&EPA
EPA 600/R-13/007 j February 2013 | www.epa.gov/ord
United States
Environmental Protection
Agency
WARRP Decon-13:
Subject Matter Expert (SME)
Meeting Waste Screening
and Waste Minimization
Methodologies Project
Final SME Meeting Report
Denver, Colorado
August 14-15, 2012
Office of Research and Development
National Homeland Security Research Center
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Waste Screening and Waste Minimization Methodologies Project
Final SME Meeting Report
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Waste Screening and Waste Minimization Methodologies Project Final SME Meeting Report
Final SME Meeting Report
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency and
U.S. Department of Homeland Security
WARRP Decon-13: Subject Matter Expert (SME) Meeting
Waste Screening and Waste Minimization Methodologies Project
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
National Homeland Security Research Center
Decontamination and Consequence Management Division
Research Triangle Park, NC
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Waste Screening and Waste Minimization Methodologies Project
Final SME Meeting Report
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Waste Screening and Waste Minimization Methodologies Project Final SME Meeting Report
Disclaimer
The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency through its Office of Research and Development
managed the research described here. This work was performed by Battelle under Contract No.
EP-C-11-038 Task Order 0002. It has been subjected to the Agency's review and has been
approved for publication. The discussion summaries presented in this report reflect the individual
opinions of the commenters and should not be considered to be the opinion or position of the
Agency. Note that approval does not signify that the contents necessarily reflect the views of the
Agency.
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Waste Screening and Waste Minimization Methodologies Project
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Waste Screening and Waste Minimization Methodologies Project Final SME Meeting Report
TABLE OF CONTENTS
1. INTRODUCTION 1
2. SUMMARY OF DAY 1, AUGUST 14, 2012 3
3. SUMMARY OF DAY 2, AUGUST 15, 2012 17
Figure 1. Criteria to be considered for evaluating segregation technologies 16
Table 1. Technology Scoring Matrix 18
Appendix A. List of Participants A-1
Appendix B. Presentations B-1
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Waste Screening and Waste Minimization Methodologies Project Final SME Meeting Report
LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS
Acronyms
AFB
Air Force Base
ALARA
as low as reasonably achievable
CBR
chemical, biological, or radiological
CFR
Code of Federal Regulations
DAS
Denver Animal Shelter
DHS
Department of Homeland Security
DOE
Department of Energy
EPA
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
HEPA
high efficiency particulate air
IBRD
Interagency Biological Restoration Demonstration
ICS
Incident Command System
INL
DOE Idaho National Laboratory
LLRW
Low Level Radioactive Waste
NHSRC
National Homeland Security Research Center
NRC
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
ORCR
Office of Resource Conservation and Recovery
ORIA
Office of Radiation and Indoor Air
PAGs
Protection Action Guides
RCRA
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
RDD
Radiological Dispersal Device
SGS
Segmented Gate System
SME
subject matter expert
SOG
standard operational guideline
UASI
Urban Area Security Initiative
USD A
United States Department of Agriculture
WAC
waste acceptance criteria
WARRP
Wide Area Recovery and Resiliency Program
Abbreviations
m3
cubic meter(s)
Cs
cesium
Ci
Curie
km
kilometer(s)
mrem
millirem(s)
mSv
millisievert(s)
pCi/g
picocurie(s) per gram
Sv
si evert
yd3
cubic yard(s)
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Waste Screening and Waste Minimization Methodologies Project Final SME Meeting Report
1. INTRODUCTION
The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), in close coordination with the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD), the U.S.
Department of Energy (DOE), the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), and
the Denver Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI), has initiated the Wide Area Recovery and
Resiliency Program (WARRP). WARRP is designed to develop guidance to support the
recovery of a large urban area (specifically, Denver) following a chemical, biological, or
radiological (CBR) wide-area incident. One program activity completed under WARRP was the
WARRP Systems Study. This study identified 25 key gaps, including the lack of waste
minimization polices, processes, and technologies, particularly highlighted for wide-area
Radiological Dispersal Device (RDD) scenarios. Specifically, the amount of waste generated
from an RDD that requires low-level radioactive waste (LLRW) disposal needs to be minimized
by employing screening techniques and properly segregating different types of waste. Project
"Decon-13" represented the effort to identify options for minimizing waste from an RDD.
The WARRP Decon-13 Subject Matter Expert (SME) Meeting, hosted by the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA's) National Homeland Security Research Center
(NHSRC), was held in Denver, Colorado, on August 14-15, 2012, at the Denver Animal Shelter
(DAS).
The purpose of the SME Meeting was to (1) identify existing technologies and methodologies
that may help to minimize wastes, segregate waste streams, keep higher activity wastes separate
from lower activity wastes, and, thereby, minimize cleanup and disposal costs, and (2) scope out
what a draft standard operational guideline (SOG) might look like to assist in the cleanup and
recovery of a wide-area RDD incident. The results from the SME Meeting will be used to
prepare a draft SOG to focus specifically on systems for waste segregation that provide
personnel with information to implement waste minimization activities as part of an RDD
response.1
The meeting brought together 30 participants, including SMEs in government (state and federal),
the military (regional), and industry. The meeting agenda was structured to allow formal
presentations from SMEs on Day 1 before lunch. Time was allocated after lunch to allow
identification, discussion, and criteria development for waste segregation technologies. These
criteria were used the second day to rank the most promising technologies. The final topic of
Day 2 was to discuss the outline of the SOG.
This report summarizes remarks made during the SME Meeting. The intent of this final report is
to provide a list of the meeting participants, an overview of the presentations, and a summary of
the discussions and specific conclusions. This final report also incorporates feedback from SMEs
who reviewed the draft summary report.
1 Waste segregation and minimization are components of waste management. The purpose of the SOG will be to
provide non-prescriptive guidelines and information on existing technologies and methodologies that enhance
cleanup and reduce waste and/or waste management costs from an RDD incident.
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Waste Screening and Waste Minimization Methodologies Project Final SME Meeting Report
This SME Meeting report is organized as follows:
• Section 1 - Introduction
• Section 2 - Summary of Day 1 discussions
• Section 3 - Summary of Day 2 discussions
• Appendix A - Final list of participants
• Appendix B - PowerPoint slides from the presentations.
The two-day meeting consisted of a series of presentations by various personnel from federal
agencies and state offices and by independent consultants. The following agenda lists the specific
sessions, the presenters, and their respective affiliations.
Denver Animal Shelter - Community Room
Tuesday, August 14,2012:8:00 a.m. - 4:30 p.m. MST
8:00-8:15 a.m.
Welcome
Paul Lemieux, Ph.D., EPA, NHSRC
8:15-8:30 a.m.
Introductions/Objectives
Rachel Sell, Battelle, Facilitator
8:30-9:00 a.m.
Opening Remarks
Garry Briese,
Briese & Associates, LLC
9:00-9:30 a.m.
Waste Stream
Characterization/How to Scope
out the Problem
Bill Steuteville, EPA, Region 3
9:30-10:00 a.m.
Waste Management
Organizational Structure
Eugene Jablonowski, EPA, Region 5
10:00-10:15 a.m.
Break
10:15-10:45 a.m.
Radiological Dispersal Device -
Case Studies
Ed Tupin, EPA, Office of Radiation and
Indoor Air (ORIA)
10:45 -11:15 a.m.
WARRP 101
Peter VanVoris, Ph.D.
VanVoris and Associates, LLC
11:15-11:45 a.m.
Waste Segregation Issues
Facing State and Local
Governments
Dave Erickson,
Denver Environmental Health
11:45-1:00 p.m.
Lunch
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Waste Screening and Waste Minimization Methodologies Project Final SME Meeting Report
Denver Animal Shelter - Community Room
Tuesday, August 14,2012:8:00 a.m. - 4:30 p.m. MST (cont'd)
1:00-2:30 p.m.
Segregation Technologies
• Preliminary Results from
Literature Review
• Additional Technologies to
Consider
• Discussion of Technology
Features
Rick Demmer, DOE Idaho National
Laboratory (INL)
Discussion facilitated by
Rachel Sell
2:30-2:45 p.m.
Break
2:45-4:15 p.m.
Criteria for Evaluation of
Segregation Technologies
• Review Draft Criteria List
• Suggestions for Additional
Criteria to Consider
• Weighting of Criteria
• Finalize Criteria List
Rick Demmer
Discussion facilitated by
Rachel Sell
4:15-4:30 p.m.
Wrap Up - Review Expectations
for Day 2
Rachel Sell
Wednesday, August 15,2012: 8:00 a.m. -12:00 p.m. MST
8:00-8:15 a.m.
Welcome
Paul Lemieux
8:15-10:00 a.m.
Rank Technologies
Against Finalized Criteria
All (discussion facilitated by Sell)
10:00-11:30 a.m.
Standard Operational Guideline
• Preliminary Outline
• Discussion of Content
Rachel Sell
All (discussion facilitated by Sell)
11:30-11:45 a.m.
Discussion of Path Forward
Rachel Sell
11:45 - Noon
Closing Remarks
Paul Lemieux
Adjourn Meeting
2. SUMMARY OF DAY 1, AUGUST 14, 2012
Welcome
PaulLemieux, Ph.D., EPA, NHSRC
Dr. Lemieux welcomed the SME Meeting participants and expressed his appreciation for their
willingness to spend time to attend and participate in the meeting. He provided a brief overview
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Waste Screening and Waste Minimization Methodologies Project Final SME Meeting Report
of the Waste Screening and Waste Minimization Methodologies Project (hereinafter: Waste
Screening project), explained its relevance to WARRP, and described how EPA is involved in
the effort. He explained that the Waste Screening project involves the development of a SOG for
adapting existing equipment, techniques, and regulations to facilitate waste segregation and
minimization activities during an RDD incident. Dr. Lemieux said waste minimization can be
achieved by identifying waste that has activity below a level set by decision-makers that would
allow it to be sent to a non-LLRW disposal facility, such as a Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act (RCRA) Subtitle C or Subtitle D facility, or even be recycled.
Introductions/Objectives
Rachel Sell, Battelle
Ms. Sell greeted meeting participants and provided an overview of logistics for the meeting.
Ms. Sell then requested that participants introduce themselves, identify their affiliation, and
describe their role(s) related to radiologically contaminated waste and debris. Ms. Sell thanked
participants in advance for their input and noted that SME input is an integral piece of the
process for identifying radiological waste screening technologies and helping to scope out what
guidelines should look like as part of an RDD response. She provided a quick overview of the
two-day agenda. She noted that the first half of Day 1 would be dedicated to presentations and
the afternoon would focus on open discussion.
Ms. Sell then introduced Frank Boldoe from the Denver Department of Environmental Health's
Animal Care and Control Division, who provided an overview of the meeting's venue, the DAS.
Mr. Boldoe explained that the DAS is Platinum-certified under the U.S. Green Building
Council's Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design program, making DAS the first and
only animal facility in the country to achieve this nationally recognized environmental rating
from the council. Finally, Ms. Sell acknowledged Garry Briese for his assistance in securing the
venue for the SME Meeting and introduced him as the first speaker.
Opening Remarks
Garry Briese, Briese & Associates, LLC
Mr. Briese serves as the Local Program
Integrator for WARRP for the Denver
Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI). He
described the efforts being undertaken as
part of the Denver UASI. He said their
efforts and focus have been related to
speed, notably the speed of recovery to the
economy. Dr. Briese said that even efforts
geared toward response always lead back to
recovery (mitigation, preparedness, and
response are the first three steps in
recovery). He noted that whether it's a
Fukushima type incident, the DHS Planning Scenario 11, or another chemical/biological attack,
the speed (or "what will allow us to move fastest") at which recovery occurs is of primary
Wide Area Recovery and Resiliency
Program (WARRP)
Decon-13 Subject Matter Expert Meeting
August 14, 2012
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Waste Screening and Waste Minimization Methodologies Project Final SME Meeting Report
concern. Dr. Briese also offered perspective on planning for simultaneous responses and being
mindful that "unexpected" events often "are still somewhat predictable." For instance, he said
that the Fukushima nuclear incident was not caused by the earthquake or tsunami, but rather by
the placement of the generators. He discussed this in terms of recognizing "Black Swan" events
that can lead to huge failures, yet may still be quantified statistically. A black swan is a highly
improbable event with three principal characteristics: it is unpredictable; it carries a massive
impact; and, after the fact, an explanation is concocted that makes it appear less random, and
more predictable, than it was.2 Mr. Briese concluded by reviewing upcoming WARRP-related
activities and events (e.g., September 13-14 Capstone) and other working group meetings. He
also noted that local participants and stakeholders have contributed more than 10,000 hours of
support to the success of WARRP.
Waste Stream Characterization/How to Scope out the Problem
Bill Steuteville, EPA, Region 3
Mr. Steuteville described the WARRP
RDD scenario, which involved two
simulated RDD attacks: one at the U.S.
Mint in downtown Denver, Colorado, and
another at the Anschutz Medical Campus
in Aurora, Colorado. The scenario
assumes that tens of thousands of people
are exposed and that hundreds die from
blast-related trauma, not radiation. The
primary fallout area is within tens of
miles of the blast although some of the
radiological agent may be carried
hundreds of miles. The downtown release
scenario potentially impacts more than 20 square miles, 32,000 buildings, and 82 million square
feet of indoor space, while the Aurora release scenario impacts fewer buildings and people but
contaminates a much larger area. Both bombs were identical but the difference in the plumes is
due to the entrainment of contamination by the high-rise downtown Denver buildings. In the
downtown Denver scenario, higher concentrations of Cesium-137 (Cs-137) were deposited
immediately around and downwind of the blast. In the Aurora scenario, the cesium was spread
out over a far larger area.
Mr. Steuteville said that the model used to simulate the contaminant deposition from the incident
calculates in three dimensions and that web-based tools were used to estimate building contents,
outdoor areas, decontamination waste, and demolition waste. Tools were used to estimate the
waste to an order of magnitude, including the Waste Estimation Support Tool, Incident Waste
Assessment & Tonnage Estimator Tool, and preliminary results from the Bio-Response
Operational Testing and Evaluation Program, specifically the personnel decontamination waste
generation data. The types of radiological waste that would be generated include a variety of
liquid and solid wastes, the vast majority of which will be Class A LLRW with minimal levels of
2
The Black Swan theory was formulated by Nassim Taleb in his 2007 book. The Black Swan: The Impact of the
Highly Improbable.
WARRP RDD Scenario —
Radiological Waste Source,
Generation, and Handling
Bill Steuteville. Homeland Security Coordinator
U S Environmental Protection Agency Region 3
WARRP Radiological Waste Sampling Workshop
Denver. Colorado
August 14. 2012
NK Homeland
v Security
>¦ i.
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Waste Screening and Waste Minimization Methodologies Project Final SME Meeting Report
contamination. Waste class A is defined in Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) regulations
at Title 10 Part 61.55 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), Waste Classification, and 10
CFR 61.56, Waste Characteristics. Class A waste is waste that is usually segregated from other
waste classes at the disposal site.3 Mr. Steuteville said such a scenario can generate a substantial
amount of liquid waste, estimated to be in the range of 1.5 to 3 billion gallons, equal to 50,000 to
100,000 railroad tank cars (30,000-gallon capacity) or 275,000 to 550,000 tanker trucks (5,500-
gallon capacity). He said the amount of solid waste generated in an RDD incident is also
significant. Solid waste estimates can approach 16 million to 21 million tons, equal to 160,000 to
210,000 railroad hopper cars (100-ton capacity), 400,000 to 525,000 semi-trailers (64,000-pound
net capacity), or 500,000 to 656,000 tri-axle dump trucks.
Mr. Steuteville then compared the WARRP RDD scenario with EPA's Liberty RadEx exercise,
an RDD scenario based in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. He described the scenario, the relocation
and cleanup areas, and how various factors (e.g., selection of various decontamination
technologies, cleanup levels/strategies) are related to the type and amount of waste generated.
Decontamination technologies tested during Liberty RadEx included cleaning agents (e.g., acids,
foams, and strippable coatings), which reduce radiation but do not eliminate it. These
technologies are most likely used in areas of lower contamination for initial cleaning to quickly
open critical infrastructure and mobilize key resources, and for areas with limited exposure.
Cleanup strategies used by Liberty RadEx players for planning wide-area cleanup in areas of
significant contamination included roof replacement; soil removal; street and sidewalk surface
removal; disposal of carpets, furnishings, possessions, and drywall; and building demolition in
the case of higher contamination. Philadelphia citizens were included in the exercise, and after
reviewing the scenario and the numerous decisions that had to be made, the citizens favored their
own cleanup prioritization. The citizens wanted a two-pronged approach to cleanup, with
simultaneous cleanups beginning: (1) around the Liberty Bell and the downtown business
district, and (2) where, under the Liberty RadEx scenario, people were not relocated as part of
the response but were still living with the contamination until their properties were cleaned.
Mr. Steuteville also stressed that as part of an RDD scenario, cleanup cannot proceed without
decisions regarding waste handling options and will be prohibitively costly and slow without
local waste disposal or staging solutions. In addition, he said state leadership, including cleanup
criteria, waste disposal, and community involvement, is essential.
He said the idea is not for EPA to impose itself on states, but rather, assuming EPA support is
needed, the agency would work with the local incident command and state and local officials to
aid in the response and cleanup.
Waste Management Organizational Structure
Eugene Jablonowski, EPA, Region 5
Mr. Jablonowski provided an overview of Incident Command System (ICS). He explained that
ICS is a standardized, on-scene, all-hazards incident management approach allowing its users to
3
Class A waste classification is available at: http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/cfr/part06l/part061-
0055.html.
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adopt an integrated, yet flexible,
organizational structure to match the
complexities and demands of single or
multiple incidents. An ICS allows
facilities, equipment, personnel,
procedures, and communications to be
integrated and operated within a common
organizational structure. The ICS enables
a coordinated response among various
jurisdictions and public and private
agencies, as well as establishing a
common process for planning and
managing resources. Mr. Jablonowski
noted that an ICS is typically structured to facilitate activities in five major functional areas:
(1) Command, (2) Operations, (3) Planning, (4) Logistics, and (5) Finance/Administration
(Intelligence/Investigations is an optional sixth functional area).
Mr. Jablonowski explained that EPA Regions 3, 4, and 5 developed an approach to RDD
response as part of a national planning exercise to meet national homeland security goals. The
exercise identified EPA resources, gaps, and other issues requiring more development (regional
and nationwide). This approach improves EPA's preparedness to respond to an RDD event and
multiple "incidents of national significance." The approach was exercised at Liberty RadEx.
Mr. Jablonowski then described several organizational charts that depicted an approach to
staffing a response. The charts were organized by a command group, including anticipated areas
of state and local personnel to assist in staffing, as well as several operation groups that were
then organized into various branches. Examples of the overarching branches included: (1)
assessment, (2) cleanup, (3) environmental monitoring, (4) health and safety implementation,
and (5) waste management. For example, the Waste Management Branch is responsible for
collecting, storing, characterizing, documenting, shipping, and/or treating all wastes generated or
collected on-site during recovery activities, including radiological waste, solid wastes, liquid
wastes, and other hazardous materials and nonhazardous wastes generated by recovery activities.
Additional organizational charts Mr. Jablonowski described included planning and logistics
groups. The planning group included such subgroups as a data and modeling interpretation team,
response and cleanup technologies specialists, and an ecological and health assessment team.
The logistics group was comprised of subgroups such as communications, information
technology support, security, medical, housing, and food.
Mr. Jablonowski concluded by presenting several waste management tactics and disposal options
to support an approach for an RDD response. During the early phase, waste management will
likely consist of supporting first responders by removing debris to support life-saving missions.
Quick identification of interim sites to temporarily store contaminated waste and debris may be
necessary. Early identification of disposal facilities and determination and establishment of waste
acceptance criteria (WAC) for disposal facilities will be imperative. From there, facility-specific
WAC information would be used to plan for waste sampling/characterization, packaging,
transportation, etc.
Waste Management
Organizational Structure
Eugene Jablonowski
U.S. EPA Region 5 Emergency Response
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency and
U.S. Department of Homeland Security
WARRP Decon-13 Subject Matter Expert Meeting
Waste Screening and Waste Minimization Methodologies Project
August 14-15,2012
Denver, Colorado
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Regarding disposal options, Mr. Jablonowski said all options would need to be addressed with
the impacted state and the receiving states, if different. Currently, there are no disposal criteria
that exist to utilize RCRA facilities for RDD radionuclides, but methods are currently available
for their development. It may be advantageous to implement a "balanced approach" for waste
disposal where smaller volumes of higher-activity waste are disposed off-site at an existing
federal disposal site, or at commercial licensed/permitted disposal facilities, while larger
volumes of lower-activity waste are disposed at either an existing RCRA Subtitle C disposal
facility near the site, or at an incident-specific Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA) disposal facility designed to meet the criteria for
RCRA Subtitle C hazardous waste disposal, the NRC Part 61 requirements for land disposal of
radioactive waste, and any other applicable or relevant and appropriate requirements (ARARs).
He noted that some sort of hazardous and mixed waste management also may be needed,
depending on the incident location and impacted buildings/areas (e.g., radiation-contaminated
asbestos-containing material).
Radiological Dispersal Device - Case Studies
Ed Tupin, EPA, ORIA
Mr. Tupin provided a detailed overview
of several scenarios with characteristics
similar to those anticipated with an RDD,
beginning with a discussion of the March
2011 earthquake and tsunami in Japan.
The earthquake knocked out the electrical
distribution systems at the Fukushima
Daiichi nuclear power plant, the tsunami
flooded the backup generators, resulting
in a total loss of cooling systems and
instrumentation and eventually leading to
core meltdown. It appears now that spent
fuel stored in pools was not damaged,
which otherwise could have made the situation much worse. The damage to the Fukushima
Daiichi reactors was classified as a Level 7 - "Major Accident" on the International Nuclear
Event Scale ("A major release of radioactive material with widespread health and environmental
effects requiring implementation of planned and extended countermeasures"). Mr. Tupin said
there is still not a consensus regarding the amount of radioactive material released, or how the
released radioactive material compares to Chernobyl. In looking at atmospheric releases of Cs-
137, there seems to be agreement that Fukushima releases were about 10 to 20% of those
produced by the Chernobyl event. However, the Fukushima event has resulted in significant
releases of contaminated water to the ocean. Also, the Chernobyl releases occurred over about 10
days, while releases from Fukushima continued over a longer period of time. Mr. Tupin
described additional radionuclides (e.g., Iodine-131) that were released and how their releases
and deposition impacted evacuation. Evacuation extended out to 20 kilometers (km), with
restricted entry extending to 30 km. More than 150,000 people were evacuated, of which
approximately 100,000 are still displaced. Many will not be able to return for years.
RDD Case Studies
Japan, Chernobyl, Goiania
Waste Screening Workshop
August 14, 2012
Edward A. Tupin
Center for Radiological
Emergency Response
Radiation Protection Division
Office of Radiation and Indoor Air
US EPA
to: Homeland
Security
©
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Waste Screening and Waste Minimization Methodologies Project Final SME Meeting Report
Mr. Tupin said two radionuclides are driving long-term cleanup: Cs-137 (30-year half-life) and
Cs-134 (2-year half-life). Cesium can present a problem for decontamination because it tends to
bind to surfaces over time. In some cases, this binding to surfaces can be an advantage, because
if cesium binds to the upper layers of soil, simple removal of those layers of soil may be
effective. Cesium is not generally very mobile in the subsurface. Iodine-131 (8-day half-life) was
not a concern in the long term (short half life, decayed away).
Mr. Tupin said the management of radioactive waste was significantly complicated by the
aftermath of the earthquake and tsunami. Everything essentially becomes a waste stream, and
much of the waste stream is mixed together, presenting a much more challenging task. Areas to
the west of Fukushima, which host agricultural activities, may have to be taken out of cultivation
for years. He said one should keep in mind the difference between the wastes being generated at
the nuclear plant itself and the wastes being generated in areas affected by fallout. Plant
operators have generated large amounts of waste consisting of filtering/absorbing media (e.g.,
zeolites) that have been used to try to remove radionuclides from water that is being released to
the ocean.
Mr. Tupin stated that the government of Japan has developed prioritized cleanup areas, including
schools and other child-sensitive areas as well as agricultural production areas. The government
has stated its goal to reach levels of 100 millirem (mrem) to 2 rem per year (1 millisievert [mSv]
to 20 mSv per year) as a bench mark for restoration. He said that, in prioritizing the cleanup
areas, those with levels above 5 rem per year (which is also a U.S. occupational standard) have
initially been seen as too contaminated to address effectively in the near term. Many areas are
significantly above that level. If local officials or residents want to clean up areas that now are
below 100 mrem, they are expected to handle that themselves. Reaching these levels (i.e., 100
mrem per year or lower) will be an iterative process and will likely take years to achieve.
Mr. Tupin also described the roadmap for special decontamination projects underway and a
timeline for anticipated completion. The aim of these decontamination projects is to serve as
demonstrations of techniques that apply to different types of circumstances - e.g., roads,
farmlands, woodlands. A temporary LLRW storage site is being planned to facilitate cleanup.
The facility will be capable of storing -280 million tons by 2015. There has been resistance from
local communities/officials who want assurance that the facilities will not be permanent. The
government continues to look at the need for both short-term (~3 years) and long-term
(-30 years) storage.
Mr. Tupin said that while the scale of the Fukushima accident likely exceeds the impacts from an
RDD attack, several aspects are relevant: (1) cleanup goals will affect the volumes of waste
generated; (2) decontamination strategies will also affect waste volumes; (3) there is likely to be
public pressure to accelerate cleanup (e.g., prioritizing certain areas like schools); (4) federal,
state, and local roles and responsibilities for decision-making on cleanup and waste management
may create tension (i.e., local management of waste will be expected); and (5) the initial focus
will be on waste staging and temporary and longer-term interim storage (disposal likely will take
more time).
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Mr. Tupin said that in the event of an RDD attack, a theme that comes up often is "shared
sacrifice" in managing large waste volumes. That is, other states will be more likely to accept
some amount of waste in a national emergency if the state (or states) where the incident occurs
shows a willingness to manage the waste as well. This type of decision would need to be made
by state and local officials and would involve local stakeholders. The decision must be
technically sound and allow officials to defend the decision as protective of public health and the
environment. The decision might involve using existing capacity for solid or hazardous waste,
reopening closed facilities, or constructing new capacity. This type of decision also needs to be
part of the planning process.
Mr. Tupin described the scenario that occurred in Chernobyl in 1986. The Chernobyl Nuclear
Power Plant suffered catastrophic failure (Level 7 on the International Nuclear Event Scale) as
an explosion and fire breached containment and spread radioactivity into the atmosphere and
around the world. Several dozen emergency "liquidators" (also known as responders) working to
put out the fire died from the effects of radiation. He described the contamination zones, the
radionuclides released, and the populations impacted. Over 140,000 square kilometers (km2)
were contaminated above 1 curie (Ci) per km . As of 2000, -350,000 people had been resettled
from areas exceeding 5 Ci/km2; however, -4.5 million people were living in contaminated areas
2 • • 2 .
above 1 Ci/km . A permanent exclusion zone covering about 4,300 km in Ukraine, Belarus, and
Russia was established. Eight thousand (8,000) km2 of agricultural land and 7,000 km2 of timber
land have been removed from production. As far as waste management, there was limited effort
to decontaminate except to support reactor decommissioning (even in populated areas). More
... 3
than 1 million cubic meters (m ) of waste was generated from rubble, debris, and soil.
The final scenario that Mr. Tupin described took place in 1987 in Gioania, the capital and largest
city of the Brazilian state of Goias. An abandoned teletherapy source containing 1,375 Ci of
Cs-137 was removed for salvage as scrap metal. The source was breached and the radioactive
cesium chloride (CsCl) powder was spread by the salvage workers and their children. The result
was contamination of people and property. Four people died, 28 had radiation burns, and 29
others were exposed. Radiation levels were measured at 0.4 Sv per hour (40 rem per hour) at 1
meter from the ground in the salvage yard. This scenario may be the closest known incident
comparable to an RDD attack, in that many people were exposed without any warning or
knowledge, and radioactive material was spread throughout an urban area. The incident cleanup
found 85 houses to be contaminated, of which 41 had to be evacuated; seven residences as well
as numerous other buildings had to be demolished. Topsoil was removed from large areas and
total waste generated was -3,500 m3 (about 150,000 times the volume of the original source).
Authorities screened many people who were not exposed, which generated a widespread fear and
stigma associated with the incident.
Mr. Tupin said waste from the incident was categorized and segregated for disposal. Two near-
surface repositories were constructed -23 km from Goiania, near the original temporary storage
site. The Great Capacity Container for Group I (short-lived) waste received about 40% of the
total volume, while the Goiania Repository for Groups II - V consisted of more extensive
engineered barriers. Mr. Tupin commented that a great deal of time is required to develop
disposal capacity options even for even a relatively small and contained amount of waste
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Waste Screening and Waste Minimization Methodologies Project Final SME Meeting Report
3...
(3,500 m ), which is not inconsequential but well within the capacity of commercial disposal
facilities and much smaller than one would expect from an actual RDD event.
WARRP 101
Peter VcmVoris, Ph.D., VanVoris and Associates, LLC
Dr. VanVoris provided an overview of
WARRP and discussed WARRP goals
and objectives. He then described the
collaborative program with the UASI and
State of Colorado, whose goal is to
develop solutions to reduce the time and
resources required to recover wide urban
areas, military installations, and other
critical infrastructures following a
catastrophic CBR incident. Stakeholders
consist of interagency partners, including
federal/state /local/tribal governments,
the military, private industry, and non-
profit organizations.
Dr. VanVoris said that a program predating WARRP, called the Interagency Biological
Restoration Demonstration (IBRD), had a similar set of goals and objectives. The IBRD
consisted of an interagency partnership in the Seattle, Washington, region. Its goal was to reduce
the time and resources required to recover and restore wide urban areas, military installations,
and other critical infrastructures following a biological incident. Similar objectives included
establishing civilian and military coordination, developing guidance and decision frameworks,
and demonstrating technologies. Another program he described was BioNet, a cooperative
program between DHS and the Defense Threat Reduction Agency with a vision and objectives
similar to IBRD and WARRP. BioNet sought to improve the ability of a major urban area in the
United States to manage the consequences of a biological attack on its population and critical
infrastructure by integrating and enhancing currently disparate military and civilian detection and
characterization capabilities. The outcome was a unified consequence management approach.
The BioNet program selected San Diego as the pilot city for developing and demonstrating
enhanced consequence management capabilities. The BioNet program engaged a variety of
stakeholders, including both civilian and military organizations in the San Diego area, to ensure
that the BioNet program was based on a full and realistic picture of biodefense operational needs
in a major metropolitan area.
Dr. VanVoris then focused his presentation on WARRP, highlighting the planning guidance,
technical reports, and technology solutions that have been generated under WARRP. From an
operational context, one WARRP metric is to reduce the time and resources required for
recovery following a catastrophic CBR incident. The goal is to be able to recover in six months,
while current estimates prior to IBRD and WARRP were 18+ years. Additional WARRP metrics
include the following three types of positive impacts:
Wide Area Recovery & Resiliency Program
(WARRP)
Pete Van Vons, Ph.D.
Consultant & Advisor to WAARP
Chemical and Biological Defense Division
Science and Technology Directorate
DEPARTMENT Of HOMELANO SEC
$
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Waste Screening and Waste Minimization Methodologies Project Final SME Meeting Report
• Efficiency Impacts measured via a significant cost savings (millions or billions of dollars)
for wide-area environmental remediation of CBR incidents. This results from more
effective, scalable, and improved technologies and methodologies that are now made
available for sampling, decontamination, and operation.
• Capability Impacts measured by reduced risks for wide-area recovery planning, which in
turn increases performance for the rapid recovery of critical infrastructure.
• Finally, the Return-on-Investment Impact measured from the "customer viewpoint,"
which is immediate to short term for the case of a wide-area incident and relatively short
term for planning guidance and for public health monitoring and surveillance.
Dr. VanVoris also described a transition plan and project status on the several activities still
ongoing under WARRP.
He concluded his presentation by reviewing several radiological attack scenarios, ranging from a
medical waste spill or transportation accident to a terrorist-focused dirty bomb or terrorist
delivery of a full yield "loose nuke."
Waste Segregation Issues Facing State and Local Governments
Dave Erickson, Denver Environmental Health
Radiological Dispersal
Device Debris Response
Waste Segregation Issues
August 14 2012
Mr. Erickson described a simulated ROD
scenario at the U.S. Mint in downtown
Denver, Colorado. The scenario assumes
significant debris is generated, structures
are damaged (no fires), and levels of
radiation are elevated (up to 5 rem)
extending several hundred feet from the
explosion. He noted that residual hazards
exist from contamination of buildings,
debris, turf and trees, vehicles, and white
goods.4 Issues likely to arise include the
handling of large volumes of collected
vegetation and building debris, storage of
collected contaminated debris, waste volume reducti on, treatment of cesium-contaminated waste,
and waste storage and disposal. Mr. Erickson expected that remediation methods employed
would include removing ground cover and the top few inches of soil, washing roofs and walls
(and attempting to contain the water), removing contaminated debris to temporary debris storage
sites, imposing institutional controls, and repairing structures/infrastructure damaged by the
RDD event.
Mr. Erickson described Denver's experience with hazardous debris, which includes asbestos in
soil and buildings, that could parallel cesium-contaminated debris. He explained that Denver had
previously had to remove radium tailings from approximately five miles of Denver streets. The
4
The term 'w hile goods" refers to appliances such as refrigerators, ranges, water heaters, freezers, air conditioners,
washing machines, clothes dryers, dehumidifiers, dishwashers, and other similar domestic and commercial large
appliances.
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Waste Screening and Waste Minimization Methodologies Project Final SME Meeting Report
road base was excavated and transported to Grandview, Idaho; Clive, Utah; and Deer Trail,
Colorado for disposal. The required cleanup level was less than 5 picocuries per gram (pCi/g)
Radium-226 on the surface. Institutional controls for these cleanup sites were not feasible.
Mr. Erickson also highlighted some of Denver's asbestos-removal techniques (e.g., soft sided
waste containers called "burrito bags") and discussed Denver's options for temporary debris
management sites (25 locations), with final disposal at the Denver Arapahoe Disposal Site.
Finally, Mr. Erickson highlighted some of the data gaps or concerns facing his organization with
respect to debris storage and disposal. The primary concern is that Denver's Debris Management
Plan is silent on RDDs. He cited the small number of local experienced personnel and that
cleanup of private property will require both assistance and oversight. An additional concern is
temporary radioactive debris storage. There is limited capacity for storage and segregation of
radioactive debris, and its presence would likely result in resident opposition. No local capacity
for permanent disposal of contaminated debris exists, but the city has an agreement with Utah for
radioactive waste disposal. The entire concept is expensive to implement and makes
transportation difficult.
Segregation Technologies
Rick Demmer, INL
Discussion facilitated by Rachel Sell, Battelle
Before Mr. Demmer began, Ms. Sell
distributed a copy of the preliminary results
from the literature review, one of the other
tasks associated with the WARRP Decon-13
Waste Screening project. She noted the
literature review would be expanded to include
topics discussed during this session. During
the discussion, Ms. Sell said she would capture
SME participant comments and ask for
feedback on the technology features after Mr.
Demmer reviewed each technology.
Mr. Demmer opened his discussion by describing the scenario (i.e., Scenario 11) and introducing
the major methods of large-scale characterization/remediation. He also presented case studies
describing the technologies that had been used.
Mr. Demmer said that as part of the Idaho Nuclear Technology and Engineering Center
contamination event that occurred in April of 1992, small flakes of radioactive material were
dispersed to a small area north and east of the 250-foot tall central off-gas stack. A sudden
release of steam from a stripping tower was accidentally directed through the stack and
"scoured" the flakes up and out of the stack. The site was locked-down for about 6 hours until it
could be confirmed that evacuation routes were clear of contamination. Eberline manual survey
(in-situ) instruments coupled with high efficiency particulate air (HEPA) vacuums were used to
identify and characterize hotspots. Using this approach, which involved approximately 100
Waste Segregation
p
Methodologies
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US EPA WARRP Workshop
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Rick Demmer
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Nuclear Materials Characterization
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Battelle Energy Alliance
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INL
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Waste Screening and Waste Minimization Methodologies Project Final SME Meeting Report
workers, about 50 acres of contaminated area was characterized in two weeks, resulting in
several tons of waste. He also said automated survey instruments exist that are equipped with
computer-generated mapping capabilities and can be mounted on unmanned vehicles. An SME
participant said automated techniques, while scientifically driven, may have a negative public
perception because it is impersonal to see an unmanned technology operate in one's community
compared to a manual survey that has a human presence.
SME participants agreed this approach seems like a viable option to consider. EPA has
demonstrated ground-based and airborne wide-area surveys. Once surveys are complete, cleanup
strategies can be implemented (i.e., roof removal, scarification). An advantage of using manual
survey instruments is that public perception is positive because there is a "presence" of a person
operating the device.
Mr. Demmer described another technology that was used at the Painesville, Ohio, Diamond
Magnesium facility. The 30-acre facility recycled radioactive scrap from 1951-1953. The soil at
the site was contaminated and initially 9,400 cubic yards (yd3) were removed followed by
another 25,000 yd as more contaminated soil was identified. In 2007, EPA excavated the
contaminated soil at the site and the Segmented Gate System (SGS) was used for waste
segregation. A SGS is a radioactive soil waste minimization system using a series of conveyer
belts that pass excavated soil under radiation detectors. He noted that the SGS was also utilized
at Johnston Atoll from 1990-1998 and had an overall removal efficiency of 98%.
One SME participant noted that SGS works great for soil, but not for biomass or other debris. A
disadvantage of this technology could be the perception that treated material might be reused. A
participant asked whether Denver would be an easier location to implement SGS compared to a
more densely populated metropolitan area. The response was that Denver would be an easier
location to implement the SGS in lieu of a more densely populated city such as Chicago or New
York City. The subject of cost also was discussed among SME participants; with projected
estimates ranging from $100,000 to $1.2 million (the former equating to simply renting a
currently operable SGS to the latter of completely building a new one, as was the case at
Johnston Atoll, where costs included SGS + equipment, including front loaders).5
Mr. Demmer said that for the Goiania scenario, personal items were decontaminated and
everything else from the neighborhood was demolished, or dug up and removed. This fairly low-
tech approach dubbed "digging and hauling" would be considered baseline. SME participants
said this approach would be a necessary step regardless. Another comment was that this would
be very costly to implement and that transportation and public resistance to hauling would be an
issue.
Mr. Demmer reviewed the cleanup strategies employed for the Chernobyl accident. He said that
the typical remediation used was "triple" dig or plow (the use of shovels to dig up the surface dirt
and rebury it well below the surface while bringing fresh topsoil to the surface), but a suite of
other techniques such as grass cutting, vacuum sweeping roads, and soil removal were also used.
SME participants questioned whether this technique would be realistic in an urban area and
5 The estimated cost would have to be verified for an RDD incident in the Denver area.
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Waste Screening and Waste Minimization Methodologies Project Final SME Meeting Report
whether it would create a subsequent groundwater issue. Other disadvantages to "triple" digging
or plowing would be access (i.e., gaining access to sections of the city in a rapid manner and
with large equipment) and timing issues (i.e., when to remediate).
Mr. Demmer presented a table that showed cost estimates and throughput for each technology,
which garnered a lot of discussion among SME participants. One concern raised by the
participants was that equal importance was given to all of the technologies, when in reality each
waste method and technology would be applicable during different times of cleanup and
recovery. Some of the information presented in one of the tables was considered very subjective
and potentially useful only under certain circumstances.
Ms. Sell asked for participants to suggest other technologies to consider. SME participants said
that biomass strategies should be considered, including incineration, composting, and landfilling.
Other SME participants suggested looking at turf or sod cutters and said turf/sod cutters would
be more ideal (look at what Japan is doing), while others commented that Denver may have
limited applicability for this technique because of roots and rocks in the soil, which may lead to
increased costs.
Other participants suggested looking at street sweepers, leaf/brush/tree removal technologies,
and selective removal of vegetation. A discussion about dust suppression requirements for these
systems followed.
Another suggestion was to consider plasma arc vitrification as it was used in Russia for animal
carcass disposal.
An SME participant raised the question of secondary waste generation and asked whether mobile
water treatment facilities are available.
Another SME participant asked if lawn mowers could be retrofitted with HEPA vacuums. An
encapsulant or fixative may need to be added to the system. This idea could be field tested.
Criteria for Evaluating Segregation Technologies
Rick Demmer, INL
Discussion facilitated by Rachel Sell,
Mr. Demmer described the criteria to be
considered for evaluating segregation
technologies. He noted that criteria can be
subjective or objective and that they can be
impacted by several factors, including: (1)
type of contaminant (radionuclide, chemical
nature and physical form); (2) type of
substrate (building material type and
configuration); (3) functionality in different
weather conditions; and (4) desired endpoint
cleanup level. He presented an example
RDD Soil Cleanup
Criteria
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US EPA WARRP Workshop. August
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14-15. 2012
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Rick Demmer
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Nuclear Materials Characterization
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15
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Waste Screening and Waste Minimization Methodologies Project Final SME Meeting Report
criteria list for decontamination, and then presented a subset of draft criteria that would be
applicable for RDD cleanup, shown in Figure 1.
Ms. Sell asked SME participants to suggest additional criteria to consider beyond the ones that
are presented in Figure 1. Additional criteria suggested included availability (how easy is it to
obtain/access the technology) and time required to implement. These two criteria were added to
the primary criteria listed on the left-hand side of the chart that Mr. Demmer presented, which
included technical performance; safety, health and environmental considerations; and cost.
Operability/Simplicity/Maintenance
(includes availability of utilities)
Technical
Performance
Segregation Efficiency
(effectiveness)
Waste Type and Volume
Created
Matu rity of T echnology
Versatility (used on
different media)
Safety, Health &
Environmental
Permitting Requirements
Ease of Safety Compliance
(intrinsic hazards analysis)
ALARA Considerations
Equipment
Labor
Supplies
Utilities
Development
Figure 1. Criteria to be considered for evaluating segregation technologies.
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Waste Screening and Waste Minimization Methodologies Project Final SME Meeting Report
Following this discussion, Ms. Sell gave each SME participant a copy of a Technology Scoring
Matrix, presented below in Table 1, and asked them to evaluate the technologies for each of the
five primary criteria (the impact each might have regarding liquid waste production was added
subsequent to the Day 1 discussion). Mr. Demmer described the process to be used to score each
criterion. Ms. Sell said the results of the exercise would be compiled and presented the following
day, with the goal of finalizing a criteria list by the end of the SME Meeting.
Wrap Up - Review Expectations for Day 2
Rachel Sell, Battelle
Ms. Sell thanked the presenters for all of the great discussion among all SME participants as part
of Day 1. She explained what would be discussed on Day 2 and adjourned the meeting for Day 1.
3. SUMMARY OF DAY 2, AUGUST 15, 2012
Welcome
Paul Lemieux, EPA, NHSRC
Dr. Lemieux welcomed participants back to the second day of the meeting and expressed his
appreciation for everyone's feedback from the previous day. He said the goal for Day 2 was to
have an SOG outline completed by the time the meeting adjourned.
Rank Technologies Against Finalized Criteria
Rick Demmer, INL
All (discussion facilitated by Sell)
Mr. Demmer began the session by explaining that he incorporated SME participant feedback
from Day 1 and recategorized the technologies and methods. The technologies would be
categorized by in-situ remediation ("characterization"), ex-situ removal ("mitigation"), and ex-
situ (after removal) treatment/disposal ("waste management").6 SME participants provided
additional input as to whether this recategorization was appropriate. They felt that disposal as a
waste management option needed to come off the list since it was assumed that disposal was a
"given" and, therefore, shouldn't be listed and scored. They also suggested adding liquid waste
(i.e., the amount of water generated during decontamination) to the criteria list. What confounds
the issue is that normal storm water and other weather events generate contaminated water in
addition to the water produced by decontamination activities.
After the discussion, Ms. Sell distributed a blank table (i.e., without colors) similar in structure to
Table 1, then asked SME participants to score each technology against each criterion and assign
it a low/not advantageous (red), medium/neutral (yellow), or high/advantageous (green)
designation. Minimal generation of liquid waste was considered advantageous. Ms. Sell
explained that the results would be compiled and presented in the SME Meeting summary. Table
1 summarizes participant scoring and is presented in no particular priority order.
6 It is acknowledged that characterization and remediation are two separate actions; however, they are closely tied
together, and for the purpose of discussion were categorized this way during the SME Meeting.
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Waste Screening and Waste Minimization Methodologies Project Final SME Meeting Report
Table 1. Technology Scoring Matrix
Alternative
Safety,
Health &
Environmental
Time to
Implement
Technical
Performance
Availability
Costs
Liquid
Waste
• • • 7
In-situ remediation
Manual survey
Automated
survey
Survey/dig
(plow)
Ex-situ removal
Lawn mowing
Parking lot
washer
(HEP A)
Sod cutter
Scarifier
Large-scale dig
and haul
Selective
removal of
vegetation
Ex-situ (after removal) treatment/disposal
Segmented
gate system
Soil washing
Composting
Plasma arc
vitrification
Incineration
Low/Disadvantageous
Medium/Neutral
High/Advantageous
7
Vacuuming and digging both generally imply removal; however, these types of techniques could be coupled with
manual or automated survey. Manual or automated surveys may assist remediation by helping to determine what
needs to be remediated and what can be left alone or, as in the case of soils, redeposited.
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Waste Screening and Waste Minimization Methodologies Project Final SME Meeting Report
Participants appeared to be mostly in favor of technologies that are available, are not expensive,
and generate minimal liquid waste. Two examples of these kinds of technologies would be the
manual survey/vacuum and "dig and haul". Those techniques are also likely to have been used
often in the past, thereby offering the advantage of user experience. However, results also show
that SME participants may be cautiously optimistic about other techniques (e.g., soil washing,
SGS, lawn mowing) which potentially provide improved cleanup efficiency. These results
provide insight into the barriers that may exist from an applications standpoint and the work that
needs to be done to gain acceptance of the technologies.
Standard Operational Guideline - Preliminary Outline and Discussion of Content
Rachel Sell, Battelle; All (discussion facilitated by Sell)
Ms. Sell said the final objective of the meeting
was to develop an outline for a draft SOG.
The SOG will describe the use of selected
waste screening technologies for minimization
of waste from an RDD event or other
radiological incident. The resulting SOG is
expected to be included in WARRP planning
documentation that will be developed to
address waste triage, staging, disposal, and
quality assurance/quality control. The SOG
will likely provide an opportunity for any
qualified contractor familiar with bulk
material radiological detection equipment to be deployed for this activity. Dr. Lemieux added
that a goal of the SOG is to give guidance without being too prescriptive.
Ms. Sell presented a preliminary outline for the draft SOG. SME participants provided feedback
on each item in the outline. The initial part of the discussion focused on the "why" of the SOG.
SME Meeting participants said that the document needs to include an introductory section that
explains the purpose and "why" there is a need for the SOG. The concept of expeditious
recovery was also part of this discussion.
SME participants said a health and safety section is needed in the SOG to reference regulations,
special exceptions, and the role of "self cleanup." With respect to training, worker and citizen
group training guidance was mentioned as needing to be covered. SME participants also
suggested that an annex be added that contained descriptions of the technologies to be
considered.
SME participants suggested several resources which could be consulted for populating the draft
SOG, notably the www.readv.gov website. They said that Superfund waste management
guidance materials should be consulted as well as asbestos debris management guidance. A U.S.
Department of Agriculture (USDA) Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service decision tree
was also suggested as a resource. Additionally, there is a Hanford SOG for dealing with tank
SOG - Preliminary Content Areas
• Envisioned Content/Outline
- Purpose (to provide guidelines)
Planning Assumptions (for an RDD event)
- Agencies Roles and Responsibilities/Direction and Control
- Health and Safety
- Training
- Staging
- Equipment to be used
- Disposal
- Communication
- Quality Assurance/Quality Control
- Public Information
- Mental Health Services
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Waste Screening and Waste Minimization Methodologies Project Final SME Meeting Report
explosions that may offer some ideas. SME participants offered to forward ideas or examples
after the meeting.
The following table summarizes the final draft outline that was agreed upon during the SME
Meeting.
Section
No.
Standard Operational Guideline (SOG)
1
Purpose (include perspective as to why)
2
Planning Assumptions (for an RDD event)
3
Agencies Roles and Responsibilities/Direction and Control
4
Operational Concepts
5
Equipment to be used
6
Health and Safety (worker and environmental)
7
Training
8
Waste Management
9
Public Information
10
Quality Assurance/Quality Control
11
References
12
Annex - Technology Descriptions
Discussion of Path Forward
Rachel Sell, Battelle
Ms. Sell thanked participants for attending the SME Meeting and for all of their input and
contributions to the discussion. She also presented a draft schedule (listed in Appendix B) for
upcoming project deliverables for the Waste Screening project. She told participants they would
be provided with the SME Meeting summary and with copies of the presentation.
Closing Remarks
Paul Lemieux, EPA, NHSRC
In his closing remarks, Dr. Lemieux thanked the presenters and all other participants who had
contributed to the meeting discussions. He felt that the SMEs came to realize that rather than
focusing on a single technology or two, a technology toolbox approach should be followed to
identify the important considerations of different technology options, realizing that each one
might potentially be used depending on the situation.
Dr. Lemieux noted that an optional component of the Waste Screening project may be to
participate in an operational demonstration during the WARRP Capstone meeting September 13-
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Waste Screening and Waste Minimization Methodologies Project Final SME Meeting Report
14, 2012, in Denver. He said the WARRP Capstone event may be an opportunity to demonstrate
one or two of the "lower-tech" approaches in front of a larger audience. Dr. Lemieux envisioned
that the operational demonstration would consist of setting up several waste minimization
schemes in the parking lot and demonstrating them for attendees of the WARRP Capstone event.
These "lower-tech" approaches could include using hand-held survey methods, demonstrating
the use of sod cutting as a way to separate highly contaminated material from material with low
levels of contamination, and possibly showing ASPECT'S mapping capability by using detection
equipment in the parking lot or placing the detector in a vehicle and driving around the area.
Based on discussions during the meeting, it appears that the technology for screening soil is
currently commercially available and that the EPA has access to the technologies.
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Waste Screening and Waste Minimization Methodologies Project Final SME Meeting Report
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Waste Screening and Waste Minimization Methodologies Project Final SME Meeting Report
APPENDIX A
List of Participants
A-1
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Waste Screening and Waste Minimization Methodologies Project Final SME Meeting Report
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A-2
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Waste Screening and Waste Minimization Methodologies Project Final SME Meeting Report
List of Participants for the
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency and U.S. Department of Homeland Security
WARRP Decon-13 Subject Matter Expert Meeting
Waste Screening and Waste Minimization Methodologies Project
August 14-15, 2012
Denver, Colorado
Name
Affiliation
August
14
August
15
Argiz, Armando
Buckley AFB - Office of Emergency
Management (OEM)
X
Benerman, Bill
Denver Environmental Health
X
X
Briese, Garry
Briese & Associates, LLC
X
X
Cleveland, Gordon
USDA
X
X
Demmer, Rick
INL
X
X
Erickson, Dave
Denver Environmental Health
X
X
Evans, Leroy
Defense Coordinating Officer - Region 8
X
X
Graham, Richard
EPA Region 8
X
X
Grove, Glenn
Adams and Jefferson County Hazardous
Response Authority
X
X
Hart, James
Denver Fire Department HazMat
X
X
Henderson, Glenn
Wastren Advantage, Inc.
X
X
Hindman, James
Colorado Department of Public
Health and Environment
X
Jablonowski, Eugene
EPA Region 5
X
X
Lee, Charlyss
Energy Solutions
X
X
Lemieux, Paul
EPA NHSRC
X
X
Lloyd, Lisa
EPA Region 8
X
X
Michael, Jim
EPAORCR
X
X
Moore, Ronnie
US - NORTHCOM
X
X
Mueller, Eric
Buckley AFB
X
A-3
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Waste Screening and Waste Minimization Methodologies Project Final SME Meeting Report
Name
Affiliation
August
14
August
15
O'Connor, Marian
Colorado Department of Public
Health and Environment
X
Patteson, Ray
Sandia (retired), Independent Consultant
X
X
Peterson, Phil
Colorado Department of Public
Health and Environment
X
X
Riggs, Karen*
Battelle
Schultheisz, Dan*
EPA ORIA
X
Sell, Rachel
Battelle
X
X
Snyder, Emily*
EPA NHSRC
X
X
Steuteville, Bill
EPA Region 3
X
X
Stilman, Terry
EPA Region 4
X
Torstenson, Jared
Colorado Department of Public
Health and Environment
X
X
Tupin, Ed
EPA ORIA
X
X
Van Voris, Peter
Van Voris & Associates LLC
X
X
*Participated via telephone
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Waste Screening and Waste Minimization Methodologies Project Final SME Meeting Report
APPENDIX B
Presentations
B-1
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Waste Screening and Waste Minimization Methodologies Project Final SME Meeting Report
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B-2
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ct Matter Expert Meeting
s \ ^ / j
ugust 14, 2012 Area UASI /<5
Wide Area Rec
P
Decon-13 Su
The Commitment to Recover
The national commitment to recover, especially from terrorist incidents,
may involve planning that is outside of normal processes and plans that
are mostly response-centered
-------
ft
Complexities of Recovery
III
Response is the first phase of recovery
• Mitigation, Preparedness & Response are the first three
steps in Recovery
• Recovery must be started in the earliest days of
Response
• It is all about the economy....the is the THE outcome
WARRP Program Elements
k Denver Area UASI £&
Task
Effort
Capability Target & Objective
1
Front-Erid System Engineering Study
and Gaps Analysis
Body of knowledge for national, state, and local
restoration capabilities
2
Wide-Area Consequence
Management Guidance and
Frameworks
Develop guidance to address civilian & military
needs and capabilities for recovery & restoration
actions
3
Science and Technology Solutions
Recovery process methods, procedures, and
technology development
4
Workshops, Exercises, and
Demonstrations
Coordinate civilian & military community
interoperability, and practical application of
technology and concepts of operation
5
Transition to Use
Operationally relevant solutions to end-users
-------
ft
Current Status
III
Framework
- Writing Team Review Completed - July 17
- Moving to final
Knowledge Enhancement Working Groups
- Behavioral Health-Aug 27
- Unmet Needs & NGOs - Aug 30
Capstone
- Sept 13-14
- Colorado Convention Center
- Plenary Sessions
- Workshops
- Demonstrations of Science & Technology Research Projects
Science & Technology Projects
III
Focus
C/B/R
Project
WARRP Systems Study Gap 1«2
Transition
Dec on
R
Waste Screening & Segregation Methodologies
Gap 1.2
EPA
Sampling
B
Development of Automated Floor Sampling Device for
Bacillus onihracis Spores
Gap 1.4
EPA
Decision
Support
CBR
Early Abberation Reporting System (BARS)
Gap 2.4
CDC, DoD
Dec on
B
Expanding Low-Technology Decontamination Options
Gap 1.5
EPA
Sampling
B
Systematic Evaluation of Aggressive Air Sampling for
Bacillus anthracis Spores
Gap 1.4
EPA
Decision
Support
CBR
Deploy able Mapbook Composer
Gap 2.6
U.S. Secret
Service
Decon
R
Demonstration of Cs-RDD Wash Aid
Gap 1.6
EPA. FEMA
Decision
Support
B
Decontamination Strategy & Technology Selection Tool
Gaps 2.9.3.5
EPA
1 Gap definitions may be found in WARRP Systems Study Report (2011).
2For official report, contact WARRP Program Manager: cliristopiierc.russcllffidhs.gov
® 4
-------
w
Knowledge Enhancement Working Groups
30-31 Jan:
15 Feb:
21 Feb:
23 Feb:
15-16 Mar:
20 Mar:
17 Apr:
20 Apr:
17 Jul
14-15 Aug:
27 Aug:
30 Aug:
13-14 Sep:
CBR Workshop
Legal Authorities
Private Sector Economic Resiliency and Restoration
Multi-Agency Coordination Process
Waste Management Workshop
Private Sector Economic Resiliency & Restoration II
Damage Assessment
Building Abandonment
Agriculture (FMD)
Decon-13 SME
Behavioral Health
Unmet Needs & Long-Term Recovery
Capstone
«
in
Local Commitment to Success
III
Local participants and stakeholder have
contributed more than 10,000 hours of support
to the success of the WARRP
-------
Garry Briese
Local Program Integrator
abriese(S)brieseandassociates.com
571.221.3319
-------
WARRP RDD Scenario -
Radiological Waste Source,
Generation, and Handling
Bill Steuteville, Homeland Security Coordinator
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency Region 3
WARRP Radiological Waste Sampling Workshop
Denver, Colorado
August 14, 2012
Homeland
W? Security
Stteoee and TecJiuuLuu)
&
j ^f&OeiwwiMsiUASjMM
WARRP RDD Scenario - Overview
(Continued)
Terrorists obtain approx. 2,300 curies of cesium-137
(CsCI) and 1.5 tons of ANFO and make 3000 pound
truck bomb
Terrorists detonate truck bomb containing the 2,300
curies of cesium outside the U.S. Mint in the downtown
business district
The explosion collapses the front of one building and
causes severe damage to three others and blows out
window of 5 other buildings
Second explosion in Aurora a
short time later outside Children's
Hospital
Z?
-------
¦II
* Two Radiological Dispersal Device (RDD) attacks:
U.S. Mint (downtown Denver)
- Anschutz Medical Campus (Aurora).
* Tens of thousands of people exposed, hundreds dead
- Died of trauma from blast not radiation
* Evacuations/Displaced Persons
- 10,000 evacuated to shelters in safe areas (decontamination
required prior to entering shelters)
- 25,000 in each city are given shelter-in-place instructions
- Hundreds of thousands self-evacuate from major urban areas in
anticipation of future attacks
WARRP RDD Scenario - Overview
Downtown Release
Most radioactive fallout is within tens of miles of blast,
some may be carried up to hundreds of miles
• Hundreds of buildings
contaminated
• Basic services affected
• Local businesses affected
• Government operations
relocated
• Mass Transit (East-West
rail line) affected
• Local military installations
affected
-------
Twin Explosions; Two Plumes
Downtown: Tall buildings Aurora: Flat terrain
/"—^
WARRP RDD Scenario - Overview
(Continued)
Airborne dose
-------
Waste Estimation - Tools that were used
in
RDD Waste Estimation Support Tool (WEST)
Building Stock and Outdoor Areas
- Decon and Demolition Waste
l-WASTE Tool
- Building Contents
Bio-response Operational Testing and Evaluation
(BOTE) Program Personnel Decontamination Waste
Generation Data
Tested by Exercise Players at Liberty RadEx
Waste Classification
Class A Low Level Radioactive
Waste (LLRW).
2. Class B/C LLRW (higher activity
levels from blast zone or on site
concentration efforts)
3. LLRW with Asbestos (i.e., old
steam pipes from demo buildings)
4. LLRW with PCB's (i.e., PCB
transformer oils coating
demolished building exteriors)
5. Low Level Mixed Waste (LLMW)
(RCRA hazardous waste and low
level radioactive waste)
III
6. Personal Protective Equipment
(PPE) waste
7. Sludge from onsite
decontamination efforts
8. Sludge from WWTPs
9. Laboratory samples
10. Contaminated clothing from off-
site health facilities
11. Non-radiological solid or
hazardous waste for disposal in
RCRA C or D landfills
-------
What Types of Radiological Waste Will be
Generated?
NRC Class
Class A: 0-1 Ci/m3
Class B: 1-44 Ci/m3
% of Scenario Waste Volume
100% of liquid waste (1-3 billion
gallons)
>95% of solid waste (16-21 million
tons)
Minimal (<1% of solid waste)
Class C: 44 - 4600 Ci/m3 Only in immediate blast zone
Negligible (<1% of solid waste)
Translation into Number of Railcars/Dump
Trucks
laai
Liquid Waste (Total = 1.5-3 billion gallons)
50,000 to 100,000 railroad tank cars (30,000 gallon capacity)
- 275,000, to 550,000 tanker trucks (5,500 gallon capacity)
Solid Waste (Total = 16-21 million tons)
- 160,000 to 210,000 Railroad hopper cars (100 ton capacity)
- 400,000, to 525,000 semi-trailer (64,000 pound net capacity)
- 500,000 to 656,000 tri-axel dump trucks
• Put end to end 3700 miles long! (LA to NY to Atlanta and some...)
10
J,*W
-------
¦
Liberty* RadEx Exercise Comparison
IBBIIII
11
LRE Relocation and Cleanup Areas
H HI H H ¦ ¦ ¦ I
140,000 Temporarily Displaced
200,000 Must Have Property Cleaned
Same scenario;
Single detonation;
Philadelphia, PA
-------
LRE - Cleanup Tactics and Technologies
Current Decontamination
Technologies:
* Cleaning agents, acids,
foams:
* Reduce radiation: do
not eliminate radiation
* Most effective on non-
porous surfaces or
areas of marginal
contamination and/or
short-term exposures
* Quickly Clean and
reopen CI/KR
in
Most Effective Wide-Area
Cleanup Strategies:
a) Roof Replacement
b) Soil Removal
c) Street and Sidewalk
Surface Removal
d) Interior: dispose carpets,
furnishings,
possessions, drywall
e) Building demolition if
higher contamination
3^
Hiroshima
-------
Hurricane Katrina
% Typical Denver Street - Google Earth
20 H Gr-cflie
-------
Waste Consistency
• Except for immediate area of bomb (1 block radius),
RDD wastes should be highly homogenous
- Remove cars, swing sets, bird baths: anything not fixed
- Remove trees & shrubs
- Empty building contents
- Remove tanks, drums, transformers, other hazardous waste
- Remove roof & siding (option if building is being saved)
- Demolish 8s remove buildings
- Excavate soils
Remove or scarify concrete & asphalt
• This generates uniform homogenous waste streams
• This how EPA cleans Superfund sites
• Makes waste characterization & disposal easier
LRE - Cleanup Tactics and Technologies
IBII
18
..
-------
Cleanup, Waste, Waste Handling. Disposal & Costs
Day One: Begin generating solid and liquid wastes
Responder, public, & hospital PPE & decon
First Week: Begin generating significant liquid and solid
wastes with CI/KR decontamination activities
- Temporary storage locations
First Month: Begin generating huge volumes of liquid
and solid wastes with initial cleanup operations
- Soils, demolition wastes, furnishings, office materials, etc.
- Roofing materials, asphalt & concrete scarification
- Need long-term storage locations and/or permanent disposal
Cleanup can not proceed without waste handling options
Cleanup will be prohibitively costly and snail-pace slow
without local waste solutions
)
LRE Citizen Stakeholder Panel:
Cleanup prioritization & Waste storage
Philadelphia citizens had no difficulty with concepts of cleanup
prioritization, local storage and disposal, and difficult choices
-------
State Leadership: Cleanup Criteria, Waste
Disposal, Community Involvement
i ¦ II
Pennsylvania Department of Environmental
Protection
- Bureau of Radiation Protection |S ¦
- Led by David Allard. Director Radiation Programs
decisions '> j «m>*m
Leading Technical Advisory Panel
Working with Community Advisory Panel
Radiation Expertise and Leadership
-------
Waste Management
Organizational Structure
Eugene Jablonowski
U.S. EPA Region 5 Emergency Response
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency and
U.S. Department of Homeland Security
WARRP Decon-13 Subject Matter Expert Meeting
Waste Screening and Waste Minimization Methodologies Project
August 14 -15, 2012
Denver. Colorado
Incident Command System
ICS Overview '
ICS is a standardized, on-scene, all-hazards incident
management approach that:
* Allows for the integration of facilities, equipment,
personnel, procedures, and communications, to
operate within a common organizational structure.
* Enables a coordinated response among various
jurisdictions and agencies, public and private.
* Establishes common processes for planning and
managing resources.
ICS is flexible and can be used for incidents of any type,
scope and complexity.
-------
ICS allows its users to adopt an integrated
organizational structure to match the complexities and
demands of single or multiple incidents.
ICS is typically structured to facilitate activities in five
major functional areas: Command, Operations,
Planning, Logistics, and Finance/Administration.
Intelligence/Investigations is an optional sixth
functional area.
Federal, State and local agencies are represented in
the IC/UC in accordance with NIMS principles
regarding: jurisdictional authorities, functional
responsibilities, and resources provided.
Region 3,4,5 Plan
Approach to RDD Response
EPA Regions 3, 4 & 5 developed an
approach to RDD response
Part of a national planning exercise to meet
national homeland security goals.
ID-ed necessary EPA resources, resource
"gaps," and other issues requiring further
development, both regionally and
nationally.
Improves EPA's preparedness to respond
to a RDD event and multiple "incidences of
national significance."
Approach exercised at "Liberty Rad-Ex."
EPA 2- -4 K a
-------
ErrvkrarviMrrtd Justice Advisor
RSC (¦)-1
Radiological Technical
Specialist
RSC (II) -1 5 Chief - FRMAC - 1
Deputy Ops Chief - 03C -1
CLEANUP BRANCH
Brrch Lft- E=AOSC -1
Deputy ar-< RSC fll>-1
START-1
HEALTH & SAFETY
IMPLEMENTATION BRANCH
Brand* D rector RSC 11) -1
Deputy D rector RSC (¦] ~ 1
EF A"ccntaclDrs - 5
WASTE MANAGEMENT
BRANCH
Branch Oil- EPA OSC -1
START-1
ASO RSC iX»" 1
ERRS - RM -1
ENV1RONEMENTAL
MCNITORINS BRANCH
Branch D!rE=A OSC -1
Deputy Cr- R&c
-------
Region 3,4,5 RDD Approach
Operations ^
- 1
7
Region 3,4,5 RDD Approach
Operations ^
-------
Region 3,4,5 RDD Approach
Operations
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Region 3,4,5 RDD Approach
Waste Management Branch
The Waste Management Branch is responsible for
collection, storage, characterization, documentation,
shipping, and/or treatment of all wastes generated or
collected on-site during ESF-10 activities including:
- radiological waste,
- solid wastes,
- liquid wastes, and
- other hazardous materials and non-hazardous wastes
generated by field activities.
to
-------
Region 3,4,5 RDD Approach
Waste Management Branch
The Waste Management Branch includes four groups:
1. Waste Water Treatment and Handling Team is
responsible for storing, treating and shipping waste
water, including personnel decon water, collected
during field response activities.
2. On-site Collection Team is responsible for collecting
wastes from cleanup operations, and transporting the
wastes to on-site collection areas where it is grossly
characterized and containerized for storage.
Region 3,4,5 RDD Approach
Waste Management Branch
Waste Management Branch (continued) ..
3. Near-site Packaging and Transportation Team is
responsible for collecting wastes from the on-site
collection areas transporting it to the central storage
area, where the wastes are characterized and
packaged for off-site transportation, manifested and
shipped for final off-site treatment and/or disposal.
4. Off-Site Characterization Team is responsible for
characterization and manifesting the wastes for off-
site treatment and final disposal.
12
-------
Region 3,4,5 RDD Approach
Operations
uraup Swp-HQC
00-1
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ph
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Branch Or-QSC -1
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13
Region 3,4,5 RDD Approach
Operations
Hair and Haft*y lr^
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14
-------
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15
Region 3,4,5 RDD Approach
Logistics
i*.oaaTK:5
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16
-------
Region 3,4,5 RDD Approach
Waste Management Tactics
Waste management tactics during the early phase will
consist of supporting first responders by removing
debris to support the life saving missions.
Removal of this debris will be critical for dose control.
Quick identification of interim sites to temporarily store
contaminated waste and debris may be necessary.
Early identification/determination of disposal facilities.
Determining and establishing waste acceptance criteria
(WAC) for disposal facilities.
Facility-specific WAC info would be used to plan for
waste sampling/characterization, packaging,
transportation, etc.
17
Region 3,4,5 RDD Approach
Potential Disposal Options
All options would need to be addressed with the
impacted state and the receiving states, if different.
Balanced approach to waste disposal:
- Smaller volumes of higher activity waste are disposed at a
federal disposal site, or one of the commercial
licensed/permitted disposal facilities.
- Larger volumes of lower activity waste are managed at a
RCRA Subtitle C facility near the site, or at an incident-specific
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and
Liability Act ("CERCLA") disposal facility that would meet the
design criteria of RCRA Subtitle C and NRC 10 CFR 61.
ts
-------
Region 3,4,5 RDD Approach
Potential Disposal Options ^
* Recognition that some sort of hazardous and mixed
waste management may be needed depending on the
incident location and impacted buildings/areas (e.g.,
radiation- contaminated asbestos containing material
(ACM) for example).
* Characterization is performed on a bulk ISO-container
level or through waste stream knowledge, where
uncertainties are compensated by disposal facility
design.
* Allowances are made for temporary storage near the
site or off-site while permanent disposal capacity is
being prepared.
Region 3,4,5 RDD Approach j
Other Issues
* Waste Packaging. Procedures need to be developed
specifying how wastes will be packaged, acceptable
types of packaging, segregation of prohibited items,
and documentation required to demonstrate traceability
of waste from the point of generation through package
certification.
* Waste Certification. (DOE Disposal Only) Procedures
will be required specifying roles, responsibilities, and
controls in place to ensure that radioactive waste is
generated, packaged, characterized, and certified in a
manner that preserves the requirements for off-site
DOE disposal.
20
-------
Region 3,4,5 RDD Approach
Questions?
-------
RDD Case Studies
Japan, Chernobyl, Goiania
Waste Screening Workshop
August 14, 2012
Edward A. Tupin
Center for Radiological
Emergency Response
Radiation Protection Division
Office of Radiation and Indoor Air
US EPA
Homeland
Security
Science tnd 'fcchnnlcrgy
G\
0 \
liO \
\ 1
1
f a Japan: Scenario
i* epicenter
Fukushtma NFSs
[DaU.Tim*]
2.46 pm on Fri, March 11.2011
[EpiccnlorJ
OtfsliMO Swwku cuail
(opprot 190 hm from I wuMina NKtsi
[Seismic Energy]
Majjnilijde (M> 9.0
Ljraest earThfl Lrake,'wunamr In
recorded history of Japan.
(Dead,1 hflising]
Appro*. 20,000
-------
Japan: Impact of Earthquake and Tsunami
Damage to the Reactors
Level 7 - "Major Accident17 on International Nuclear Event Scale
- :'A major release of radioactive material with widespread health and
environmental effects requiring implementation of planned and extended
countermeasures"
• Loss of Cooling
• Damage to
Secondary
Containment
Vessels
• Fuel Meltdown
(partial or
complete - three
of six units)
• Hydrogen
Explosions units
1,2 and 4.
^ u Radionuclide Releases - Evacuation
* Early evacuation decisions driven by release and
deposition of
- lodine-131 (8-day half-life)
- Ceslum-134 (2-year half-life)
- Cesium-137 {30-year half-life)
• Evacuation out to 20 km, restricted entry to 30 km
- >150,000 people evacuated, -100,000 still displaced, many will
not be able to return for years
- Zones extended beyond 20 km in highly affected areas to
northwest
4
-------
Evacuation Zoues (20 km + >20 inSv/y
Zones of Evacuation Instruction
7^L^h\
-. •¦•P " n
E«eu«iixi lonm
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(Bmcstf)
RotKtsi w*
rfl
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lip
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prcparHtafl ion*
i'UW art
59
lew
130
Radionuclide Releases - Cleanup
Two radionuclides are driving long-term cleanup
Ceslum-137 (30-year half-life)
- Cesium-134 (2-year half-life)
Some reports of Strontium-90 (29-year half-life) and
Plutonium outside boundaries of nuclear plants
- Tiny quantities
- Few locations
[Note: lodine-131 (8-day half-life)]
- Driver for initial protective actions
- not a concern In the long term (short half life, decayed away)
-------
(37 PBq = 1,000,000 Curies)
Japan: Impact of Earthquake and Tsunami:
Releases of Radiation to the Environment
* Air Releases - intentional
venting, containment
breach & hydrogen
explosions
—150 PRq of 131i
- -10 PBq of 137Cs
* Ocean Releases -
intentional release of
cooling water & leakage
* 1311 equivalent activity
release of ^500 PBq,
* Total release -10% - 20%
of releases from Chernobyl
Wide Area Contamination
MEXT data as of September 15. 2011
IBII
Radioactive materials spread widely mciudir»g to the wee in NW
| direction where high dose areas are distributed
Monitoring results
* (Air dose rate)
I'JO <
id • is
| O* 10
I 0?-M
01 • 02
* 01
Contaminated areas defined by > 0.23 pSv/h
Cs-134 and Cs-137 dominate
-------
Japan: Description of Waste Streams
Management of radioactive waste significantly
complicated by aftermath of earthquake and tsunami
- Buildings destroyed
- Infrastructure damaged
- Agricultural areas flooded and contaminated
- Mixtures of toxic and hazardous substances widespread
- Accumulation of wastes from treating power plant effluents
- Significant ocean releases could lead to re-contamination
- "Hot spots" found across the country
- Might be considered comparable to nuclear device damage
Japan relies heavily on incineration of solid waste
- Precautions to avoid re-suspension of radioactive material
- Concentration of radioactive material in ash
9
Japan - Path to Restoration and Recovery
Government of Japan has spoken of adopting
international reference levels of 1 to 20 mSv per year
(100 mrem to 2 rem/yr) as a benchmark for restoration
- Prioritize cleanup of areas up to 50 mSv/yr (5 rem/yr) to allow
return of residents by March 2014 {>5 rem/yr may be deferred)
• Schools and other child-sensitive areas
• Agricultural production areas
- Restrictions on planting in highly-contaminated areas
- Research on effects on different plant types
- iterative process to reach 100 mrem/yr or lower will take years
• Localities responsible for areas <100 mrem/yr
- 70,000 square meters of seabed to be covered (cement & clay)
- Next slide shows extent of contamination and significant areas
above 20 mSv per year (bright green and above) io
-------
Special Decon Areas
> 20 mSv/y
11 municipalities
Led by MOEJ
Intsv. Cont.
Sur. Areas
1 to 20 mSv/y
104 municipalities
Led by Prefecture
Qutilnwi uf tfc® Act
Vfiimn tot DisctrtemfmiVeri afth# >u»l irJ Wrvnr
I 5#t«#w gf Che nana MmMUB |
tut* ip»
Cmp»gT^HH>ont» i
Dose are above nat'l background +
medical
Current Goals:
General Public 50% reduction by 08/13
Children 60% reduction by
additional decon of I
iving environment.
1D0 Tgyi, r
28 irSv'r ¦
Sz""""
WBBmm-mmm Nv
|AxtwicMm«Ko«
2& mSitffcr «.i
15:—
ta$rrr
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D Lara tem sAxts me
in ;K>v *
pMr»
O fN» *»fesrva< go**ni*rm*n
!-«¦'» *1is ilfianr#! anrt
(ariwwat bjw if t
Source: OHMURA presentation. May 19, 2012
It
Decon Roadmap for Special Decon Areas
(20 km + > 20 inSv/y)
• Plan developed by March
2012
• Advance decon work for
public facilities (city rsnri
town halls) and
infrastructures (highway,
water facilities)
• Priority given to > 20 mSv/y
and 20 to 50 mSv/y with an
aim of returning evacuees.
• >50 mSv/y used for Decon
projects Source: OHMURA presentation, May 19, 2012
• Policy : focus on areas with
highest exposures first
An3» will >S*fltfn
uHSDCBOOC
12
-------
%. f j Special Dacon Areas (>20 mSv/y)
¦ 25 Proposals - Impacting
*221 ha (=550 acres)
• 12 municipalities
> Decon Projects
• Farmland
• Roads
• Woodlands / forest
• Structures
¦ schools
* railroad stations
* libraries
* playgrounds
* factories
* houses
targeted areas of ire model-ease
deoomaT#iatisr, iemonetrntco Cfojecl ¦* IMs
eft-linns zone and ihe scheduled MWBlBton
1« aI Dec 27, ?011)
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&
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¦mittn.1!
1
- /" mm "Y*j
V - *afis.
UIIUl*
r™ '*?
,e -•
o •tf"
¦ ¦<1L J1 .flL >1,' »¦*".
SBnsf ISHIDA presentation materials, JAEA
Flow churl of actions under the Decontamination Roadmap
W>.0(Xh :
hcmwlmlii •
J
ABcmiI fOOjClotl
monfoofing pronto and
teas of titoosaicnii
. faiiUiinnfi mrnlwi >
C Work siaHa in the ">
• -nfdcT nl tlwsc r
riKrc I be
been conpteted
• «iili rniJkiKxi
mcthtcfa mid
fem*col to war
mower 10
til lurid, building,
etc
ftcpwilng \m
remits
Consul uticds with limiuwiKts wk3
-------
Decontamination Case-Study Model
Chmniii ftcftnduJa nf rlnrnrrtaminaf^nn prr
|«rt
£>h* up rTHxrinrmfl piara
~
-
II,. cw-*:l M nll.ri Dl ll» rnWiWJ
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TT
f*i«y =iani Vir daccnkiinrutc.
Siini ujimiRiUHt or on wifjiurwy"
Coi» d*ax* ittiga Wt>w
Cknu lHr lir—pttuiy UtKlnJw Iw-tU.i
conduct incoiiyrfl
Cc*»»::l pwtl-WKflDiirTnWK*! wWfrg
i :
tviaii -*:srii.u"«j m
i
Work Categories
1. Decor:
2. Temporal Waste Storage
3- Monitoring
Timelines
• 1 month for Prep (includes
stakeholder input)
¦ 1 to 2 months for
Decontamination
l.r*J u< 1.1 |ii».
15
Decontamination Projects
Date and JYIinami-soma C ities
IBII
¦ Houses
¦High Pressure Spray
¦Brushing, etc.
•Gardens
•High pressure spray
•Mowing
•Removal of top soil, etc.
•Rice Fields, dry fields
¦Removal of top soil
¦Poly-ion absorption, etc.
•Forest
•Collecting fallen leaves
•Pruning
¦Removal of topsoil
•Roadside ditch
¦Brushing
¦Grinding, etc.
Decontammaliori
Specific^ ty
assigned
evacuation
f«commendaHD
n house
\
Garten
Dry field
Source: QHMURA presentation. May 19, 2012
16
-------
" , f a Temporary Radioactive Waste Storage
iln.i VjTst jVJU J
tmpormeofolc lay
or <|iwi sbtwt
• t' ¦-'.¦j-' "
ImpermeaDte layer
or liner sheet
Local interim storage capacity sought to facilitate cleanup
Facility to be capable of storing -280 million tons by 2015
Resistance from local communities/officials
Want assurance that facilities will not be permanent
Protec tive ID yet
| Supplemental
layer for wBler
co'UectitMij
Embankment or sandbags
Tank for checking of
rad loach wily concentration
of seeping water
for shielding
Gas discharge
Th»
Drainpipe
Japan: Waste Management Issues and
Lessons Learned
Early estimates from Government of Japan
-30 million tons of soil to be removed in Fukushima Prefecture
- -13% of land area in the prefecture
• Estimated to reach cleanup level of 5 mSv/yr
- ~11,000 square kilometers nationally contaminated >1 mSv/yr
• 3% of land area in Japan
- Storage capacity sought for -90 million cubic meters of soil
• -3 billion cubic feet
• -20% of volume landfilled annually in US
- Incinerator ash up to 8 Bq/g (216 pCi/g) allowed to be landfilled
Local interim storage capacity sought to facilitate cleanup
- Facility to be capable of storing -280 million tons by 2015
- Resistance from local communities/officials 13
- Want assurance that facilities will not be permanent
-------
ppaB Japan — Additional Considerations
an
• Restrictions on distribution of Fukushima products
Meat milk, rice, fish, other
- Fund of >40 billion yen (~$500 million) to restore confidence
- Building materials (e.g.. lumber, stone, aggregate)
• One quarry found highly contaminated
• Atypical waste streams/vectors
- Leaves from forested areas piling up (incineration concerns)
- Wastewater treatment sludge and ash accumulating at facilities
- River transport of contaminated sediments
- Local citizens (not trained workers) doing cleanup/ad hoc disposal
• Uncertain future of contaminated areas
- Power plants likely to be left in place for some period
- Youngest evacuees considered least likely to return
Mixed Reaction Over Plan for Fukushima County to Store
Radioactive Waste (Wainichi Daily News, March 12, 2012)
Three Towns Near Fukushima No. 1 Asked to Store
Radioactive Soil, Waste (Japan Tries, March 11 2012)
Disposal Sites Refuse to Accept 140,000 Tons of Tainted
Waste (Yomiuri Shinbun, March 4. 2012)
86% of Municipalities Reluctant to Accept Debhs from
March Disasters (Mainichi Daily News, March 4, 2012)
6,800 Tons of Radiation-Tainted Straw Left Lying in 8
Prefectures (Matnich Daily News. March 3, 2012)
Radiation Fears Behind Debris Refusal omun Shinbun
November 4, 2011)
No-Go Zone Soil To Be Moved in 2-1/2 Years (Yomiuri
Shinbun, October 12, 2011)
19
1 a Japan - Some Headlines
-Jf
-------
" , f a Japan - Implications for RDD Waste
¦¦I
* While the scale of the Fukushima accident likely exceeds
the impacts from an RDD, several aspects are relevant:
- Cleanup goals will affect the volumes of waste generated
- Decontamination strategies will also affect waste volumes
- Likely to be public pressure to accelerate cleanup
* Desire to return to affected area to live or work
* Prioritizing certain areas/functions (e.g., schools)
- Federal, state, and local roles and responsibilities for decision-
making on cleanup and waste management may create tension
* Local management of waste will be expected
- Initial focus on waste staging, temporary and longer-term interim
storage - disposal likely will take more time
• On April 26, 1986, Unit 4 of the Chernobyl Nuclear
Power Plant suffered catastrophic failure (Level 7 on the
International Nuclear Event Scale)
- Explosion and fire breached containment and spread
radioactivity into the atmosphere and around the world
• Estimated releases up to 8 EBq (8 x 101B Bq)
(excluding noble gases)
- Fuel meltdown
- Several dozen emergency "liquidators" working to put out the fire
died from the effects of radiation
21
" f a Chernobyl - Scenario
22
-------
Chernobyl - Contamination (i of 2)
* Several zones defined for '"contaminated areas" (those
exceeding 1 Curie per square kilometer of Cs-137)
li,Cs&oil
tlcpo sitiun
Dc^kniMiun in
BeLiius
btsiynjtii'ii in
Russian
1 cdaahon
Designation in
Ukraine
lA-biaia(iun in
ihj s report
>7 IK* kliij'lll"
{i-iuW>
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itttd «nnf*fltr *tnrwi
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Ssjrce: Tecsoc 124.C. 2C01
23
Chernobyl - Contamination (2 of 2)
Exclusion Zone
2040 km2 Ukraine
- 2100 km2 Belarus
- 170 Km2 Russia
- -4300 km2 total
Contaminated
area {>1 Ci/km2 of
Cs-137) totals
-140,000 km2
-8,000 km2 of
agricultural land,
-7,000 km2 of
timber land out of
production
j""
Belarus
Russia
*' 1 ;
1 f - ¦ *
U Maine
CnriBOHitCniHl • sua
| Tinit.nii »f ,1
r-t. ii i ¦*»> *¦¦!») ii
• H**MF /IMJ1
«¦* a iwawrt—rtii
limiiN hiip
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24
-------
Chernobyl - Impacts on Population
As of 200CL -350,000 people hod been resettled
-4.5 million living in contaminated areas
- Initial annual dose target of 500 mrem/yr. later changed to 100
- Estimated costs ot 100s of billions in U.S. dollars
T'.ihU* U, V'iyjm indhri'lti.il dow* rofaivnH by population of
jl'tfi li'J lOTtorii". in relation to rurr^nt density of uinUniinjIlon by J,7l's
land
eontimin»bo« by
"Xi, CiW
Atrarags individual doses." received in 196M5 hy residents of
iflklMftimforiH, mSv
Bulling
Ruwa
dkriint
1*5
19
4.2
111
5-15
187
130
244
> 15
4T.0
35.7
31E-
Soww dented faw> UNSCCAfi 2M0. Note. * • e*dudng doses to thyiorf
TaKe satws cumulaUve asses. 1 rnSv - 1 H is ran
Chernobyl - Waste Management
Limited effort to decontaminate except to support reactor
decommissioning (even in populated areas)
- >1 million m3 ot waste generated from rubble, debris, soil
- Trees bulldozed and buned
- -800 burial areas in Ukraine exclusion zone, largely without
characterization or segregation
• "These facilities were established without proper design
documentation and engineered barriers and do not meet
contemporary waste disposal safety requirements" - Chernobyl
Forum
• Vector site to provide upgraded treatment, sorting, packaging, and
disposal capabilities for long- and short-lived waste
- Reactor shelter (sarcophagus) also being upgraded
- Belarus reviewing disposal areas for potential upgrades
26
-------
Gioauia - Scenario
On September 13, 1987,
an abandoned teletherapy
source was removed for
sale as scrap metal
- 1,375 Curies of Cs-137
The source was breached
and resulted in
contamination of people
and property
- Four deaths, 28 radiation
burns, multiple others
exposed
- Radiation measured at 0.4
Sv/h (40 rern/h) at 1 meter
27
Hpflfi Gioauia - Impacts
II
Authorities moved quickly to contain the incident
35 houses found to be contaminated, 41 evacuated
- 45 public places found to be contaminated
- Demolished seven residences and numerous other buildings
- Topsoil removed from large areas
- Total waste generated -3,500 m3 - about 150,00 times the
volume of the original source
- The source was placed in a sack on a chair, which was then
encased in concrete and packed in a special container
Authorities screened many people who were not exposed
- 112,000 people monitored, 249 found with some contamination
- Widespread fear and stigma associated with the incident
BHAZH
PACIFIC
OCEAN
Paulo
CARIBBEAN SEA
28
-------
Goiania — Waste Categorization
Waste from the incident was categorized and segregated
for disposal (time for Cs-137 to reach 87 Bq/g)
Table D 6 waste from Goinrila Accident
CROUP
(Time -
years)
Number
Metallic
Boxes
Volume
Oifi
Number
of Drums
Volume
(mJ)
Storage
Activity *
Total
Volume
(m3>
Current
Activity
(TSqf
I
n=0)
404
686 8
2710
542
0,06
1223,SO
0,03
n
( €' < t * 90)
356
605 2
930
196
0,476
301,20
0,250
III
(90 < t< 150)
287
487 9
314
02,8
1.44
550,70
0.76
IV
(150-= 1 <300)
275
467 5
217
43,4
13,67
510,90
7,19
V
It > 300)
25
42.5
¦n
*
0.4
30
42,90
15,80
Total
1347
2289.9
4223
844.6
45,71
3134.50
24,03
NOTE ' Stoiacm Activity atihi tunaofiioHQf / " Cuniwf Aclrwly aiotfHnh JOOfl.
Source: Natloral Repot of Eraz: ToMtieTKfd Review Cycle or the Join Convents or the Safety ofSpe-it
Fuel Management and on me Safety or Radioactive Waste Management 29
Goiania - Waste Management
ii
Two near-surface repositories were constructed -23 km
from Goiania, near the temporary storage site
- Great Capacity Container for Group I (short-lived) waste
• About 40% of the total volume
• Group I waste could have been released as solid waste
- Goiania Repository for Groups II - V
• More extensive engineered barriers
- Site selected after extensive study
• 189 "preliminary areas" identified
• Narrowed to 18 "potential areas"
• 3 candidate sites selected for final decision
- Repositories opened in 1995
30
-------
"/ , fa Goiania - Waste Disposal Sites
Ftpure D 4 Great CapacHy Cortalnef
Figur* D.»- Fteposl
Thank you
Questions?
Edward A. lupin
Tiipin.edward eoa. gov
202-343-93S3
-------
3K Homeland
V* Security
Wide Area Recovery & Resiliency Program
(WARRP)
Pete Van Voris, Ph.D.
Consultant & Advisor to WAARP
Chemical and Biological Defense Division
Science and Technology Directorate
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
9
Security d Wide Area Recovery and Resiliency Program
Goal:
Working with interagency partners, including federal /state I local I Iribal
governments, mili!ary, private industry and non-profit organizations, develop
solutions to reduce she time and resources required to recover wide urban
areas, military installations, and tKher critical infraslructures following a
catastrophic chemical, biological, or radiological (CBR> incident.
Objectives:
1.Develop/refine guidance, plans, and decision frameworks for long term
recovery 1hai can be leveraged and transitioned b other parts of (he United
States and internabcnalty as applicable.
2.ldentify, develop.'refine, demonstrate, and transition
technologies.'standards that support recovery prioritzabon, planning and
operations.
3.Beteer understand the public health strategies an d challenges related to
long term recovery and recommend changes as needed to public health
guidance and/or plans.
4.Exercise programmatic solutions for CBR recovery
5.Enhance long-term formal coordination between DOD, QMS, DOE, EPA.
and HHS that will be optimized for stakeholder use at the state, regional,
and local levels.
'»!> 4'
DHS <3& l) sponsored program
t=J
-ED -
Coordination St partnership with
the Denver, CO region
teiwAm UM?
2
-------
^ Security WARRP Problem Statement
¦ Collaborative program with the Denver Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI)
and State of Colorado
— Goal: Develop solutions to reduce the time and resources required to recover wide urban
areas, miSitary installations, and other criticai infrastructures following a catastrophic
chemical, biologica:, or radio'ogical (CBR) incident.
— Stakeholders; Interagency partners, including federal /state / loca! /tribal governments,
military, private industry' and non-profit organizations
• WARRP - Resiliency through Partnership
— Program Alignment:
• National Security Strategy goaE to "strengthen security and resilience at home" against
the all hazards threat (May 2010]
• FEMA 2011-2014 Strategic Plan to build the Nation's capacity to stabilize and recover
from a catastrophic event through "Whole Community* approach
— S&T Oeve lo pment:
• Enhanced capabilities for wide area urban recovery from a large-scale CBR incident
• Solutions aItgned with Interagency validated gaps Cist
• Capability Areas: Characterization, Remediation, Clearance, Public: Health
" Q©#®#-4
3
£
scSritvnd Interagency Biological Restoration Demonstration
Goal: Working with interagency partners, including state,
regional & local, to reduce time and resources required to recover
and restore wide urban areas, milrtary installations, and other critical
infrastructures followng a biological incident
DQD (DTRA) & DH5 (S&T) CO-
sponsored program
Objectives:
Study social, economic & operational interdependences
Establish civilian and milrtary coordination
Develop guidance and decision frameworks
Identify & demonstrate technologies that support operations
Exercise activities & available technology solutions
Coordination & partnership with
the Seattle, WA region
-------
^ Homeland
Security Response and Recovery Actions (BW)
IT1' T33I
As defirved by the Office of Science and Technology Policy (Q5TP}
RESFOHSE AMD RECOVERY ACTIVITIES
[GREtIS ktfiKAOEMENTl
FlrCt RMpoa
-------
35 security1*1 BiolMet — consequence management
Vision
Effectively manage the consequences of a biological attack
Objectives
* Develop interoperable military and civilian concepts of operation
* Integrate military and civilian capabilities to detect and
characterize a biological event
* Provide common situational awareness to ensure timely, effective,
and consistent response actions
Homeland
Security
Program Goal
stt
Detection and
Civilian
Capabilities
Collection & Detection
Laboratory Analysis
Modeling
Public Health Monitoring
Decision Support Tools
4
Military
Capabilities
Unified Consequence
Management
For official use only
-------
?K Homeland
ferity 5an Qjego stakeholders are engaged
Military
Navy Region Southwest
— North Island
— 3rd Fieet
— Navy Shipyard
— Emergency Response Coordinator
— Operational Medicine (EPMU-05)
Naval Health Research Center
Camp Pendleton Marine Corps Base
Miramar Field
* NORTHCOM
Civilian
* City of San Diego
— Director of Homeland Security
- Fire and Life Safety Services
- Police Department
* County of San Diego
— Office of Emergency Services
- Department of Public Health
* US Coast Guard
— Joint Harbor Operations
* FBI
* San Diego Regional" Network for Homeland
Security
* California Office of Emergency Services
* California State Department of Public
Health
^ &e5rh^d BioNet will integrate these distinct capabilities
Inacf ctf pi,|j
Increase data collodion on
Evaluata civilian
population
hoaltti data
noft traditional population
Itoalifa indicators
Evaluate military
population
health data
Decision support tools For
com equate a i»mBfn*nt
intOQr ated •> p * r a c i o 11 a I
Check
MllitAryCtiitian
seniors and
pud filters
Coordinated response
-------
Ill sSrity^ BioNet will yield significant benefits through well defined
Science and Technology deliverables
Area
Deliverable
Approach
ConOps
Integrated military/civilian Concepts of
Operation for detection and characterization
Build on BioWatch (ICAP) and JSIPP ConOps, evaluate
through table-top and command post exercises
Area Monitoring
Enhanced operational test and evaluation
environment for area monitoring
Integrate military and civilian area monitoring networks,
conduct OT&E of new sensors, model optimum sensor
placement
Laboratory
Advanced high-throughput laboratory
capabilities, common assays
Conduct side-by-side testing of military and civilian assays,
implement high-throughput lab for surge requirements
Health
Monitoring
Integrated military and civilian health monitoring
system
Integrate de-identified population health data and analysis
tools for military and civilian users, optimize use in conjunction
with area monitoring and other data types
Information
Products
Common operating picture for military and
civilian users
Leverage existing incident management hardware and
software to generate views for diverse users, provide access
to cost effective decision supporttools, including reach-back
System Studies
Cost benefit studies of alternative urban
biosurveillance architectures
Define key architecture questions and evaluate using real-
world (San Diego) and simulated systems
Mobile Detection
Trade-study on fixed vs. mobile detection,
including costs
Conduct benchmark study of alternative approaches using
nationally-recognized panel
>«v Homeland
Hp Security
Conceptual Architecture for BioNet
Science and Technology
External
V Stakeholders
External
Stakeholders )
Environmental
Monitoring Node
Environmental
Monitoring Node
Laboratory
Information
Management
System
Laboratory
nformation
Management
System
Military
Civi nan
Incident
Incident
Mgmt Sys
Mgmt Sys
Decision
Support
System
Decision
Support
System
Population Healtr
Monitoring
Server
Health Monitorinc
System
Reachback
Capability
Reachback
Capability
For Official Use Only
-------
^ &d^nd Programmatic Approach
MncTDiMtaai^
Task
Effort
Capability Target & objective
1
Front-End System Engineeri n? Study and
Saps Analysis
Body of knowledge for nations 1, state, and local
restoration capabilities
2
Wide-Area Recovery Framework
Develop guidance to address civilian & military needs
and capabilities for recovery & restoration actions
3
Science and Technology Development
Recovery process methods, procedures, and
technology development
4
Workshops, Exercises, and
Demons! rations
Coordinate civilian & military community
interoperability, and practical application of technology
and concepts of operation
5
Transition to Use
^ Security WARRP Technical Discussion
Mean neMi^i;
Primary Impact Areas
Targeted End Userfs) Groups
PLANKING -GUIDANCE
1. Denver UASI AII-*S2arcs Regional Recovery
Framework
2. National Urtan Area Recovery Plan
-------
^ Security WARRP Operational Context
T.^ ii *TJ
Metric; Reduce the time and resources required for recovery following a catastrophic CBR incident
Goal: Recovery in 6 months (Current Estimates 18+ Years prior to IBRD and WARRP)
Operational Cofrtert - Wide Area CBR Incident
Easting Capability Gap
PlAftNi Y4G — Technical Planning G dies nee for FEMA. Colorado Depart men", of Emergency Management
National Preparedness
Insufficient processes to:
2 1 Ea ance econom c L ouolic foealfih concerns
2J. Provide tbneJjt Jr. ^iec tiessa-ing during incident
2 4 Manage anc Share cata ir wfde area reca^ry
2 5 Coorcnate oetween federal, state and local stakeholders
23 Haoidiy reconstitute CIKR lifelines
3 2 EstaWisti regional ti jtb-junsdict-onal recovery orjaniational structure
SAMPUM5 and DECONTAMINATION- Tools asd Technologies Tr*ns*t»ns 60 £?A and DoD
Environmental P.e media ban
1_2 Waste minimization 30fides orocesses, ard technologies
i.4 Lade of sensitive and/or rasid screening technologies
1-5 Safe procedures tor owner-occupant oropertf decontamination
IjS Elective, scalaole options for indoor or outdoor de co ntami na t ion
23 Insufficient know edge of decontarr'nart efficacy ard nreak-do#n produces on
urban surfaces
2-5 Insufficient accepted sampin- -nemods for urban oontaT rated materials
2.9 Lack of processHdase d decontamination verrfcatior nettoc to reduce samp ng
and clearance requirements
PUBLIC HEALTH SURVEILLANCE - Collaborative Information Management System Umitira to CDC and DoD
Publ.k Health Monitoring and Surveillance 2.4. Insufficient methods for data management ard scaring in wide-area recovery
IS
^ Homcknd Impact Metrics "Why It Matters"
* Efficiency Impacts
- Significant cost savings ($M-$B) for wide area environmental remediation
of CBR
* More effective, scalable technologies for sampling and decontamination
* More efficient methodologies for technology selection and operation
* Improved waste management practices
* Capability Impact
- Risk reduction for wide area recovery planning
* Improved technical planning guidance for CBR incidents
* Improved coordination amongst federal, state, and local stakeholders
- Increased performance for the rapid recovery of critical infrastructure
* Improved decision support tools for prioritization and technology selection
* More effective, scalable technologies for sampling and decontaminaition
16
-------
^ s^ritynd Impact Metrics "Why It Matters"
~ Return on Investment (ROI) Impact - Customer viewpoint
- Remediation Products (materiel and non-materiel):
• ROI immediate in case of wide area incident — Tools and Products are required nationwide
through FEMA and states by end FV13
• Otherwise, ROI relatively short through enhanced a I hazards planning, coordination, and
operations
- Planning Guidance:
* ROI relativeSy short through enhanced all hazards planning, coordination, and operations
- Public Health Monitoring and Surveillance:
* ROI relatively short through enhanced computing environment for data management,
anaSysis, and sharing
17
^ Security Transition Plan
-------
^ Security WARRP Project Status
!kxrKT w
PHI
FY12
Feb-5ep
System
Study
WuibM>
: I! i i}
Oxtimtimn Jj | s
WAHHC
SLakehnkiBgi
Regional
Frame won
4
Jbi
i
4
AugJdsi
SlelM at CO LtM
National
Guidance
Nddundl Uttan Are* Reluvoip M»n Guii«ni.c Review
FiTBO
1 |
II :,1
«j :J]
5*pJ»12
F£MA
Science.!
Technology
I-1 UUUM L
¦
¦
S&T Ocvekiplnen!
L>evelufimant
(Jrmat &
Aai- CweJUIJ
to£M
£k C£)C
i.uiii
hoduiti n OnEbpirMil 11-e- til un
HHKP iulau
Ft MA
Transition
Agsevnca
i iif.i i m
llmiota IV ii| Lcnlcr lllM'-l
litnllton
MML imnJiill
JPM1&
^ArH/AWftHi |P*j1*S i^Mli D«2fUl)
HFnbvn
JuUfclJ U'A
Wortetops
£ &
T J KriwwleiUB Estancanunl thu rum Oroupa
; * ; Iaa* H«LtLM«l
a 6
'
f
I
3
AAfl Pwckmim.
AiifjOI/
11-1- uf ti> DfcM
Wort
Groups
EnrirMHMmial R«ttietf»alion Op«*dora Work Gi-yup |ERGW6I
Publk HMMi & SwhH Wuiklr* Giwjp |PHMWli|
19
% Scenarios
* Medical Waste Spill of larger proportion
* Source Release - an accident
* Transportation accident of larger proportion
* Terrorist focused on "dirty bomb"
* Terrorist focused on "small device"
* Reactor accident - Chernobyl or Fukushima
* Terrorist focused on a Waste Containment system
- Storage for spent fuel
— Hanford Tanks
* Terrorist Delivery of a full yield "Loose Nuke"
* Worst nightmare
Distrinotion Statement Autborisec to U.5.
Severn TTient Ager»c?es Ority
20
-------
*4 i I > J*"t I r*\ ir rt r* trt- I
auiviugitai uio|Jci i
Device Debris Response
Waste Segregation Issues
August 14 2012
RDD Debris Response
» RDD Device
• Stolen Seed Irradiator
• 2300 Curies Cesium chloride
• 3,000 pounds prilled ammonium nitrate and 6% fuel oil
• Pentaerythritol tetranitrate (PETN) booster
• Stolen detonator cord
-------
RDD Debris Response
Cesium Complicates Management of Debris
• Most electropositive element
• Loses single valence electron
• Forms electrovalent bonds easily
• Combines with nearly all inorganic and organic anions
• Replaces potassium in tissues and cells
• Radiation destroys rapidly dividing cells
RDD Debris Response
» RDD Device
• Explosion near Denver Mint
• Significant debris
• Damaged structures - no fire
• Elevated levels of radiation (up to 5 REM) extending
several hundred feet from explosion
-------
RDD Debris Response
Hazard Assessment
• Residual hazard from contamination of
• Buildings
• Debris
• Turf and trees
• Vehicles
• White goods
RDD Debris Response
Likely Issues of Cesium Contaminated Debris
• Handling large volume of collected vegetation and
building debris and other
• Waste storage of collected contaminated debris
• Waste volume reduction
• Waste treatment of cesium-contaminants
• Soil
• Water
• Other
• Waste Storage/Disposal
-------
RDD Debris Response
Expected Remediation Methods
• Remove ground cover and top few inches soil
• Wash roofs, walls and attempt to contain water
• Remove dissolved cesium by zeolite?
• Remove contaminated debris to temporary debris sites
• Institutional controls for RDD site
« Evacuate people (>o.2mRem)
• Repair of structures/infrastructure damaged by RDD
RDD Debris Response
Denver's Experience with hazardous debris
• Asbestos in soil and buildings
• Parallels to cesium contaminated debris
Containment of contaminated material
Emphasis on avoiding air-bome dispersal
Stringent requirements for transportation and disposal
Need for PPE, personal air monitoring and environmental
testing
-------
RDD Debris Response
Denver's Experience with Hazardous Debris (cont)
• Denver Radium Sites
• Removal of radium tailings from Denver streets
• Road base excavated and transported to Grand view, Idaho,
Clive. Utah, and Deer Trail, Colorado
• Approximately five miles of Denver streets remediated
• Cleanup level (exceeding 2 pCi/g background) of <5 pCi/g Ra-
226 surface; and 15 pCi/g Ra-226
• Institutional controls impossible
RDD Debris Response
Asbestos Removal Techniques
-------
-------
-------
RDD Debris Response
Radium Streets Legacy
• Local (Denver) resources
• 12 B-25 boxes available for transportation of debris
• 200 Super Sacks available for debris handling
• DEH rad monitoring capabilities/equipment
2 Ludlum 12 meters
3 Ludlum 17 meters
¦ 3 Ludlum 19 meters
¦ 2 Ludlum 2241-2 survey meters
24 personal dosimeters
- 4 high volum e air samplers
-------
-------
RDD Debris Response
Denver's Temporary Debris Management Sites
• 25 locations - typically Denver Parks
• Envisioned for catastrophic debris generating event
• Selected for "conventional debris"
• Limited space available for segregation ol waste streams
• One likely site having paved surface
• Facilitate post operations cleanup
• Separated from residential
Final Disposal at DADS
TO—
-------
-------
RDD Debris Response
Site Stabilization and Debris Removal Assumptions
• Rely 011 local resources for initial reconnaissance and
assessment
• Use contractors for debris containment and removal
under Federal supervision with local input/guidance
• Limit first responder missions/contractor cleanup
missions to radiation dose of no more than 5 rein
RDD Debris Response
Debris Storage and Disposal- Concerns
• Denver's Debris Management Plan is silent 011 RDDs
¦ Soluble nature of cesium complicates cleanup
• Small number of local experienced personnel
« Cleanup of private property will require/assistance oversight
• Temporary Storage of Debris
• Limited capacity for storage and segregation
• Presence of contaminated debris encumbers Denver facilities
• Likely would result in long-term environmental
contamination
• Resident opposition for temporary storage of radioactive
debris
-------
RDD Response
Debris Storage and Disposal- Concerns (cont)
• Temporary Storage of Debris
¦ Local activists
¦ Environmental justice for residents in likely temporary disposal
areas
Debris Storage and Disposal
• No local capacity for permanent disposal of
contaminated debiis
• Likely mixed wastes (RCRA, petroleum etc) complicating
disposal options
• Agreement with LTtah for radioactive waste disposal
• Expensive to implement and transportation difficult
-------
p
o
s
Waste Segregation
Methodologies
US EPA WARRP Workshop
o
o
o
o
o
Rick Demmer
Nuclear Materials Characterization
Battelle Energy Alliance
Idaho National Laboratory
*r»« Mirth
C»Ttr«J Attn
— FWJt
V
hi'.^l Riwr-yj
111 Ha Wjr** Tr^nsiyw
nfrwwtlQ Cirfrf
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® 3T»r*5trr» Caliper
B imf FiciJ-)-
Aroi'W ftylant
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MFC
lfir»jTTOrf CcTOt»
569,135 Acr-
AM Square Mih
-------
Objectives
• Introduce our scenario (i.e. what was Rick thinking
about?)
• Introduce the 4 major methods of large scale
characterization/remediation
• Basically develop a common ground about the
technologies
• Discuss the pros and cons of those methods
• Stimulate discussion about other methods
(recategorize new methods if possible)
Thoughts on RDD Contamination
Based on DHS Scenario 11, Radiological Attack (RDD)
• Cs-137 source (2300 Ci), ANFO yield of about 3000
lbs TNT(?)
• 36 city blocks (20 acres) of contamination -5-50
uCi/m2
- EPA's Tests at INL are 42 uCi/m2 Cs-137
- Converts to about 3.5 to 35 Bq/g (1 inch deep)
- Target of -0,01 Bq/g? (30 yr occupational dose)
• Remediation begins more than a month later (and
precipitation is likely)
-------
Five Cases Describing Technologies
* Idaho Chemical Processing Plant {black flakes)
- Small Event
* Painesville, OH Radioactive Scrap Recycling
- Small Area
* Goiania, Brazil
- A Neighborhood
* Johnson Atoll Fallout Contamination
- A Small Island
* Chernobyl (countryside), Ukraine
- Several Countries
INTEC Contamination Case
-------
Remediation of INTEC Contamination
Used Available Eberline 2A instruments
Carried HEPA vacs from hotspot to hotspot
Covered about 50 acres in 2 weeks
Probably 100 people involved
Several tons of waste
SNL (& INL) Variation of Manual
Surveys
* SNL characterization (in-situ) of DU projectiles (lots
of fragments)
* Global positioning
* Nal and LaBr Gamma Nuclide ID
* Computer generated mapping {GIS)
* Unmanned vehicles
-------
Large Area Gamma-Spec System
(LAGS)
• SNL developed
• Takes survey out of the field (ex-situ)
• 33'X33? X-Y table, 3" deep, 10 yd
• About 30 min. count.
ktobo National uabcrtdofy
Painesville, OH - Diamond Magnesium
* Recycled radioactive scrap 1951-1953
* Processing areas and uncovered lay-down yards
* 30 Acre site
* 9,400 cu yd of soil removed, perhaps 25.000 yds
more because increase in contaminated area.
* Typical contamination about 50 Bq/g, up to 500 Bq/g
(U-238)
m
.i A'fPsv
IdatoNrojwl -obo-ntofy
-------
Painesville, OH - Diamond Magnesium
* USACE, 2007 {excavation)
• Segmented Gate System (SGS) for Segregation
Goiania, Brazil
• 9/13/1987
• Scrapyard workers break
open CsCI capsule
* 6 died (including 6 yr old)
* 249 people significantly
Contaminated.
\ *
fl <£r
'is> K..
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Of""""*"- _
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Goiania City
i
-
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Hospital
Initial Location
-------
Goiania, Brazil Remediation
* Personal items deconned
* Everything else from neighborhood knocked down,
dug up and removed
IML
te'io Notion? Lcowoti
OTQKW
Johnston Atoll Fallout Contamination
24 acre Pu-239 & Am-241 contaminated area
Contaminated intentional destruction of a nuclear
missile (not detonation)
Contamination up to 5000 Bq/g ^
Cleanup target 0.5 Bq/g
Growth of
Johnston Island
iNL
Ills
Idaho Noscnol ujboraiofy
-------
Johnston Atoll Fallout Contamination
• Used Segmented Gate System 1990-1998
* Contaminated soil diverted to water wash system
(fines continued disposal)
* Overall efficiency of 98%
• SGS + equipment (incl front loader) $1.2M
Chernobyl (countryside), Ukraine
* 4/26/1986
* Released 20 tBq contam.
* Areas in red are -1 uCi/m2
- -1.5 Bq/g (Cs-137,
Propagated over 1")
Horif'Dl
EUROPE
Soil cantiiinin«tion
•trior dL'ticlunl
¦¦ CmtJu'i" 117
lull* IJ'tl M .11
•i.HN »>•> k»t i
wg^siA
kioho Nffliond Idbonfloiy
-------
Chernobyl (countryside), Ukraine
* Typical remediation is either "triple" dig, or plow
IdabNoteraluibaQlcHy
Chernobyl Typical Technologies
TrchniijBr
f JTrvtitnucsa. % iw>ik4
A-jrif oinfjimiaal*in
IjH JlB|ULt
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12 (»d Jepoabuul
ami
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meta
wm mhii riiKBip
• w*3k, 25 iRjft
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100
Rjoof nroli irzcii
100
Fli wisg u»J In Vj uii
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IMl ¦ tatfnNo^rd xfcoTray
-------
The Technologies
Alternative
Cost
Safety
Effectiveness
Throughput
Manual S^jrveyYacuan
I2Q0K
Moderate
Moderate
tons/wk
tetorruted Survey
S50OK
Moderate
Moderate
10-100 tons/wk
LAGS
S30OK
Moderate
Good
10 tons/day
SGS
SI.OCDK
Hiqh
Good
up to 500 ton/day
DiCi'Plow
S?
Low
Moderate
tonsMay
Baseline Digi'Ha'J
SI.DOOK
High
Good
1000 ton/day
Soil Wasfrig
S30OK
High
Good
20 ton/day
Costs/Savings Add Up With SGS/CVL
• Conventional Hispmal Casts (Dig urid Haul);
» tacavaliuiL'Screerung = JI00/yd3
» TraiiajKination = 53UQi'_yd3
• swhiJiMiian/SoiuiiticatHKi •
i l)ii|w»iil (BbvIibcwv) * iiiS/jiP
• Total llnll CoM ¦ J833^
• Told CW/IOOK ytl3 ¦ S82.JM
Pi>|l> SGS/CVI..
• EicavnrloiVScTwmrij: SKMVyil1
Applied 1a LOO'S- of Volume: SlOOxIflO.OWl » SIOM
• Soil E'rDC-esiisn^ vLa SOS S55i'VTd^*
Applied m IK)1® til volume' SSSxlDflvOOW* 55.5M
- Wut Chcntmry SJSOi'yJ '
Applied to 20$ of volume: 5250*20,ODO ¦ $5M
• Disnoiwi! (SovlrocBfe ~ Triiwran); S2i5.'yd3
Applied in of volume $J25M,01Xl= SJM
• Tainl Ca«*/IG«K yd-1 - DliM
Potential Cofil Sa vines for I 00,809 j<3 suit Miteed* J.6UM
TlwnuiNitfi^t^t i|iiiiig -.,1' V JM ifiir l'ii ii y.l SJiSM'^llilHiO -
Rsmatflatlon of Lfranlujn-ccmtanilnateHI! Soil Using SGS and CVLTMltnlqu&a: Cost
Effectiveness Study
Mar* Cummwgs, Stevan Booth. LANL, LA-
Mart cunmMBS
-------
UMTRA Remediation
• Radioactive Uranium ore tailings used in many
areas
• 8 Uranium Mill Tailing sites excavated and removed
to off-site disposal cells
• 1 (Melba, Co) excavated and used on-site cell
• >4000 properties were remediated
• $75M initial
A Word From Our Sponsors
* BMI/INL have a terrific basis for testing technologies
o Urban RDD Decon (TTEP)
• EPA. DHS, Environment Canada, etc
o IND fallout testing
o BOTE (biological decon)
• INL is developing a depth profile system {lacking
funds, looking for support)
o Uses highly collimated gamma detectors/
modeling
IddwNaticrol
-------
p
o
E
o
"o
o
o
RDD Soil Cleanup
Criteria
US EPA WARRP Workshop, August
14-15,2012
Rick Demmer
Nuclear Materials Characterization
Battelle Energy Alliance
Idaho National Laboratory
iNl
What are Criteria About?
• Everything we do involves identifying and weighing
criteria
* Taking a new job
• Is salary the most important thing, location,
schools, church?
* Buying a new car
• Fuel mileage, acceleration, color?
• Engineering analyses were new to this Analytical
Chemist until 1991.
* I've come to know and love(?) them
-------
Impacts ori Criteria
• Type of contaminant (radionuclide, chemical
nature and physical form)
• Type of substrate (which building material and
configuration)
• Weather conditions
• Desired endpoint levels
Ull kktbo Notional uibcrtdafy
General About Criteria
* Criteria can be subjective or objective
• We can have some discussion
* Gut checks are OK, but need to be based on a
criteria
m
-------
Criteria for Underwater Coatings
• Easy to apply
• Adhere well to the four surfaces of interest
• Can not change or have a negative impact on
water chemistry or clarity
• Can not be hazardous in final applied form
• Proven in other underwater applications,
High pigment or high cross-link density to
prevent radiation damage
.Idaho National lab
Wash Water Minimization Criteria
10.1 Functions
Nsr-HzILu hazzjdi
MaximiM byproduct: raaoval
y-r,i~
\r--,
Danauvtrvta nc rmatal : an ram ma hob
Saasrvi reactivity
L ocks imaaaatf sodsna
E &£ni waits ssrumi
Manaesi expectations uriih rogalator
T: a-ar—iina finzl reactor sad-ins (assotiiaDa; witi DOE ;
Pa i a vara the pricjjy Tint iftat claming
10.2 Criteria "Wants"
V'-ir-.» xadixdca icit
Mimawi hinrda
V - ir—ira VchffiM
M-riir-ire cost
ELagnlilary accs-gczare
M"nirrire iiaprcrs to foRcw D
-------
Wash Water Minimization Criteria
Alternative
Cost
Schedule
Dose
Effectiveness
Future Impact
Weighting of Criteria
26
11.5
31
19
12.5
Optimized (OBA)
24
24
24
25
24
High Temp Steam
23
22
22
21
21
Grout
19
21
21
16
16
Partial Fill and Steam
17
16
16
15
15
No Action
18
18
18
10
10
Baseline
15
15
11
17
17
¦ Scored 1-25 for each criteria
• Multiplied by weight
Criteria for Decontamination
Criteria Eye
Chart
__J mrta 1
| J'
rrt"
I I wm
-------
Criteria for Decontamination
Main Criteria
* Performance
* Waste Considerations
* Environmental/Safety/Health
* Costs
* Remote usefulness
Drilling Down on Performance
Criteria -1
• Performance
• Operability/Simplicity
• Utilities availability
• Training requirements
• Setup time
• Preconditioning
• Cleanup time
• Maintenance requirements
• Labor required(#}
• Flexibility
-------
Drilling Down on Performance
Criteria - 2
• Performance
* Development Necessary
• Success Probability
• Necessary Test Facilities
• Times Required
• Ability to Patent/License
lid kktbo National abends
Drilling Down on Performance
Criteria - 3
• Performance
• Efficiency
• Rate
• Effectiveness (Df, or percent removal)
Versatility (high levels/low levels, different
n-
iNL taes'to Notroncr laboratory
media)
-------
Suggested Criteria for RDD Cleanup
I
: Bm.1
iiMwti) dfr.ititmftr,
I OtMkFI MM
RDD Cleanup Criteria -1
• Technical Performance
* Operability/Simplicity/Maintenance {!_)
* Separation Efficiency (H)
* Waste Type and Secondary Volume (WAC-H, L)
* Maturity
* Versatility for Different Media (H)
^Ujyh, lialw Naiiofiol uabonakKy
-------
RDD Cleanup Criteria - 2
• Safety/Health/Environmental
* Permitting Requirements (L>
* Intrinsic Safety Analysis (L)
• PPE vs Engineered controls
* ALARA Considerations (L)
• Reduced dose/exposure
RDD Cleanup Criteria - 3
• Costs
* Equipment/Capital Costs (L)
* Labor (L)
* Supplies (L)
* Utilities (L)
* Development/Modification {maturity for use) (L)
-------
RDD Cleanup Criteria - 4 simplified
• Cost
• Throughput
• Expected removal
• Overall hazard mitigation
Better Slice and Dice
Alt&rnatJve
S af&ty. Health &
Environmental
Time to
Implement
Technical
PBfformance
Availability
Costs
28
26
21
IS
10
In-s.'Jjj rcvnocfurxvi
jbI Surrey-Vacuum
*iiETOll!td SWYeyiVaCUUTTI
LAGSftacuuir
S6*TO®lBIBkr*.'
-------
AStemative
Safety, Health &
T'mie to
Technical
Availabhity
Costs
Environmental
implement
Performance
28
26
21
IS
10
M-siiii ramovaf
_3itn
xr. er iHEPAi
loi attar
Scatller
_3roa scale ao and sau
1 Survey/Characterization
-Manual
-Automated
2 Removal
-Baseline Cut&Gut
-Turf Cutter
vs
Non-removal
Dig Plow/Bury
3 Treatment
Treat and Replace
4 Disposal
Treat & Dispose
-------
How to perform weighting
• EPA Weighted Sum Method
• Used in waste min evaluation
• Uses Low/Medium/High
* Low - little impact on effectiveness, difficult to
use, high cost
* Medium - moderate impact on effectiveness,
moderate difficulty, medium cost
* High - high impact, little difficulty, low cost
How to perform weighting
* Maximum score of 30 (highly desirable impact)
* H-30, M-20, L-10
* We will use different colored dots that Rachel will
hand out.
* Scores will be normalize to 100% for each "criteria
set"
-------
Standard Operational Guideline
and
Discussion of Path Forward
Rachel Sell, Battelle
Waste Screening and Waste Minimization
Methodologies Project
SME Meeting August 14 - 15, 2012
1
Standard Operational Guideline (SOG)
• Describes the use of the selected waste screening
technologies, techniques, and regulations to
facilitate waste minimization activities to rapidly
screen and segregate radiologically-contaminated
waste and debris that is moved from the hot zone of
an RDD incident into a waste staging area.
- Resulting SOG will be included in WARRP planning documentation
• Goal is to give guidance, without being too
prescriptive
• Have examples (1) Missouri DA Carcass Disposal
and (2) Delaware/Contagious Disease Containment
Measures Plan
-------
SOG - Preliminary Content Areas
• Envisioned Content/Outline
- Purpose (to provide guidelines)
- Planning Assumptions (for an RDD event)
- Agencies Roles and Responsibilities/Direction and Control
- Health and Safety
- Training
- Staging
- Equipment to be used
- Disposal
- Communication
- Quality Assurance/Quality Control
- Public Information
- Mental Health Services
Discussion of Path Forward
Task
October
September
August
FY12
Literature
Review
Task 1
1
Preliminary list of packaging,
segregation, and screening technologies
directed at radiologically contaminated
materials, particularly soils
Tues, August 14
i 1
Annotated spreadsheet with literature
review results
(September 14)
SME
Meeting
Task 2
Preliminary List of
criteria to
consider for
technologies
Tues, August 14
Draft SME Meeting
Report -
Submitted to EPA
within 2 weeks
after SME meeting
Revised SME
Meeting Report -
within 2 weeks
after receipt of
SME comments
Final SME Meeting
Report - within 6 weeks
after receipt of EPA
comments
SOG
Task 3
Draft SOG -
Submitted to EPA within mid to end of
September. Distribute to SME
participants.
SOG in Review
[Final SOG (beyond
October date) - Review
will occur within
program offices .
Battelle - will finalize
SOG within 30 days of
receipt of EPA review
comments.]
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SEPA
United States
Environmental Protection
Agency
PRESORTED STANDARD
POSTAGE & FEES PAID
EPA
PERMIT NO. G-35
Office of Research and Development (8101R)
Washington, DC 20460
Official Business
Penalty for Private Use
$300
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