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U.S. Environmental Protection Agency	19-P-0147
f AA \ Office of Inspector General	May 9 2019
" At a Glance
Why We Did This Project
We performed this audit to
assess the U.S. Chemical
Safety and Hazard
Investigation Board's (CSB's)
security practices related to the
performance measures outlined
in the fiscal year (FY) 2018
Inspector General (IG)
reporting metrics document for
the Federal Information
Security Modernization Act of
2014 (FISMA).
The FY 2018 IG FISMA
Reporting Metrics outlines five
security function areas and
eight corresponding domains to
help federal agencies manage
cybersecurity risks. The
document also outlines five
maturity levels by which IGs
should rate agency information
security programs:
•	Level 1—Ad Hoc.
•	Level 2—Defined.
•	Level 3—Consistently
•	Level 4—Managed and
•	Level 5—Optimized.
This report addresses the
following CSB goal:
•	Preserve the public trust by
maintaining and improving
organizational excellence.
Address inquiries to our public
affairs office at (202) 566-2391 or
CSB Still Needs to Improve Its "Incident Response'
"Identity and Access Management" Information
Security Functions
The CSB lacks established
procedures for automated
processes and authentication
technologies, which could
permit unauthorized access
to agency systems.
What We Found
We assessed the maturity of the CSB's
information security program and determined it
met the second of five levels: Defined. This
means that policies, procedures and strategies
are formalized and documented but not
consistently implemented. While the CSB has
policies, procedures and strategies for many of
these function areas and domains, the agency still needs to improve the following
issues that we previously identified in our FYs 2016 and 2017 FISMA audits:
•	Incident Response—The CSB neither identified nor defined its incident
response processes for incident handling, including the containment,
eradication and recovery from incidents. The CSB did not document or
formalize its rationale for not having an automated system to detect potential
incidents. Additionally, the agency did not document established procedures
to generate alerts based on log data analysis or record pertinent data of
suspicious activity.
•	Identity and Access Management—The CSB did not fully define or
implement processes for the use of Personal Identity Verification cards for
physical and logical access.
We also found that the CSB needs to make improvements to its "Data Protection
and Privacy" domain, which was added to the FY2018 IG FISMA Reporting
Metrics. Appendix B contains the results of our FISMA assessments.
Recommendations and Planned CSB Corrective Actions
We recommend that the CSB improve its "Identity and Access Management,"
"Incident Response," and "Data Protection and Privacy" capabilities, including by
implementing Personal Identity Verification card technology to strengthen access
to its computers and network, and documenting its practices for data exfiltration
and incident response. The CSB agreed with the five recommendations in this
report and provided sufficient corrective actions and milestone dates for all of
them. We consider the recommendations resolved with corrective actions
List of OIG reports.