 exposure)
90
24
3
12
On
Ambient (control)
40
24
--
7 | April 2010
LGS Innovations LLC and Alcatel-Lucent - Proprietary 2010
Alcatel Lucent
%
-------
Mandich
Accomplishments in C102 and H202
Decontamination Studies
8 | April 2010 LGS Innovations LLC and Alcatel-Lucent - Proprietary 2010
Alcatel-Lucent
-------
Assessment of Damage following C102 or H202 Exposure
Mandich
1) Computer diagnostics (using PC Doctor™)
2) Visual Inspection
3) Detailed assessment of failure modes resulting from exposures
9 | April 2010 LGS Innovations LLC and Alcatel-Lucent - Proprietary 2010
Alcatel Lucent ©
-------
degradation of Computers: PC Doctor™ Failures Duriq^fost
Exposure Monitoring at EPA NHSRC
* Some failures intermittent. Overall, number of failures increases overtime
* Comparable numbers of cumulative failures seen for H202-0N and CI02
(both 3000 and 75 ppm)
o
BIOQUELL ON
STERIS ON
• STERIS OFF
~ BIOQUELL OFF
I Control, ambient
h2o2
0 12 3 4
Months Elapsed After Exposure
30
25
(/)
0)
20
re
0)
>
15
re
3
I 10
o
- 3000pp m,90%RH,ON
¦3000ppm,75%RH,OFF
3000ppm,75%RH,ON
75ppm,75%RH,ON
»75ppm ,40% RH, ON
•0ppm,90%RH,ON
-Control, ambient
CIO
or i » i — —
90% RH; outside
of normal use
condition
0 12 3 4
Months Elapsed After Exposure
10 | April 2010
LGS Innovations LLC and Alcatel-Lucent - Proprietary 2010
Alcatel Lucent
%
-------
Assessment of Damage Using Visual Inspection
Mandich
Visual corrosion only occurred in computers exposed to C102
No obvious corrosion seen for H202 fumigated computers
Corrosion from C102 observed in
multiple materials including aluminum,
steel, silver, and plated copper
Different types of corrosion observed
— extensive particulate formation
from CPU Al alloy heat sink fins
— pore corrosion of plated copper
— corrosion of plated steel parts
— bleaching of cables
— hygroscopic salt generation
Static Intercept™ packaging observed to
protect against further corrosion under
ambient environmental conditions
11 | April 2010
LGS Innovations LLC and Alcatel-Lucent - Proprietary 2010
1
CPU I
eat sink
Fumigation Conditions
3000 ppmv CI02 - 75%RH - Off
Alcatel-Lucent
-------
Susceptibility of Connectors to Corrosion from C102 Expqsyre
Determined by Gold Thickness
Contact Plating
Structure
A i i
AU
jjh '| j
Ni
Cu
Fumigation Conditions: 3000 ppmv CI02 - 75%RH
v_..
1 1
1
1 I
1 1
1|j Au
DIMM Module
Hard Drive
Connector on
DIMM
Connector on
motherboard
Connector
on drive
Connector
on cable
Au Thickness
1 pm
0.5 pm
0.5 pm
0.1 pm
Ni Thickness
3 |jm
2 |jm
2 |jm
4 |jm
Au Coverage
complete
selective
complete
selective
Corrosion Thru Au Layer?
NO
YES
YES
YES
>0.5 (xm thick Au plating over Ni is required for connector to
survive the corrosive environment during C102 decontamination.
Alcatel-Lucent %
12 | April 2010
LGS Innovations LLC and Alcatel-Lucent - Proprietary 2010
-------
m
ny Dual DVD-CD Drive Failures Occurred in Exposed Computers
Location of Damage: Passive Optics in Optical Pickup Assembly
• Both C102 and H202 fumigation damages DVD-CD drives
• Most damage is laser-assisted; worst is seen for H202 exposures
• Optics with most damage fabricated with plastic optical materials.
CI02 Fumigated
1/4-Wave Plate
H202 Fumigated CD Laser Beamsplitter
13 | April 2010
LGS Innovations LLC and Alcatel-Lucent - Proprietary 2010
Alcatel-Lucent
%
-------
Failure Analysis of Most Heavily Damaged Optical Elem^pJ in
the OPA in Phase2 Studies: CD Laser Beamsplitter
H,0, Vendor A
¦X
S'wij
1M: | II
mm m
¦
in
100m
Increasing amount of damage
H ?02 Vendor B
~ ~
iSJ • [r :
}¦
: • ¦ ' -
%
* *
¦ *
¦ L«
** Note: small splotchy areas in this image are
sputtered gold for SEM imaging purposes
14 | April 2010
LGS Innovations LLC and Alcatel-Lucent - Proprietary 2010
Alcatel-Lucent
%
-------
Mandich
Lessons Learned
15 | April 2010 LGS Innovations LLC and Alcatel-Lucent - Proprietary 2010
Alcatel-Lucent %
-------
Sjmmary of the Short and Long Term Impact of *C102 aQd^,
on Materials and Components in Electronic Equipment
Impact Observed
Reliability Problem
Impact on Equipment
Short Term
Long Term
Catastrophic
Aesthetic
C102
h2o2
C102
h2o2
C102
H202
C102
H202
CPU heat sink corrosion
•
•
Connector corrosion
•
•
•
Joint corrosion (e.g. solder,
bond pads)
•
•
•
Plated steel corrosion
•
•
Optics damage (especially
plastic optics)
Dust formation
•
•
•
Cable bleaching
* Using sporicidal C102 fumigation conditions
** Potentially catastrophic for larger systems and installations involving complex wiring
16 | April 2010 LGS Innovations LLC and Alcatel-Lucent - Proprietary 2010
Alcatel Lucent ©
-------
ubsystem Repair and Cleaning Are Not Effective Meansjtg
Mitigate Corrosion and Failure
1. Tried: monthly cleaning of hygroscopic dust particles
¦ Palliative only: new dust particles form in ambient room air
¦ Possible safety hazard: dust has particles with sizes in sub-pm
range that disperse easily and contain Al, Mi, CI, Fe, P, Cu
2. Tried: disconnection-reconnection to solve connector
failures (especially DIMM memory)
¦ Relief temporary: failure often repeated
¦ Replacement DIMM cards only temporary solution: corroded
motherboard connector transfers corrosion to new cards
3.
Performed reflow to simulate circuit board repair
¦ ICs on control motherboard survived
¦ Observed IC detachment on exposed motherboard,
indicates hidden damage to solder
CPU Heat Sink
Particles
Effective mitigation requires using more robust
materials suitable for these harsh environments
17 | April 2010
LGS Innovations LLC and Alcatel-Lucent - Proprietary 2010
Alcatel-Lucent
%
-------
Mandich
Conclusions and Future Studies
18 | April 2010 LGS Innovations LLC and Alcatel-Lucent - Proprietary 2010
Alcatel-Lucent %
-------
Impact of COTS Components on Equipment Survivability"
andich
1. Use of optical plastics in COTS components
¦ Optical plastics highly susceptible to both C102 and H202 induced damage
¦ Both H202 fumigation technologies cause much more damage than C102
¦ Expanding use of optical plastics in COTS components
• Lower cost materials and manufacturing
• Can be made as "one piece" with precision mounting components
¦ Proliferation of optical plastics in many different technologies
• Digital cameras
• CD/DVD players, optical sensors, optical mice
• LED optics for lighting
• Optical scanners (fingerprint and retinal scanners) and sensors
2. Cost reduction in gold use in COTS components
¦ C102 fumigation damages connectors with <0.5 pm thick gold
¦ Greatest C102 damage to connectors using thin gold arid selective plating
¦ H202 causes no apparent damage even for thin gold
¦ Commercial electronics market using thinner gold/selective plating to save costs
• Gold plating on many connectors in Dell Optiplex computers less than 0.5 |jm
• Consumer electronic market often uses "flash Au" which is only 0.1-0.25 |jm thick
19 | April 2010 LGS Innovations LLC and Alcatel-Lucent - Proprietary 2010 AIC3t©l ¦Lucent Qtf
-------
Significant, In-depth Data Now Available on Impact of C|aQ2 and
H7Q7 Fumigation on Electronic Equipment
¦ Material choices used in test computers a significant reason for extent of damage
- Examples used by COTS commercial market for cost saving:
~ thinner gold plating on connectors
~ plastic optical components
~ cut plated steel
¦ Have comparative damage summary for C102 and H202
- Corrosion of many different metals, e.g. Al, Ag, Ni, plated Cu, steel
- Bleaching of plastic coating on cables
- Variety of subsystems damaged, e.g. Au-plated connectors and CD/DVD drives
¦ Much of the damage progresses in time
¦ C102 fumigation forms copious quantities of corrosive, submicron size dust
¦ C102 fumigation causes extensive corrosion of many connectors in computers
¦ Most computers exposed to C102 or H202 suffered DVD/CD disk drive failures
Current Work:
Study impact of Methyl Bromide decontamination on electronic equipment
20 | April 2010 LGS Innovations LLC and Alcatel-Lucent - Proprietary 2010
Alcatel Lucent ©
-------
Visible Corrosion of the Aluminum CPU Heat Sink as a
Function of Fumigation Conditions
Mandich
3000 ppmv Cl02/90%RH/on 3000 ppmv Cl02/75%RH/off
3000 ppmv ClO,/75%RH/on
25 r
CONTROL (ambient)
no ClO,/90%RH/on
75 ppmv Cl02/75%RH/on
75 ppmv CI02/40%RH/on
• All CPU heat sinks exposed to 75-3000 ppmv CI02 and >75% RH significantly corroded.
• The CPU heat sink exposed to 75 ppmv CIO2/40% RH shows possible discoloration
• CPU heat sinks not exposed to CI02 exhibit no corrosion.
Alcatel-Lucent
22 | April 2010
LGS Innovations LLC and Alcatel-Lucent - Proprietary 2010
-------
Visible Corrosion of the Rear Case Screen as a Function of
Mandich
Fumigation Conditions
ij
3000 ppmv Cl02/90%RH/on
zmz
3000 ppmv CI02/75%RH/off
3000 ppmv CI02/75%RH/on
it#!1
75 ppmv CI02/75%RH/on
J~ 75 ppmv Cl02/40%RH/on
m
Zez«z«z«
no Cl02/90%RH/on ¦
WM CONTROL (ambient) W
• Screens exposed to 3000 ppmv CI02 and >75% RH exhibit obvious corrosion of both steel and Zn.
• Screens exposed to 75 ppmv CI02/75% RH have corrosion of steel along edge, no corrosion of Zn.
• Screens exposed to 75ppmv CIO2/40%RH or not exposed to CI02 show no signs of corrosion of
either steel or Zn.
23 | April 2010
LGS Innovations LLC and Alcatel-Lucent - Proprietary 2010
Alcatel-Lucent
%
-------
Mandich
www.alcatel-lucent.com
© © o o o ® © m ® m o o ® o q o © m m
-------
Evaluating Strategies for CWA Decontamination of
Indoor Facilities
Adam H. Love, Consultant to Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
Presentation not available for distribution
-------
Test Methodology for the Assessment of Chemical Warfare Agent
Decontaminant Performance on Porous or Complex Surfaces
Paul Brister, Clean Earth Technologies, LLC
Presentation not available for distribution
-------
Basic Research Needs in Decontamination
Jennifer Becker, U.S. Army Research Office
-------
US ARMY
RDECOM
U.S. Army Research, Development
and Engineering Command
Basic Research Needs
in Decontamination
April 2010
TECHNOLOGY DRIVEN. WARFIGHTER FOCUSED.
Dr. Jennifer Becker
Chemical Sciences Division
Organic and Inorganic Chemistry
Army Research Office
jennifer.j.becker#us.army.mil
919 549-4224
BDEcoMlk Army Research Office
Overview
Mission: to serve as the Army's premier
extramural basic research agency in the
engineering, physical, information and
life sciences; developing and exploiting
innovative advances to ensure the
Nation's technological superiority.
• Exploit Scientific Opportunities for
Revolutionary New Army Capabilities
• Drive Science to Develop Solutions to
Existing Army Technology Needs
• Accelerate Transition of Basic
Research
• Strengthen University, Industry, and
Government Partnerships
• Educate and Train the Future S&E
Workforce for the Army
Research Funding
by State
S15M, >$8M
<$8M, >$2M
<$2M
• 256 Institutes of Higher Learning
• 861 Individual Investigators
• 47 Research Centers
Research Thrusts
Chemistry Materials Science
Computing &
Info Science
Electronics
Environmental
Life Sciences
Mathematics
Mechanics
Network Science
Manoscience
Physics
-------
RDECOM.
Funding Scientific
Breakthroughs
ML,
Extrapolation of Existing Technologies (needs
driven)
• Incremental, Continued Improvement inExisting Technologies
• Often Driven or Enabled by Commercial Market
• Disposable handheld sensors
• First responder decon solutions
• May be a "Disruptive Technology" (e.g. personal vs. mini
computers)
Revolutionary New Applications from Scientific
Breakthroughs (opportunity driven)
• Utilizes Two Somewhat Distinct Mechanisms
• Fundamentally new approaches to solving old problems
• Fundamentally new capabilities
• Examples from Past
• Navigation - Satellites and atom clocks for GPS
• Range Finders and Target Designators - Lasers
• Potential Examples for Future
• Smart materials - sense and neutralize threats
• Integration of protection with living systems
• Nanotechnology based capabilities for protection, decon,
or detection
QSsxiSSt
op
%
\j gŁ
r ,
h :.-HF*****!
' AH
• ^3
V; ,-^e
*"'m ?"
ARO Basic Research Role
-------
Becker
PMFCnMj)
Vision
El
To develop a molecular level understanding of catalytic
reactions, functionalized surfaces and organized
assemblies that will provide the foundation for creating new
materials and processes to protect the soldier from
hazardous chemicals and materials.
Research Thrusts
1. Surfaces and Catalysis
2. Organized Assemblies
water
R
c and
nic Chemis
M
Hazardous Materials Management
El
ORGANIC AND INORGANIC CHEMISTRY
Decontamination
Protection
Detection
-------
Becker
Surfaces and Catalysis Thrust
Scientific Objectives
Scientific Objectives
• To design and synthesize nano-
structured catalysts with known
properties and well-defined
morphologies
• To fully understand the kinetics
and mechanisms of catalytic
reactions
• To develop a mechanistic
understanding of reactions on
surfaces and at interfaces
• To understand and enhance
mass transport on surfaces
Organized Assemblies
Scientific Objectives
Scientific Objectives
• To design new approaches to
synthesize controlled self-
assembled structures
• To incorporate functionality
into self-assembled structures
• To design self-assembled
systems with responsive
behavior
• To understand how to control
assembly under different
conditions
-------
Becker
w3>
Surface Chemistry
A Molecular Level Understanding
John Morris, Virginia Tech
Scientific Goal
To understand the molecular
level mechanisms and kinetics of
reactions on surfaces
Approach
• Synthesize metal oxide
nanoparticle catalysts
• Design ultra-high vacuum time-
resolved techniques
• Characterize surface bound and
gas-phase reaction products
|j ' wSr
1 nm Y203 made
in 1 Ton N,
5 nm Y2Os made
in 10 Ton N,
Sample
Mount
Analyzer
RDECOM
OM*
Surface Chemistry
A Molecular Level Understanding
John Morris, Virginia Tech
| Experimental Set-Up
|Actual System
FTIR Source
X-ray
Photoelectron
Spectrometer
Doser System
Residual Gas
Mass Spectrometer:
Vapor Analysis
IR Detector
Nanoparticle
Preparation
and
Transfer Chambers
-------
Becker
RDFCOM
Surface Chemistry
A Molecular Level Understanding
John Morris, Virginia Tech
Room temperature adsorption and decomposition of DMMP
Dissociated:molecular bound DMMP increases by factor of 2 with
smaller particles (2nm vs 5nm)
CH3O-P-O-CH3
CH,
Controlled flux of DMMP
Vapor Deposition Approaches
Create New Nanoparticle Materials
Characterize Surface Adsorption
and Decomposition
Nanoparticle Surface
HO--
Surfaces and Products are Analyzed with:
AFM, XPS, FTIR, thermal desorption
Product Desorption:
Mass Spectrometer
Further Reactions
"nrrfiM ** Conjugated Polyelectrolytes
As Versatile Antimicrobials
David Whitten, University of New Mexico 1
Scientific Goal
To explore the biocidal activity of
conjugated polyelectrolytes
Approach
•Materials synthesis
•Studies of biocidal activity of CPE
and OPE in various formats
'#
• Mechanistic studies of dark and
it-
light-activated biocidal activity
• Photochemical, photophysical
and theory/modeling studies of
OPE and CPE
Image of single surface grafted
conjugated polyelectrolyte SGCP
particle with captured bacteria
-------
Becker
Conjugated Polyelectrolytes
As Versatile Antimicrobials
David Whitten, University of New Mexico
\J
-O
N(Me)3 CI "
t X —}.
"CI(Me)3N
PPE-NR3+
PhavSe contrast
Eoifluorescence
E. coli with PPE-NMe,
Lu., et al. Langmuir. 2005, 21, 10154.
Initial Findings
• PPE-NR3+ shows biocidal
activity vs both
Escherichia coli vegetative
cells and Bacillus anthracis
spores
• Biocidal activity enhanced
by illumination with visible
light
• Solution phase PPE-NR3+
associates with bacteria
• >1 monolayer coverage on
B. anthracis Sterne spores
OM*
Conjugated Polyelectrolytes
As Versatile Antimicrobials
David Whitten, University of New Mexico
el
Mechanism of Biocidal Action of SGCP
V,.
¦
'0/
i) Reversible
bacteria
adhesion to the
particle.
ii) Photoexcitation
of CPE.
iii) Singlet oxygen
generation.
iv)Killing bacteria
by singlet
oxygen.
v) Aggregation of
particles.
-------
PMFCnMj)
Becker
Conjugated Polyelectrolytes
As Versatile Antimicrobials
David Whitten, University of New Mexico
Micro "Roach Motels" based
on layer-by-layer assembly
of oppositely charged CPEs
Uaik Illuminated 1 hr
i'n
Dead + - ~
polyma'
Left: Confocal laser scanning micrograph of
|iRM cluster 10 minutes after introduction into a
solution of Pseudomonas aeruginosa (107/mL)
k^pt in the dark.
Right: Central slice of 20 mm z-stack showing
interior of mRM cluster with entrapped, killed
bacteria after 1 hour exposure to white light,
Corbitt., et al. ACS Appl. Mat. Interf. 2009, 1, 48.
RfiFCOMP Molecular Machines as Abiotic Enzymes
Chad A Mirkin, Northwestern University
Scientific Goal
To explore the fundamental
assembly and functional chemistry
approaches to develop easily
assembled abiotic catalysts
("artificial enzymes")
Approach
•Synthesize and characterize new
types of supramolecular allosteric
catalysts
•Design and synthesize bio-inspired
structures that facilitate directional
energy transfer
•Explore novel signal transduction
and amplification strategies within
the supramolecular assemblies
A spontaneously-assembled "molecular
machine" that displays highly selective,
cavity-controlled catalytic chemical oxidation
Active sites = coordinatively encapsulated,
torsionally rigid, manganese porphyrins
-------
Becker
Molecular Machines as Abiotic Enzymes
Chad A Mirkin, Northwestern University
Cataylyst/Cavity Assembly Strategy:
The Weak-Link Approach (WLA)
-PPh,
K
2 W + Z
Ph7p' 11<-CE D->C~)» Ph, + 4 L
8
PPh2
flexible
hemilabile
ligand
^\JP
ph2p x-nr
"condensed" macrocycle
^:l
r^vx-OZl-x'^
PPh, PPh3
I]—X«^_^
^x-nr
"open" macrocyde
^ = transition metal center
X = S, O or N
Key Points:
• General and high yield syntheses
• Flexible ligands
¦ Multiple levels of tailorability
¦ Coordinativeiy unsaturated metal centers
• Multiple geometries available in situ
Holliday, etai Angew. Chem. Int. Ed. 2001,40,2022.
Gianneschi, etol. Acc. Chem. Res. 2005 38.625.
RDECOM
nn" Molecular Machines as Abiotic Enzymes
Chad A Mirkin, Northwestern University
Sense and Respond System Example
Structural regulatory sites
S PPh
6
r»
O O
Allosteric effector
¦CO/OAc-tl|("-Bu).NOAc| ——
CO, ch2ci.
Starting point
2BF4
Rh cat, (n-Bu^NOAc
co,ch2ci2
Closed (Inactive) ""s/ r0" o o
The first cycle
S~\l J
C "3 4
Ph2P
I ..CO Ca fa/yf/caffl
AcO-T aC"V.° /AnO-'T
Ph2P. cavity
P Ph2
' ..co
Rh"
vHPPh2
S ^ Exponential
generation of
acetate ion
Q
AcO |
The second cycle
Open (Active)
rce third cycle
Fluorescence
Cascade reaction
No fluorescence
-------
Becker
Dynamic Combinatorial Chemistry
iMichel Gagne, University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill
Scientific Goal
To develop Dynamic
Combinatorial Chemistry as an
effective and powerful tool for
discovering new functional host
guest combinations with a focus
on analyzing complex libraries
Approach
•Develop new ultrahigh resolution
LC techniques (UPLC and 2 D LC)
•Develop new assays for detecting
binding/response behavior of
aqueous receptors
•Develop new libraries, reactions,
and strategies for high throughput
analysis
As
«"¦" w JT s
s I J
T ^
s
jj
add
analyte
+ many other ^S"
combinations S*
4
>
^ S ^s-
S'
Dynarric Combinatorial Library
of exchar^jng components
4
,0
$ b
Vi
s
Bndng to this
receptor
increases its
S concentration
al the
expense cf
the otter
S constituents
RDECOM
OM*
Dynamic Combinatorial Chemistry
Michel Gagne, University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill
The initially racemic library can deracemize on binding to (-)-cytidine
or (-)-2-thiocytidine (10 eq with respect to (rac)-1), resulting in the
amplification of the homo-dimer ((SS) dimer) and the homo tetramer
((RRRR) tetramer) at the expense of the trimers and hexamers
H VnN
N t> 5 rnM (racH in CH3CN
O cnon TCA vX J
o
50 eq. TFA
(racM
- vO^°0
r - ° A -
Trimers
Chiral guest
I HO So
Tetramers >—J
nn wc^etc
no — ¦
an
i
<§>B
Amplifical
-------
Becker
bdegomT^ Basic Research Success:
Activated Metal Oxides to Decontaminants
Mid-1980's - Fundamental investments
in activated metal oxides; potential
broad uses in filters, pre-concentrators,
and decontaminants
Fundamental decontamination research
effort funded with Professor Ken Klabunde
at Kansas State University - "Activated
Metal Oxide Surfaces as Highly Basic &
Reducing Environments*
1995 - Research leads to breakthrough
development of "nanostructured
sorbents" which becomes one of the
first nanotechnology products
Very small 2-4 nm
cubes/waffles can be seen that
aggregate into polyhedral
structures,
ftoECOMM Basic Research Success:
Activated Metal Oxides to Decontaminants
1990s Breakthrough leads to development of
Nanoscale Fast-Act Decontaminant
Collaborative Research Programs in CBD
between DTRA, ECBC, and ARO lead to the
development of the commercially available
decontaminant effective against nerve, blood,
and blister agents.
-------
Becker
See* Conveyor
RDBCOM
Basic Research Success:
Vehicle Wash System
RDECOM
OMjk Vehicle Wash System at Ft. Leonard
Wood Demonstration in 2009
Octaflex and Cha Corporation
-------
Becker
RDECOM
omJ> Decontamination Challenges
Mass transport
Mechanistic and kinetic studies
Structure-function relationships
Control of responsive and
dynamic systems
Agent-simulant correlation
Dissolution of agents
Structure of a sodium dodecyl
sulfate micelle, a surfactant
aggregate
bdecom^ Organic and Inorganic Chemistry
Program Dynamics/Future Directions
Nano-Structured Porous Functional and Reactive
Materials by Design
- Controllable pore sizes, shapes, and functionalized surfaces
- Fundamental understanding of structure-function relationship
- Understanding of principles that govern synthesis,
functionalization, adsorption, and reactivity
Bio-colloids combining colloid chemistry and
biotechnology
- Functional biological materials to create advanced materials in
high yield and regularity
- Targeted synthesis of self-organizing biocolloids
-------
Becker
Suggestions for Applicants
ARO Single Investigator Program (no deadlines):
1. Discover ARO Interests - www.aro.army.mil, talk to
program managers
2. Write Pre-proposal (several pages) - clear goals, some
technical detail, level of support needed, special
equipment
3. Email Pre-proposal - expedites review by Army
scientists
ARO Opportunities
ARO Broad Agency Announcement
• Proposals Due ~ October even though BAA is always open
• Conference / Symposium / Workshop Grants
• Short Term Innovative Research - STIR
• Young Investigator Program - YIP and PECASE
Multidisciplinary University Research Initiative - MURI
• Proposals Due ~ November
Defense University Research Instrumentation Program - DURIP
• Proposals Due ~ August
Small Business Innovative Research - SBIR
• Proposals Due ~ May
Small Business Technology Transfer - STTR (university partners)
• Proposals Due ~ April
Other Opportunities
• DARPA, DTRA, DoD Laboratories
-------
Knockdown and Neutralization of Aerosolized Chemical Agent
Simulants Using Charged Decontaminant Sprays
Rita Betty, Sandia National Laboratories
-------
Betty
Knockdown and Neutralization of Aerosolized
Chemical Agent Simulants Using Charged
Decontaminant Sprays
Presented at the 2010 US EPA Decontamination
Research and Development Conference
April 15, 2010
Rita G. Betty, John Brockmarin, Dan Lucero, Mark Tucker,
Jonathan Leonard, Mollye Wilson, Brandon Servantes
Andres Sanchez, Ashley Allen
Sandia National Laboratories is a multi-program laboratory operated by Sandia Corporation, a wholly owned subsidiary
of Lockheed Martin company, for the U.S. Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration under
contract DE-AC04-94AL85000.
©
Sandia
Nalionai
1 abotalnites-
Neutralization or decontamination of toxic chemical or biological
materials may require a set of technologies and approaches
Volumetric Decon (Gas, vapor, or aerosol to
reach all surfaces in a contaminated space)
Neutralization/Knockdown
of airborne agents
Our objective is to
investigate the use of small,
charged liquid droplets to
knockdown and neutralize
clouds of CBW agents
Waste Decon
(Liquid, foam, or gel)
Contaminated
Surface or 'Hot Spot' Decon
(Liquid, foam, or gel)
Sandia
National
lahni.iinui?s
-------
Betty
Spray
Knockdown
Agent
Cloud
Airborne Agent Knockdown & Neutralization
Concept
Interior Protection
Protected
Facility
Nalional
labomni
Agent Cloud Knockdown & Neutralization
Concept
Fixed Site Protection
Agent
Cloud
§^
itt^
I
Cloud Knockdown
Neutralization System
Fixed Site to
be protected
Sandia
Malional
-------
Betty
Through a series of three projects, Sandia has developed and
demonstrated a fundamental agent cloud knockdown process
2001-2002
2004-2005
FY2009
DARPA
Immune
Building Project
Laboratory
Directed Research
and Development
(LORD)
Non-Stockpile
Chemical Materials
Agency (Chem
Demil)
Knockdown and
neutralization of
CBW agents in an
interior faciiity
Small (~30-90pm).
uncharged droplets
of modified DF-200
Prototype system
developed for
Anniston, AL test
facility
Knockdown and
neutralization of
CBW agents in
an outdoor
setting
Small (—30-
50pm), charged
droplets of
modified DF-200
Feasibility study
Knockdown and
neutralization of
CW agents in an
interior or
temporary demil
facility
Small (~30-50pm),
charged droplets of
modified DF-200
Prototype system
to be installed
Sandia
National
1 abcualnitns
Fundamental Requirements for Airborne
Agent Knockdown & Neutralization System
Define the
Threat
Agents of Concern
Airborne
Concentrations
and Exposures
Knockdown &
Neutralization
Efficacy Required
Detect the
Agent Cloud
Stand off Detection
Direct Detection
Particle Detectors
Knockdown efficacy
requirements have
been developed for
each project
Our work has primarily
focused on this part of
the problem
Knockdown and
Neutralize the
Agent Cloud
Chemical Properties for
Neutralization
- Efficacy
- Solubility
- Safety and Environment
Physical Properties for
Efficient Collection
- Droplet Size
- Charge
Deployment
- Disperse Knockdown
Spray into Agent Cloud
Sandis
National
lahnulnups
-------
Betty
Example calculations for airborne agent knockdown efficacy
requirements
Toxic
Material
Initial
Airborne
Concentration
(mg/rn3)
Exposure at
initial Airborne
Concentration
(mg-min/m3)
LCt*
(mg-
min/m3)
Log
reduction
required
to reach
Let*
No
significant
effects
dosage (mg-
min/m3)5
Log
reduction
required to
reach no
significant
effects
VX
560
300
15
1.3
0.09
3.5
GB
560'
300
35
0.9
0.5
2.8
HD
5600
3000
900
0.5
2.0
3.2
Anthrax
Spores
0.009!
0.0054
0.00015
4
1.6
0.0000094
3.0
Chlorine
gas
681,0002
408,600
52,740
0.9
150
3.4
Estimated from scenarios in open literature
From estimated maximum concentration following Graniteville, SC release
Data from "Immune Building Systems Technology", Kowalski, WJ, 2003
Assumes 1011 spores/g
Data for VX, GB, and HD from "Compilation of Existing Chemical Agent Guidelines Table as of September 1997",
ORNL/TM-13649
6: Sarin attack by truck with sprayer from Davis et al. (2003, ISBN 0-8300-3473-1) 100 kg Sarin sprayed into 6 mph wind,
1 km down wind Sandra
7: Used same conditions as Davis but with 100 kg for VX and 1000 kg for HD [aft | NaMxial
7 i ¦
Fundamental Requirements for Airborne
Agent Knockdown & Neutralization System
Define the
Threat
Agents of Concern
Airborne
Concentrations
and Exposures
Knockdown &
Neutralization
Efficacy Requirec
Detect the
Agent Cloud
Stand off Detection
Direct Detection
Particle Detectors
We have utilized
fundamental physics and
experimental work to
determine the required
physical properties
Knockdown and
Neutralize the
Agent Cloud
Chemical Properties for
Neutralization
- Efficacy
- Solubility
- Safety and Environment
Physical Properties for
Efficient Collection
- Droplet Size
- Charge
Deployment
- Disperse Knockdown
Spray into Agent Cloud
Sandia
NaUonal
lahnulnups
-------
Betty
Physical properties of the knockdown spray droplets are important
for optimal collection of agent vapors, liquid aerosols, and particles
Particles may be collected by falling droplets
with various mechanisms
- Diffusion
- Interception
- Impaction
- Thermal effects
- Electrostatic effects
Collection efficiency may be enhanced by
certain physical properties of the droplets
- Droplet size
- Charge on the droplet
- Concentration of the droplets
- Surface tension (wetability)
Diffusion Eieetrossasie
Inertiai \ Oeposiiitn
Impawn
SlmgmlHiB*
Droplet
From Spurney, "Advances in Aerosol
Filtration"
The optimal properties of the knockdown spray parameters are
determined through modeling and experimental work
m
Santfoa
Nalionai
1 abcualnitns I
Aerosol Test Chamber for Spray Knockdown Tests
8-ft wide by 16-ft long by 8-ft high chamber divided into two 8-foot cubes
separated by an intervening wall (512 cu. ft.)
The chamber was fitted with an array of nine electrostatic spray (ESS)
nozzles (Maxcharge™ Spray Nozzle - Agricultural Manufacturing
Company, Inc.) located at the top of the test chamber
Spray droplet sizes from the nozzles are 30-80 microns In diameter
Required air pressure for each nozzle is 20-90 psi
Air consumption is 2.9-10 CFM
The liquid flow rate is 50-200 ml/min for each nozzle
Aerosol Test Chamber
ESS nozzles in the chamber
Sandia
National
-------
Betty
Instrumentation in the Sandia Aerosol Test Chamber
BioSamplers (aerosol samplers, SKC Model No. 225-9595, Operated at -10
liters per minute)
Collison Nebulizer (BGI Incorporated Model No. CN-60, used to aerosolize
chemical simulants)
Aerodynamic Particle Sizer (TSI Inc., Model 3321, used to characterize the
particle diameter of the simulants in the chamber and distinguish between vapor
and particulate)
Malvern Spraytec (Real-time Liquid Droplet Sizing system, Malvern Inc., Model
RS500, used to measure liquid droplet size distributions from the spray nozzles)
Fluidized Bed Generator (used to disperse bacterial spores into the test
chamber)
Collison Nebulizer
Aerodynamic
Particle Sizer (APS)
Control and Data
Acquisition System
Sandia
National
1 aharalnni;;;
Threat Scenario Definition
Based on a theoretical accident at a typical EDS deployment
DGM
J.001
Time (sec)
4,2" mortar shell, 3,0 Kg of HD
Source term is a liquid drop dispersion
Airborne mass concentration and drop size decrease from 3.9 to
0.22 gm/m3 and 150 to 30 micrometers in 100 seconds
~ 0.9 gm/m3 additional vapor for a total airborne concentration of
4.8 to 1.12 gni/m3
We design to mitigate this airborne source.
Sandia
National
lahnulnups
-------
Betty
Rapid Knockdown and Neutralization of Aerosolized G-Agent Simulant
1-minute Charged DF200 Spray in an unmixed environment
1 E+01
1 .E+00
§,1
E-01
S
•g 1 .E-02
CC
U
| 1 .E-03
c
o
u 1 .E-04
1 .E-05
~APS
~ Filter Mass Cone
ASKC Aerosol Samplers
x Extracted Filter Mass Coric
~
ion
4
20 40 60 80
Time (mill)
100
120
Maximum efficacy of >4 orders of magnitude reduction at 30 minutes post-spray
&and«a
National
1 aharalnni;;;
Rapid Knockdown and Neutralization of Aerosolized G-Agent Simulant
2-minute Charged DF200 Sprays, reduced air flow for Minute 2
6
1
3
S
•2 l.E-02
g l.E-03
O
CJ
~
'
f '
1
L
A
A
~
¦
¦
~
~
~ APS
Q Extracted Filter Mass Cone
A SKC Aerosol
Extracted Filter Mass Cone
Ł
A *
~
ND
NI
40 60
Time (min)
Increased neutralization rate achieved using "Staged" spray strategy
Sandia
National
lahnulnups
-------
Betty
Rapid Knockdown and Neutralization of Aerosolized G-Agent Simulant
1-minute Charged & 1-minute neutral DF200 Sprays
Reduced air flow for Minute 2
eo
s 1.E+00
OJj
s
o
s
o
u
1.E-01
1.E-02
1.E-03
1.E-04
1.E-05
1.E-06
~ APS
~ Filter Mass Cone
A SKC Aerosol
Extracted Filter Mass
Cone
-quj
¦ ¦
20 40 60 80
Time (min)
100
120
Increased neutralization rate achieved using "Staged" spray strategy
&and«a
National
1 abotalnites-
Rapid Knockdown & Neutralization of Aerosolized G- Agent Simulant
CO
S
S
3
Ł
O
c
CD
o
C
O
O
1 .E+00
1.E-01
1.E-02
1 ,E-03
1 .E-04
1 .E-05
1 .E-06
m
~APS
~ Filter Mass Cone
ASKC, Unmixed
x Extracted Filter Mass Cone
* SKC 2 min charged
• SKC 2 min charged/neutral
20 40 60 80
Time (min)
100
120
Improved knockdown & neutralization by change in spray parameters
Sandia
National
lahafalmtPR
-------
Betty
DF-200 Knockdown & Neutralization Spray
BW Agent Simulant Data
Tests were conducted against 'weaponized like' Bacillus atrophaeus spores
Spores were introduced into the chamber at a concentration of 106 log CFU/1. After 120
minutes of mixing, DF-200 spray was deployed for one minute through the ESS nozzles.
Total spray volume deployed was 2 L and the concentration of DF-200 was approximately
138 g/m3 in the chamber.
The simulant was collected by aerosol sampling and concentration in the chamber was
determined by culturing at <5, 15, and 30 minutes after the end of the spray period.
The results demonstrated a 5 log knockdown and kill of the simulant immediately after the
spray was stopped. A 5 log knockdown and kill was also observed using a 92 g/m3 spray
density and a 4 log knockdown and kill was observed using a 46 g/m3 spray density.
4—1 Minute Spray
~
~
~ T T T
T ~—~
30
60 90 120
Time, minutes
150
Results of cloud knockdown tests
using a mist of DF-200 against
Bacillus atrophaeus spores (an
anthrax simulant).
&and«a
National
1 abotalnites-
Fundamental Requirements for Airborne
Agent Knockdown & Neutralization System
Define the
Threat
Agents of Concern
Airborne
Concentrations
and Exposures
Knockdown &
Neutralization
Efficacy Required
Detect the
Agent Cloud
Stand off Detection
Direct Detection
Particle Detectors
We have developed a number of
concepts and preliminary
designs for deployment of the
knockdown and neutralization
spray formulation
Knockdown and
Neutralize the
Agent Cloud
Chemical Properties for
Neutralization
- Efficacy
- Safety and Environment
Physical Properties for
Efficient Collection
- Droplet Size
- Charge
Deployment
- Disperse Knockdown
Spray into Agent Cloud
Sandia
National
lahnulnups
-------
Betty
Potential Applications
Many applications for fundamental capability.
Potential applications for military use
• Force protection (battlefield)
• Force protection (fixed sites)
• Chemical demilitarization
• Immune building
Potential applications for civilian use
• Chemical plants
• Subways
• Nuclear plants
• High-profile buildings
• Special events
//////"
Airborne CBW Agent Knockdown & Neutralization
Subway Tunnel
Spray Array
Cleaned Gas Out
Contaminated Gas In
4)
Subway Tunnel
Sandia
National
lahnulnups
-------
Betty
Airborne CBW Agent Knockdown & Neutralization
Subway Station
Entrance / Exit
Mover
P atform
Spray Array
Spray Array
Tunnel
T racks
Tunnel
P atform
Entrance / Exit
Strategic placement of Mitigation Sprays will limit spread of contamination
Sandia
Nalionai
1 aharalnni;;;
National
lahoiJlni
• Spray density capability of new
structure based on experimental outcome
provided by smaller aerosol chamber tests
• Ideas for full-scale optimization have
been proposed
Full-Scale Prototype Mitigation Spray Safety System at
Sandia National Labs
-------
Betty
Summary of Sandia Airborne Chemical and Biological
Knockdown Effort
Sandia has successfully
demonstrated knockdown and
neutralization of airborne CBW
agent simulant releases
Various deployment scenarios
have also been developed
A prototype system has been
developed for installation at a
Chein Demil Facility
Charged spray of modified DF-200 in the
Sandia Aerosol Test Chamber during a
cloud knockdown test.
A release mitigation spray safety system will remove airborne
CBW contaminants to protect personnel, limit contamination
spread, and minimize overall remediation timelines.
Backup Slides
1
24
Sandia
1 National
U iabofalniu?&
-------
Betty
Sandia Decon Formulation (DF-200)
Component
Foam Component
(Surfactants, mild
solvents, buffers)
Peroxide (7.9
Solution)
Novel Activator
Formulation
Mix
Synergistic
formulation
(multiple
reactive
species)
Spray,
Foam,
Mist, or
Gel
Multiple Uses
Kill of BW Agents
Kill of Bio Pathogens
Neutralization of
CW Agents
Neutralization of TICs
Final peroxide concentration is -3.6%
I abqfalnrn!&
Electrostatic Spray (ESS) Nozzles
Made by Agricultural Manufacturing
Company, Inc.
Two-fluid mixing nozzle
Charges droplets by induction without
using high voltages
Recommended operating conditions are
application dependent
The ESS MaxCharge™
Spray Nozzle
Auir^v
elacfcrod*
Sandia
National
lahafalmtps-
-------
Betty
ESS nozzle characterization
Near-linear response with
respect to air flow (SLPM) and
air pressure (psig).
Volume mean particle size
(inn) as a function of various
liquid flow rates (80-200
ml/minute) and various air
pressures (20-100 psig).
We defined test spray
parameters based on nozzle
characterization and desired
performance.
ESS Nozzle Flow Calibration
Air Pressure (psig)
ESS Nozzles Done with Dl Water
and at -1500V
Air Pressure (psig)
&and«a
National
1 abcualnitns
ESS nozzle characterization
Test and characterize new ESS
nozzle design (Spring 2009)
- Vary air and liquid flows to
produce varying droplet sizes
and spray densities
- Measure droplet sizes
• Average droplet diameter
<30pm (@ 100 psi dispersion
air)
Other nozzles capable of
generating smaller droplets
may also be tested
ESS nozzle characterization (side-view) - A
close-up photo of the spray emitted from the
ESS nozzle tip (red arrow).
Sandia
National
lahnulnups
-------
Betty
Chemistry Optimization
We have optimized the DF-200 chemistry to better mitigate for
HD releases
- Increasing solubility of agent into formulation is key
Mustard (HD)
Decontaminant
HD Simulant (solution
tests)
5 Min.
60 Min.
DF-200
70.0
99.8
DF-200, modified
99.3
ND
2-Chloroethyl phenyl sulfide
-s-"X/cl
\ /
Sand»a
National
1 aharalnni;;;
Efficacy of Sandia Formulations against CW Agents
ECBC Modified Stirred Reactor, 2010
(funded by NSCMA)
Decon Reagent
CN
HD
HD in HM
GD
VX
No
Metais
Metais
No
Metais
Metals
No
Metals
Metals
No
Metals
Metals
No
Metals
Metals
DF-200
99.5
94.5
99.9
99.9
99.9
99.9
99.9
99.9
100
100
SNL Modified
#1
98.9
99.1
99.9
99.9
99.9
99.9
99.9
99.9
100
100
SNL Modified
#2
99.8
99.2
100
100
100
100
99.9
99.9
100
100
Test Conditions:
• 5Q±2 °C for 6 hours, duplicate
• Two treatment variables - with and w/out added 320 mg Fe & 1.5 mg Cu
• Volumetric loading of 1:100, (agent:reagent), stirred
• Post-reaction extraction, analyses by GC/MS
Sandis
National
lahnulnups
-------
Study of the Release of Pesticides From Building Materials
Genevieve Thouin, SAIC Canada
-------
Thouin
Study of the Release of Pesticides from Building Materials
Genevieve Thouin, Wenxing Kuang, and David Cooper
Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC Canada), Ottawa, Ontario
Ken Li and Konstantin Volchek
Environment Canada, Ottawa, Ontario
2010 US EPA Decontamination Research and Development Conference
April 13-15, 2010
¦ ^ ¦ Environment Environnement ~/j
I ' H Canada Canada CSaMSS
© 2010 Science Applications International Corporation. All rights reserved.
Project Overview arid Objectives
Page 2
Energy | Environment | National Security | Health | Critical Infrastructure
mic
-------
I ij\ y
Project Overview MjV'jKiV.
'r*Lm Ł'
Thouin
• Project CRTI-04-0018RD "Development of Standards for Chemical and
Biological Decontamination of Buildings and Structures Affected by
Terrorism"
• Project team
Chemical: EC, SAIC Canada, U.S. EPA, DRDC Suffield, RIHTOP, University
of Leeds
Biological: EC, SAIC Canada, PHAC, University of Ottawa, University of Leeds
• Objectives for chemical standards
Development of preliminary theoretical standards
• For chemical agents on equipment, surfaces, and air
For inhalation and dermal exposure
Database of existing data
Toxicity testing of target chemicals
Study of the fate and behaviour of target agents on surfaces and inside
buildings
Page 3
Energy | Environment | National Security | Health | Critical Infrastructure
Objectives of the Fate and Behaviour
Study
/
1 sjT J \
\./
exposure
exposure
by inhalation
through skin
contaminated surface
and
surrounding air
surface/air
concentration
Evaluation of transfers to skin
Toxicity studies
Desorption study
Penetration study
Development of standards
Page 4
Energy | Environment | National Security | Health | Critical Infrastructure
mic
-------
/
Test Methods for the Evaluation of the Desorption of
Pesticides from Construction Materials
Page 5
Energy | Environment | National Security | Health | Critical Infrastructure
Experimental Method
Coupons of surface materials (5 cm x 5 cm)
Spiked with known amounts of target compound
Coupons placed in 10-L Tedlar® bags
Sample bags stored at target temperature
0.1 -L to 2-L samples pumped through Tenax® tubes
Tubes analyzed using a thermodesorption unit and GC-MS
5ML
tr--" « JOblCdS
Tedlar is a registered trademark of E.I. Dupon de Nemours and Company in the United States and/or other countries.
Tenax is a registered trademark of Buchem BV Corporation in the United States and/or other countries.
Page 6
Energy | Environment | National Security | Health | Critical Infrastructure
Thermodesorption
unit
Spiked coupon
10-L bag
-------
Target compounds: pesticides
- Lindane (97%)
Carbofuran (98%)
Diazinon (neat)
Malathion (95%)
Temperatures
- 20°C
40°C
Concentrations on surfaces
0.04 mg/cm2 to 40 mg/cm2(0.4 g/m2 to
400 g/m2)
25 cm2 in 10 L (equivalent to 1 m2 in a 125-m2
room)
Surface materials
Glass
- Carpet
Ceramic tile
Vinyl tile
Painted drywall
Ceiling tile
Gases
Nitrogen
- Air
Page 7
Energy | Environment | National Security | Health | Critical Infrastructure
mic
Saturated Vapour Phases:
Theoretical Saturation Concentrations
Pesticide
Temperature
(°C)
Vapour Pressure
(Pa)
Theoretical Saturation
Concentration (jjg/m3)
Lindane
20
3.75*10-3
450
40
4.87*10-2
5,500
Carbofuran
20
5.8*10-5
5
40
1.5*10-3
130
Diazinon
20
1.2*10-2
1,500
40
1.47-10-1
17,000
Malathion
20
1.36-10-4
20
40
8.17*10-3
1,000
ATSDR, 2006; Boehnke et ai„ 1996; McGraw-Hill, 2007; WHO, 2003; and Zhang et al„ 1987
Page 8
Energy | Environment | National Security | Health | Critical Infrastructure
mic
-------
Thouin
Desorption Experiments: Test Results
Page 9
Energy | Environment | National Security | Health | Critical Infrastructure
mic
Vapour-Phase Concentration Depending on
Surface Concentration
/
Lindane from Glass at 20°C
Lindane from Carpet at 20°C
O Lindane
A -Lindane
~ PCCH
—— TWA for Lindane
Exponential Fit
O Lindane
A -Lindane
~ PCCH
— TWA for Lindane
Exponential Fit
9 .B-
o
Initial Surface Concentration of Lindane (mg-cm"
Initial Surface Concentration of Lindane (mg-cm"2)
Page 10
Energy | Environment | National Security | Health | Critical Infrastructure
mic
-------
Vapour-Phase Concentration Depending on
Surface Concentration
Carbofuran from Glass at 20°C
Carbofuran from Carpet at 20°C
Carbofuran
Carbofuran Isomer
- TWA for Carbofuran
- Exponential Fit
Carbofuran
Carbofijran Isomer
¦ TWA for Carbofuran
• Exponential Fit
10 20 30 40
Initial Surface Concentration of Carbofuran (mg-cm"2)
0 10 20 30
Initial Surface Concentration of Carbofuran (mg-cm 2
Page 11
Energy | Environment | National Security | Health | Critical Infrastructure
307T
Langmuir-Freundlich Isoterms
/
(kc
where:
Cs is the concentration of pesticide on the
surface, in mg-cm 2
C . is the maximum concentration that can be
sm
adsorbed on the surface, in mg-cm'2
k is the equilibrium constant, in m3- [Ig 1
C is the concentration of pesticide in the vapour
phase, in Jlg-m3
n is a dimensioniess empirical constant
Lindane from Carpet at 40°C
TWA for Lindane
O Total HCCH
Langmuir-Freundlich Isotherm
06
o /o
©Q
500 1000 1500 2000
Vapour Concentration (pg-m^)
Page 12
Energy | Environment | National Security | Health | Critical Infrastructure
mic
-------
Vapour-Phase Concentrations and Health
Concerns at 20°C
Pesticide
TWA
(Hg/m3)
Theoretical
Saturation
Concentration
(Hg/m3)
Vapour-Phase
Concentration
of Pesticide
(|jg/m3)
Total Vapour-
Phase
Concentration
(Hg/m3)
Lindane
500
450
300
560
Carbofuran
100
5
2,650
3,025
Diazinon
100
1,500
430
430
Malathion
1,000
20
30
30
ACGIH, 2004; NIOSH, 2006; Sanusi etal., 1999
Page 13
Energy | Environment | National Security | Health | Critical Infrastructure
Vapour-Phase Concentrations and Health
Concerns at 40°C
/ yht
<71 V/Jr/ V
Pesticide
TWA
(Hg/m3)
Theoretical
Saturation
Concentration
(Mg/m3)
Vapour-Phase
Concentration
of Pesticide
(Mg/m3)
Total Vapour-
Phase
Concentration
(Mg/m3)
Lindane
500
5,500
1,800
7,300
Carbofuran
100
130
870
920
Diazinon
100
17,000
1,650
1,650
Malathion
1,000
1,000
130
130
Page 14
Energy | Environment | National Security | Health | Critical Infrastructure
-------
Surface Concentrations Corresponding to Vapour-
Phase Concentrations Equal to TWAs
'¦) /Jt
Pesticide
TWA
((jg/m3)
Corresponding
Surface
Concentration
at 20°C
(mg/cm2)
Decon
Efficiency for
a Surface
Contaminated
with
40 mg/cm2 at
20°C
Corresponding
Surface
Concentration
at 40°C
(mg/cm2)
Decon
Efficiency for
a Surface
Contaminated
with
40 mg/cm2 at
40°C
Lindane
500
10
>50%
0.001
> 99.99%
Carbofuran
100
1
>90%
1
>90%
Diazinon
100
0.1
>99%
0.01
> 99.9%
Malathion
1,000
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
Page 15
Energy | Environment | National Security | Health | Critical Infrastructure
Vapour-Phase Concentration in a Ventilated
Building
A
Evaporation model developed by Nielsen et al. for workplace environments
Scenario
100 mg of pesticide spilled over 25 dm2 (50 cm x 50 cm)
At the centre of a 10mx10mx3m room (floor area: 100 m2; volume: 300 m3)
Ventilation rate: 15 air exchanges per day
Pesticide
TWA
((jg/m3)
Temperature
(°C)
Calculated from
Experimental
Data ((jg/m3)
Calculated from
Literature Data
(|jg/m3)
Lindane
500
20
160
40
Carbofuran
100
20
3,000
2
40
3,600
50
Diazinon
100
20
40
1,600
6,300
Malathion
1,000
20
7
6
40
130
380
Page 16
Energy | Environment | National Security | Health | Critical Infrastructure
mic
-------
Result Overview
Vapour-phase concentration
3 to 10 times greater for glass than carpet
5 to 10 times greater at 40°C than 20°C (except for
carbofuran)
Similar profiles
Importance of surface material
Release rate higher for glass and ceramic tile
Release rate lower for carpet and acoustic tile
Desorption component of the release higher for carpet
than glass (Langmuir-Freundlich isoterm)
Types and amounts of by-products varied depending
on
Temperature
Surface material
J
Quantity of pesticide in headspace
At most 0.001% of surface concentration
Release possible over a long period of time
Page 17
Energy | Environment | National Security | Health | Critical Infrastructure
mic
Result Overview
Maximum headspace concentrations
Measured concentrations and calculated concentrations were of the same order of magnitude for
lindane, diazinon, and malathion
For carbofuran, measured concentrations were 500 times greater than theoretical concentrations
Headspace concentrations
Exceeded the TWAs at 20°C and 40°C for lindane, carbofuran, and diazinon
Attained 15% of the TWA for malathion at 40°C
Model for ventilated office space
Based on Nielsen's evaporation model
Concentrations of the same order of magnitude than in experiments, except for carbofuran
Page 18
Energy | Environment | National Security | Health | Critical Infrastructure
Expected level of decontamination required
Low for malathion
High for carbofuran
Very high for diazinon
Medium to very high for lindane
-------
Thouin
Acknowledgments
Financial support from the Chemical, Biological, Radiological/Nuclear, and
Explosive Research and Technology Initiative, CRTI-04-0018RD
Page 19
Energy | Environment | National Security | Health | Critical Infrastructure
mic
-------
Assessment of Fumigants for Decontamination of Surfaces
Contaminated With Chemical Warfare Agents
Emily Snyder, EPA/ORD/NHSRC
-------
Snyder
vvEPA Assessment of Fumigants for
Decontamination of Surfaces Contaminated
United Stales
Errvironmental Protection
with Chemical Warfare Agents
US EPA Decontamination Research and Development Conference
Research Triangle Park, NC
Emily Snyder1, Joe Cappello2, Meg Stapleton2, Rich Fitzpatrick2, Bob
Ambrusko2, Jacqueline Hill2, Shannon Serre1, and Roy Sieber3
1 EPA/O RD/NHSRC
2 CUBRC
3 Eastern Research Group
r Office of Research and Development
— — -
oEPA Outline of Presentation
Why is tiiis work being done and what is being
learned from this study?
What is the goal and how do we accomplish this goal?
Results related questions
What is the optimum generation rate and exposure
time for steam fumigation?
What conditions (concentration, environmental
conditions) are optimum for decontamination using
Modified Vaporous Hydrogen Peroxide® (mVHP ®)?
Where do we go next?
1
-------
Snyder
oEPA
Significance and Impact of this Research
• Assessment of technologies performance at certain
operational conditions
How technologies can best be implemented in the field
Who uses this information:
-EPA Special Teams
-EPA On-Scene Coordinators
DOD
oEPA
Overall Experimental Approach
Technologies are investigated as a function of:
- Technology operating conditions (concentration, time,
temp, fumigant output rate or flow, RH)
- Materials (building materials - IBMs): galvanized metal
ductwork (GM), carpet (CA), ceiling tile (CT), and
decorative laminate (DL)
- Chemical agent
Two-phased approach
2
-------
Snyder
oEPA
Chemical Agents Tested in this Program
0
C~,
-c , o' ::h.„
¦j p 0
0
II
mx i ;e
CHk
F H,C
CHq
3 CH,
Sarin
Soman
0
lii
H„C \ S"
0
CH*
h,cYch3
CH,
cr ^ ^ xi
Sulfur Mustard
VX
vvEPA Experimental Approach
United Slalcs
Environmental Protection
Agency
• ~ 2 mg of CWA on coupons
Positive controls or test coupons
and procedural blanks placed in test
chamber
Relative humidity, temperature, and
air exchange rate controlled
Fumigant technology applied
Air monitoring is conducted
Coupons extracts analyzed by
GC/MS for CWA
r: \
a 1 a
3
-------
Snyder
Decontamination of Carpet Contaminated with VX using 1.5
kg/hr Steam
~ Steam Decontamination Recoveries
13 Ambient Positive Control Recoveries
180
Exposure Time - min.
99% Decontamination Efficacy at 240 minutes
SEPA
United Stales
Environmental Protection
Agency
Decontamination of Carpet Contaminated with VX using 3.0 kg/hr Steam
S
>
o
o
Ph
~ Steam Decontamination
Recoveries
¦ Ambient Positive Control
Recoveries
s
Below MDL
240
Exposure Time - min.
> 99% Decontamination Efficacy at 180 minutes
4
-------
Snyder
V>EPA Summary of Other Steam Results
United Stales
Environmental Protection
Agency
Agent
Materials
Steam Generation
Rate
Time to get
>99% Efficacy
VX
CT
1.5 and 3.0 kg/hi'
60 min
vx
GM, DL
3.0 kg/hi'
120 min
HD
GM, DL, CT,
CA
1.5 and 3.0 kg/hi'
120 min
GB
CT, CA
1.5 and 3.0 kg/hi'
60 min
TGD
GM, DL, CT,
CA
3.0 kg/hi'
60 min
Efficacy = (C0 - CF)/C0»100%
8
<>EPA Agent Remaining in Condensate
1 liter condensate collected during the test (collection
began after coupons inserted into chamber)
Steam Rate
Sample Description
kg/hr, time
HD, |ig/mL
1.5, 3.0(60, 30
HD All Materials
min)
<0.02
GB, |ig/mL
GB - CT, CA
1.5 (60 min)
5.4
GB- CT, CA
3 (30 min)
0.9
9
5
-------
Snyder
-------
Snyder
^ mVHP® Decontamination Efficacy for HD
Contaminated Carpet
Environmental Protection
Agency
Calculated from ambient positive controls
O
CO
CJ
a
w
c
o
c
Not determined
for this exposure
time
Exposure Time - min.
250 ppmv (158 ppmv actual) & 350 ppmv (219 ppmv actual)
90%
80%
¦ 100 % output - 250 ppmv
target
¦ 100 % output - 350 ppmv
conditions
¦ 100% flow
conditions
^ Decontamination Efficacy of mVHP® (250
V/EPA ppmv target) for GM Contaminated with VX
Environmental Protection
Agency
Calculated from ambient positive controls
Exposure times - min.
10 % flow = 272 ppmv actual & 100 % flow = 154 ppmv actual
7
-------
Snyder
~ 10% flow mVHP test
recoveries
~ 10% flow positive control
recoveries
SEPA Decontamination of CT Contaminated with VX by mVHP^
240
Exposure time - min.
100 % VHP concentration =154 ppmv
10 % VHP concentration =
14
261 ppmv
SEPA Decontamination of CT Contaminated with VX by mVHP®
United Stales
Environmental Protection
Agency
Exposure time - min.
100 % VHP concentration =154 ppmv
400
10 % VHP concentration =
15
261 ppmv
~ 100% flow mVHP test
recoveries
~ 100% flow positive control
recoveries
8
-------
Snyder
SEPA Environmental Conditions for CT-VX-mVHP® testing
50
~ RH, %
¦ T, °C
10% 10% Positive 100% 100% Positive Ambient Positive
Decontamination Control Test Decontamination Control Test Control Test
4>EPA Concentration of HD in Gas-Phase (0-60 min)
S™""1 During mVHP® Testing and Positive Controls -
Sampling with Tenax
IBMs
Target
ppmv
h2o2
Actual
ppmv
h2o2
STERIS
Output
Mean
Concentration and
Standard
Deviation (n=3),
mg/m3
GM, DL, CA, CT
0
0
100%
00
©
+1
«rS
GM, DL
250
157
100%
2.4 ± ND
CA, CT
250
158
100%
2.5 ± 0.3
GM, DL
350
215
100%
3.6 ± 4.E-03
CA, CT
350
219
100%
2.4 ± 0.6
ND - not determined only one sample was taken
9
-------
Snyder
SEPA Material Effects and Other Considerations
United Stales
Environmental Protection
Agency
• No visual material effects - a white residue remained
on the GM
• HD was detected in the sorbent tube samples
• HD was found on the CA and CT procedural blanks for
the 10% flow tests
18
SEPA Material Effects and Other Considerations
United Stales
Environmental Protection
Agency
• At 100 % flow difficult to reach target VHP™
concentration due to sensor/temperature issue
• Agent residence time prior to decontamination would
likely yield different efficacies
• Agent vapor/fumigant interactions differ from agent
liquid droplet/fumigant interactions
19
10
-------
Snyder
SEPA Conclusions and Future Work:
United Stales
Environmental Protection
Agency
• Conclusions:
-Steam is effective at removing surface
contamination but agent was present in condensate
(except HD)
-mVHP® is efficacious against HD surface
contamination but HD in vapor phase - longer
exposure times needed against VX
• Future work:
-Examination of steam cleaners
-Longer exposure times for mVHP® testing
20
11
-------
&EPA
United States
Environmental Protection
Agency
PRESORTED STANDARD
POSTAGE & FEES PAID
EPA
PERMIT NO. G-35
Office of Research and Development (8101R)
Washington, DC 20460
Official Business
Penalty for Private Use
$300
------- |