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U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
Catalyst for Improving the Environment
Audit Report
Chemical Safety and Hazard
Investigation Board Did Not Take
Effective Corrective Actions on
Prior Audit Recommendations
Report No. 11-P-0115
February 15, 2011
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Report Contributors: Patrick Gilbride
Gail Saunders
Anthony Grear
Vanessa Rodriguez-Moya
Ashley Sellers-Hansen
Abbreviations
CAA
COO
CSB
DHS
EPA
FEMA
FY
GAO
OIG
OMB
Clean Air Act
Chief Operating Officer
Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board
U.S. Department of Homeland Security
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
Federal Emergency Management Agency
Fiscal year
U.S. Government Accountability Office
Office of Inspector General
Office of Management and Budget
Cover photo: Damage resulting from a natural gas explosion at the ConAgra Foods facility in
Garner, North Carolina.
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At a Glance
Why We Did This Review
We initiated this audit to
determine whether the Chemical
Safety and Hazard Investigation
Board (CSB) implemented audit
recommendations from three
Offices of Inspector General
(OIGs) and the U.S. Government
Accountability Office (GAO),
and whether the corrective
actions taken were effective.
Background
In fiscal year (FY) 2000, GAO
began to report problems with
CSB's policies, management,
procedures, and overall
governance. From FYs 2002
through 2007, three OIGs
provided oversight and made
recommendations to address
governance issues. In FY 2008,
in response to a mandate in the
Joint Explanatory Statement that
accompanied the consolidated
Appropriations Act, GAO
examined how CSB responded to
GAO and OIG recommendations.
For further information,
contact our Office of
Congressional, Public Affairs and
Management at (202) 566-2391.
The full report is at:
www.epa.qov/oiq/reports/2011/
20110215-11-P-0115.pdf
Catalyst for Improving the Environment
Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation
Board Did Not Take Effective Corrective
Actions on Prior Audit Recommendations
What We Found
CSB did not take timely corrective actions to address a total of 34 audit
recommendations from three OIGs and from GAO. In four instances, it took
CSB 4 years beyond the agreed-upon corrective actions date (or report date) to
implement corrective actions. CSB's actions to address 13 recommendations
were not completely effective and require additional corrective actions, and
7 recommendations are not yet completed. CSB has not established and
implemented a management control program to evaluate and report on the
effectiveness of controls related to its program operations.
CSB's control environment and control activities do not ensure accountability.
Specifically, CSB's office directors are not accountable for achieving
individual and program initiatives leading to chemical accident prevention.
Effective control activities, including Board Orders, have not been developed
and implemented. In addition, without a clearly defined statutory mandate,
CSB will face difficulties in developing outcome-related goals for measuring
its impact on chemical accident prevention. Without effective controls, CSB is
not timely in carrying out initiatives to achieve the board's goal of chemical
accident prevention.
On September 16, 2010, CSB announced an internal reorganization, appointing
a managing director who will oversee all aspects of CSB operations. A
managing director who ensures accountability should provide for more timely
and effective resolution of audit recommendations.
What We Recommend
We recommend that the Chairman, Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation
Board, create a management control plan, take actions to fully address all
outstanding audit recommendations, and further improve upon actions taken on
previous recommendations. CSB concurred with all of our new
recommendations and developed timelines and completion dates for the
corrective actions. CSB's comments are summarized in each chapter and the
entire response is included as appendix C.
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$ L, ., I \ UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY
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| I WASHINGTON, D.C. 20460
proi^°
THE INSPECTOR GENERAL
February 15, 2011
MEMORANDUM
SUBJECT:
FROM:
Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board Did Not Take
Effective Corrective Actions on Prior Audit Recommendations
Report No. ll-P-0115
Arthur A. Elkins, Jr.
Inspector General
< '
TO:
The Honorable Rafael Moure-Eraso, Ph.D.
Chairman and Chief Executive Officer
U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board
This is our report on the actions the Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board (CSB) took
to address prior U.S. Government Accountability Office and Office of Inspector General audit
recommendations. This report represents our final position on the subjects reported. On
December 23, 2010, you provided a response to our draft report. You concurred with the findings
and recommendations and provided an action plan with milestone dates for completion.
Therefore, a response to the final report is not required. CSB should continue to track corrective
actions not yet implemented.
The estimated cost of this report, calculated by multiplying the project's staff days by the
applicable daily full cost billing rates in effect at the time, is $1,024,495.
If you or your staff have any questions regarding this report, please contact Melissa Heist,
Assistant Inspector General for Audit, at (202) 566-0899 or heist.melissa.@epa.gov; or Patrick
Gilbride, Product Line Director, at (303) 312-6969 or gilbride.patrick@epa.gov.
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Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board
Did Not Take Effective Corrective Actions on
Prior Audit Recommendations
11-P-0115
Table of C
Chapters
1 Introduction 1
Purpose 1
Background 1
Noteworthy Achievements 2
Scope and Methodology 3
2 CSB Has Not Established a Management Control Program 4
Management Control Plan Not Implemented 5
Monitoring Corrective Actions Needs Improvement 5
Conclusion 7
Recommendations 7
CSB Response and OIG Comments 8
3 CSB's Control Environment and Control Activities Do Not Facilitate
Accountability 9
CSB Can Improve Management Accountability 9
CSB's Control Activities Need Strengthening 11
Statutory Responsibility for Investigating Chemical Accidents
Remains Unclear 12
Conclusion 13
Recommendations 13
CSB Response and OIG Comments 15
Status of Recommendations and Potential Monetary Benefits 16
Appendices
A Status of Prior Audit Recommendations 18
B Details on Scope and Methodology 37
C CSB Response to Draft Report 39
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Purpose
We initiated this audit to determine whether the Chemical Safety and Hazard
Investigation Board (CSB) had implemented audit recommendations made by
three Offices of Inspector General (OIGs) - the Federal Emergency Management
Agency (FEMA), the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) - and by the U.S. Government
Accountability Office (GAO); and whether the correcti ve actions taken were
effective.
Background
CSB is an independent federal agency, created under the Clean Air Act (CAA)
Amendments of 1990 and charged with investigating industrial chemical
accidents. The act directs CSB to (1) investigate and report on the root cause or
probable cause of any accidental chemical release resulting in a fatality, serious
injury, or substantial property damage; (2) make safety recommendations to
reduce the likelihood or consequences of accidental chemical releases and
propose corrective measures; and (3) establish regulations for reporting accidental
releases.
CSB's investigations examine all
aspects of chemical accidents,
including physical causes such as
equipment failures, as well as
inadequacies in safety management
systems that define safety culture
and adherence to government
regulations. The board makes safety
recommendations to plants, industry
organizations, labor groups, and
regulatory agencies.
On July 17, 2007, an explosion and fire erupted at the Barton
Solvents facility in Valley Center, Kansas. CSB investigated
and issued a Case Study report on June 26, 2008. (CSB
photo)
CSB's authorizing statute provides
for five board members, including a
chairperson, all appointed by the
president of the United States. The
board's Chairman serves as the chief
executive officer and is responsible
for the board's administration, while
11-P-0115
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the full board is responsible for major budgeting decisions, strategic planning and
direction, general board oversight, and approval of investigation reports and
studies.
As of July 2010, there were 5 appointed board members, including the Chairman,
and a professional staff of 36. Over the past 3 years, CSB's operating budget has
increased from $9.26 million in fiscal year (FY) 2008 to $10.55 million in
FY 2010 (table 1).
Table 1: CSB's 2011 budget justification
FY 2008
FY 2009
FY 2010
FY 2011
Operating budget
(in millions)
$9.26
$10.20
$10.55a
$12.71
(requested)
Staffing
38
40
45 (projected)
56 (requested)
Source: CSB's FY 2011 budget justification.
a Excludes a one-time appropriation of $600,000 for a study on the industrial use of methyl
isocyanate by the National Academy of Sciences.
In FY 2000, GAO began to report problems with CSB's policies, management,
procedures, and overall governance. From FY 2002 through FY 2007, the FEMA,
DHS, and EPA OIGs provided oversight and made audit recommendations to
address governance issues. The EPA OIG assumed oversight responsibility in
FY 2004.
In FY 2008, in response to a mandate in the Joint Explanatory Statement that
accompanied the consolidated Appropriations Act, GAO examined how CSB
responded to GAO and FEMA, DHS, and EPA OIG audit recommendations.
A total of 34 audit recommendations were issued to CSB from FYs 2000 through
2008. The 34 audit recommendations and CSB's responses to the audit
recommendations are in appendix A.
Noteworthy Achievements
CSB issued a contract to facilitate a more thorough identification of chemical
incidents. CSB's contractor reviews the global media using key-word strings to
identify significant news pertaining to CSB's mission and provides CSB
information on chemical accidents. Since issuing the contract in FY 2008, the
number of incidents CSB has logged into its system has increased substantially,
from about 600 per year to over 1,000 per year.
CSB has developed and implemented software that has greater functionality in
tracking its safety recommendations and collecting data on chemical incidents.
Prior to FY 2008, CSB used a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet to track its incident
notification data. In FY 2008, CSB converted the spreadsheet into a sequel
database that interfaces with software that enables incident screeners and incident
screening managers to track workflows related to incidents. The software's access
11-P-0115
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controls include audit trails that allow system administrators to view all changes
to a record, and user controls to better control segregation of duties.
Scope and Methodology
We conducted this performance audit in accordance with generally accepted
government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform
the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis
for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that
the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and
conclusions based on our audit objectives.
We performed our audit work from May 2009 through November 2010. We
followed up on GAO and FEMA, DHS, and EPA OIG audit recommendations
made to CSB from FYs 2000 through 2008.
We interviewed CSB's board members and office directors to identify and discuss
the actions taken to address the audit recommendations. We obtained and
reviewed CSB's Board Orders1 developed in response to the audit
recommendations and assessed their effectiveness. We also judgmentally selected
and analyzed CSB's chemical incident data to determine whether data quality
improvements were effective. We tested and assessed CSB's internal control
structure related to ensuring effective and efficient operations and compliance
with applicable laws and regulations.
For additional details on our scope and methodology, see appendix B.
1 Board Orders are CSB's Policies and Procedures.
11-P-0115
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Chapter 2
CSB Has Not Established a
Management Control Program
CSB did not take timely corrective actions to address audit recommendations
from the FEMA, DHS, and EPA OIGs and from GAO. In four instances, it took
CSB 4 years beyond the agreed-upon corrective actions date (or report date) to
implement corrective actions. In addition, CSB's actions to address 13
recommendations were not completely effective, and actions to address 7
recommendations are ongoing. CSB has not established and implemented a
management control program to evaluate and report on the effectiveness of
controls related to its program operations. Office of Management and Budget
(OMB) Circular A-123, Management's Responsibility for Internal Control,
directs management to establish and maintain internal controls to achieve the
objectives of effective and efficient operations. As a result of not having an
effective management control program, 13 of 34 prior audit recommendations
require additional corrective actions and 7 recommendations have not been
addressed and remain open.
According to OMB Circular A-123 and GAO's Standards for Internal Control in
the Federal Government, management control programs should encompass
GAO's five standards of internal control, as shown in table 2. While we did not
audit CSB's internal control program, delays in responding to prior audit
recommendations indicate weaknesses in its internal control structure. We found
that CSB has not effectively implemented internal control standards 1,3, and 5.
Table 2: GAO's Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government
1 Control
Environment
This standard requires organizations to establish and maintain an environment that
sets a positive and supportive attitude toward internal control.
2 Risk Assessment
A precondition to risk assessment is the establishment of clear, consistent agency
objectives. The internal control risk assessment process includes assessing risks the
agency faces from both internal and external sources. Management should
comprehensively identify risks and should consider all significant interactions between
the entity and other parties, as well as internal factors at both entity and activity levels.
3 Control Activities
These are the policies, procedures, techniques, and mechanisms that implement
management's direction toward achievement of goals. Internal control activities help
ensure that management's directives are carried out.
4 Information and
Communications
This standard includes data and information (performance and financial) to determine
whether the organization is meeting its goals and objectives and maintaining
accountability over resources.
5 Monitoring
Internal control monitoring should assess the quality of performance overtime and
ensure that findings of audits and other reviews are promptly resolved.
Source: OIG summary of GAO's Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government,
GAO/AIMD-OO-21.3.1, November 1999.
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Controls are a major part of managing an organization and are necessary for CSB
to achieve its mission and program results through improved accountability. By
implementing an effective management control program that fully incorporates
GAO's standards of internal control, CSB should be reasonably assured that
operations are effectively and efficiently carried out and management is in
compliance with applicable laws and regulations.
Management Control Plan Not Implemented
In FY 2002, the FEMA OIG recommended that CSB's acting chief operating
officer (COO) develop a written strategy for identifying, prioritizing, and
improving the board's system of management controls. A draft written strategy
was developed on May 30, 2002, and transmitted to the FEMA OIG. However,
the draft was never finalized and no additional action was taken to address the
audit recommendation.
In CSB's FY 2009 performance and accountability report, CSB's Chairman
acknowledged that the Federal Managers' Financial Integrity Act requires an
annual evaluation of its management controls to identify any material weaknesses.
The Chairman further acknowledged that the requirement applies to all CSB
programs and administrative functions. However, according to CSB, the
assurance statement in its performance and accountability report addresses
controls over CSB's financial management operations and not the organization's
mission-related program operations. CSB has not developed and implemented
complete and effective controls over its program operations.
Based on our assessment of CSB's actions to address the FEMA OIG's audit
recommendation, we determined that CSB needs to develop and implement a
management control plan to address prior audit recommendations and to improve
the board's system of management controls.
Monitoring Corrective Actions Needs Improvement
CSB did not promptly resolve some prior audit recommendations. GAO's
Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government states that monitoring
the effectiveness of internal controls should occur in the normal course of
business to ensure that the findings of audits are promptly resolved. In addition,
OMB Circular A-50, Audit Follow-up, specifies that agencies shall assign a high
priority to the resolution of audit recommendations and to implementing
corrective actions.
While CSB took actions to address 27 of the 34 prior audit recommendations,
1 recommendation was implemented over 8 years after CSB's planned corrective
actions date (or report date) and 3 are ongoing over 4 years after the
recommendations were issued (see table 3).
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Table 3: Corrective actions delayed over 4 years
Prior Audit Recommendations
Over
4 years
Over
8 years
GAO, Chemical Safety Board: Improved Policies and Additional Oversight Are
Needed, GAO/RCED-OO-192, July 1, 2000
"We recommend that the Board develop clear policies and
procedures on potential conflicts of interest and consider other
policies and procedures that would further promote investigative
impartiality and thoroughness..."
[Corrective actions implemented]
X
FEMA OIG, Issues Regarding Management Accountability, Control, and Direction
Have Not Been Resolved, IC-01-02, March 1, 2002
"We recommend that the Chief Operating Officer develop and
implement a system that links strategic planning to resource
allocation decisions and measures performance in a way that
balances productivity and costs with desired outcomes."
[Corrective actions ongoing]
X
"We recommend that the Acting Chief Operating Officer develop
a written strategy for identifying, prioritizing, and improving the
agency's system of management controls...."
[Corrective actions ongoing]
X
DHS OIG, A Report on the Continuing Development of the U.S. Chemical Safety
and Hazard Investigation Board, OIG-04-04, 2004, January 7, 2004
"Establish a plan linking measurement data and strategic
improvements that enables the CSB to assess and enhance its
impact on chemical accident prevention."
[Corrective actions ongoing]
X
Source: GAO, FEMA OIG, and DHS OIG audit reports. See appendix A.
Although the corrective actions dates have passed, actions are still ongoing to
address the remaining seven audit recommendations. Three of the seven open
recommendations have been open for over 4 years. In addition to the 7 ongoing
audit recommendations, CSB could benefit from improvements to 13 of the 27
previously closed audit recommendations (appendix A, audit recommendations 4,
7, 12, 13, 14, 15, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 27, and 33).
The absence of an environment that sets a positive and supportive attitude toward
internal control contributed to delays in actions to improve CSB's program
performance. Had CSB implemented FEMA's 2002 audit recommendation to
develop and implement a strategy to improve its management control system,
many of CSB's corrective actions delays could have been prevented.
For example, in FY 2004, the DHS OIG recommended that CSB develop a plan to
describe and address the investigative gap. The investigative gap is the difference
between the number of chemical accidents within CSB's jurisdiction and the
number CSB investigates. The DHS OIG further recommended that CSB define
what constitutes a chemical accident within CSB's purview and publish a
regulation that outlines how CSB will receive information on these accidents as
11-P-0115
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required by the CAA Amendments of 1990. In FY 2008, GAO found that CSB
had not fully responded to the DHS OIG audit recommendation to address its
investigative gap and had not published a regulation for reporting accidental
releases. Therefore, GAO recommended that CSB's Chairman develop a plan to
address the investigative gap and request the necessary resources from Congress
to meet CSB's statutory language or seek amendment to its statutory mandate.
CSB's corrective actions to address the remaining seven audit recommendations
are still ongoing. On November 5, 2009, over 4 years after the DHS OIG raised
the issue regarding CSB's statutory mandate, and over a year after GAO
recommended CSB seek clarification from Congress, CSB requested clarification
from Congress on its statutory mandate. CSB is currently awaiting this
clarification so that it can properly identify and address its investigative gap.
In June 2009, CSB published a notice of rulemaking in the Federal Register to
obtain comments on the best way to proceed with implementing its regulatory
reporting requirement. CSB is in the process of considering the comments in
preparation for drafting a proposed rule. Although CSB has taken actions that
should lead to full implementation of these audit recommendations, it has taken
over 4 years from the initial audit recommendation to initiate actions that will
bring them into full compliance with the requirements and the intent of the CAA
Amendments.
Conclusion
CSB's corrective actions to address prior audit recommendations have not
effectively corrected all of the conditions identified by auditors. Problems
identified in prior audits persist because CSB does not have an effective
management control program. CSB should develop and implement a management
control plan to address prior audit recommendations in a timely manner and to
improve the board's system of management controls. Although CSB has taken
actions that should lead to full implementation of prior audit recommendations, in
some cases it has taken over 4 years beyond CSB's milestones to complete
corrective actions.
Recommendations
We recommend that the Chairman, Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation
Board:
1. Develop and implement a management control plan that documents and
addresses the five internal control standards in accordance with OMB
Circular A-123 and GAO's Standards for Internal Controls in the Federal
Government. The plan should include an effective monitoring system to
track corrective actions to address and implement audit recommendations.
The plan is to include:
11-P-0115
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a. A database to track all prior audit recommendations, planned
milestone completion dates, and corrective actions taken.
b. Procedures for conducting periodic internal control reviews and
properly documenting those reviews, including verifying and
ensuring that audit recommendations are resolved promptly.
2. Develop and publish a regulation requiring persons to report chemical
accidents, as required by the CAA.
3. Follow up with Congress on the CSB request for clarification of its
statutory mandate. Upon receipt of the response, develop a plan to
describe and address the investigative gap, address prior audit
recommendations and request the necessary resources to meet CSB's
statutory mandate.
CSB Response and OIG Comments
CSB concurred with all OIG recommendations. We evaluated CSB's planned
actions for this recommendation and concluded that, if implemented according to
CSB's plan, the actions should correct the concerns identified.
In response to recommendation 1, CSB indicated its intention to develop a
management control plan by February 28, 2011, as an initiative in its FY 2011
action plan.
In response to recommendation 2, CSB indicated its intention to issue a proposed
rule on accident reporting by September 30, 2011, as an initiative in its FY 2011
action plan.
In response to recommendation 3, CSB indicated its intention to transmit a formal
package of suggested legislative improvements to CSB's congressional
authorizing committee by April 30, 2011, as an initiative in its FY 2011 action
plan. The package will include suggested language to clarify the statutory
mandate to investigate. CSB noted that it is not in a position to guarantee a
congressional response as indicated in our recommendation.
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Chapter 3
CSB's Control Environment and Control Activities
Do Not Facilitate Accountability
CSB's control environment and control activities do not ensure accountability.
Specifically, CSB's office directors are not accountable for achieving individual
and program initiatives leading to chemical accident prevention. Effective control
activities, including Board Orders, have not been developed and implemented. In
addition, without a clearly defined statutory mandate, CSB will face difficulties in
developing outcome-related goals for measuring its impact on chemical accident
prevention. According to OMB Circular A-123, Management's Responsibility for
Internal Controls, a good internal control environment includes a management
structure that helps ensure accountability for results. Without effective controls,
CSB is not timely in carrying out initiatives to achieve the board's goal of
chemical accident prevention.
CSB Can Improve Management Accountability
Three of CSB's prior audit recommendations pertained to creating an
organizational structure that helps ensure accountability for results, including the
need for a COO (also referred to as lead management official). The COO concept
is consistent with the governance principle2 that there is a single person within
agencies responsible for the successful implementation of functional management
and business transformation. The COO serves as a bridge between the Chairman
of the board, functional chiefs, and mission-focused executives. The COO
provides leadership and vision, bringing greater integration and increased
attention to the board's management functions, which enables employees to
accomplish their mission more effectively and efficiently. Governed by a term-
appointed board, CSB should have an executive succession and transition
planning strategy that ensures a sustained commitment and continuity of
leadership as individual leaders arrive, depart, or serve in acting capacities.
In 2002, the FEMA OIG recommended that the board delegate the authority to
effectively manage the day-to-day operations of CSB to the COO. The FEMA
OIG further recommended that the COO develop and implement a system that
links strategic planning with resource allocation decisions and measures
performance in a way that balances productivity and costs with desired outcomes.
CSB agreed with the audit recommendation and stated that the COO was taking
the lead to develop a system linking strategic planning, resource allocations, and
measuring performance.
2 For additional information, see GAO, Organizational Transformation: Implementing Chief Operating officer/Chief
Management Officer positions in Federal Agencies, GAO-08-34, November 2007.
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In FY 2004, the COO left the organization and the chairperson at that time chose
not to fill the vacancy. CSB office directors assumed the COO's duties. We
interviewed four of CSB's five office directors and found that when individual or
program initiatives are not met, they are added to the following fiscal year's
annual action plan. We also reviewed CSB's annual action plans and found that
many of CSB's annual initiatives toward accomplishing program goals remain on
its annual action plans for up to 6 years (see table 4).
Table 4: Program initiatives carried forward from fiscal year to fiscal year
INITIATIVES
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
(X indicates initiative is outstanding)
GOAL 1
Update investigative protocol.
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
Revise incident selection criteria.
X
X
Develop a program for collecting feedback from end
users of our products and incorporating the results
into the protocol.
X
X
Obtain security clearances for Investigations and
Safety Programs investigators.
X
X
Conduct investigative training including protocol,
core competencies, and presentations by safety
experts.
X
X
X
GOAL 2
Develop and implement targeted prevention plans
for new and completed investigations aimed at
ensuring adoption and strategic dissemination of
recommendations and promoting their
implementation.
X
X
GOAL 3
Establish a comprehensive human resources
program that incorporates: training and
development for all staff; incentives and awards;
diversity awareness; performance management;
human capital scorecard; and timely recruitment
and hiring.
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
Complete a long-term strategic space (physical
infrastructure) plan.
X
X
X
X
Develop board order on roles and responsibilities
for board members.
X
X
X
Develop and implement continuity of operations
plan.
X
X
X
X
GOAL 4
Develop and implement outreach plans, including
video production, for each CSB investigation/study.
X
X
X
GOAL 5
Implement Homeland Security Presidential Directive
12, Policy for a Common Identification Standard for
Federal Employees and Contractors.
X
X
X
Develop foreign travel policy.
X
X
Source: CSB's annual action plans for FYs 2003-2009.
In 2008, GAO recommended that CSB consider reinstating the COO position with
responsibility for establishing performance goals, holding program managers
accountable for meeting those goals, and demonstrating improvement in the
board's ability to meet its statutory mandates over time. GAO further
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recommended that the Chairman develop a plan to address the investigative gap
and request the necessary resources from Congress to meet its statutory mandate
or seek an amendment to its statutory mandate. CSB agreed that it was
appropriate to consider establishing a senior executive position to oversee
important mission responsibilities. To improve the efficiency of CSB's
operations, on September 16, 2010, the Chairman announced an internal
reorganization appointing a managing director who will oversee all aspects of
CSB operations.
Additionally, in FY 2008, GAO recommended that CSB use the strategic
management of human capital portion of the President's Management Agenda to
provide criteria for developing a comprehensive human capital plan, including
specific objectives and performance measures to improve accountability for
results. CSB agreed and included the development of a human capital plan in its
2009 action plan. Work to finalize the plan and gain the board's approval
continues.
CSB's Control Activities Need Strengthening
Control activities are the policies, procedures, techniques, and mechanisms that
enforce management directives. They are integral to an entity's ability to plan,
implement, review, and account for government resources.
We found that CSB's Board Orders are not updated or revised in a timely manner.
While CSB has changed a number of processes and practices to address prior
audit recommendations, it has not documented those changes in its Board Orders
(appendix A, audit recommendations 12, 15, 18, 19, 20, and 31). We noted that
14 of the 34 audit recommendations required the development of, or revisions to,
existing CSB Board Orders. Of those 14, 5 previously closed audit
recommendations require additional corrective actions due to subsequent events,
and 1 audit recommendation remains open. See appendix A.
CSB should strengthen controls to ensure that corrective actions are consistently
implemented throughout the organization. For example, we selected 18 of CSB's
70 completed and ongoing investigations from 1998 to 2009 to assess various
aspects of the investigative process, including data quality. CSB incorrectly
scored 2 of the 18 incidents in our sample. These scores provide the basis for
deployment decisions. For one incident, we were unable to determine whether it
was scored for investigative purposes and, for the other, CSB did not document
fatalities, which is one of CSB's investigative scoring factors. However, both
incidents did result in an investigation by CSB. CSB officials stated that data
quality control reviews are now in place and will catch these types of
inaccuracies. However, without official internal written guidance, such as the
scope and frequency of CSB's quality control reviews and documented results,
CSB has no assurance that these reviews are occurring or that data quality is
improving.
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CSB has recognized the importance of documenting internal control activities by
establishing board orders that outline processes and procedures. However, CSB
explained that due to limited resources, developing and updating Board Orders is
not a high priority. CSB further stated that developing and updating policies takes
a great amount of time and resources. We understand that developing and
updating internal Board Orders requires time and resources. However, to ensure
that the board's control objectives are met in an effective and efficient manner,
CSB should ensure its Board Orders are clearly documented and accurately reflect
current processes and practices.
Statutory Responsibility for Investigating Accidents Remains Unclear
In 2004, the DHS OIG recommended that CSB develop a plan to describe and
address the "investigative gap." The investigative gap is the difference between
the number of accidents CSB investigates and the accidents that meet statutory
criteria triggering CSB's responsibility to investigate. The DHS OIG also
recommended that CSB define what constitutes a chemical accident within the
CSB's purview and publish a regulation that outlines how CSB will receive
information on these accidents. CSB concurred with the intent of the audit
recommendations. CSB cited a lack of resources to investigate more than a small
percentage of the accidents that fall within its legal jurisdiction and believed it
had responded to its understanding of current congressional intent. CSB stated
that given the questions concerning the benefits and potential impacts of such a
regulation, it needed to seek additional guidance from OMB and Congress before
it committed to a long-term regulatory plan of action. CSB responded that it
would work with Congress to clarify the issue of CSB's statutory mandate as
suggested by GAO. In a letter dated November 5, 2009, CSB requested that
Congress clarify its statutory mandate as it relates to investigating chemical
accidents. To date, there has been no response from Congress.
OMB Circular A-123 instructs agencies to design a management structure that
helps ensure accountability for results as they develop and execute strategies for
implementing agency programs and operations. Without clarity on its statutory
mandate, CSB cannot develop goals representative of its mandate, justify the
resources necessary to achieve them, and subsequently measure its progress
toward meeting them.
Congress enacted the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 to
increase public confidence in the federal government by systematically holding
federal agencies accountable for achieving program results. The Act requires
agencies to have "general goals and objectives, including outcome-related goals
and objectives, for the major functions and operations of the agency." CSB will
encounter difficulties in developing outcome-related goals and objectives for
measuring impacts on chemical accident prevention until it has a clear
understanding of its statutory mandate.
11-P-0115
12
-------
CSB could use logic modeling to link its resources, investigative activities, and
program accomplishments. Logic modeling is a tool that describes logical
linkages among program resources, activities, outputs, and outcomes (see
figure 1). Once a program has been described in terms of the logic model, critical
measures of performance can be identified. Logic modeling could provide CSB
and its stakeholders with an understanding of the resources invested, activities
undertaken, and results achieved.
Figure 1: Elements of a logic model
INPUTS
OUTPUTS
What we
What we
Who we
Invest
Do
Reach
• Time
• Workshops
• Customers
• Money
• Publications
• Participants
• Partners
• Field Days
• Equipment
• Equipment
• Facilities
Demonstratior
OUTCOMES
Short
Medium
Long
Change in:
• Knowledge
• Skills
• Attitude
• Motivation
• Awareness
Change in:
• Behaviors
• Practices
• Policies
• Procedures
Change in:
• Environment
• Social
Conditions
• Economic
Conditions
• Political
Conditions
:z
External Influences, Environmental, Related Programs
Source: Paul F. McCawley, associate director, University of Idaho Extension.
Conclusion
CSB should institute an organizational structure that ensures accountability for
results. According to CSB, Board Orders are not established or updated because
their establishment is not a high priority and CSB has limited resources. The
appointment of a managing director, with responsibility for managing CSB
operations, could help ensure that weaknesses in management controls are
appropriately remedied. In addition, an effective control environment would put
CSB on course for developing measurable outcome goals and metrics to measure
the effect of its efforts on preventing chemical accidents.
Recommendations
We recommend that the Chairman, Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation
Board:
4. Ensure that the responsibilities of the managing director include:
a. Establishing performance goals, holding program managers
accountable for meeting those goals, and demonstrating
11-P-0115
13
-------
improvement in the board's ability to meet it statutory mandates
over time, as recommended by the GAO.
b. Developing and implementing an executive succession and
transition planning strategy that ensures a sustained commitment
and continuity of leadership operations.
5. Develop and implement a system for periodic reviews of Board Orders to
ensure they remain updated (i.e., effective date of the policy and scheduled
review date) and include the requirement for such a system in the
management control plan.
6. Take corrective actions that will satisfy prior audit recommendations by
updating and formalizing Board Orders that are essential to facilitate and
manage effective and efficient control activities. Specifically, update:
a. Board Order 036, "Incident Selection Process," to reflect current
changes, such as its data sources, changes due to technology
improvements, and the incident selection process decision-making
flowchart, to improve the incident screening and deployment
decision-making process. In addition, formalize the Incident
Screeners Guide (appendix A, audit recommendation 17, 18, 19,
20, and 31).
b. Board Order 040, "Investigation Protocol," to govern employees
retaining memberships in societies or organizations to which the
CSB issues recommendations (appendix A, audit recommendation
21).
c. Board Order 027, "Roles, Responsibilities, and Standards of
Conduct in Procurement Activities," to reflect current procurement
practices and processes to ensure consistency in the procurement
process (appendix A, audit recommendation 7).
d. Board Order 022, "Recommendation Program," to include new
practices adopted for following up on safety recommendations, to
include a quality review program to ensure timely followup on
closed safety recommendations (appendix A, audit
recommendations 12 and 15).
e. Board Order 028, "Executive Administrative Functions of the
Board," to document the role and responsibility of the managing
director position.
7. Finalize and issue the human capital plan currently under development.
11-P-0115
14
-------
CSB Response and OIG Comments
CSB concurred with all OIG recommendations.
In response to recommendation 4, CSB indicated its intention to review the
managing director's position description and make any necessary modifications to
ensure the position description includes the responsibilities recommended by
March 31, 2011.
In response to recommendation 5, CSB indicated its intention to develop a system
for periodic reviews of Board Orders and include the requirement for such a
review in the management control plan by February 28, 2011.
In response to recommendation 6, CSB indicated its intention to satisfy prior audit
recommendations by updating and formalizing Board Orders that are essential to
facilitate and manage effective and efficient control activities, specifically:
a. Update Board Order 036 by March 31, 2011, as an initiative in its
FY 2011 action plan.
b. Update Board Order 40 to address employee participation and
membership in professional associations by September 30, 2011. In
addition, CSB will develop a Board Order specifically addressing
memberships and organizational conflicts of interest by March 31,
2011, as an initiative in its FY 2011 action plan.
c. Improve the procurement program as an initiative in the FY 2011
action plan. As part of this initiative, CSB will update Board Order
027 as appropriate by March 31, 2011.
d. Board Order 022, "Recommendation Program," is currently under
review and CSB will consider including a quality review program to
ensure timely followup on safety recommendations by September 30,
2011. CSB will also update the Recommendations Office "Standards
of Practice" document and expect that the Board Order will contain
general guidance and the Standards of Practice will include detailed
procedures.
e. Review Board Order 028 and update it as appropriate to reflect the role
and responsibility of the managing director position by September 30,
2011.
In response to recommendation 7, CSB indicated that updating and approving the
human capital plan by January 31, 2011, is an initiative in its FY 2011 action
plan.
11-P-0115 15
-------
Status of Recommendations and
Potential Monetary Benefits
RECOMMENDATIONS
POTENTIAL MONETARY
BENEFITS (In $000s)
Planned
Rec.
Page
Completion
Claimed
Ag reed-To
No.
No.
Subject
Status1
Action Official
Date
Amount
Amount
Develop and implement a management control
plan that documents and addresses the five
internal control standards in accordance with OMB
Circular A-123 and GAO's Standards for Internal
Controls in the Federal Government. The plan
should include an effective monitoring system to
track corrective actions to address and implement
audit recommendations. The plan is to include:
a. A database to track all prior audit
recommendations, planned milestone
completion dates, and corrective actions taken.
b. Procedures for conducting periodic internal
control reviews and properly documenting
those reviews, including verifying and ensuring
that audit recommendations are resolved
promptly.
Develop and publish a regulation requiring persons
to report chemical accidents, as required by the
CAA.
Follow up with Congress on the CSB request for
clarification of its statutory mandate. Upon receipt
of the response, develop a plan to describe and
address the investigative gap, address prior audit
recommendations (appendix A, audit
recommendations 8,13,14,16, 29, 32, and 34),
and request the necessary resources to meet
CSB's statutory mandate.
Chairman, Chemical
Safety and Hazard
Investigation Board
Chairman, Chemical
Safety and Hazard
Investigation Board
Chairman, Chemical
Safety and Hazard
Investigation Board
02/28/11
09/30/11
04/30/11
4 13 Ensure that the responsibilities of the managing O Chairman, Chemical 03/31/11
director include: Safety and Hazard
a. Establishing performance goals, holding Investigation Board
program managers accountable for meeting
those goals, and demonstrating improvement in
the board's ability to meet it statutory mandates
over time, as recommended by the GAO.
b. Developing and implementing an executive
succession and transition planning strategy that
ensures a sustained commitment and continuity
of leadership operations.
5 14 Develop and implement a system for periodic O Chairman, Chemical 02/28/11
reviews of Board Orders to ensure they remain Safety and Hazard
updated (i.e., effective date of the policy and Investigation Board
scheduled review date) and include the
requirement for such a system in the management
control plan.
11-P-0115
16
-------
RECOMMENDATIONS
POTENTIAL MONETARY
BENEFITS (In $000s)
Rec.
No.
Page
No.
Subject
Status1
Action Official
Planned
Completion
Date
Claimed
Amount
Ag reed-To
Amount
14 Take corrective actions that will satisfy prior audit
recommendations by updating and formalizing
Board Orders that are essential to facilitate and
manage effective and efficient control activities.
Specifically, update:
a. Board Order 036, Incident Selection Process,"
to reflect current changes, such as its data
sources, changes due to technology
improvements, and the incident selection
process decision-making flowchart, to improve
the incident screening and deployment
decision-making process. In addition, formalize
the Incident Screeners Guide (appendix A,
audit recommendation 17,18,19, 20, and 31).
b. Board Order 040, Investigation Protocol," to
govern employee's retaining memberships in
societies or organizations to which the CSB
issue recommendations (appendix A, audit
recommendation 21).
c. Board Order 027, "Roles, Responsibilities, and
Standards of Conduct in Procurement
Activities," to reflect current procurement
practices and processes to ensure consistency
in the procurement process (appendix A, audit
recommendation 7).
d. Board Order 022, "Recommendation Program,"
to include new practices adopted for following
up on safety recommendations, to include a
quality review program to ensure timely
followup on closed safety recommendations
(appendix A, audit recommendations 12
and 15).
e. Board Order 028, "Executive Administrative
Functions of the Board," to document the role
and responsibility of the managing director
position.
14 Finalize and issue the human capital plan currently
under development.
Chairman, Chemical
Safety and Hazard
Investigation Board
03/31/11
09/30/11
03/31/11
09/30/11
Chairman, Chemical
Safety and Hazard
Investigation Board
09/30/11
01/31/11*
1 O = recommendation is open with agreed-to corrective actions pending
C = recommendation is closed with all agreed-to actions completed
U = recommendation is undecided with resolution efforts in progress
Although the milestone for Recommendation 7 has passed, CSB has not provided the OIG with the documentation needed to verify implementation of the
recommendation.
11-P-0115 17
-------
Status of Prior Audit Recommendations
Appendix A
AUDIT RECOMMENDATION
CSB RESPONSE
(From referenced audit
reports)
CSB ACTIONS TAKEN
Completed
Not
Completed
Completed but
Additional
Improvements
Needed
ADDITIONAL
IMPROVEMENTS
NEEDED
GAO, Chemical Safety Board - Improved Policies and Additional Oversight Are Needed, GAO/RCED-OO-192, July 1,2000
1
We recommend that the Board develop
and implement clear policies and
procedures on potential conflicts of
interest. In addition, consider other
policies and procedures that would
further promote investigative impartiality
and thoroughness, such as ensuring
substantive disagreements among
investigative team members are
appropriately identified and addressed,
reporting minority views of Board
members in investigative reports,
handling of requests for reconsideration
of aspects of issued reports, and
external peer review.
As we informed Congress in December
1999, as part of the ongoing endeavor to
improve our investigation policies, the
CSB will continue to refine and improve
our investigation protocol this fiscal year.
We will consider the additional policies
and procedures you identified for
ensuring impartiality and thoroughness
in our investigations as part of this effort.
We note that although we have not had
written policies and procedures on the
items you identified, all three of the
CSB's investigation reports have been
highly praised for their impartiality and
thoroughness.
In September 2009, CSB created
an "Investigation Product Review
Verification and Certification"
checklist, which considers and
resolves comments from internal
staff on investigative reports.
Additionally, Board Order 001,
"Board Quorum and Voting,"
addresses dissenting statements of
board members.
X
2
To provide the Board with the benefits
of independent institutional oversight
and to protect the government's
financial interests, we recommend that
the Board develop an agreement with
an existing Office of Inspector General,
giving that office the authority to
investigate the Board's operations and
programs, monitor agency responses to
its recommendations, report to the
Board and the Congress about
weaknesses and deficiencies, and
provide a hotline to report instances of
suspected fraud, waste, or abuse. We
further recommend that the Board notify
the Congress in the event that it is
unable to negotiate an agreement for
these services with an existing inspector
general.
We agree with your recommendation. In
fact, as you reported, we have sought
assistance from the Offices of Inspector
General for the Department of Energy
and the Treasury. Although those
attempts were unsuccessful, we will
continue to seek assistance from an
existing Office of Inspector General. We
note that as an interim step, we have
posted information on the General
Accounting Office's Fraud NET in
common areas at the CSB so that
employees can easily report allegations
of fraud, waste, and abuse, or
mismanagement of federal funds to an
independent entity.
EPA OIG has oversight authority
for CSB. CSB provided EPA OIG
with $300,000 for FY 2009.
X
11-P-0115
18
-------
AUDIT RECOMMENDATION
CSB RESPONSE
(From referenced audit
reports)
CSB ACTIONS TAKEN
Completed
Not
Completed
Completed but
Additional
Improvements
Needed
ADDITIONAL
IMPROVEMENTS
NEEDED
FEMA OIG, U.S. Chemical Safety Board-Issues Regarding Management Accountability, Control and Direction Have Not Been Resolved, IC-01-02, March 2002
3
We recommend that the Board, in the
absence of a Chairperson, establish the
necessary protocol to assign to one
Board member on an interim basis
executive and administrative functions,
including the authority to appoint and
supervise the staff, distribute business
among the agency's personnel and
administrative units, and control the
preparation of the agency's budget and
the expenditure of funds. The CSB also
seek specific guidance from the Office of
Legal Counsel (OLC) concerning the
permissibility of designating a single
member of the Board to be responsible
for the executive and administrative
functions during the period that the
chairmanship is vacant. CSB should also
consider seeking legislation that would
definitively resolve this crucial issue.
CSB agrees with the recommendation
and plans to seek an opinion from the
OLC on the legality of appointing an
acting Chairperson.
In its Letter Opinion dated April
2002, the CSB Office of Legal
Counsel concluded that, "Although
the CSB may not name an Acting
Chairperson, it may delegate
administrative and executive
authority to a single member while
the position of chairperson is
vacant." CSB created Board Order
003, entitled "Interim Operating
Protocol During a Vacancy in trie
Position of Chairperson," dated
March 2000 and amended October
2007.
X
4
We recommend that the Board delegate
to the Chief Operating Officer (COO)
authority to effectively manage the day-
to-day operations of the CSB. The
delegation should be consistent with the
duties set forth in the COO's position
description.
The Board provided justification for
some of the specific administrative items
over which it retained control, but it also
acknowledged "over investment" in
administrative affairs. To correct the
situation the CSB intends to codify a
broad delegation of authority to the COO
via an internal Board Order, which will
be drafted by April 30, 2002.
CSB provided the 2002 COO
position description verifying that
the position description authorized
the COO to manage the day-to-day
operations of CSB. The COO left
CSB in FY 2004 and the former
chairperson chose not to fill the
position. CSB developed Board
Order 028, "Executive
Administrative Functions of the
Board," dated August 2002
(revised August 2006). On
September 16, 2010, CSB
announced an internal
reorganization appointing a
Managing Director who will oversee
all aspects of CSB operations.
X
Ensure the managing
director's responsibili-
ties include establishing
performance goals,
holding program
managers accountable
for meeting those goals,
and demonstrating
improvement in CSB's
ability to meet statutory
mandates over time, as
recommended by GAO;
and developing and
implementing an
executive succession
and transition planning
strategy that ensures a
sustained commitment
and continuity of
leadership operations.
11-P-0115
19
-------
AUDIT RECOMMENDATION
CSB RESPONSE
(From referenced audit
reports)
CSB ACTIONS TAKEN
Completed
Not
Completed
Completed but
Additional
Improvements
Needed
ADDITIONAL
IMPROVEMENTS
NEEDED
5
We recommend that the Acting Chief
Operating Officer develop a written
strategy for identifying, prioritizing, and
improving the agency s system of
management controls. Particular
attention should be paid to establishing
accountability mechanisms, including
separation of duties.
The CSB agrees to develop a strategy
to improve management controls and to
create a management council below the
Board level to oversee operations.
A draft written strategy (dated
May 30, 2002) was developed and
transmitted to the FEMA OIG,
however, the draft was never
finalized and no additional actions
were taken to address this audit
recommendation. No mechanisms
are in place to link strategic
planning and accountability.
X
6
We recommend that the Board publish
regulations that comply with the
requirements of the' Government in the
Sunshine Act."
The CSB agreed to publish a Sunshine
Act regulation by May 1, 2002. In the
meantime, the agency plans to establish
a FOIA (Freedom of Information Act)
reading room and to implement an
interim Sunshine Act Compliance
program.
CSB's rules implementing the
Government in the Sunshine Act
were published in the Federal
Register, Vol. 67, No. 97, May 20,
2002, Rules and Regulation.
X
7
We recommend that the Board revise
policies and procedures to reduce
Board member involvement in the
soliciting and awarding of contracts.
Such measures should include vesting
administrative aspects of the
procurement process in the Acting COO
and raising the minimum procurement
amount requiring Board approval.
The CSB agreed to make appropriate
revisions to policies and procedures by
May 31, 2002, to reduce Board Member
involvement in the soliciting and
awarding of contracts. Key revisions will
include vesting administrative aspects of
the procurement process in the COO
and limiting Board member involvement
in the procurement process to the final
approval of goods or services valued at
$50,000 or more. The CSB will also
rescind the SAC HE (Safety and
Chemical Engineering Education
Committee), CCPS (Center for Chemical
Process Safety), ana NIEHS (National
Institute of Environmental Health
Sciences) initiatives.
Updated Board Order 027, "Roles,
Responsibilities, and Standards of
Conduct in Procurement Activities,"
dated June 2002, giving the COO
oversight and management
authority of the procurement
process.
X
CSB should update
Board Order 027 to
reflect its current
procurement practices
and responsibilities.
11-P-0115
20
-------
AUDIT RECOMMENDATION
CSB RESPONSE
(From referenced audit
reports)
CSB ACTIONS TAKEN
Completed
Not
Completed
Completed but
Additional
Improvements
Needed
ADDITIONAL
IMPROVEMENTS
NEEDED
8
We recommend that the Chief
Operating Officer develop and
implement a system that links strategic
planning to resource allocation
decisions and measures performance in
a way that balances productivity and
costs with desired outcomes.
The CSB agreed with the
recommendation. The COO is taking the
lead to develop a system linking
strategic planning to resource
allocations and measuring performance.
The CSB noted that it is now monitoring
progress on performance goals using
work plans, and the agency is
developing a system to track staff hours
to performance goals that will be in
place by April 30, 2002.
Although CSB tracks staff hours to
performance goals, it has not
demonstrated how this information
is used for making strategic
decisions. As an ongoing effort,
CSB should consider its statutory
mandate (upon receipt from
Congress) to link strategic planning
and resource allocations for
measuring performance outcomes.
X
9
We recommend that the Board
immediately prioritize agency resources
to ensure successful execution of all
action items related to its investigative
performance goal.
The CSB agreed with the
recommendation. The CSB announced
during its public meeting on
February 27, 2002, that it has taken a
hard look at it is FY 2002 performance
plan and decided to rescind allocations
for the SACHE workshop, NIEHS
conference and CCPS membership. The
agency decided not to undertake new
outreach or data initiatives, including
hiring, until it completes a review of its
strategic plan, expected June 30, 2002.
The Board plans to vet proposed
revisions to the strategic plan through
Congressional authorizing and
appropriating committees.
CSB has limited its outreach
activities and has stated that it is
actively trying to hire more
investigators. However, according
to CSB officials, CSB is
encountering problems recruiting
investigators to work in
Washington, DC. Therefore, CSB
opened the Denver office. OIG
reviewed hiring packages to verify
that problems encountered hiring
investigators for Washington, DC.
We found that CSB has been
actively trying to recruit
investigators in the DC area, and
that CSB received a much greater
response to positions advertised
for the Denver office.
X
10
We recommend that the Board and
Chief Operating Officer make the
agency's FY02 hiring plans a top
priority, and to the extent possible,
accelerate the hiring process for new
investigators.
Asserting that hiring staff within the
Office of Investigations and Safety
Programs is a top priority, the CSB has
decided to petition the Office of
Personnel Management by March 31,
2002, for permanent Schedule A hiring
authority for investigative positions.
We obtained and reviewed CSB's
FY 2006-2008 hiring packages.
The Human Resources Servicing
Center has destroyed prior years'
hiring packages. Also, see the
comments for audit
recommendation 9 above.
X
11-P-0115
21
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AUDIT RECOMMENDATION
CSB RESPONSE
(From referenced audit
reports)
CSB ACTIONS TAKEN
Completed
Not
Completed
Completed but
Additional
Improvements
Needed
ADDITIONAL
IMPROVEMENTS
NEEDED
11
Curtail training-outreach initiatives until
(a) the Board develops a Strategic
Outreach Plan that takes into account
the agency's statutory responsibilities,
primary audience, and limited
resources, and (b) its investigative
function is fully operational. The plan
should reflect the consensus of Board
members, senior management, and
staff.
The CSB rescinded its current training-
outreach initiatives and expects to
finalize a strategic outreach plan by
April 30, 2002. The CSB will also review
its strategic plan to ensure that the CSB
is focused on the successful executions
of its investigative performance goal.
According to CSB officials,
strategic goal 4 is the CSB
outreach plan. A review of the
strategic plans indicates that focus
has been on hiring investigators;
however, CSB has not been very
successful, filling only 2 of 11
investigator positions in the
Washington, DC headquarters
office.
X
12
Implement a follow-up program for
recommendations made in investigative
reports, including monitoring
recommendations, closing
recommendations when corrective
actions are taken, and periodically
publishing the status of them. In order to
better measure the impact of report
recommendations, the program should
be tied to the performance measures
identified in the agency's strategic plan.
The CSB agreed with our
recommendation and outlined several
steps it will undertake to enact its
recommendations program, including:
(a) voting to close out 20
recommendations by March 15, 2002;
(b) implementing an internal tracking
system for recommendations status
including a database and electronic file
system for correspondence and
documentations by March 30, 2002;
(c) holding a public meeting to formally
close a number of other
recommendations by May 31, 2002;
implementing a publicly accessible
database on the World Wide Web for
CSB's recommendations status by
October 2002; and (d) including the
percentage of recommendations
adopted as a factor in measuring the
effectiveness of CSB's mission
accomplishment.
CSB Board Order 022,
"Recommendation Program," was
issued in December 2001, prior to
FEMA's March 2002 report date.
An internal safety recommendation
tracking system was developed
and implemented. However, CSB
should update the policy to reflect
current processes.
X
Update Board Order
022 to reflect current
processes.
11-P-0115
22
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AUDIT RECOMMENDATION
CSB RESPONSE
(From referenced audit
reports)
CSB ACTIONS TAKEN
Completed
Not
Completed
Completed but
Additional
Improvements
Needed
ADDITIONAL
IMPROVEMENTS
NEEDED
DHS OIG, A Report on the Continuing Development of the U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board, OIG-04-04, January 7,2004
13
Develop a plan to describe and address
the gap between the number of
accidents the CSB investigates and the
number falling within its statutory
investigative jurisdiction. Include this
information in future budget
submissions to Congress and the Office
of Management and Budget.
The CSB concurred with the intent of the
recommendation and agreed that it
would be beneficial to investigate more
chemical accidents and determine their
root causes. The CSB cited its lack of
resources to investigate more than a
small percentage of the accidents that
fall within its legal jurisdiction. The CSB
believes it has responded to its
understanding of current Congressional
intent and conducting a larger number of
superficial investigations would neither
conform to the legislative intent of the
Clean Air Act Amendments nor serve
the ultimate goal of reducing accident
rates. The CSB agreed that Congress
and the Executive branch are likely to be
unaware of the extent of injuries,
damage, and dislocation caused by
chemical accidents. In an effort to
remedy this lack of information, the CSB
will, beginning with fiscal year 2004,
submit to Congress and the OMB an
account of the total number of incident
reports received and a listing of the
serious chemical accidents evaluated by
the agency for possible deployment.
Audit recommendation closed by
EPA OIG in November 2004, at
which time CSB was maintaining a
database of incidents believed to
be within its jurisdiction. The
database was to be used to report
to Congress the number and extent
of incidents that occurred over a
12-month period. Two years after
the OIG recommendation, CSB
prepared a one-time report to
Congress in FY 2006 and included
less-detailed information in
subsequent budget justifications to
Congress.
X
Upon receipt of
clarification of CSB's
statutory mandate from
Congress, conduct an
analysis of CSB
incident data to
accurately indentify the
investigative gap and
develop a plan to
address the gap.
11-P-0115
23
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AUDIT RECOMMENDATION
CSB RESPONSE
(From referenced audit
reports)
CSB ACTIONS TAKEN
Completed
Not
Completed
Completed but
Additional
Improvements
Needed
ADDITIONAL
IMPROVEMENTS
NEEDED
14
Define what constitutes a chemical
accident within the CSB's purview and
publish a regulation that outlines how
the CSB will receive information on
these accidents.
The CSB acknowledged that it has not
yet developed a regulation requiring the
reporting of chemical incidents falling
within its jurisdiction, but it has
developed non-regulatory alternatives. It
has postponed undertaking a formal
regulation for a number of reasons,
including the significant financial and
staffing implications for the Board and
possible burden on affected parties.
Given the questions concerning the
benefits of and potential impacts of such
a regulation, the CSB must seek
additional guidance from OMB and
Congress before it commits to a long-
term regulatory plan of action. In light of
the statutory language and the OIG's
recommendation, the CSB will seek this
guidance and define a further course of
action by June 30, 2004.
Audit recommendation closed by
EPA OIG in November 2004,
based on CSB discussion with
House Appropriations
Subcommittee and OMB staff. CSB
has not published a reporting
regulation, nor has CSB clearly
defined what constitutes a
chemical accident within its
purview. A letter was submitted to
Congress on November 5, 2009,
seeking clarification of its statutory
mandate.
X
Upon receipt of
clarification of CSB's
statutory mandate from
Congress, CSB should
identify its investigative
jurisdiction and develop
and publish the required
reporting regulation.
15
Evaluate the CSB's performance on
recommendations follow-up and
consider policies and practices to
improve the CSB's timeliness for closing
recommendations.
The CSB accepted the
recommendation. In response to the
increasing number of recommendations,
the CSB is tracking and closing them
more expeditiously. The CSB has
recently reorganized to establish a
separate recommendations supervisor
with three staff, has developed a
recommendations tracking database,
and has initiated contact with recipients
of all previous recommendations. With
adequate funding, the CSB will make a
major effort to close old
recommendations and keep current on
new ones during the first half of FY
2004.
Audit recommendation closed by
EPA OIG in November 2004, as
DHS OIG accepted CSB's
response and planned actions.
Written Board Orders have not
been updated.
X
CSB should perform
quality assurance
reviews to ensure timely
follow-up of closed
safety
recommendations. CSB
should revise its board
order to document its
policy and procedures,
to include
improvements in
monitoring safety
recommendations and
closing safety
recommendations when
corrective actions are
taken.
11-P-0115
24
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CSB RESPONSE
"O
-------
CSB RESPONSE
"O
-------
AUDIT RECOMMENDATION
CSB RESPONSE
(From referenced audit
reports)
CSB ACTIONS TAKEN
Completed
Not
Completed
Completed but
Additional
Improvements
Needed
ADDITIONAL
IMPROVEMENTS
NEEDED
18
Revise the incident selection process to
ensure that all accidents meeting
statutory investigation criteria are
considered for deployment by a
manager with delegated authority for
such decisions.
The CSB agreed with the
recommendation. It intends to revise the
investigation selection process in its FY
2004 action plan. To ensure that all
accidents meeting statutory investigation
criteria are considered, the CSB will
more clearly define incidents within the
CSB's purview. CSB will review the
terms of its agreements with the NTSB
and the NRC to ensure that they report
these incidents to the CSB.
Audit recommendation closed by
EPA OIG in November 2004.
Board Order 036, "Incident
Selection Process," was
implemented on February 25,
2005, to address the audit
recommendation to revise the
incident selection process to
ensure all accidents meeting
statutory investigation criteria are
considered for deployment by a
manager with authority for such
decisions. We were able to verify
that incidents meeting statutory
investigation criteria were
considered for deployment by a
manager with authority. During the
course of the audit, CSB started
(July 2009) documenting
deployment meetings and plans to
include these meetings in its
tracking system in order to support
deployment decisions.
Documenting deployment meetings
will support management's
involvement in considering
accidents for deployment.
X
CSB should update
Board Order 036,
"Incident Selection
Process," to include
guidance on the scope
and frequency of data
quality checks, a
requirement to maintain
records of such data
quality checks, and a
requirement to
document deployment
meeting discussions.
19
Revise the incident selection process to
incorporate appropriate levels of
supervision and separation of duties
associated with receiving, evaluating,
and recording or discarding
notifications.
The CSB agreed with the
recommendation. Its action plan will
contain clearly defined lines of authority
and control between the incident
screeners (duty officers) and the Board
to ensure that decisions regarding
incident selection and investigation
deployment are made with proper
management control and oversight. CSB
will implement a revised incident
selection process by September 30,
2004.
Audit recommendation closed by
EPA OIG in November 2004. CSB
tracking system incorporates many
steps for separation of duties;
however, it is implemented
inconsistently. We found from our
review of the tracking system that
there was not always evidence of
appropriate supervisory review.
X
CSB should update its
policy to ensure current
processes are
documented, including
separation of duties,
and that all notifications
are entered into its
tracking system.
11-P-0115
27
-------
AUDIT RECOMMENDATION
CSB RESPONSE
(From referenced audit
reports)
CSB ACTIONS TAKEN
Completed
Not
Completed
Completed but
Additional
Improvements
Needed
ADDITIONAL
IMPROVEMENTS
NEEDED
20
Improve its recordkeeping of the
selection process, including a definition
of which types of notifications the CSB
will record or discard, to manage the
quality of incident selection data and
enable the CSB to analyze it in the
future.
The CSB agreed with the
recommendation. In its FY 2004 action
plan, it will revise the selection process
by improving recordkeeping of incident
notifications and follow-up activities. The
CSB will upgrade the screening matrix to
a database. CSB will implement a
revised incident selection process by
September 30, 2004.
Audit recommendation closed by
EPA OIG in November 2004.
Board Order 036, "Incident
Selection Process," dated 2005,
addresses the incident selection
process recordkeeping
requirements. CSB upgraded its
screening matrix to an
electronic/secure database in
FY 2008. CSB has not updated
existing guidance (Board Order
036) to address data quality and
record keeping improvements (e.g.,
new tracking system, supervisory
checks).
X
CSB should update
existing guidance to
address recordkeeping
improvements.
21
Publish a policy regarding employee
conflicts of interest related to
investigations.
The CSB agreed with the
recommendation. It agreed that the
policy should address employee
participation in professional
associations.
Audit recommendation closed by
EPA OIG in November 2004. CSB
has not published a separate policy
for employee participation in
professional associations. In March
2006, CSB revised Board Order
40, "Investigative Protocol" to
address conflict of interest in the
investigative process and conflict of
interest in contracting with CSB.
X
CSB should update
Board Order 40 to
govern employees
retaining memberships
in societies or
organizations to which
the CSB issue
recommendations.
22
Enact required administrative
regulations, including the CSB
organization.
The CSB generally agreed with this
recommendation. The CSB recently
published a regulation on its
organization, functions, quorum, and
voting procedures and it plans to pursue
further action on a reporting regulation.
The CSB will also consider
benchmarking information provided by
the OIG and decide what additional
regulations on investigative functions it
should publish.
Audit recommendation closed by
EPA OIG in November 2004. CSB
has met the requirements of the
administrative regulations. CSB
addressed the Freedom of
Information Act and Electronic-
Freedom of Information Act for
enacting and publishing information
on its website and in the Federal
Register. CSB has published
organizational information on its
publicly available web site.
X
11-P-0115
28
-------
AUDIT RECOMMENDATION
CSB RESPONSE
(From referenced audit
reports)
CSB ACTIONS TAKEN
Completed
Not
Completed
Completed but
Additional
Improvements
Needed
ADDITIONAL
IMPROVEMENTS
NEEDED
23
Publish policies and administrative
guidance on the CSB website,
particularly regarding the conduct of
investigations, but afso including other
relevant materials such as board voting
records and orders.
The CSB agreed that it could take
additional steps to improve the public's
understanding of its functions. The CSB
will ensure that materials required under
5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (2) are published on
the agency's website. The CSB will
determine what additional information on
investigative functions it should publish.
Audit recommendation closed by
EPA OIG in November 2004. Also
see comments to audit
recommendation 22.
X
EPAOIG, U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board Should Track Adherence to Closed Recommendations, Report No. 2007-P-00010, March 26,2007
24
Revise CSB guidance, Board Order
022, to include follow-up on closed
recommendations.
CSB concurred with our findings
regarding facility adherence to closed
recommendations. Specifically, CSB's
Chairman stated that she "will ask her
staff to propose an amendment to Board
Order 022 to include follow-up action on
selected, major closed
recommendations." The goal will be to
conduct periodic evaluation of the
impacts of the selected
recommendations. This commitment
would require and be contingent upon
some additional staff resources, and
depending upon the nature of the follow-
up, paperwork reduction act clearances
from OMB.
Board Order 022,
"Recommendation Program," was
revised on March 2009 to include
follow up on closed safety
recommendations.
X
11-P-0115
29
-------
CSB RESPONSE
"O
-------
AUDIT RECOMMENDATION
CSB RESPONSE
(From referenced audit
reports)
CSB ACTIONS TAKEN
Completed
Not
Completed
Completed but
Additional
Improvements
Needed
ADDITIONAL
IMPROVEMENTS
NEEDED
EPA OIG, U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board Did Not Adhere to Its Merit Promotion Plan, Report No. 2007-S-00001, June 4,2007
26
For future promotions, evaluate
candidates and manage the selection
process in accordance with CSB policy.
The person responsible for day-to-day
administration of the merit promotion
process should ensure that: CSB has a
sound rationale for the scoring
methodology; Independent personnel
score tests rather than recommending
officials; CSB applies the required
evaluation criteria, including detailed
crediting plans, to ensure a pool of high
quality candidates; Personnel maintain
documentation, including notes,
supporting selection decisions;
Applicants submit required
documentation, such as the appropriate
performance appraisals; Vacancy
announcements list a specific number of
positions; and CSB affords due weight
to past performance in selection
decisions.
CSB' concurs with the general intent "to
manage the selection process in
accordance with CSB policy." However,
the CSB objects that the
recommendation implies that the CSB
did not manage the process in
accordance with CSB policy. The CSB
also disagrees with some of the specific
suggestions because: The CSB
employed a sound rationale for the
scoring methodology. The OIG did not
identify any problem or a perceived
problem by having the recommending
officials score tests and in future
personnel actions; it may be the case
that the recommending officials are the
ones that are best positioned to score
tests. CSB applied the required
evaluation criteria, and went beyond
these requirements to ensure a fair and
objective process. The CSB did maintain
adequate documentation. All applicants
submitted the appropriate performance
appraisals as required for the subject
action; and due weight was given to past
performance for the subject action.
CSB has updated Board Order
016, "Merit Promotion Plan," dated
January 18, 2001, to include a
scoring process. Although our
review of CSB hiring packages did
not include any merit promotion
positions, we did see evidence that
the Board Order requirements were
being implemented.
X
27
Update the Merit Promotion Plan (MPP)
to reflect the current human resources
servicing provider and the status of the
Chief Operating Officer.
The CSB has revised its MPP to reflect
the discontinuation of the Chief
Operating Officer position, and the roles
of the Human Resource Director and
servicing personnel office. The CSB will
also update its Performance Appraisal
Program to reflect current management
arrangements.
CSB Board Order 016, "Merit
Promotion Plan," dated January 18,
2001, was amended May 4, 2007.
The 2007 amendments to the
board order identifies "a federal
agency" for personnel support
services, and gives the Chairman
the responsibility to implement the
MPP.
X
Update Board Order
016, "Merit Promotion
Plan," to reflect the
hiring of the Managing
Director and to give the
Managing Director
oversight authority to
ensure that the director,
Office of Human
Resources implements
the MPP.
11-P-0115
31
-------
AUDIT RECOMMENDATION
CSB RESPONSE
(From referenced audit
reports)
CSB ACTIONS TAKEN
Completed
Not
Completed
Completed but
Additional
Improvements
Needed
ADDITIONAL
IMPROVEMENTS
NEEDED
28
Clarify instructions on interview score
sheets to ensure that the interview
panel bases scores on information
provided by the candidate during the
interview process and not on personal
knowledge of the candidates outside of
the interview setting.
The CSB has revised its MPP to help
avoid the concerns that the OIG
identified. Under the revised MPP, if
interviews are conducted, interview
panel score sheets will contain specific
instructions that those candidates are to
be evaluated solely on the basis of the
information provided by candidates
during the interview and not on any
other basis. In addition, each member of
the panel will be asked to certify in
writing that his or her scores are based
strictly on the information provided by
the candidate during the interview. The
CSB will also conduct research and
benchmarking to determine if other
measures would benefit its structured
interview process.
CSB has developed and
implemented clear procedures for
its interview score sheets to ensure
the panel bases scores on
information provided by the
candidate during the interview. This
process was verified through our
review of the CSB recruitment
packages.
X
GAO, Chemical Safety Board - Improvements in Management and Oversight Are Needed, GAO-08-864R, August 22,2008
29
We recommend that the Chairman of
the Chemical Safety Board (a) develop
a plan to address the investigative gap
and request the necessary resources
from Congress to meet CSB's statutory
mandate or seek an amendment to its
statutory mandate.
The CSB has not construed the
agency's authorizing statue as requiring
investigation for every chemical accident
involving a fatality, serious inquiry, or
substantial property damage, or the
potential for such consequences, but
understands GAO's concern and
recommendation. In addition to seeking
additional investigation resources, we
will draft a plan for obtaining information
on additional chemical accidents
occurring in the U.S., and clearly set
forth a risk-based approach to accident
selection and investigation. We will work
with Congress to clarify the issue of
CSB's statutory mandate, as suggested
by GAO, including if appropriate, an
amendment to CSB's enabling
legislation.
CSB has requested clarification of
its statutory mandate from
Congress (letter dated November
5, 2009). Actions to address CSB's
investigative gap will be based on
the response CSB receives from
Congress on its statutory mandate.
X
11-P-0115
32
-------
AUDIT RECOMMENDATION
CSB RESPONSE
(From referenced audit
reports)
CSB ACTIONS TAKEN
Completed
Not
Completed
Completed but
Additional
Improvements
Needed
ADDITIONAL
IMPROVEMENTS
NEEDED
30
(b) consider using the work of other
entities, such as government agencies,
companies, and contractors (subject to
an assessment of the quality of their
work), to a greater extent to maximize
the board's limited resources;
The Board will consider using the work
of other entities and contractors to
further maximize its limited resources. In
our experience, however, there are limits
and pitfalls to the use of other entities'
work. Based on this experience, we
respectively suggest that the CSB has
correctly interpreted its Congressional
mandate by independently investigating
major accidents and hazards in depth,
rather than attempting to serve as a
clearinghouse for numerous, disparate,
and other superficial reports from other
organizations.
According to CSB officials, the
Denver office is currently using
work of other organizations to
produce shorter products such as
case studies and safety bulletins.
X
31
(c) improve the quality of its accident-
screening database by better controlling
data entry and periodically sampling
accident data to evaluate their
consistency and completeness;
We note that the screening database
primarily represents a compilation of the
earliest reports of accidents - including
those from the National Response
Center and the media - which may
contain inherent inaccuracies.
Nonetheless, the CSB agrees that it
should take additional steps to prevent
errors from being introduced through
incorrect data entry. The CSB will revise
its board order on the incident selection
process and consider changes to
improve data accuracy. We plan to
consider such measures as additional
written guidance and training for incident
screeners, designing an electronic
workflow so that significant changes to
the database require supervisory sign-
off; and periodic auditing of screening
data for quality and completeness. In
addition, we will review tne staffing for
the screening program and its overall
structure as the CSB develops its
human capital plan.
We are aware that CSB has taken
steps to remedy data quality
issues. We observed data quality
improvements, such as supervisory
checks, use of a new search
engine, and an automated data
tracking system. However, based
on our analysis of a sample of CSB
data, we were unable to identify
whether some inaccuracies noted
were due to human error or to the
lack of periodic testing. CSB can
further improve its data quality by
developing and implementing
written guidance that documents
the scope and frequency of the
data quality checks, and by
maintaining records of such data
quality checks.
X
11-P-0115
33
-------
AUDIT RECOMMENDATION
CSB RESPONSE
(From referenced audit
reports)
CSB ACTIONS TAKEN
Completed
Not
Completed
Completed but
Additional
Improvements
Needed
ADDITIONAL
IMPROVEMENTS
NEEDED
32
(d) publish a regulation requiring
facilities to report all chemical accidents,
as required by law, to better inform the
agency of important details about
accidents that it may not receive from
current sources;
The CSB will publish in the Federal
Register a Request for Information (RFI)
concerning a reporting regulation. The
RFI will present various options for
rulemaking and seek the views and
opinions of our stakeholders on the best
path forward. We intend to publish the
RFI within the next three months. In
addition, the detailed plan to conduct
more investigations will include staffing
and resource projections for staff to
collect and analyze incident information.
We note that CSB's position has been
that a reporting regulation is not needed
for the narrow purpose of notifying the
CSB of major accidents warranting the
deployment of investigators, which
appears to be the sole purpose of the
CSB's authority to issue a reporting rule.
CSB has not published a reporting
regulation. CSB stated in its
response to a GAO report (dated
July 11, 2008) that it intended to
publish the Request For
Information within the next
3 months. An Advanced Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking was
published in the Federal Register
on June 25, 2009. CSB review of
the responses is ongoing. Upon
receipt from Congress clarifying
CSB s statutory mandate, CSB
needs to identify its investigative
jurisdiction and publish the required
regulation.
X
11-P-0115
34
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CSB RESPONSE
"O
-------
AUDIT RECOMMENDATION
CSB RESPONSE
(From referenced audit
reports)
CSB ACTIONS TAKEN
Completed
Not
Completed
Completed but
Additional
Improvements
Needed
ADDITIONAL
IMPROVEMENTS
NEEDED
34
(f) use the Strategic Management of
Human Capital portion of the
President's Management Agenda to
provide criteria for developing a
comprehensive human capital plan, with
input from investigators that includes
specific objectives and performance
measures to improve accountability for
results and to assist the agency in its
goal of improving its human capital and
infrastructure.
The CSB agrees to use the Strategic
Management of Human Capital portion
of the President's Management Agenda
as a guide for developing a
comprehensive human capital plan. The
CSB will also continue to work with the
Office of Personnel Management's
Small Agencies Human Capital
Leadership and Merit System
Accountability Office to develop the
human capital plan.... Developing the
plan will be included in the CSB's
FY2009 action plan.
CSB included the development of a
human capital plan in its 2009
action plan. CSB submitted the
draft plan to the Office of Personnel
Management in December 2009,
and work continues to finalize and
implement the plan and gain the
board's approval. CSB's
management of its human capital
will be dependent on its
investigative jurisdiction. Congress
will clarify CSB's investigative
jurisdiction.
X
14
7
13
11-P-0115
36
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Appendix B
Details on Scope and Methodology
We followed up on GAO and FEMA, DHS, and EPA OIG performance audit recommendations
made to CSB from FYs 2000 through 2008 (Financial Statement and Federal Information
Security Management Act reports were excluded). A total of 34 audit recommendations were
made in six prior audit reports issued by the four audit organizations. The reports were:
• GAO, Chemical Safety Board: Improved Policies and Additional Oversight Are Needed,
GAO/RCED-00-192, July 1, 2000
• FEMA OIG, Issues Regarding Management Accountability, Control, and Direction Have
Not Been Resolved, IC-01-02, March 2002
• DHS OIG, A Report on the Continuing Development of the U.S. Chemical Safety and
Hazard Investigation Board, OIG-04-04, January 7, 2004
• EPA OIG, U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard investigation Board Should Track
Adherence to Closed Recommendations, Report No. 2007-P-00010, March 26, 2007
• EPA OIG, U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard investigation Board Did Not Adhere to Its
Merit Promotion Plan, Report No. 2007-S-00001, June 4, 2007
• GAO, Chemical Safety Board: Improvements in Management and Oversight Are Needed,
GAO-08-864R, August 22, 2008
The EPA OIG closed all the audit recommendations contained in the January 7, 2004, DHS OIG
report. The EPA OIG closed the recommendations based on satisfactory actions taken to address
the recommendations as well as planned corrective actions. We followed up on those audit
recommendations to assess the effectiveness of actions taken by CSB to address issues identified
in the report.
We interviewed members of CSB, including the Chairman/Chief Executive Officer, and CSB's
office directors, to identify the actions taken to address prior audit recommendations. We
obtained and reviewed documentation that supports the board's corrective actions. We conducted
tests of the corrective actions taken to determine whether those actions were effective in
mitigating the weaknesses identified during prior audits.
We selected 18 of CSB's 70 investigations (13 completed investigations and 5 ongoing
investigations) from 1998 through 2009 to assess various aspects of the investigative process,
including data quality. As of May 27, 2010, 60 of the 70 investigations were completed and
10 were ongoing. Our sample represented approximately 25 percent of the total completed and
ongoing investigations from 1998 through 2009.
11-P-0115
37
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To determine whether CSB prioritized its resources to ensure execution of all actions related to
its investigative performance goal, including hiring new investigators and conducting more
incident investigations, we reviewed CSB's recruitment packages, dated from 2006 through
2008, at the National Business Center (CSB's Human Resources Servicing Center) and at CSB.
All job announcements were reviewed. We analyzed the responses to announcements for CSB's
headquarters in Washington, DC, and for its Denver, Colorado, office to substantiate CSB's
assertions that it had difficulty recruiting for headquarters positions due to the high cost of living.
We also reviewed interview score sheets for each announcement to determine whether there
were biases in the selection process.
11-P-0115
38
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Appendix C
CSB Response to Draft Report
December 23, 2010
Arthur A. Elkins, Jr.
Inspector General
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
1200 Pennsylvania Ave, NW (2410T)
Washington, DC 20460
Dear Inspector General Elkins:
Thank you for the opportunity to comment on your draft report on the actions the Chemical
Safety and Hazard Investigation Board (CSB) took to address prior audit recommendations. You
reviewed a total of 34 prior audit recommendations issued from fiscal years 2000 and 2008, and
found that CSB actions on 7 recommendations were not yet completed, and identified additional
corrective actions for 13 recommendations closed by prior auditors. You also recognized CSB's
September 2010 appointment of a Managing Director, who will oversee CSB's operations and
ensure accountability.
We agree that the CSB will take further action on the prior audit recommendations you
identified, and believe that our September 2010 reorganization is the first step in establishing and
implementing an effective management control program. The following discussion addresses
each of your recommendations.
OIG Recommendation 1
Develop and implement a management control plan that documents and addresses the five
internal control standards in accordance with OMB Circular A-123 and GAO's Standards for
Internal Controls in the Federal Government. The plan should include an effective monitoring
system to track corrective actions to address and implement audit recommendations. The plan is
to include:
a. A database to track all prior audit recommendations, planned milestone completion dates,
and corrective actions taken.
b. Procedures for conducting periodic internal control reviews and properly documenting
those reviews, including verifying and ensuring that audit recommendations are resolved
promptly.
CSB Response. We agree with the recommendation and developing a management control
plan will be an initiative in our fiscal year (FY) 2011 Action Plan.
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39
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OIG Recommendation 2
Develop and publish a regulation requiring persons to report chemical accidents, as required by
the CAA.
CSB Response. We agree with the recommendation and issuing a proposed rule on accident
reporting will be an initiative in our FY 2011 Action Plan.
OIG Recommendation 3
Follow up with Congress on the CSB request for clarification of its statutory mandate. Upon
receipt of the response, develop a plan to describe and address the investigative gap, address
prior audit recommendations (appendix A, audit recommendations 8, 13, 14, 16, 29, 32, and 34),
and request the necessary resources to meet CSB's statutory mandate.
CSB Response. We agree with the recommendation. Under our 2011 action plan, we will
transmit a formal package of suggested legislative improvements to the CSB's Congressional
authorizing committees. The package will include language to clarify the statutory mandate
to investigate. The CSB is not in a position, however, to guarantee a Congressional response
as indicated in the OIG recommendation.
OIG Recommendation 4
Ensure that the responsibilities of the Managing Director include:
a. Establishing performance goals, holding program managers accountable for meeting
those goals, and demonstrating improvement in the board's ability to meet it statutory
mandates over time, as recommended by a GAO.
b. Developing and implementing an executive succession and transition planning strategy
that ensures a sustained commitment and continuity of leadership operations.
CSB Response. We agree with the recommendation. We will review the Managing
Director's position description and make any necessary modifications to ensure these
responsibilities are included.
OIG Recommendation 5
Develop and implement a system for periodic reviews of Board Orders to ensure they remain
updated (i.e., effective date of the policy and scheduled review date) and include the requirement
for such a system in the management control plan.
CSB Response. We agree with the recommendation. A system for periodic reviews of
Board Orders will be developed and included in the management control plan.
11-P-0115
40
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OIG Recommendation 6
Take corrective actions that will satisfy prior audit recommendations by updating and
formalizing Board orders that are essential to facilitate and manage effective and efficient control
activities. Specifically, update:
a. Board Order 036, "Incident Selection Process," to reflect current changes, such as its data
sources, changes due to technology improvements, and the incident selection process
decision-making flowchart, to improve the incident screening and deployment decision-
making process. In addition, formalize the Incident Screeners Guide (appendix A, audit
recommendation 17, 18, 19, 20, and 31).
b. Board Order 040, "Investigation Protocol," to govern employees retaining memberships
in societies or organizations to which the CSB issues recommendations (appendix A,
audit recommendation 21).
c. Board Order 027, "Roles, Responsibilities, and Standards of Conduct in Procurement
Activities," to reflect current procurement practices and processes to ensure consistency
in the procurement process (appendix A, audit recommendation 7).
d. Board Order 022, "Recommendation Program," to include new practices adopted for
following up on safety recommendations, to include a quality review program to ensure
timely follow-up on closed safety recommendations (appendix A, audit recommendations
12 and 15).
e. Board Order 028, "Executive Administrative Functions of the Board," to document the
role and responsibility of the Managing Director position.
CSB Response. We agree with the recommendation. Specifically:
a. Updating Board Order 036 will be included as an initiative in our FY 2011 action
plan.
b. We will either update Board Order 40 or develop a specific Board Order to address
employee participation and memberships in professional associations.
c. Improving the procurement program will be an initiative in the FY 2011 action plan.
As part of this initiative we will update Board Order 027 as appropriate.
d. Board Order 022, "Recommendation Program," is currently under review and we will
consider including a quality review program to ensure timely follow-up on safety
recommendations. We are also updating our Recommendations Office "Standards of
Practice" document and expect that the Board Order will contain general guidance
and the Standards of Practice will include detailed procedures.
e. We will review Board Order 028, and update it as appropriate to reflect the role and
responsibility of the Managing Director position.
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41
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OIG Recommendation 7
Finalize and issue the human capital plan currently under development.
CSB Response. We agree with the recommendation. Updating and approving the human
capital plan is an initiative in our FY 2011 Action Plan.
If you or your staff has any questions regarding this response, please contact Bea Robinson, audit
liaison, at 202-261-7627. I thank you and your staff for your efforts on this evaluation.
Sincerely,
Rafael Moure-Eraso, Ph.D.
Chairperson & CEO
11-P-0115
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