Review of Agency Draft Entitled Expansion and Upgrade of the Radnet Air Monitoring Network Vol 1 2 Concept and Plan 2005 Working Review Draft Report #1 March 9, 2006


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SAB Working Review Draft Report dated March 9, 2006 for RAC RadNet Review Panel Edits - Do Not Cite or Quote. This working
review draft is a work in progress, does not reflect consensus advice or recommendations, has not been reviewed or approved by the
RAC's RadNet Review Panel or the Chartered SAB, and does not represent EPA policy.

EPA-SAB-RAC-06-xxx

The Honorable Stephen L. Johnson
Administrator

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
1200 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, DC 20460

Subject: Review of Agency Draft entitled "Expansion and Upgrade of the
RadNet Air Monitoring Network, Vol. 1 &2, Concept and Plan,"
2005

Dear Administrator Johnson:

The Radiation Advisory Committee's (RAC) RadNet Review Panel of the
Science Advisory Board has completed its review of the Agency's draft entitled
"Expansion and Upgrade of the RadNet Air Monitoring Network, Vol. 1 &2, Concept
and Plan, " dated 2005.

The Panel commends the Agency	(continue)	

The Panel recommends	(continue)	

The Panel finds that there is a need to	(continue)	

In summary, the SAB finds that the draft entitled "Expansion and Upgrade of the
RadNet Air Monitoring Network, Vol. 1 &2, Concept and Plan, " dated 2005 is an
important document that 	(continue)	

The Panel appreciates the opportunity to review this draft document. We hope
that the recommendations contained herein will enable EPA to enhance the RadNet Air
Monitoring Network and ensure its essential service to the public. We look forward to
your response to the recommendations contained in this Advisory, and in particular to the
items raised in this letter to you.

- - Working Review Draft Report #1 - -
March 9, 2006

Text to be provided at a later date.

Sincerely,

Dr. M. Granger Morgan
Chair

Science Advisory Board

Dr. Jill Lipoti

Chair, RAC RadNet Review Panel
Science Advisory Board

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SAB Working Review Draft Report dated March 9, 2006 for RAC RadNet Review Panel Edits - Do Not Cite or Quote. This working
review draft is a work in progress, does not reflect consensus advice or recommendations, has not been reviewed or approved by the
RAC's RadNet Review Panel or the Chartered SAB, and does not represent EPA policy.

NOTICE

This report has been written as part of the activities of the EPA Science Advisory Board
(SAB), a public advisory group providing extramural scientific information and advice to
the Administrator and other officials of the Environmental Protection Agency. The SAB
is structured to provide balanced, expert assessment of scientific matters related to
problems facing the Agency. This report has not been reviewed for approval by the
Agency and, hence, the contents of this report do not necessarily represent the views and
policies of the Environmental Protection Agency, nor of other Agencies in the Executive
Branch of the Federal government, nor does mention of trade names of commercial
products constitute a recommendation for use. Reports of the SAB are posted on the
EPA website at http://www.epa.gov/sab.

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SAB Working Review Draft Report dated March 9, 2006 for RAC RadNet Review Panel Edits - Do Not Cite or Quote. This working
review draft is a work in progress, does not reflect consensus advice or recommendations, has not been reviewed or approved by the
RAC's RadNet Review Panel or the Chartered SAB, and does not represent EPA policy.

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
Science Advisory Board
Radiation Advisory Committee (RAC) RadNet Review Panel

CHAIR

Dr. Jill Lipoti, Director, Division of Environmental Safety and Health, New Jersey
Department of Environmental Protection, Trenton, NJ

MEMBERS

Dr. Bruce Boecker, Scientist Emeritus, Lovelace Respiratory Research Institute,
Albuquerque, NM

Dr. Antone L. Brooks, Professor, Radiation Toxicology, Washington State University
Tri-Cities, Richland, WA

Dr. Gilles Y. Bussod, Chief Scientist, New England Research, Inc., White River
Junction, VT

Dr. Brian Dodd, Consultant, Las Vegas, NV

Dr. Shirley A. Fry, M.B., B. Ch., MPH, Consultant, Indianapolis, IN

Dr. William C. Griffith, Associate Director, Institute for Risk Analysis and Risk
Communication, Department of Environmental and Occupational Health Sciences,
University of Washington, Seattle, WA

Dr. Helen Ann Grogan, Cascade Scientific, Inc., Bend, OR

Dr. Richard W. Hornung, Director of Biostatistics and Data Management, Cincinnati
Children's Hospital Medical Center, Division of General and Community Pediatrics,
Cincinnati, OH

Mr. Richard Jaquish, Health Physicist, (Retired),Washington State Department of
Health Statistics, Richland, WA

Dr. Janet A. Johnson, Past Chair RAC, Senior Technical Advisor, MFG, Inc.,
Carbondale, CO

Dr. Bernd Kahn, Professor Emeritus, School of Nuclear Engineering and Health
Physics, Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta, GA

Dr. Jonathan M. Links, Johns Hopkins University, Bloomberg School of Public Health,
Baltimore, MD

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SAB Working Review Draft Report dated March 9, 2006 for RAC RadNet Review Panel Edits - Do Not Cite or Quote. This working
review draft is a work in progress, does not reflect consensus advice or recommendations, has not been reviewed or approved by the
RAC's RadNet Review Panel or the Chartered SAB, and does not represent EPA policy.

Dr. Gary M. Sandquist, Professor, Mechanical Engineering/Nuclear Engineering
Department, College of Engineering, University of Utah, Salt Lake City, UT

Dr. Richard J. Vetter, Head, Radiation Safety Program, Mayo Clinic, Rochester, MN

Ms. Susan Wiltshire, Vice President Emeritus, JK Research Associates, Inc., S.
Hamilton, MA

SCIENCE ADVISORY BOARD STAFF

Dr. K. Jack Kooyoomjian, Designated Federal Officer, US EPA, Science Advisory
Board (1400F), 1200 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW, Washington, DC, 20460

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SAB Working Review Draft Report dated March 9, 2006 for RAC RadNet Review Panel Edits - Do Not Cite or Quote. This working
review draft is a work in progress, does not reflect consensus advice or recommendations, has not been reviewed or approved by the
RAC's RadNet Review Panel or the Chartered SAB, and does not represent EPA policy.

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
Science Advisory Board

CHAIR

Dr. M. Granger Morgan, Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PA
SAB MEMBERS

[NOTE: This space is reserved for listing the Charter Board members — KJK],

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SAB Working Review Draft Report dated March 9, 2006 for RAC RadNet Review Panel Edits - Do Not Cite or Quote. This working
review draft is a work in progress, does not reflect consensus advice or recommendations, has not been reviewed or approved by the
RAC's RadNet Review Panel or the Chartered SAB, and does not represent EPA policy.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

[NOTE: To be Generated , but see below for current format and subject titles — KJK.]

1.	EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

2.	INTRODUCTION

2.1	Background

2.2	Charge to the RAC RadNet Review Panel

2.3	Acknowledgement and Overview

3.	PROPOSED UPGRADES AND EXPANSIONOF RadNet
MONITORING NETWORK

3.1	Issues with respective role of fixed and deployable monitors

3.2	Issues with the monitors themselves

3.3	Potential sampling biases in the fixed air monitor

3.4	Measurement of external photon radiation fields

3.5	Measurement of alpha emitters at fixed stations

3.6 Need for numerical clarity and transparency

3.6.1	Value of the Protective Action Guide (PAG)

3.6.2	Relation of the EPA-specified MDA value to the PAG for fixed-
location monitor

3.6.3	Calculation of the MDA values for the fixed-location monitor

4.	REASONABLENESS OF OVERALL APPROACH FOR SITING
MONITORS

4.1	Issues with siting

4.2	Issues with data analysis and management

4.3	Issues with communication of RadNet output

4.3.1	Communication with decision makers

4.3.2	Communication with the public

4.3.3	Units for communication

4.3.4	Communicating risk

4.3.5	Other factors that complicate accurate communication

4.3.6	Preparing for communications in an emergency

4.4	Issues with analysis and testing of the RadNet Plan

4.5	Other Issues

5.	OVERALL APPROACH FOR SITING MONITORS

5.1	Background

5.2	Charge Question #2

5.2.1	Population-based vs geographic-based siting

5.2.2	Fixed vs deployable monitor networks

5.3	Charge Question #2a

5.3.1 Meteorological constraints

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SAB Working Review Draft Report dated March 9, 2006 for RAC RadNet Review Panel Edits - Do Not Cite or Quote. This working
review draft is a work in progress, does not reflect consensus advice or recommendations, has not been reviewed or approved by the
RAC's RadNet Review Panel or the Chartered SAB, and does not represent EPA policy.

TABLE OF CONTENT: CONTINUED

5.3.2	Gaps in coverage

5.3.3	Uncertainty in number of near-term fixed monitors

5.3.4	Mission priority

5.3.5	Integration with existing networks

5.3.6	Other questions

5.4	Charge Question #2b

5.4.1	Model requirements

5.4.2	Practical issues

5.4.3	Vertical siting

5.4.4	Effective use of resources

5.5	Charge Question #2c

5.5.1	Mobile unit storage

5.5.2	Pre-Deployment

5.5.3	Personnel training

5.5.4	Flexible response to incident scenarios

5.5.5	Other concerns

5.6	Charge Question #2d

5.6.1	Near-term network shortage

5.6.2	Scenario dependence

6. OVERALL PROPOSALS FOR DATA MANAGEMENT

6.1 Overview response to Charge Question #3

6.4	Response to Charge Question #3c

6.4.1	Review and evaluation of data

6.4.2	Communication to decision makers and the public

6.4.3	Communication with decision makers

6.4.4	Communication with the public

6.4.5	Units for communication

6.4.6	Communicating risk

6.4.7	Other factors that complicate accurate communication

6.4.8	Preparing for communication in an emergency

6.5	Response to Charge Question #3d
REFERENCES

APPENDIX A - Description of the SAB Process

A-l Request for EPA Science Advisory Board (SAB) Review
A-2 Panel Formation

A-3 Panel Review Process and Review Documents

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SAB Working Review Draft Report dated March 9, 2006 for RAC RadNet Review Panel Edits - Do Not Cite or Quote. This working
review draft is a work in progress, does not reflect consensus advice or recommendations, has not been reviewed or approved by the
RAC's RadNet Review Panel or the Chartered SAB, and does not represent EPA policy.

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2	APPENDIX

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4	APPENDIX

B - BIOSKETCHES
C - ACRONYMS

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SAB Working Review Draft Report dated March 9, 2006 for RAC RadNet Review Panel Edits - Do Not Cite or Quote. This working
review draft is a work in progress, does not reflect consensus advice or recommendations, has not been reviewed or approved by the
RAC's RadNet Review Panel or the Chartered SAB, and does not represent EPA policy.

1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

[NOTE: To be generated — KJK]

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SAB Working Review Draft Report dated March 9, 2006 for RAC RadNet Review Panel Edits - Do Not Cite or Quote. This working
review draft is a work in progress, does not reflect consensus advice or recommendations, has not been reviewed or approved by the
RAC's RadNet Review Panel or the Chartered SAB, and does not represent EPA policy.

2. INTRODUCTION

2.1 Background

RadNet is the nation's only comprehensive radiation monitoring network, with
more than 200 sampling stations located throughout the United States. Since its inception
in 1973, RadNet has continuously monitored multiple media, including air precipitation,
surface water, drinking water, and milk. EPA is proposing a plan for upgrading and
expanding the air monitoring component of RadNet. The plan is designed to go beyond
the original mission for just providing information on nuclear or radiological accidents.
The mission now includes homeland security concerns and the special problems posed by
possible intentional releases of radiation to the nation's environment.

EPA's plan proposes new air monitoring equipment, more monitoring stations,
more flexible responses to radiological and nuclear emergencies, significantly reduced
response time, and much improved processing and communication of data. The ultimate
goal of RadNet air monitoring is to provide timely, scientifically sound data and
information to decision makers and the public.

It is important to note that formal planning for RadNet began in the mid 1990's
when the Office of Radiation and Indoor Air (ORIA) initiated a comprehensive
assessment of RadNet to determine if the system was meeting its objectives and if the
objectives were still pertinent to EPA's mission. The first Radiation Advisory
Committee advisory, in 1995, concentrated on an ORIA proposed preliminary design for
a RadNet reconfiguration plan. The second RAC advisory, in 1997, examined the
reconfiguration plan for RadNet that was developed, in large part, based in the guidance
from the previous advisory.

In 1999 and 2000, three events took place that placed the RadNet national air
monitoring component on emergency status, and confirmed some lessons on limitations
in the existing system. The three events were the Tokaimura, Japan criticality incident,
the fire near the DOE's Los Alamos National Laboratory, and the fire near the DOE's
Hanford Reservation. The Tokaimura incident highlighted the fact that the air system
was not designed to detect noble gases. The two fires underscored the limitations of
having low sampling density and the relatively slow system response time. Air filters
had to be shipped to NAREL for analyses, and it took several days for definitive data to
reach decision makers and the public.

In 2001, well before September 11, 2001 (9/11), ORIA began working on a new
vision for national radiation monitoring. In August of 2001, the design team announced
their goals, and was well along in their planning. The terrorist attacks on the United
States on September 11, 2001 expedited and strongly influenced the subsequent planning
for updating and expanding RadNet. The design team decided to concentrate on the air
monitoring portion of RadNet, and came up with the idea to have a series of deployable

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SAB Working Review Draft Report dated March 9, 2006 for RAC RadNet Review Panel Edits - Do Not Cite or Quote. This working
review draft is a work in progress, does not reflect consensus advice or recommendations, has not been reviewed or approved by the
RAC's RadNet Review Panel or the Chartered SAB, and does not represent EPA policy.

monitors that could be positioned flexibly to augment the fixed locations and to add real-
time monitoring capability to the fixed locations.

Since deployable monitors had already been planned prior to September 11, 2001
and they could be procured more quickly, the first available homeland security funding
(late in 2001) was committed to the acquisition. OIRA then turned its attention to the
system of fixed monitors with testing of a prototype in 2002. By 2003, EPA had decided
that the prototype had demonstrated the technical feasibility of adding real time gamma
and beta monitoring capability to the fixed air monitoring stations. A proposal was
submitted to the capital budget for upgrading and expanding the fixed air monitoring
station component of RadNet, and, after evaluation by the Office of Management and
Budget, was funded in the FY 04 budget. An actual purchase was made in 2005.

The RadNet project is currently in the early implementation phase. The first fixed
monitor has been received, tested, and is installed at Montgomery. A set of deployable
monitors has been acquired and 20 have been delivered to ORIA labs in Montgomery and
20 in Las Vegas. The information technology infrastructure is in place for handling real-
time data.

The next steps include the national siting plan (where to put the fixed monitors),
how to distribute and operate the deployables under emergency conditions, and the best
protocols for dissemination of verified RadNet data during emergencies. EPA requested
that the Radiation Advisory Committee (RAC) provide input for these next steps.

2.2 Charge to the RAC RadNet Review Panel

The Agency's Office of Radiation and Indoor Air is requesting that the EPA
Science Advisory Board review and provide advice on a draft document entitled
"Expansion and Upgrade of the RadNet Air Monitoring Network, (Volume 1&2) Concept
and Plan, " dated October 2005. EPA seeks comments on the following specific charge
questions:

Charge Question 1: Are the proposed upgrades and expansion of the RADNET air
monitoring network reasonable in meeting the air network's objectives?

Charge Question 2: Is the overall approach for siting monitors appropriate and
reasonable given the upgraded and expanded system's objectives?

2a) Is the methodology for determining the locations of the fixed monitors

appropriate given the intended uses of the data and the system's objectives?

2b) Are the criteria for the local siting of the fixed monitors reasonable given the

need to address both technical and practical issues?

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SAB Working Review Draft Report dated March 9, 2006 for RAC RadNet Review Panel Edits - Do Not Cite or Quote. This working
review draft is a work in progress, does not reflect consensus advice or recommendations, has not been reviewed or approved by the
RAC's RadNet Review Panel or the Chartered SAB, and does not represent EPA policy.

2c) Does the plan provide sufficient flexibility for placing the deployable monitors
to accommodate different types of events?

2d) Does the plan provide for a practical interplay between the fixed and
deployable monitors to accommodate the different types of events that would
utilize them?

Charge Question 3: Given that the system will be producing near real-time data, are the
overall proposals for data management appropriate to the system's objectives?

3 a) Is the approach andfrequency of data collection for the near real-time data
reasonable for routine and emergency conditions?

3b) Do the modes of data transmission from the field to the central database
include effective and necessary options?

3 c) Are the review and evaluation of data efficient and effective considering the
decision making and public information needs during an emergency?

3d) Given the selected measurements systems are the quality assurance and
control procedures appropriate for near real-time data?

2.3 Acknowledgement and Overview

The RAC RadNet Review Panel met in Montgomery, AL at the National Air and
Radiation Environmental Laboratory (NAREL) on December 14 -16, 2005 to consider
these charge questions. The location was important to facilitate discussion of the system
since members could see (and touch) the prototype fixed monitor and the deployable
monitors. RAC members were able to maximize the interaction with staff that had been
involved in the project at NAREL since they were all available at the meeting. This face
to face interaction was integral to the RAC RadNet Review Panel's understanding of the
thought processes during design of the system. The hands-on aspect of being able to
directly experience the fixed and deployable monitors was also essential. RAC RadNet
Review Panel members even commented on the noise associated with the monitors in
operation as part of the siting criteria. The RAC RadNet Review Panel wishes to express
their sincere thanks to the NAREL staff in accommodating their needs during the meeting
and making the meeting as productive as possible.

The RAC RadNet Review Panel wishes to commend ORIA on the planning that
went into this meeting. The document "Expansion and Upgrade of the RadNet Air
Monitoring Network {Volume 1&2) Concept and Plan, " 2005 was well-written and
provided much needed background to the RAC's RadNet Review Panelists. During the
meeting, the staff worked hard to augment this excellent document with additional pieces
of information that the committee members felt were necessary to assist with the review.
The staff took extreme care to honor all of the RAC's requests and demonstrated their
patience as RAC RadNet Review Panel members struggled to understand all that went

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SAB Working Review Draft Report dated March 9, 2006 for RAC RadNet Review Panel Edits - Do Not Cite or Quote. This working
review draft is a work in progress, does not reflect consensus advice or recommendations, has not been reviewed or approved by the
RAC's RadNet Review Panel or the Chartered SAB, and does not represent EPA policy.

into the decisions on equipment, siting and deployment strategies, and anticipated data
uses.

3. PROPOSED UPGRADES AND EXPANSION OF RadNet
MONITORING NETWORK

Charge Question 1: Are the proposed upgrades and expansion of the RadNet air
monitoring network reasonable in meeting the air network's objectives?

In its briefing document, EPA stated the mission and objectives of the expanded
and upgraded RadNet monitoring network as (in paraphrased form):

•	Provide data on baseline levels of radiation in the environment;

•	To the extent practicable, maintain readiness to respond to emergencies by
collecting information on ambient levels capable of revealing trends;

•	During events, provide credible information to public officials (and the public)
that evaluates the immediate threat and the potential for long-term effects; and

•	Ensure that data generated are timely and are compatible with other sources.

We believe, in general, that the proposed expansions and upgrades significantly
enhance the ability of the RadNet monitoring network to meet this mission and
objectives. However, in making this statement, we are concerned about a number of
specific issues, which are detailed below.

3.1 Issues with respective roles of fixed and deployable monitors

Current plans for the upgraded RadNet system of air monitoring instruments call
for a system comprising 180 fixed samplers and 80 deployable samplers. The 80
deployable units have been purchased and are available for deployment from the National
Air and Radiation Environmental Laboratory (NAREL) in Montgomery and the
Radiation and Indoor Environments National Laboratory (RIENL) in Las Vegas.
Procurement of the fixed monitors is in progress, but the full complement of 180
samplers is not projected to be completed for a number of years. Both types of units will
be needed in response to a major airborne release of radionuclides. It is planned that the
deployable units will be used to expand the sampling network of interest around the site
of a known airborne release. As discussed below, deployable units could also be used
routinely in the near future to expand the fixed station network until more fixed sampling
units can be obtained.

The objectives above identify two basic operational scenarios: "routine" and
"emergency" (i.e., a radiological 'incident,' whether accidental or intentional). In

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practice, the necessary monitoring data to characterize the radioactivity/radiation
'environment' in these two basic scenarios exists at multiple levels of scale or
"resolution." For the sake of simplicity, we identify three levels: large (multi-state; 100s
to 1000s of miles), regional (10s to 100s of miles), and local (miles).

Routine (also called baseline) monitoring is predominately a large-scale activity.
The purpose of this monitoring is to characterize, on an on-going basis, the ambient
radiation environment in space and time. For this purpose, air monitoring needs to be
supplemented with existing other RadNet-based media sampling, including water and
milk sampling.

Emergency monitoring requires data inputs at all three levels of scale. Large- and
regional-scale data are used to track major releases, typically from nuclear power plant
accidents or detonation of an improvised nuclear device (rather than from a Radiological
Dispersion Device, RDD). Local data are most relevant for RDD events, and help
determine evacuation vs. shelter-in-place decisions. For such decision-making, real-time
data are critical.

Of major importance, while our view of the expanded and upgraded RadNet
network's capabilities to meet EPA objectives is essentially consistent with EPA, our
view of the respective roles of the fixed and deployable monitors is significantly different
than that of EPA, and is a major factor in the responses and recommendations in this
report.

Routine monitoring relies virtually exclusively on the fixed monitor network.
Here, real-time monitoring is not as important as expanded coverage. In this regard, the
major benefit of the expansion and upgrade plan is the addition of up to 180 new
monitoring sites. Here, the fixed monitors provide large-scale data, the deployable
monitors provide regional and (to a complementary extent) local level data. (Local scale
data are also provided by portable monitors representing local and state assets.)

3.2 Issues with the monitors themselves

Because of timing and resource issues, there are some differences in the design
and operation of the two types of monitors. The fixed and deployable units are both
capable of sampling air at high volumetric rates (35-75 m3/hr) through a 4"-dia. glass-
fiber filter. The deployable unit also has a second sampling head operated at a lower
sampling rate (0.8-7 m3/hr) suitable for sampling radioactive gases. The sampling heads
are located in different places in the two types of monitors. The two sampling heads on
the deployable units are located on extensions several feet above the system's equipment
enclosure, whereas the sampling head in the fixed unit is located in the top portion of the
system's enclosure along with two radiation detectors that provide periodic in-place
measurements of the accumulation of radionuclides on the filter medium. These
detectors are a 2"x2" Nal detector to measure gamma emissions and a 600 mm2 ion-
implanted silicon detector to measure alpha and beta emissions from radionuclides on the

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filter sample periodically during the sampling cycle. These radiation results can be
transmitted via satellite to NAREL.

The deployable unit has no built-in capability for monitoring either the high
volume or low-volume filters in place, so they must be counted and analyzed at NAREL
or in a mobile laboratory brought near the area of interest. Another difference between
the deployable and fixed units is the ability of the deployable units to provide
measurements of the external gamma radiation field at the sampling site. Results from
two GM detectors can be transmitted to NAREL via satellite transmission. The fixed
sampling unit has no comparable capability for quantifying external photon radiation
fields.

Because both the fixed and deployable sampling units will be used to provide
important information to decision makers, it is imperative that both the similarities and
differences between these two monitoring systems be understood and quantified so that
the resulting data will be of high quality and consistency.

3.3 Potential sampling biases in the fixed air monitor

The configuration of the detector and filter in the fixed air sampler may result in
bias in collection of larger particles due to impaction on the detector or associated support
surfaces. The EPA report should include a drawing that shows, with dimensions, the
locations of the two detectors relative to the filter, and indicates the expected air flow
path. The impact of this geometrical arrangement on the deposition of airborne particles
should be evaluated by an experienced professional using laboratory or field tests. Is
particle deposition on the filter uniform across the filter? Does a significant fraction of
particles deposit on the surfaces of the two detectors to contaminate them? Are there
sampling biases related to different particle-size regions? While large particles (greater
than 10 |im AMAD) are not of significance with regard to inhalation, they may be of
concern in evaluating the potential for soil and surface water impacts. Also, depending
on the type of incident that results in generation of air particulates, NAREL should
consider whether "hot particles" might be in the larger size range and thus not be
collected on the filter in proportion to their presence in the airborne material.

From the materials we were provided, it is not clear whether the currently-
designed instruments have been testedfor the collection efficiency of airborne
particulates as a function of the wind speed and direction at which they arrive at the
sampler, and how the sampling efficiency versus particle size might also be impacted. A
wind tunnel would be a good place to conduct such tests. It is better to know these
characteristics now, than to learn that there might be a problem later. This seems to be
particularly critical for the new fixed samplers where many things are around and near
the actual sampling area.

One of the arguments for large particles not being of major concern for RadNet is
the expectation that an event that results in airborne dust generation will occur at a

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considerable distance from the sampler. Thus, the large particles would fall out before
the plume reached the detector. This would be true for most of the fixed samplers for a
single event, but the fixed samplers are located in the population centers where the
probability of a terrorist incident involving release of radioactive material is the greatest.
A sampler in the vicinity of the incident is of primary importance in such a case and
should be capable of representative sampling of airborne dust.

3.4 Measurement of external photon radiation fields

The deployable sampling units use GM detectors to provide near real-time data on
gamma exposure rates, but no similar measurements can currently be made with the fixed
monitors. If it is assumed that the near real-time collection of these gamma exposure
measurements is an important function of the deployable units, then consideration should
be given to making similar gamma exposure measurements on the fixed sampling units as
well. It seems inconsistent to have this capability only on the deployable units.

It is unclear how the count rates from the GM detectors accurately reflect dose
rate in rem or sieverts. GM detector response is highly energy-dependent. While the
detectors are "compensated" (presumably for energy dependence), they are apparently
calibrated against unattenuated Cs-137 gamma radiation. While Cs-137 may be the most
important gamma-emitting radionuclide in the event of a nuclear incident, Co-60 - with
gamma photons twice the energy of the Cs-137 photons - may be of equal or greater
importance for a "dirty bomb" event. It is also important to note that the GM detector
response to scattered Cs-137 gamma radiation may be different from the response to the
unattenuated Cs-137 radiation. While it might be impractical to cross-calibrate each
deployable system against a pressurized ion chamber (PIC), NAREL should consider
cross-calibrating the prototype using a series of different energy gamma emitters,
including naturally occurring thorium with its relatively high energy gamma Tl-208
decay product and uranium with its lower average energy decay products.

Cross-calibration would afford a degree of assurance that the GM detectors are
accurately measuring exposure when a variety of different gamma energies are present.
Said another way, the EPA report should address the following aspects of detector
response:

• the pattern of the energy response in the form of a curve or tabulated values from

the low-energy cutoff to about 3,000 keV;

• the standard deviation of measured exposure rates for the full claimed range of 2

*R/h to 1 R/h ; and

• the response to beta-particles and associated Bremsstrahlung.

The use of the terms Sv and rem for the output of the GM detectors is a bit
misleading since a GM detector measures counts per unit time. With appropriate cross-
calibration against a PIC, the output could be converted to roentgens. However, if the
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to-one ratio of roentgen to rem may not be appropriate. The conversion from exposure in
roentgen to effective dose in Sv or rem depends on both the receptor (e.g., adult or child)
and the energy of the gamma radiation.

3.5 Measurements of alpha emitters at fixed stations

The description of major components of the fixed air monitoring stations on p.25
of the EPA report includes "Instruments for measuring gamma and beta radiation
emanating from particles collected on the air filter media." Measurements of alpha
emissions is not mentioned on p. 25, but the detailed specification sheet we were given
mentions the capability to measure both low- and high- energy alpha particles. During
our meeting at NAREL, we were told that a complicated algorithm is needed to sort out
alpha emissions measured in the fixed monitor from the alpha emissions from naturally
occurring Rn progeny. It is important that this capability be perfected because other
alpha emitters besides Am-241 may become important in assessing potential terrorist
threats.

3.6 Need for numerical clarity and transparency
3.6.1 Value of the Protective Action Guide (PAG)

The PAG is stated in the EPA report to be the committed effective dose
equivalent (CEDE) of 1 rem that results from inhaling a specified radionuclide
continuously during a 4-d period (p.24, para. 5). The measurement requirements,
including the minimum detectable activity (MDA), specified in the EPA report for
selected radionuclides, are related to this value.

The selected 1-rem value appears to be reasonable, but the authors should
indicate whether it is accepted by other responsible Federal agencies, such as DHS,
DOE, and NRC. If the appropriate PAG has not yet been decided upon, the proposed
values, or at least a range of values, should be stated, so that the corresponding
measurements requiredfor radionuclides or radiation can be calculated.

3.6.2. Relation of the EPA-specified MDA value to the PAG for fixed-location
monitor

The MDA values (at the 95% confidence level) are given in terms of nanocuries
(nCi) for each of 7 radionuclides on a filter to be counted for no more than 1 h with the
specified Nal(Tl) detector and spectrometer (p. 27, para. 1). Of the 7 radionuclides, Am-
241, Cs-137, Co-60, and Ir-192 were considered to be important because of their
availability in large quantity (p.24, para. 3). An MDA value also is given for Sr-90
counted with the silicon detector and spectrometer (p.27, para.2).

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The EPA report should include the nd value on the filter that corresponds to the
selected limit on intake related to the PAG (see part A) for each of the 8 radionuclides.
The purpose is to confirm that the MDA is (1) suitably lower than specified by the PAG
to permit reliable measurement results, and (2) not unreasonably low compared to the
PAG.

This information can be extracted from the two tables that were distributed by
EPA staff in response to a request at the meeting. One table is a list of radionuclide
concentrations (in pCi/m3) that correspond to the PAG for 1 rem by inhalation during 4 d
(and fractions of this PAG) for 5 of the 8 radionuclides. The other table is a list of nCi
for a 30 m3 sample related to deaths per nCi inhaled given in Federal Radiation Guide
#13, for all 8 radionuclides (and 2 others). The EPA staff should decide which data set is
appropriate, apply the selected factors for m3 collected on the filter for counting and m3
inhaled in the 4-d period, and discuss the appropriateness of the specified MDA values.

3.6.3 Calculation of the MDA values for the fixed-location monitor

Calculation of the MDA for radionuclides detected by the Nal(Tl) detector is
addressed in a separate document, "MDA for the EPA's fixed Radnet monitors", WSRC-
TR-2005-00527 (12/16/05) that was distributed at the meeting. The value of the MDA is
related to the standard deviation, *, by MDA = (2.8 + 4.65*)/constant.

The constant relates counts accumulated for this study in 10 minutes to nCi.
Values of * were obtained by measuring the counts recorded with the detector in the
regions of interest for various radionuclide standards and obtaining the counting
efficiency for these measurements. The Westinghouse Savanna River Company (WSRC)
report notes that the calculation of * is more complex than shown if background peaks
intrude on the regions of interest for a radionuclide, as is the case of radon progeny
intruding on Am-241 and Cs-137. The radon-progeny background on filters is stated in
the EPA report to fluctuate from 0.3 to 30 nCi (p.26, para.6). The calculated MDA
values based on measurements that do not include radon-progeny fluctuation range from
12.3 to 1.1 nCi for the 7 radionuclides. The MDA value for Am-241 is above the
specified MDA for the 10-min count but equals it for the expected 60-min count; the
MDA for each of the other radionuclides is 1 - 3 orders of magnitude below the EPA-
specified MDA value.

The calculated MDA values reported in the WSRC report should be inserted into
the EPA report with an explanation of the reasons for the much larger EPA-specified
MDA values (p.27, para. 1), except for Am-241. If one reason is the indicated radon-
progeny fluctuation, the extent of increase in MDA values over those calculated in the
WSRC report should be tested in a field study. Relative to the EPA-specified MDA
values, however, the fluctuation appears to be significant only for Am-241.

Before inserting the WSRC data in the EPA report, some improvements in the
WSRC report are recommended. Calculation of * should be explicitly shown, with

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counts and background counts tabulated for each region of interest. Apparent errors
made in the sample calculation for Cs-137 should be corrected in calculations of
MDA(cps), MDA(dps), and MDA(nCi).

The MDA calculation for Sr-90 measured by the silicon detector should be shown
for the direct beta-particle count and counter background, and for the influence of radon-
progeny fluctuation. Any difference between these values and the EPA-specified MDA
should be explained.

The implications of the change in the silicon-detector window thickness (from
thick to thin) that was reported by EPA staff at the meeting should be discussed in the
EPA report. If the alpha-particle spectra that now can be measured are useful to
compensate for radon-progeny fluctuations, the appropriate calculations and test results
should be presented. Conversely, any detrimental effects of cross-talk on Sr-90 counting
sensitivity should be reported.

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4. REASONABLENESS OF OVERALL APPROACH FOR SITING

MONITORS

4.1 Issues with siting

In planning the distribution of monitors, EPA used the following assumptions.
Modelers want a well-spaced network, and want (non-zero) readings in contaminated
areas and zero readings in non-contaminated areas (to validate model predictions).
Decision-makers want monitors where more people are located, and need data for other
reasons, too (e.g., food production sites). The public wants monitors where more people
are located. Other relevant concerns include agriculture (monitoring of areas that are
otherwise unpopulated or geographically "uninteresting"), business and tourism areas,
and border coverage for plumes from other countries. In order to address these needs,
EPA took an approach that is both population-based and geographically-based:

• Start with the largest cities (population-based);

• Remove the "over" clustering of monitors in certain areas; and

• Fill in the gaps (geographically-based).

There are some tricky issues involved in siting, and the plan cannot be evaluated
in a vacuum. There are at least two important additional considerations that are highly
relevant to the discussion:

1) whether or not other monitoring networks (fixed and portable; e.g.,

Radiological Emergency Response Team, RERT), complementary to RadNet,

will also be providing similar data; and

2) the sampling requirements of the mathematical models used to estimate

environmental distributions in space and time.

Siting based on a combination of "population" and "cluster density" - as EPA is
proposing - may or may not make sense depending on the answers to the 2 additional
considerations above. For example, the models may require or be optimally served by,
as input data, more uniform geographic sampling, or a (non-uniform) sampling scheme
that is driven by geographic/geologic and meteorological factors (in 3 dimensions) rather
than population or sampling density per se.

In practice, the sampling requirements of the specific model used to predict the
space and time distribution of radioactivity determine the optimum siting plan. Ideally,
then, the siting plan would evolve from modeling considerations, rather than be
determined beforehand. Given the current approach to siting, at a minimum, post-hoc
confirmatory modeling (i.e., siting plan validation) should be used.

The following approach is offered by way of example. Model 3-5 different,
plausible scenarios, using one or more mathematical models, including that/those to be
used by IMAAC, with extremely dense (over-) sampling (e.g., simulating the availability

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of input from thousands of monitors). This initial run establishes the ground truth space
and time distribution. Then, perform a sensitivity analysis in which a number of monitors
are "removed" (e.g., to reduce the total number to 180 or 180 + 20 or + 40), and the
model rerun. This sensitivity analysis would both illustrate the optimum deployment of
180 (+ 40) monitors, and provide comparison of this optimum monitor distribution (or
limited monitor sampling scheme) to the actual siting plan.

The approaches discussed above focus on the selection of 180 "optimum" cities
(or geographic sites throughout the country) without regard to either technical or practical
issues, but only based on sampling considerations, either from a population and clustering
basis or in the context of modeling. The actual selection of sites, however, must also be
driven by technical and practical issues. These include the availability of the appropriate
electrical power, an accessible yet secure place to site the system, and (of particular
importance, according to EPA) the availability of appropriate volunteers to maintain and
"operate" the system.

The EPA proposes to house the deployable systems in its two main detector R&D
lab sites (Las Vegas and Montgomery). EPA believes that it is important to do so, in
order to be able to provide continuing maintenance, and to deploy the monitors with
trained staff. As an alternative, however, it may make more sense to store the systems at
a more diverse set of regional locations, where they could be potentially deployed more
rapidly in the event of an emergency.

EPA's plan does not include routinely using the deployable monitors (i.e., in the
absence of an emergency). A key question is whether or not the systems could be
systematically deployed for "routine " monitoring to supplement the fixed monitors,
thereby increasing their utility, and still be as readily deployable in an emergency. A
related issue is the utility or desirability of pre-deployment (e.g., within a region to keep
the deployable monitors readily available) in anticipation of significant terrorist targets
(i.e., specific events).

There are also some practical operational issues that need resolving. How (and by
whom) will the (acute) siting of the deployable monitors be determined? In practice, how
long will it take to deploy the monitors relative to the start of an event, and how does this
lag time influence the desirability of pre-deployment?

4.2 Issues with data analysis and management

A fundamental issue raised by the briefing document is the need for and use of
"zero" readings. A closely related issue is the portrayal of 'not distinguishable from

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background' values, and their dissemination to incident commanders, policy makers, and
the public. We recommend the use of PAGs, not simply MDAs, for definition of trigger
levels.

EPA staff explained that hourly data for the 7 regions of interest of the gamma-
ray spectrometer, and Sr-90 by the alpha/beta particle spectrometer, at 180 fixed
sampling stations will be telemetered to a central group for collection and analysis. The
resulting radionuclide concentration data will be stored, promptly distributed to
appropriate government agencies, and made available to the public.

Two important aspects of evaluating these approximately 35,000 data points per
day related just to radionuclide levels are:

1) rapid identification of elevated levels to identify locations of concern; and

2) avoidance of false positives that misdirect concern.

The EPA report should consider limiting the information distributed by the
central analysis group to results that exceed a critical value selectedfor each
radionuclide. The critical value should be selected to be significantly greater than the 2*
MDA, but well below the limit on intake by inhalation. By selecting a 2* limit, 2.3% of
null values - about 800 data points per day - would randomly exceed the limit and
become the focus of concern. This leads to the suggestion that, because even at a 3.1 *
limit, 0.1% of null values or about 3 per day, still will be above the limit, a data-pattern
recognition program should be instituted and controlled by an experienced radiological
professional at the central location.

4.3 Issues with communication of RadNet output

The presentation of data in a manner that accurately conveys technical
information must vary for different events and for users with varying needs and levels of
technical expertise. The method of presenting the data to decision-makers does not need
to be the same as the methods used to present the data to the public. Routine data from
the fixed monitors can be supplied in raw form to either of the groups, and needs to be
made available in an easy to access form as soon as the data has had proper QA/QC
evaluation, as has been done in the past. The handling and release of the data in
emergencies has different requirements which need to be carefully considered.

4.3.1 Communication with decision makers

In an emergency, the EPA's responsibility is to get accurate and reliable data to
IMAAC as soon as possible, so that models can be adequately developed to help
understand the dose, distribution and direction of the plume. As soon as the data have
been conveyed to IMAAC and properly evaluated, IMAAC needs to convey the models
along with all other information on the event to FERMAC.

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RAC's RadNet Review Panel or the Chartered SAB, and does not represent EPA policy.

Immediately following the recognition of a radiation incident, local Incident
Command will be established to direct local responders in their rescue and treatment of
people who are directly affected and to protect the public who are not affected. Incident
Command will make decisions on the basis of the information at hand. These decisions
must be informed by data that describe the nature and significance of any potential
radiation exposure. Very early qualitative data will be collected locally and provide
information for early decisions but historical and quantitative data collected by EPA,
including RadNet data, should be forwarded through channels as soon as possible.
Because data need to be reviewed to assure quality, there will be some delay. Everything
possible should be done during emergencies to minimize the time necessary to review the
data and forward it on to inform local Incident Command as soon as possible.

4.3.2	Communication with the public

In the event of an emergency, FRMAC, rather than EPA, has the initial
responsibility for releasing information to the public. It is important that the flow of data
from the event to the public be restricted to this line of communication (EPA to IMMAAC
to FRMAC), so that the messages the public receives are consistent, accurate and useful
as possible. For example, it is important that there is not one message reporting activity
in dpm and another suggesting some type of radiation dose. After communication from
FRMAC has occurred, EPA should then make every effort to rapidly supply the validated
raw data in a form that is easy for the public to understand.

4.3.3	Units for communication

During all the processing of the data and in the preparation of documentation,
such as the "Expansion and Upgrade of the RadNet Air Monitoring Network, "( Volume 1
and 2) Concept and Plan, " care needs to be taken to use proper international units to
express activity, radiation exposure, dose and risk. This was not the case in the
document. This may be related to the fact that international units were adopted and came
into wide spread use after much of the monitoring data were derived by the systems that
have been replaced by RadNet. From this time forward, all data should be re-evaluated
using the proper S.I. units with the older units put in parenthesis, i.e. Bq (pd) or rem
(Sv) etc. Such consistency is the first step in helping the decision makers and public
understand the meaning of the data.

4.3.4	Communicating risk

Great care needs to be taken in converting raw data from counts per minute, to
exposure, dose and risk. Raw counting data is very site, detector, nuclide, isotope,
particle size, chemical form and population specific. Thus, without much additional
information and analysis, the raw data (counts per minute) cannot be used to make even
the crudest estimates of risk. In conveying the raw data to the public, it is important that

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review draft is a work in progress, does not reflect consensus advice or recommendations, has not been reviewed or approved by the
RAC's RadNet Review Panel or the Chartered SAB, and does not represent EPA policy.

the message does not convey an improper perception of the risk from any event. For
example, Figure B.l page B-2 in the report records the level of activity as Monthly
Maximum Gross Beta Concentration (pCi/m3) over a 13 year time period. It shows that
the activity during this time varies by more than 100,000 times. Conveying such raw
data to the public would suggest that the risk had changed by a very large amount.
Historical data suggest that these large changes in activity in the air resulted in minimal
non-detectable changes in background cancer frequency in the U.S. This is of course
related to the high background frequency of cancer in the population and the low risk
from radiation related cancer.

4.3.5	Other factors that complicate accurate communication

The difficulty in communicating raw data from RadNet is further complicated by
the wide range of background radiation and radioactive materials in the environment.
Information on background radiation and its variability also needs to be communicated
to the public relative to the changes measured by RadNet. It would be important for
information on the range of background radiation to be quantified and made available
with any report to the public.

The current public fear of radiation and the perception that an increase in
radiation-induced cancer frequency will result following any level of exposure adds
another difficulty in communication with the public. The difference between "calculated
risk" and "measured increases in cancer frequency" following low dose radiation
exposures of large populations needs to be further established and discussed in a
framework that the public can understand. The small magnitude of the radiation-related
cancer risk compared to the background cancer risk without radiation exposure needs to
be properly communicated in any releases to the public. Care should be taken to avoid
calculation of the number of excess cancers in large populations exposed to very low
doses of radiation. This is a calculation that should not be done by EPA or from data
derivedfrom RadNet.

4.3.6	Preparing for communication in an emergency

The committee recommends that when RadNet data are used in exercises on mock
releases, EPA makes efforts to design public release statements associated with the
"data" derived from the models and activities generated during these exercises. These
statements can be prepared ahead of time, and need to be related to exposure, activity,
dose and risk. Such statements must be carefully reviewed by both physical and social
scientists and communications experts to be sure that the messages are understandable
and accurate.

The messages derived from the mock release exercises also need to be discussed
with decision makers associated with the area where the exercise is conducted. These
decision makers should include individuals like the Governors, City Managers, Mayor,

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Media managers, Chief of Police and Fire Chief. The decision makers should be asked to
respond to the information provided and let EPA, IMAAC, and FERMAC know what
information that they need to make decisions and how the data and messages supplied
would influence the decisions that they must make in the time of a real event or
emergency. Studies of this type will help to develop useful, understandable and accurate
messages that can be used to convey the data derived from RadNet following an event
involving radiation dispersal devices or improvised nuclear weapons.

It will be especially important to have these messages developed well ahead of
time and defined for rapid use in the case of a real event. Such messages will need to be
modified to be specific for each real event. They must provide a foundation that will help
the public understand if they were exposed, the levels of the exposure, the radiation doses
associated with the exposure and the level of damage or risk associated with the
exposure. This will provide a rational basis for any action or sacrifice that the public are
asked to make by the decision makers.

4.4 Issues with analysis and testing of the RadNet plan

The discussions presented to us about methods to provide Quality Assurance/
Quality Control (QA/QC) of the data showed that the plans for ensuring the quality of the
data were adequate. In addition, the automatic and computerized methods currently in
place to determine if the equipment is working properly and that data are accurate were
well thought out.

Standard operating procedures (SOP) should be in place and accompany all the
QA/QC plans to insure that the data handling is reproducibly done prior to any release
and that information from the system is accurate and reliable. The QA/QC system should
be tested over an extended period of time with "dry runs " to determine if the methods can
insure that the equipment is operating properly at both the fixed and deployable stations.
In the rare case when one of the fixed stations has a reading that is outside the
predetermined range of acceptability, everything possible must be done to expedite the
QA/QC process to validate the readings. Even in an emergency, it is essential that the
proper QA and QC be done on the data before it is released; the time-table for releasing
the data should not be compressed in any way that may jeopardize data quality.

The air monitoring and data management/transmission system have only recently
been delivered to NAREL, and have not been completely tested. The discussion of data
in the Concept and Plan document is brief, and provides only a conceptual plan for data
management. We did not see complete raw data sets or data in the form that it will be
provided to users, including the public. The NAREL proposal for data management
appears to be adequate, but it cannot be conclusively stated that it is appropriate to the
system's objectives until the data management procedures are developed and tested.

4.5 Other Issues

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If RadNet is the nation-wide environmental radiation monitoring network, feeding
into IMAAC modeling, why use the word "assist" in the objectives? How do the other
'assets' factor into a unified modeling scheme? It seems likely that local and state assets
will not be able to be readily incorporated; the same is likely true of other federal assets
(e.g., data from RERT systems). This is because of issues of cross-calibration, and
potential problems with the accurate input of location data, etc.

How did the mileage radii for de-clustering and gap-filling arise? How is
"proximity" defined? How, if at all, does the spatially varying distribution of background
(especially radon) influence the siting, the MDA, and the modeling? (The temporal
variation in radon background is also important, but of less influence on the siting.)

Filter changing frequency depends on the radionuclide and particle concentration
(and particulate matter will significantly increase after an explosion).

Is giving the public access to the data a good thing? Are there any national
security issues in providing public access? What about the (counter-productive)
possibility of second guessing by unaffiliated "experts"?

Reassurance re 'no danger' must be on a regional, not local, basis - because at the
local level, at best, only one RadNet monitor would be available. Should routine (non-
peri-emergency) reporting via the RadNet website be real-time values or lab-based
(longer integration time) values?

Meteorological monitoring on the fixed monitors is desirable in some cases, and
should be decided on a site-specific basis, based on 2 considerations: (a) no "canyon
effect" exists, and (b) no alternative "close" meteorological monitoring exists (where
"close" still needs to be defined).

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5. OVERALL APPROACH FOR SITING MONITORS

Charge Question #2: Is the overall approach for siting monitors appropriate and
reasonable given the upgraded and expanded system's objectives?

2a. Is the methodology for determining the locations of the fixed monitors
appropriate given the intended uses of the data and the system's
objectives?

2b. Are the criteria for the local siting of the fixed monitors reasonable given
the need to address both technical and practical issues?

2c. Does the plan provide sufficient flexibility for placing the deployable
monitors to accommodate different types of events?

2d. Does the plan provide for a practical interplay between the fixed and
deployable monitors to accommodate different types of events that would
utilize them?

5.1 Background

In its briefing document (U.S. EPA. 2005), EPA stated the RadNet mission and
objectives of the expanded and upgraded RadNet monitoring network as (in paraphrased
form):

• Provide assessment data and baseline levels of radiation in the environment to
modelers, scientists and the public;

• To the extent practicable, maintain readiness to respond to emergencies by
collecting information on ambient levels capable of revealing trends;

• During events, provide credible information to public officials (and the public)
that evaluates the immediate threat and the potential for long-term effects; and

• Ensure that data generated are timely and are compatible with other sources.

Due to the limited number of monitors, the ultimate decisions for siting are based
on practicalities concerning operators, resources and the number of effective monitors
available at a given time. The system proposed is consequently receptor-based with focus
on national impact, and not a source-based early warning system.

5.2 Charge Question # 2

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Is the overall approach for siting monitors appropriate and reasonable given the
upgraded and expanded system's objectives?

We believe, in general, that the proposed EPA approach for siting fixed and
deployable monitors significantly enhances the ability of the RadNet monitoring network
to meet mission objectives. Nevertheless we are concerned about a number of specific
issues that are detailed below.

Given the limited resources the difficulties in designing the siting plan stems from
two seemingly contradictory drivers: population- vs. geography-based. The siting plan
proposed is therefore the result of a compromise between monitoring people and
spanning the nation, or between socio-political considerations and mission requirements.
There is an apparent discrepancy between the stated RadNet objectives in the context of
EPA responsibilities, and the interplay and use of deployable vs. fixed monitors. This is
reflected in a lack of clarity in the usage of deployable monitors: What are the decision-
making processes and prioritizations used to accommodate different types of events from
long term monitoring deficiencies to the response to catastrophic incidents? Are the
objectives for the usage of deployable monitors strictly identical to those for the fixed
monitors?

5.2.1 Population-based vs. geographic-based siting

Even though the siting plan is not intended to monitor a city-based incident, it has
been designed to accommodate one monitor per city. For populated Eastern and Western
coastline areas (e.g., Los Angeles basin and the New York metropolitan area) this results
in an anonymously high density of fixed monitors compared to other regions, notably the
US-Canadian boarder, Central Northern United States, Central and Eastern Nevada and
Eastern Oregon.

From these considerations and the limited resources available, we suggest that a
more aggressive declustering of fixed monitors be considered initially, particularly in the
vicinity of the Los Angeles and New York metropolitan areas, and that local and regional
meteorological models be used along with other considerations, to pare down and
redistribute fixed monitors. This will result in better geographic coverage consistent with
the primary decisions for siting a 'receptor-based system' with a focus on national
impact. This approach is also more flexible in terms of adapting to limited resources and
the deployment of a lesser amount of fixed monitors than the eventual 180 planned for.
A related concern includes: How did the mileage radii for de-clustering and gap-filling
arise, and how is "proximity" defined?

5.2.2 Fixed vs. deployable monitor networks

It is unclear whether the proposed deployment of mobile monitors in predicated
solely on the RadNet objectives outlined for the deployment of fixed monitors: the

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SAB Working Review Draft Report dated March 9, 2006 for RAC RadNet Review Panel Edits - Do Not Cite or Quote. This working
review draft is a work in progress, does not reflect consensus advice or recommendations, has not been reviewed or approved by the
RAC's RadNet Review Panel or the Chartered SAB, and does not represent EPA policy.

collection of environmental data within the context of a National scope, and for the sole
purpose of monitoring, assessment and baseline data collection. Given the limited
resources and possible limitations on the number of fixed monitors deployed in the near-
term, it appears that at least some of the mobile units could be used to fill coverage gaps
identified through modeling. To the degree to which mobile units are actually a response
to EPA's new monitoring responsibilities as outlined in the post 9/11
Nuclear/Radiological Incident Annex document, National Response Plan (NRP), then
this should be specifically included in the siting discussion and reviewed in that context.
Specifically the mission of the RadNet Air Network includes providing "data for
radiological emergency response assessments in support of homeland security and
radiological accidents." This objective is vague and brings into question responsibility
and chain of command. Under most circumstances, EPA is not the lead but a supporting
organization to the Coordinating Agency (CA). This may also preclude the pre-
deployment of mobile monitoring stations by the EPA and requires the integration of
what then becomes two separate systems associated each with deployable and fixed
monitoring Networks.

To avoid future implementation failures and the loss of key data, this apparent
discrepancy needs to be specifically addressed in the report, integrated and planned for by
EPA, the Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center (FRMAC) and the end
user IMAAC that generates the plume projections.

5.3 Charge Question # 2a

Is the methodology for determining the locations of the fixed monitors appropriate given
the intended uses of the data and the system's objectives?

We strongly suggest that the declustering of high density population areas be
more aggressive and involve the use of model constraints and meteorological forecast
predictions. To this end we support the use of sensitivity analyses and confirmatory
transport modeling proposed by EPA, in conjunction with Savannah River National
Laboratory, the US Weather Bureau, IMAAC and/or other partners.

Overall we believe that the methodology for determining the locations of the fixed
monitors is appropriate with some reservations: There appear to be a few gaps in the
proposed siting methodology for fixed monitors, resulting from (1) the apparent lack of
local and regional meteorological constraints; (2) possibly significant gaps in geographic
coverage; (3) deficiencies in siting scenarios in the context of uncertainty in the near term
number of operational fixed monitors, and (4) RadNet mission priorities; (5) integration
with current EPA monitoring responsibilities; and (6) other.

5.3.1 Meteorological constraints

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SAB Working Review Draft Report dated March 9, 2006 for RAC RadNet Review Panel Edits - Do Not Cite or Quote. This working
review draft is a work in progress, does not reflect consensus advice or recommendations, has not been reviewed or approved by the
RAC's RadNet Review Panel or the Chartered SAB, and does not represent EPA policy.

The proposed EPA scheme for adapting fixed monitor locations to both
population density and land coverage achieved about 50% population coverage and about
82 % land coverage. With the constraint of 180 independent stations this appears
satisfactory as an initial siting basis. However, meteorological and natural background
radiation conditions (e.g., radon) may demand adjustments of this distribution as
experience is gained with actual operation of the system and results from preliminary
models are considered. The data from the RadNet Air Monitoring Network should
eventually be combined with a standard US Weather Bureau computer code for
projecting variations in the local geological and meteorological conditions in the area of
the monitor and regional atmospheric conditions and trends. Meteorological monitoring
associated with the fixed monitor Network is desirable in some cases, and should be
decided on a site-specific basis, based on 2 considerations: (a) no "canyon effect" exists,
and (b) no alternative "close" meteorological monitoring exists (where "close" still needs
to be defined). In this way, elevated radiation conditions and their atmospheric transport
could then be predicted and their significance assessed with respect to natural and/or
man-made anomalies.

5.3.2	Gaps in coverage

The fixed monitor siting plan proposed is the result of a compromise between
monitoring people and spanning the nation. As a consequence, even though the siting
plan is not intended to monitor a city-based incident it allows for one monitor per city.
For populated Eastern and Western coastline areas (e.g., Los Angeles basin and the New
York metropolitan area) this results in an anonymously high density of fixed monitors
compared to other regions, notably the US-Canadian boarder, Central Northern United
States, Central and Eastern Nevada and Eastern Oregon. Some of this concern may be
addressed through joint US-Canadian operations. At a minimum, NAREL should note
the locations of Canadian monitoring facilities to indicate if the coverage is better than it
appears from the US maps alone. In addition, we suggest that initially a more aggressive
declustering of fixed monitors be considered in the vicinity of the largest population
centers (i.e., Los Angeles and New York metropolitan areas) and that local and regional
meteorological models be used along with other considerations, to pare down and
redistribute fixed monitors on a physical geography basis. This will result in improved
geographic coverage consistent with the primary decisions for siting receptor-based
system with a focus on national impact.

5.3.3	Uncertainty in number of near-term fixed monitors

Given the limited resources and possible limitations on the number of fixed
monitors deployed in the near-term, it appears that scenarios with less than 180 fixed
monitors be examined in terms of immediate impact of system response. In addition at
least some of the mobile units could be used to fill coverage gaps identified through
modeling. This approach has the advantage of being more flexible and responding to
changing environmental conditions. It requires a thorough study in terms of costs and

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SAB Working Review Draft Report dated March 9, 2006 for RAC RadNet Review Panel Edits - Do Not Cite or Quote. This working
review draft is a work in progress, does not reflect consensus advice or recommendations, has not been reviewed or approved by the
RAC's RadNet Review Panel or the Chartered SAB, and does not represent EPA policy.

added complexity in the event that deployable systems are required in response to an
unanticipated radiological incident.

5.3.4	Mission priority

In keeping with EPA responsibilities and the continuity of the RadNet mission,
the most important function of the fixed monitors is the continued and improved routine
evaluation of the ambient radiation environment. In the context of the new RadNet
network, this involves continued coordination of the air monitoring Network with the
other current EPA networks involving water and milk monitoring, even in the context of
a later evaluation and update of those systems. This again emphasizes that population
density is not necessarily the main driver but that isolated areas that involve many rural
communities also support the monitoring infrastructure of the Nation. In view of the
resource limitations to the new RadNet system, NAREL should not lose sight of the EPA
function that involves tracking the transfer of ambient air-borne radiological conditions to
Nation's food supply.

5.3.5	Integration with existing networks

Even though RadNet is a receptor-based system, it should strive on leveraging
any and all additional monitoring stations by working with other existing systems, such
as those in individual States and around Nuclear Power Plants and other source areas.
Moreover, there should be a mechanism established for entities such as States or Cities
who may use their own funds to purchase stations that are in compliance with the
standards to become full-fledged 'members' of the network. There also appears to be a
lack of coordination with Canadian monitoring networks. Specifically, the US southern
border seems to be well covered by the proposed siting plan, whereas monitors along the
northern Canadian border appear scarce. Health Canada maintains monitoring stations in
Edmonton, Calgary, Saskatoon, and Regina and perhaps elsewhere but the EPA does not
appear to have engaged Health Canada and there is no mention of the monitoring
capabilities or planned joint coordination efforts between the US and Canada.

5.3.6	Other questions

A further question regarding siting is how EPA will respond to socio-political factors
that could derail the siting scenario?

5.4 Charge Question #2b

Are the criteria for the local siting of the fixed monitors reasonable given the need to
address both technical and practical issues?

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SAB Working Review Draft Report dated March 9, 2006 for RAC RadNet Review Panel Edits - Do Not Cite or Quote. This working
review draft is a work in progress, does not reflect consensus advice or recommendations, has not been reviewed or approved by the
RAC's RadNet Review Panel or the Chartered SAB, and does not represent EPA policy.

Ideally, the siting plan would evolve from modeling considerations, rather than be
determined beforehand. Given the current approach to siting, at a minimum, post-hoc
confirmatory modeling (i.e., siting plan validation) should be used.

Additionally, siting criteria based on a combination of "population" and "cluster
density" - as EPA is proposing - may or may not make sense depending on the answers
to the 2 additional considerations (a) and (b) below.

There are complex and non-intuitive issues involved in siting monitors, and the
plan cannot be evaluated in a vacuum. At least two important additional considerations
are highly relevant to the discussion:

(a)	Whether or not other fixed and portable monitoring networks complementary to
RadNet (e.g., RERT) will also be providing similar and/or compatible data; and

(b)	What are the sampling requirements for the mathematical models used to
estimate environmental distributions in space and time?

In planning the distribution of fixed monitors, EPA used the following
assumptions. In order to validate model predictions modelers and planners require a
well-spaced network that include 'non-zero' readings in contaminated areas and 'zero'
readings in non-contaminated areas. Decision-makers require monitors where large
population centers are located, as well as other (e.g., food production sites). The public
also demands that monitors exist where they are located although other relevant concerns
include agriculture (monitoring of areas that are otherwise unpopulated or geographically
"uninteresting"), business and tourism areas, and border areas that anticipate plumes from
other countries.

In order to address these needs, EPA took an approach that is both population-
based and geographically-based:

o Start with the largest cities (population-based);
o Remove the "over" clustering of monitors in certain areas; and
o Fill in the gaps (geographically-based).

In addition to the points covered in the report, we strongly encourage that several
be either added or reconsidered:

(1)	Siting needs based on model requirement. Given that the models will be
used for rapid decision making and analysis, it follows that criteria satisfying
required model inputs be prioritized so that the results are quantitative and the
model predictions are robust;

(2)	Practical considerations involving siting protocols based on monitoring
station security and operation must be specified and prioritized;

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SAB Working Review Draft Report dated March 9, 2006 for RAC RadNet Review Panel Edits - Do Not Cite or Quote. This working
review draft is a work in progress, does not reflect consensus advice or recommendations, has not been reviewed or approved by the
RAC's RadNet Review Panel or the Chartered SAB, and does not represent EPA policy.

(3)	Vertical siting considerations need attention in view of the role of possible

monitoring obstructions, different sampling environments (e.g., monitors at

different elevations sampling different plume horizons), etc...; and,

(4)	The effective use of other existing resources that could benefit rapid

detection and analysis of a radioactive plume.

5.4.1 Model requirements

Models may best be served by input data that require more uniform geographic
sampling, or a non-uniform sampling scheme that is driven by geographic/geologic and
meteorological factors in three dimensions, rather than by a population or sampling
density scheme. For quantitative analysis and understanding of the Network data, optimal
siting is therefore the product of simulation requirements, anticipated scenarios, and
variations within each. In practice, the sampling requirements are also model specific
and as different models come into play, optimizing the siting plan involves integration of
several results that together stochastically predict the space and time distribution of
radioactive plume in three dimensions.

The following approach is offered by way of example:

Stepl: Model 3-5 different, plausible scenarios, using one or more mathematical
models, including any used by IMAAC. The initial tests should involve a dense
monitoring coverage or over-sampling (e.g., simulating the availability of input from
thousands of monitors), thereby establishing the 'ground truth' space and time
distribution;

Step 2: Use a preferred model to simulate a case with 180 monitoring stations as
proposed in the RadNet siting plan and vary the siting density distribution using proposed
EPA siting plan(s);

Step 3: Perform a sensitivity analysis in which a number of monitors are
"removed" from a "preferred RadNet siting configuration" to reduce the total number of
stations from 180 to [180 - 20] or [180- 40];

Step 4: Compare all model run results. This sensitivity analysis could render (i)
the optimum deployment for 180 fixed monitors; (ii) provide a comparison of the
preferred monitor distribution to an optimal siting scenario involving a greater or ideal
number of monitors (»180); (iii) optimize the use of a resource-limited monitor
sampling scheme (<180 stations); and (iv) help in the design of portable station
deployment either as temporary stations to offset perceived coverage gaps or for use in
rapid deployment scenarios and effective integration with other networks, including fixed
RadNet monitors.

5.4.2 Practical issues

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(i) The availability of the appropriate electrical power;

(ii) An accessible and secure place to site the system; and

(iii) The availability of appropriate volunteers to maintain and "operate" the
system.

5.4.3 Vertical siting

A key issue that needs further specification and refinement is the vertical location
of the fixed monitors. A rooftop location may be the preferred (and potentially
standardizable) location, to avoid the "canyon effect" that might otherwise be present,
especially in large cities. We suggest that the "2-meter rule" be amended or redefined in
the context of tall buildings or large vertical structures.

5.4.4 Effective use of resources

A complete inventory of all existing, functional radiation equipment should be
performed by EPA to determine available non-EPA resources, which may include the
environmental radiation equipment at nuclear power plants, resources at universities,
federal, state, and industrial laboratories, or medical facilities. In the event of a major
incident within a given region the EPA could rapidly assess national needs and enlist
these resources for extended coverage.

5.4 Charge Question #2c

Does the plan provide sufficient flexibility for placing the deployable monitors to
accommodate different types of events?

A key question is whether or not the systems could be systematically deployedfor
"routine " monitoring to supplement the fixed monitors, thereby increasing their utility,
and still be as readily deployable in an emergency.

This question requires resolution of the apparent discrepancy noted earlier
between the stated RadNet objectives and the interplay and use of deployable vs. fixed
monitors. Both the RadNet document and the EPA RadNet presentations bring
uncertainty as to the ultimate objectives for the usage of deployable monitors. EPA's plan

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to date does not include routinely using the deployable monitors (i.e., in the absence of an
emergency). To the degree to which mobile units are actually a response to EPA's new
monitoring responsibilities as outlined in the post 9/11 Nuclear/Radiological Incident
Annex document (NRP'), then the flexibility of the deployment depends on the mobile
Network ability to adapt to rapid response times and deployment requirements. This can
only be accomplished if the siting is 'pre-planned' by incident type, regardless of
location. This in turn requires that the deployment scenarios be tied to 'realistic' model
renditions of different scenarios and that both model and siting plan be responsive to the
input of new incident boundary conditions in a timely and effective way. At present, this
is not the case and we urge the EPA to take measures in this direction and lead the way to
the use of the RadNet database.

Other considerations are the practical effective deployment requirements within
the framework of limited resources. These issues include (1) Storage; (2) Pre-
Deployment, (3) Personnel Training, (4) Flexible Response to Incident Scenarios, and (5)
Other Concerns.

5.5.1 Mobile unit storage

5.5.2 Pre-Deployment

Under certain circumstances and in response to a DHS request, if a pre-
deployment option for the mobile stations were envisaged, it would drastically change the
nature of the RadNet mission and can make it much more of an event detection and early
warning response system. In view of the possibility the EPA would be requested to pre-
deploy its portable air monitors, the criteria for pre-deployment should be clearly
addressed and carefully established. There are a large number of gatherings of large
numbers of people where there may well be pressure to pre-deploy the monitors. Fairly
routine pre-deployments have positive and negative aspects. On the positive side it
enables operators to become familiar with shipping and setting up the systems. It also
increases the probability that they will be in place when needed. On the negative side,
apart from the cost, routine pre-deployments increases the probability that they will be in
some other location when they are needed to be used post-event or need to be re-
deployed due to environmental changes. There needs to be further discussion of how
such situations will be handled and how operator safety would be addressed.

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SAB Working Review Draft Report dated March 9, 2006 for RAC RadNet Review Panel Edits - Do Not Cite or Quote. This working
review draft is a work in progress, does not reflect consensus advice or recommendations, has not been reviewed or approved by the
RAC's RadNet Review Panel or the Chartered SAB, and does not represent EPA policy.

5.5.3 Personnel training

The large number of deployable monitors ideally permits rapid deployment and
operation of field monitors where and when required to meet specific situations. Since
the tactics and location of a radiological based terrorist attack may not be know, the
deployable monitors must permit rapid response to a given situation in 'real time.'
Because of the variety of potential radiological terrorist attacks that are not significantly
transported by the atmosphere, a small inventory of specialized monitors (e.g., noble gas,
alpha spectrometers, C-14 detectors) should be available for rapid deployment. However,
in relation to the use of deployable monitors the EPA states that the "information
concerning the exact location of each monitor relative to buildings, terrain level changed,
other obstacles, along with a description of the surface terrain (for surface roughness
determination), will need to be relayed to meteorologists so they can determine the value
of the data prior to use."

EPA relies on volunteers to deploy their portable monitors and bring flexibility to
the deployment scenario. Without training or experience it is difficult to imagine the
success of this enterprise in the light of a National emergency, where potential risks to
personnel safety are to be envisioned. EPA needs to clarify how these untrained
individuals will know how to adequately provide the required terrain descriptions in a
timely and accurate manner before starting the sampling activities; and assure themselves
of the robustness of their deployment plan in view of recent incidents during hurricane
Katrina where major defections of police and emergency personnel occurred.

5.5.4 Flexible response to incident scenarios

The overall plan for the deployment of the RadNet portable monitors seems to rely
on the occurrence of a single radiation incident and does not consider multiple near-
simultaneous incidents. Based on the history of the 9-11 attack, where three to four
locations were targeted simultaneously, the single incident assumption is inadequate.
Simultaneous, coordinated dirty bomb or nuclear device attacks on several cities (e.g.,
Boston, New York, Miami, Chicago, and Los Angeles) are as plausible as a single event
scenario. ORIA should therefore revisit its deployable siting plan and determine the
effectiveness of the proposed methodology if only five to ten mobile stations are
available for deployment at each of several locations instead of the 20 to 40 monitoring
stations per site they depict in the Report.

As discussed in the Charge Question 2b answer, the deployment and siting of
mobile air monitoring stations would be greatly improved by a modeling exercise where
the siting is closely tied to model scenarios involving different types of incidents (e.g.,
dirty bombs vs. nuclear devices), as well as different areas (e.g., large cities vs. industrial
or military centers).

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5.5.5 Other concerns

There are also some practical operational issues that need resolving. How and by
whom will the siting of the deployable monitors be determined? In practice, how long
will it take to deploy the monitors relative to the start of an event, and how does this lag
time influence the desirability of pre-deployment?

The RadNet siting plan provides flexibility for placing deployable monitors for
different types of events; however, the role of the deployables is not totally clear. Are the
deployables for monitoring the edge of a plume or are they to provide assurance to
populated areas not covered by fixed monitors, that they have not been affected? The
deployables are a flexible, well designed system, but the locations where they will be
placed relative to where the contaminated plume is located needs better definition.

The air concentration and external gamma radiation data from the RERT teams
and the deployables should be integrated. This should be the easiest data to integrate
since it is collected by the same organization and provide an extra safeguard to the
operators.

In the early phase, the deployable monitors are to provide gamma radiation and
airborne radioactive particulate data to modelers to assist in validation of model output
or adjustment of input parameters (page 16). But the deployment scheme is to place the
monitors outside of the contaminated area. To assist the modelers, the monitors may
have to be placed inside the plume to measure gamma or airborne above background.

The scheme for siting deployable monitors is to put them where they will measure
background or pick up resuspension. Decision-makers will be looking for more data on
the impacted areas, particularly from monitoring stations that can send data remotely
without exposing personnel, except for short timeframes to change filters. Have we
really worked out the correct mission for the deployables? Is there a short term strategy
to use the deployables in the location of a fixed monitor on a temporary basis as part of
the testing program? We suggest that EPA explore this strategy.

5.6 Charge Question #2d

Does the plan provide for a practical interplay between the fixed and deployable
monitors to accommodate different types of events that would utilize them?

While our view of the expanded and upgraded RadNet Air Network's capabilities
to meet EPA objectives is essentially consistent with EPA objectives, our view of the
respective roles of the fixed and deployable monitors is significantly different than that of
EPA, and is a major factor in determining what constitutes an effective interplay between
fixed and deployable monitors.

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Concerning the interplay between fixed and deployable monitors, EPA proposes
in essence, to treat the data from the two types of monitors in a similar fashion. Yet, the
fixed stations do not include exposure rate measurements, and the deployable monitors
do not include gamma spectrometry. In addition, the collection filters (for air sampling)
are different on the two systems. These differences lead to a number of issues. How will
the fixed and deployable data be integrated (e.g., in the context of modeling), especially
given the different gamma-ray detectors? How will cross-calibration of the systems,
considering the use of different air sampling filters, be accomplished?

These questions lead to more fundamental questions. Why is exposure rate
measurable on the deployable, but not on the fixed, monitors? In this regard, what is the
purpose of the exposure rate monitoring on the deployable monitors? Finally the EPA
needs to address foreseen shortcomings in the RadNet program in the near term: (1)
Shortage of fixed monitoring stations and (2) Scenario dependence of the interplay
between fixed and deployable stations.

5.6.1 Near-term network shortage

Current plans for the upgraded RadNet system of air monitoring instruments call
for a system comprising 180 fixed samplers and 80 deployable samplers. The 80
deployable units have been purchased and are available for deployment from NAREL in
Montgomery and RIENL in Las Vegas. Procurement of the fixed monitors is in progress,
but the full complement of 180 samplers is not projected to be completed for a number of
years. However the projections made by EPA in the RadNet report are based on full
deployment of 180 fixed monitors and the availability of 80 deployable monitors. Both
types of units will be needed in response to a major airborne release of radionuclides.

It is planned that the deployable units will be used to expand the sampling
network of interest around the site of a known airborne release. In light of the near-term
limitations to the Network discussed above, it is important that the interplay between both
types of monitors include a scenario where deployable units be used routinely in the near
future to expand the fixed station network until more fixed sampling units can be
obtained.

5.6.2 Scenario dependence

The objectives associated with the interplay of fixed and deployable monitors will
be specific to the two basic operational scenarios: (a) "routine" and (b) "emergency" (i.e.,
a radiological 'incident,' whether accidental or intentional). In practice, the necessary
monitoring data to characterize the radioactivity/radiation 'environment' in these two
basic scenarios exists at multiple scales of detection or "resolution." For the sake of
simplicity, we can identify 3 scales: National- or Interstate-scale (multi-state; 102 to 103
mile radius), Regional-scale (101 to 102 mile radius), and Local-scale (1 to iomile radius).

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a) 'Routine' or 'baseline' monitoring is predominately an Interstate-scale
activity. Routine monitoring relies virtually exclusively on the fixed monitor
network: in this case, real-time monitoring is not as important as expanded
coverage. The major benefit of the expansion and upgrade plan is the addition
of up to 180 new monitoring sites. Fixed monitors provide Interstate-scale
data, the deployable monitors provide Regional- and (to a complementary
extent) Local-scale data. Local-scale data are also supplemented by portable
monitors representing local- and state-assets. The purpose of this monitoring
is to characterize, on an on-going basis, the ambient radiation environment in
space and time. For this purpose, air monitoring needs to be supplemented
with other existing monitoring Networks, including water and milk
monitoring/sampling. The interplay with deployable monitors will depend on
the ability of the fixed network to fulfill coverage requirements on the
National scale. Deployables could be used to supplement that coverage; and

b) 'Emergency' monitoring requires data inputs at all 3 scales. Interstate- and
Regional-scale data are used to track transport of major releases, typically
from nuclear power plant accidents, the detonation(s) of improvised nuclear
device(s) (rather than from an RDD). Local-scale data are most relevant for
smaller RDD events, and help determine evacuation vs. shelter-in-place
decisions. However, in addition, EPA should also address the pros and cons
of 'routinely' pre-deploying the monitors to places where "intel" suggests that
they may be needed (e.g., Times Square NYC during New Year's eve, Super
Bowl game, World Series, Olympics, Mardi Gras, etc.) For such decision-
making, real-time data are critical and deployables must be well integrated
with fixed Networks in terms of data integration and immediate availability to
the key decision making agencies FRMAC and the end user IMAAC that
generates the plume projections. For small events the best interplay between
monitor types would factor in all of the monitors in the Nation in spite of data
quality variability, for state, local, utility, DOE and others.

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6. OVERALL PROPOSALS FOR DATA MANAGEMENT

Charge Question 3: Given that the system will be producing near real-time data, are the
overall proposals for data management appropriate to the system's objectives?

3 a) Is the approach andfrequency of data collection for the near real-time data
reasonable for routine and emergency conditions?

3b) Do the modes of data transmission from the field to the central data base
include effective and necessary options?

6.1 Overview response to Charge Question #3

This charge question deals primarily with the tiered communication approach
available for the field stations to transmit the data to NAREL where the central base is
maintained. The tiered approach involves four automated methods of data transmission of

• Telephone hardware modem;

• Cellular phone modem;

• Ethernet; and

• LandSat Satellite trancsceiver.

The system will automatically switch to alternate communications methods if a
particular resource is not available and the order of preference is programmable. In
addition there are other methods for manually downloading the data at the field stations.
These methods of data transmission from the field appear to offer a reasonable and
effective set of options for collection of data from the field. The degree of redundancy
also appears to be necessary because of the uncertainties about how various methods of
data transmission and communication may be crippled during an emergency.

Emergencies may cause various communication systems to fail due to use beyond
the capacity of a system or actual physical damage to a system. This particular mix of
communication methods provides alternatives that utilize independent systems.
The particular mix of communication methods will require an ongoing evaluation of their
effectiveness in two ways. First is the obvious need to evaluate new technologies and to
consider whether they offer preferable alternatives in cost or reliability compared to the
existing communication methods. The second aspect is to review the continuing viability
of the existing methods.

Even though a communication technology may not change in terms of its
technical specifications, other factors may have a detrimental or beneficial effect on the
existing technology. An example would be when a form of communication becomes
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emergency? Also there should be an ongoing evaluation of the degree of independence of
the alternative communications methods—are infrastructure changes causing two
previously independent communication methods become dependent on the same
resources.

The present plan provides multiple modes of transmission as the solution to the
problem of failure of one or more communications links. There is the need to consider
how decisions should be made with incomplete transmission of the data because of
partial failure of all of the communication methods. If you could only receive partial
information from the field stations how would you prioritize the data available to you?
Should you change your decision rules when you have incomplete data or information
with larger variability than you anticipated?

The charge question dealt with the transmission of data from the field to the
central data base at NAREL. The evaluation and interpretation of RADNET data also
involves other communication links that are critical to the process of providing high-
quality information to decision makers and other stakeholders. The vulnerability of these
communication links should also be considered in any evaluation of the RADNET
system. In order for RADNET data to be effectively interpreted it requires modeling at a
center remote from NAREL—what alternative communication methods are available to
link to this center? Similar concerns arise over communication of results to decision
makers since for many scenarios the decision makers are likely to be located at the site of
the emergency where communication methods may not be working. FRMAC and
coordinating agencies also need to have alternative communication methods. Also if we
consider the field stations, NAREL, modeling center, FRMAC, agencies, and decision
makers as a communications system to provide information to the public in an emergency
then there is a need to consider not only the communication links between the parts of the
system but also the need for alternative sites such as the modeling center to preserve the
communication system to the public.

Evaluation of some of the questions proposed here probably require more
resources than are available to RADNET and go beyond decisions that can be made by
NAREL. These will require coordination with FRMAC and other agencies. For this type
of review to meet the needs of RADNET the specifications for the communication needs
of RADNET that may be different or unique to RADNET should be made a formal part
of the review process.

Draft from Brian Dodd:

Generally, the modes appear to be satisfactory. There are a variety of backup
systems for communicating data including modem backup to the satellite telemetry. The
panel liked the idea of using the PDA for getting information from the data-logger. All
of the systems appear to be based on existing technology and the panel felt that the EPA
should keep abreast of future improvements as the systems are deployed and employ
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systems were appropriate because it seems that the system had only been tested for a few
days. Modifications to the system and its options will probably become clear once there
has been much more testing of multiple data streams over longer periods.

The panel expressed some concern with regard to the operators being a weak link
in some aspects of the transmission of data. While understanding the plan to use non-
radiological personnel for such tasks, it is believed that there are sufficient trained
radiation safety personnel available to be able to use some of them for this role. For
example, there could be many volunteers from the Health Physics Society who are
unlikely to have a formal role in an emergency that would be willing to help. In addition,
radiation safety staff from other, unaffected States may be called upon through mutual aid
agreements. This becomes important if the role of the deployable monitors is revised in
line with other panel recommendations. If the deployables are used in areas where there
are measurable radiation or contamination levels non-radiological personnel may not
respond appropriately.

The panel believes that the revised mission of deployable monitors has a number
of other impacts. It makes it important to have a direct read-out of radiation levels on the
monitor itself. It is felt that being able to download a local dose rate to a PDA and then
read it would not be satisfactory. Similarly, there is likely to be more need for electrical
generators than has been planned for up to this point as well as a greater need for security
of the deployables once positioned.

The panel felt that only having one person from each lab responsible for 20
systems was too few. A span of control of about 5 teams to one lab expert would be
much better.

Support is needed for deployable exercises so that there can be an evaluation of
the SOPs for: set-up; criteria for siting; evaluation of data transmission; data QA; data
presentation; use of data by incident management; as well as message evaluation on data
interpretation.

6.4 Response to Charge Question #3c

Are the review and evaluation of data efficient and effective considering the decision-
making and public information needs during an emergency?

6.4.1 Review and evaluation of data

The discussions presented to the Radiation Advisory Committee (RAC) about
methods to provide Quality Assurance/Quality Control (QA/QC) of the data showed that
the plans for ensuring the quality of the data were adequate. In addition, the automatic
and computerized methods currently in place to determine if the equipment is working
properly and that data are accurate were well thought out.

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SAB Working Review Draft Report dated March 9, 2006 for RAC RadNet Review Panel Edits - Do Not Cite or Quote. This working
review draft is a work in progress, does not reflect consensus advice or recommendations, has not been reviewed or approved by the
RAC's RadNet Review Panel or the Chartered SAB, and does not represent EPA policy.

The Committee notes that standard operating procedures (SOP) should be in place
and accompany all the QA/QC plans to insure that the data handling is reproducibly done
prior to any release and that information from the system is accurate and reliable. The
QA/QC system should be tested over an extended period of time with "dry runs" to
determine if the methods can insure that the equipment is operating properly at both the
fixed and deployable stations.

In the rare case when one of the fixed stations has a reading that is outside the
predetermined range of acceptability, everything possible must be done to expedite the
QA/QC process to validate the readings. Even in an emergency, it is essential that the
proper QA and QC be done on the data before it is released; the time table for releasing
the data should not be compressed in any way that may jeopardize data quality.

The air monitoring and data management/transmission system have only recently
been delivered to NAREL and have not been completely tested. The discussion of data in
the Concept and Plan document is brief and provides only a conceptual plan for data
management. The review panel did not see complete raw data sets or data in the form that
it will be provided to users, including the public. The NAREL proposal for data
management appears to be adequate, but it cannot be conclusively stated that it is
appropriate to the system's objectives until the data management procedures are
developed and tested.

6.4.2 Communication to decision makers and the public

The presentation of data in a manner that accurately conveys technical
information must vary for different events and for users with varying needs and levels of
technical expertise. The method of presenting the data to decision-makers does not need
to be the same as the methods used to present the data to the public.

Routine data from the fixed monitors can be supplied in raw form to either of the
groups and needs to be made available in an easy to access form as soon as the data has
had proper QA/QC evaluation, as has been done in the past. The handling and release of
the data in emergencies has different requirements which need to be carefully
considered.

6.4.3 Communication with decision makers

In an emergency, the EPA's responsibility is to get accurate and reliable data to
National Atmospheric Release Advisory Center (NARAC) Interagency Modeling and
Atmospheric Assessment Center (IMAAC) at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
as soon as possible so that models can be adequately developed to help understand the
dose, distribution and direction of the plume. As soon as the data has been conveyed to
IMAAC and properly evaluated, IMAAC needs to convey the models along with all other

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SAB Working Review Draft Report dated March 9, 2006 for RAC RadNet Review Panel Edits - Do Not Cite or Quote. This working
review draft is a work in progress, does not reflect consensus advice or recommendations, has not been reviewed or approved by the
RAC's RadNet Review Panel or the Chartered SAB, and does not represent EPA policy.

information on the event to Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center
(FRMAC).

Immediately following the recognition of a radiation incident, local Incident
Command center will be established to direct local responders in their rescue and
treatment of people who are directly affected and to protect the public who are not
affected. Incident Command will make decisions on the basis of the information at hand.
These decisions must be informed by data that describe the nature and significance of any
potential radiation exposure. Very early qualitative data will be collected locally and
provide information for early decisions but historical and quantitative data collected by
EPA, including RadNet data, should be forwarded through channels as soon as possible.
Because data need to be reviewed to assure quality, there will be some delay. Everything
possible should be done during emergencies to minimize the time necessary to review the
data and forward it on to inform local Incident Command as soon as possible.

6.4.4	Communication with the public

In the event of an emergency, FRMAC, rather than EPA, has the initial
responsibility for releasing information to the public. It is important that the flow of data
from the event to the public be restricted to this line of communication (EPA to IMAAC
to FRMAC), so that the messages the public receives are consistent, accurate and useful
as possible. For example it is important that there is not one message reporting activity
in dpm and another suggesting some type of radiation dose. After communication from
FRMAC has occurred, EPA should then make every effort to rapidly supply the validated
raw data in a form that is easy for the public to understand.

6.4.5	Units for communication

During all the processing of the data and in the preparation of documentation,
such as the "Expansion and Upgrade of the RadNet Air Monitoring Network, " Vol 1 and
2, Concept and Plan, " care needs to be taken to use proper international units to express
activity, radiation exposure, dose and risk. This was not the case in the document. This
may be related to the fact that international units were adopted and came into wide spread
use after much of the monitoring data were derived by the systems that have been
replaced by RadNet. From this time forward, all data should be re-evaluated using the
proper S.I. units with the older units put in parenthesis, i.e. Bq (pCi) or rem (Sv) etc.

Such consistency is the first step in helping the decision makers and public understand
the meaning of the data.

6.4.6	Communicating risk

Great care needs to be taken in converting raw data from counts per minute, to
exposure, dose and risk. Raw counting data is very site, detector, nuclide, isotope,

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SAB Working Review Draft Report dated March 9, 2006 for RAC RadNet Review Panel Edits - Do Not Cite or Quote. This working
review draft is a work in progress, does not reflect consensus advice or recommendations, has not been reviewed or approved by the
RAC's RadNet Review Panel or the Chartered SAB, and does not represent EPA policy.

particle size, chemical form and population specific. Thus, without much additional
information and analysis, the raw data (counts per minute) cannot be used to make even
the crudest estimates of risk. In conveying the raw data to the public, it is important that
the message does not convey an improper perception of the risk from any event. For
example Figure B. 1 page B-2 in the report records the level of activity as Monthly
Maximum Gross Beta Concentration (pCi/m3) over a 13 year time period. It shows that
the activity during this time varies by more than 100,000 times. Conveying such raw
data to the public would suggest that the risk had changed by a very large amount.
Historical data suggest that these large changes in activity in the air resulted in minimal
non-detectable changes in background cancer frequency in the U.S. This is of course
related to the high background frequency of cancer in the population and the low risk
from radiation related cancer.

6.4.7 Other factors that complicate accurate communication

The difficulty in communicating raw data from RadNet is further complicated by
the wide range of background radiation and radioactive materials in the environment.
Information on background radiation and its variability also needs to be communicated to
the public relative to the changes measured by RadNet. It would be important for
information on the range of background radiation to be quantified and made available
with any report to the public.

The current public fear of radiation and the perception that an increase in
radiation induced cancer frequency will result following any level of exposure adds
another difficulty in communication with the public. The differences between
"calculated risk" and "measured increases in cancer frequency" following low dose
radiation exposures of large populations needs to be further established and discussed in a
framework that the public can understand. The small magnitude of the radiation-related
cancer risk compared to the background cancer risk without radiation exposure needs to
be properly communicated in any releases to the public. Care should be taken to avoid
calculation of the number of excess cancers in large populations exposed to very low
doses of radiation. This is a calculation that should not be done by EPA or from data
derived from RadNet.

6.4.8 Preparing for communication in an emergency

The Panel recommends that when RadNet participants in exercises on mock
releases they also make efforts to design public release statements associated with the
"data" derived from the models and activities generated during these exercises. These
statements can be prepared ahead of time and need to be related to exposure, activity,
dose and risk. Such statements must be carefully reviewed by social scientists and
communications experts to be sure that the messages are understandable and accurate.
The messages derived from the mock release exercises also need to be discussed with
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SAB Working Review Draft Report dated March 9, 2006 for RAC RadNet Review Panel Edits - Do Not Cite or Quote. This working
review draft is a work in progress, does not reflect consensus advice or recommendations, has not been reviewed or approved by the
RAC's RadNet Review Panel or the Chartered SAB, and does not represent EPA policy.

makers should include individuals like the Governors, City Managers, Mayor, Media
managers, Chief of Police and Fire Chief. The decision makers should be asked to
respond to the information provided and let EPA, IMAAC, and FERMAC know what
information that they need to make decisions and how the data and messages supplied
would influence the decisions that they must make in the time of a real event or
emergency. Studies of this type will help to develop useful, understandable and accurate
messages that can be used to convey the data derived from RadNet following an event
involving radiation dispersal devices or improvised nuclear weapons. It will be
especially important to have these messages developed well ahead of time and defined
for rapid use in the case of a real event. Such messages will need to be modified to be
specific for each real event. They must provide a foundation that will help the public
understand if they were exposed, the levels of the exposure, the radiation doses
associated with the exposure and the level of damage or risk associated with the
exposure. This will provide a rational basis for any action or sacrifice that the public are
asked to make by the decision makers.

Richard Jaquish—My comment on question 3c is the following:

The air monitoring and data management/transmission system have only recently
been delivered to NAREL and has not been completely tested. The discussion of data in
the Concept and Plan document is brief and provides only a conceptual plan for data
management. The review panel did not see complete raw data sets or data in the form that
it will be provided to users, including the public. The NAREL proposal for data
management appears to be adequate, but it cannot be conclusively stated that it is
appropriate to the system's objectives until the data management procedures are
developed and tested.

6.5 Response to Charge Question #3d

Given the selected measurements systems, are the quality assurance and control
procedures appropriate for near real-time data?

SANDOUIST RESPONSE:

It is EPA policy that all EPA environmental programs observe 48 CFR 46 and
comply fully with the American National Standard ANSI/ASQC E4-1994 for the agency-
wide Quality System. 48 CFR 46 and ANSI/ASQC E4-1994 provide the regulatory and
operational basis for QA/QC procedures and appear appropriate and adequate for the
RadNet Air Monitoring Network. However, given the extensive array of requirements
and activities provided in these regulations and standards, important issues regarding the
RadNet Air Monitoring Network include the following:

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SAB Working Review Draft Report dated March 9, 2006 for RAC RadNet Review Panel Edits - Do Not Cite or Quote. This working
review draft is a work in progress, does not reflect consensus advice or recommendations, has not been reviewed or approved by the
RAC's RadNet Review Panel or the Chartered SAB, and does not represent EPA policy.

•	The specific EPA QA System established to assure that environmental data from
the RadNet Air Monitoring Network used to support federal, state, and local
decisions are of adequate quality and usability for their intended purposes;

•	Are all organizations and individuals under direct contract to EPA for RadNet Air
Monitoring related activities providing their services, products, deliverable items,
personnel training, and work in full conformance with 48 CFR 46 and
ANSI/ASQC E4-1994?;

•	Has EPA audited and documented that the required quality and performance of
these services, products, deliverable items, personnel training, personnel training,
and work is adequate and demonstrated for other interested parties?;

•	Annual assessments (as documents available to appropriate agencies) of the
effectiveness of each quality system component associated with the RadNet Air
Monitoring Network are required to demonstrate conformance to the minimum
specifications of ANSI/ASQC E4-1994; and

•	Because the integrity and accuracy of the data measured, gathered, processed and
disseminated is essential to the successful mission of the RadNet Air Monitoring
Network, a controlled testing and periodic assessment of the overall performance
of the system is essential for national security and confidence in the network.

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SAB Working Review Draft Report dated March 9, 2006 for RAC RadNet Review Panel Edits - Do Not Cite or Quote. This working
review draft is a work in progress, does not reflect consensus advice or recommendations, has not been reviewed or approved by the
RAC's RadNet Review Panel or the Chartered SAB, and does not represent EPA policy.

REFERENCES

[NOTE: To be provided by RAC's RadNet Review Panel. DFO has provided references
to ERAMS I, ERAMS II, etc. below, and will provide others, including relevant FR
notices if needed. — KJK]

U.S. EPA ORIA. 2005. Expansion and Upgrade of the RadNet Air Monitoring Network,
Vol. 1 & 2, Concept and Plan, Prepared for the Radiation Advisory Committee RadNet
Review Panel, Science Advisory Board, U.S. EPA, Prepared by the Office of Radiation
and Indoor Air, U.S. EPA

U.S. EPA SAB. 1996. "Radiation Advisory Committee (RAC) Advisory on
Environmental Radiation Ambient Monitoring System (ERAMS), " EPA-SAB-RAC-
ADV-96-003, April 5, 1996

U.S. EPA SAB. 1998. "An SAB Advisory: Environmental Radiation Ambient
Monitoring System (ERAMS) II, An Advisory by the Radiation Advisory Committee
(RAC), " EPA-SAB-RAC-ADV-98-001, August 28, 1998

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APPENDIX A - Description of the SAB Process

[NOTE: Will be further edited as appropriate and provided here or in introduction.

KJK]

A-l Request for EPA Science Advisory Board (SAB) Review

The EPA Office of Radiation and Indoor Air (ORIA) requested the SAB to
provide advice on the National Monitoring System (NMS) upgrade, formerly known as
the Environmental Radiation Ambient Monitoring System (ERAMS). The Radiation
Advisory Committee (RAC) held a public conference call meeting on February 28, 2005
to receive briefings from ORIA about this request, to receive public comments and to
discuss its plan for the coming year (see FR, Vol. 70, No. 19, January 31, 2005, pp.
4847-4848).

A-2 Panel Formation

The Panel (Radiation Advisory Committee's (RAC) RadNet Review Panel) was
formed in accordance with the principles set out in the 2002 commentary of the SAB,
Panel Formation Process: Immediate Steps to Improve Policies and Procedures: An
SAB Commentary (U.S. EPA SAB. 2002). A notice offering the public the opportunity
to nominate qualified individuals for service on the Panel was published, where the SAB
Staff Office requested nominations of experts to augment expertise to the SAB's
Radiation Advisory Committee (RAC) for SAB review of RadNet's air radiation
network, a nationwide system to track environmental radiation (see FR, Vol. 70, No. 56,
March 24, 2005, pp. 15083-15084). The SAB Staff Office sought individuals who have
radiation expertise and knowledge of ERAMS in the following areas:

1) Instrumentation (especially air monitors and detection equipment involving
fixed and deployable monitors, sodium iodide crystals, and gamma exposure
instruments);

2) Statistics (especially involving data interpretation, identification of
abnormalities during normal operations, monitor siting plans, baseline data
and data trends analysis, data coverage issues, and data interpretation);

3) Modeling (especially involving validating and refining source terms,
dispersion modeling, meteorological assumptions and estimates);

4) Risk assessment (with particular experience and expertise in population dose
reconstruction, health data interpretation, and health effects); and

5) Risk communication.

The SAB Staff Office Director, in consultation with SAB Staff, including the
Designated Federal Officer (DFO), the SAB Ethics Advisor, and the Chair of the SAB's
Chartered Board, selected the final Panel. Selection criteria included: excellent
qualifications in terms of scientific and technical expertise; the need to maintain a
balance with respect to qualifying expertise, background and perspectives, willingness to

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serve and availability to meet during the proposed time periods, and the candidate's prior
involvement with the topic under consideration. The final Panel includes persons with
expertise advertised in the Federal Register as outlined above. The Panel members, in
addition to having new persons to serve, also include individuals who are experienced
SAB consultants familiar with the Agency. The final panel determination memo was
signed on November 22, 2005 and posted prior to the December 1, 2005 conference call
meeting of the Panel.

A-3 Panel Review Process and Review Documents

The RAC's RadNet Review Panel first met via conference call on December 1,
2005 to be briefed by the Agency staff on the draft document to be reviewed, to clarify
the charge to the Panel, and to assign specific charge questions to the individual Panelists
in preparation for the face-to-face meeting. The actual face-to-face meeting of the RAC's
RadNet Review Panel to conduct a peer review of the Agency's draft document entitled
"Expansion and Upgrade of the RadNet Air Monitoring Network, Vols. 1 &2 Concept
and Plan, " dated October, 2005 was held on December 19 and 20, 2005 in the Agency's
NAREL in Montgomery, AL where many of the Agency ORIA Staff implementing and
managing RadNet are housed (see FR, Vol. 70, No. 220, November 16, 2005, pp. 69550-
69551).

The RAC's RadNet Review Panel scheduled three (3) additional public
conference calls to reach closure on their draft report in critique of the Agency's RadNet
draft document dated October, 2005. The meetings that are scheduled include March 20,
2006, April 10, 2006, and June 12, 2006. (see FR, Vol. 71, No. 40, March 1, 2006, pp.
10501-10502).

(KJK will briefly summarize the public conference call meetings as they occur, as well
as a briefly summarize the Chartered Board's Quality Review process when that is
complete. — KJK).

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APPENDIX B- BIOSKETCHES

U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY
SCIENCE ADVISORY BOARD
RADIATION ADVISORY COMMITTEE (RAC) RadNet REVIEW PANEL

Biosketches of the RAC RadNet Review Panel
Dr. Bruce B. Boecker:

Dr. Bruce B. Boecker: is a Scientist Emeritus of the Lovelace Respiratory Research
Institute, Albuquerque, New Mexico. He is a Diplomate of the American Board of health
Physics, a Certified Health Physicist, and a Fellow of the Health Physics Society (HPS).
He has served on numerous committees especially for the National Council Council on
Radiation Protection and Measurements, NCRP, International Commission on
Radiological Protection, ICRP, and the National Academy of Science/National Research
Council, NAS/NRC, dealing with the intake, internal doses, bioassays, epidemiology,
radiobiology and risk of radionuclides. He has been elevated to honorary member of the
NCRP. He was a consultant to develop a Federal strategy for research into the biological
effects of ionizing radiation. He currently serves as a Technical Staff Consultant with the
NCRP dealing with various Homeland Security topics. Dr. Boecker's research interests
have been manily in tow broad areas, namely (1) inhalation toxicology and (2) dose-
response relationships for long-term biological effects produced by internally deposited
radionuclides. He has been particularly involved in the conduct of animal
experimentation to develop information to support predictions of consequences of
accidental exposure of man or to establish standards to ensure the safe and orderly
conduct of activities that might result in release of toxic agents to man's environment.
His personal research efforts have been associated primarily with the radiobiology and
toxicology of airborne material associated with different activities in the nuclear fuel
cycle. This research has spanned broadly from studies of aerosol characteristics as they
may influence patterns of deposition, retention, and dosimetry on through to risk
assessments for different nuclear energy systems. Dr. Boecker holds a Ph.D. and M.S. in
Radiation Biology from the University of Rochester and a B.A. in Physics from Grinnell
College.

Dr. Antone L. Brooks

Dr. Antone L. Brooks is a radiation biologist, Senior Scientist and Professor of Radiation
Toxicology in the Environmental Science Department at Washington State University.
Dr. Brooks received an associate's degree in Chemistry from Dixie Junior College in St.
George, Utah, a B.S. in Experimental Biology and an M.S. in Radiation Biology from the
University of Utah in Salt lake City. He received his Ph.D. in Physical Biology and
Genetics from Cornell University in Ithaca, New York. Dr. Brooks has conducted
extensive research on health effects of radiation exposure from both external radiation

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sources and internally deposited radioactive materials. He has used both molecular, cell
and whole animal research to help define these effects. His current research is focused at
developing a scientific basis for radiation risk estimates following low-dose radiation
exposure. He has done extensive work to define energy barriers for radiation-induced
cellular effects, has characterized cell and molecular responses that result in bystander
effects, adaptive responses and genomic instability. His current focus is to understand
how these new observations result in paradigm shifts that may impact the shape of
radiation dose-response relationships in the low dose region. A major current focus is
developing better tools to communicate the results of radiation science including a web
site, http://lowdose.tricitv.wsu.edu. Dr. Brooks has served as a member of the NAS
BEIR VI Committee on Health Effects of Exposure to Radon. He is a member of the
National Council on Radiation Protection and measurements (NCRP) and is on the Board
of Directors of the NCRP. He is currently serving on the EPA Science Advisory Board
(SAB) as a member of the Radiation Advisory Committee (RAC). He is a member of the
Editorial Board of the International Journal of Radiation Biology and the International
Journal of Low Radiation.

Dr. Gilles Y. Bussod., dipl H. Sci., Ph.D.

Dr. Gilles Y. Bussod is Chief Scientist with New England Research, Inc. in White River
Junction, VT, and an Adjunct Professor in Earth Sciences at The University of Vermont
in Burlington, VT. He also holds an appointment as Professor Candidat aux Universites
de France, a Doctorate in Geophysics from the Universite de Paris VII, France, and a
PhD in Geology from the University of California, Los Angeles. He has recently served
on the Faculty of Science at the International Research Center of the Catholic University
of Leuven, Campus Kortrijk in Belgium and was employed as President of Science
Network International, Inc., in Santa Fe, NM. Previously he was a staff Hydrogeologist
and Geochemist at Los Alamos National Laboratory, Los Alamos, NM, and a Science
Fellow at both the Bayerisches Geoinstitut in Bayreuth, Germany, and the Lunar and
Planetary Institute, Houston, TX. He also served as a National Laboratory
Representative to the Middle East, and a Delegation Member to the U.S. Secretary of
State Madeleine Albright, at the Economic Summit Conference in Doha, Qatar. As the
Los Alamos National Laboratory Project Leader and technical manager for the Yucca
Mountain Project, he received several Achievement Awards and Patents. Dr. Bussod's
research is centered on Environmental Restoration of contaminated DoD and DOE sites,
specializing in the design and implementation of integrated laboratory and field studies
on radionuclide transport, the remobilization of "legacy waste" in the environment, and
the effect of subsurface heterogeneities on modeling transport phenomena and upscaling.
He was PI for the Underground Unsaturated Zone Transport Test, Busted Butte, NV, and
The Cerro Grande Subsurface Remediation Project, Los Alamos, NM. He holds
authorship or co-authorship in over 60 publications involving geochemical flow and
transport and related phenomena, as well and over 30 invited oral
presentations dealing with unsaturated zone modeling, high pressure and high
temperature research in experimental rock physics and petrology, novel drilling methods,

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rock melting drilling systems, deformation mechanisms, energy extraction techniques,
high pressure experimental seismic velocity measurements and related topics.

Dr. Brian Dodd:

Dr. Brian Dodd is originally from the U.K. where he worked at Imperial College and the
Royal Naval College in Greenwich. He and his family moved to the USA in 1978, taking
up citizenship in 1993. Until February 2004, Dr. Dodd was Head of the International
Atomic Energy Agency's Radiation Source Safety and Security Unit, managing the
IAEA's efforts in dealing with orphan sources and the potential use of radioactive
sources for radiological terrorism. He is currently 'retired' form the managerial burdens
of work, but is still pursuing the technical aspects as BDConsulting in Las Vegas. Prior
to joining the IAEA he was at Oregon State University for 20 years, most recently as the
Director of its Radiation Center a well as a Professor of Health Physics and Nuclear
Engineering. Dr. Dodd has been involved with the Health Physics Society for many
years, including terms of office on the Board of Directors and as treasurer. He is
currently (2005-6) the President-Elect of the HPS as well as Treasurer of the International
Radiation Protection Association. His fields of expertise include safety and security of
radioactive sources, transportation of radioactive material, emergency response, training
and research reactors. Brian Dodd has authored or co-authored a number of IAEA/UN
publications on security of radioactive sources, safe transport of radioactive materials,
management of radiation protection, quality aspects of research reactor operations and
related topics. He has authored or co-authored over 100 publications in technical
journals, conference proceedings, reports and others dealing broadly with the above
topics. Dr. Dodd has a B.S. in Nuclear Engineering and Ph.D. in Reactor Physics from
Queen Mary College, London University.

Dr. Shirley A. Fry. M.B.. B. Ch.. MPH:

Dr. Shirley A. Fry is a self-employed consultant in radiation health effects. She holds a
medical degree from the University of Dublin, Trinity College, Ireland, and a master's
degree in epidemiology in the School of Public Health, University of North Carolina,
Chapel Hill. She was on the staff of the Medical Sciences Division (MSD) of Oak Ridge
Associated Universities (ORAU) from 1978 until her retirement in 1995. At ORAU she
was member of MSD's Radiation Emergency Assistance Center/Training Site's
(REAC/TS) clinical staff, teaching faculty and response team (1978-1995); director of its
Center for Epidemiologic Research (1984-1991) and its assistant director (1991-1995).
Subsequently she was a member of the Scientific Advisory Council and later the
scientific director of the International Consortium for Radiation Health Effects Research,
a Washington, DC.-based consortium of research groups at academic institutions in the
US, Belarus, Russian Federation and Ukraine established to conduct collaborative
epidemiological studies among groups potentially exposed to radiation as the result of the
1986 Chernobyl reactor accident. She continued a part-time association with ORAU until
November 2005. Her areas of scientific interest are in the acute and chronic health

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effects of radiation, specifically in the long term follow-up of individuals and populations
previously accidentally exposed or at risk of occupational exposure to radiation,
including workers employed by US Department of Energy, its predecessor agencies and
their contractors, and in the US radium dial painting industry. Dr. Fry is the author or co-
author of a number of publications on topics relating to these groups. She has served on
national and international committees concerned with radiation health effects, including
the Institute of Medicine' Medical Follow-up Agency (IOM/MFUA's) Committee on
Battlefield Exposure Criteria and the National Academies of Sciences/ National
Research Council 's Board of Radiation Effects Research (NAS/NRC's BEAR)
Committee on the Assessment of the Scientific Information for the Radiation
Exposure, Screening and Education Program, the Health Studies Group of the US/USSR
Joint Commission on Chernobyl Nuclear Reactor Safety and the International Agency for
Research on Cancer's International Study Group on Cancer Risk Among Nuclear
Workers.

Dr. William C. Griffith:

Dr. William C. Griffith was trained as a biostatistician and has collaborated for over three
decades in studies of the dosimetry and health effects of radiation and other toxicants.
His work has included design, data collection and analysis of laboratory and field based
studies. In particular he has extensive experience in estimation of doses from internally
deposited radionuclides and estimation of dose response in terms of age specific
incidence rates and prevalence. He has also been active in translating his experience into
models that are useful for health protection through is participation in committees of the
National Council for Radiation Protection. More recently he has analyzed how these
models are applied in environmental cleanup of the Department of Energy's Hanford site,
and he has worked extensively with committees of the Hanford Advisory Board. Most
recently he has been funded as part of the Department of Energy's Low Dose Radiation
Program to translate laboratory results into mathematical models that will be useful for
future regulation of radiation. Dr. Griffith also has experience in the study of non-
radioactive toxicants. He was part of the team at the Lovelace Inhalation Toxicology
Research Institute that was the first to prove that diesel exhausts are pulmonary
carcinogens in laboratory animals. For the last five years at the University of
Washington he has been Director of the Risk Characterization Core for the Child Health
Center funded by the Environmental Protection Agency and the National Institute of
Environmental Health Science. As director he has designed and developed statistical
methods for analysis of a community based randomized intervention to test the
effectiveness of educating farm workers about how they can decrease the accidental
exposures of their children from pesticides they bring home on their clothes. Dr. Griffith
has also collaborated with EPA Region 10 by lecturing frequently on how to apply
statistical methods to superfund cleanup decisions. This year he organized 8 workshops
on the application of new genomic and proteonomic methods in collaboration with EPA-
ORD for EPA regions, state and tribal environmental offices.

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Dr. Helen Ann Grogan:

Dr. Helen Ann Grogan is a member of the SAB's Radiation Advisory Committee. She is
employed as an independent consultant who has her own consulting firm, Cascade
Scientific, which has been subcontracted by Risk Assessments Corporation (RAC) to
work on a variety of projects, including an independent assessment of the risks to the
public from the 2002 Cerro Grande Fire for the New Mexico Environment Department,
development of a risk-based screening for historical radionuclide releases to the
Columbia River from the Hanford Nuclear Facility in Washington under contract to the
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), and two dose reconstruction projects
(Rocky Flats near Denver, CO and Savannah River in So. Carolina). Her work for the
Rochy Flats site emphasized quantifying cancer risk and its uncertainty following
exposure to plutonium from inhalation and ingestion. Dr. Grogan is currently working
with other RAC contractors on the RACER project to develop a process and tool that can
be used to guide the efforts to reduce public health risk and ecological impact from
radionuclides and chemicals originating at the Los Alamos National Laboratory. DR.
Grogan has assisted in the development of an International Features Events and
Processes (FEP) database for the Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development(OECD) in France to be used in the
performance assessment of radioactive waste disposal systems. In addition, she was also
involved with the Swiss National Cooperative for the Disposal of Radioactive Waste
(Nagra), specifically in modeling the biosphere for repository performance assessment,
and in development of scenario analyses for the Nagra Kristallin I and Wellenberg
projects and development of supporting data bases that identify important phenomena
(FEPs -features, events and processes) that need to be accounted for in repository
performance assessment. She was actively involved in the Biospheric Model Valuation
Study - Phase I and IIBIOMOVS study (Biospheric Model Validation Study), which is
an international cooperative effort to test models designed to quantify the transfer and
accumulation of radionuclides and other trace substances in the environment. Dr.
Grogan's doctoral thesis title is "Pathways of radionuclides from soils into crops under
British field conditions." She has authored or co-authored several dozen publications,
and technical reports dealing with the role of microbiology modeling the geological
containment of radioactive wastes, plant uptake of radionuclides, laboratory modeling
studies of microbial activity, models for prediction of doses from the ingestion of
terrestrial foods (with a focus on radionuclides), long-term radioactive waste disposal
assessment, modeling of radionuclides in the biosphere, quantitative modeling of the
effects of microorganisms on radionuclide transport from a High Level Waste respository
and related topics. She received her Bachelor of Science Degree in Botany with honors
from the Imperial College of Science and Technology at the University of London, and
her Ph.D. from that same university.

Dr. Richard W. Hornung :

Dr. Richard W. Hornung is a member of the Radiation Advisory Committee (RAC) since
FY 2001. He recently (2005) became Director of Biostatistics and Data Management of

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Cincinnati Children's Hospital Medical Center, Division of General and Community
Pediatrics. He headed the Statistical Working Group of the RAC's Multi-Agency
Radiological Laboratory Analytical Protocols (MARLAP) Review Panel. He served as a
consultant to the RAC (March, 1999), and participated in the SAB's advisory on Radon
Risk. He was Senior Research Associate and Director of the Division of Biostatistical
Research and Support in the Institute for Health Policy and Health Services Research at
the University of Cincinnati Medical Center in Cincinnati, Ohio. He has served since
1996 as a member of the White House Committee on Revisions to the Radiation
Exposure Compensation Act. Since 1990, he has served as an advisor on the National
Research Council. He received numerous awards, including the U.S. Public Health
Service award for "Sustained High Level Performance in the Field of Biostsatistics." He
was a consultant to the National Academy of Science Committee on the Biological
Effects of Ionizing Radiation (BEIRIV). He is a reviewer for a dozen scientific journals.
His peer-reviewed publications deal with exposure assessment methods, lung cancer risk
in Uranium miners, dose assessments, dose reconstruction, development of models for
use in estimating exposures to a number of pollutants, including diesel exhaust, benzene,
ethylene oxide, lung cancer in shipyard workers and other related topics. In the area of
radiation research, he is currently funded under contract to the University of Kentucky to
serve as the scientific director of an occupational epi study of workers at the Paducah
Gaseous Diffusion Plant. He is also funded by NIOSH as the biostatistician on a study of
radiation related cancers among residents living near the Fernald plant in Southwestern
Ohio. Dr. Horning has a B.S. in Mathematics from the University of Dayton, an M.S. in
Statistics from the University of Kentucky, and a Ph.D. in Biostatistics from the
University of North Carolina.

Mr. Richard Jaquish:

Mr. Richard Jaquish has over 40 years experience in environmental radiation
surveillance. He was the Director of the Technical Support Laboratory of the EPA
National Environmental Research Center in Las Vegas which provided laboratory
services for the analysis of samples from underground nuclear testing and plowshare
programs. Analytical procedures were developed for unique radionuclides and media
resulting from nuclear tests. In 1980 he became a senior research engineer with Battelle
Memorial Institute in Richland, WA where he was manager of the environmental
radiation program for the Hanford site. He was later the manager of the Office of
Hanford Environmental that managed the programs in environmental surveillance,
groundwater monitoring, meteorology, and wildlife resources. In 1995 he took a position
with the Washington Department of Health as an advisor in environmental radiation and
Hanford cleanup activities.

Hands on monitoring experience in unique environments included six months of
monitoring radioactivity in Antarctica, monitoring fallout in Eskimos in Alaska, and
regularly serving on a flight crew for aerial monitoring of radioactive plumes on and
around the Nevada Test Site. He was a regular member of emergency response teams at

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Battelle and the State of Washington and responded to several unusual occurrences
including the 2000 Hanford fire.

Mr. Jaquish served two terms on the American Public Health Committee on Laboratory
Standards and Practices. He was a member of the National Council on Radiation
Protection and Measurements (NCRP) Committee 64 (1994-2000) on Environmental
Radiation and Waste Issues and is currently a member of NCRP Committee 64-22 that is
preparing a guide on "Design of Effective Effluent Monitoring and Environmental
Surveillance Programs." Mr. Jaquish has a B.S. degree in Civil Engineering from
Washington State University and an M.S. in Engineering and Applied Physics from
Harvard University. He has over 20 publications in environmental radioactivity.

Dr. Janet A. Johnson:

Dr. Janet A. Johnson is currently employed by MFG, Inc. in Fort Collins, CO as a Senior
Radiation Scientist with expertise in health physics, radiation risk assessment, and
environmental health. MFG, Inc., a Tetratech Company, provides environmental
engineering consulting services to industry including the mining sector. She holds a BS
in Chemistry from the University of Massachusetts, an MS in Radiological Physics from
the University of Rochester School of Medicine and Dentistry, and a PhD degree in
Microbiology (Environmental health) from Colorado State University. Dr. Johnson was
formally employed by Colorado State University as Interim Director of Environmental
Health Services in Fort Collins, Colorado. She is a certified industrial hygienist (CIH,
radiological aspects) and is also certified in the comprehensive practice of health physics
by the American Board of Health Physics. She is an active member of a number of
radiation and health-oriented professional organizations, and is a Fellow of the Health
Physics Society (HPS), as well as a former member of the Board of Directors of the HPS.
She has served on the Colorado Radiation Advisory Committee since 1988 and was a
member of the Colorado Hazardous Waste Commission (1992-1997). Dr. Johnson's
primary consulting work focuses on the mining industry with emphasis on uranium
recovery facilities. She is also involved in developing technical basis documents for the
National Institutes of Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) dose reconstruction
project under the Energy Employees Occupational Illness Compensation Program Act
(EEOICPA). Dr. Johnson is a former chair of the Radiation Advisory Committee. In
addition, she chaired the ERAMS II advisory (EPA-SAB-RAC-ADV-98-001, August 28,
1998).

Dr. Bernd Kahn:

Dr. Bernd Kahn is Head of the Environmental Radiation Branch since 1974
(formerly the Environmental Resources Center) and now Professor Emeritus of the
Nuclear and Radiological Engineering and Health Physics Programs at Georgia Institute
of Technology (GIT). He received his B.S. in Chemical Engineering from Newark
College of Engineering (NowNew Jersey Institute of Technology), M.S. in Physics from

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Vanderbilt University and Ph.D. in Chemistry from the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology. He was Adjunct Professor of Nuclear Engineering at the University of
Cincinnati (1970-1974), Chief of the Radiological & Nuclear Engineering Facility at the
U.S. EPA's National Environmental Research Center (1970-1974), undertaking research
in environmental, medical, and biological radiological programs, including studies of
radioactive fallout in food, radionuclide metabolism in laboratory animals, and SR-90
balances in human infants; an Engineer/Radiochemist with the U.S. Public Health
Service (1954-1970), evaluating the treatment of low-and intermediate-level radioactive
wastes; and a Health Physicist and Radiochemist with Union Carbide Corporation (1951-
1954).

Dr. Kahn has served on a number of distinguished committees, panels and
commissions, including the National Research Council committees on decontamination
and decommissioning of uranium enrichment facilities, buried transuranium waste, single
shell tank wastes, Panel on Sources and Control Technologies, Committee on Nuclear
Science, and Subcommittee on the Use of Radioactivity Standards. Dr. Kahn serves on
the U.S. EPA SAB's Radiation Advisory Committee, having been on the RAC reviews of
both ERAMS I and ERAMS II, the predecessor systems to RadNet, as well as the
MARLAP review on laboratory radiation measurement protocols. He has served on the
National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements (NCRP) Scientific
Committees as Chair of the Scientific Committee 64-22 for Effluent and Environmental
Monitoring, Chair of the Task Group 5 on Public Exposure from Nuclear Power, member
of the Scientific Committee 84 on Radionuclide Contamination, member of the Scientific
Committee 64 on Environmental Issues, member of the Scientific Committee 63-1 on
Public Knowledge About Radiation Accidents, member of the Scientific Committee38 on
Accident-Generated Waste Water, member of the Scientific Committee 18A on
Radioactivity Measurement Procedures, and member of the Scientific Committee 35 on
Environmental Radiation Measurements.

Dr. Kahn is widely published with over 160 publications on the topics of radiation
measurements, monitoring and protocols, fate of radionuclide discharges, critical
pathways for radiation and population exposure, radiochemical analyses for
environmental studies, airborne radiation in buildings , emergency response to accidents
involving radioactive materials, airborne fallout, sources, fate and occurrences and health
effects of radionuclides in the environment, surveillance of radionuclides in the food
chain, integrated environmental measurement, germanium detectors and other devices,
decommissioning procedures and radiation-related topics.

Dr. Jonathan M. Links:

Dr. Jonathan M. Links is Professor of Environmental Health Sciences at the Johns
Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health, with joint appointments in Radiology and
Emergency Medicine at the Johns Hopkins School of Medicine. He is a medical
physicist, with a B.A. in Medical Physics from the University of California, Berkeley,
and a Ph.D. in Environmental Health Sciences (with a concentration in Radiation Health

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Sciences) from Johns Hopkins University. Dr. Links' expertise is in radiation physics
and dosimetry, medical imaging instrumentation, radiation-based biomarkers, and
terrorism preparedness and response. Dr. Links is a member of the Delta Omega
National Public Health Honor Society, and is a past president of the Society of Nuclear
Medicine, a 16,000 member professional medical society. Dr. Links is currently Director
of the Johns Hopkins Center for Public Health Preparedness, and is Baltimore City's
radiation terror expert, working with the Health, Fire, and Police Departments. He is a
current member of the EPA SAB's Radiation Advisory Committee.

Dr. Jill A. Lipoti:

Dr. Jill A. Lipoti was recently reappointed by the Administrator to serve a second two-
year term as Chair of the SAB's Radiation Advisory Committee (RAC). She was
recently appointed (2005) as Director, Division of Environmental Safety & Health for the
New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection (NJ DEP) in Trenton, NJ. From
1989 until late 2005, she held the position of Assistant Director of Radiation Protection
Programs of the NJ DEP. This program administers licensing and inspection of radiation
sources, certification of technologists, radon public awareness, certification of radon
testing and mitigation firms, low level radioactive waste siting issues, nuclear emergency
response, oversight of nuclear power plant activities for environmental releases, and non-
ionizing radiation. She has also held positions of Chief of the NJ DEP Bureau of
Hazardous Substances Information (6/88 to 4/89), as well as Supervisor of
Communication/ Outreach in the NJ DEP Bureau of Hazardous Substances Information
(7/87 to 6/88). Dr. Lipoti served as a Hazardous Materials Specialist with the NY/NJ
Port Authority (9/84 to 6/87), as an Assistant Instructor in the Department of
Environmental Science at Rutgers University in New Brunswick, NJ (6/79 to 9/84), and
as an Adjunct Professor of Chemistry at Middlesex County College in Edison, NJ (9/79
to 6/80, and 9/83 to 6/84). Dr. Lipoti's funding comes from the NJ DEP as a State
employee. A modest portion of the funding as a state employee is charged to her time
spent on and EPA Grant for the NJ Radon Program, as well as for NJ DEP activities
related to the four Nuclear Power Plants in the State of New Jersey.

She has publications and proceedings in a broad range of topical areas, such as
diagnostic radiology quality assurance, certification of radiation risks from high-dose
fluoroscopy, nuclear power plant and X-Ray program redesign, reduced emissions from
mammography, public confidence in nuclear regulatory effectiveness, the linear non-
threshold regulation, similarities and differences in radiation risk management,
partnerships between state regulators and various other organizations, electromagnetic
fields from transformers located within buildings, community Right-to-Know, identifying
individuals susceptible to noise-induced hearing loss, community noise control, safety for
supervisors - an updated manual for training of supervisors at the Port Authority, and a
variety of other topics.

Dr. Lipoti holds numerous appointments to boards and councils. For instance, she
currently serves as Chair of the Committee on Public Information on Radiation Protection

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and as Liaison to the American College of Radiology, as well as Liaison to the American
Association of Physicists in Medicine. She has served as Chairman of the Conference of
Radiation Control Program Directors (1997-98), the Board of Directors and Chair of of
the Environmental Nuclear Council (1992-95), Chair of the Transportation Committee
(1991-93) and is a member of the National Council on Radiation Protection and
Measurement (NCRP). She is a member of the Health Physics Society, the American
College of Radiology, the Science Advisory Board's Radiation Advisory Committee and
other organizations. She is the State of New Jersey Representative to the U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission (NRC), the Interagency Steering Committee on Radiation
Standards (ISCORS), and served as a member of the Technical Electronic Products
Radiation Safety Standards Committee for the U.S. Food and Drug Administration
(FDA).

Dr. Lipoti has provided expert testimony on a variety of radiation-related topics.
She has provided comments on the revised oversight program for nuclear power plants,
and orphan source recovery, and licensee's accountability programs before the U.S.
NRC. She has also provided comments to various Congressional committees and
subcommittees, such as comments on the Radon Disclosure and Awareness Act in a joint
hearing before the United States House of Representatives Subcommittee on
Transportation and Hazardous Materials and the Subcommittee on Health and the
Environment, and comments on the Indoor Radon Abatement Reauthorization Act of
1993 in a hearing before the U.S. Senate Committee in Environment and Public Works,
Subcommittee on Clean Air Nuclear Regulations.

Dr. Lipoti holds a Ph.D and M.S. in Environmental Science from Rutgers
University, and a B.S. in Environmental Science from Cook College in New Brunswick,
NJ.

Dr. Gary M. Sandquist:

Dr. Gary M. Sandquist is currently a Professor of Mechanical Engineering and
former Director of the Graduate Nuclear Engineering Program at the University of Utah.
Previously he was a Distinguished Visiting Professor in Physics and Civil and
Mechanical Engineering Departments at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, where
he supported and trained Army personnel in Functional Area 52 activities (Nuclear
operations). He has a B.S. in Mechanical Engineering, M.S. in Engineering Science,
Ph.D. in Mechanical and Nuclear Engineering, MBA, was a Post Doctoral Fellow at
MIT, and served a Sabbatical at ben Gurion University in Beer Sheva, Israel. He is a
Registered Professional Engineer in Utah and New York (Mechanical) and California
(Nuclear), a Board Certified ealth Physicist, a Diplomate in Environmental Engineering,
a Certified Quality Auditor, and a retired U.S. Naval Reserve Commander with an
Intelligence Designator. The Reactor Supervisor and U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC) Licensed Senior Reactor Operator for a TRIGA research reactor, he
served as a short mission expert in nuclear science and safeguards for the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and as Technical Training Director for the joint DOE,

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EPA, DRI Community Radiation Monitoring Program at the Nevada Test Site. Dr.
Sandquist's principal scientific interests include risk assessment; radiation transport,
analytical detection and measurement; assessment and decontamination of chemical and
radioactive hazards; design and execution of characterization and final status surveys
using Multi-Agency Site Survey and Investigation Manual (MARSSIM); and design and
operation of heating, ventilation and air-conditioning (HVAC) systems. He is a Fellow
of the American Society of Mechanical Engineering (ASME) and American Nuclear
Society (QUANS). He has authored or co-authored 500 publications including 5 books
and book chapters, 180 refereed papers, 325 technical reports, developed 17 major
technical computer codes and participated in over 200 technical meetings, conferences,
workshops and government hearings.

Dr. Richard J. Vetter

Dr. Richard J. Vetter is Radiation Safety Officer for Mayo Clinic and Professor of
Biophysics in the Mayo College of Medicine in Rochester, Minnesota, and Director of
Safety for Mayo Foundation. His major areas of interest include biological effects and
dosimetry of ionizing and nonionizing radiation and public policy of radiation
applications. Dr. Vetter is certified by the American Board of Health Physics and the
American Board of Medical Physics and the American Board of Medical Physics. He is
former Health Physics Society President and has served as Editor-in-Chief of the Health
Physics Journal, as well as the Board of Directors of the Minnesota Safety Council. He
currently serves as a member of the National Council on Radiation Protection and
Measurements Board of Directors and a member of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Advisory Committee on Medical Use of Isotopes. He is a member of the American
Association of Physicists in Medicine, the Radiological Society of North America, the
Society of Nuclear Medicine, the American Academy of Health Physics, and the
International Radiation Protection Association. He has served in numerous capacities on
the Mayo Clinic Activities, such as the Radiation Safety Committee, the Mayo
Foundation Radiation Safety Committee, the Safety Council, and the Foundation
Environmental Health and Safety Committee. He has participated in a number of
professional activities at the state level, such as the Governor's Task Force on Low Level
Radioactive Waste. He is or has been a reviewer for the American Council on Science
and Health, the Health Physics Journal, Radiation Research and numerous other
publications. He is author or co-author of more than 200 publications in hewalth physics
and related areas. He received his B.S. and M.S. in Biology from South Dakota State
University in Brookings, SD and his Ph.D. in Health Physics from Purdue University in
West Lafayete, IN.

Ms. Susan Wiltshire:

Susan Wiltshire is a former Vice President of the consulting firm JK Research
Associates, Inc. Her areas of expertise include radioactive waste management, public
involvement in policy and technical decisions, and risk communication. She has planned

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and facilitated citizen involvement, moderated multi-party discussions and assisted with
the peer review of technical projects and written and spoken extensively about the
public's role in the formulation of public policy. Ms. Wiltshire's wrote the 1993 version
of the League of Women Voters' "A Nuclear Waste Primer, " the 1985 revision of which
she coauthored.

Ms. Wiltshire has served on a number of committees of the National Academies
National Research Council including the Board on Radioactive Waste Management, the
Committee on Technical Bases for Yucca Mountain Standards, and the Committee on
Risk Perception and Communication. She chaired both the Committee to Review New
York State's Siting and Methodology Selection for Low Level Radioactive Waste
Disposal and the Committee on Optimizing the Characterization and Transportation of
Transuranic Waste Destined for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant. Ms. Wiltshire is a Vice
President and member of the Board of the National Council on Radiation Protection and
Measurements (NCRP) and serves as Chairman of that organization's Committee on
Public Policy and Risk Communication. She is a former member of the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency Advisory Committee on Radiation Site Cleanup
Regulation and its committee on the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP), which she has
chaired.

Ms. Wiltshire served two terms as member and Chairman of the elected
Board of Selectmen, the chief executive body of the Town of Hamilton, Massachusetts,
and of the Town's appointed Finance Committee. She is former Chairman of the Board
of Northeast Health System, Beverly, Massachusetts and of Beverly Hospital. Ms.
Wiltshire was formerly President of the League of Women Voters of Massachusetts. She
graduated Phi Bete Kappa with High Honors from the University of Florida, receiving a
BS in Mathematics.

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SAB Working Review Draft Report dated March 9, 2006 for RAC RadNet Review Panel Edits - Do Not Cite or Quote. This working
review draft is a work in progress, does not reflect consensus advice or recommendations, has not been reviewed or approved by the
RAC's RadNet Review Panel or the Chartered SAB, and does not represent EPA policy.

APPENDIX C-ACRONYMS

AL	Alabama

Am	Americium (Am-141 isotope)

AMAD	Activity Median Aerodynamic Diameter (Reference to particle size)

AMADF	Activity Median Aerodynamic Diameter Factor (Reference to particle
size)

ANSI	American National Standards Institute

ASQC	American Society for Quality Control (also American Society for Control
of Quality (ANSI/ASQC)

Be	Becquerel

C-14	Carbon 14

CA	Coordinating Agency

CEDE	Committed Effective Dose Equivalent

CFR	Code of Federal Regulations

Ci	Curie

Co	Cobalt

cps	Counts Per Second

Cs	Cesium (Cs-137 isotope)

DFO	Designated Federal Officer

DHS	Department of Homeland Security (U.S. DHS)

DOD	Department of Defense (U.S. DOD)

DOE	Department of Energy (U.S. DOE)

dpm	Disintegrations Per Minute

dps	Disintegrations Per Second

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SAB Working Review Draft Report dated March 9, 2006 for RAC RadNet Review Panel Edits - Do Not Cite or Quote. This working
review draft is a work in progress, does not reflect consensus advice or recommendations, has not been reviewed or approved by the
RAC's RadNet Review Panel or the Chartered SAB, and does not represent EPA policy.

EPA	Environmental Protection Agency (U.S.EPA)

FERMAC	Federal Emergency Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center

FRMAC	Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center

GM	Geiger Mueller (Detector)

hr	Hour

IMAAC	Inter-Agency Modeling and Atmospheric Assessment Center
IMMAAC

Ir	Iridium (Ir-192 isotope)

keV	kiloelectron volts

MDA	Minimum Detectable Activity

MGBC	Maximum Gross Beta Concentration

MMGBC	Monthly Maximum Gross Beta Concentration

mm2	Square Millimeter

m3	Cubic Meter

jam	micrometer

Nal	Sodium Iodide

Nal (TI)	Sodium Iodide Thallium (Crystal/Detector)

NARAC	National Atmospheric Release Advisory Center

NAREL	National Air and Radiation Environmental Laboratory (U.S.
EPA/ORIA/NAREL, Montgomery, AL)

NIST	National Institute of Standards and Technology

NRP	National Response Plan

nCi	nanocuries

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SAB Working Review Draft Report dated March 9, 2006 for RAC RadNet Review Panel Edits - Do Not Cite or Quote. This working
review draft is a work in progress, does not reflect consensus advice or recommendations, has not been reviewed or approved by the
RAC's RadNet Review Panel or the Chartered SAB, and does not represent EPA policy.

NYC	New York City

ORIA	Office of Radiation and Indoor Air (U.S. EPA/ORIA)

PAG	Protective Action Guide

pCi	picocuries

PIC	Pressurized Ion Chamber

QA	Quality Assurance

QC	Quality Control

QA/QC	Quality Assurance/Quality Control

R	Roentgen

RAC	Radiation Advisory Committee (U.S. EPA/SAB/RAC)

RadNet	Radiation Network, a Nationwide System to Track Environmental
Radiation

RDD	Radiological Dispersion Device

R&D	Research and Development

Rem	Rad (Roentgen) Equivalent Man (1 rem = 0.01 Sv)

RERT	Radiological Emergency Response Team

RIENL	Radiation and Indoor Environments National Laboratory (U.S.
EPA/ORIA/RIENL, Las Vegas)

R/h	Roentgen/hour

Rn	Radon

SAB	Science Advisory Board (U.S. EPA/SAB)

SI	International System of Units (from NIST ,as defined by the General
Conference of Weights & Measures in 1960)

SOP	Standard Operating Procedures

Sr	Strontium (Sr-90)

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SAB Working Review Draft Report dated March 9, 2006 for RAC RadNet Review Panel Edits - Do Not Cite or Quote. This working
review draft is a work in progress, does not reflect consensus advice or recommendations, has not been reviewed or approved by the
RAC's RadNet Review Panel or the Chartered SAB, and does not represent EPA policy.

Sv	Sievert (1 rem = 0.01 Sv)

T1	Thallium (Tl-208 isotope)

TR	Toxicological Review

US	United States

WSRC	Westinghouse Savanna River Company (contractors for Savanna River)

End of Document

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