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Catalystfor Improving the Environment
Evaluation Report
EPA's Response to the
World Trade Center Collapse:
Challenges, Successes, and
Areas for Improvement
Report No. 2003-P-00012
August 21, 2003
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Report Contributors: Rick Beusse Dana Gilmore
James Hatfield Sarah Fabirkiewicz
Chris Dunlap Steve Schanamann
Geoff Pierce Eric Hanger
Abbreviations
AEGL
Acute Exposure Guideline Level
AHERA
Asbestos Hazard Emergency Response Act
AT SDR
Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry
CEQ
Council on Environmental Quality
CERCLA
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act
CFR
Code of Federal Regulations
COPC
Contaminants of Potential Concern
EPA
Environmental Protection Agency
f/cc
Fibers per Cubic Centimeter
FEMA
Federal Emergency Management Agency
FRP
Federal Response Plan
HEPA
High Efficiency Particulate Air
HVAC
Heating, Ventilation, and Air Conditioning
NCP
National Contingency Plan
NESHAP
National Emissions Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants
NIOSH
National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health
NYCDDC
New York City Department of Design and Construction
NYCDEP
New York City Department of Environmental Protection
NYCDOH
New York City Department of Health
OCEMR
Office of Communications, Education, and Media Relations
OIG
Office of Inspector General
OSHA
Occupational Safety and Health Administration
PAHs
Polycyclic Aromatic Hydrocarbons
PCBs
Polychlorinated Biphenyls
PCM
Phase Contrast Microscopy
PDD
Presidential Decision Directive
PLM
Polarized Light Microscopy
PM
Particulate Matter
s/mm2
Structures Per Millimeter Squared
TEM
Transmission Electron Microscopy
TERA
Toxicology Excellence for Risk Assessment
TSP
Total Suspended Particulates
VOCs
Volatile Organic Compounds
WTC
World Trade Center
Cover photo: New York Police Department photograph
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UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY
WASHINGTON, DC 20460
THE INSPECTOR GENERAL
August 21, 2003
MEMORANDUM
SUBJECT: Final Evaluation Report: EPA's Response to the World Trade Center
Collapse: Challenges, Successes, and Areas for Improvement
Report No. 2003-P-00012
TO:
Marianne L. Horinko
Acting Administrator
Attached is our final report regarding the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) response
to the World Trade Center (WTC) collapse. This report contains findings that describe problems
encountered in responding to the WTC collapse and corrective actions the Office of Inspector
General (OIG) recommends. This report represents the opinion of the OIG and the findings
contained in this report do not necessarily represent the final EPA position. Final determinations
on matters in the report will be made by EPA managers in accordance with established
procedures.
Action Required
In accordance with EPA Directive 2750, as the action official, you are required to provide this
Office with a written response within 90 days of the final report date. The response should
address all recommendations. For the corrective actions planned but not completed by the
response date, please describe the actions that are ongoing and provide a timetable for
completion. Where you disagree with a recommendation, please provide alternative actions for
addressing the findings reported.
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We appreciate the efforts of EPA officials and staff, as well as those of New York City, in
working with us to develop this report. If you or your staff have any questions regarding this
report, please contact me at (202) 566-0847 or Kwai Chan, Assistant Inspector General for
Program Evaluation, at (202) 566-0827.
Attachment
cc:
Thomas J. Gibson, Chief of Staff, Office of the Administrator
Jane M. Kenny, Regional Administrator, EPA Region 2
Barry N. Breen, Principal Deputy Assistant Administrator, Office of Solid Waste and
Emergency Response
Jeffrey R. Holmstead, Assistant Administrator for Air and Radiation
J. Paul Gilman, Ph.D., Assistant Administrator for Research and Development
Kimberly Terese Nelson, Assistant Administrator for Environmental Information
Lisa B. Harrison, Acting Associate Administrator, Office of Public Affairs
Kathleen Callahan, Assistant Regional Administrator for New York City Response and
Recovery Operations
Mary U. Kruger, Director, EPA Office of Homeland Security
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Executive
The September 11, 2001, terrorist attack on the World Trade Center in New York
City and the environmental aftermath were unprecedented. Airborne dust from
the collapse of the towers blanketed Lower Manhattan and was blown or
dispersed into many of the surrounding office buildings, schools, and residences.
This complex mixture of building debris and combustion by-products contained
such ingredients as asbestos, lead, glass fibers, and concrete dust. Responding to
this crisis required organizations from all levels of government to coordinate their
response efforts and to make critical public health and safety decisions quickly,
and without all of the data that decision-makers would normally desire.
Unfortunately, this country may experience more terrorist attacks, and a response
to such a tragedy could be needed again. Accordingly, we initiated this
evaluation, in consultation with the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
Deputy Administrator, to evaluate EPA's response to September 11. During our
evaluation, we sought to answer six specific questions that address how EPA
responded and how it could better respond in the future. Those questions, along
with summaries of what we found and recommendations for each, follow.
1. Did the available monitoring data and analyses of that data support EPA's major
public communications regarding air quality and associated health risks resulting
from the collapse of the World Trade Center (WTC) towers?
EPA's early public statements following the collapse of the WTC towers
reassured the public regarding the safety of the air outside the Ground Zero area.
However, when EPA made a September 18 announcement that the air was "safe"
to breathe, it did not have sufficient data and analyses to make such a blanket
statement. At that time, air monitoring data was lacking for several pollutants of
concern, including particulate matter and polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs).
Furthermore, The White House Council on Environmental Quality influenced,
through the collaboration process, the information that EPA communicated to the
public through its early press releases when it convinced EPA to add reassuring
statements and delete cautionary ones. An EPA draft risk evaluation completed
over a year after the attacks concluded that, after the first few days, ambient air
levels were unlikely to cause short-term or long-term health effects to the general
population. However, because of numerous uncertainties - including the extent of
the public's exposure and a lack of health-based benchmarks - a definitive
answer to whether the air was safe to breathe may not be settled for years to come.
Details regarding the handling of indoor contamination are discussed in relation to
Objective 2 below.
EPA has initiated actions to strengthen its risk communication procedures for
emergency situations, including the development of a draft Plan for Incident
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Communication. We recommend that the EPA Administrator continue these
efforts and develop procedures for emergency risk communication to ensure that
public pronouncements regarding health risks and environmental quality are
adequately supported with available data and analysis and are appropriately
qualified.
2. Were EPA actions and decisions in regard to evaluating, mitigating, and controlling
risks to human health from exposure to indoor air pollutants in the WTC area
consistent with applicable statutes, regulations, policies, guidance, and practice?
EPA's actions to evaluate, mitigate, and control risks to human health from
exposure to indoor air pollutants in the WTC area were consistent with applicable
statutes and regulations. These statutes and regulations do not obligate EPA to
respond to a given emergency, allowing for local agencies to lead a response, and
New York City in fact exercised a lead role regarding indoor air. Nonetheless, we
believe EPA could have taken a more proactive approach regarding indoor air
cleanup. After the City was criticized for its response, EPA began to assume a
lead role in February 2002. Prior to initiation of the EPA-led cleanup, many WTC
area residents had returned to their homes, and a study indicated most of them had
not followed recommended cleaning practices. The full extent of public exposure
to indoor contaminants resulting from the WTC collapse is unknown.
We recommend that the EPA Administrator coordinate with other Federal, State,
and local agencies to develop protocols for determining how indoor
environmental concerns will be handled in large-scale disasters. We also
recommend that EPA work with the Department of Homeland Security and other
Federal agencies to develop and publish oversight criteria, including State and
local agency reporting requirements, for handling indoor air contamination.
3. Were asbestos demolition and renovation work practice standards followed during
WTC cleanup and recovery operations and, if not, why not?
We could not conclusively determine the extent to which required work practices
regarding the control of asbestos were followed at the WTC site during demolition
and debris removal. Since asbestos is a known human carcinogen, EPA has
established stringent work practices to control emissions of asbestos resulting
from demolition and renovation projects. We found that a significant requirement
to reduce emissions in emergency demolitions - wetting damaged buildings
before demolition and keeping the waste material wet after demolition - was
followed. However, work practices applicable to the transport of debris from the
site were employed inconsistently. The specific impact on air quality of any
variance from EPA's asbestos emergency work practices is unknown.
We recommend that the EPA Administrator develop specific procedures for
ensuring that Federal, State, and local responders follow the appropriate NESHAP
work practices for catastrophic emergency situations involving asbestos.
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4. To what extent were EPA and government communications regarding air quality and
associated health risks: (a) received by the public; (b) understood by the public; and
(c) effective in getting people to take the desired actions to reduce their potential
health risks?
After the WTC terrorist attack, people received information from many different
sources, and many factors - in addition to government communications - could
have influenced their actions. Information is a critical component in helping the
public minimize their exposure to potential health hazards. However, evidence
gathered through government hearings, news polls, health studies, and our
interviews indicated that the public did not receive sufficient air quality
information and wanted more information on associated health risks. Also,
evidence indicated that government communications were not consistently
effective in persuading the public to take recommended precautions. Because of
these concerns, the OIG conducted a survey of New York City residents regarding
government communications. These results will be reported separately.
EPA has initiated several actions to improve its risk communications procedures
during emergencies. Further, EPA is working with the Federal Emergency
Management Agency to clarify roles and responsibilities for ensuring worker
safety during an emergency response. We recommend that EPA continue to
coordinate efforts to establish clear Federal roles.
5. What additional actions, if any, should EPA take to improve its response and
recovery efforts in the WTC area related to ambient and indoor air quality?
The majority of officials contacted indicated EPA did not need to take additional
actions to address outdoor ambient air quality concerns. However, concerns were
expressed regarding indoor contamination, and several more measures can be
taken to ensure that indoor cleanup effectively minimizes health risk exposure.
We recommend that EPA implement a testing program to ensure the indoor
cleanup effectively reduced health risks from all pollutants of concern, and
implement a verification program to determine whether previously cleaned
residences have been recontaminated.
6. Should EPA revise its preparation and contingency planning for dealing with air
pollution resulting from environmental catastrophes?
The events of September 11 had national security ramifications not previously
experienced, and many persons interviewed spoke highly of the response of EPA
and its employees. Still, we, as well as EPA and others, have identified lessons
learned from the response that can improve EPA's preparedness for future
disasters. An overriding lesson learned was that EPA needs to be prepared to
assert its opinion and judgment on matters that impact human health and the
environment. Although many organizations were involved in addressing air
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quality concerns resulting from the WTC collapse, subsequent events have
demonstrated that, ultimately, the public, Congress, and others expect EPA to
monitor and resolve environmental issues. This is the case even when EPA may
not have the overall responsibility to resolve these issues or the necessary
resources to address them.
EPA has initiated many actions as a result of its own internal lessons learned
exercises. Based on our review, we our making a number of recommendations to
improve EPA's emergency response capabilities in three areas: (1) contingency
planning, (2) risk assessment and characterization, and (3) risk communication.
Agency and New York City Comments and OIG Evaluation
In her August 8, 2003 response to the draft report, the EPA Acting Administrator
stated that she was proud of the men and women of EPA and that the Agency's
response was extraordinary. Although she generally agreed with the
recommendations of our draft report (with the exception of Chapter 6), she
responded that our report lacked sufficient acknowledgment of EPA's efforts in
several areas. For example, she noted that our report focused too heavily on the
Agency's press releases and did not sufficiently consider the Agency's other
forms of communication or the Agency's "lessons learned" efforts. She provided
several specific comments outlining the Agency's disagreement with some of the
report's findings and conclusions. A detailed summary of the Agency response
and our evaluation is included at the end of each chapter. The Agency's complete
response and our evaluation of that response are included as Appendices Q and R,
respectively.
New York City officials responded to excerpts from the draft report and provided
us with specific comments and clarifications which we incorporated into the final
report, as appropriate. New York City's response is attached as Appendix S and
our evaluation of that response is attached as Appendix T.
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Table of C
Executive Summary
Chapters
1 Introduction 1
Purpose 1
Background 1
Scope and Methodology 5
2 EPA Statements About Air Quality Not Adequately Qualified 7
Communicating Information to the Public Critical 7
What EPA Said in Its Major Public Communications 8
Data Available at the Time Did Not Fully Support EPA Press Releases 9
Council on Environmental Quality Influenced EPA Press Releases 14
September 13 Press Release Also Revised to Eliminate Cautionary Statements 17
Recent Conclusions About WTC Air Quality 18
Recent Developments 19
Conclusions 19
Recommendation 20
Agency Comments and OIG Evaluation 20
3 EPA's Response to Indoor Environment Consistent With Statutes
and Regulations But May Have Delayed Needed Health Protection 21
Concerns Expressed Regarding Indoor Contamination Response 21
Responses to Indoor Contamination 22
EPA Statutory and Regulatory Authority for Indoor Environment 27
Prior Responses to Releases of Hazardous Substances 28
Conclusions 29
Recommendations 30
Agency and New York City Comments and OIG Evaluation 30
4 Asbestos Emission Control Work Practices Inconsistent 33
Application of NESHAP Demolition and Renovation Regulations to the WTC Disaster 33
Asbestos Work Practices Used in the WTC Complex Demolition 34
Asbestos Still in Many U.S. Buildings 38
Conclusions 39
Recommendations 39
Agency and New York City Comments and OIG Evaluation 39
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5 Air Quality-Related Communications Not Effective in
Getting Public and Workers to Take Recommended Precautions 41
NYCDOH Survey Found Residents Wanted More Air Quality Information
and Did Not Use Recommended Cleaning Procedures 41
Telephone Poll Indicated Public Did Not Believe Air Was Safe 42
Unprotected Workers Cleaned Contaminated Offices and Residences 42
Ground Zero Workers May Not Have Received Sufficient Information 43
Recent Developments 44
Conclusions 44
Recommendation 45
Agency and New York City Comments and OIG Evaluation 45
6 Further Actions Needed to Address Current WTC Response 47
WTC Outdoor Monitoring Ended June 2002 47
Indoor Residential Cleanup Program 47
Actions Can Be Taken to Provide Additional Assurance
That Indoor Cleanup Is Protective of Human Health 50
Conclusions 53
Recommendations 53
Agency and New York City Comments and OIG Evaluation 54
7 EPA Should Continue Efforts to Improve Contingency Planning 55
Various Actions Initiated 55
OIG Observations for Improving Emergency Response 57
Contingency Planning 57
Risk Assessment and Characterization 60
Risk Communication 63
EPA Actions to Improve Its Communications 67
Recent Developments 68
Conclusions 68
Recommendations 69
Agency Comments and OIG Evaluation 70
Appendices
A Federal Agencies Responding to the WTC Collapse 71
B Details on Scope and Methodology 73
C EPA September 18. 2001 Press Release 77
D Screening Levels Used by EPA to Assess Outdoor Air Quality 79
E EPA Outdoor Air Asbestos Sampling for September 2001 81
F EPA Outdoor Bulk Dust Asbestos Test Results for September 2001 83
G EPA September 16. 2001 Press Release 85
H EPA September 13. 2001 Press Release 87
I Non-Governmental Environmental Experts Interviewed 89
J NYCDEP October 25. 2001 Instructions to Residents 91
K Indoor Air and Dust Test Results 93
L Details on Use of Respirators at Ground Zero 99
M Cleaning Procedures for Residents Opting to Have Their Residences Cleaned 103
N Details from EPA and Non-EPA Lessons Learned Reports 105
O Details on Health-Based Benchmarks Needed 113
P EPA Letter Concerning Worker Protection 115
Q EPA Response to the Draft Report 117
R OIG Evaluation of the Agency's Response 131
S New York City Response to Draft Report Excerpts 139
T OIG Evaluation of New York City's Response 149
U Distribution 155
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Purpose
The September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on this country and their environmental
aftermath were unprecedented. Unfortunately, further terrorist attacks on this
country remain likely and a response to such a tragedy could be needed again.
Accordingly, the Office of Inspector General (OIG) initiated this evaluation, in
consultation with the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Deputy
Administrator, to evaluate EPA's response to the collapse of the World Trade
Center (WTC) towers on September 11. The objectives of our evaluation were to
answer the following:
Did the available monitoring data and analyses of that data support EPA's
major public communications regarding air quality and associated health risks
resulting from the collapse of the WTC towers?
Were EPA actions and decisions in regard to evaluating, mitigating, and
controlling risks to human health from exposure to indoor air pollutants in the
WTC area consistent with applicable statutes, regulations, policies, guidance,
and practice?
Were asbestos demolition and renovation work practice standards followed
during WTC cleanup and recovery operations and, if not, why not?
To what extent were EPA and government communications regarding air
quality and associated health risks: (a) received by the public; (b) understood
by the public; and (c) effective in getting people to take the desired actions to
reduce their potential health risks?
What additional actions, if any, should EPA take to improve its response and
recovery efforts in the WTC area related to ambient and indoor air quality?
Should EPA revise its preparation and contingency planning for dealing with
air pollution resulting from future catastrophes?
Background
On the morning of Tuesday, September 11, 2001, terrorists flew two hijacked
commercial jets into the WTC towers. Both towers collapsed within 2 hours of
impact, killing almost 2,800 people, including 343 firefighters and 60 New York
City and Port Authority police officers. In addition to the devastating loss of life,
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the dust and debris emanating from the collapse and the ensuing fires created
environmental concerns for the public that have persisted more than a year after
the disaster.
Airborne dust from the collapse of the towers blanketed Lower Manhattan and
was blown or dispersed into many of the surrounding office buildings, schools,
and residences. One person described the aftermath in Lower Manhattan as
"looking like a blizzard" had hit. However, this blizzard did not deposit snow,
but instead a complex mixture of building debris and combustion by-products.
This mixture included, among other substances, asbestos, lead, glass fibers, and
concrete dust.
Dust cloud from the WTC collapse. Source: NYPD
Street level conditions in Lower Manhattan after collapse.
Source: wtcphotos by flagsoncars.com
In addition to the initial dispersion of
dust and debri s, fires at the site
created various emissions of
potentially harmful pollutants. These
fires were not officially declared
extinguished until December 19,
2001, and debris continued to
smolder and fires flared up for weeks
after that. Emissions resulting from
these fires included particulate
matter, various metals,
polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs),
volatile organic compounds (VOCs),
polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons
(PAHs), and dioxin.
On September 11, 2001, the
President signed a major disaster
declaration for the five counties of
New York City to provide assistance
to New York State, thus activating
the Federal Response Plan (FRP).
The FRP establishes the process and
structure for the Federal Government
to provide assistance to local
agencies when responding to the
consequences of any major disaster
or emergency declared under the
Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief
and Emergency Assistance Act, as
amended (42 U.S.C. § 5121, et seq ).
The FRP employs an operational
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structure based on the principles of the Incident Command System,1 a system
adopted by the fire and rescue community.
The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) is responsible for
administering the FRP. This plan includes 12 Emergency Support Functions,
which describe the types of support provided to local authorities and identify the
Federal agencies responsible for leading and assisting in providing that support.
To obtain assistance under the FRP, a State requests assistance from FEMA,
which in turn issues a mission assignment to the appropriate Federal lead agency
as outlined in the Emergency Support Functions.
EPA is the designated lead agency for Emergency Support Function No. 10,
"Hazardous Materials Annex." The intent of this function is to provide support to
State and local governments in responding to an actual or potential discharge
and/or release of hazardous materials following a major disaster or emergency,
including the release of airborne contaminants. To ensure the most efficient and
effective use of resources in responding to an actual or potential release of
hazardous materials, this function also places the response mechanisms of the
National Contingency Plan within the FRP coordination structure. The National
Contingency Plan is the implementing regulation for EPA's Superfund program,
and provides guidelines and procedures for responding to releases and threatened
releases of hazardous substances, pollutants, or contaminants, including releases
that threaten air quality.
Early Response
Various circumstances complicated the Government's and EPA's ability to
respond to environmental concerns in what was an unprecedented and extremely
difficult situation. The New York City Office of Emergency Management's
Emergency Operations Center was destroyed in the attacks. EPA's Region 2
office, about a half-mile from the WTC site, was evacuated and not re-opened
until 2 weeks after the attacks. Electrical power was lost in Lower Manhattan, as
well as radio and telephone communications. Further, transportation to Lower
Manhattan was halted, as well as commercial air travel nationwide.
As with most disasters, local authorities were the first responders. "Ground
Zero," as the seven-building WTC area site would become known, was initially a
search and rescue effort under the direction of the Fire Department of New York
and, subsequently, a recovery operation under the jurisdiction of the New York
City Department of Design and Construction (NYCDDC) and the Fire
Department of New York. According to New York City's Deputy Assistant Chief
Incident Command System Principles include use of common terminology, modular organization,
integrated communications, unified command structure, action planning, manageable span of
control, pre-designated facilities, and comprehensive resource management.
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of the Fire Department, "the complexity of the activity performed at one site -
rescue, recovery, demolition, and construction - at one time is unprecedented."
The New York City Office of Emergency Management was responsible for
coordinating the response efforts of approximately 150 governmental agencies
and non-governmental organizations. Further complicating the situation was the
fact that the area was treated as a crime scene, with law enforcement authorities
strictly limiting access for agencies such as EPA, particularly in the first 48 hours.
Nonetheless, EPA officials immediately recognized the need to monitor
environmental conditions after the attacks occurred. After the collapse, EPA
on-scene coordinators collected bulk dust samples that were analyzed for asbestos
and lead. EPA's Edison, New Jersey, location provided workspace for essential
Region 2 personnel while EPA's New York City office was closed. The
Environmental Response Team in Edison also collected ambient air samples in
New Jersey and Brooklyn on September 11, which were analyzed for the presence
of asbestos, lead, and VOCs. On September 12, nine ambient (outdoor) air
samples were collected from Ground Zero.
As the first week progressed, the assessment of environmental conditions became
a primary emphasis for EPA and other Federal, State, and local government
organizations. An EPA air monitoring specialist in Research Triangle Park, North
Carolina, took a team to New York and helped develop a monitoring network to
assess the ambient air conditions for the general public around Lower Manhattan.
In addition, a multi-agency task force was established to address environmental
concerns, with EPA eventually being designated the lead agency for managing all
of the ambient air data collected by the various government agencies.
In addition to responding to the air quality issues, which are the focus of this
report, EPA conducted many other response activities. These included overseeing
the removal of hazardous wastes, monitoring and assessing water quality,
monitoring environmental conditions at the landfills, and establishing and
operating personal and truck washing stations at the disaster site and landfills.
Hazardous material removed from the site included an estimated 236 batteries,
802 containers, and 3,049 cylinders that had potential to cause environmental and
human health damage. Further, approximately 639,465 gallons of fuel oil and/or
oily water mixture were pumped from basements, manholes, trenches, and
underground storage tanks. A NYCDDC official told us that EPA's response was
"phenomenal" in his opinion and that EPA's response crews were on top of every
issue.
Other Federal agencies in addition to EPA were involved in providing support to
local authorities regarding environmental quality and safety. For example:
• FEMA was in charge of coordinating the FRP.
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The Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), within the
Department of Labor, conducted ambient and bulk dust sampling within the
immediate Ground Zero work zone and provided guidance to Ground Zero
workers regarding the use of personal protective equipment.
Within the Department of Health and Human Services:
~ The National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH)
assisted in ensuring worker health and safety.
~ The Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry (ATSDR)
provided technical assistance to the New York City Department of
Health by conducting an indoor residential sampling and assessment
project.
~ The Public Health Service provided assistance to the New York City
Department of Health.
Appendix A provides further details on the various tasks performed by these and
other Federal Agencies.
Scope and Methodology
Our evaluation focused on EPA's response to air quality concerns - both ambient
and indoor - for the period September 2001 through April 2003. Our work was
performed at various EPA offices and the offices of several other Federal
agencies, such as FEMA, OSHA, and ATSDR. We also performed work at
various New York City offices. Further, we visited and consulted selected health
research, air quality testing, academic, and environmental organizations.
Our approach included the independent review and verification of WTC air
monitoring and bulk dust data. For example, we randomly selected monitoring
results posted on EPA's web site and traced the test results back to the raw data to
verify the accuracy of the information posted. Further, we selected certain data
from EPA's "NYC Response" database and determined whether it was included
on EPA's public web site.
Our approach included a synthesis of WTC-related research reports, independent
legal interpretation of applicable statutes and regulations, and independent
analysis of EPA technical decisions used in interpreting and presenting air quality
information. We interviewed key officials within and outside of EPA who
collected, analyzed, interpreted, or made decisions with WTC air monitoring and
bulk dust data, as well as environmental and medical external experts. We
conducted our field work during the period June 2002 through July 2003. We
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conducted this review in accordance with Government Auditing Standards, issued
by the Comptroller General of the United States.
A detailed description of our scope and methodology is in Appendix B.
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Chapter 2
EPA Statements About Air Quality
Not Adequately Qualified
EPA's early statements reassured the public regarding the safety of the air outside
the Ground Zero perimeter area. However, when EPA made a September 18
announcement that the air was "safe" to breathe, the Agency did not have
sufficient data and analyses to make the statement. The White House Council on
Environmental Quality (CEQ) influenced, through the collaboration process, the
information that EPA communicated to the public through its early press releases
when it convinced EPA to add reassuring statements and delete cautionary ones.
Conclusions from an EPA draft risk evaluation completed over a year after the
attacks have tended to support EPA's statements about long-term health effects
when all necessary qualifications are considered. However, EPA's statements
about air quality did not contain these qualifications. (Details on indoor air are in
Chapter 3.)
Communicating Information to the Public Critical
Communicating the potential health risks resulting from an environmental hazard
is a key mechanism for warning the public to mitigate potential exposures and
take other precautions to avoid unnecessary health risks. However, an emergency
situation often presents significant challenges.
EPA has many years of experience in communicating environmental risks to the
public, especially through its Superfund program. The Agency has issued
numerous guidance documents on how to effectively communicate risks to the
public, including EPA's "Seven Cardinal Rules of Risk Communication"
(see box). EPA and the New York City Department of Health were significantly
involved in
communicating
information on the
air quality in Lower
Manhattan after the
WTC disaster.
Seven Cardinal Rules of Risk Communication
1. Accept and involve the public as a legitimate partner.
2. Plan carefully and evaluate your efforts.
3. Listen to the public's specific concerns.
4. Be honest, frank, and open.
5. Coordinate and collaborate with other credible sources.
6. Meet the needs of the media.
7. Speak clearly and with compassion.
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What EPA Said in Its Major Public Communications
EPA used various methods to inform the public after September 11, including
attending public forums; having interviews with newspaper, television, and radio
reporters; and posting information on its public web site. Our analysis focused
primarily on the information provided through press releases since the Agency
develops its position through a deliberative process that represents the Agency's
official position.
EPA issued five press releases within 10 days after September 11, 2001, four
more through the end of December, and another four through the end of May
2002. EPA's WTC press releases from September through December 2001
reassured the public about air quality. Although EPA's press releases generally
recommended that rescue and cleanup workers take precautions to reduce their
exposure to pollutants, EPA's basic overriding message was that the public did
not need to be concerned about airborne contaminants caused by the WTC
collapse. This reassurance appeared to apply to both indoor and outdoor air.
For example, EPA Region 2 officials told us that the September 18 statement
made by the EPA Administrator (see Appendix C) that the air was "safe" to
breathe only applied to:
long-term health effects - not short-term or acute health effects;
the general public - not Ground Zero workers;
outdoor air - not indoor air;
healthy adults - not sensitive sub-populations such as children and the
elderly; and
asbestos - not other air pollutants.
However, except for the second point, the statements issued by EPA in press
releases throughout 2001 generally did not contain the above qualifications. For
the general public, EPA's overriding message was that there was no significant
threat to human health.
Key air quality related statements from EPA press releases issued during 2001
following the WTC collapse are in Table 2-1. The full text of each of these press
releases are available at our web site.2
www.epa.gov/oig
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Table 2-1: Key Air Quality Statements from 2001 Press Releases
Date
Key Statement
09-13-01
"Monitoring and sampling conducted on Tuesday and Wednesday have
been very reassuring about potential exposure of rescue crews and the
public to environmental contaminants. . . . EPA and OSHA will work
closely with rescue and cleanup crews to minimize their potential
exposure, but the general public should be very reassured by initial
sampling."
09-16-01
"Our tests show that it is safe for New Yorkers to go back to work in New
York's financial district" (quoting Assistant Secretary of Labor for OSHA).
"The Agency is recommending that businesses in the area planning to
reopen next week take precautions including cleaning air conditioning
filters and using vacuums with appropriate filters to collect dust."
09-18-01
"I am glad to reassure the people of New York and Washington, D.C.
that their air is safe to breath [sic]..." (quoting EPA Administrator).
09-21-01
"NYC Monitoring Efforts Continue to Show Safe Drinking Water & Air"
(press release heading).
10-03-01
"Data Confirms No Significant Public Health Risks; Rescue Crews and
Nearby Residents Should Take Appropriate Precautions. . ." (press
release sub-heading).
10-30-01
"While we have fortunately not found levels of contaminants that pose a
significant health risk to the general public, our efforts to monitor the
area and keep the public informed of our findings have not waned."
Agency officials stressed that press releases were only one of many forms of
communication used to provide air quality information to the public, and that
public forums and media interviews were also important. Further, EPA provided
public access to its monitoring data through its public web site, which included
interactive maps that could be used to identify monitoring results. In regard to the
monitoring data, we found no evidence that EPA attempted to conceal data results
from the public.
Data Available at the Time Did Not Fully Support EPA Press Releases
Information and the analyses of available data did not fully support the statement
made in the September 18, 2001, release, which quoted the EPA Administrator as
saying the air was "safe" to breathe. Four factors in particular posed limitations
on the conclusions that could be made at that time about air quality:
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A lack of data results for many pollutants,
An absence of health benchmarks for asbestos and other pollutants,
Imprecise optical asbestos sampling methodologies, and
Over 25 percent of the bulk dust samples collected before September 18
showed the presence of asbestos above the 1 percent benchmark.
EPA did not have monitoring data to support reassurances made in press releases
up to September 18 because it lacked monitoring data for several contaminants,
particularly PCBs, particulate matter, dioxin, and PAHs.
According to a draft evaluation entitled Exposure and Human Health Evaluation
of Airborne Pollution from the World Trade Center Disaster, by EPA's Office of
Research and Development, that Office was not able to make health risk
evaluations for exposures in the first couple of days because of the lack of
monitoring data. For several pollutants of concern, sampling did not begin until
September 16, and in many cases the results were not known until after the
September 18 press release was issued. EPA was not able to obtain samples and
monitor air due to difficulties in access and security, power supply sources,
equipment availability, and analytical capacity. As a result, data available before
September 18 for making conclusions about air quality for pollutants other than
asbestos was limited.
Table 2-2 shows when air monitoring began and when the data results first
became available for each pollutant of concern.
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Table 2-2: Outdoor Sampling Timeline for Pollutants of Concern
Pollutant
Sampling Source
Sampling
Started
Results Available[1]
Lead
Dust
September 11
September 12
Asbestos
Bulk Dust
Ambient Air
September 11
September 12
September 12
September 13
Benzene [2]
Air Grab Samples
September 16
September 17
Mercury
Ambient Air
Dust
September 16
September 16
September 18
September 20
Lead
Ambient Air
September 16
September 20 [3]
PAHs
Cadmium
Chromium
Manganese
Ambient Air
September 16
September 20
PAHs
Dust
September 16
September 22
Dioxin
Dust
Ambient Air
September 16
September 16
September 24 [4]
September 28
PCBs
Ambient Air
September 16
September 28
pm25
PM10 [5]
Ambient Air
September 21
October 4
TSP [5]
Ambient Air
No Monitoring
No Monitoring
Notes:
[1] = Based on Daily Summaries of monitoring results prepared by Region 2 staff in Edison,
New Jersey, which were used to brief management on data results.
[2] = EPA sampled for additional VOCs on this date as well.
[3] = EPA's Health Risk Evaluation reported lead results were known on September 18.
[4] = EPA's Health Risk Evaluation reported dioxin results were known on September 23.
[5] = "PM" stands for "Particulate Matter." PM2 5 represents "fine" particulate matter less
than or equal to 2.5 micrometers in diameter. PM10 refers to particulate matter less
than or equal to 10 micrometers, with the fraction between 2.5 and 10 micrometers
known as "coarse." "TSP" stands for "Total Suspended Particulates," and includes
all sizes of particles.
Health-based benchmarks for short-term and acute exposures did not exist for
pollutants of concern resulting from the collapse of the WTC. For asbestos, EPA
used benchmarks originally designed for other purposes to assess potential health
risks from breathing the air following the WTC collapse. Because health-based
benchmarks for short-term exposures did not exist for most of the other
pollutants, EPA revised benchmarks for lifetime (30-year) exposures to develop
screening levels for short-term (1-year) exposures. Further, health-based
benchmarks did not exist for assessing the risk to human health from exposure to
the combination of air pollutants that were emitted.
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EPA did not have health-based benchmarks for airborne asbestos nor for asbestos
in bulk dust. Consequently, EPA used criteria from two programs originally
developed for other purposes.
• Asbestos Hazard Emergency Response Act (AHERA): Criteria for this
program were developed for air monitoring inside schools following an
asbestos abatement program, to clear those schools for re-entry. For the
WTC testing, EPA used AHERA criteria to evaluate the ambient (outdoor)
air quality for asbestos. However, this is not a health-based standard. The
AHERA standard for re-entering schools was established at 70 structures
per millimeter squared (s/mm2) in 1987 because this was considered to be
the amount of background contamination found on the filters used to
collect air samples when the AHERA standard was issued. Due to filter
improvements over the years, the amount of background contamination
today is considerably less, but the AHERA standard has not been revised.
• Asbestos National Emissions Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants
(NESHAP): Criteria for this program were developed to identify
asbestos-containing material subject to demolition and renovation work
practices. This criteria states that material containing at least 1 percent
asbestos, by volume, is considered asbestos-containing material and
subject to EPA's NESHAP regulations. The 1 percent threshold, based on
the smallest amount that can be measured using Polarized Light
Microscopy, is not a health-based standard. This was emphasized in a
September 19 e-mail from an EPA Branch Chief, who has testified as an
Agency expert at an asbestos penalty hearing that: "Additionally, 1%
asbestos in a material is not a safe level of asbestos [emphasis in original
quotation] . . . one-half percent asbestos-containing material (ACM) could
be just as hazardous as 20% ACM depending on the condition of the
material and how it is handled." New York City also recommended that
building owners use this 1 percent benchmark in determining whether the
interior of buildings should be cleaned for asbestos (see Chapter 3).
Guidelines were not available to assess the impact of acute (up to 8 hours)
exposures. People caught in the initial debris and dust cloud on September 11
were potentially exposed to high levels of various pollutants for a short duration.
EPA has been funding a program to develop Acute Exposure Guideline Levels
(AEGLs), but none of these levels had been finalized at the time of the WTC
disaster. The program had developed several draft AEGL's but these draft AEGLs
were not applicable to the pollutants of concern at the WTC site.
In general, EPA did not have benchmarks to evaluate short-term exposures such
as those experienced from the WTC collapse. For the WTC situation, EPA
adjusted the Superfund 30-year exposure benchmarks to 1-year (short-term)
exposure benchmarks. (See Appendix D for a list of benchmarks used by EPA in
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assessing WTC ambient data.) Since this was done very quickly during an
emergency situation, these benchmarks were not subjected to peer review.
In addition to not knowing the health impacts of certain individual pollutants,
information was not available on the cumulative or synergistic impacts of being
exposed to several pollutants at once. For example, one medical expert suggested
there may be a synergistic effect between PAHs and asbestos, since PAHs
resemble cigarette tar. Studies have shown the lung cancer risk from exposure to
asbestos is increased exponentially for cigarette smokers. In addition, this expert
noted that the combination of high pH and the small shards of glass found in
WTC dust could have had a synergistic impact on the acute respiratory symptoms
that many people experienced.
There were limitations with all three methods used to analyze asbestos
concentrations in the ambient air and bulk dust in Lower Manhattan. These
limitations, which were not noted in EPA's press releases, restricted EPA's ability
to make definitive assessments about the health risks posed by asbestos.
However, even with these limitations, sufficient data existed to identify the
presence of asbestos in the dust and ambient air, and to warrant that persons
working around the dust take necessary precautions to not inhale the dust. The
three methods used and their limitations follow:
Transmission Electron Microscopy (TEM) is a sensitive method generally
used to analyze air samples collected from a relatively clean indoor
environment. At the WTC site, many samples could not be analyzed because
the filters being used to collect asbestos were overloaded with particulates.
For example, 24 of the 69 samples collected as of September 17 could not be
analyzed because the filters were overloaded.
Phase Contrast Microscopy (PCM), which was used to analyze asbestos
concentrations in ambient air beginning September 18, can only count fibers
in the filter greater than 5 micrometers in length. A study at the WTC site
found that the majority of the asbestos fibers at the site were less than
5 micrometers in length.
Polarized Light Microscopy (PLM) was used to measure asbestos in bulk dust.
This method is primarily an estimation method that is not very precise, and
has a detection limit of 1 percent. Therefore, using this method against a strict
benchmark is not reliable.
According to EPA, essentially all outdoor areas at the WTC site were vacuumed,
and the detection methods did not impact the action actually taken to remove the
dust from outdoor areas. See Appendix E for a summary of EPA's outdoor air
asbestos sampling results.
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Some Asbestos Readings Exceeded Levels of Concern
Over 25 percent of the bulk dust samples that EPA had collected and analyzed by
September 18 showed the presence of asbestos above the 1 percent threshold used
by EPA to indicate significant risk. In addition, New York City used the 1 percent
threshold to determine whether the removal of indoor dust was subject to its
Asbestos Control Program regulation. The level of asbestos in dust was a concern
because of the potential for the dust to be disturbed and become airborne, and thus
inhaled. As noted above, this level is not a health-based standard and dust that
contains less than 1 percent could pose a health risk. See Appendix F for results
of EPA outdoor asbestos bulk testing.
EPA and the New York City Department of Environmental Protection (NYCDEP)
conducted extensive ambient air monitoring for asbestos around Ground Zero and
Lower Manhattan after September 11. This sampling was conducted at up to 60
sites and a total of almost 10,000 samples were analyzed using TEM. During the
month of September 2001, EPA and New York City monitoring recorded 30
exceedences of the AHERA standard of 70 s/mm2. However, after September
2001 the number of AHERA exceedences decreased significantly. For the period
October 2001 through May 2002, seven exceedences of the AHERA standard
were recorded, as shown in Table 2-3.
Table 2-3. Ambient Asbestos Readings in Lower Manhattan In Excess of 70 s/mm2
Date
Reading (s/mm2)
Location 1
10/09/01
104.99
Chambers Street
11/28/01
124.44
North Side of Stuyvesant High School
12/27/01
204.44
Albany and Greenwich
01/14/02
72.00
Pier 6 bus sign
02/05/02
88.00
Liberty and Trinity
02/11/02
213.33
Church and Dey
05/25/02
336.00
West Street (near Stuyvesant H.S.)
1 Excludes four exceedences at worker wash tent.
Council on Environmental Quality Influenced EPA Press Releases
Coordination and collaboration impacted the completeness of the information and
the substance of the message EPA communicated to the public through its press
releases. As a result of the White House CEQ's influence, guidance for cleaning
indoor spaces and information about the potential health effects from WTC debris
were not included in EPA's issued press releases. In addition, based on CEQ's
influence, reassuring information was added to at least one press release and
cautionary information was deleted from EPA's draft version of that press release.
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EPA officials told us that EPA's WTC press releases issued during the weeks
following September 11 were discussed in conference calls that included EPA
officials, OSHA, and CEQ. Accordingly, the content of an EPA press release
issued during this period could come from several different sources.
Few written records were available on the process used to prepare WTC press
releases. We found draft versions for two of the press releases. However, the
White House's role in EPA's public communications about WTC environmental
conditions was described in a September 12, 2001, e-mail from the EPA Deputy
Administrator's Chief of Staff to senior EPA officials:
All statements to the media should be cleared through the
NSC [National Security Council] before they are released.
According to the EPA Chief of Staff, one particular CEQ official was designated
to work with EPA to ensure that clearance was obtained through NSC. The
Associate Administrator for the EPA Office of Communications, Education, and
Media Relations (OCEMR)3 said that no press release could be issued for a 3- to
4-week period after September 11 without approval from the CEQ contact.
Although EPA's position has been that WTC area residents should obtain
"professional cleaning,"4 EPA's press releases did not instruct residents to do so.
Instead they instructed residents to follow recommended and proper cleaning
procedures and referred the public to the New York City Department of Health
(NYCDOH) for recommended cleaning procedures. We asked the OCEMR
Associate Administrator whether her office had considered advising the public
through a press release that they needed to obtain professional cleaning for their
indoor spaces. The Associate Administrator stated: "It was in a press release: it
was removed by. . . [the CEQ contact]."
OCEMR's records contained a document, entitled "PM FACT SHEET," that
discussed the health risk to "sensitive populations" from exposure to particulate
matter. We asked the Associate Administrator whether she had considered
putting any of this information in a press release. She said she had, but the CEQ
official discouraged her from doing so. Her recollection was that he told her
health effects information should not be included in EPA's press releases, and
that anything dealing with health effects should come from New York because
they were on the ground and they were already dealing with it.
EPA's Office of Communication, Education and Media Relations (OCEMR) issued the press
releases. The OCEMR Associate Administrator left the Agency in December 2001 and OCEMR
was renamed the Office of Public Affairs in July 2002.
In this context, professional cleaning refers to the use of a certified asbestos cleaner trained in the
proper use of personal protective equipment and procedures to prevent re-contamination.
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The extent of the CEQ official's influence on EPA's WTC press releases was
most clearly illustrated by the changes that were made to a draft press release
dated September 14, 2001, that was issued on September 16, 2001. Every change
that was suggested by the CEQ contact was made. The CEQ official's suggested
changes added reassuring statements and deleted cautionary statements.
Details on these various revisions based on the CEQ contact's input, including
comparisons of draft and issued versions, are in Table 2-4, while the actual press
release is in Appendix G. It should be noted that our analysis of CEQ's input was
limited because CEQ officials chose not to meet with us. Details on this
limitation are in Appendix B.
Table 2-4: Impact of CEQ Instruction on September 16 EPA Press Release
Statement Deleted From the Draft and Not Replaced
The concern raised by these samples would be for the workers at the cleanup site and for those workers
who might be returning to their offices on or near Water Street on Monday, September 17, 2001.
Statements Significantly Revised
Draft Press Release
Issued Press Release
Recent samples of dust gathered by
OSHA on Water Street show higher
levels of asbestos in EPA tests.
The new samples confirm previous reports that ambient air
quality meets OSHA standards and consequently is not a
cause for public concern. New OSHA data also indicates that
indoor air quality in downtown buildings will meet standards.
EPA has found variable asbestos levels in bulk debris and
dust on the ground, but EPA continue [sic] to believe that
there is no significant health risk to the general public in the
coming days. Appropriate steps are being taken to clean up
this dust and debris.
Seven debris and dust samples
taken Thursday, showed levels of
asbestos ranging from 2.1 percent to
3.3 percent. EPA views a 1 percent
level of asbestos as the definition for
asbestos-containing material.
Debris samples collected outside buildings on cars and other
surfaces contained small percentages of asbestors, [sic]
ranging from 2.1 to 3.3 - slightly above the 1 percent trigger
for defining asbestos material.
Statements Added to the Issued Press Release Based on CEQ Instructions
CEQ Instructions
Statements Added to Issued Press Release
"Add sentence about OSHA monitors
walking the streets yesterday and
wearing personal monitors and
coming up clean."
OSHA staff walked through New York's financial district on
September 13th, wearing personal air monitors and collected
data on potential asbestos exposure levels. All but two
samples contained no asbestos. Two samples contained
very low levels of an unknown fiber, which is still being
analyzed.
"INSERT HENSHAW quote
somewhere around here"
"Our tests show that it is safe for New Yorkers to go back to
work in New York's financial district," said John L. Henshaw,
Assistant Secretary of Labor for OSHA.
"Add OSHA indoor air sampling data
sentence."
Air Samples taken on Sept. 13th inside buildings in New York's
financial district were negative for asbestos.
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We were unable to identify any EPA official who claimed ownership of EPA's
WTC press releases issued in September and early October 2001. When we asked
the EPA Chief of Staff whether she could claim ownership of EPA's early WTC
press releases, she replied that she was not able to do so "because the ownership
was joint ownership between EPA and the White House," and that "final approval
came from the White House." She also told us that other considerations, such as
the desire to reopen Wall Street and national security concerns, were considered
when preparing EPA's early press releases. The OCEMR Associate
Administrator said of the September 16 release: "I did not feel like it was my
press release."
September 13 Press Release Also Revised to Eliminate
Cautionary Statements
Cautionary statements in a draft version of the September 13, 2001, press release
(see Appendix H) were removed and replaced with more reassuring statements.
For example, the second clause of the caption to the draft press release, which
noted that EPA was testing for environmental hazards, was replaced with a
statement reassuring the public about environmental hazards. Further, the press
release did not contain a statement in the draft version that EPA considered
asbestos hazardous in this situation. We were unable to locate any record that
explained why the changes were made, and the OCEMR Associate Administrator
did not recall ever having seen the draft. The major differences between the draft
and the issued press release are shown in Table 2-5.
Table 2-5: Significant Changes to the September 13 EPA Press Release
Draft Press Release
Issued Press Release
Caption to press release:
EPA Initiating Emergency Response
Activities, Testing Terrorized Sites
For Environmental Hazards
Revised caption to press release:
EPA Initiating Emergency Response Activities, Reassures
Public About Environmental Hazards
Preliminary results of EPA's
sampling activities indicate no or
very low levels of asbestos.
However, even at low levels, EPA
considers asbestos hazardous in
this situation and will continue to
monitor and sample for elevated
levels of asbestos and work with the
appropriate officials to ensure
awareness and proper handling,
transportation and disposal of
potentially contaminated debris or
materials.
EPA is greatly relieved to have learned that there appears to
be no significant levels of asbestos dust in the air in New York
City," said Administrator Whitman. "We are working closely
with rescue crews to ensure that all appropriate precautions
are taken. We will continue to monitor closely."
Public health concerns about asbestos contamination are
primarily related to long-term exposure. Short-term, low-level
exposure of the type that might have been produced by the
collapse of the World Trade Center buildings is unlikely to
cause significant health effects. EPA and OSHA will work
closely with rescue and cleanup crews to minimize their
potential exposure, but the general public should be very
reassured by initial sampling.
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Recent Conclusions About WTC Air Quality
The only formal risk evaluation of the health effects from exposure to the outdoor
air in Lower Manhattan following the WTC collapse was performed by EPA's
Office of Research and Development. This evaluation, still in draft form as of
July 2003, concluded that, except for the rescue and cleanup workers at Ground
Zero who were not wearing respirators, as well as unknown exposures to the
public during the first few days, persons in the area were unlikely to suffer adverse
heath effects from the outdoor air.
The report also had a caveat for the conclusions drawn in the report relative to
human health risks. The draft report stated:
This report should be viewed as the first phase of an ongoing
analysis, and the conclusions andfindings cited below should not
be considered the final EPA judgment. At this point, the available
data and analysis are still too preliminary to support reliable
quantitative predictions of potential human health risks.
We spoke to a number of experts in the field of environmental monitoring,
including physicians, industrial hygienists, and researchers These experts
generally agreed that the levels of airborne asbestos detected in the air outside the
perimeter of Ground Zero in Lower Manhattan did not present a significant
increase in long-term health risk to the public. Appendix I lists the experts we
interviewed during this evaluation.
We noted that several health studies pointed to potential problems for firefighters,
rescue workers, and other persons working within the confines of Ground Zero
who did not wear respirators:
A study of firefighters with "World Trade Center Cough" concluded that
"intense, short-term exposure to materials generated during the collapse of the
World Trade Center was associated with bronchial responsiveness and the
development of cough."5
The preliminary results of a Mount Sinai School of Medicine study on
workers directly involved in rescue and recovery found that 78 percent of
those sampled had suffered lung ailments and 88 percent had experienced ear,
nose, and throat problems in the months immediately following the attack.
"Cough and Bronchial Responsiveness in Firefighters at the World Trade Center Site," David J.
Prezant et al, New England Journal of Medicine, Vol. 347, No. 11, September 12, 2002.
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At the time we completed our report, no studies of the health effects of the WTC
collapse on the general public had been completed, although we noted studies6
were underway to determine the effects of the WTC collapse on pregnant women
and their children. Further, in January 2003, New York City and Federal health
officials announced a plan to study residents and employees in Lower Manhattan
to identify whether there will be long-term pulmonary effects associated with
exposure to WTC dust and air.
Recent Developments
EPA has initiated actions to strengthen its risk communication procedures for
emergency situations. For example, EPA's Office of Public Affairs has prepared
a draft "Plan for Incident Communication" that establishes basic incident
procedures and assigns responsibilities and authorities. Further, the Agency
intends to use this plan as the basis for more inclusive best-practices emergency
communications guidance.
Conclusions
EPA's early statement that the air was safe to breathe was incomplete in that it
lacked necessary qualifications and thus was not supported by the data available at
the time. CEQ influenced the final message in EPA's air quality statements.
Competing considerations, such as national security concerns and the desire to
reopen Wall Street, also played a role in EPA's air quality statements. The
"safety" of the air in Lower Manhattan after the collapse of the WTC towers is
still being debated and studied. However, given the current lack of health-based
benchmarks, the lack of research data on synergistic effects, and the lack of
reliable information on the extent of the public's exposure to these pollutants, the
answer to whether the outdoor air around WTC was "safe" to breathe may not be
settled for years to come.
"Prospective Study of Pregnant Women and Infants Exposed in Utero to WTC Air Pollution,"
Columbia University; and "Study of Pregnant Women and Children Near WTC," Mt. Sinai School
of Medicine.
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Recommendation
We recommend that the EPA Administrator:
2-1. Develop procedures for emergency risk communication to ensure that
EPA's public pronouncements regarding health risks and environmental
quality are adequately supported with available data and analysis.
Additional recommendations regarding contingency planning, risk
characterization and assessment, and risk communication are presented in
Chapter 7.
Agency Comments and OIG Evaluation
In her August 8, 2003 response to our draft report, the EPA Acting Administrator
stated that the report placed too much emphasis on EPA's press releases and did
not sufficiently acknowledge EPA's many other communications. She further
noted that EPA's early statement that the air was safe to breathe was made in
direct response to the public's concern about asbestos contamination following the
WTC collapse, and that the press release detailed the monitoring that led to the
statement and made it clear that further monitoring would take place. The Acting
Administrator also pointed out that EPA never withheld data from the public and
made its extensive monitoring data available on its interactive web site. With
respect to CEQ's involvement in the preparation of EPA's press releases, the
Acting Administrator stated that the Agency coordinated with CEQ and that this
coordination was neither unusual nor unexpected during a catastrophic disaster on
the scale of the WTC attacks. Further, she noted that EPA acknowledges that
mistakes were made and things could have been done better, and that there are
lessons to be learned in the difficult area of risk communication. Improving risk
communications is an Agency priority as it implements its "lessons learned."
In our opinion, Agency press releases are a very important form of
communication. As detailed in our draft report, EPA press releases result from a
deliberative process that should reflect the Agency's official position on
significant issues. Press releases are made available to essentially all news media
and may be quoted or paraphrased in radio, television, and other forms of
communication. In our opinion, the Agency could have provided more complete
and useful information in the press releases. Further, we reviewed other agency
forms of communication including all communication-related documents
provided by the Agency. These documents included videotaped interviews,
newspaper articles, briefing notes, and other forms of communication. With
respect to the Agency's early statement about the air quality, we fully recognize
the extraordinary circumstances that existed at the time the statement was made
about the air being safe to breathe. It continues to be our opinion that there was
insufficient information to support the statement.
The Agency's complete written response to our draft report and our detailed
evaluation of that response are contained in Appendices Q and R, respectively.
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Chapter 3
EPA's Response to Indoor Environment
Consistent With Statutes and Regulations
But May Have Delayed Needed Health Protection
EPA's actions to evaluate, mitigate, and control risks to human health from
exposure to indoor air pollutants in the WTC area were consistent with applicable
statutes and regulations. EPA is not obligated to respond to a given emergency,
and New York City exercised a lead role regarding indoor air. Nonetheless, we
believe EPA could have taken a more proactive approach regarding indoor air
cleanup. EPA began to assume a lead role in February 2002, when the Agency
initiated a multi-agency task force to address concerns about the indoor
environment. Prior to initiation of the EPA-led cleanup, many WTC area
residents had returned to their homes, and a study indicated most of them had not
followed recommended cleaning practices. The full extent of public exposure to
indoor contaminants resulting from the WTC collapse is unknown.
Concerns Expressed Regarding Indoor Contamination Response
The public and elected officials began raising concerns about the extent that
indoor spaces were contaminated with asbestos and other contaminants shortly
after the WTC collapse. New York City, which initially took lead responsibility
for addressing indoor air, was criticized for:
• Delegating testing and remediation efforts to building owners and residents.
• Not enforcing proper procedures for cleaning asbestos.
• Giving improper advice to the public on testing and cleaning procedures.
EPA was criticized for not initially taking a greater role in indoor testing and
cleaning. U.S. Congressman Jerrold Nadler (D-NY), whose district includes
Lower Manhattan, contended that EPA violated the law by allowing New York
City to handle indoor air quality and not exercising oversight authority pursuant to
the National Contingency Plan (NCP). EPA maintained that the NCP does not
create a right to a Federal response and its approach to indoor air was a "proper
and legal exercise of our discretion" under the NCP.
In the immediate aftermath of the disaster, EPA undertook several activities to
address various issues related to indoor air. However, according to EPA
documentation, New York City officials stated on September 30, 2001, that the
City would not be requesting assistance from EPA regarding residential sampling
or reoccupation issues, or roof debris cleanup.
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Indoor dust contamination from WTC debris. Source: EPA/ORD - - photo courtesy of Dr. Lung Chi Chen
-NYU
Responses to Indoor Contamination
Initially, building owners were held responsible for cleaning up their own
buildings, including interiors and exteriors. According to New York City
officials, the issue of funding the cleanup of privately owned buildings was
discussed with FEMA and EPA; and the initial federal position was that the
Stafford Act (the implementing statute for the FRP) did not provide direct funding
to New York City for this cleanup. New York City officials said that during this
discussion they informed the federal agencies that building owners would be
responsible for funding the cleanup of their buildings and the federal agencies
agreed with this position. Under this arrangement, owners of rental units were
responsible for cleaning apartment walls, ceilings, and floors; common areas, such
as hallways and lobbies; and heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC)
systems, when deemed necessary as explained in guidance provided by New York
City. Renters were responsible for cleaning personal belongings. In resident-
owned condominiums, residents were responsible for cleaning their units, while
building owners were responsible for cleaning common areas and HVAC systems.
Table 3-1 notes key instructions New York City provided to building owners and
residents regarding the potential for indoor contamination resulting from the
collapse of the WTC towers and steps for cleaning the indoor contamination.
Copies of the instructions are available on our web site.
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Table 3-1: Actions by New York City
Date
Key Statement
09-14-01
NYCDEP provided a notice to building owners entitled "Clean-up of Asbestos Containing
Material." For "minimal dust accumulations (light coating)" the notice recommended
using wet methods and/or vacuums equipped with HEPA (high efficiency particulate air)
filters. For "accumulations of dust that included pieces of debris" the procedures
provided for two options. Building owners could assume that the material was asbestos-
containing material and have it cleaned in accordance with NYCDEP Asbestos
Abatement Program removal procedures, or have the material sampled by a NYCDEP
certified investigator or New York State Department of Labor inspector to determine
whether the material was asbestos-containing material and subject to New York City's
Asbestos Abatement Program removal procedures. Asbestos-containing material was
identified as any material containing more than one percent asbestos.
09-16-01
The NYCDEP issued a "Public Notice" flyer to building owners that discussed building
maintenance issues. The notice stated that building owners/managers should have
possible contamination problems reviewed by competent professionals.
09-17-01
NYCDOH issued a press release that recommended that individuals reentering their
residences and places of work remove dust by using a wet rag or wet mop, and vacuum
with a HEPA filtration vacuum. If a HEPA vacuum was not available, the press release
recommended using HEPA bags or dust allergen bags with a regular vacuum cleaner.
EPA's web site also linked to these instructions.
09-26-01
NYCDEP issued a notice to building owners entitled "Clean-up of Debris inside Buildings"
which was identical to the notice issued on 9-14-01 except for three items. First, the
notice did not say "accumulations of dust that include pieces of debris . . may be
assumed to be ACM (asbestos-containing material)." Second, the notice stated that
such accumulations "can be sampled" (rather than "must be sampled") by a NYCDEP
certified investigator or New York State Department of Labor inspector. Third, the notice
stated that EPA had studied the situation and reported "that the potential presence of
ACM in dust and debris is minimal."
10-25-01
NYCDEP described benchmarks and guidelines used to evaluate environmental
conditions in a letter to Lower Manhattan residents dated October 25. In regard to
cleaning indoor spaces the letter stated: "If more than 1 percent asbestos was found
and testing and cleaning was necessary, it had to be performed by certified personnel."
In addition, the statement indicated landlords should not reopen any building until a
competent professional had properly inspected their building. The City's Asbestos
Abatement Program requires that building owners file a written notification with the
NYCDEP for asbestos abatement projects that do not require plan or permit approval
from the City's Buildings Department. NYCDEP officials told us this notification applied
to buildings owners who found more than 1 percent asbestos in bulk dust in their
buildings (see Appendix J for a copy of the instructions).
NYCDEP officials told us that in September 2001 they began visually inspecting
the exteriors of over 1,000 buildings and identified 323 with visible dust.
NYCDEP documentation indicated that 102 of these 323 building exteriors were
subsequently cleaned by the building owners. NYCDEP officials told us that the
remaining owners stated they could not afford to clean their buildings, and these
buildings were cleaned by NYCDEP with funding provided by FEMA.
To determine the extent of indoor contamination in Lower Manhattan residences,
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the NYCDOH and ATSDR initiated an indoor air study in November 2001. The
sampling phase was completed in December 2001, preliminary results released to
the public in February 2002, and the final report issued by ATSDR in September
2002. The results of this study are discussed later in this chapter.
Indoor dust contamination from WTC debris. Source: ESA/ORD - Photo courtesy of Dr. Lung Chi Chen -
NYU
In the weeks following the disaster, EPA was involved in testing various indoor
spaces. EPA worked with the U.S. Coast Guard7 to monitor offices in the Wall
Street area so that employees could enter their offices and obtain needed files
On September 13, 2001, EPA tested for asbestos in its building located at
290 Broadway. Further, on September 17, 2001, EPA sampled dust in the Jacob
Javits Convention Center complex, and on October 23, 2001, tested in the
Department of Justice offices on 100 Church Street.
Details on the results of EPA's indoor testing, as well as General Services
Administration testing of Federal buildings and three significant non-EPA studies,
are in Appendix K.
Also, EPA conducted preliminary indoor assessments of 11 buildings at the
request of the Ground Zero Elected Offici als Task Force. These preliminary
assessments included inspecting the interiors of the buildings, discussing cleanup
plans with building owners/managers, and collecting dust samples from four of
the buildings - three schools and one apartment building. An EPA Situation
The U.S. Coast Guard maintains strike teams that typically deploy for responses to oil and
hazardous chemical spills and were deployed in response to the WTC attacks.
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Report for September 27-29, 2001, noted that a projected future action was to
"finalize sampling plan for residential buildings." However, EPA's Situation
Report for September 30 noted:
Residential sampling reoccupation: On 9/30/01, EPA spoke to
US Public Health Service and NYSDOH (New York State
Department of Health) who have been discussing issue with
NYCDOH. NYC will not be requesting State or Federal assistance
for residential sampling or reoccupation issues. The Federal
Response Plan assigns responsibility to the U.S. Public Health
Service under ESF-8, Health and Medical Services, when state and
local resources request Federal assistance for medical and public
health assistance.
In addition, correspondence from the Region 2 Regional Administrator indicated
that in an October 9, 2001, meeting between FEMA, EPA, and New York City
officials, City officials stated that they would not be requesting EPA's assistance
for residential sampling or reoccupation issues. The September 30 report also
indicated that New York City would not be requesting Federal assistance for
cleaning roof debris. New York City officials disagreed with the characterizations
of their statements presented in these documents and told us that they repeatedly
expressed the position that the City welcomed any authorized federal assistance at
that time.
Though EPA press releases through 2001 generally addressed outdoor air and not
indoor contamination, the September 16 and October 3 releases discussed
cleaning procedures that business owners and residents should take in cleaning
indoor spaces. The press releases advised residents and business owners they
could clean their own spaces if they used "appropriate" vacuum filters, and
followed "recommended" and "proper" procedures. These press releases did not
define what "appropriate," "recommended," and "proper" procedures meant.
Initially, EPA deferred to New York City to provide guidance for cleaning indoor
spaces. As noted in Chapter 2, EPA was prepared to include recommendations in
its press releases that residents obtain professional cleaning of their residences.
The absence of instructions recommending that residents obtain professional
cleaning in the initial weeks following the disaster may have increased the long-
term health risks for those who cleaned WTC dust without using respirators and
other professional cleaning equipment.
EPA's web site and press releases deferred to the NYCDOH guidance even
though EPA's position on indoor cleaning was different than the City's. EPA's
basis for deferring to New York City was summarized by the testimony of the
Region 2 Administrator before the U.S. Senate Committee on Environment and
Public Works on February 11, 2002. The Administrator, when asked if the
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NYCDOH provided adequate cleanup directions to residents, answered as
follows:
Consistent with their responsibility for the indoor environment, the
City DOH, working with ATSDR and the Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention (CDC) took the lead on the development
and dissemination of public health recommendations related to
building cleanups. DOH statements emphasizing wet wiping,
moping and use of HEP A vacuums were reasonable. EPA 's advice
has been more conservative and suggested that people
encountering more than minimal amounts of dust should consider
this as a "worst case " and likely to be contaminated with asbestos.
Under these circumstances, they should hire a certified asbestos
cleanup contractor. . .
Asbestos medical experts we consulted agreed that professional cleaning was
preferred for the asbestos contamination found. Further, the experts stated that, at
a minimum, if members of the public were to clean residences themselves, they
should have been instructed to wear respirators. A study by NYCDOH found that
most residents did not follow the City's recommended cleaning practices.
Although not specifically mentioned in the study, this conclusion would suggest
that these residents did not obtain professional asbestos abatement contractors to
clean their residences. The increased risk that residents placed themselves in by
cleaning residences themselves is not known.
Although Agency press releases did not recommend professional cleaning of
residences, EPA officials told us that they consistently recommended that
residents obtain professional cleaning during interviews, public forums, and other
communications. We were unable to determine when EPA first told the public
that they should obtain professional cleaning for WTC-contaminated indoor
spaces. The earliest instance we could locate was on October 26, 2001, when the
EPA Administrator recommended professional cleaning in a televised interview
on MSNBC:
However, again, as we saidfrom the beginning, if you live there
and you have any kind of breach - a window open, a broken
window, anything like that in your apartment - or you have a heavy
amount of dust -you should get a professional cleaner to clean it
out. . . but just wiping it down, using your regular vacuum
cleaner, that's not good enough. But - you know - we provided
that information and it is up to the City Health Department and
OSHA and others to follow-up. . .
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EPA also posted information on its public web site that recommended that indoor
spaces with "more than a minimal amount of dust" be cleaned by a "professional
asbestos contractor." We could not identify the exact date this information was
posted, but determined that it was on EPA's web site by December 11, 2001.
In February 2002, EPA initiated a multi-agency task force on indoor
contamination. The former EPA Chief of Staff told us that EPA initiated this
effort because "Over time, we saw that New York City was not prepared to handle
all the issues related to indoor air and offered to support them." The task force
developed a plan in which EPA assumed the lead role for overseeing a FEMA-
funded cleanup of residences in Lower Manhattan. EPA, New York City, and
FEMA officials announced this plan to the public on May 8, 2002. Residents of
Lower Manhattan living south of Canal Street could request testing and cleaning
of their residences, or just testing. Public registration for the indoor testing and
cleaning program ended December 28, 2002. This residential cleanup program is
discussed in more detail in Chapter 6.
EPA Statutory and Regulatory Authority for Indoor Environment
EPA does not have clear statutory authority to establish and enforce health-based
regulatory standards for indoor air. EPA is provided the authority to respond to
releases of hazardous substances under the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA, or Superfund).
Specifically, under Section 104(a) of CERCLA, EPA is authorized, consistent
with the NCP, to remove or remediate any hazardous substance that is released
into the environment, or any pollutant or contaminant that may present an
imminent and substantial danger to the public health or welfare. Asbestos is a
hazardous substance under CERCLA.
Neither CERCLA nor the implementing regulations under the NCP obligate EPA
to undertake response actions. As provided in the NCP, "activities by the Federal
and State governments in implementing this subpart are discretionary
governmental functions" that do not create "a right to federal response" nor "any
duty of the Federal government to take any response action at any particular time"
(40 CFR § 300.404(h)(3)). Moreover, CERCLA contemplates State participation
in response actions (42 U.S.C. 9621(h)), and the NCP allows for States to assume
the lead agency role.
CERCLA only applies to the release of hazardous substances "into the
environment." CERCLA defines "environment" as "the navigable waters ... and
... any other surface water, ground water, drinking water supply, land surface or
subsurface strata, or ambient air within the United States." Courts have held the
emissions of dust within enclosed buildings are not releases "into the
environment" and therefore are not CERCLA releases. However, in the WTC
case, the contamination of indoor spaces was caused by an external event - the
collapse of the WTC. The collapse itself caused a release of hazardous substances
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into the "environment" when a huge dust plume was released into the ambient air.
Matter from the dust plume then entered buildings in the surrounding area. In
such a case, when the release "into the environment" ends up contaminating
enclosed structures, CERCLA provides EPA the authority to take any actions
necessary to eliminate or mitigate the threat to public health from the release.
A 1998 Presidential Decision Directive8 (PDD 62) tasked EPA with the leadership
role in cleaning up buildings and other sites contaminated by chemical or
biological agents as a result of an act of terrorism. This leadership role was
discussed in the EPA Administrator's November 28, 2001, testimony before a
Congressional Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, wherein she
noted that:
Under the provisions of PDD 62, signed by President Clinton in
1998, the EPA is assigned lead responsibility for cleaning up
buildings and other sites contaminated by chemical or biological
agents as a result of an act of terrorism. This responsibility draws
on our decades of experience in cleaning up sites contaminated by
toxins through prior practices or accidents.
The expectation that EPA should be the lead agency for responding to indoor
contamination has been clarified since September 11, 2001. The July 2002
National Strategy for Homeland Security issued by the Department of Homeland
Security states that:
"After a major incident, the Environmental Protection Agency will be
responsible for decontamination of affected buildings and neighborhoods
and providing advice and assistance to public health authorities in
determining when it is safe to return to these areas''
Prior Responses to Releases of Hazardous Substances
Due to the magnitude of the WTC collapse, it is difficult to compare the WTC
response with responses to other emergencies. However, we noted other
emergencies involving indoor contamination in which EPA's and other
government entities' response to those emergencies appeared more proactive or
comprehensive than the response to the WTC incident.
In 1989, a relevant emergency response occurred in Gramercy Park in New
York City. A steam pipe exploded, disbursing asbestos-contaminated mud
into nearby buildings. The NYCDOH declared a public health emergency and
evacuated residents until their apartments were decontaminated. An EPA
Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 62, "Protection Against Unconventional Threats to the
Homeland and Americans Overseas," May 22, 1998.
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guidance document that addresses the applicability of the Asbestos NESHAP
to emergency situations discussed the Gramercy Park incident and concluded
that a Federal response under CERCLA could have been undertaken if deemed
necessary. However, in this case a Federal response was not needed in light of
the City's response.
In 1999, under its CERCLA authority and in cooperation with local health
authorities, EPA started testing homes in Libby, Montana, and conducting
other emergency removal activities. Asbestos contamination in Libby and
EPA's response to that incident have been compared to the WTC situation.
The contamination in Libby resulted from many years of mining activity, as
well as extensive community use of by-products from the mine. Cleaning of
residences and businesses in Libby, which was designated a Superfund site on
November 25, 2002, is projected to be completed in 2005.9
Conclusions
For indoor environment concerns resulting from the collapse of the WTC towers,
EPA had the authority to act under CERCLA but was not obligated to do so.
Guidelines exist for determining whether an emergency response is warranted;
however, these guidelines are not definitive. Under the NCP, it was within EPA's
discretion to defer to New York City the responsibility for responding to indoor
contamination concerns. EPA's action was consistent with the FRP, which is
intended to supplement local government response.
Although EPA acted within its discretion, a 1998 Presidential directive and the
more recent National Strategy for Homeland Security task EPA with taking the
leadership role in cleaning up buildings and other sites contaminated by chemical
or biological agents as a result of an act of terrorism. EPA needs to work with the
Department of Homeland Security and other agencies to determine the nature and
form with which the Federal government should assume a more direct role in
addressing indoor environment concerns, under what circumstances this direct
role should occur, and the oversight mechanisms to be employed when local
agencies undertake such responses. In the WTC case, the delay in providing a
government-organized and adequately monitored cleanup in Lower Manhattan
may have contributed to unnecessary exposures to asbestos and other pollutants
by unprotected workers and residents.
The indoor air clearance memorandum for Libby had not been finalized at the time we drafted this
report. A preliminary clearance level of non-detect for asbestos was being used; based on the
method detection limit used in Libby, the clearance level being used is similar to the clearance
level being used for residences in Lower Manhattan.
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Recommendations
We recommend that the EPA Administrator coordinate with the Department of
Homeland Security, FEMA, other appropriate Federal agencies, and those State
and local governments having jurisdiction over potential terrorist targets to:
3-1. Develop protocols for determining how indoor environmental concerns
will be handled in large-scale disasters, to include addressing:
The agency or agencies responsible for testing and/or overseeing
testing of indoor spaces;
Sampling methods to be used in analyzing indoor contamination;
Benchmarks to be used in assessing whether the indoor contamination
poses a threat;
Under what circumstances government-assisted cleanups are
warranted;
How these cleanups will be funded; and
The agency or agencies responsible for communicating testing results
and appropriate cleaning instructions.
3-2. Develop and publish oversight criteria and State and local agency reporting
requirements for those agencies involved in cleaning up buildings and other
sites contaminated by pollutants resulting from terrorist attacks or other
disasters.
Additional recommendations related to responding to indoor environmental
concerns are in Chapters 6 and 7.
Agency and New York City Comments and OIG Evaluation
The Agency disagreed that unprotected workers and residents may have
experienced unnecessary exposures to asbestos or other pollutants as a result of
the delay in providing a government-organized and monitored cleanup, because
(1) their recommended cleaning instructions (use of wet mops and HEP A
vacuums) were proven effective in EPA studies, and (2) the Agency
recommended professional cleaning when residents encountered more than
minimal dust. The Agency generally agreed with the recommendations.
EPA's study of cleaning effectiveness concluded that 1 to 3 cleanings were
needed to achieve the health-related benchmarks and did not address the exposure
experienced by an unprotected person who may be performing these
recommended cleaning procedures. Also, a NYCDOH study conducted in
October 2001 concluded that the majority of households polled did not follow the
recommended procedures of wet mopping and HEPA vacuuming. Also, a study
of immigrant workers used to clean indoor spaces in Lower Manhattan around
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Ground Zero reported that the workers often did not wear respiratory protection
and experienced numerous respiratory symptoms. With respect to professional
cleaning, EPA's press releases did not recommend this approach. Therefore, we
continue to believe delays in implementing a government organized cleanup
resulted in unnecessary exposure to asbestos and other contaminants. The
Agency's full written response to our draft report and our detailed evaluation of
that response are contained in Appendices Q and R, respectively.
New York City officials disagreed with some of the draft report's
characterizations of its position on the indoor response and offered clarifications
which we incorporated into the final report. New York City's response to draft
report excerpts and our evaluation of that response are contained in Appendices S
and T, respectively.
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Chapter 4
Asbestos Emission Control Work Practices
Inconsistent
Since asbestos is a known human carcinogen, EPA has established stringent work
practices to control emissions of asbestos resulting from demolition and
renovation projects. Evidence indicated that a significant requirement in
emergency demolitions - wetting damaged buildings before demolition and
keeping the waste material wet after demolition - was followed at the WTC site.
However, work practices applicable to the transport of debris from the site were
employed inconsistently. The specific impact on air quality of any variance from
EPA's asbestos emergency work practices is unknown, although outdoor air
monitoring showed seven asbestos readings above the AHERA standard after
September 2001.
Application of NESHAP Demolition and Renovation Regulations
to the WTC Disaster
The applicability of the Asbestos NESHAP regulations to the demolition of
damaged WTC Complex buildings and the removal of WTC building debris was
discussed by EPA officials as early as September 12, 2001. An EPA official told
us that EPA did not want to insist on any NESHAP requirement that would
impede or deter the WTC search and rescue operation. An EPA Office of
Enforcement and Compliance Assurance official involved in these early
discussions told us that, in theory, NESHAP would apply to all dust and debris
from the WTC disaster and subsequent demolition and removal efforts if that
material contained more than 1 percent asbestos. However, in his opinion, a
literal interpretation of the requirements was not realistic under the circumstances.
The Regional Counsel for EPA Region 2 told us that he concluded the Asbestos
NESHAP was not applicable to the transport of steel from the towers since the
collapse did not meet the definition of a NESHAP demolition. However, he did
not render an opinion on the applicability of the NESHAP to the demolition and
removal of the three buildings that had not fully collapsed.
The Asbestos NESHAP regulations (40 CFR Part 61 Subpart M) prescribe
requirements for industries and operators of certain activities to reduce the
emissions of asbestos, including the demolition and renovation of buildings that
contain asbestos. Generally known as the asbestos NESHAP work practice
standards, many of these are applicable to emergency situations involving
asbestos, as explained in EPA's "Guidelines For Catastrophic Emergency
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Situations Involving Asbestos"10 issued in February 1992. For example, asbestos-
containing buildings that are in danger of imminent collapse and are ordered by
the government to be demolished must be wetted down to reduce emissions.
Further, asbestos-containing waste must be adequately wetted at all times after
demolition and kept wet during the handling and loading for transport to a
disposal site.
Additionally, in response to questions about the proper handling of WTC dust and
debris from a law firm representing Local 78, Asbestos, Lead and Hazardous
Waste Laborers, OSHA issued an "interpretive letter" in January 2002 stating that
the WTC dust was presumed to contain asbestos and the WTC demolition and
salvage was subject to the Construction Asbestos Standard.
Asbestos Work Practices Used in the WTC Complex Demolition
The NESHAP emergency requirement - wetting damaged buildings before
demolition and continuous wetting of the debris after demolition - appeared to
have been followed. However, implementation of work practices to reduce
asbestos emissions during transport of asbestos-containing debris appeared to be
inconsistent.
The New York State Department of Labor is delegated responsibility for
implementing all Federal regulations under the NESHAP program. NYCDEP is
responsible for the asbestos abatement program in New York City. Even though
authority to run the program in New York was delegated to the State and local
agencies, EPA retains the authority to oversee agency performance and to enforce
NESHAP regulations as appropriate.
NYCDDC was responsible for demolition and debris removal at the site.
NYCDDC retained four construction companies to perform the demolition and
debris removal. In addition, wetting and misting operations at the site were
arranged by one of the four companies. According to New York City officials,
because of the unprecedented nature of the situation, formal written contracts with
detailed statements of the work were not prepared. Instead, daily meetings were
held to plan the day's activities and address any special work practices that may
be required to reduce possible emissions of asbestos.
EPA and New York State asbestos NESHAP regulations require that a
notification be filed by building owners even in emergency situations. The
process provides an opportunity for government officials to discuss and agree to
preferred work practices to be used in demolition and renovation operations.
This guidance was issued to assist EPA regional offices and State and local agencies in managing
potential asbestos hazards resulting from a catastrophic accident or disaster after three emergencies
involving asbestos occurred in 1989.
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Notification of a NESHAP demolition and removal operation was not filed for the
WTC. City officials stated that a written notification was not filed for WTC
buildings 4, 5, and 6 because they were advised by the property owners that there
was no asbestos-containing material in the above-ground structures. NYCDDC
officials told us that they were advised by the Port Authority that subsequent to
the WTC bombing in 1993, they initiated a program to remove asbestos-
containing materials from the WTC complex. In regard to the WTC towers, the
Port Authority advised the NYCDDC that one tower contained asbestos fire-
proofing up to approximately the 40th floor while the other tower did not use
asbestos-containing fire-proofing. An EPA On-Scene Coordinator's
understanding was that only accessible asbestos-containing material was removed
from WTC buildings 4, 5, and 6.
Although a formal notification was not filed, New York City officials told us that
proper planning was ensured through the use of daily health and safety meetings.
These meeting included representatives from a number of City, State, and Federal
agencies, including EPA. New York City officials maintained that EPA had
functional notice of NE SHAP related activities through its participation at these
meetings and that it was doubtful that notification would have changed the
manner in which these activities were conducted.
Demolition of Damaged Buildings
The demolition of all WTC complex
buildings to ground level was completed
by late December 2001. WTC 4 and
WTC 5 were brought down by a weight
that was suspended by a cable. Use of
this wrecking device required a special
approval from the New York City
Department of Buildings, which was
granted. WTC 6 was brought down with
mechanical grapplers and cutting shears.
WTC complex. Source: New York Times
In addition to WTC 1 and 2 (North and South Towers, respectively), WTC 3
(Marriott Hotel) collapsed from tower debris and WTC 7 also collapsed after
burning for approximately 7 hours. The remaining three buildings in the WTC
Complex - WTC 4 (South Plaza),
WTC 5 (North Plaza), and WTC 6
(U.S. Customs) - were all significantly
damaged. According to an EPA
On-Scene Coordinator, the damaged
buildings were considered in danger of
collapse.
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Both NYCDDC and OSHA officials told us that the WTC site was under
continuous dust suppression, and the latter said this dust suppression was very
successful. An EPA On-Scene Coordinator told us that once dust suppression
began, water was sprayed wherever there was dust and, to the best of his
knowledge, this practice was successful. OSHA officials further stated that it
would have been too dangerous to send abatement contractors into WTC 4,
WTC 5, or WTC 6 to remove asbestos-containing material before demolition.
Both NYCDDC and EPA officials told us that when asbestos-containing material
(e.g., pipe wrapping, steel insulation) was encountered during the removal, it was
tested and treated in accordance with asbestos abatement procedures. According
to the NYCDDC official, the majority of the asbestos-containing material was
encountered when removing the remnants of the basement levels of WTC 6.
EPA Situation Reports confirmed statements about asbestos abatements and
recorded instances where asbestos was found during debris removal and asbestos
abatements performed. For example, the EPA May 23, 2002, Situation Report
noted that:
Twelve (12) bulk asbestos samples were taken in the Bl, B2, B3, levels
of (WTC) Building 6. The samples were taken from sprayed on
insulation at the request of NYC DOI. Of the twelve samples, nine (9)
should (sic) results were in excess of 1% Chrysotile asbestos, the
results rangedfrom 1.30% to 30.80%. The three samples that were
not above 1% were detect for Chrysotile asbestos.
According to the April 5, 2002, Situation Report, bulk testing showed that one
sample of the pipe wrap that was being removed as part of this abatement
contained 66 percent amosite11 asbestos.
Work Practices Related to Transporting Waste Not Always Followed
To minimize dust emissions, City, State, and Federal officials established
procedures for trucks hauling debris from the site. These procedures included the
use of tarps (nylon mesh) to cover debris and procedures for wetting down the
trucks before they left the site. The truck wetting operation was performed by
contractors for EPA. The large volume of traffic made ensuring compliance with
procedures difficult. Particularly in the weeks immediately following the disaster,
trucks hauling debris from the site did not consistently stop to be wetted down
before leaving the site. As a result, New York City obtained assistance from the
New York State Department of Environmental Conservation Police and the
National Guard to ensure that trucks stopped at the wash stations before leaving
Amosite is a form of amphibole asbestos. Several studies suggest that amphibole asbestos may be
more harmful than chrysotile asbestos, particularly for mesothelioma. Test results from the site
showed that the asbestos was predominantly chrysotile, not amphibole.
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the site. Even after getting assistance, EPA Situation Reports indicated that the
trucks were not stopping long enough to get completely wetted down.
Similar observations were reported in an October 6, 2001, report funded by the
National Institute of Environmental Health Sciences, which discussed worker
safety issues at WTC. The report noted that:
Vehicles leaving the site with debris, either dumps or lowboys with
large sections of steel beams, are not deconned (decontaminated)72
and the dumps do not have covers over the loads. As a
consequence, potentially hazardous dust and debris is tracked off
site or is blown from the loads during transit.
EPA Situation Reports indicated that as late as October 13, 2001, this was still a
problem. However, around this time period, New York City officials began
issuing summonses to truck operators and their employers for failure to secure
loads and to stop and be wetted down. City officials told us that approximately
300 summonses were issued and that compliance with the requirement for trucks
to get wetted down before leaving the site was almost 100 percent by late October
to early November 2001.
However, certain requirements for transporting debris from the site were
suspended by the Governor of New York in an Executive Order dated October 9,
2001. This Order temporarily suspended regulations regarding the transportation
and handling of certain solid waste resulting from the WTC disaster. The Order
applied to persons working at the site under the supervision of New York State or
the New York City government officials and suspended requirements to:
Obtain permits for collection, transportation, and delivery of regulated waste
to staging areas or disposal locations owned or operated by the City.
Comply with hazardous waste management standards at the site, during the
transportation of waste from the disaster site to staging areas or disposal
locations owned by the City of New York, and in connection with the
temporary storage of such waste at these staging area or disposal locations.
Once debris was loaded onto trucks at Ground Zero it was transported to piers and
unloaded on barges that carried the debris to landfills. The manner in which these
trucking and barge operations were conducted was discussed at hearings held by
New York City officials disagreed with the report's characterization of the debris removal
operation. They stated that the requirement for dump trucks to be covered started September 12,
and that this requirement was enforced. They also said that the vehicles did not require
decontamination since they were not transporting hazardous waste as defined by EPA under 40
CFR Part 260-280; and while decontamination procedures were not required, wash down
procedures were mandated.
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the EPA Superfund Ombudsman, Congress, New York City Council, and New
York State Assembly. Concerned citizens and local elected officials testified at
these hearings that trucks hauling debris from Ground Zero were not marked as
carrying hazardous material, nor were they covered in such a manner to prevent
dust from escaping. In addition, people testified that the wetting of debris at the
barge operation at Pier 25, which was located north of Ground Zero and near
Stuyvesant High School and residences, was inconsistent and resulted in the
release of dust into the air. Parents of children at Stuyvesant High School and
other members of the public raised concerns that these barge operations were
re-contaminating Stuyvesant High School and other buildings in that area.
EPA officials told us they asked New York City to consider alternatives for the
placement of the barge, and while New York City officials were understanding of
the concerns of the residential and school communities located nearby, viable
alternatives were not available. Thus, emphasis was placed on ensuring use of
appropriate work practices during unloading of debris-carrying trucks and transfer
to barges. Further, the EPA Region 2 Regional Administrator advised us that
EPA sampled for the potential air quality impact of these barge operations from
September 22, 2001, through May 31, 2002, and found that "99.83% of samples
were below the screening level." She further noted that the New York City
Department of Education collected daily air samples at Stuyvesant and other
nearby schools from October 4, 2001, to the end of June 2002, and found that "the
overwhelming majority of daily sampling has resulted in no structures detected."
We contacted the president of a consulting firm hired by the Stuyvesant High
School Parents' Association to review environmental test results for Stuyvesant
High School. He told us that ambient asbestos testing at the school was
conducted in accordance with AHERA standards and elevated levels of airborne
asbestos were not found. However, he said that elevated levels of particulate
matter were recorded that could have come from the debris off-loading operation
or diesel fuel emissions from the trucks transporting the debris.
Asbestos Still in Many U.S. Buildings
Asbestos is present in many buildings across the country and is still used in some
building materials. For example, a 1984 building study by EPA found that, on
average, 20 percent of all buildings in the United Stated contained asbestos.
These averages were higher for some cities. A 1988 building survey found that,
overall, 68 percent of the buildings in New York City contained asbestos.
Further, although the use of asbestos-containing material has been banned from
some products, it is still used in others. For example, asbestos-containing material
is still allowed in pipeline wrap, asbestos-cement corrugated sheet, asbestos-
cement flat sheet, roofing felt, millboard, vinyl-asbestos floor tile, asbestos-
cement shingle, and roof coatings.
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Conclusions
Although many steps were taken to reduce asbestos emissions from the WTC site,
problems were encountered in fully implementing the applicable NESHAP
requirements for emergency situations, such as ensuring that trucks transporting
debris were adequately wetted down before leaving the WTC site. Further, the
placement of a WTC debris unloading and transfer operation near schools and
residences compounded the potential impact of not implementing normally
required NESHAP requirements. Given the likelihood that many buildings across
the country may contain asbestos, EPA and State and local agencies need to
establish improved monitoring and oversight procedures for ensuring that
appropriate NESHAP work practices are followed in responding to situations that
cause widespread building damage.
Recommendations
We recommend that the EPA Administrator:
4-1. Ensure that EPA Regional and Headquarters personnel are aware of the
"Guidelines For Catastrophic Emergency Situations Involving Asbestos,"
including its application in the event of future terrorist attacks or other
disasters.
4-2. Develop specific monitoring, reporting, and oversight procedures for
ensuring that Federal, State, and local responders follow the appropriate
Asbestos NESHAP work practices, including initiating enforcement
actions when EPA observes violations of NESHAP work practices.
Agency and New York City Comments and OIG Evaluation
The Agency noted in its response that ensuring compliance with NESHAP work
practices in the immediate aftermath of the WTC collapse and fires was
"extremely difficult" not because of a lack of knowledge about what was required,
but because of the practicality of implementing these practices under the extreme
conditions of duress. Further, the Agency noted that over time, these problems
were eliminated to the maximum extent possible. The Agency agreed with the
recommendations. The Agency's full written response to our draft report and our
detailed evaluation of that response are contained in Appendices Q and R,
respectively.
New York City offered additional information and clarification as to how
NESHAP work practices were discussed and implemented at the site. We added
this information to the final report. New York City officials objected to the
inclusion of testimony from the EPA Superfund Ombudsman hearing on the basis
of it being unsubstantiated and to the discussion of lead levels at Stuyvesant High
School on the basis of not being relevant to the Chapter. We disagree and have
retained that information in the final report. New York City's response to draft
report excerpts and our evaluation of that response are contained in Appendices S
and T, respectively.
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Chapter 5
Air Quality-Related Communications
Not Effective in Getting Public and Workers
to Take Recommended Precautions
A critical component in helping the public minimize exposure to potential health
hazards resulting from a terrorist attack or other disasters involves communicating
risk information to the public. Armed with such information, the public can take
positive steps to mitigate potential exposures as well as other precautions to avoid
unnecessary health risks. After the terrorist attack on WTC, government
communications were criticized for not providing timely and accurate information
to the public. Evidence gathered through studies and various governmental
hearings indicates that the public and Ground Zero workers did not receive
sufficient air quality information, wanted more information on the associated
health risks, and did not consistently take precautions recommended by
government communications to minimize their health risk. Because of these
concerns, the OIG conducted a survey of New York City residents regarding
government communications. These results will be reported separately.
NYCDOH Survey Found Residents Wanted More Air Quality
Information and Did Not Use Recommended Cleaning Procedures
From October 25 through November 1, 2001, NYCDOH conducted a door-to-
door survey of residents in Lower Manhattan's Battery Park City, Southbridge
Towers, and Independence Plaza. All of these neighborhoods were in close
proximity to the WTC towers. A representative sample of apartments from each
of these three areas was selected and a total of 414 interviews were conducted.
The survey reached two conclusions related to air quality:
Residents of Lower Manhattan were worried about their health and safety.
There was a tremendous concern about the air quality and its potential effects
on health. The high proportion of the population experiencing symptoms
likely to be related to respiratory irritants contributed to this concern.
The majority of households had not been cleaned according to
recommendations, possibly increasing the exposure to respiratory irritants.
Specifically, in regard to air quality information, the report noted that:
The topics of most interest to this population related to air quality, its
safety and its effect on the physical health of both adults and children
(70% said they wanted more information about air quality). There is a
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needfor more information regarding the potential risks from exposure to
the dust and debris that continues to be emittedfrom the WTC site.
Related to this topic, 35% of the respondents reported that they needed
more information regarding cleaning.
The report noted that only 40 percent of the residents said they cleaned their
homes according to the recommended methods of wet moping hard surfaces and
using HEPA vacuums on carpeting. The report noted two limitations on its
results. First, the survey only included three selected neighborhoods in Lower
Manhattan and did not include residents who had not re-occupied their apartments
at the time of the survey. Second, the report noted that normally respiratory
symptoms (e.g., symptoms related to allergies) increase during the time of year the
survey was conducted.
Hearings held by a Congressional Subcommittee, the EPA Superfund
Ombudsman, New York City Council, and New York State Assembly included
testimony indicating that the public desired more information regarding air
quality. Further, several reports detailing lessons learned from the WTC response
noted problems with government communications regarding air quality. These
reports and their conclusions are discussed in Chapter 7.
Telephone Poll Indicated Public Did Not Believe Air Was Safe
A telephone poll13 conducted in March 2002, after many news articles were
published questioning the air quality information that the government had issued,
found that 70 percent of those surveyed did not believe environmental protection
and other government agencies when they said the air quality around the WTC
site was safe. The poll surveyed 511 randomly dialed residences from the five
boroughs of New York City. We contacted one of the principals of the polling
organization, who told us the answers to the lone question asked about air quality
were consistent among all groups polled.
Unprotected Workers Cleaned Contaminated Offices and Residences
Preliminary results of an independent study14 of the health of day laborers who
cleaned indoor spaces near Ground Zero noted that these workers were generally
not provided with respirators or any personal protective equipment. Further, the
workers were not informed about the contents of the dust they removed from
offices and apartments, nor were they informed of any environmental test results
Blum and Weprin Associates, New York Daily News, March 2002, margin of error plus or minus 4.5
percent.
"Assessing the Health of Immigrant Workers Near Ground Zero: Preliminary Results of the
World Trade Center Day Laborer Medical Monitoring Project"; Ekaterina Malievskaya, M.D., Nora
Rosenberg, Steven Markowitz, M.D.; American Journal of Industrial Medicine; December 2002.
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on the dust and debris that they removed. Moreover, most of these workers
reported health symptoms that first appeared or worsened after September 11,
2001. These symptoms included coughing, sore throat, nasal congestion, chest
tightness, headaches, fatigue, dizziness, and sleep disturbances. The results were
based on examinations of 418 workers from January 15 through February 28,
2002.
Ground Zero Workers May Not Have Received Sufficient Information
A widely publicized aspect of the WTC response was the lack of respirator use by
rescue and construction crews. It was beyond the scope of this review to
determine the extent that respirators were not used and why this occurred.
However, we reviewed EPA's efforts to provide respirators, reviewed accounts of
respirator use in various articles and reports, and inquired about respirator use and
availability during our interviews with EPA, other Federal agency, New York
City, and non-government officials. Our limited work in this area indicated that
respirators were generally available but were not worn for a number of reasons.
A significant factor was the desire to save lives without regard for personal safety
in the immediate aftermath of the disaster. Other reasons appeared to include the
respirators' interference with the ability of emergency workers to communicate,
lack of training, lack of enforcement of safety measures at the site, and conflicting
messages about the air quality at Ground Zero.
A detailed discussion on the use of respirators by rescue and construction crews at
Ground Zero, including EPA activities to encourage respirator use as well as the
health impacts of the lack of respirator use, are in Appendix L.
A January 2002 report15 concluded that respirator use was compromised, in part,
due to mixed messages that workers received about the importance of respiratory
protection. For example, the report noted that air monitoring information was
often within OSHA permissible limits or below the analytical method limit of
detection. Thus, on one hand workers had information suggesting that the air
quality was not bad, but a message to wear respirators on the other. This report
also noted the poor example set by political figures, celebrities, and even
supervisors who visited the site but did not wear respirators.
The experiences of the Laboratory Director of an environmental testing firm hired
to conduct testing for one of the companies conducting the site clean-up was
consistent with information presented in the report on respiratory usage at the
WTC site. This individual, with many years experience in asbestos toxicology
and applied environmental hygiene, told us that he interpreted EPA's statement
that the air was safe to breathe to apply to Ground Zero. The Laboratory Director
"Respiratory Protection at the World Trade Center: Lessons From the Other Disaster," Bruce
Lippy, CIH, CSP, January 15, 2002.
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said that the construction company that hired him also interpreted EPA's
statement to apply to Ground Zero, and on the basis of EPA's statements about air
quality, company officials questioned the Laboratory Director's recommendations
that workers wear respirators. Although he was able to convince his client that
respirators were needed, he told us that it was difficult to convince workers to
wear respirators.
A November 2001 report16 prepared for the National Council of Structural
Engineers Associations - Structural Engineering Emergency Response Plan
Committee similarly noted that structural engineers at the site had concerns about
environmental contamination at Ground Zero but proceeded with their work given
the urgency of the situation. The report noted that although structural engineers
assumed the air quality was being monitored by government agencies, specific
information on the results of this monitoring did not filter down to the structural
engineering teams. Further, structural engineers did not know if they were
wearing the correct respirators. The report cited the following joint EPA and
OSHA statement as an example of information that the authors concluded did not
provide sufficient information on air quality or the proper respirators needed:
. . . EPA and OSHA are providing real-time analysis in the
immediate vicinity of the debris pile at Ground Zero This
information helps response workers on the scene determine what
level of respiratory protection is appropriate to use (U.S. Dept. of
Labor Press Release 01-339)
Recent Developments
EPA has initiated several actions to improve its risk communications to the
public. These actions are discussed in Chapters 2 and 7. In regard to worker
safety, EPA is participating in a FEMA-led Interagency Health and Safety
Coordinating Committee to provide unified safety and occupational health
leadership, guidance, and policy development for all Federal agencies under the
Federal Response Plan. In particular, the Committee plans to develop an
Emergency Support Function for Safety and Occupational Health.
Conclusions
The public wanted better information about air quality than they received from
government sources. A NYCDOH study, other lessons learned reports, and
testimony provided at various hearings suggest that the public did not receive
adequate air quality information and that individuals cleaned their residences
without using proper procedures and personal protection. In addition, workers at
"World Trade Center Disaster: Structural Engineers at Ground Zero, " August Domel, Jr., Ph.D.,
S.E., P.E., November 2001.
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Ground Zero may not have used respirators due, in part, to inadequate EPA and
other government communication.
EPA was one of many governmental and non-governmental agencies that
communicated health risk information to workers and the public. The levels of
non-adherence to the risk communications of these governmental agencies
suggests that all the participating levels of government need to re-examine their
policies, procedures, and practices for ensuring that necessary precautions are
consistently followed to reduce human exposure to contaminants.
Recommendation
We recommend that the EPA Administrator:
5-1. Coordinate with FEMA and other applicable Federal agencies to clearly
establish Federal agency responsibilities, roles, and procedures during an
emergency response that ensure that:
• Workers responding to emergencies are adequately protected by the
development and strict enforcement of health and safety plans.
• Health hazard information is effectively communicated to emergency
response crews.
• Sufficiently detailed health risk information is effectively
communicated to the public, including actions that the public should
take to reduce their potential exposure to harmful pollutants.
Additional recommendations relevant to the issues discussed in this chapter are
included in Chapters 2, 3, and 7. Also, additional recommendations may be
presented in our subsequent report on the results of our public survey.
Agency and New York City Comments and OIG Evaluation
EPA agreed with the recommendation but noted that it and other Agencies
provided the public with the most comprehensive and up-to-date information
available. In regard to worker safety, EPA noted that it supported OSHA in many
ways, including a long-term effort to educate workers about the need to wear
respirators. The Agency's complete written response to our draft report and our
detailed evaluation of that response are contained Appendices Q and R,
respectively.
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New York City officials responded that our report should not discuss respiratory
issues related to Ground Zero since this was OSHA's responsibility and not
EPA's. New York City offered several revisions to this section if we were to
retain it in our report. We incorporated New York City's suggested changes
where appropriate but have retained our discussion of respiratory issues as
Appendix L since EPA supported OSHA in this activity. New York City's
response to draft report excerpts and our evaluation of that response are contained
in Appendices S and T, respectively.
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Chapter 6
Further Actions Needed
to Address Current WTC Response
Monitoring data showed that ambient air levels in Lower Manhattan had generally
returned to pre-September 11 levels in mid-2002 or earlier, and as such, EPA
ceased outdoor monitoring in June 2002. Further, all debris had been removed
from the site by June 2002. However, concerns about indoor contamination
resulting from the collapse remained at the time we completed our review in April
2003, even though EPA, FEMA, and New York City had initiated a multi-million
dollar Indoor Air Residential Assistance program that included testing and
cleaning of residences in Lower Manhattan. Additional measures can be taken to
ensure cleanup provides reasonable assurance that the public's exposure to
asbestos and other contaminants in residences and workspaces in Lower
Manhattan is within the acceptable risk guidelines.
WTC Outdoor Monitoring Ended June 2002
EPA ceased all WTC-related outdoor air monitoring in Lower Manhattan on
June 20, 2002, with EPA concluding that, for the most part, outdoor ambient air
pollution levels had returned to pre-September 11 levels. Generally, ambient
pollutant levels in Lower Manhattan noticeably decreased in January 2002, once
the fires at Ground Zero were essentially extinguished. Some spikes in benzene
were recorded in January and February 2002, as a result of fires that flared up
during removal operations. From March 2002 through June 20, 2002, the only
elevated readings recorded were for asbestos. The elevated readings occurred in
March and April 2002 at the worker wash station and in May 2002 at the
monitoring site near the barge operation.
Our review of monitoring data as well as discussions with EPA, other Federal
agencies, New York City, and selected external health research, air quality testing,
academic, and environmental organization officials supported EPA's view that the
outdoor ambient air pollution levels in Lower Manhattan had, for the most part,
returned to pre-September 11 levels for those pollutants where pre-September 11
monitoring data existed.
indoor Residential Cleanup Program
The testing and cleaning of residences was one of several activities included in an
overall Indoor Air Residential Assistance Program funded by FEMA at an
estimated cost of $60 to $80 million. In addition to testing and cleaning of
residences, the program included:
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identifying contaminants of potential concern resulting from the WTC attack,
conducting a confirmation cleaning study to evaluate the effectiveness of
various cleaning techniques in achieving health-based benchmarks,
conducting a study of Upper Manhattan to determine background (normal)
levels of contaminants.
inspecting and cleaning building exteriors in Lower Manhattan,
cleaning two unoccupied residential buildings.
The indoor residential cleanup program was administered by EPA and New York
City. FEMA officials told us that they normally do not fund indoor cleanups of
private spaces related to a disaster unless an immediate hazard is declared. FEMA
officials told us that New York City officials indicated a formal cleanup program
was not needed. Therefore, in May 2002, the EPA Region 2 Administrator
provided FEMA with a memorandum that furnished the necessary justification to
authorize funding.
Public registration for the testing and cleaning program ended on December 28,
2002. As of July 17, 2003, EPA had reported the following test results.
Table 6-1: Test Results for Indoor Asbestos Testing as of July 17, 2003
Type of
Request
Total
Requests
Tests
Completed
Residences
Cleared1
Residences
Not
Cleared2
Not
Determined 3
Test
Results
Pending4
Test Only
730
729
691
8
30
1
Clean and Test
3,436
3,425
3,256
36
133
11
Notes
1 = Ambient levels were below the clearance standard of .0009 fibers per cubic centimeter (f/cc).
2 = Ambient levels were above the clearance standard of .0009 f/cc.
3 = Samples could not be analyzed because of overloaded filters or other reasons. Re-testing to be performed.
4 = Testing not begun or results not yet analyzed.
Residents could choose to have "testing only" of their residence or they could
choose to have "cleaning and post-cleaning testing" of their residence. Residents
requesting to only have their residence tested could choose between one of two
sampling options: aggressive sampling or modified aggressive sampling.
Aggressive sampling used a leafblower to stir up any settled dust by blowing air
against walls, ceilings, floors, and other surfaces prior to collection of air samples.
Modified aggressive sampling did not use leaf blowers. For either sampling
option, the air samples were to be analyzed for asbestos only. In addition to
testing indoor air for asbestos, EPA planned to collect pre- and post-cleaning wipe
samples for a limited number of residences (approximately 250) and test these
samples for dioxin, total metals, and mercury.
For residents requesting "cleaning and post-cleaning testing," two approaches
were used to clean the residences. The cleaning approach was based on the extent
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of dust contamination as determined through visual inspection. If a visual
inspection of the residence and the building's common spaces (including elevator
shafts) revealed minimal dust accumulations (light coating), "Scope of Work A"
applied. If visual inspection indicated large or significant accumulations of dust
or debris from the WTC collapse in residences, portions of the residence, or the
building's common spaces, "Scope of Work B" applied. In general, "Scope of
Work B" included additional cleaning of surfaces not included in "Scope of
Work A." Appendix M describes the two approaches available for residents
requesting cleaning and post-cleaning testing.
A significant issue with respect to developing health-related benchmarks
(or clearance standards) is the extent of prior or background contamination,
particularly in urban areas. This information is needed to determine the impact of
a disaster on the indoor environment. Studies have shown that these background
levels can exceed concentrations that may present a greater than 1-in-1,000,000
excess lifetime cancer risk (the desired cleanup goal for the Superfund program).
In the WTC case, EPA's background study of Upper Manhattan suggests that the
background concentrations for asbestos in indoor air and dioxin in settled dust
were at levels that presented a greater than 1-in-1,000,000 excess cancer risk.
Concurrent with the start of the indoor cleanup, a multi-agency workgroup of
Federal, State and city officials identified contaminants of potential concern
(COPC) related to the WTC collapse and developed health-related benchmarks for
these COPCs, including asbestos, lead, dioxin, PAHs, fibrous glass, and
crystalline silica. Three of these COPCs are considered cancer causing: asbestos,
dioxin, and PAHs. For each of the three carcinogens, the workgroup established a
health-related benchmark that equated to an increased lifetime cancer risk of 1-in-
10,000. This means that if 10,000 people are exposed to a single COPC at the
established benchmark level for 30 years, there may be one more case of cancer
than if the group had not been exposed.
In September 2002, the multi-agency workgroup published these COPCs in a peer
review draft entitled "World Trade Center Indoor Air Assessment: Selecting
Contaminants of Potential Concern and Setting Health-Based Benchmarks,"
which was peer reviewed by the Toxicology Excellence for Risk Assessment
(TERA) organization in October 2002. TERA's peer review report was issued on
February 7, 2003. The group's suggestions included:
Expanding the list of COPCs as appropriate,
More clearly explaining the methodology for selecting the COPCs,
Adding criteria to account for potential exposures through contact with dust in
the risk-based screening for COPC selection,
Adding parameters for children's exposure, and
More fully describing the approach for considering the health effects of
mixtures of COPC.
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The workgroup issued a revised COPC document in May 2003 that included
responses to the peer review panel's comments. Given the significance of the
panel's comments, the fact that additional information has been developed since
the peer review was conducted, and the potential for this document to be used as a
basis for future indoor cleanups, we believe the revised COPC document should
be submitted for a second peer review as suggested by the TERA panel.
Actions Can Be Taken to Provide Additional Assurance
That Indoor Cleanup Is Protective of Human Health
The residential cleanup effort represents a significant undertaking by EPA,
FEMA, and New York City. Nonetheless, it has been criticized by some groups.
The geographical coverage of the cleanup, limited to residences south of Canal
Street, has been questioned. The testing and cleanup procedures have been
criticized, particularly the fact that EPA has not required all apartments within a
building to be cleaned. In addition, not requiring the cleaning of all HVAC
systems was criticized as a limitation that could lead to re-contamination of clean
residences.
Additional actions can be taken to provide greater assurances that the program is
fully protective of human health. These actions include:
Ensuring that the cleanup meets minimum Superfund site cleanup goals,
Treating impacted buildings as a system,
Employing sampling methods (i.e., aggressive) to ensure that asbestos is at or
below acceptable levels,
Including workspaces as well as residential buildings, and
Including all geographic areas impacted by WTC dust.
Discussions on each of these actions follow.
Indoor Cleanup Level Does Not Meet Minimum Superfund Levels
Although the indoor cleanup in Lower Manhattan was not being conducted as a
Superfund cleanup, Superfund regulations and guidelines provide useful criteria
for evaluating the health protectiveness of the Lower Manhattan cleanup and
whether it provides reasonable assurance that the public's risk of exposure to
asbestos and other contaminants had been minimized.
The NCP describes specific criteria for determining the cleanup goals for
contaminated sites placed on the National Priorities List. The NCP requires that
for known or suspected carcinogens, acceptable exposure levels are generally
concentration levels that represent between a l-in-10,000 and l-in-1,000,000
increased lifetime cancer risk. The NCP lists nine factors, including cost,
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exposure, uncertainty, and technical limitations, that may justify a cleanup remedy
that departs from the l-in-1,000,000 cleanup goal.
In contrast to the above criteria, EPA's Lower Manhattan indoor cleanup
established a l-in-10,000 risk as the goal of the cleanup for asbestos. The
program does not include monitoring for the presence of the other COPCs,
including dioxin and PAHs, which are known carcinogens. The COPC document
established benchmarks for these two pollutants that also correspond to a l-in-
10,000 increased risk. Although the assumption is that the cleaning methods
prescribed for asbestos will clean the residence of other pollutants as well, the
post-cleaning testing does not provide assurance that these other pollutants were
removed. However, under Superfund guidance, the risk from exposure to
multiple carcinogens is considered additive. Thus, if all three pollutants were
cleaned up to levels that equate to a l-in-10,000 risk for each pollutant, the
combined risk would be considered greater than l-in-10,000.
The TERA peer review addressed the risk level established for the COPCs. The
panel suggested that the document more clearly explain how the impact of being
exposed to mixtures of the COPCs was considered in developing the benchmarks.
Further, panel members disagreed with the rationale for using an upper level
excess lifetime cancer risk of l-in-10,000. The workgroup's response to the peer
review panel stated the risk level was appropriate because of practical sampling
limitations for asbestos, noting a sampling time of 800 hours would be required to
achieve the air monitoring results needed to support a l-in-1,000,000 increased
lifetime risk level. The workgroup acknowledged that running multiple pumps
concurrently could reduce total sample time, but did not judge this practical since
more than 6,000 individual residences signed up for the cleaning program.
Need to Treat Impacted Buildings as a System
Tests of indoor asbestos contamination have shown that the distribution of
asbestos within indoor spaces is not consistent. Selective cleaning of apartments
does not ensure that uncleaned residences or uncleaned objects in apartments are
free of asbestos contamination. In the case of centralized HVAC systems,
selective cleaning does not ensure that cleaned apartments will not be
re-contaminated by uncleaned apartments through the HVAC system.
Consequently, the cleaning of contaminated buildings should proceed by treating
the building as a system.
This systematic approach to cleaning would require that the exterior of the
building be cleaned first before the building is re-occupied. All possible entrances
for outside air should be sealed off and the building HVAC shut down during
exterior cleaning. Once the exterior is cleaned, interior cleaning can begin. For
buildings with centralized air and heating, the interior surfaces of supply ducts and
return air plenums, fan housings, and filter housings should be cleaned. Filters
should be removed, filter tracks cleaned, and new filters installed. The above
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actions are necessary to prevent uncleaned sub-parts of the HVAC system from
re-contaminating the system. When cleaning individual rooms, each air supply or
return register should be sealed to prevent re-entrainment of toxicants into the
HVAC system.
According to EPA officials, as of July 2003, 143 buildings had been cleaned,
including 28 HVAC systems.
Non-Aggressive Sampling Does Not Provide Assurance Residents
Will Not be Exposed to Potentially Harmful Levels of Asbestos
The non-aggressive sampling option available to residents does not provide
assurances that residents will not be exposed to potentially harmful levels of
asbestos. AHERA protocols for building clearance after abatement require
aggressive sampling to re-entrain (stir) settled dust before air samples are taken.
The modified aggressive option available to residents may not re-suspend asbestos
particles clinging to surfaces within the residence.
Comprehensive Health Protection Would Also Include Workspaces
EPA, FEMA, and New York City implemented a cleaning and testing program for
residences but not workspaces. Some have complained about this limitation,
noting that a program of comprehensive health protection would address indoor
contamination in workspaces. The EPA Region 2 Assistant Administrator for
WTC Recovery Operations told us that EPA had discussed this issue with OSHA,
and that workers or employers could contact OSHA if they had concerns about
possible asbestos contamination in their work places. Further, EPA indicated that
OSHA was prepared to address any workplace issues brought to its attention.
Cleanup Boundary Not Scientifically Developed
The northern boundary of the cleanup area (Canal Street), coincides with the
initial exclusion zone developed on September 11. However, this boundary was
not based on systematic and representative sampling to determine the likely outer
boundary of WTC contamination. Several indoor sampling efforts were
conducted after September 11, but none were designed to determine the
geographic extent of WTC dust contamination. Consequently, it has not been
determined whether buildings north of Canal Street or east of Lower Manhattan,
in Brooklyn, were contaminated.
EPA officials told us that the Canal Street boundary represented a conservative
one based on visual inspection of how far dust and debris from the collapse
traveled as well as their interpretation of various data, including images obtained
by overhead flights. We also discussed the path of the dust and smoke plume with
an Office of Research and Development researcher. He told us that his modeling
demonstration as well as satellite images taken by the U.S. Geological Survey
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indicated that dust from the collapse did not extend beyond Canal Street.
Environmental experts told us that ideally a sampling plan should have been
implemented that collected and analyzed samples starting at Ground Zero and
radiating outward in concentric circles until the boundary of WTC contamination
was determined.
Conclusions
Extensive ambient monitoring data collected after September 11 demonstrated
that outdoor air quality levels around Lower Manhattan eventually returned to pre-
September 11 levels. As such, EPA does not need to take additional actions to
address outdoor ambient air quality concerns specifically related to the collapse of
the WTC towers.
EPA, in cooperation with FEMA and New York City, initiated a large-scale
indoor cleanup. In our opinion, this cleanup should meet the minimum criteria for
protecting human health that EPA has established for Superfund cleanups. Also,
the indoor cleaning and testing program should employ aggressive testing in all
residences and treat buildings as a system. Additionally, EPA should evaluate the
potential health risks for pollutants of concern in workspaces and for geographic
areas north of Canal Street, in Brooklyn, and any other areas where
meteorological data show pollutants of concern may have been deposited.
Recommendations
We recommend that the EPA Administrator ensure that EPA Region 2:
6-1. Submit the revised "World Trade Center Indoor Air Assessment: Selecting
Contaminants of Potential Concern and Setting Health-Based
Benchmarks" document to TERA for a second peer review.
6-2. Implement a post-cleaning testing program to ensure that, in addition to
asbestos, the indoor cleanup program has reduced residents' risk of
exposure from all of the identified COPCs to acceptable limits.
6-3. Due to concerns over possible re-contamination of residences cleaned
under the Indoor Air Residential Assistance program, EPA should treat
buildings as a system and implement a post-cleaning verification program
to ensure that residences cleaned by the program have not been
re-contaminated.
6-4. Work with FEMA and OSHA to assess whether the ongoing residential
testing and cleaning program should be expanded to address potential
contamination in workspaces in Lower Manhattan, or whether other
measures need to be taken to ensure that workspaces are not contaminated
with WTC dust.
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Agency and New York City Comments and OIG Evaluation
The Agency disagreed with the recommendations presented in this Chapter. The
Agency responded that EPA's indoor cleanup program was sufficient and that
EPA studies and data indicated a more widespread cleanup program is not
warranted. Because asbestos is a carcinogen with no commonly accepted safe
level of exposure, and approximately 18,000 residential units in Lower Manhattan
have not been tested or cleaned through the indoor residential program, we
continue to believe our recommendations are warranted to assure adequate health
protection for residents in Lower Manhattan. The Agency's complete written
response to our draft report and our detailed evaluation of that response are
contained in Appendices Q and R, respectively.
New York City's response provided some technical clarifications which we made.
New York City's response to our draft report excerpts is provided in Appendix S.
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Chapter 7
EPA Should Continue Efforts to
Improve Contingency Planning
The events of September 11 represented an attack on the U.S. mainland not
previously experienced in this country's history. The response to this tragedy was
trying and difficult for all parties involved, including environmental professionals.
Many of the persons we interviewed spoke highly of the response of EPA and its
employees. Still, lessons were learned from the September 11 response that can
be used to improve the Agency's ability to respond to future disasters. The
primary lessons learned from our evaluation relate to:
Contingency planning
Risk assessment and characterization
• Risk communication
An overriding lesson learned was that EPA needs to be prepared to assert its
opinion and judgment on matters that impact human health and the environment.
Although many organizations were involved in addressing air quality concerns
resulting from the WTC collapse, subsequent events have demonstrated that,
ultimately, the public, Congress, and others expect EPA to monitor and resolve
environmental issues. This is the case even when EPA may not have the overall
responsibility to resolve these issues or the necessary resources to address them.
Various Actions Initiated
EPA and several non-EPA groups and individuals prepared "lessons learned"
reports on the government's response to environmental issues resulting from
September 11. We generally agree with the recommendations made in these
reports. A summary on the previous lessons learned areas follows in Table 7-1.
Further details on the lessons learned as part of both EPA and non-EPA reviews
are in Appendix N.
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Table 7-1: Previous Lessons Learned Reviews
Type of Review
Lessons Learned Areas
EPA Office of Solid Waste and
Emergency Response, per request
by EPA Administrator, determined
lessons learned between
September 11, 2001, and October 19,
2001. Results were summarized in a
final report dated February 1, 2002.
• Decision making and communication
• Emergency response structure and plans
• Data analysis and information
management infrastructure
• Public information dissemination
• Resources
• Safety and security
• Environmental vulnerabilities
EPA Region 2 conducted a region-
specific lessons learned analysis. The
Region held an "after action session"
in Edison, New Jersey, on January 9-
10, 2002, and issued a final report
dated January 8, 2003.
Overarchina Recommendation Areas
• Planning
• Coordination
• Resources
Specific Recommendation Areas
• Public risk communication
• Data management
• Regional crisis management structure
EPA Office of Research and
Development held a data-oriented
lessons learned workshop in
November 2002. The report was
still in draft as of our review.
• Quality assurance project plan
• Mechanism for tracking monitoring tasks
• Improved health-related benchmarks for
asbestos and short-term exposures of
pollutants in general
• Identification of technical expertise teams
that could be called on to assist with
technical decisions
Environmental experts and others
prepared lessons learned reports from
September 2002 to December 2002.
• Better risk communication
• Health-related benchmarks assessing
exposure
• Clearer lines of authority between
government agencies in responding to
environmental issues
In September 2002, EPA issued its "Strategic Plan for Homeland Security," which
outlines the Agency's plan for meeting its homeland security responsibilities.
This Strategic Plan includes many proposed actions recommended in EPA's
February 2002 Lessons Learned report. The goals of the plan are grouped under
four major mission areas:
Critical Infrastructure Protection
Preparedness, Response, and Recovery
• Communication and Information
• Protection of EPA Personnel and Infrastructure
The second and third mission areas - "Preparedness, Response, and Recovery"
and "Communication and Information" - are particularly relevant to the issues
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discussed in this report.17 Within these two major areas, the Homeland Security
plan lists several actions that were recommended in the February 2002 Lessons
Learned Report as well as issues identified in this report.
OIG Observations for Improving Emergency Response
Observations developed by our evaluation, as well as any Agency actions already
underway to address these observations, are summarized in Table 7-2, and
discussed in detail in the sections that follow.
Table 7-2: Summary of OIG Observations
Contingency Planning
• Environmental Threats from Potential Terrorist Attacks Need to Be Assessed
• Roles and Responsibilities Within EPA Need to Be Delineated
• Roles and Responsibilities With Outside Agencies Need to Be Delineated
Risk Assessment and Characterization
• Health-Based Benchmarks Needed
• Sampling and Data Collection Protocols Needed
• Monitoring Capabilities Need to Be Increased
Risk Communication
• Better Communication Policies, Procedures, and Guidance Needed
• Risk Communications Need to Acknowledge Uncertainties
• Procedures Needed to Ensure Consistency in Communications
• Communications Need to Identify External Influences
• Environmental Data from Sources Outside EPA Need to Be Addressed
Contingency Planning
EPA has many years experience in responding to environmental emergencies and
has established policies and procedures to deal with such emergencies. EPA's
Lessons Learned Report identified issues related to contingency planning and
made recommendations for improvements in this area. Additionally, EPA's
Homeland Security strategy includes actions to address this area. Notably, the
Agency has started efforts to upgrade the National Incident Coordination Team,
which coordinates EPA's response to large-scale emergencies. The events of
September 11 demonstrate the following areas where the Agency's emergency
response mechanisms can be improved.
OIG has ongoing and planned work to evaluate EPA's efforts related to the other major homeland
security missions not addressed in this report.
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Environmental Threats from Potential Terrorist Attacks
Need to Be Assessed
It is understandable that the government and others were not fully prepared for
what happened on September 11. Now that the country has experienced such an
attack and lives under the threat of future attacks, it is important that the Agency
anticipate and plan for different disaster scenarios. To the extent that EPA can
anticipate various scenarios and plan for the type of environmental response
needed before a disaster strikes, the Agency's response efforts can be more
focused on appropriate implementation and avoid making interpretative, technical,
and policy-setting decisions with potential public health implications during the
stressful and time-demanding circumstances created by an emergency.
The experience of September 11 has provided the Agency with considerable
information on what to expect of a large-scale disaster involving office and multi-
family residential buildings in a densely populated urban environment. However,
disasters involving other scenarios, other types of targets, and other locations may
present different challenges. For example, New York City has significant
emergency response and environmental resources - other cities may not and may
require more assistance from EPA. In addition, EPA Region 2's office was
located within New York City and close to the disaster site, and EPA's national
Environmental Response Team was located in nearby Edison, New Jersey,
approximately 30 miles away. This was important, because air travel was
curtailed for several days after the attacks. EPA may not be as closely located to
the next disaster.
Disasters in different parts of the country could present different, perhaps greater,
environmental exposures than at WTC. EPA researchers told us the tall buildings
in New York City combined to create a "chimney effect" that helped to push air
and pollutants upward and away from street level. Winds also helped disperse
and dilute WTC airborne emissions, and rain during the first week helped
alleviate dusty conditions. If a similar disaster were to strike in a city with
different geography and weather patterns, a more serious exposure scenario could
develop.
Accordingly, EPA should work with the Department of Homeland Security and
other agencies to share information on high-risk targets and areas, and develop
plans for responding to an emergency situation in those areas. These plans
should address the different scenarios anticipated from a disaster involving these
targets and how EPA, other Federal, and the appropriate State and local agencies
should respond to these different scenarios.
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Roles and Responsibilities Within EPA Need to Be Delineated
EPA needs to delineate roles and responsibilities for its various programs offices
when responding to emergencies, including how these roles and responsibilities fit
within the incident command structure. Despite the commendable actions of
many EPA personnel, the Agency should outline roles and responsibilities for its
program offices beforehand to provide a more efficient and coordinated response
to future disasters.
For example, within 3 days of the disaster, EPA officials within the Office of
Radiation and Indoor Air and the Office of Air Quality and Planning Standards
had developed a web site with such captions as "Protecting Yourself from
Asbestos Exposure," "Health Effects of Dust and Smoke," and "Strategies for
Clean Up Inside Residences and Businesses." However, this web site was not
activated and made available to the general public. One EPA official told us there
was an overwhelming amount of activity going on and that this information
probably "got lost in the fray." EPA Region 2 officials could not recall why the
web site was not activated.
Also, although EPA's National Exposure Research Laboratory team made it to
New York on September 16 to help implement an ambient monitoring network,
they were unable to gain access to the site and start monitoring until
September 21. The Laboratory's monitoring team's abilities were especially
needed since they had air monitoring equipment that could run on both electrical
and battery power, and they had airborne particulate matter monitors.
In its lessons learned report, EPA Region 2 recommended that the Region identify
a team of dedicated people who will respond in the event of a new crisis. In our
opinion, other EPA regions should follow Region 2's lead and identify specific
areas of expertise that may be needed in the event of an emergency, and assemble
teams of experts that can be mobilized to quickly provide this support. These
areas may include specialized sampling techniques, exposure modeling and
assessment, and risk assessment. Also, EPA Headquarters should develop
national teams to support or augment Regional response when needed, including
guidelines for determining when a response should be elevated to a national level.
Roles and Responsibilities With Outside Agencies
Need to Be Delineated
A response to an event the size of the WTC incident requires the efforts and
coordination of numerous government organizations, including Federal, State, and
local governments. Our discussions with EPA and non-EPA officials, as well as
WTC "lessons learned" reports from other organizations, indicated that there were
overlapping and sometimes confusing roles and responsibilities for the various
responding organizations. For example, early in the response, various agencies
were conducting numerous sampling efforts. Particularly for asbestos, different
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sampling methods were being used with the results being reported in different
metrics, which made the results more difficult to interpret. A senior New York
City Office of Emergency Management official told us that roles and
responsibilities of the Federal, State, and local agencies in responding to a disaster
were unclear on September 11, 2001, and were still unclear when we met with
him during the summer of 2002.
EPA has addressed coordination with other organizations in both its Headquarters
and Region 2 lessons learned reports. For example, the Headquarters Report
recommended that EPA collaborate with OSHA and the Department of Health
and Human Services to clarify the Agency's role in protecting the health and
safety of responders, and that EPA coordinate with Department of Homeland
Security to develop a coordination strategy for all responders during national
emergencies. Region 2 management and staff recommended that their Region
clearly identify scope and boundaries of their work in an emergency; and educate
EPA and other Federal and State officials about the scope, boundaries and
authorities of the various emergency response plans and systems. We agree with
these recommendations. These coordination efforts should also take place in all
EPA regions and include FEMA, and should address likely sources of funding for
these activities.
Risk Assessment and Characterization
The WTC disaster pointed to the need for better risk assessment and
characterization procedures and tools for addressing the types of environmental
concerns resulting from large-scale disasters. A significant challenge encountered
by EPA and other organizations was how to characterize health risks to the public
in the absence of health-based benchmarks. The need for consistent sampling
protocols and special monitoring requirements was also demonstrated.
Health-Based Benchmarks Needed
Government entities, such as EPA, OSHA, ATSDR, and NIOSH, have developed
guidelines for many of the contaminants found in Lower Manhattan. However,
existing health benchmarks were not applicable to exposures experienced by the
general public in Lower Manhattan. Many of the benchmarks available at that
time to assess the exposure risks for contaminants found in the ambient air were:
occupational standards based on an 8-hour-per-day exposure; guidelines based on
long-term exposures; or standards, such as those for asbestos, that were not health
based. Details on some of these issues are in Chapter 2.
OSHA and NIOSH have developed occupational standards to protect industrial
workers from pollutant exposures, but these standards are based on an 8-hour-a-
day exposure. In general, these standards were not applicable to characterizing
risks for residents who experienced exposures greater than 8 hours a day in indoor
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and outdoor settings. Some of the screening levels developed to assess the sub-
chronic risks from the contaminants created by the WTC collapse were developed
by adjusting emergency removal guidelines listed in EPA's Hazard Evaluation
Handbook to take into account shorter exposure periods. These guidelines are
based on a 30-year exposure period and correspond to a l-in-10,000 increased
lifetime cancer risk for carcinogens.
Further, some of the benchmarks used to assess air quality and bulk dust in Lower
Manhattan were criteria- or condition-based standards and not health-based
standards. For example, the benchmark used to assess asbestos risk from WTC
dust was developed to determine when asbestos containing material was subject to
demolition and renovation regulations. For future disasters, health benchmarks
are needed to address the types of exposures experienced at the WTC site, which
included:
acute or high concentration exposures up to 8 hours
sub-chronic (2 weeks to 1 year) exposures
indoor air exposures
exposure to asbestos
synergistic or multiple pollutant exposures
Details on each of the above benchmarks are in Appendix O.
We recognize that it is not possible to anticipate all the scenarios and develop
standards that address all possible pollutants that may result from a disaster.
Thus, we believe an agreed-upon framework for quickly developing additional
guidelines and benchmarks in an emergency situation is needed. This process
could include a panel of scientific experts that would be available in an emergency
to analyze the available risk data and establish appropriate health-based
benchmarks for the pollutants of concern
As discussed above, a multi-agency workgroup developed health-related
benchmarks for six pollutants of concern related to indoor environment
contamination from the WTC collapse that underwent peer review in October
2002. We believe the Agency should expand on these efforts to identify
benchmarks for other pollutants of concern and for outdoor and indoor exposures
based on threat assessments discussed earlier in this chapter. Related to this
effort, EPA should collect information on background levels (i.e., pollutant
concentrations under normal conditions), to properly assess the impact that a
disaster has on the concentration of these pollutants of concern in the
environment.
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Sampling and Data Collection Protocols Needed
EPA, other government organizations, and non-governmental organizations
undertook extensive monitoring efforts in the months following September 11.
Extensive sampling was done around the work zone to monitor conditions for first
responders. To assess ambient conditions for the general public, EPA established
an ambient monitoring network in coordination with New York City and New
York State officials. EPA also developed a draft Quality Assurance Project Plan
for the WTC ambient monitoring network; however, the plan was not finalized.
A comprehensive Quality Assurance Project Plan outlines the objectives of the
monitoring, identifies the monitoring and sampling methodologies, identifies the
siting of monitors, and outlines monitoring exit strategies. In essence, the Plan
helps to ensure that sufficient data is collected of adequate quality for the
decisions to be made.
The Quality Assurance Project Plan should also address the format and means of
transmitting data. In the WTC response, various government agencies collected a
large amount of environmental data for Lower Manhattan in the months following
September 11. The Office of Environmental Information maintains the New York
City Response Monitoring Data Retrieval database, which stores the monitoring
data collected by the various Federal, State, and City environmental agencies
involved in the response. According to a report prepared by an EPA contractor
that analyzed trends in the data, the database contained 263,000 monitoring results
for 605 contaminants through April 24, 2002. Because the data came in different
formats, consistent sampling, monitoring, and quality assurance information was
not provided for each of the pollutants monitored, and in many instances this data
was not provided. Our review of information in the database confirmed the trends
noted by the contractor.
Providing standardized guidance for the organizations reporting data to EPA
would improve the consistency of the data. A complete data set would make
future assessments of the data easier to complete. Both EPA Region 2 and EPA
Headquarters' Lessons Learned reports made recommendations to improve data
collection. The Region 2 Lessons Learned report recommended that all
organizations submit data in an electronic format, and standardized formats
should be used as much as possible. The report also recommended that easy-to-
understand context and explanations be provided for the data, to allow data and
risk assessments to be released to the public more quickly.
EPA's Office of Environmental Information has created a standardized template
for future responses by making a generic shell of the New York City Monitoring
Database. This Office is also exploring longer-term improvements. With regard
to WTC data, Region 2 officials have been working to improve the data in the
"NYC Response" database by requesting that organizations perform a quality
assurance review of the data they submitted to EPA. Once this process is
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completed, the data will become available to the public on a CD-ROM. We agree
that EPA should continue to explore long-term improvements for data collection.
Monitoring Capabilities Need to Be Increased
The amount of monitoring data for pollutants other than asbestos was limited in
the first few weeks following September 11. In the beginning, monitoring efforts
were hampered by several factors. There were difficulties associated with getting
access and security, power supply sources, equipment availability, and analytical
capacity. One environmental monitoring expert who participated in
environmental sampling and analysis after the WTC collapse suggested that
emergency response monitors must be improved and recommended that
lightweight and manageable battery operated air samplers be developed that are
able to measure a wide range of particles and gaseous substances.
In the case of a major disaster that causes a significant dispersion of particulates,
the levels of TSP can be a concern, particularly in regard to acute respiratory
symptoms. However, in the WTC response, these particles were not monitored
because of a lack of TSP monitors. The availability of TSP monitors has
decreased over time as EPA's National Ambient Air Quality Standards program
has shifted its focus from measuring TSP to measuring smaller particles. While
health studies support measuring smaller particles from the standpoint of the
National Ambient Air Quality Standards program, experts told us that it is useful
to measure the levels of TSP in a disaster to determine potential short-term or
acute health effects.
EPA Headquarters' Lessons Learned Report addressed equipment needs and
recommended that EPA clearly identify such needs. In addition, the Office of Air
Quality and Planning Standards acquired funding for a Mobile Rapid Response
Laboratory to collect data quickly in emergency situations and transmit data to a
central database via satellite. The Office of Air Quality and Planning Standards
plans to establish two such mobile laboratories.
Risk Communication
The collapse of the WTC towers disrupted normal communication infrastructures,
yet required that difficult decisions about the condition of the environment be
made quickly and under extreme stress. Under these conditions, EPA made
extraordinary efforts to successfully assemble an extensive amount of information
on its web site and otherwise communicate to the public. Despite these efforts,
the information EPA communicated was in some cases inconsistent with prior
Agency positions, inconsistent with other communications regarding the WTC
disaster, or incomplete. Some of these communication problems may have been
avoided if the Agency had updated policies and procedures in place for
communicating to the public and had followed existing risk communication
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guidelines established for the Superfund program. Based on its experience with
the WTC response and the subsequent anthrax contamination responses, EPA has
initiated various actions to improve its communication practices.
Better Communication Policies, Procedures, and Guidance Needed
Officials from EPA's OCEMR and its successor office, the Office of Public
Affairs, in Washington, D.C., were not able to provide us with current written
policies or procedures for communicating with the public. Although not
established as official Agency communication policy, EPA's Superfund program
has issued several guidance documents regarding risk communication. EPA's risk
communication principles and recommended practices are contained in EPA's
Superfund Community Involvement Handbook. This Handbook identifies the
"Seven Cardinal Rules of Risk Communication," presented in Chapter 2. As
explained in the following, EPA's risk communications did not consistently
adhere to the principles and guidelines discussed in its Superfund guidance.
Risk Communications Need to Acknowledge Uncertainties
EPA's Superfund Community Involvement Handbook specifically discusses
uncertainties ("Be willing to discuss uncertainties"), and the fourth rule states:
If you do not know an answer or are uncertain, acknowledge it and
respond with the answer as soon as possible. Do not hesitate to
admit mistakes or disclose risk information. Try to share more
information not less; otherwise, people may think you are hiding
something.
As detailed previously in this report, EPA's statement that the air was safe to
breathe was not qualified (except for rescue and cleanup personnel at Ground
Zero). Further, EPA's press releases did not discuss any of the uncertainties
associated with this statement.
Dr. Peter Sandman, founder of the Environmental Communication Research
Program at Rutgers University, provided 26 recommendations for risk
communication. These include that one should "acknowledge uncertainty" and
urged "never using the word 'safe' without qualifying it."
Procedures Needed to Ensure Consistency in Communications
EPA communications after the WTC catastrophe sometimes gave conflicting
information in regard to the same issue or were inconsistent with prior Agency
positions. Specifically, information provided orally about cleaning of indoor
spaces was not consistent with the messages given in Agency press releases.
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Also, EPA communications about the risk from asbestos were not entirely
consistent with prior Agency public positions regarding asbestos risk.
EPA's communications during the WTC crisis - that the general public did not
need to be concerned about short-term exposure to WTC asbestos - were
inconsistent with the Agency's prior position that all asbestos exposure is
hazardous to human health. EPA's historical position, as detailed in the Federal
Register, has been that:
. . . short-term occupational exposures, have also been shown to
increase the risk of lung cancer and mesothelioma. In addition,
there are many documented cases of mesothelioma linked to
extremely brief exposure to high concentrations of asbestos or
long-term exposure to low concentrations. . . . EPA has concluded
that it is prudent to treat all fiber types as having equivalent
biological activity...Available evidence supports the conclusion
that there is no safe level of exposure to asbestos. (April 25, 1986
Federal Register Volume 51, page 15722)
However, EPA's position in its September 13, 2001, press release was that the
public did not need to be concerned about short-term exposure to WTC asbestos.
The confusion of some residents may have been reflected at a May 8, 2002, press
conference, when the questioner quoted EPA's 1986 position and asked the
Region 2 Administrator:
Available evidence supports the conclusion that there is no safe
level for exposure to asbestos. So what science are you citing that
there is a safe level?
The EPA Region 2 Administrator replied:
We are talking about very short term exposure to quantities of
[unintelligible word] that - we know exactly that these buildings
came down and they contained asbestos. There are other places in
the country perhaps where people have been exposed over long
periods of time - based on using substances containing asbestos -
and breathing them - as part of their household. We know this was
a one time - you know buildings came down, and that is what
needs to be cleaned up so there is not that risk of long term
exposure.
The research community has not reached consensus on the relative risk to human
health from exposure to different types and sizes of asbestos, and EPA's approach
has been to not distinguish between fiber types and sizes when characterizing the
risk from asbestos exposure. Many experts and studies support the general
message EPA conveyed about asbestos exposure and risk after the WTC
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catastrophe, and research may ultimately prove these statements correct.
However, this position was different from prior Agency pronouncements, and can
create doubts in the public's mind about EPA's statements.
Communications Need to Disclose External Participation
As discussed previously in this report, EPA officials were not the sole determiners
of the information that was included in its press releases, nor the information that
was excluded. This was demonstrated by the EPA OCEMR Associate
Administrator's statement that residential cleaning instructions were deleted from
a draft press release by the CEQ contact official. The extent of outside influence
was further illustrated by the statement from the EPA Administrator's Chief of
Staff that she could not claim ownership of EPA's early WTC press releases
because "the ownership was joint ownership between EPA and the White House."
In a time of disaster, EPA officials should be careful to ensure that EPA's press
releases reflect EPA's professional judgment based on sound science,
acknowledge the participation of outside parties, and provide accurate information
about the environment to the public in accordance with EPA's mission.
Environmental Data from Sources Outside EPA Need to Be
Addressed
In the aftermath of the WTC collapse, several entities were involved in collecting
data on environmental conditions. This included private firms; research
organizations; Federal agencies; and State, local, and city governments. Several
days after the attacks, EPA was designated as the lead agency for collecting and
storing all of the WTC monitoring data. This designation did not include being
the sole spokesperson for communicating the results of this monitoring data.
EPA was subsequently criticized for not including other organizations'
monitoring results in its public communications. For example, EPA was
criticized for not putting the results of sampling done by the U.S. Geological
Survey on EPA's web site, or at least discussing this data. The U.S. Geological
Survey monitoring had found high pH levels in the WTC dust, which reportedly
contributed to the burning of respiratory pathways experienced by first responders
and others who breathed WTC dust. An EPA spokesperson stated that EPA had
not intended to keep the information from the public, and EPA thought the
information had been posted on the U.S. Geological Survey's web site. EPA
officials also told us that the high levels of pH found in the dust was to be
expected because of the pulverized concrete.
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Another monitoring study was highly publicized by the media, but was not
discussed in EPA communications. This study was conducted by a collaborative
association of aerosol scientists that specialize in fine particulate ambient
monitoring techniques. This group found that the air around Lower Manhattan
contained high levels of fine particulates and metals, particularly in readings taken
on October 3, 2001. We spoke to the author of this study who told us that he had
tried to work with EPA regarding his group's test results before releasing it to the
press, but was unsuccessful. EPA correspondence indicated the EPA officials
were invited to the press release for this study, but were not aware of the study
prior to that invitation.
EPA needs to develop a policy, in conjunction with other Federal agencies,
outlining how organization(s) will coordinate the reporting of environmental data
after a disaster. This policy should address the State and local government role in
these communications, as well as how to address data collected by research or
academic organizations.
EPA Actions to Improve Its Communications
Both EPA's Headquarters and Region 2 Lessons Learned Reports address
communication issues and provide recommendations to improve the Agency's
response in this area. EPA's Headquarters report recommended that EPA develop
policies and procedures for disseminating public information during national
emergencies within the established emergency response plans and structures. The
report also recommended that EPA coordinate with other organizations outside to
identify and address obstacles to timely and consistent presentation of
environmental information during national emergencies. In regard to releasing
monitoring data, the report recommended that EPA clearly define a process for
approving and coordinating the release of information to other agencies and the
public. Also, EPA's Lessons Learned report recommended that EPA work with
the Department of Homeland Security to have EPA designated the lead agency for
environmental data during national emergencies when both EPA and other
agencies are conducting environmental analyses.
Region 2's lesson learned report recommended that Region 2 develop a
comprehensive approach to handling crisis communications, and that this
approach include other Federal and State partners. In addition, mechanisms
should be in place for resolving differences about the interpretation of risk and the
appropriate response.
These recommendations, if properly implemented, should help ensure technical
consistency and accuracy in the Agency's public information, and accountability
for press release content.
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Recent Developments
In May 2003, EPA participated in a Department of Homeland Security-
administered Top Officials exercise with other Federal, State, local, and Canadian
government organizations. This exercise simulated weapons of mass destruction
incidents with the goals of: (1) improving the nation's capacity to manage extreme
events; (2) creating broader frameworks for the operation of expert crisis and
consequence management systems; (3) validating authorities, strategies, plans,
policies, procedures, and protocols; and (4) building a sustainable, systematic
national exercise program to support the national strategy for homeland security.
Further, on June 27, 2003, EPA issued the EPA National Approach to Response
Policy to implement a new approach to responding to Nationally Significant
Incidents. The Policy calls for a multi-faceted and coordinated approach to
managing EPA's emergency response assets during a Nationally Significant
Incident. A key aspect of the policy is that it requires EPA to operate under an
Incident Command System approach based on the National Interagency Incident
Management System. EPA plans to supplement the Policy with guidance to fully
characterize roles and responsibilities within the Agency to manage a Nationally
Significant Incident. As noted in the Policy, Homeland Security Presidential
Directive-5 calls for the development of a new National Response Plan and a
single, comprehensive National Incident Management System. As standards,
guidelines, and protocols are developed to implement the national system, EPA
will modify its National Approach to Response Policy as necessary.
Conclusions
Although many organizations were involved in addressing air quality concerns
resulting from the WTC collapse, subsequent events have demonstrated that,
ultimately, the public and others expect EPA to monitor and resolve
environmental issues, even though EPA may not have the overall responsibility to
resolve these issues or the necessary resources to address them. These issues
range from collecting, interpreting, and communicating environmental
information to cleaning up any environmental contamination. EPA must be
prepared to take a leadership role, within the evolving framework established by
the Department of Homeland Security and existing statutes, in fulfilling its
mission of "protecting human health and the environment," if another large-scale
disaster occurs.
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Recommendations
This chapter summarizes observations based on work conducted to answer the
objectives discussed in Chapters 2 through 6. These prior chapters contain
recommendations that address specific issues related to those objectives.
Recommendations to address observations not covered in the prior chapters are
included in this chapter.
We recommend that the EPA Administrator:
7-1. Work with the Department of Homeland Security and other agencies to
share information on likely targets and threats and collaboratively develop
approaches to address these threats. Such approaches should include, at a
minimum:
a. Identifying the pollutants expected to be emitted from such targets,
b. Assessing the pathways of human exposure to those pollutants,
c. Developing approaches to monitoring and assessing environmental
contamination from those targets, and
d. Establishing plans of action for reducing human exposure from these
pollutants.
7-2. Define and clarify internal EPA organizational roles and responsibilities in
responding to large-scale disasters. This should include designating teams
of Agency experts - at both the National and Regional level - that can be
mobilized to quickly provide needed technical support during a response.
These areas may include specialized sampling techniques, exposure
modeling and assessment, and risk assessment.
7-3. Develop and improve health-related benchmarks that can be used to assess
health risk in emergencies. Specifically:
a. Continue agency work on Acute Exposure Guideline Levels,
b. Develop sub-chronic exposure guidelines for pollutants determined to
be a high priority as a result of terrorist attacks or other large-scale
disasters,
c. Develop health-related benchmarks for asbestos in air,
d. Develop benchmarks for assessing potential exposure from
contaminant levels in dust,
e. Continue to develop and refine benchmarks for COPCs in indoor
environments,
f. Conduct research to determine the synergistic impact of exposure to
multiple pollutants, and
g. Develop expert panels that can be used to quickly develop health-
related benchmarks in emergency situations.
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7-4. Develop an emergency quality assurance sampling plan to be used as a
guidance for monitoring environmental conditions after a large-scale
disaster. This plan should address:
a. Monitoring objectives,
b. Preferred sampling and analytic methods for high-priority pollutants,
c. Siting of monitors,
d. Quality control, and
e. Data reporting formats
7-5. Improve monitoring capabilities by:
a. Making TSP monitors available for use in emergency situations, and
acquiring other monitors as determined,
b. Continuing the mobile monitoring laboratory project, and
c. Exploring new technologies for monitoring in extremely dusty
conditions
7-6. Require that the Office of Public Affairs develop emergency
communications policy and procedures consistent with the principles of
risk communication provided in EPA's "Seven Cardinal Rules of Risk
Communication."
Agency Comments and OIG Evaluation
The Agency generally agreed with the recommendations in this Chapter. With
respect to the conclusion, the Agency emphasized that it exercised its opinions
and judgments on matters impacting human health and the environment and will
continue to do so within the context of its authorities and its role under the Federal
Response Plan. The Agency's complete written response to our draft report and
our detailed evaluation of that response are contained in Appendices Q and R,
respectively.
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Appendix A
Federal Agencies Responding to the WTC Collapse
| Agency
Role
Federal Emergency
Management Agency
Managed and coordinated Federal Government response. Provided
funding for response including cleaning of building exteriors and cleaning
of indoor residential spaces.
U.S. Department of
Health and Human
Services
National Institute for
Occupational Safety and
Health
Performed various activities related to worker health and safety, which
included:
• Assessing jobs and work locations for health potential hazards.
• Helping site managers select appropriate equipment for sampling, use it
properly, and institute procedures for analyzing data.
• Helping select appropriate personal protective equipment and coordinate
deployment of respirators.
• Developing procedures for cleaning and sanitizing respirators.
• Developing and disseminating written guidelines for worker safety and
health.
• Conducting health hazard evaluations to assess worker health.
• Providing technical assistance to NYCDOH to develop voluntary registry
of individuals who worked at, lived near, or responded to the WTC
attack.
U.S. Department of
Health and Human
Services
Agency for Toxic
Substances and Disease
Registry
Provided various types of monitoring and health assessment support,
including:
• Assisting EPA and other agencies in sampling dust and air at Ground
Zero and evaluating data to assess health risks.
• Providing technical assistance to NYCDOH on environmental medicine,
• Participating in the World Trade Center Environmental Assessment
Workgroup, which was made up of representatives from ATSDR and
other Federal agencies.
• Using geographic information systems to map environmental sampling
results and other data for Lower Manhattan.
U.S. Department of
Health and Human
Services
National Institute of
Environmental Health
Sciences
Funded research and training to address health concerns resulting from
the WTC collapse.
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| Agency
Role
U.S. Department of
Labor
Occupational Safety and
Health Administration
Conducted various risk assessment and monitoring activities related to
worker protection at the Ground Zero Site. This included:
• Taking air and bulk samples to date for asbestos, silica, lead, and other
heavy metals, carbon monoxide, noise, and numerous organic and
inorganic compounds.
• Providing 24-hour laboratory support to analyze air and bulk samples
taken at the site.
• Distributing sampling results to workers and other safety and health
representatives at the site, and posting the sampling results on the
agency's web site, and
• Providing guidance on appropriate personal protection equipment and
feasible control measures based on monitoring results.
Distributed respirators and conducted fit testing for the Fire Department of
New York and other rescue workers.
Conducted initial safety assessment of the site within 24 hours of the
attack to identify hazards and potential health and safety risks to workers
involved in the recovery, and provided around-the-clock monitoring of the
site to identify and alert workers to safety and health hazards.
Provided various safety and health support functions such as helping
develop an environmental, safety, and health plan; distributing personal
protective equipment to workers; and conducting job hazard analyses.
Provided support to promote site safety and health, which included
sponsoring weekly meeting regarding safety and health issues.
United States Coast
Guard
Operated Incident Command Center in Edison, New Jersey.
Conducted air-monitoring operations in buildings in Manhattan's financial
district.
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Appendix B
Details on Scope and Methodology
Objective 1. Did the available monitoring data and analyses of that data support EPA's
major public communications regarding air quality and associated health
risks resulting from the collapse of the WTC towers?
We requested all data and correspondence used to support "major" EPA
pronouncements regarding air quality. We defined "major" as press releases,
testimony, television, and other public appearances. This effort primarily focused
on, but was not limited to, data collected and pronouncements made during the
period September 2001 through December 2001. The data we reviewed included
"Daily Summary Sheets" prepared by EPA staff, and the raw data sheets that
showed the results of air and dust samples and were the basis for the daily
summaries. In addition, we obtained access to the "New York City Response"
database maintained by EPA's Office of Environmental Information and
downloaded selected data from the database and compared it to the raw data
sheets. We also reviewed monitoring results from other organizations, including:
• New York State Department of Conservation
• New York City Department of Environmental Protection
• National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health
• New York City Board of Education
Operating Engineers National Hazmat Program
• New York State Public Employees Safety and Health Bureau
U.S. Geological Survey
Occupational Safety and Health Administration
• DELTA Group
• New York University
Environmental and Occupational Health Sciences Institute
ConEd
Turner Construction
We interviewed Region 2 officials to determine their views on what monitoring
data showed and the messages conveyed by EPA press releases. In addition, we
interviewed EPA officials within the Office of Research and Development, Office
of Air and Radiation, and Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response. We
also interviewed officials outside EPA to obtain their views on EPA's statements
about air quality and the support for these statements. These interviews included
officials and researchers from OSHA, FEMA, NYCDOH, NYCDEP, the Mount
Sinai School of Medicine, New York University, the Environmental and
Occupational Health Sciences Institute, and the DELTA Group.
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We also reviewed available correspondence and documentation related to the
preparation of the EPA press releases. Further, we interviewed principal EPA
officials involved in the preparation of press releases, including the EPA
Associate Administrator for OCEMR, the Associate Administrator for the Office
of Public Affairs (formerly OCEMR), the EPA Administrator's former Chief of
Staff, and the Region 2 Communications Division Director.
Limitations: Our review of the process and the support for information in EPA
press releases on air quality was limited since CEQ officials declined to meet with
us to discuss their role in the preparation of press releases. Our written request for
an interview was declined by a White House legal counselor, who noted there
were "institutional concerns about interviewing White House employees."
Further, there was a lack of documentation in general regarding preparation of
press releases. We only found documentation regarding the preparation of two of
six press releases issued during the period September 12, 2001, through
October 3, 2001. This documentation included a draft copy of the EPA press
release issued on September 16; a single e-mail about this draft press release from
CEQ; and a draft copy of the September 13 EPA press release.
Objective 2. Were EPA actions and decisions in regard to evaluating, mitigating, and
controlling risks to human health from exposure to indoor air pollutants in
the WTC area consistent with applicable statutes, regulations, policies,
guidance, and practice?
We reviewed applicable laws, regulations, and guidance related to emergency
responses, including CERCLA (Superfund) and implementing regulations, and the
FRP. We also reviewed EPA's authority to test and clean indoor spaces, and the
applicability of this authority to the WTC response. We interviewed EPA and
FEMA officials about the applicability and requirements of these statutes. We
also identified EPA and other government actions taken in response to other
disasters to compare prior indoor responses to the WTC indoor response.
We identified and reviewed reports of indoor testing conducted by both
government and non-government entities. This included indoor air and dust
testing conducted by EPA, ATSDR, contractors for the General Services
Administration, consultants for the Ground Zero Task Force, and an
environmental firm hired by one of the debris removal construction companies.
We also interviewed officials both within and outside the government to
determine their views regarding the extent of indoor contamination and the
adequacy of the government's response.
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Objective 3. Were asbestos demolition and renovation work practice standards
followed during WTC cleanup and recovery operations and, if not, why
not?
To determine the requirement applicable to emergency situations, we reviewed the
Asbestos National Emissions Standard for Hazardous Air Pollutants (40 CFR Part
61 Subpart M), EPA's "Guidelines For Catastrophic Emergency Situations
Involving Asbestos," and other EPA background documents on NESHAP. We
also reviewed New York City's "Asbestos Control Program" rules and New York
State's Industrial Code Rule 56, which governs asbestos emission in the State.
We interviewed EPA and New York City officials to discuss the applicability of
NESHAP rules to the WTC response. This included the EPA Region 2 Counsel,
officials from the EPA Office of Enforcement and Compliance Assurance and the
Office of Air Quality Planning and Standards, and officials from NYCDEP and
NYCDDC. To determine the extent that NESHAP work practices were followed
in demolishing damaged buildings and removing debris from the WTC site, we
interviewed officials who were present at the site during these operations
including EPA on-scene coordinators, and officials from New York City and
OSHA. We also reviewed transcripts of EPA Superfund Ombudsman, United
States Senate Subcommittee, New York State Assembly, and New York City
Council hearings on this issue. Further, we reviewed reports from persons present
at the site, EPA situation reports, and other reports of activities at the site.
Limitations: Information on which we based conclusions includes personal
accounts of the work activities obtained from interviews and hearings, and reports
describing work practices at the site. Further, it was beyond the scope of our
review to determine whether all NESHAP regulations applicable to emergency
situations were followed or the extent to which they may have been followed. We
also did not evaluate compliance with worker protection requirements.
Objective 4. To what extent were EPA and government communications regarding air
quality and associated health risks: (a) received by the public;
(b) understood by the public; and (c) effective in getting people to take the
desired actions to reduce their potential health risks?
To obtain information on the impact EPA pronouncements had on the actions of
area residents and workers, we reviewed testimony at hearings before a United
States Senate Subcommittee, EPA's Superfund Ombudsman, the New York State
Assembly, and the New York City Council. In addition, we reviewed the results
of surveys of people's actions and opinions, and reviewed reports prepared by
officials present during the WTC response. At the time this report was prepared,
we were in the process of conducting a random survey of New York City residents
to obtain information on the public's satisfaction with the air quality information
provided by the government after the WTC response, how the public interpreted
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this information, and actions taken by the public to reduce their exposure to
potential contaminants. The results of this survey will be presented in a separate
OIG report.
Limitations: Except for a survey by NYCDOH and a random telephone poll of
New York residents, the information we reviewed was not collected by statistical
sampling methods and may not be representative of the public's and emergency
crews' actions with respect to government communications.
Objective 5. What additional actions, if any, should EPA take to improve its response
and recovery efforts in the WTC area related to ambient and indoor air
quality?
This objective primarily focused on the indoor residential cleanup - the only
significant EPA WTC recovery activity ongoing at the time we completed our
review. We did not audit the results of the cleaning and testing to determine
compliance with the prescribed procedures of the program or to determine the
actual effectiveness of cleaning conducted. Our analysis was based on a review of
the procedures for the testing and cleanup by our certified industrial hygienist, a
comparison of those procedures to commonly accepted asbestos abatement
procedures, and a comparison of the cleanup goals to remediation goals that
would have been required if this were a designated Superfund site. We also
reviewed a peer review report of COPCs developed by EPA for indoor cleanup.
Objective 6. Should EPA revise its preparation and contingency planning for dealing
with air pollution resulting from environmental catastrophes?
To answer this question, we summarized lessons learned from the work we
conducted to complete our other objectives. We also interviewed EPA officials,
other government officials, and non-government environmental experts to obtain
their suggestions for improving EPA's capability to respond to similar disasters in
the future. We also reviewed EPA and non-EPA "lessons learned" reports.
Prior Audit Coverage
The OIG has not conducted any prior evaluations of EPA responses to large-scale
disasters. However, our report on EPA's actions related to asbestos
contamination in Libby Montana (EPA 's Actions Concerning Asbestos-
Contaminated Vermiculite in Libby, Montana; 2001-S-7; March 31, 2001)
discussed several issues related to the regulation and analysis of health risks from
asbestos that were relevant to this evaluation.
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Appendix C
EPA September 18, 2001 Press Release
September 18, 2001
Whitman Details Ongoing Agency Efforts to Monitor Disaster Sites, Contribute to Cleanup Efforts
[En Espafioll
EPA Administrator Christie Whitman announced today that results from the Agency's air and drinking water
monitoring near the World Trade Center and Pentagon disaster sites indicate that these vital resources are
safe. Whitman also announced that EPA has been given up to $83 million from the Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA) to support EPA's involvement in cleanup activities and ongoing monitoring of
environmental conditions in both the New York City and Washington metropolitan areas following last
week's terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon.
"We are very encouraged that the results from our monitoring of air quality and drinking water conditions in
both New York and near the Pentagon show that the public in these areas is not being exposed to
excessive levels of asbestos or other harmful substances," Whitman said. "Given the scope of the tragedy
from last week, I am glad to reassure the people of New York and Washington, D.C. that their air is safe to
breath and their water is safe to drink," she added.
In the aftermath of last Tuesday's attacks, EPA has worked closely with state, federal and local authorities
to provide expertise on cleanup methods for hazardous materials, as well as to detect whether any
contaminants are found in ambient air quality monitoring, sampling of drinking water sources and sampling
of runoff near the disaster sites.
At the request of FEMA, EPA has been involved in the cleanup and site monitoring efforts, working closely
with the U.S. Coast Guard, the Centers for Disease Control (CDC), the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration (OSHA) and state and local organizations.
EPA has conducted repeated monitoring of ambient air at the site of the World Trade Center and in the
general Wall Street district of Manhattan, as well as in Brooklyn. The Agency is planning to perform air
monitoring in the surrounding New York metropolitan area. EPA has established 10 continuous (stationary)
air monitoring stations near the WTC site. Thus far, from 50 air samples taken, the vast majority of results
are either non-detectable or below established levels of concern for asbestos, lead and volatile organic
compounds. The highest levels of asbestos have been detected within one-half block of ground zero,
where rescuers have been provided with appropriate protective equipment.
In lower Manhattan, the City of New York has also been involved in efforts to clean anything coated with
debris dust resulting from Tuesday's destruction. This involves spraying water over buildings, streets and
sidewalks to wash the accumulated dust off the building and eliminate the possibility that materials would
become airborne. To complement this clean up effort, EPA has performed 62 dust sample analyses for the
presence of asbestos and other substances. Most dust samples fall below EPA's definition of "asbestos
containing material" (one percent asbestos). Where samples have shown greater than one percent
asbestos, EPA has operated its 10 High Efficiency Particulate Arresting, HEPA, vacuum trucks to clean the
area and then resample, EPA also used the 10 HEPA vac trucks to clean streets and sidewalks in the
Financial District in preparation for Monday's return to business. The Agency plans to use HEPA vac trucks
to clean the lobbies of the five federal buildings near the World Trade Center site, and to clean the streets
outside of New York's City Hall
Drinking water in Manhattan was tested at 13 sampling points, in addition to one test at the Newtown
Sewage Treatment plant and pump station. Initial results of this drinking water sampling show that levels of
asbestos are well below EPA's levels of concern.
While FEMA has provided EPA with a Total Project Ceiling cost of slightly more than $83 million for the
Agency's cleanup efforts in New York City and in at the Pentagon site, EPA currently is working with
emergency funding of $23.7 million. If costs exceed this level, FEMA will authorize EPA to tap additional
funding in increments of $15 million. As part of the additional funding to be provided by FEMA, EPA will be
responsible for any hazardous waste disposal, general site safety and providing sanitation facilities for
many of the search and rescue workers to wash the dust off following their shifts. EPA is coordinating with
both the U.S. Air Force Center for Environmental Excellence and the U.S. Coast Guard to quickly
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implement these additional responsibilities to ensure that search and rescue personnel are provided with
the maximum support and protection from hazardous materials that may be found during their mission.
At the Pentagon explosion site in Arlington Va., EPA has also been involved in a variety of monitoring of air
and water quality. All ambient air monitoring results, both close to the crash site and in the general vicinity,
have shown either no detection of asbestos or levels that fall well below the Agency's level of concern.
Testing of runoff water from the disaster site does not show elevated levels of contaminants. Given the
large numbers of Department of Defense (DOD) employees returning to work this week, EPA has worked
closely with officials from DOD and from the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) to
evaluate air and drinking water quality and to be certain that the workplace environment will be safe.
While careful not to impede the search, rescue and cleanup efforts at either the World Trade Center or the
Pentagon disaster sites, EPA's primary concern has been to ensure that rescue workers and the public are
not being exposed to elevated levels of potentially hazardous contaminants in the dust and debris,
especially where practical solutions are available to reduce exposure. EPA has assisted efforts to provide
dust masks to rescue workers to minimize inhalation of dust. EPA also recommends that the blast site
debris continue to be kept wet, which helps to significantly reduce the amount of airborne dust which can
aggravate respiratory ailments such as asthma. On-site facilities are being made available for rescue
workers to clean themselves, change their clothing and to have dust-laden clothes cleaned separately from
normal household wash.
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Appendix D
Screening Levels Used by EPA
to Assess Outdoor Air Quality
Pollutant
Screening Level
Source
Asbestos
(Ambient Air)
70 s/m2
AHERA clearance level to re-enter school after asbestos
abatement. Represents minimum detection limit of method in use
at time standard set.
Asbestos
(Bulk Dust)
1% asbestos
The Asbestos NESHAP (40 CFR Part 61) level at which a material
is considered asbestos-containing and subject to NESHAP removal
regulations.
Benzene
0.02 ppm [1]
California-EPA toxicity studies.
.21 ppm [3]
Region 2 [2]
PCBs
.73 ug/m3 [1]
Region 2 [2]
9 ug/m3 [3]
Region 2 [2]
Chromium
.6 ug/m3 [3]
Region 2 [2], Based on risk for Chromium Hexavalent (the most
toxic form of Chromium).
Cadmium
.2 ug/m3 [1]
California-EPA toxicity studies
3 ug/m3 [3]
Region 2 [2]
Manganese
.5 ug/m3 [1]
Region 2 [2]
Particulate
Matter 2.5
40 ug/m3
Air Quality Index. Represents caution level for sensitive
populations for 24-hour average exposure.
65 ug/m3
(24 hr avg)
National Ambient Air Quality Standard
Particulate
Matter 10
150 ug/m3
Air Quality Index and National Ambient Air Quality Standard
Lead
1.5 ug/m3
(3 mo avg)
National Ambient Air Quality Standard
.1 ug/m3
Default value in EPA's Integrated Exposure Uptake/ Bio-kinetic
Model for Lead in Children.
PAHs
6 ug/m3 [3]
Region 2 developed from EPA's "Hazard Evaluation Handbook:
A Guide to Removal Actions," and EPA National Center for
Environmental Assessment provisional inhalation Slope Factor for
Benzo(a)pyrene.
Dioxin
.162 ng/m3 [3]
Region 2 [2]
Sulfur Dioxide
.14 ppm
(24 hr avg)
National Ambient Air Quality Standard
Acetone
1.5 ppm [1]
Region 2 [2]
Benzaldehyde
860 ppm
Not identified
1,3 Butadiene
.01 ppm [1] [3]
Region 2 developed using EPA's "Hazard Evaluation Handbook:
A Guide to Removal Actions," and proposed reference
concentration.
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Pollutant
Screening Level
Source
Chloro-methane
.4 ppm [1]
Region 2 [2]
2.6 ppm [3]
Region 2 [2]
1,4 Dioxane
.5 ppm [3]
Region 2 [2]
Ethanol
45 ppm
American Conference of Government Industrial Hygienists
Threshold Limit
Ethyl-
benzene
2.5 ppm [1]
Region 2 [2]
Freon 22
140 ppm
Not Identified
Propylene
simple asyphyxiant
Styrene
2.3 ppm [1]
Region 2 [2]
Alpha methyl
styrene
,1ppm [1]
Region 2 [2]
Tetrahydro-furan
.9 ppm [3]
Region 2 [2]
Toluene
1.1 ppm [1]
Region 2 [2]
Xylenes
1 ppm
ATSDR Minimum Risk Level x 10. Represents screening level for
chronic (over 365 days) exposure. Used to identify contaminants
of potential concern.
Acetaldehyde
.05 ppm [1]
Region 2 [2]
1.3 ppm [3]
Region 2 [2]
Formaldehyde
.04 ppm
ATSDR Minimum Risk Level for acute exposure. Represents
screening level for acute (1- to 14-day) exposure to identify a
potential concern.
.35 ppm [3]
Region 2 [2]
Acrolein
.0001 ppm [1]
Region 2 [2]
Notes:
[1] = Represents risk of non-cancer disease based on a 1-year continuous exposure at screening level. The
hazard quotient represents the ratio of the potential exposure to the substance and the level at which no
adverse health effects are expected. If the quotient is greater than 1, then adverse health effects are
possible. For WTC's response, the screening level established equals a hazard quotient of 10.
[2] = Region 2 developed the screening level using EPA's "Hazard Evaluation Handbook: A Guide to Removal
Actions," and toxicity criteria from EPA's Integrated Risk Information System database.
[3] = Represents a 1 -in-10,000 increased lifetime risk of cancer based on a 1-year continuous exposure at the
screening level.
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Appendix E
EPA Outdoor Air Asbestos Sampling
for September 2001
Date
Sample
Collected
No. of
Samples
Collected
Sampling
Location
No. of Samples
Exceeding
70s/mm2
No. of
Samples Not
Analyzed [1]
Date
Results
Available
9/11
4
Brooklyn
[2]
9/12
9/11
4
New Jersey
[2]
9/12
9/12
9
Ground Zero
[2]
9/13
9/13
1
Lower Manhattan
[2]
9/14
9/15
16
Lower Manhattan
2 [3]
7
9/16
9/16
20
Lower Manhattan
1 [4]
9
9/17
9/17
23
Lower Manhattan
0
8
9/18
9/18
12
Lower Manhattan
0
9/19
9/18
13
Lower Manhattan
0
3
9/20
9/18
4
New Jersey
0
1
9/20
9/18
2
New Jersey
0
9/22
9/19
12
Lower Manhattan
0 [5]
9/20
9/19
11
Lower Manhattan
0
9/21
9/19
13
Lower Manhattan
0
9/23
9/19
3
New Jersey
0
9/22
9/20
18
Lower Manhattan
0
9/21
9/20
2
New Jersey
0
9/22
9/20
4
New Jersey
0
9/23
9/21
13
Lower Manhattan
0
9/22
9/21
4
New Jersey
0
9/24
9/22
13
Lower Manhattan
0
9/23
9/22
15
Lower Manhattan
1 [6]
1
9/24
9/22
4
New Jersey
0
9/26
9/23
29
Lower Manhattan
1 [7]
3
9/25
9/23
4
New Jersey
0
9/27
9/24
16
Lower Manhattan
0
9/25
9/24
16
Lower Manhattan
0
9/26
9/24
4
New Jersey
0
9/27
9/25
17
Lower Manhattan
0
9/28
9/25
4
New Jersey
0
9/28
9/26
17
Lower Manhattan
0
9/28
9/26
16
Lower Manhattan
3 [8]
9/29
9/26
4
New Jersey
0
9/29
9/27
18
Lower Manhattan
0
9/29
9/27
17
Lower Manhattan
0
9/30
9/28
17
Lower Manhattan
0
9/29
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Date
Sample
Collected
No. of
Samples
Collected
Sampling
Location
No. of Samples
Exceeding
70s/mm2
No. of
Samples Not
Analyzed [1]
Date
Results
Available
9/28
17
Lower Manhattan
0
10/01
9/28
4
New Jersey
0
9/30
9/29
16
Lower Manhattan
0
10/01
9/29
17
Lower Manhattan
1 [9]
10/02
9/29
4
New Jersey
0
10/01
9/30
17
Lower Manhattan
2
10/02
TOTALS
474
11
32
Notes:
[1 ] = Not analyzed due to filter overloading or other sampling problems.
[2] = No sample results reported for this method.
[3] = Results were 128 and 160 s/mm2.
[4] = Result was 90 s/mm2.
[5] = TEM results were reported in fibers per cubic centimeter. Results in s/mm2 not reported on
daily summary sheet.
[6] = Result was 80 s/mm2.
[7] = Result was 88.89 s/mm2.
[8] = Results were 177.78, 97.78, and 71.11 s/mm2.
[9] = Result was 80 s/mm2.
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Appendix F
EPA Outdoor Bulk Dust Asbestos Test Results
for September 20011
Date
No. of
No. of
Date Results
Sample
Samples
Results
Reported in Daily
Collected
Collected
Location
> 1% Asbestos
Summary
9/11
4
Ground Zero
1
9/12
9/12
7
Ground Zero
0
9/12
5
Brooklyn
0
9/13
9/13
0
9/14
12
Financial District
0
9/15
9/15
29
West of Broadway
13
9/16
9/16
5
South of Ground Zero
5
9/17 and 9/18
9/17
13
Perimeter of Ground Zero
0
9/18
9/18
11
Perimeter of Ground Zero
6
9/20
9/19
16
Various Lower Manhattan locations
12
9/21
9/20
7
Various Lower Manhattan locations
0
9/21
9/21
11
Around WTC
0
9/22
9/21
1
Beam from South Tower
0
9/23
9/22
0
9/23
11
Around Ground Zero
0
9/25
9/24
0
9/25
13
Various Lower Manhattan locations
0
9/28
9/26
0
9/27
0
9/28
0
9/29
0
9/30
0
Totals
145
37
1 = Excludes bulk testing at landfill.
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Appendix G
EPA September 16, 2001 Press Release
September 16, 2001
EPA, OSHA Update Asbestos Data, Continue to Reassure Public about Contamination Fears [En
Espanol]
The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency and the Department of Labor's Occupational Health and Safety
Administration today announced that the majority of air and dust samples monitored at the crash site and in
lower Manhattan do not indicate levels of concern for asbestos. The new samples confirm previous reports
that ambient air quality meets OSHA standards and consequently is not a cause for public concern. New
OSHA data also indicates that indoor air quality in downtown buildings will meet standards,
EPA has found variable asbestos levels in bulk debris and dust on the ground, but EPA continues to
believe that there is no significant health risk to the general public in the coming days. Appropriate steps
are being taken to clean up this dust and debris.
"Our tests show that it is safe for New Yorkers to go back to work in New York's financial district," said
John L. Henshaw, Assistant Secretary of Labor for OSHA. "Keeping the streets clean and being careful not
to track dust into buildings will help protect workers from remaining debris."
OSHA staff walked through New York's financial district on September 13th, wearing personal air monitors
and collected data on potential asbestos exposure levels. All but two samples contained no asbestos, Two
samples contained very low levels of an unknown fiber, which is still being analyzed.
Air Samples taken on Sept. 13th inside buildings in New York's financial district were negative for asbestos,
Debris samples collected outside buildings on cars and other surfaces contained small percentages of
asbestors, ranging from 2.1 to 3.3 - slightly above the 1 percent trigger for defining asbestos material.
"EPA will be deploying 16 vacuum trucks this weekend in an effort to remove as much of the dust and
debris as possible from the site where the samples were obtained," said EPA Administrator Christie
Whitman. "In addition we will be moving six continuous air monitoring stations into the area. We will put five
near ground zero and one on Canal Street. The good news continues to be that the air samples we have
taken have all been at levels that cause us no concern."
The continuous monitoring stations will augment the ambient air quality monitoring located in Brooklyn.
EPA and OSHA will remain on site and continue to monitor for levels of asbestos, PCBs, lead and
polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons (PAHs) in the area throughout the Jong weeks of cleanup ahead, In
addition, EPA will move in a bus that has the equipment to do instant analysis of volatile organic compound
samples from air at the site. It is called a Total Atmospheric Gas Analyzer and is similar to a unit used
during the Gulf War to sample emissions from the oil fires in Kuwait,
The Agency is recommending that businesses in the area planning to reopen next week take precautions
including cleaning air conditioning filters and using vacuums with appropriate filters to collect dust.
Vacuuming will reduce the chance of re-entering workers tracking dust into the buildings. This work is
already underway by city agencies.
The U.S. Coast Guard will be assisting EPA in monitoring impacts, if any, of today's rainstorms on the
water quality. However, most of the rainflow is expected to be handled by the City's waste water treatment
facility, since there will be only limited sewage in the combined sewer system. EPA has a vessel on site in
New York to handle any necessary testing
Additional technical support has been offered to EPA in New York from the U.S. Air Force Surgeon
General's Office of Environmental and Occupational Health. That support would involve five engineers
and/or environmental technicians and equipment if needed.
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Appendix H
EPA September 13, 2001 Press Release
September 13, 2001
EPA Initiates Emergency Response Activities, Reassures Public About Environmental Hazards [En
Esparioil
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency Administrator Christie Whitman today announced that EPA is taking
steps to ensure the safety of rescue workers and the public at the World Trade Center and the Pentagon
disaster sites, and to protect the environment. EPA is working with state, federal, and local agencies to
monitor and respond to potential environmental hazards and minimize any environmental effects of the
disasters and their aftermath.
At the request of the New York City Department of Health, EPA and the U.S. Department of Labor's
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) have been on the scene at the World Trade Center
monitoring exposure to potentially contaminated dust and debris. Monitoring and sampling conducted on
Tuesday and Wednesday have been very reassuring about potential exposure of rescue crews and the
public to environmental contaminants.
EPA's primary concern is to ensure that rescue workers and the public are not exposed to elevated levels
of asbestos, acidic gases or other contaminants from the debris. Sampling of ambient air quality found
either no asbestos or very low levels of asbestos. Sampling of bulk materials and dust found generally low
levels of asbestos.
The levels of lead, asbestos and volatile organic compounds in air samples taken on Tuesday in Brooklyn,
downwind from the World Trade Center site, were not detectable or not of concern.
Additional sampting of both ambient air quality and dust particles was conducted Wednesday night in lower
Manhattan and Brooklyn, and results were uniformly acceptable.
"EPA is greatly relieved to have learned that there appears to be no significant levels of asbestos dust in
the air in New York City," said Administrator Whitman. "We are working closely with rescue crews to
ensure that ail appropriate precautions are taken. We will continue to monitor closely"
Public health concerns about asbestos contamination are primarily related to long-term exposure.
Short-term, low-level exposure of the type that might have been produced by the collapse of the World
Trade Center buildings is unlikely to cause significant health effects. EPA and OSHA will work closely with
rescue and cleanup crews to minimize their potential exposure, but the general public should be very
reassured by initial sampling.
EPA and OSHA will continue to monitor and sample for asbestos, and will work with the appropriate
officials to ensure that rescue workers, cleanup crews and the general public are properly informed about
appropriate steps that should be taken to ensure proper handling, transportation and disposal of potentially
contaminated debris or materials.
EPA is taking steps to ensure that response units implement appropriate engineering controls to minimize
environmental hazards, such as water sprays and rinsing to prevent or minimize potential exposure and
limit releases of potential contaminants beyond the debris site.
EPA is also conducting downwind sampling for potential chemical and asbestos releases from the World
Trade Center debris site. In addition, EPA has deployed federal On-Scene Coordinators to the Washington,
D.C. Emergency Operations Center, Fort Meade, and FEMA's alternate Regional Operations Center in
Pennsylvania, and has deployed an On-Scene Coordinator to the Virginia Emergency Operations Center.
Under its response authority, EPA will use all available resources and staff experts to facilitate a safe
emergency response and cleanup.
EPA will work with other involved agencies as needed to:
. procure and distribute respiratory and eye protection equipment in cooperation with the Dept. of
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Health and Human Services;
. provide health and safety training upon request;
. design and implement a site monitoring plan;
• provide technical assistance for site control and decontamination; and
• provide some 3000 asbestos respirators, 60 self-contained breathing apparatuses and 10,000
protective clothing suits to the two disaster sites.
New York Governor George E, Pataki has promised to provide emergency electric generators to New York
City in efforts to restore lost power caused by Tuesday's tragedy, and EPA will work with State authorities
to expedite any necessary permits for those generators.
OSHA is also working with Consolidated Edison regarding safety standards for employees who are digging
trenches because of leaking gas tines underground. OSHA has advised Con Edison to provide its
employees with appropriate respirators so they can proceed with emergency work, shutting off gas leaks in
the city.
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Appendix I
Non-Governmental Environmental Experts
Interviewed
Philip Landrigan, M.D.
Stephen Levin, M.D.,
George Thurston, Sc.D.
Paul Lioy, Ph.D.
Hugh Granger, Ph.D., CIH
Piotr Chmielinski, M.S., CIH
Thomas Cahill
Michael Beard
Michael Gallo, PhD.,
Director/Attending, The Mount Sinai Hospital
Chairman & Professor, Mount Sinai School of Medicine
Assistant Attending, The Mount Sinai Hospital
Associate Professor, Mount Sinai School of Medicine
Associate Professor of Environmental Medicine,
New York University School of Medicine
Director, Exposure Measurement and Assessment
Division, Environmental and Occupational Health
Sciences Institute
Toxicologist and Laboratory Director, HP Environmental,
Inc.
Director of Industrial Hygiene, HP Environmental, Inc.
Professor of Atmospheric Science/Physics,
University of California-Davis, Director, DELTA Group
Research Environmental Chemist, Center for
Environmental Measurements, Research Triangle
Institute
Director, Toxicology Division, Environmental and
Occupational Health Sciences Institute
Howard Bader, P.E.
President, H. A. Bader Consultants, Inc.
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Appendix J
NYCDEP October 25, 2001 Instructions to Residents
Dear Residents of Lower Manhattan:
Since September I l '1. ihe U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (LPA), NYC Department of
Lnvironmeniai Protection (L>ŁP), NYC Department of Health (DOII), and the Occupational Safety
and Health Administration (OSHA), have been taking samples of the air. dust, water, river sediments
and vinnkmg water and analyzing them for the presence of pollutants. The samples are evaluated
against a variety of benchmarks, standards and guidelines established to protect public health under
various conditions. These agencies consider the amount of time a person is exposed to a particular
pollutant and where—a school, workplace or home—m creating these criteria.
The following is a description of some of the benchmarks, standards and guidelines these agencies
arc using to evaluate environmental conditions m the-aftermath of the World Trade Center disaster
Asbestos in the Air / in Open Spaces
EPA is requiring the strictest protective standard under AHERA, the Asbestos Hazard Emergency
Response Act, for asbestos in outdoor and indoor areas. (This standard is used to determine whether
children tnay reenter a school building after asbestos has been removed or abated.) To be as
protective as possible, EPA, together with NYCDEP and ail the other health anci environmental
agencies, are requiring school reentry standards in tests around the World Trade Center site.
NYCDEP, USEPA, and NYC Department of Sanitation worked to perform cleanups of all dust in
exterior areas with HHPA vacuums and wetwashing. NYCDEP and EPA have both conducted
tests in exterior spaces and all exterior areas of Lower Manhattan that were closed passed
their strict protective standards before being opened again tn the public.
As hex i us in Dust In 3uiidinws
if a substance contains more than ["/'» asbestos, it is considered to be an "asbestos-containing
material." There are Federal, State, and (,':ty regulations in place lo ensure the proper handling and
disposal of usbesto.s-eiMUaintng material. If a substance contains 1% or less asbestos, these
regulations do rust apply.
Department of Environmental Protection
Executive Offices
59-17 Junction Boulevard- 1 9th floor
Corona, New York 1 I 368-51(17
w w wnyc.gov/dcp
Joe] A- MieJe Sr., P.E., Commissioner
(718) 595-6565 Fax it-: {718,1 595-'?525
E-mail: Jmicie@nysne1.net
October 25, 20!)!
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liPA is using (he 1 % definition in evaluating exterior dust samples in the I.owcr Manhattan area near
the World Trade Center. All affected landlords have been instructed to test dust samples within
their buildings utilizing this standard. Landlords were notified that they should tiuf reopen any
building until a competent professional had properly inspected their premise. If more thun
la/o asbestos was found and testing and cleaning was necessary, it had to be performed by
certified personnel.
Drinking Water
NYC OF.P continuously tests drinking water every day for multiple parameters. After the World
Trade Center disaster, DEP expanded the number of tests taken and the parameters of testing- F.PA
also conducted separate testa. Before and after the even/. Vew York City drinking water hits
met and continues to meet all Federal, State, and City standards. Testing at a heightened level
is continuing.
NYC Department of Health
The New York City Health Commissioner Neal C. Cohen, M.J>. has reviewed the findings of
the various testing agencies ami issued the following statements to residents. He said "despite
the smoky conditions in areas of lower Manhattan that are close to the World Trade Center
site, test results from the ongoing monitoring of airborne contaminants indicate that the levels
continue to be below the level of concern to public health. Nonetheless, while debris continues to
be disturbed, and while flare-ups of smoke continue to permeate the downtown area, air-testing
results will continue to be monitored, and appropriate health recommendations will be issued as
necessary." Dr. Cohen added, "As work continues at the disaster site, the presence of dust and
smoke odor in the downtown area has been of understandable concern to residents. However, air
monitoring by Federal, State and City agencies has indicated that the levels of particulate
matter being detected are below the level of public health concern and do not pose long-term
health risks to the general public."
In addition to air monitoring activities, efforts are being made daily to suppress dust and smote at
the World Trade Center disaster site. Results of daily dust sampling conducted by the U.S.
linvironmentat Protection Agency is available online at epa.gov. Factsheets detailing Health
Department recommendations pertaining to air quality, asbestos, safely rcoccupytng homes and
buildings, and worker safety arc available online at nvc.gov/heaitb. For more information about all
Health Department activities, New Yorkers can call (212) 227-5269. For .r.tonr.atiai: about asbestos
issues, you can consult our website at nyc.gov/Jcg or call the Mew York City Department of
EivwasvrMMrtal Protection at (718) DEP-HELP and ask to be referred to our asbestos staff.
Very truly yours.
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Appendix K
Indoor Air and Dust Test Results
EPA conducted indoor air monitoring and indoor dust wipe sampling in the weeks after the
collapse. This EPA indoor air monitoring (prior to the FEMA-funded residential cleanup) was
limited primarily to testing for asbestos in buildings. EPA's dust wipe sampling tested for
metals, PCBs, and dioxin.
On September 13, 2001, 14 air samples were collected from 26 Federal Plaza, 290 Broadway,
and Chase Manhattan Plaza, and analyzed for asbestos. All samples were analyzed by TEM and
the results converted to PCM equivalent readings in fibers per cubic centimeter (f/cc). One of the
14 samples exceeded the New York City standard for asbestos clearance of .01 f/cc
(see Table K-l).
Table K-1: Indoor Air Test Results from September 13, 2001
Address
Sample
ID
Sample
Volume
[1]
PCM Analysis
TEM Analysis
f/cc
f/mm2
[2]
f/cc
s/mm2
s = .5- 5
[3]
s > 5
[4]
Chase Manhattan Plaza
571
np
na
na
0.0098
na
na
na
26 Federal Plaza (13th floor)
16370
np
na
na
0.0064
na
na
na
26 Federal Plaza (13th floor)
16371
np
na
na
<0.0033
na
na
na
26 Federal Plaza (Lobby S.)
16372
np
na
na
0.0072
na
na
na
26 Federal Plaza (Lobby W.)
16373
np
na
na
0.0037
na
na
na
26 Federal Plaza (39th floor)
16374
np
na
na
<0.0038
na
na
na
26 Federal Plaza (38th floor)
16375
np
na
na
<0.0039
na
na
na
26 Federal Plaza (26th floor)
16376
np
na
na
<0.0038
na
na
na
290 Broadway (8th floor)
27490
np
na
na
0.0042
na
na
na
290 Broadway (Lobby)
27491
np
na
na
<0.0043
na
na
na
290 Broadway (22nd floor N.)
27492
np
na
na
<0.0041
na
na
na
290 Broadway (22nd floor S.)
27493
np
na
na
0.004
na
na
na
290 Broadway (LL-1)
27494
np
na
na
0.013
na
na
na
290 Broadway (LL-2)
27495
np
na
na
0.0044
na
na
na
KEY:
np = sample volume not provided on data sheets.
na= not analyzed for this metric.
NOTES:
[1] = sample volume for TEM (AHERA method) is 1200 liters for 25 mm filter
[2] = fibers per millimeter squared
[3] = structures equal to or greater than 0.5 micrometers and less than or equal to 5 micrometers in length
[4] = structures greater than 5 micrometers in length
During the period September 17 to November 3, 2001, EPA collected dust wipe samples within
four buildings: Stuyvesant High School, Public School 234, Manhattan Borough Community
College, and the Jacob Javits Convention Center. The samples were analyzed for various metals
at all locations, while at Stuyvesant and the Community College samples were also collected and
analyzed for PCBs and dioxin. Fifty-four percent of the sample results were below the minimum
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detection limit, while the remaining 46 percent detected contaminants in varying levels. The
highest recorded amount for each pollutant at each location is shown in Table K-2.
Table K-2: Highest Recorded Readings for Dust Wipe Samples
Analyte
Stuyvesant
High School
Jacob
Javits
Convention
Center
Manhattan
Borough
Community
College
Public
School
234
Unit
Aluminum
320
220
570
83
ug/w
pe
Antimony
0.81
1
0.79
0.15
ug/w
pe
Arsenic
0.1
0.24
0.38
<0.1
ug/w
pe
Barium
4.2
9.3
9.4
2.1
ug/w
pe
Beryllium
<0.1
<0.1
<0.1
<0.1
ug/w
pe
Cadmium
0.59
0.47
2
<0.25
ug/w
pe
Calcium
3300
1900
5000
1400
ug/w
pe
Chromium
3.3
2.1
4.4
0.6
ug/w
pe
Cobalt
<0.5
<0.5
1.1
<0.5
ug/w
pe
Copper
5
7.3
9.8
6.1
ug/w
pe
Iron
360
580
840
200
ug/w
pe
Lead
4.5
6.3
9.7
1.5
ug/w
pe
Magnesium
370
240
670
160
ug/w
pe
Manganese
15
8.9
28
3.9
ug/w
pe
Mercury
.01
0.02
<.01
ug/w
pe
Nickel
1.5
1.9
2.4
<0.5
ug/w
pe
Potassium
110
380
220
<100
ug/w
pe
Selenium
<.01
<.01
<.01
<.01
ug/w
pe
Silver
<.25
0.26
<.25
<.25
ug/w
pe
Sodium
<25
1300
280
250
ug/w
pe
Thallium
<.01
<.01
<.01
390
ug/w
pe
Vanadium
<0.5
<0.5
1.2
0.81
ug/w
pe
Zinc
55
93
150
39
ug/w
pe
PCBs-totals
0
na
0
<5
ng/100cm2
TEQ (ND=1/2)
0.0046
na
.0055
0.0082
ng/100cm2
na = samples not analyzed for this pollutant.
On September 26, 2001, bulk dust samples from 110 Greenwich were collected and analyzed
for various pollutants. For those pollutants where a screening level existed, the test results were
all below the applicable soil screening levels contained in EPA's Hazard Evaluation Handbook.
Table K-3 presents the results of testing at 110 Greenwich.
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Table K-3: Bulk Dust Sampling at 110 Greenwich
Analyte
Result [1]
Screening Level [2]
Aluminum
18900 mg/Kg
780000 mg/kg
Antimony
< 5.75 mg/Kg
310 mg/kg
Aroclor 1016
< 740 ug/kg
Aroclor 1221
< 740 ug/kg
Aroclor 1232
< 740 ug/kg
Aroclor 1242
< 740 ug/kg
Aroclor 1248
< 740 ug/kg
Aroclor 1254
< 740 ug/kg
Aroclor 1260
< 740 ug/kg
Asbestos
[3]
Arsenic
<0.96 mg/Kg
43 mg/kg
Barium
195 mg/Kg
Beryllium
1.76 mg/Kg
15 mg/kg
Cadmium
3.8 mg/Kg
390 mg/kg
Calcium
186000 mg/Kg
Chromium
71.5 mg/Kg
3900 mg/kg
Cobalt
5.6 mg/Kg
47000 mg/kg
Copper
93.2 mg/Kg
31000 mg/kg
Iron
7410 mg/Kg
230000 mg/kg
Lead
97.7 mg/Kg
Magnesium
19100 mg/Kg
Manganese
757 mg/Kg
18000 mg/kg
Mercury
0.37 mg/Kg
78 mg/kg
Nickel
15.5 mg/Kg
16000 mg/kg
Potassium
5400 mg/Kg
Selenium
<0.96 mg/Kg
3900 mg/kg
Silver
4.91 mg/Kg
3900 mg/kg
Sodium
3880 mg/Kg
TEQ (ND =1/2)
60.9pg/g
410 pg/g
Thallium
<0.96 mg/Kg
55 mg/kg
Vanadium
18.3 mg/Kg
5500 mg/kg
Zinc
791 mg/Kg
230000 mg/kg
[1] = All samples collected on September 26, 2001.
[2] = Residential soil screening level from EPA's Hazard Evaluation Handbook.
Only accounts for health risk from ingestion.
31 = No result reported in NYC Response database.
On October 10, 2001, two bulk dust samples inside 100 Church Street were collected
and analyzed for asbestos. The results of this testing, done at the Department of
Justice's request, found that one of the samples contained 1.1 percent asbestos while
the other was non-detect.
On October 23, 2001, 10 air samples were collected at 100 Church Street and analyzed
for asbestos. The samples were analyzed by both the TEM and PCM methods. All
TEM results were below the AHERA standard of 70 s/mm2 and all PCM results were
below .01 f/cc. This testing was performed on the 18th and 19th floors after these floors
had been cleaned.
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Table K-4: Indoor Air Test Results from October 23, 2001
PCM Analysis
TEM Analysis
Sample
Sample
Volume
f/mm2
s = .5- 5
s > 5
Address
ID
[1]
f/cc
[2]
f/cc
s/mm2
[3]
[4]
100 Church St (front of 1927/8)
11931
2400
0.002
9.55
na
<20
0
0
100 Church St (Lobby)
11932
2400
0.002
11.46
na
<20
0
0
100 Church St (1909/1910)
11933
2160
0.003
15.92
na
<20
0
0
100 Church St (1902/1903)
11934
2400
0.001
7.64
na
<20
0
0
100 Church St (Alley 1960)
11935
2400
<0.001
<7
na
<20
0
0
100 Church St (Alley 1941)
11936
2400
<0.001
<7
na
<20
0
0
100 Church St (1935/1937)
11937
2400
0.004
21.66
na
<20
0
0
100 Church St (1835/1837)
11938
2400
<0.001
<7
na
<20
0
0
100 Church St (18FL-SW corner)
11939
2400
<0.001
<7
na
<20
0
0
100 Church St (18th main lobby)
11940
2400
0.005
30.57
na
<20
0
0
KEY:
np = sample volume not provided on data sheets.
na= not analyzed for this metric.
NOTES:
[1] = sample volume for TEM (AHERA method) is 1200 liters for 25 mm filter
[2] = fibers per millimeter squared
[3] = structures equal to or greater than 0.5 micrometers and less than or equal to 5 micrometers in length
[4] = structures greater than 5 micrometers in length
General Services Administration Monitoring of Federal Buildings
From September 13, 2001, through January 2, 2002, the General Services Administration, which
is responsible for Federal building management, arranged for indoor environmental testing at
Federal buildings located at 290 Broadway, 26 Federal Plaza, 201 Varick Street, and 1 Bowling
Green. Over 100 air samples were analyzed and all samples were below the AHERA standard of
70 s/mm2. All but four air samples analyzed by TEM were non-detect for asbestos. The four
samples that detected asbestos all occurred between September 13 and September 19, 2001. Two
samples showed 25 s/mm2 and two samples could not be analyzed because the filters were
overloaded. The only testing for asbestos in dust was conducted on September 14, 2001. Three
dust samples collected in the lobby of 290 Broadway and two collected outside the building on
September 13, 2001, showed the presence of chrysotile asbestos by TEM analysis. The results
for these tests only reported whether asbestos was present or not, not the percentage of asbestos
in the sample. Table K-5 through K-7 provide more information on the results of indoor testing
of Federal buildings.
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^^^sbesto^Ah^estinc^
Location
Sampling
Period
PCM Results (0.01 flee)
TEM Results (70 s/mm2)
No. of
Samples
No. above
0.01 f/cc
No. of
Samples
No. above
70 s/mm2
290 Broadway
09/13/01 -09/28/01
18
0
58
0
10/09/01- 10/23/01
16
0
16
0
12/03/01 -01/02/02
21
0
21
0
1 Bowling Green
10/12/01-10/25/01
18
0
16
0
Note: All results were non detect except for 4 of the 58 samples collected between 9/13/01 and 9/28/01.
Two of these sample showed asbestos levels of 25 s/mm2 by TEM and 2 samples could not be
analyzed because of overloaded filters.
K-6: Asbestos Dust Testing at 290 Broadway
Sample Collection Information
PLM
TEM
Date
Type
No.
No. of Samples
Asbestos Detected
No. of Samples
Asbestos Detected
09/14/01
Vacuum
5
Not Analyzed
5
09/14/01
Tape
5
0
0
09/14/01
HVAC Filter
3
0
0
JW^orW\sbesto^\ii^am|Dlinc^esults
Pollutant
Screening
Level
Test Method
290 Broadway
500 Pearl Street
No. of
Samples
No. Above
Screening
Level
No. of
Samples
No. Above
Screening
Level
Lead
50 ug/m3
NIOSH 7082
3
0
6
0
Respirable Dust
5.0 mg/m3
NIOSH 0600
3
0
6
0
Carbon Dioxide
5000 ppm
Telaire C02
3
0
6
0
Carbon Monoxide
50 ppm
SGA91
3
0
6
0
VOCs
1 ppm [1]
H-Nu Photo
3
0
6
0
[1] = Method Detection Limit
Other Indoor Air Studies
"Characterization of Particulate Found in Apartments After Destruction of the World
Trade Center."18 This study was conducted at the request of the Ground Zero Elected Officials
Task Force. This study selected two residential apartment buildings for sampling - one
presumed to have significant WTC dust contamination and the other not - based on their
locations. Six air samples were collected from inside one apartment building and five from the
other. All 11 samples were analyzed by the TEM method. The study found higher levels of
Eric J. Chatfield, Ph.D.. Chatfield Technical Consulting Limited, and John R. Kominsky,
M.Sc.,CIH, CSP, CHMM, Environmental Quality Management, Inc.; October 12, 2001.
97 Report No. 2003-P-00012
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airborne asbestos in apartment building expected to have WTC dust contamination. Further, the
study found that asbestos levels in both buildings exceeded the AHERA standard of 70 s/mm2:
Asbestos concentrations ranged from 6,277 to 10,620 s/mm2 in the building expected to
experience significant WTC dust contamination.
Asbestos concentrations ranged from 141 to 379 s/mm2 in the building not expected to
experience significant WTC dust contamination.
"Health Risks from Exposures to Asbestos and Inorganic Metals Due to Collapse of the
World Trade Center.19 The results of the aforementioned "Characterization of Particulate
Found in Apartments After Destruction of the World Trade Center" study were analyzed by a
consultant for the Ground Zero Elected Officials Task Force to address possible health risks to
residents and workers from exposure to the levels of inorganic metals and asbestos
contamination found in the study.
"Final Report of the Public Health Investigation to Assess Potential Exposures to Airborne
and Settled Surface Dust in Residential Areas in Lower Manhattan, NYCDOH, and
ATSDR."20 This was the largest study in terms of buildings analyzed and was conducted by
ATSDR and NYCDOH. The final report was issued in September 2002. The study collected
dust and air samples in and around 30 residential buildings (encompassing 59 apartment units) in
Lower Manhattan, along with 4 buildings north of 59th Street for comparison purposes. Of the
59 apartments sampled, 50 - or 85 percent - had been reportedly cleaned (professionally or
otherwise) prior to ATSDR's sampling.
The study concluded that the increased risk of cancer or other adverse lung health effects from
prolonged exposure to WTC dust was greater than l-in-10,000 for those areas sampled. This risk
was based on several worst-case scenario assumptions. These worst-case assumptions were that
apartments tested would not be cleaned after sampling, all fibers detected were asbestos, and the
levels detected in the study represented long-term levels. The report noted that for individuals
who frequently clean their apartments using HEPA vacuums and damp cloths/mops or take part
in the EPA cleaning program, it was unlikely their exposure would resemble worst-case
conditions. The report noted that when evaluating the health risks from indoor contamination, it
did not take into account the potential effects of high doses of dust, fibers, and other materials
that people in the WTC area at the time of the attacks may have experienced. The report noted
these exposures could add to the public's risk of long-term health effects.
Dr. E.B. Ilgren, MD, MA, D Phil, October 11, 2001.
New York City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene and U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services, Public Health Service, Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry, as
part of the World Trade Center Environmental Assessment Workgroup, September 2002.
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Appendix L
Details on Use of Respirators at Ground Zero
Reports on Lack of Respirator Use
An October 2001 report21 by the National Institute of Environmental Health Sciences discussed
worker safety issues at the WTC site for the period up to October 5, 2001. The report's
observations generally focused on construction workers at the site and not Fire Department
rescue team or Federal disaster assistance personnel. According to the report:
Respiratory protection was rare with the exception of heavy equipment operators. Further,
workers were observed in the smoke plume emanating from the pile without hard hats, eye
wear, or respirators.
Workers did not decon [decontaminate] after leaving the site. The hand/face and boot wash
stations did not appear to be used by most of the workers.
During the September 22-26, 2001, period, an increase in worker protection was observed,
notably respiratory protection. Vehicles leaving the site began to be hosed down.
There was no evidence that any safety and health program was operating at the site. The lack
of an operating safety and health program was confirmed by various support personnel,
workers, and government officials.
A January 2002 report22 prepared by a certified industrial hygienist for the Operating Engineers
National Hazmat Program noted that during the period October 2-16, 2001, less than half of the
heavy equipment operators regularly used respirators when working on the "pile" at Ground
Zero, and often this use decreased to less than one-third of the workers This report, which
discussed respiratory protection lessons from the WTC disaster, concluded that the respirators
NIOSH recommended for use at the site were correct and sufficiently protective provided that
they were properly tested and conscientiously worn.
In contrast to the recovery operation at the WTC site, the January 2002 report noted that workers
conducting WTC debris sorting and inspection at the Fresh Kills landfill were wearing half-face
respirators, hard hats, eye protection, and Tyvek suits. The author noted that respiratory
protection compliance by workers at Fresh Kills was reported to be approximately 90 percent as
"Worker Education and Training Program (WETP) Response to the World Trade Center Disaster:
Initial WETP Grantee Response and Preliminary Assessment of Training Needs," Donald
Elisburg, John Moran, National Institute of Environmental Health Sciences WETP, National
Clearinghouse for Worker Safety and Health Training, October 6, 2001.
22
"Respiratory Protection at the World Trade Center: Lessons From the Other Disaster," Bruce
Lippy, CIH, CSP, January 15, 2002.
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opposed to 30-50 percent compliance at the WTC site. The author observed that:
"... debris is pulled by workers from the smoking, twisted wreckage of the World
Trade Centers and then wetted and hauled to a site where the debris is carefully
sorted by workers wearing more protective clothing, much more consistently
Moreover, the author noted that workers at the landfill were officially informed that not wearing
respirators would result in disciplinary action. OIG investigators from our New York office who
participated in the recovery operations confirmed the report's conclusions about the difference in
respiratory use between the WTC and landfill sites.
EPA Actions to Encourage Respirator Use
As demonstrated by a fact sheet prepared on September 11, 2001, EPA's emergency response
officials immediately recognized the need for and recommended the use of air purifying
respirators23 at Ground Zero (a copy of this document is available on our OIG web site).
EPA officials told us this fact sheet was provided to a FEMA official, but was not issued. We
contacted a FEMA representative who told us that the flyer was not issued because it was
decided that New York City should handle worker protection issues.
EPA also provided respirators for workers at the site. According to a May 1, 2002, letter from
EPA's Region 2 Administrator to Senator Joseph Lieberman (D-CT) and Senator George
Voinovich (R-OH), EPA had distributed 22,100 air purifying respirators and 30,500 sets of P100
particulate cartridges to New York City by September 22, 2001. Additionally, 600 respirators
(MSA and 3m brand) and 2,000 cartridges (GME-P100) were provided to the New York State
Department of Environmental Conservation and the New York State Department of Health. The
bulk of EPA-procured equipment was transported from EPA's Edison facility by the New York
National Guard to the New York City Office of Emergency Management for distribution to
response workers.
As the rescue phase progressed, EPA emergency response officials told us they were concerned
about the lack of respirator use at Ground Zero and outlined these concerns in a letter to
NYCDOH dated October 5, 2001. This letter outlined the threat of potential exposure of workers
to hazardous substances. The letter noted that EPA "... has recommended, and continues to
recommend, that workers utilize personal protective equipment and the personal wash stations to
prevent the spread of asbestos and other hazardous substances from the WTC to their homes,
cars, public transportation, food service locations, etc." The letter stated that EPA had observed
very inconsistent compliance with its recommendations, but did not have the authority to enforce
compliance with non-EPA/United States Coast Guard employees. The letter concluded by
recommending that the Incident Commander adopt and enforce a site-wide Health and Safety
Plan. A copy of the letter is in Appendix P.
NIOSH recommended the use of half-face negative pressure respirators with P-100, organic
vapor/acid gas (P-100/OV/AG) cartridges. Respirators must be properly fitted to provide adequate
protection against airborne hazards.
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Health Impacts of Lack of Respirator Use at Ground Zero
Two studies documented acute health effects suffered by emergency and construction workers at
Ground Zero. A study24 of firefighters who responded to the collapse concluded that intense,
short-term exposure to material generated during the collapse of the World Trade Center was
associated with bronchial responsiveness and the development of cough. The study found that
the following percentages of firefighters developed "World Trade Center cough" that was severe
enough to require at least 4 weeks of medical leave:
8 percent of the firefighters with a high level of exposure to contaminants at the site
(i.e., present at the WTC collapse).
3 percent of the firefighters with a moderate level of exposure to contaminants at the site
(i.e., present within first 2 days after the collapse).
1 percent of the firefighters with a low level of exposure to contaminants at the site
(i.e., present within 3-7 days of the collapse).
Initial findings of medical examinations of workers directly involved in rescue and recovery
efforts also found evidence of acute health impacts. Preliminary results of these examinations
released in January 2003 and reported in the Washington Post concluded that 78 percent of those
sampled had suffered lung ailments and 88 percent had experienced ear, nose, and throat
problems in the months immediately following the attack. Further, a September 2002 report25 by
the Mount Sinai School of Medicine concluded that protection of workers at Ground Zero was
"seriously inadequate." The report noted that the response of workers in the first few hours and
days after the attack without regard to their personal safety was laudable and understandable.
However, according to the Mount Sinai report, a lack of enforcement of worker protection
measures in the weeks and months that followed was not excusable.
"Cough and Bronchial Responsiveness in Firefighters at the World Trade Center Site," David J.
Prezant, M.D., et al, New England Journal of Medicine, Vol. 347, No. 11, September 12, 2002.
25
"Lesson Learned for Public Health from September 11, 2001: A One-Yar Perspective," Philip J.
Landrigan, M.D., M.Sc., et al, September 2002.
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Appendix M
Cleaning Procedures for Residents
Opting to Have Their Residences Cleaned
Cleaning
Scope of Work
Procedures
A
B
Common
Areas
Cleaned if requested by the building
owner. Procedures included
vacuuming, wet wiping, and cleaning of
carpets using a water extraction
cleaner. Surface not cleaned by wet
methods to be vacuumed two times.
Cleaned if requested by the building owner.
Procedures included vacuuming, wet wiping,
and cleaning of carpets using a water
extraction cleaner. Additionally, all surfaces
except for carpet and fabric covered furniture
to be cleaned a second time.
HVAC
Systems
HVAC systems determined to be
impacted by WTC dust to be cleaned in
accordance with a site-specific scope of
work prepared by the monitoring
contractor and approved by EPA. In
the event that the entire HVAC system
needs cleaning, a separate site-specific
contract will be awarded by NYCDEP
for the work. Work to be completed
before initiation of cleaning of common
spaces and residences in the building.
HVAC systems determined to be impacted by
WTC dust to be cleaned in accordance with a
site-specific scope of work prepared by the
monitoring contractor and approved by EPA.
Work to be completed before initiation of
cleaning of common spaces and residences
in the building.
Residences
Cleaned using HEPA vacuums, water
extraction cleaners, and wet wiping.
First foot of all exhaust duct work to be
vacuumed.
Cleaned using HEPA vacuums, water
extraction cleaner, and wet wiping. First foot
of all exhaust duct work to be vacuumed.
Additionally, all surfaces except for carpet and
fabric covered furniture to be cleaned a
second time.
Worker
Protection
No specific measures described in the
scope of work.
Residents not allowed in work areas, except
residents may be present in their residence
during cleaning when the work area can be
isolated by barriers.
Asbestos abatement procedures to be
employed include, among others: use of
personal protective equipment including
respirators, a properly enclosed
decontamination system, posting of warning
signs, isolation barriers to seal off openings,
and all waste generated during the cleaning
being treated as asbestos-containing waste
and disposed in accordance with applicable
rules and regulations.
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Appendix N
Details from EPA and Non-EPA
Lessons Learned Reports
Recommendations of EPA Lessons Learned Reports
Headquarter's Lessons Learned Report
1. Clarify Involvement of Senior EPA Leaders, and Confirm Authority of Emergency Response
Personnel in Decision-Making and Communications During National Emergencies
1. Issue a national policy for EPA's implementation of a NIIMS-type ICS structure to meet its
needs in responding to national emergencies.
2. Ensure all EPA emergency personnel are trained and equipped to effectively implement EPA's
ICS (including relevant portions of the NCP).
3. Develop a process to involve senior EPA management in policy and strategic decision-making
as appropriate for national emergencies.
4. Revise Regional and area plans to incorporate national ICS policy.
5. Develop a national terrorism training and exercise strategy/program using ICS to strengthen
on-scene and management response coordination.
2. Revisit, and Revise as Needed, Existing Internal and External Emergency Response
Coordination Plans and Structures; Conduct Interagency Training and Exercises to Solidify
Government-wide Understanding of Roles, Responsibilities, and Capabilities
1. Examine existing coordination structures within the Agency (e.g., NICT, Regional Incident
Coordination Team (RICT)) to ensure adequate participation and efficient operational
capability.
2. Consider how to better use the NRT and the Catastrophic Disaster Response Group (CDRG)
during national emergencies, and ways to quickly access the senior leadership of member
organizations.
3. Better educate EPA's responders in the existing EPA, OSHA, and State roles for the protection
of the health and safety of all responders.
4. Collaborate with OSHA and U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) agencies
to clarify the Agency's role in assuring protection of the health and safety of all responders.
5. Develop a structure for intra-agency coordination that encompasses all levels of management
during national emergencies.
6. Communicate new and revised structure and processes to emergency response staff and all
involved levels of agency leadership.
7. Coordinate with the OHS to develop a coherent coordination strategy for all responders during
national emergencies; specifically, address the need to improve emergency coordination with
the FBI.
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3. Develop an Emergency Response Infrastructure to Address both Data Analysis Issues and
Information Management
1. Clearly define a process for approving and coordinating the release of information to other
agencies and the public; ensure program staff on AA and Office level (e.g., OSWER and
OERR) review information before it is released.
2. Establish a forum for Regional emergency response, Regional labs, and OERR's analytical
staff to specify and address analytical needs during emergencies.
3. Ensure that prompt communication of analytical results to emergency response staff is
addressed in response procedure revisions.
4. Continue the Environmental Assessment Workgroup (EAWG) to address interagency sampling
and analysis needs.
5. Ensure laboratory analysis and data management of health, safety, and risk information are
incorporated in emergency response plans.
6. Work with OHS and other emergency response organizations to have EPA designated the lead
agency for environmental data during national emergencies when both EPA and other agencies
are conducting environmental analyses.
7. Ensure that sufficient laboratory capabilities for national emergencies are readily available to all
Regions.
4. Develop EPA Policies and Procedures for Public Information Dissemination During National
Emergencies, Within Established Emergency Response Plans and Structures
1. Continue developing a network of tools to facilitate public communication.
2. Clarify roles, authorities, protocols, and contingency plans for Headquarters, Regional,
Community Outreach, and Regional Press Office staff during national emergencies.
3. Coordinate with OHS, CEQ, and other response partners to identify and address obstacles to
timely and consistent presentation of environmental information during national emergencies.
5. Increase the Agency's Emergency Response Resources, and Address the Unique Demands
of OSC Positions in Human Resource Processes
1. Assess additional personnel needs for responding to national emergencies while maintaining
emergency response preparedness.
2. Establish Western Environmental Response Team (WERT)
3. Pursue personnel classification and associated human resource practice changes to
acknowledge the unique expectations and demands placed on OSCs during national
emergencies.
4. Support WERT readiness needs.
5. Identify geographic distribution and readiness of supplies, equipment, and contractor capacity.
6. Identify and meet emergency response staff personal safety needs, including providing both
equipment and training/exercises.
7. Assess additional analytical program resource needs for national emergencies.
8. Establish a process to support responders logistically during national emergencies.
9. Clearly articulate additional equipment response resource needs in the budget requests for FY
2003 and beyond.
6. Invest in the Safety and Security of EPA Staff and Facilities, Including Telecommunications
Needs
1. Review all COOPs to ensure all facilities are included, and bring COOP planning, training, and
exercises in line with current threats.
2. Improve and update employee evacuation planning.
3. Review stress management assistance provided to Headquarters, Regions 2 and 3, and ERT.
Assess stress levels of EPA emergency response employees, and determine whether
additional action should be taken.
4. Address, using currently available resources, all possible facility security needs, at both
government-owned and private buildings.
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5. Provide telecommunications redundancy nationwide that will provide for ongoing
communication (voice and data) to EPA's workforce during a national emergency, as well as
emergency notification systems.
6. Provide central communication principles using the web to ensure EPA employees are given
the latest, most recent information.
7. Determine whether a Headquarters-sponsored stress management system should be more
formally deployed in future national emergencies.
8. Broaden health monitoring for OSCs and other Agency response personnel to make it
consistent nationwide.
9. Systematically follow through on facility security improvements requiring additional resources.
7. Identify and Address National Environmental Vulnerabilities
1. Complete EPA efforts to identify national environmental vulnerabilities posed by public and
private utilities/facilities.
2. Coordinate with State, local, and other environmental regulators to plan for reducing
environmental vulnerabilities.
3. Increase technical support by EPA and States to identify and assist in corrective actions to
reduce vulnerabilities
4. Increase inspections to identify and oversee corrective actions to reduce environmental
vulnerabilities caused by permit or regulation violations.
5. Examine EPA's authorities and regulations to identify any changes needed to effectively
address vulnerabilities.
Region 2 Lessons Learned Recommendations
Overarching Recommendations
1. EPA Region 2 should undertake an effort to connect with senior officials of the Federal Emergency
Management Agency, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, and the Department of Health and Human
Services on a routine basis to ensure EPA mission is clearly understood.
2. Region 2 needs to develop a comprehensive approach to emergency management and response,
perhaps based upon the NFPA 1600 Standard, that includes all divisions in the region. This would:
Spread responsibility across the organization so that one division is not the sole source of
information, staffing responsibilities, decision making, and documentation.
Provide for a consistent, expandable and contractible structure and process for the Region that
is understood across organizational boundaries.
Routinize emergency/disaster response.
3. Region 2 should identify a team of dedicated people who will respond in the event of a new crisis.
This would limit the stress on personnel who might otherwise be pulled from the current response to
another, as well as allowing designated staff to prepare, to the extent possible, for the possibility of
mobilization. This could be accomplished by assigning an individual to a particular task until they are
directly and explicitly relieved. In addition, a feedback mechanism could be established to
encourage and solicit concerns during and after a response.
4. The Region's Continuity of Operations Plan (COOP) needs to be reviewed and updated.
5. Senior leadership of Region 2 and Regional staff not currently assigned to emergency response
who might respond in a disaster, should participate in introductory training and education on basic
disaster management and response. This would include intergovernmental relationships that are
inherently different than typical Superfund emergency response and removal.
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6. Public information, risk communications, and crisis communications must be organized and
strategized in advance of a disaster. Region 2 should develop a comprehensive approach - which
includes Headquarters and regional Federal and State partners - on how to handle crisis
communications. Then, in a disaster event, relationships are established, lines of coordination and
communication are established, and communications/public affairs officers can focus on tactics
rather than trying to develop a framework in the midst of the emergency. Mechanisms should be in
place for resolving differences about the interpretation of risk and the appropriate response.
7. Nationally, EPA should examine policies and procedures for ESF #10 activation and coordination
with USCG to ensure roles and responsibilities are executed according to the FRP.
Additional Recommendations
1. As soon as possible, educate Region 2 personnel and management on Agency and Region
responsibilities and authorities during a disaster or crisis with emphasis on the relationship between
the Stafford Act, FRP, National Contingency Plan (NCP) and ICS. Include suggested peer
relationships with counterpart agencies at all levels, but especially at the senior management level
(e.g., regional administrators).
2. National Issue - Adopt an incident management system that is consistent across all regions, has
common terms and plugs into other crisis/consequence management structures. National and
regional management systems should be compatible
Regional Issues - Create Regional crisis management structure, staffed by people with authority,
commitment and qualifications, to improve roles and communication between management and
OSCs. Develop an incident management system for Region 2 that:
Expands or contracts as needed to address both crises and routine events.
Prescribes specific people to fill roles during an event. The Coast Guard "watch quarter
station bill" or synchronization matrix may serve as a model.
Includes mechanism for provision of resources, "protect" incident managers.
Has agreements, plans and procedures for internal communications during a crisis.
Includes a crisis management team that supports the incident management system in terms
of the Region 2 operating principles.
Regional Interagency Coordination Team (RICT)
Training for backup staff
Mobilize Regional resources
Signed agreement by Division Directors
Ensures leadership/managerial backup
Regional Incident Command System (ICS)
Dedicated and known backup
Clear commander
Known ability to expand and contract
Emergency Operations Center (EOC)
Physically separate from branch
3. Develop a Regional Strategy and Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) for communicating risk to
the public during a crisis.
Include processes and resources needed to obtain and manage information.
Include links to incident management structure, data management mission.
Include defined up-front risk parameters and benchmarks.
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4. Develop a logistics and support capability for incident management system that:
May include standing/expedient contracts, especially for sampling and analytical services, as
well as data management.
Obtains facilities and other support resources.
Includes resource management and contracts in the development.
Include processes for intra and inter-agency coordination.
5. Develop agreements and processes for the emerging data generation and management mission
including:
Developing methods and demonstrating a commitment to plan (identify data monitoring
objectives, sampling and analytic methods, and benchmarks).
Ensure the process/system is flexible and could include external contributors and users.
Define users and contributors.
6. Need a corporate philosophy on how to manage expectations in a crisis (internally outside of
Region 2 emergency responders and externally). Consider:
Expectations of elected officials and the public
Part of incident management system specific to health and well-being
7. Develop a crisis management plan. SOPS, COOP, should address all issue categories
Mechanism for elevating to Incident of National Significance
Separate policy and communications priorities from operational priorities
Establish protocol for continuing response if local/State counterparts are unavailable for any
reason
Inventory of regional resources
Expedited contract authorities
8. Clearly identify scope and boundaries of work within authorities and expertise, (e.g. logistical tasks)
(e.g. accept only Mission Assignment with authority?)
Educate Region 2, EPA Headquarters, and other Federal and State agencies about scope,
boundaries and authorities with emphasis on the relationship between the Stafford Act, FRP,
NCP and ICS.
Manage expectations
Establish and maintain relationships and contacts
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Major Conclusions of Non-EPA Lessons Learned Reports
Lessons Learned for Public Health from September 11, 2001: A One Year Perspective;
Philip J. Landrigan, M.D., M.Sc., Jordan Slutsky, Angali Garg, M.S., Mona Lisa Mouallem,
Lauri Boni; Center for Children's Health and the Environment of the Mount Sinai School of
Medicine; September 2002:
• Inadequate preparation for disaster as public health authorities had not established
partnerships with agencies outside the health field
• Unclear lines of authority which resulted in poor risk communications, a disorganized
approach to worker health and safety, and failure to agree on who should clean up
residences.
• Neither workers or the public were provided accurate information on health risks in the first
weeks after the attacks.
• Protection of workers was seriously inadequate
• Lack of exposure standards for chemicals in settled dust or on surfaces inside buildings
Lessons Learned on Environmental, Occupational, and Residential Exposures From the
Attack on the World Trade Center; Paul J. Lioy, Ph.D. and Michael Gochfeld, M.D., Ph.D;
American Journal of Industrial Medicine, December 2002:
• Improved data collection for emergencies is needed. This should include development of:
~ improved portable and flexible emergency response monitors,
~ strategies for the rapid acquisition of settled particulate material samples in
catastrophic events that yield resuspendable dust/smoke, and
~ a rapid method for determination of site-specific and event-specific analytes that could
cause acute or chronic effects.
• Need to develop emergency response standards for:
~ community evacuation, worker re-entry, and residential/commercial re-entry, in various
community or occupational zones at increasing distances from a disaster site, and
~ Short-term exposure in establishing evacuation and restricted entry zones, and
determining an "all clear" based on potential acute health outcomes.
• Need to develop a formal post-disaster cleanup protocol and a lead agency to implement
the program so that cleanup can proceed without delay. Also need to develop a set of
residential dust/smoke clearance levels to permit safe re-entry after cleanup.
• Need to conduct research on the design of respirators to ensure that they will be used in
emergency response. Many of the existing non-air pack respirators are heavy and not
easily worn over the nose and mouth during complex operations.
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Risk Communication in the Aftermath of the World Trade Center Disaster, George D.
Thurston, S.cD. and Lung Chi Chen, PhD, American Journal of Industrial Medicine,
December 2002:
• The public wants facts upon which they can make individual decisions, not just
reassurances.
• The government needs to develop peer-reviewed pollution benchmarks of "acceptable" and
"unacceptable" exposures applicable to such disaster situations and make them available
to the public and media.
• Physicians, scientists, and other exposure/health effects experts need to be consulted
regarding the appropriateness of government monitoring and health effects assessments
on a real-time basis.
Perspective on the Tragedy at the World Trade Center, Joel Shufro, American Journal of
Industrial Medicine, December 2002:
• A new regulatory framework regarding potentially toxic exposures is needed,
• Government agencies saw their role as reassuring the public or said little, rather than use
their position as a bully pulpit to provide the public with information they could use to make
informed decisions,
• The absence of strong enforcement and leadership on the part of EPA, OSHA, PESH, the
New York City Department of Health and New York City Department of Environmental
Protection resulted in unnecessary exposure of workers and community residents to toxic
substances,
• A uniform sampling protocol and centralized collection of all testing results is needed, and
• Government agencies appear to have ignored their own precedents [e.g. government
intervention in Gramercy Park and Libby, Montana],
Health Effects of World Trade Center Site Workers, Stephen Levin, MD, Robin Herbert, MD,
Gwen Skloot, MD, Jamie Szeinuk, MD, Alvin Teirstein, MD, David Fischler, MD, Debra Milek,
MD, George Piligian, MD, Elizabeth Wilk-Rivard, MD, and Jacqueline Moline, MD; American
Journal of Industrial Medicine, December 2002:
• The importance of an advisory to health care providers ASAP to assist with their evaluation
and clinical management of the physical and psychological problems WTC-related patients
experienced.
• Immediate capture of registry (contact) information for volunteers and workers.
• Rapid distribution of appropriate respiratory protection and a peer-based structure for
encouraging consistent use.
• Rapid mobilization of resources for pro-active medical evaluation/treatment-respiratory,
musculoskeletal, and psychological-during the weeks following exposure at the disaster
site.
• Testing of indoor settings, including analysis of settled dust and aggressive air monitoring,
to establish a gradient of exposure with distance from Ground Zero to guide
recommendations regarding clean-up and reoccupancy.
• Communication by public health agencies regarding exposure hazards in lay language,
with focus not only on long-term cancer risks, but on short-term health consequences as
well.
• Greater attention to human health experience, rather than exclusive focus on air monitoring
for the usual suspects.
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Respiratory Protection at the World Trade Center: Lessons From the Other Disaster, Bruce
Lippy, CIH, CSP, January 15, 2002:
• The chosen respirators were correct.
• Compliance with the requirements was poor at Ground Zero.
• Workers received mixed messages about the importance of wearing respiratory protection.
• Achieving high compliance with respiratory requirements in not unrealistic in these
situations.
Safety and Health of Heavy Equipment Operators at Ground Zero, Bruce Lippy, CIH, CSP,
American Journal of Industrial Medicine, December 2002:
• Except for asbestos, the few excess pollutant readings at the site were almost always
associated with specific tasks.
• In the eagerness to declare the New York Financial District safe for re-occupancy,
Government communications blurred the distinctions between the OSHA and EPA
asbestos standards.
• The lack of a clear command structure at the site thwarted efforts to enforce the use of
personal support equipment and other risk-reduction measures.
• Need to consider the use of OSHA's Hazardous Waste Operations and Emergency
Response Standard in responding to terrorist incidents.
Firefighter Safety and Health Issues at the World Trade Center Site, Ronald Spadafora,
Deputy Assistant Chief, Fire Department of New York, American Journal of Industrial
Medicine, December 2002:
• Safety controls must be instituted by the uniformed services for the protection of the
rescuers no matter how great the life hazard,
• The Site Safety Officer role in the FDNY's Incident Command Structure is a crucial one.
This position must be filled immediately at the scene of a terrorist attack or similar event,
• Schedule an adequate number of Safety Chiefs on duty at any given time,
• Firefighters must be informed of the dangers in their work environment prior to the start of
the detail, when possible,
• A universal-fit respirator cartridge should be available to rescue workers,
• Respirators should have built-in voice emitters to enhance communication, and
• Lighter personal protective equipment (hard hat, military fatigues/boots, safety
glasses/goggles) for rescue and recovery workers must be made readily available.
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Appendix O
Details on Health-Based Benchmarks Needed
Acute Exposure Guideline Levels. EPA is responsible for a program involving entities inside
and outside the government to develop Acute Exposure Guideline Levels (AEGLs). These
guidelines are developed by the National Advisory Committee for Acute Exposure Guideline
Levels for Hazardous Substances. The AEGLs address exposures to pollutants that last for
10 minutes, 30 minutes, 1 hour, 4 hours, and 8 hours, and are established to address three
potential types of health impacts from these acute exposures: non-disabling, disabling, and
death. This program has finalized a limited number of AEGLs; however, none of the finalized
guidelines addressed the primary pollutants of concerns for Lower Manhattan after September
11. EPA's Office of Research and Development and the Office of Prevention, Pesticides and
Toxic Substances are currently working to establish needed AEGLs.
Sub-Chronic Guidelines. EPA also did not have sub-chronic guidelines for the contaminants
found in Lower Manhattan on September 11. ATSDR defines sub-chronic as exposures lasting
2 weeks to 1 year. In general, EPA's benchmarks have focused on lifetime cancer risk over a
30-year exposure period. Because sub-chronic guidelines did not exist for the WTC pollutants of
concern, these 30-year benchmarks were adjusted to fit the situation found at WTC. For
example, to assess sub-chronic (1 year) exposure to dioxin in the ambient air, EPA took the
dioxin 30-year exposure benchmark and adjusted it to reflect a 1-year exposure by multiplying
the 30-year exposure benchmark by 30. These guidelines should be developed, to the extent
possible, before a disaster strikes so that the process can be properly peer reviewed and any
necessary revisions made before they are needed.
Indoor Air Benchmarks. EPA also did not have risk-based indoor air or bulk dust benchmarks
for the pollutants found in dust deposited indoors. A work group formed after September 11,
consisting of officials from Federal, New York State, and New York City agencies, developed
indoor air benchmarks for COPCs resulting from the WTC towers collapse. These benchmarks,
identified in a document entitled "World Trade Center Indoor Air Assessment: Selecting
Contaminants of Potential Concern and Setting Health-Based Benchmarks," were initially
published in draft in September 2002. The document was peer reviewed and a revised interim
final version was published in April 2003. The COPC report could be used as a starting point in
developing health benchmarks for additional pollutants that may be encountered in future
disasters. EPA's Homeland Security Strategy includes plans to identify chemical and biological
substances for which indoor air reference levels (benchmarks) may be needed, and establish
advisory indoor air reference levels for the substances identified.
Health-Based Benchmarks for Asbestos. As addressed in Chapter 2, health-based asbestos
standards for indoor and outdoor air do not exist. The AHERA standard, used as a primary WTC
benchmark to communicate asbestos risk for ambient air, is the filter background contamination
level estimated when the TEM protocol was developed. Filters with smaller asbestos
contamination levels are now available, so that smaller concentrations of asbestos can now be
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reliably measured. The TEM analysis of asbestos data in response to the WTC disaster suggests
that the minimum detection limit may now be approximately 15 to 20 s/mm2.
A significant issue with regard to indoor spaces was the potential exposure from asbestos in dust.
In assessing the need for asbestos abatements in indoor spaces in New York City, the City relied
on the NESHAP definition of asbestos-containing material, which defines asbestos-containing
material as 1 percent or more asbestos by volume. This is not a health standard, and dust with
less than 1 percent asbestos could pose a health risk. Risk assessors employ a mathematical
formula to estimate the amount of asbestos in dust that can be expected to become airborne in
order to evaluate the potential risk to human health from asbestos in dust. This factor is known
as the "K Factor." However, this factor is not deemed reliable at this time. The panel that
completed the peer review for EPA's indoor standards did not endorse the asbestos-settled dust
benchmark because the "the K-factor methodology is, at this time, inadequate for predicting
inhalation exposure from asbestos surface loading measurement."
We believe EPA should review the AHERA standard and determine whether the standard needs
to be revised in light of the fact that better filters are available today, and continue the work of
the indoor COPC group to develop health-related screening levels for asbestos in dust
Benchmarks for Exposure to Multiple Pollutants. The synergistic impacts of multiple
pollutants on human health in the aftermath of an air quality emergency, such as occurred on
September 11, are unknown. Synergistic effects have been documented between asbestos and
cigarette smoke. For example, the lung cancer risk from exposure to asbestos is increased if the
individual exposed to asbestos is a cigarette smoker. Researchers interviewed indicated that
there could be other synergistic effects caused by the wide array of pollutants generated by the
collapse of the WTC, but research is not available to make this determination.
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Appendix P
EPA Letter Concerning Worker Protection
Mr. Kelly It. McKimwjr, P.E.
Associate CoiiiintfiRinnei
Bureau of Regulatory and Environmental Health Services
The City of New York;
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
t25 Worth Street, Room 616, CN-32
New York, NY 10013
Dew Mr. McKimiey;
Health and safety concerns for workers at th« World Trade Center Disaster Site (WTC) has been
a concern fron the beginning of the response In addition to standard constmct;an/;U'.rn«Ktioia
site safety concerns, this Site also poses threats to workcis relaxed to potential exposure to
hazardous substances. Sources of hazardous substances include (1) building materials from the
destroyed buildings (primarily asbestos), (2) hazardous material,-: that were stored iti the
buildings (refrigerants, hazardous wastes, ethylene giycol, compressed jjas cylinders, etc.),
snd (3 ) products of combustion bem<> emitted from the fires that continue to burn within the
debris piles. EPA., along with a number oS other federal, state and your agency, has been
gathering information about these threats to worker health Air sampling by EPA and others
indicates that asbestos and other contaminants art; present in the air at the WTC. EPA has
recommended, and continues to recommend, that workers at the Site wear respiratory protection.
Ill addition, EPA has recommended, and continues to recommend, that workers utilize peraon&l
protective equipment artd tbe personnel wash stations to prevent the spread of asbestos and other
hazardous substances fh)TT. the V.TC to their homes, cars, public transportation, food service
locations, etc. We have obsei veil very inconsistent compliance wirh our recommendations,
however, we do not have authority to enforce the worker health and safety policies for noo-
EPA/USOG employees. Therefore. HP A believes the Incident Commander should sdojx and
enforce a site-wide Health ar.d Safety Plan. if there is anything 1 can do to assist you concerning
thi* matter, please fee! free to call trie al (731) 321-6656.
Sincerely yours.
OCT 05 2001
Brace Sprmgue. Chief
Retpome and Preveetiim Branch
cc: KCO. FEMA
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Appendix Q
EPA Response to the Draft Report
UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D C. 2046®
MS I *
OFFKEOF THI
HPMMST1WT0B
SUBJECT: Transmittal Mcmoondsnn for EPA'* Response to Inspector General
(Draft) Evaluation Report: "EPA's Response to the World Trade Cento
Collapse — Challenges, Success, and. Improvements." {Assignment
Number: 2002-0000702)
FROM: Marianne Lament Horinlu>yt(
Acting Administrator
TO; Nikki Tinsley
Inspector General
I.
This memorandum transmits the Agency's consolidated response to tie subject draft
report ("Draft Report"). With (his memo, I formally request that EPA's comments be included
as part of ttie few! version of the official report.
The unprecedented terrorist attack on the World Trade Cento* (WTC) and the enormity of
its aftcOTMh compelled responding government agencies to write a new book on disaster
response. While the Draft Report acknowledges the situation that the nation - and New York
City in particular — confronted following the di saster. the intone of its criticism, conclusions
and tweommendatiom do not reflect those circumstances. In fact, this document is infected with
the attitude that somehow "business as usual" conduct should have prevailed.
I am exceedingly proud of the response that the men and women of EPA made in the
aftermath ofthe World Trade Center collapse, Along with other first respondcrs, out people were
there within hours of the attack and hundreds of our specialists devoted long hours under difficult
conditions to provide assistance and information. EPA responded with its heart as well as its
science to protect fhe health of the public and the workers involved in rescue and recovery. In all,
we took over 25,000 samples and conducted a quarter of a million measurements of nearly 700
See Appendix R
Note 1
potential contaminants.
EPA's response was extraordinary, especially when examined in the chaotic context in
which we and other governing bodies found ourselves. EPA beg an monitoring immediately for
contaminants ~~ ¦without benchmarks or standards that applied to the disaster situation such as
ambient asbestos — and we did it without electricity, in the midst of firefi^hiting and rescue
See Appendix R
Note 2
I
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operations, in the midst of high security concent*, and surrounded by construction. equipment
moving debris. The New York City Emergency Command Center was destroyed, agendas' New-
York offices wens closed, communications services in Lower Manhattan ware inoperative, and
airlines were shut down.
Given the magnitude of the disaster, the mattivemesg of the response, the very real
security issues at stake, and the many entities involved, it wis essential dial the Executive Brands
coordinate the federal response At a time of national emergency, the people expect ttte see Appendix R
government to speak with one voice. Note 3
Indeed, onr, of the key lessons learned is the need for centralized commum cations during
limes of national crisis. The creation of the Department of Homeland Security trutittfbonahzed
the coordination pt'comrmj m cations in one Department. The Dnft Report, however, goo to
great length to erroneously criticize federal efforts, specifically the Council on Environmental
Quality (CfcQ). to coordinate health and safety communications.
EPA, along with other agencies and departments responsible for environment, health and
safety, acted to provide the best health and safety guidance to those who lived and worked in
Lower Manhattan, bas«d on available data and using our best professional judgement under See Appendix R
extraordinary circumstances. We continuously monitor?*! the environmental effects of the Note 4
explosion, fire and ultimate collapse of the WTC buildings. We made this data available as
widely and as transparently as possible. Our public statements at every stage conveyed our best
professional advice based on the most current data available.
We continue to evaluate our response to identify improvements that em "be made in how
we manage and respond to future situations of ttis magnitude. A few weeks after the attacks,
EPA commissioned a formal report, conducted by an objective outside contractor, to assess the
"lessons learned" from rhese events. Many of the "lessons learned" that we have been
implementing since 2002, anticipated most of those the Draft Report sew highlights. We «re
making every effort to strengthen our planning and response systems to be as ready as possible
for any unforeseen catastrophic event, and we are committed to continuing to provide the public
with the best possible environmental information and assistance i» times of national "
See Appendix R
NoteS
lens
The Report Jacks sufficient acknowledgment of our efforts to implement our "lessons
teamed."and is flawed in its lack of recognition in other areas such as:
* EPA'S message was coraroonicated to different audiences.
For the "genertl public," EPA stated from the beginning that people Irving
and waiting in lower Manhattan were not exposed to levels of
contaminants ia the outdoor air thai EPA believed would poee a significant
lona-tgim health threat.
EPA advised people experiencing acute health probl ems to see feir
physician, and stressed that wwkcra at th« site faced a. higher risk and mast
»MgMimS3>gtt0fyA^.:lS>BH>lied by HP A and other apencits).
See Appendix R
Mole 6
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EPA also emphasized that people returning to dusty homes and
w orkplace* should have these spaces professionally cleaned by asbestos
contractors
The Report errcwewsly fonua* on five early Agency press releases, neglecting
the extensiveness of KPA's communications.
See Appendix R
Note 7
EPA undertook a massive outreach program, which included hundreds of
media interviews (print, radio, TV), participation in public forums,
di?tribu'ions of tens of thousands of fact sheets and handouts, and
extensive usage of the Internet (including information is three languages).
~ Aa immediitc and continuing problem in measuring and communicating
eaviromnectid risk associated with the WTC dast/debri* clowJ was Ac fact that
for many of the oontsxiiiunts of concern, there were no health based standards.
The need for such standards could not have ever been reasonably See Appendix R
anticipated, Note 8
¦ Even for asbestos, the contaminant of greatest concern, there was no
applicable standard covering the situation in Lows' Manhattan.
In raeretsing its professional judgement, EPA consulted with experts in
eo*ironntental health and science M federal, stole and local lewis.
Could things have been done better'.' Certainly. Were mistakes made? Without a doubt.
But like other agencies of government in the wake of this event, EPA has reviewed its response,
asked tough questions about its conduct, and begun the process the process of change and
improvement.
To be a valid "basis for planning, the Draft Report needed to capture the things that went
right - and the wast majonty of our efforts did - as well as what needs to "be improved- Tins
Report simply seems out of Couch with the reality 0/ what took p I see at the World Trade Center,
and thus it trivializes both the horrendous event that occunrd and the extraordinary efforts of r_ . „
EPA and other respondent " |See Appendix R
;Note 9
By ignoring that good -wtwk, flu; Report leaves a bruised population wondering once
again if their government properly saved them at their time of greatest need. The fact is, the
dedicated people of the EPA — and government at all levels - rose to the challenge of the Wocld.
Trade Center disaster... and performed with courage and, distinction.
3
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EPA'i Reaimae to th« World Trade Center Collapse:
Chdlcatei. Successes, and Areas lor Improvement
Prafllleport
Office of the Imieettir feteral
GENERAL OBSERVATIONS
Response Hi the World Trade Center collapse was unprecedented in the challenges it
presented to federal, state and local emergency responders. EPA undertook immediate efforts to
ascertain the prcser.ee of contaminants from the collapse and fires, and to assist FF.MA and "New
York City in all phases of the subsequent recovery and cleanup. F.PA's activities included
sampling aid analysis of ambient air and water; wash down and decontamination of vehicles;
removal and disposal of hazardous materials: vacuuming of dust and debris from streets;
supplying personal protective equipment: assisting Financial District in retrieval of electronic
files/papers; and provision of data and health information to the public. To illustrate the
magnitude of the activities conducted at the site, over 25,000 samples were taken representing
227,000 measurements of 692 potential contaminants. 'Hie initial response continued until May
2002 aid at times, involved as many as 290 EPA and US Coast Guard personnel, and 200
Agency contractors
While the report acknowledges the unprecedented nature of the response to the terrorist
attack upon the WTC, many of its findings and rceommeodations imply that Ae response could
have been conducted in a manncT consistent with a standard regulatory approach, e.g.
implementation of NESIlAPs asbestos regulations. Farther, the report does not recognize, that
the WTC response and clean up efforts were conducted in the absence of adequate background
concentrations for the contaminants of potential concern, eg , typical levels of asbestos ordfewdn
in an urban apartment. Having sock infonwBion available would have greatly simplified the
effort to delineate areas that were impacted and determine when indoor residential environments
were cleaned to pe-eveot condition. Additionally, the report docs not acknowledge Ac
Agency's massive campaign to provide quality information to the public through hundreds of
media interviews, tens of thousands of fact sheets and handouts .and innovative use of the
internet, including information in three languages. Lastly, and most importantly the report- fails
ft) recognize the nature of decision making in a catastrophic emergency. We must accept that, a
future incident may involve a scenario or contaminant that we simply cannot foresee. This
means that while work can and should be done to develop protocols, standards and benchmarks -
when an event of the magnitude of the World Trade Center attack occurs., many decisions will
based on the best professional judgement of emergency res ponders from all branches and levels
of government, through the leadership ranks of the Department of Homeland Security
See Appendix R
Note 1©
See Appenidix R
Note 11
1
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CHAPTER!
IP A STATEMENTS ABOUT AIM QUALJTY
NOT ADEQUATELY QUALIFIED
Report Conekraions/Recommeodartoitj:
• Conclusion: "EPA's early statements about afar quality were incomplete in thai they
lacked necessary qualifications and not supported % dbu» available at tie time. CEQ
influenced the final message m EPA's air quality statements. Competing considerations,
such s national security concerns awl the desire to reopen Wall Street, also plsyed a role
in EPA's air quality statements. The "safety** of Ac air!« Lower Manhattan aftci the
collapse of the WTC towers is still being debated and studied. However, given the
current lack of health-based benchmarks, the lack of research data on synergistic effects,
and the lack of reliable information on the extent of the public's exposure to these
pollutants, the answer to whether the outdoor air around WTC was "safe" to breathe may
not be settled for years to come.'"
• Rec*mw«odatx>a: That the EPA Administrator develop procedures for emergency risk
communication to ensure that EPA's public pronouncements regarding health risks and
environmental quality are adequately supported with avjjWWe data and aotlysis.
EPA Response:
The EPA "statement" referred to in the report was made days ate the attack, teed on air
sampling at seven sites surrounding the WTC site. The Agency knew, from testing |see Appendix R
conducted at As time of the 1993 WTC bombing, that aabettos was the primary [Note 12
contaminant of concern outside the WTC site, following 9/11, the news media was filled
with stories about possible asbestos contamination of the air. Tens of thousands of
residents and hundreds of thotmods of worker? were displaced and scared. HP A's initial
statement was made in direct response to the public's concern abenf asbestos
contamination The EPA press release from which the statement was: quoted detailed the
monitoring that led to the statement and made it clear that further monitoring for asbestos
and oilier contaminants would take place. 1ZPA subsequently made this and extensive
additional momtormg data available on an interactive Web site that allowed people to
track data at mapped monitoring stations.
FPA new withheld data from the public and sampling results were reported out as soon
®S they were reviewed. Results were communicated in discussions with media
representatives, federal, stale arid local officials, elected officials and interested citizens.
The Agcrxy did coordinate press releases with the Council for Environmental Quality
(CEQ) This is neither unusual nor unexpected during a catastrophic disaster on the scale
See Appendix R
Note 13
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Report No. 2003-P-00012
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of the SVTC attacks EPA acknowledges that there are lessons to be learned about how to
communicate more effectively, especially in the work with the Department af Homeland
Security and other agencies to determine the nature and farm with which the Federal
government should assume a more direct role in addressing indoor environment concerns,
undei what circumstances this direct role should occur. and the oversight mechanisms *.o
be employed when local agencies undertake such responses. In the WTC case, the delay
in providing a govemmertt-of ganizcd and adequately moiutoned cleanup in Lower
Manhattan may have contributed to unnecessary exposures to asbestos and other
pollutants by unprotected workers and residents."
• Reeommeadbtioas: That the EPA Administrator wornf nate with the Department of
Homeland Security, FEMA, other appropriate Federal agencies, and those State and
local governments having jurisdiction over potential terrorist targets to :
Develop protocols for determining how indoor environmental concerns will be
handled in large-scale disasters, to include addressing:
3
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Report No. 2003-P-00012
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The agency or agencies responsible for testing aftd/or overseeing testing of
indoor spaces;
Sampling methods to be used in analyzing indoor caniansBatioB;
Benchmarks to be used in assessing whether the indoor ooiTtaminstion
pose a threat
Under what circumstances goveramcol-assistei cleanups are warranted;
How these cleanups will be funded; and
The agency or agencies responsible for communicating testing results and
appropriate cleaning instructions.
Develop and publish oversight criteria and State and local agency reporting
requirements for those agencies involved in cleaning up buildings and otter
disasters.
EPA Itarpomc:
EPA disagrees that unprotected residents Mid workers may have experienced, unnecessary
exposures to wbwtos or other pollutants as a result of delay in providing a guvemin wit-
organized and adequately monitored cleanup in Lower Manhattan. Pram the beginning,
FEMA, New York City and State, as well as EPA provided advice, to residents on cleanup
method'! (wet wiping/mopping, HEPA vacuuming) that has proven effective In addition,
residents with more than minimal dust, were urged to use professional, asbestos
abatement cleaners. FEMA provided financial assistance to residents to enable them to
relocate while cleanup was being done, and New York City provided guidaswx atid
cleanup requirements to building owner* AH this took place ia the absence of a
"GoveromeMK>rg«Hzrd cleanup." Subsequent EPA studies show that the basic cleaning
techniques that ware recommended were effective in reducing drat and reducing dust to
below healih based benchmarks whew these could be identified. In sirarnary, EPA feels
thai the advice and assistance provided was sufficient to enable the affected population to
take appropriate action to minimize further risk.
See Appendix R
Note 14
"With respect to the outside environment, EPA provided personal protective equipment,
repeatedly stated that workers ai Ground Zero should use this equipment and were at
greater risk than the surrounding population. Additionally, the Agency consistently raised
concerns over the use of protective equipment to t'ocal officials. Additionally, EPA
repeatedly advised anyone with acute symptoms to consult with their physicians and
acknowledged that sensitive populations., such as those wilh respiratory illnesses might
ic&cl differently -than die genets! popuIati«m, *ad also should otmrolt their physician*.
See Appendix R
Note 15
4
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In summary, EPA's initial role in support of New York city and State officials in bo way
crested additional health risk to workers or residents. In fact, EPA and otfher federal, state
and city agencies responded to the best of their abilities to reduce potential risk as quickly
»d as reasonably as possible. EPA generally agrees with the recommendations
concerning coordination with the Department of I lomeland Security and other federal
agencies, and thai the topic of roles and responsibilities for all levels of government
regarding potential contamination of indoor spaces should be further explored. The
Agency further agrees that consideration should be given to possible identification of
sampling methods, benchmarks, circumstances where government-assisted cleanups are
appropriate, funding support and communications.
ASBESTOS EMISSION CONTROL WORK PRACTICES INCONSISTENT
See Appendix R
Note 14
Report Concluvton/RecQ;o»n>e*dati«ii:
• CncMoo: "Although many steps were taken, to reduce asbestos enusawm from the
WTC site. problems wm encountered fa Mly implementing Ac appieabie NESHAP
requirements for emergency situations, such as ensuring that tracks transporting debns
**re adequately welted down before leaving the WTC site. Further, the placement of
WTC debris, -unloading and transfer operation near schools and residences compounded
the potential impact of not implementing nomaliy lequired NESHAP requirements.
Given the likelihood that many buddings across the country may contain asbestos. t-'PA
and State and local agencies need to establish improved monitoring and oversight
procedures for ensuring appropriate NESHAP work practices are followed in responding
to situations that cause widespread damage."
• Rjccmiimendatio a: The EPA Administrator ensure that EPA Regional and Headquarters
personnel are aware of the "'Guidelines for Catastrophic Emergency Situations Involving
Asbestos." inchiding its application in the event of future terrorist attacks or other
disasters. EPA develop specific monitoring, reporting and oversight procedures for
ensuring tat federal, State, and local responders follow the appropriate asbestos
NESHAP work practices, including initiating enforcement actions whew EPA observes
violations of NESHAP work practices.
EPA Rc*poa*c:
In the immediate Aftermath of WTC collapse and Łrte$, "ensuring" compliant work
practices was extremely difficult. This was not for jack of knowledge about what should
be done, but rather a_s a matter of practically implementing these practices under extreme
conditions of duress. Search and rescue operations were going on in the presence of
See Appendix R
Note 16
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debris removal including removing molten steel beams from the site; Search, rescue and
construction equipment surrounded the site. EPA worked with New Yotic City and State
agencies to setup truck routes, wet-down stations, on-site wetting of debris, wetting at
the barges, and wash stations for vwnfcers on the pile at Ground Zero. Given the physical
impediments andtbe intensity of the situation, it took time to implement best woik
practices fully. As the various federal, state and local agencies became organized in their
response and set up communications with debris cleanup contractors, these problems
were eliminated, to Ac maximum extent possible. With respect to the recommendations.
EPA agrees that the regillations for NESHAPS should be reviewed to determine whether
additional procedures are necessary to provide to federal. State and local respondere
Additionally, the applicability ofNESHAPS to disaster situations may need to clarified
CHAPTERS
AIR QU ALITY-RELATED COMMUNICATIONS
NOT EFFECTIVE IN GETTING PUBLIC AND WORKERS
TO TAKE RECOMMENDED PRECAUTIONS
Report Coaclusion/RccofPineiidaliin):
• Conclusion: "The public wanted better information about aii quality than they received
from government sources. A NYCDOH study, other lessons learned reports, and
testimony provided at various bearings suggest that the public did not receive adequate air
quality Moimation and that individuals cleaned their residences without using proper
procedures and personal protection. In addition, workers at Ground Zero may not have
used respirators due. in part, to inadequate EPA and other government oomrmmicatioe.
EPA was one of many governmental and non-governmental agencies that communicated
health risk to the public The levels of non^adbermce to the ride communications of these
governmental agencies suggests that all the participating levels of government need to re-
examine their policies, procedures, and practices for ensuring that the accessary
precautions are consistently followed."
* Recommendations: That the EPA Administrator coordinate with FEMA and other
applicable Federal agencies to clearly establish Federal agency responsibilities, rotes and
procedures during an emergency response that ensure that;
Workers responding to emergencies are adequately protected "by the development
and strict enforcement of health and safety plans.
Health hazard information is effectively communicated to emergency response
crews.
6
See Appendix R
Note 16
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Report No. 2003-P-00012
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Sufficiently detailed health riak information is effectively communicated to the
public, mcbdmg actions that the public should take to reduce their potential
exposure to harmful pollutant*.
EPA Response
With respect to worker safety on or near the debris pile at Ground Zero, although OSHA
had direct responsibility. EPA supported them in many ways EPA immediately provided
a large supply of respirators for the workers, followed hy a long-term and concerted effort
to educate workers about the need to wear the masks, further, EPA's worker-safety
message was stressed repeatedly in news releases, media interviews, public meetings and
appearances, on the Agency's WTC Web site, in flyers nod posters at the worker wash
station that CPA provided.
See Appendix R
Note 17
With respect to the public's reported need for better information. EPA and other federal.
State and local agencies provided the most comprehensive and up U> dale information
available. As mentioned earlier in response to Chapter 1, extensive air monitoring data
was available on an interactive Web site and air sampling results u/re reported out as
soon as they were reviewed in discussions with media representatives, federal, state and
local officials, elected officials and interested etfaais. While government agencies,
including EPA, $bo«M examine ride communication tools and skills in emergency
situations and make improvements, the public sometimes wants information that is
simply not scientifically available, or is not available quickly EPA feels that the efforts
made in conjunction with New York City and State. FEMA and OSHA provided
reasonable assurance that worker's and the general public's exposure to contaminants was
minimized.
See Appendix R
Note 18
As the report acknowledges, EPA has initiated actions to improve risk communications to
the public, and with regarf to worker safety, is participating in a FKMA-led Interagency
effort to provide uniform occupational safety and health policy under the Federal
Response Plan.
FURTHER ACTIONS NEEDED
TO ADDRESS CURRENT WTC RESPONSE
H^ortXaaclaiiffi^RcMttMjidhtfiK
• Condmsitm: "Extensive ambient monitoring data collected after September 11
demonstrated that outdoor ait quality levels around Lower Manhattan eventually returned
to prc-September 11 levels. As such, EPA does not need to take additional actions to
address outdoor ambient air quality concerns specifically related to the collapse of the
7
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WTC towers,
EPA. in cooperation with. FEMA and New York City, lias initiated a large-scale indoor
cleanup.. In oar opinion, this cleanup should meet the minimum criteria for protecting
human health that EPA has established for Superfutid cleanups Also, the indoor cleaning
and renting propjam should employ aggressive testing in all residences and treat buildings
as a system. Additionally , EPA should evaluate the potential health risks for pollutants of
concern in work spaces and for geographic areas north of Car.a! Street, m Brooklyn, and
any other areas where jneieurological data show pollutants of concern may have been
deposited."
Recommendation; That the EPA Administrator ensure that EPA Region 2:
Submit tile revised "World Trade Center Indoor Air Assessment; Selecting Contaminants
of Potential Concern and Setting Health-Based Benchmarks- document to TERA for a
second peer review."
Implement a post-cleaning testing program to ensure that, in addition to asbestos, the
indoor cleanup program has reduced residents' risk of exposure from all of the identified
COPCs to acceptable limits.
Due to concerns over possible re-contamination of residences cleaned tinder the Indoor
Air Residential Assistance program. EPA should treat buildings as a system and
implement a post-cleaning verification program to ensure that residences cleaned by the
program have not been re-contaminated.
Work vvitb FEMA and OSHA to as»ss whether the ongoing residential testing and
cleaning program should be expanded to address potential contamination in work spaces
in Lower Manhattan, or wheflier other measures m«d to be taken to ensure that work
spaces are not contaminated with WTC dust.
WA Rtspwic
EPA, in conjunction with New York City and FEMA. has initiated and nearly completed
a large-scale indoor cleanup under the Federal Response Plan - not Superfund and the
program has met the criteria for protecting human health. Under this program EPA did
cleaning and testing in 675 building "footprints'" as identified in the city's building
inventory. From NYC records,, there appear to be about 22.000 residential units below
Canal Street. There are 2,323 building footprints which would aJso include
approximately 1550 commercial buildings. If a cleanup program -were expanded to
include all of these buildings footprints and tie commercial space tbewto, it would be a
monumental undertaking which t<;.PA studies and data indicate is not necessary.
See Appendix R
Note 1®
127 Report No. 2003-P-00012
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First, the vast mass of dust and debris from the WTC collapse has been Temoved. This is
a result of cleanup during the response actions, the Ground Zero cleanup, cleanup of
building exteriors by the private sector and New York City. Second, in 95 % of the over
4,100 residences cleaned and tested or tested only, the asbestos in the air results were
non-detect. Lastly, cleanup techniques of wet mopping, wet wiping and HEP A
vacuuming were found to be successful In achieving health-based benchmarks for W1
contaminants of concern. EPA focused upon a cleanup program for residences, because
this is where individuals spend the most time and where the greatest need for assistance
in conducting cleanup and getting reassurance was evident.
Regarding the need for "aggressive" air sampling, EPA notes that scientists and
physicians expert in environmental health issues advised EPA at a meeting convened by
the New York Academy of Medicine in June 2002, that aggressive sampling -was not a
representative condition for testing and potential exposure. In addition. EPA's
Confirmation Cleaning Study did not find a measurable difference in the use of modified
or aggressive air disturbance technique in sampling.
Lastly, EPA did evaluate the potential for health risks, qualitatively, for areas North of
Canal Street, in Brooklyn, and beyond. The determination was that lower Manhattan was
the principal impact area where the mass of building materials from the collapse was
deposited and where the most fire plume exposure occurred. In addition, EPA's
judgement is that commercial establishments had alternative sources of assistance to fund
cleanup activity. EPA and OSHA have coordinated throughout the indoor cleanup
program, and OSHA has agreed to investigate any complaints by workers in commercial
establishments of dust exposure.
With respect to the recommendation that EPA submit the revised "World Trade Center
Indoor Air Assessment" for a second peer review, the Agency disagrees. EPA does agn
that, as part of its efforts to develop indoor health based benchmarks, a protocol for
establishing these would be usefiiUly peer reviewed. Such a general protocol could take
into account what was done for the WTC Contaminants of Potential Concern (COPC)
EPA does not see any benefit to further peer review of the WTC specific document
With respect to the recommendation that EPA implement a post-cleaning testing program
to ensure that, in addition to asbestos, the indoor cleanup program has reduced residents'
risk of exposure from all of the identified COPCs to acceptable limits, the Agency
disagrees. EPA believes that the health based asbestos in air clearance testing is effective
in reducing the potential for risk related to WTC contaminants- The results of the
Confirmation Cleaning Study support this, and the study results provide effective
guidance for additional cleanup where there are continued concerns.
With respect to the recommendation that due to concerns over possible re-contamination
of residences cleaned under the Indoor Air Residential Assistance program, EPA should
9
See Appendix R
Note 20
See Appendix R
Note 21
See Appendix R
Note 22
See Appendix R
Note 23
See Appendix R
Note 24
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Report No. 2003-P-00012
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teat buildings as a system and implement a post-cleaning verification program to ensure
that residences cleaned % the program have not'been re-contaminatcd, EPA disagrees Isee Appendix R
EPA has dooe post-cleaning testing in common spaces, in rcmdeuc.es. E? A does not |Note 25
bdieve further testing to assure there las not been rccorrtamiitarion is needed. The testing
rcsuhs to date do not show widespread exceedences; the vast amount of dost from the
WTC and streets and buildings (exterior arid interior) has been removed. Retesling would
involve over 4,000 dwelling units with an average oi 5 asbestos .in air samples per unit, or
tX last 20.000 additional samples. Cleanup work m loww Manhattan has largely been
completed.
With respect to the recommendation that HP A wort wjifi FRMA and OS I LA to assess ¦ ADDendix R
whether the ongoing residential testing and deaning ptoB*3® should be expanded to iNofe 2S
address potential contamination m work spaces in Lower Manhattan, or whesber other j_
measures need to be taken to ensure that work spaces are not contaminated wirh WTC
dust, EPA disagrees- As previously mentioned. EPA focused upon a cleanup program for
residences, because this is where individuals spend the most time: ami where the greatest
need for assistance in conducting cleanup and gating itassurancc was evident Further as
stated above, Ac Agency bm no data to support the need foe a massive testing and
cleanup program in Lower Manhattan.
CHATTER?
EPA SHOULD CONTINUE EFFORTS TO
IMPROVE CONTINGENCY PLANNING
Conclusion: "Although many organizations were involved in addressing air quality
concerns resulting froro the WTC collapse, subsequent events have demonstrated that,
ultimately, the public and others expect EPA to monitor and resolve environments]
issues, even though EPA may not have the overall responsibility to resolve these issues or
the necessary resources to address them. These issues range from collecting, interpreting
and communicating environmental information to cleaning up any environmental
contamination. EPA wast be prepared to take a leadership role, within the evolving
framework established by tbe Department of Homeland Security and existing statutes, in
fulfilling its mission of 'protecting human health aid the environment,1 if another large-
scale disaster occurs."
Recommendations (summitry):
HP A should work with the Department of Homeland Security and other agencies to share
information on likely target* and threats and collabojarively develop approaches to
address these threats.
10
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EPA should define and clarify internal EPA organizational rotes and responsibilities in
responding to large-scale disasters. This should include designating teams of Agency
experts - at both the National and Regional level - that can be mobilized to quickly
provide needed lecli»jca,J support during a response. These areas may include specialized
sampling techniques, exposure modeling wd assessment, and risk assessment.
EPA should develop and improve health-related benchmarks that can be used to assess
health risk in emergencies (specific (1st recomroeoded)
EPA should develop an emergency quality assurance sampling plan to be used as a
guidance for monitoring environmental conditions after a large scale disaster. It should
address monitoring objectives, sampling and analytic methods, ar.d siting of monitors.
EPA Response:
With respect to the conclusion. EPA emphasizes that, at the WTC response, it certainly
did exercise its opinions and judgements on matters impacting human health and the ;see Appendix R
environment and will continue to do so within the context of its authorities and its role (Note 27
tracer the Federal Response Plan. With respect to the recommendations, it should be
recognized that the Department of Homeland Security looks to EPA and other agencies to
assist them in identification of potential targets and critical infrastructure. In fact EPA
has already provided much of the information recommended, to DHS. EPA collects the
data under various legislative and regulatory programs and uses it to develop approaches
and establish plans of action for protection of public health and safety in collaboration
with State and local agencies. EPA generally agrees with the other Chapter ?
recommendations.
11
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Appendix R
OIG Evaluation of EPA's Response to the Draft Report
Transmittal Memorandum
Note 1 - We believe the report's findings, conclusions, and recommendations properly
consider the unprecedented circumstances in which the response to the WTC tragedy
was carried out. For instance, we point out the unprecedented nature of these events
in the first line of the Executive Summary and the first line of Chapter 1. We do not
believe that a response to such a tragedy can be conducted under a business as usual
attitude. However, an emergency response should not preclude the Agency from
following previously established guidance and practices regarding public safety and
protection from hazardous substances conceived and designed to be applied in times
of crisis. This position is consistent with the intent of EPA's Guidelines for
Catastrophic Emergency Situations Involving Asbestos issued in 1992. These
guidelines were issued after emergency responses to three incidents in 1989 focused
attention on the need to consider asbestos along with other emergency response
activities. Additionally, although the initial emergency response was carried out
under trying conditions, as time passed the crisis nature of the response subsided and
the Agency had the opportunity to consider its actions carefully before continuing its
response efforts. For example, decisions regarding the approach to addressing indoor
contamination evolved over time, after extensive deliberations, and well after the
initial emergency response had subsided. We also note that, except for the
recommendations in Chapter 6, the Agency agreed with the recommendations in five
other chapters of the report, which does not suggest that we misunderstood the
circumstances that the Nation, EPA, or the City faced following the disaster.
Note 2 - We agree that the Agency should be proud of the response of its men and women in
the aftermath of the WTC attacks and collapse. We also agree that the Agency's
response was made under extremely trying circumstances as detailed in Chapter 1 of
the report. The findings, conclusions, and recommendations in this report are in no
manner intended to disparage the valiant contributions of EPA personnel, or those of
any other responding organization.
Note 3 - We agree with the need for coordinated federal efforts and the concept of centralized
communications during a time of national emergency. In the report we recommend
that EPA develop emergency communications policy and procedures which are
consistent with the "Seven Cardinal Rules of Risk Communication,' the fifth of
which is to "coordinate and collaborate with other credible sources."
We do not believe the report "goes to great length to erroneously criticize" CEQ's
efforts "to coordinate health and safety communications." In accordance with the first
assignment objective, the report appropriately examines the analytical basis for EPA's
major public communications regarding air quality. To the extent that reassuring
words were added to EPA's draft press release and cautionary words were deleted, it
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Report No. 2003-P-00012
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is important to understand the basis for such changes in the Agency's risk
communications. The report also provides the former EPA OCEMR Associate
Administrator's explanation for why EPA's press releases did not discuss health
effects or contain a recommendation that residents obtain professional cleaning.
Additionally, as noted by the former EPA Chief of Staff, factors other than protecting
human health and the environment entered into the determinations of the information
that would be communicated to the public, including national security considerations
and the desire to re-open Wall Street.
Note 4 - We agree that EPA made its data available to the public. However, based on the
documentation we reviewed and our discussions with numerous environmental
experts, both within and outside of EPA, we do not agree that the Agency's statement
on September 18, 2001 that the air was safe to breathe reflected the Agency's best
professional advice. In contrast, based on the circumstances outlined in Chapter 2 of
the report, it appeared that EPA's best professional advice was overruled when
relaying information to the public in the weeks immediately following the disaster.
Note 5 - We applaud EPA's efforts to evaluate its response and implement changes. We
believe the report sufficiently acknowledges EPA's efforts to implement its "lessons
learned." The draft report's Executive Summary acknowledges EPA's "lessons
learned" efforts and highlights specific actions the Agency initiated. In addition,
Chapter 7 of the report discusses EPA's "lessons learned" efforts in great detail.
Note 6 - We do not believe the report "is flawed in its lack of recognition" of the issues
discussed. In regard to the absence of a long-term health threat, the Agency did not
have a sound basis for reaching this conclusion at the time for the numerous reasons
detailed in the report. Further, as noted in the report, the position that EPA took
regarding WTC is inconsistent with the Agency's historical position that there is no
safe level of asbestos.
In regard to the comment about the Agency advising people who were experiencing
acute health problems to see their physician, no supporting documentation has been
identified which shows that EPA instructed residents to see their physicians. We also
provided agency officials with the opportunity to provide us with documentation
which supported specific statements, but none has been provided to date.
In regard to EPA discussing acute health problems, we reviewed extensive
information on EPA's risk communications, including all of the documents and
videocassettes which were provided by Region 2 and EPA's Office of Public Affairs.
We agree there were instances where documentation indicated agency spokespersons
discussed acute health problems. However, as detailed in the draft report, EPA's
press releases generally did not discuss potential acute health problems or the need to
see a physician (except for rescue and cleanup workers at Ground Zero). The words
"physician," "doctor," "acute," "symptoms," and "sensitive," do not appear in any of
EPA's WTC press releases. Considering the totality of all the information we
reviewed, it is our opinion that EPA did not communicate a clear, or consistent
message on this subject. We agree that EPA advised rescue and cleanup workers to
132 Report No. 2003-P-00012
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take safety precautions. This agreement is detailed on page 9 of the draft report and
illustrated in Appendix P.
We do not agree that EPA "emphasized" the need for professional cleaning because
this concept was not discussed in EPA's press releases. According to the OCEMR
Associate Administrator, a recommendation to obtain professional cleaning was
deleted from an EPA press release by a CEQ official. As detailed in the draft report,
EPA's press releases referred the public to a New York City Department of Health
web site which recommended that people clean their own residences and businesses
using wet rags, wet mops, and HEPA vacuums.
Note 7 - We do not believe that "The Report erroneously focuses" on five early Agency press
releases. We reviewed many different types of information from many different
sources including videocassettes which were provided by Region 2. We made
extensive efforts to locate all relevant records. For example, by contacting the
Administrator's Press Secretary and Scheduling Director, we were able to determine
the date of a videotaped newscast which showed the Administrator advising the
public orally about obtaining professional cleaning on October 26, 2001. Similarly,
we worked closely with Region 2 officials and agreed with their analysis that EPA's
web site recommended professional cleaning at least as early as December 11, 2001.
In summary, although EPA's subsequent communications sometimes added
information or clarification to the message presented in the press releases, the
Agency's overall message of reassurance about long-term health impacts did not
change.
In regard to the comment in the response to the draft report about EPA's "massive
outreach program," we note, as detailed in the draft report, that a NYCDOH study,
other lessons learned reports, and testimony provided at various hearings indicated
that the public did not receive adequate air quality information and that individuals
cleaned their residences without using proper procedures or personal protection.
Note 8 - We agree there were no health-based standards for many of the pollutants encountered
in the aftermath of the WTC attacks, and the report does not intend to find fault with
EPA or any other government organization for not having developed those
benchmarks beforehand. However, we do not agree with using certain criteria-based
benchmarks - particularly the NESHAP asbestos-containing material definition of
one percent asbestos - as health-related benchmarks when environmental
professionals clearly acknowledge that this standard is not protective of health.
Note 9 - The Agency is to be commended for its proactive approach to analyzing its response
to the WTC collapse and initiating improvements to its emergency response
capabilities. We disagree with the Agency's comment that this report "trivializes both
the horrendous event that occurred and the extraordinary efforts of EPA and other
responders." The primary objective of the report is to ensure that, if such a tragedy
were to happen again; the public and emergency responders impacted by the disaster
would receive the best available advice, protection, and assistance that the
Government can provide.
133 Report No. 2003-P-00012
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General Observations
Note 10 - We agree that the Agency's response to the WTC collapse was unprecedented and
enormous in terms of resources and human effort. Page 5 of the draft report
acknowledged the many other activities - in addition to the air quality related
activities - that EPA conducted in response to this tragedy.
Note 11 - We agree that the Agency undertook extraordinary efforts to provide information to
the public and we acknowledge that the documents we reviewed indicated EPA
provided full disclosure of sampling results. However, in our opinion, the importance
of Agency press releases should not be minimized. As detailed in the draft report,
EPA press releases result from a deliberative process that should reflect the Agency's
official position on significant issues. Press releases are made available to essentially
all news media and may well be quoted or paraphrased in radio, television, and other
forms of communication. In our opinion, the Agency could have provided more
complete and more useful information in its press releases.
We also agree that future incidents may involve scenarios that cannot be anticipated.
In order to address this possibility, the draft report recommends that EPA designate
teams of Agency experts - at both the National and Regional level - who can be
mobilized quickly to provide needed technical support during a response, and that the
Agency develop expert panels that can be used to quickly develop health-related
benchmarks in emergency situations.
Chapter 2
Note 12 - We fully recognize the extraordinary circumstances that existed at the time the
statement was made about the air being safe to breathe. However, for the reasons
detailed in the draft report, there was insufficient information to support the statement
made and the principle of acknowledging uncertainty was relevant.
We disagree with the assertion that EPA's statement about the air being safe to
breathe would clearly be understood by New Yorkers as applying exclusively to
asbestos. The press release sentence which preceded the subject statement asserts that
New Yorkers are "not being exposed to excessive levels of asbestos or other harmful
substances . . . ." The same press release also states that sample tests results are
"below established levels of concern for asbestos, lead and volatile organic
compounds."
Note 13 - We agree that, to our knowledge, EPA never withheld data from the public, and the
draft report makes this point (page 10). The draft report does not imply that it is
"unusual" or "unexpected" for the Agency to coordinate with CEQ during a
"catastrophic disaster." In such a situation we would expect EPA to coordinate with
numerous government entities and any non-government entity that could provide
needed services. However, we would expect EPA to remain fully committed to its
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mission of "protecting human health and the environment" during a catastrophic
disaster. We understand that national security considerations or the desire to re-open
Wall Street may affect certain communications. However, in our opinion, if such
considerations cause EPA to omit or change statements that would otherwise have
been made in its efforts to fulfill its mission, the Agency risks harm to its long term
credibility as an authoritative source of health information for the public in times of
crisis. EPA needs to acknowledge significant collaborations and, where necessary,
qualify its communications appropriately. We agree with the goals of EPA's
Homeland Security Strategic Plan which commit EPA to disseminating quality
environmental information to all levels of government, industry and the public.
Chapter 3
Note 14 - We agree that, from the beginning, EPA and other government entities provided
advice to residents to cleanup indoor spaces using wet rags, wet mops, and HEPA
vacuums. As detailed in the draft report, EPA's Administrator and various Agency
spokespersons orally advised the public to obtain professional cleaning when the dust
was in their residences was "more than minimal," "a heavy amount," etc. However,
we note the Agency's web site referred readers to NYC guidance and that a
NYCDOH press release reassured residents that it was "unnecessary to wear a mask"
while cleaning indoor spaces, and if a HEPA filtration vacuum was not available,
simply "wetting the dust down with water and removing it with rags and mops is
recommended."
In regard to potential exposures to asbestos and other contaminants, we note that a
study of immigrant workers used to clean indoor space contaminated with WTC dust
disclosed that these workers were not provided with personal protective equipment.
The study reported that these workers reported health symptoms including coughing,
sore throat, nasal congestion, chest tightness, headaches, fatigue, dizziness, and sleep
disturbances that worsened after September 11, 2001. Further, a NYCDOH survey
conducted in October 2001 found that the majority of residents polled had not
followed the recommended cleaning procedures of using wet rags and HEPA
vacuums. With respect, to the effectiveness of the cleaning studies, we note that
EPA's Confirmation Cleaning Study report dated May 2003 found that:
. . . one to three cleanings were necessary to reduce contamination levels to
below health-based benchmarks, and the number of cleanings required generally
correlated with the levels of contamination initially identified in the units.
We continue to believe unprotected workers and residents may have experienced
unnecessary exposures to asbestos and other pollutants.
Note 15 - We agree EPA repeatedly stated that workers at Ground Zero should wear respirators,
and that the Agency raised these concerns to local officials as discussed in Appendix
L of the report. However, EPA's advice that workers wear respirators was directed to
Ground Zero workers at the debris pile, and not to workers who cleaned contaminated
indoor spaces outside the perimeter of Ground Zero. In regard to EPA's statements
135 Report No. 2003-P-00012
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that they repeatedly advised sensitive sub-populations and people experiencing acute
symptoms to consult a physician, we note that these warnings were not presented in
EPA's press releases. We attempted to verify the extent to which EPA advised these
other groups through other forms of communication. For example, we reviewed
briefing notes prepared for public meetings that EPA. These briefing notes showed
that EPA officials intended to discuss sensitive populations at two public meetings in
October 2001. We also reviewed newspaper and other news articles to determine
when EPA publicly provided such advice. Based on the evidence EPA provided to
us, and our own independent research, we were not able to conclude that EPA
"... repeatedly advised anyone with acute symptoms to consult with their
physicians..."
Chapter 4
Note 16 - We acknowledge the difficulty in implementing NESHAP work practices in the
aftermath of the WTC collapse and agree that these work practices should not be
implemented to the detriment of rescue operations in any emergency situation.
However, even in the aftermath of an emergency, appropriate measures should be
taken to the extent practical to reduce the exposure of emergency responders, clean-up
crews, and the surrounding public to asbestos emissions.
Chapter 5
Note 17 - We agree that EPA conducted many activities to support efforts to alert Ground Zero
workers to health-related issues, and we discuss these actions in Appendix L of the
report.
Note 18 - EPA notes that the public sometimes wants information that is not scientifically
available, or is not available quickly. We agree that this may sometimes be the case.
EPA guidance in discussing the 4th rule of the "The Seven Cardinal Rule of Risk
Communication" states: "If you do not know an answer or are uncertain, acknowledge
it and respond with the answer as soon as possible."
Chapter 6
Note 19 - The Agency states that there are many residential and commercial buildings below
Canal Street, and that a cleanup program including all of them would be a
monumental undertaking that EPA studies and data indicate is not necessary. We
agree that this would require a significant effort. However, the former EPA
Administrator stated in September 2001 that the President made it to clear to spare no
expense and to do everything needed to make sure the people of New York City were
safe as far as the environment was concerned.
Note 20 - We agree that the vast amount of outdoor dust and debris has been removed, and thus
exterior sources for contamination of indoor spaces have been significantly reduced.
However, any indoor spaces contaminated with WTC dust that have not been cleaned
using proper techniques will likely remain contaminated. The Agency notes that in
136 Report No. 2003-P-00012
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95% of the residences that were cleaned and tested or cleaned only, the asbestos
readings were non-detect. It is encouraging that 95% were non-detect. However, it is
not clear which sampling methods were used in obtaining these readings, what
asbestos levels were present in the remaining 5 percent, and whether EPA believes
possible asbestos contamination in 5 percent of the residences is acceptable. See note
24 for our comments regarding cleaning effectiveness.
Note 21 - Concerning the use of aggressive sampling, we agree that the use of a leaf blower
does not represent normal activity in a residence. Neither does the use of a leaf
blower represent normal activity in a school room, although the AHERA standard
requires its use for clearing a school room after an asbestos abatement. Under a
standard asbestos cleaning, all items in a room would be cleaned thoroughly, even
documents as was done when cleaning a courthouse in Titusville, FL. In a private
residence, especially when cleaning is voluntary and the owner can refuse to have
individual items touched, it is extremely difficult to ensure that each item is cleaned
of every microscopic asbestos fiber, yet this degree of cleaning should be the intent of
the cleanup. Use of a blower prior to aggressive sampling serves to stir up the air, re-
entrain dust and fibers in the air stream, and allow negative air filtration equipment to
trap fibers that have been missed in the wet cleaning process or skipped entirely. It
thus can be as much a cleaning procedure as a sampling procedure. We believe it is a
necessary adjunct to the type of cleaning performed in NYC.
Note 22 - We accept EPA's statement that Agency officials qualitatively evaluated the potential
for health risks beyond the current boundaries established for the residential cleanup.
However, if a future disaster were to occur, we believe the boundaries of any
government-organized cleanup should be based on a systematic, quantitative approach
to determining the extent of contamination.
Note 23 - EPA issued a revised "World Trade Center Indoor Environment Assessment:
Selecting Contaminants of Potential Concern and Setting Health-Based Benchmarks,"
as well as a "Response to Peer Review Comments on the Report." We note that both
these documents cite the "World Trade Center Background Study Report" and the
"Interim Final WTC Residential Confirmation Cleaning Study" which were issued in
April and May 2003, respectively. Neither of these documents were available when
the TERA panel peer reviewed the original COPC document in October 2002. In
light of the significant, detailed comments that the peer review panel had on the
original report, the detailed responses made in EPA's response document, and the fact
that additional information is now available that was not available during the first
peer review, we continue to believe it is appropriate that EPA re-submit the revised
report, with newly issued supporting documentation, for peer review.
Note 24 - EPA states the belief that". . . health-based asbestos-in-air clearance testing is
effective in reducing the potential for risk related to [other] WTC contaminants." We
note that 82% of the residential units re-cleaned during the Cleaning Study [Interim
Final WTC Residential Confirmation Cleaning Study, Vol. 1, pp. 113-114] had to be
re-cleaned because the sampling filters were too clogged with dust to be analyzed.
While we agree with the decision to re-clean residences under this circumstance, we
137 Report No. 2003-P-00012
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also interpret this to mean that, after cleaning, the units were still too dusty to pass the
clearance test over 80 percent of the time. This is evidence that the cleaning process,
although conducted under close EPA oversight, was often not successful. We had no
evidence that this cleaning process would be more successful under the oversight of
others, nor that the risks from exposure to other contaminants would be significantly
reduced when the residence passes the asbestos clearance test.
Note 25 - Our recommendation applies to the interior building system in buildings with central
heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC), composed of furnace/cooling coils
and condenser, plenum, filtration system, supply ducts, and return ducts or return
open air plenums. We continue to believe that these buildings should be treated and
cleaned as an entire building system rather than as individual apartments because of
the high likelihood that uncleaned subparts of the system will re-contaminate the
entire system when the system is re-energized after cleaning of registers/ducts in a
single or small group of apartments. We do not believe the absence of "widespread
exceedences" provides sufficient assurances that public health is protected. EPA's
own regulations state that asbestos is a known human carcinogen with no known safe
level of exposure.
Note 26 - As indicated on page 9 of its response, EPA indicates that it has coordinated with
OSHA throughout the indoor cleaning program, and that OSHA is prepared to address
worker complaints. While we commend EPA and OSHA for coordinating on this
issue, we continue to believe EPA, OSHA, and FEMA should assess the need for a
work space cleaning program and formally come to an agreement as to whether or not
work spaces should be addressed pro-actively by a cleaning program.
Chapter 7
Note 27 - Based on the events that unfolded after September 11, 2001 it is clear that the public
looks to EPA for its advice and opinions on issues related to the environment. We
expect that the public and the Department of Homeland Security will continue to look
to EPA for its professional advice and judgment on matters related to the
environment.
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Report No. 2003-P-00012
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Appendix S
New York City's Response to Draft Report Excerpts
The City of New York
Law Dfipaktmknt
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August 4, 2003
BY FACSIMILE AND OVERNIGHT DELIVERY
V(r. Rick Bcussc
U.S. OPA Office of the Inspector Ge I
Mail Drop: N-2S3-01
K I P. North Carolina 27111
Re: City of New York's Response To Draft Evaluation Report; BPA's
Response lu ihu Work] Trade Center Collapse: Lessons Learned,
Assignment No. 2002-000070?
Dear Mr. Bcussc:
Thank you for the opportunity to respond to the revised excerpts from the Draft
Evaluation Report: CPA's Response to the World Trade Center Collapse: Lessons Learned,
Assignment No, 2002-0000702, This response is on behalf of The City of New York (the
"City"), In addition to this response, the City requests that you consider the City's response to
tie initial excerpts that the EPA forwarded to the City. That response was made by letter dated
July 7,2003 from this office to the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA"), a copy of which
is enclosed, and was supported by submissions of documents by letters dated July 10,21 and 22,
2003.
www, nyc.gov
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Report No. 2003-P-00012
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Page 2
Mr, Rick Beusse
August 4,2003
Before commenting on the excerpts thai were forwarded to the City, we note that
although this office requested the entire draft report so that the City would best be able to address
the portions of the report concerning the City, only excerpts were supplied Without access to
the entire draft report to place sections concerning the City into context, the City is
disadvantaged in providing comments to the excerpts. However, portions of the excerpts
concerning the City compel a response by the City and the City hereby responds to the best of its
ability, as follows:
1. The third sentence in the first paragraph on page 1 of the cxccrpts of the
revised draft report is misleading. The sentence implies that the HP A assumed a lead role
iai responding to indoor environmental concerns because of criticism of the City. It
implies furthermore that criticism of the City was warranted. The evidence does not
support a conclusion that the EPA took a lead role with respect to this issue solely
becau.se of criticism of the City. There were a number of factors present at that time
which appear to have influenced the liPA, including criticism of the EPA and the initial
availability of federal funds at that time to address this issue. More importantly, there is
no evidence that any criticism of the City with respect to indoor environmental concerns
was warranted. Also, the sentence refers to EPA initiating a multi-agency task force at
that lime. This implies that this was the fust time thai federal, state and City agencies
worked together to address this issue. The documents supplied by the City show that
federal, stale and City agencies worked together beginning September 12, 2001 to
address a wide variety of environmental issues, including indoor environmental concerns.
We recommend that the sentence be revised to read, "CPA began lo assume a lead role in
February 2002, when the Agency chaired a multi-agency task force to continue to address
concerns about the indoor environment."
2. The City has similar comments with respect to the paragraph labeled "Indoor
Contamination "Response" on page 1. This paragraph refers to concerns raised by public
and elected officials and specific criticism of the City. Again, including this criticism
appears to imply that the criticism was warranted, particularly since the City's position is
not presented. We note that in the same paragraph, where criticism of the KPA is set
forth, the EPA's position is presented in rebuttal to the criticism. The Cily believes that
the evidence does not support the criticism of the Cily. For example, criticism
concerning delegating testing and remediation effort? to building owners and residents is
unwarranted. The City did not delegate this responsibility to owners and residents. The
owners and residents always have had this responsibility, it was never the City's
responsibility to do this and consequently the Cily could not delegate what it did not
have. Similarly, there is no evidence that the City did not enforce proper procedures for
cleaning asbestos where it had the enforcement authority or that the City gave improper
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advice to the public on testing and cleaning procedures. As noted in the City's previous
submission dated July 7, 2003, the EPA adopted the City's advice to its citizens.
Moreover, including these criticisms implies that there was asbestos in these buildings-
There is no evidence to support a claim that any significant number of buildings were
contaminated with asbestos. Both the sampling conducted by many agencies and the
City's response to complaints concerning asbestos, where out of over 300 responses to
complaints there was only 1 finding of asbestos above the threshold level, demonstrate
that asbestos containing material was not present above the threshold level in these
buildings. References to criticisms are also not appropriate for this substantive section of
the EPA report. The City does not dispute that there was criticism, but the criticism is
irrelevant to whether the City and EPA followed the appropriate statutes, regulations and
procedures. While the criticism may provide an impetus for conducting an evaluation, it
does not provide any substantive basis for the findings in the report. To include the
criticism in the substantive portion of the report in the manner in which it is included
erroneously implies that the criticism has been substantiated and is unduly prejudicial to
the City. Accordingly, the City recommends that this paragraph be deleted.
3. Concerning the second sentence in the paragraph labeled "Initial Actions
Taken by New York City and EPA" on page 1, although the City was not provided with
the documentation, the City has been informed that there is EPA documentation
concerning an alleged statement by the City that it would not be requesting federal
assistance. The documentation, which appears to be quoted on page 4 and 5 of the
revised report, refers to a conversation between the EPA and the U.S. Public Health
Service and the New York State Department of Health, where these agencies allegedly
relayed to EPA the alleged statement by the City. It is impossiWe for the City to
comment on the source of the statement given its vagueness and the fact that it is not
attributed to any individual or agency. The City can, however, confirm that the statement
is contrary to its repeatedly expressed position that it welcomed any authorized federal
assistance at that point in time. To include this statement and purport to characterize the
City's position based on a single, un attributed, out-of-context statement is unfair to the
City. This is not the type of reliable evidence that should be required to support findings
in an Inspector General report. The City therefore recommends that the statement be
deleted.
4. Concerning the last sentence in the first full paragraph on page 2, the City
believes EPA Region 2's comment that it did not want to take a more assertive stance
because it would create a confrontation is not valid for more reasons than just that EPA
was the lead agency for Emergency Support Function #10. From September 12,2001 to
the end of the Response Effort, the EPA was thoroughly involved in the effort. EPA had
a "seat at the table" as demonstrated by the documents submitted by the City. Moreover,
there was a cooperative relationship between EPA and the City. The EPA provided
support for the Response Effort's overall health and medical response, which coordinated
both environmental health and worker safety issues. In fact, when at a point in time
during the Response Effort, EPA suggested that its functions be transitioned to a
contractor, the City urged the EPA not to do this and to continue to maintain an on-site
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presence and be part of the team. To suggest that EPA could not become more assertive
or involved because it would create a confrontation is inconsistent with the evidence.
5. The first paragraph in the section labeled "New York City's Initial Response"
on page 2 is misleading. It fails to mention that the City's policy and practice in the past
was to hold building owners responsible for maintaining a safe environment and when
necessary cleaning up their buildings. In other previous disasters, the federal government
did not provide for federal funding to municipalities to clean privately owned buildings
or property. The City consequently had. no authority to request reimbursement for this
activity and no authority to enter privately owned buildings to effect such a cleanup
without the owner's consent or the finding of imminent hazard. Thus, the second
sentence is misleading. We recommend that the first three sentences be modified as
follows: "Consistent with past practices and federal law, building owners were initially
held responsible for cleaning their own buildings. According to New York City officials,
the issue of funding the cleanup of privately owned buildings was discussed with FEMA
and the EPA. Initially, the federal position was that the Stafford Act, the statute which
provides authority for federal disaster response, did not provide direct funding to the City
for cleanup of privately owned buildings. During this discussion, the federal agencies
were informed that owners of privately owned buildings would be responsible for
funding the cleanup of their buildings and agreed with this course of action. Building
owners, who needed help, were directed to the Disaster Assistance Service Center
(DASC) where they could apply for financial assistance from FEMA."
6. Concerning the first Ml paragraph on page 4, which begins, "NYCDEP
officials told us. .the paragraph is misleading in that there never had been a
certification program to determine the level of compliance with NYCDEP instructions
concerning cleaning of privately owned buildings. Also, the paragraph does not reflect
the proactive efforts of the NYCDEP and the fact that NYCDEP not only told EPA it
cleaned all of the rest of the buildings, but provided documentation. The City suggests
that the first sentence be revised to read, "NYCDEP officials told us they have never had
and did not create a certification program, nor did they have authority to create such a
program, to determine the level of compliance with their instructions regarding the
testing and cleaning of asbestos inside buildings, unless a complaint was made or an
asbestos abatement notification was filed with the City." The City suggests that an
additional sentence be added that states, "However, NYCDEP made significant efforts,
including establishing an additional "hotline" to insure that residents could obtain
information concerning asbestos cleanup and could report any asbestos related
problems." We suggest that the last sentence of the paragraph be revised to read,
"NYCDEP officials provided documentation that the remaining buildings were cleaned
by NYCDEP with FEMA funding."
7. With respect to the first full paragraph on page 5, which alleges that New York
City officials told EPA that the City would not be requesting EPA assistance with respect
to sampling and reoccupation issues, without further information such as who the New
York City officials were, or even what New York City agency they represented, it is
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impossible for the City to comment on the source of the allegation. Again, the City at
that time was willing and eager to accept all authorized federal assistance. Moreover, as
shown in the documents submitted by the City, the City had accepted U.S. Public Health
Service and Agency for Toxie Substances and Disease Registry (ATSDR) assistance in
conducting indoor air sampling. Thus, it would he inconsistent for lie City to refuse the
assistance of the EPA — another federal agency — in this matter. In fact, EPA
participated in the discussion with ATSDR concerning the protocol for the Indoor Air
Study. The City has already commented concerning the alleged statement made on
September 30, 2001, which is referenced in this paragraph (see item 3, above) and will
not repeat its comments. The City recommends that the two sentences that refer to the
statements allegedly made on October 9,2001 and September 30,2001 be deleted.
8. The City believes that the paragraph labeled "Multi-Agency Residential
Cleanup Undertaken" on page 5 is somewhat misleading. The second sentence suggests
that the sole basis for EPA's involvement in indoor air in February 2002 was that it
believed the City could not handle all the issues involved in this matter. This is not
accurate. First, EPA did not just become involved in indoor issues in February 2002. As
shown by the documents submitted by the City, EPA was involved in indoor air issues as
early as September 29, 2001. Second, there were a number of events that coalesced
around February 2002 that brought about more involvement in indoor issues by the EPA,
including, public criticism of the EPA and, perhaps most importantly, the initial
availability of federal funding for indoor cleaning of private residences. Therefore, the
City recommends that the second sentence be deleted.
9. The first paragraph in the section labeled "EPA Role on Indoor Environment"
on page 5 is misleading. It refers to the portion of the NCP which allows a state or local
agency to take the lead role in the case of a hazardous substance release. However, in
this case, the site was not declared a hazardous waste site. We recommend that a
footnote be added to this sentence noting that the site was not declared a hazardous waste
site.
10. In the first paragraph of the subsection labeled "Cleaning Instructions" on
page 6, the report opines that as a result of the failure of the City to recommend that
residents obtain professional cleaning, long term health risks may have been increased for
individuals who cleaned their residences without using respirators and other professional
cleaning equipment. This is speculation that is not supported by the evidence. Indoor air
sampling data along with the "Interim Final WTC Residential Confirmation Cleaning
Study," completed by EPA Region 2 in May 2003, confirm that the methods
recommended by the City, and adopted in the EPA website, were appropriate.
Accordingly, we recommend that this paragraph be deleted.
11. The last paragraph in this section is also inaccurate. The City strongly
contests the current opinion of asbestos medical experts contained in the first sentence of
this paragraph. First, a huge body of test results established that asbestos contamination
in indoor air was virtually nonexistent. Also, the conclusion of the experts completely
ignores the practicality of the situation, in that for respiratory protection to be effective,
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the user must be fit tested first and also that it is medically dangerous for an individual to
wear a respirator without being medically cleared. Finally, the last two sentences of the
paragraph are sheer speculation. There is no evidence as to how the individuals cleaned
their residences. More importantly, as noted previously, there is no evidence of asbestos
contamination in indoor air that would support the requirement to use abatement
procedures or support the speculation that if abatement procedures were not used, health
risks would be increased. Accordingly, this paragraph should be deleted.
12. Page 7 provided to the City is blank,
13. As a technical correction, in the first paragraph on page 8, the New York
State Department of Labor, not the Department of Environmental Conversation, is
delegated the responsibility for implementing federal regulations under the NESHAP
program.
14. Concerning the first full paragraph on page 9 of the draft report, the City
believes that given the prominent mention of the NESHAP notification requirement, this
paragraph should include a sentence indicating that the EPA, because of its involvement,
had functional notice of the demolition and everything concerning the demolition and
that, as a practical matter, notification would not likely have changed the manner in
which demolition was conducted- We recommend that the following sentences be added
at the beginning of the paragraph, "While the EPA and other agencies were not provided
formal written notice of the WTC demolition activities, the EPA and other regulatory
agencies had notice, in advance, of the demolition activities and the manner in which they
were being conducted as a result of these agencies' involvement in the Response Effort.
EPA and the other regulatory agencies did not object to these activities and even if formal
written notification was provided, it is doubtful the activities would have been conducted
in any different manner."
15. As the only intact asbestos containing material encountered at the WTC site
was below grade, the City recommends that the first sentence of the first paragraph on
page 10 be revised to read, "Both NYCDDC and EPA officials told us that asbestos
containing material (e.g., pipe wrapping, steel insulation) was only encountered below
grade, and when it was encountered during removal it was tested and treated in
accordance with asbestos abatement procedures."
16. The last sentence of the footnote on page 11 should be modified to provide a
more complete explanation. The sentence should read, "Furthermore, they stated thai the
vehicles did not require decontamination since they were not transporting hazardous
waste as defined by the EPA under 40 CFR Part 260-280. While decontamination
procedures were not required, wash down procedures were mandated."
17. The first paragraph in the section labeled 'Transfer of Debris to Barges'* on
page 12 is misleading and unfairly prejudicial to the City. It is based on citizen
complaints rather than substantial evidence. The testimony of people complaining may
be a useful starting point for analysis but it must be evaluated very carefully. This has
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not been done here. This paragraph, without any critical evaluation al all, seems to
accept all of the complaints as true. The verifiable evidence available, however, suggests
that the complaints are unfounded. Only one aspect of the testimony is true. The trucks
transporting WTC debris were not marked as carrying hazardous waste. They were not
marked in tills manner because they were not carrying hazardous waste as defined by the
EPA. This is just one example of testimony that should have been critically evaluated
before being included in the report. Of" more concern is the uncritical acceptance of
testimony of trucks not being wetted down properly and trucks not being covered
properly, both allegedly resulting in the release of dust. The area around Stuyvcsant High
School was among the most thoroughly monitored in the City. There is no data, to show
that this area was contaminated by the operation of the transfer station for WTC debris
from tracks to barges in the vicinity of the i Ji«h School. Thus, if there was a release of
dust, it was so insignificant as to present no risk at all to health unci safety and should not
be highlighted in this report. EPA, itself, represents that air sampling concerning barge
operations indicated that 99.83% of the samples were below the screening levels. The
City consequently recommends that this paragraph "be deleted.
18, The paragraph that begins at the bottom of page 12 should be modified. The
last sentence reports that there was lead I bund in the ventilation system of Stuyvesant
High School. The sentence also reports that it was not determined whether (Ms lead was
from WTC fallout Environmental monitoring iti lower Manhattan indicates that airborne
lead levels averaged over 90 days (from September 2001 through November 2001) did
not exceed the EPA National Ambient Air Quality Standard (NAAQS) of 1.5 ug/m3.
Given these results and the ubiquity of tetraethyl lead in urban environments from its use
in leaded gasoline, it is very unlikely that the lead lound in the ventilation system was
from WTC fallout. Even if it was, this has nothing to do with the City's response to the
terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center. While this may be of some academic
interest, it has no place in this part of the report The City recommends that this sentence
be deleted.
19. The Hist paragraph in the section labeled "Asbestos Levels During
Demolition and Debris Removal" is misleading. It unduly emphasizes that after
September 2001 there were 7 air monitoring samples which exceeded the AH ERA
standard. The paragraph fails to mention that. EPA collected a total of 12,676 ambient
samples in lower Manhattan for phase contrast light microscopy analysis and 8,872
samples for transmission electronic microscopy analysis. Considered in this context, the
fact that there were only seven exceedances demonstrate-; that the response actions taken
were appropriate. The report mischaracterizes the seven exceedances as showing the
sporadic presence of asbestos in the ambient air. Given the extensive monitoring, less
than one exceedance per month can hardly be characterised as "sporadic." We
recommend that the paragraph be revised to delete the table showing the exceedances and
any reference to the table be deleted. Also, the reference that two of the exceedanccs
were near Stuyvcsant High School should be deleted. Reference to Stuyvesant implies
that this location should be given preference over other locations near the site. The fourth
sentence of the paragraph should be revised to read, "Out of approximately 21,000
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samples taken from October 2001 through May 2002 there were only seven exceedances
of the A HERA standard."
20. The second full paragraph on page 20 beginning, "The indoor residential
cleanup program" is inaccurate, The second sentence states that the Governor of New
York did not declare a public health emergency. In fact, the Governor declared a
"general emergency," which is construed to include a public health emergency. Also, the
fourth sentence states that the City indicated that an indoor cleanup was, not necessary.
This is not correct. At no time did the City indicate that an indoor cleanup was not
necessary. In fact, early in the "Response KfforC the City inquired concerning the
availability of federal fimis to pay for such a cleanup. Hie City also widely disseminated
guidelines for building owners and tenants to clean indoor spaces. The City accordingly
recommends that the second sentence he modified to delete the phra.se, "and the
Governor of New York did not declare a public health emergency lor this incident.'' We
recommend that the fourth sentence of the paragraph he deleted,
21. We strongly recommend that the respirator sections contained within pages
16 through 1 "> be completely taken nut of this report. Work place safety and personal
protective equipment arc matters within the jurisdiction of OS1IA. These matters are,
therefore, inappropriate for assessment b\ EPA-OIG. Further, much of the material
concerning respirators appears to he based on two reports that are inaccurate, incomplete
and insufficiently researched. If these sections remain in the report, we advise the
following: The sec I ion entitled ''Respirator Use at Ground Zero Lacking" should be
changed to "Respirator Use at Ground Zero." Within that section, the first sentence
should be changed to read: "A widely publicized aspect of the WTC response was the
less than 1 CM>% compliance with requirements to use respirators by rescue and
construction crews," since there was nut a total lack of respirator use. The second
sentence should be changed to: "It was beyond the scope of this review to determine the
extent of noncompliance with respirator requirements and why this occurred" for the
same reason. The fourth sentence within that section should read' "Our limited work in
this area indicated that respirators were widely available hut provisions of the site
requirements for using respirators were not fully complied with for a number ol reasons"
since there was a plethora of respirators at the site. The. sixih sentence contains several
i naccuracies and should be changed to: "Other reasons appeared to include the
respirators1 interference, due to the state of the technology, with the ability of emergency
workers to communicate and conflicting messages about the air quality at Ground Zero."
22. The section entitled "Reports on Lack of Respirator Use" on page 17 should
be completely deleted because, while it purports to represent a total picture of site
operations, it in fact presents a very narrow and skewed snapshot by the author, who was
at the site for a very limited number of hours, and who misidentilied a key City agency -
the Department of Design and Construction — and its role in the rescue and recovery
efforts. The bullet points should be taken out with the exception of the point starting with
"During the September 22-26 period," because there were thousands oi rescue and clean-
up workers on the site and a JDDC official monitoring safety at the site personally
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observed many who did wear .respi.ra.ta.rs diligently. There are hundreds of photographs
(hat depict the use of respiratory equipment and hard hats. Respirator use was '.racked
and enforced throughout the response to the disaster. In addition, this was not a
hazardous waste operation. OSHA defines the scope of a "hazardous waste operation" as
"dean up upci atiuns rwjuii ed by a governmental body, whet her led trial, state, local or
other, involving hazardous substances (hat are eonducied at uncontrolled hat^ardo jy waste
sites." Although the debris produced by the collapse of the WTC did contain minor
eoncentrations of various contaminants, including ashestos, fiberglass and alkaline
eement dusl. extensive sampling never indicated the presence of hazardous waste as
defined by the F.PA in Resource Conservation and Recovery Act regulations 40 CFR
Parts 260-280. In addition, there was an aggressive safety and health effort underway,
spearheaded by the DDC and OSIIA working in close collaboration. Beginning
September 12, 2001, daily health and safety meetings were held and attended by multiple
City, Stale and Federal agencies, including HP A, KBMA. OSI 1A, DEC, DDC, DOH,
DEP, FDNY, NYPD and OliM, together with the contractors' safety personnel, at which
air monitoring and PPH protocols were discussed and established. There was a
preliminary "Accident Prevention Plan" in place from September 14, 2001 through
October 29, 2001, at which time the World Trade Center Liniergeney "1-nvirurmient,
Safety and 1 leallh Plan" went into elicet, l earns of safety and health professionals
worked around the clock providing "direct intervention" to gel workers to eoir.ply with
basic safety and health requirements, especially the use of PPE-i. There were as many as
30 safety professionals on site each day. OSHA employees were constantly roving the
site with safety equipment, and provided hands-on instruction and preliminary fit
checking at IS 89 and at supply caches on the site. There are tens of thousands ot
documents which record these multi-agency health and safety efforts, many nf which
have already been provided to the EPA. Additional documents can be provided upon
request.
23. On page 18, the first sentence beginning with "In contrast" should read as
follows: "In contrast to the recovery operation at. the WTC site, the January 2002 report
rioted that workers conducting WTC debris sorting and inspection at the Fresh Kills
landfill wore half-face respirators, hard hats, eye protection, and Tyvck suits." "Hie
lantiiiai>e that the work at Fresh Kills was handled us a "hazardous waste operation"
should be eliminated because WTC cebris at the Fresh Kills landfill, and at Ground Zero,
did not call for a hazardous waste response under OSHA or EPA standards, iioi was it
handled as such. The next sentence should heyin: "The author opined" to avoid an
erroneous impression that the reported information was an CPA finding. The sentence
beginning "to oilier words'' is inaccurate and should be replaced with- "The author's
perception was that PPE use was more prevalent at the Fresh Kills landfill than at the
WTC site." The report as written is again misleading, in describing the debris as
hazardous waste, and imsch aractenzes the Fresh Kills landfill operation, which presented
its own unique, multi-faceted challenges, as "less hazardous."
24. On page 19 the first sentence of the first full paragraph beginning "As the
rescue phase progressed," should be changed to read as follows: "As the rescue phase
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Mr. Rick Hcusse
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progressed, EPA emergency response officials told u.s (hey wcte concerned about the less
than 100% compliance with respirator requirements aJ (in •Kind A-.ro and outlined these
concerns in a letter to NYCDOH, dated October 5, 2001." 71ie third sentence of that
paragraph should tvmi "The letter noted that I'.PA had Tccomniended and continued to
recommend that workers at the site wear respiratory protection, and that workers comply
with procedures to prevent them from spreading debris from the site (o their ironies, cars,
and other locations" Again, "decontamination" nod "contaminants" language assumes a
hazardous waste operation, and this was not such an cvem.
To make it easier to understand our proposed, modifications to the respirator
sections contained within pages 16 through It, I have enclosed a copy of the excerpts from the
draft report with interlineations containing our proposed language
Thank you for the opportunity to comment concerning the revised draft report. If
you.have any questions, please do not hesitate to contact me or my staff.
Chief, World Trade Center Unit
Enclosures
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Appendix T
OIG Evaluation of New York City's Response to Draft
Excerpts
The following numbered notes respond to the numbered comments in New York City's response
in Appendix S.
1. We agree that there were a number of factors that caused EPA to assume a lead role in
responding to indoor environmental concerns, and that only presenting the criticism of
NYC and not EPA would be misleading. Our draft already recognized that EPA was
criticized as well and that this also influenced their actions regarding indoor concerns. The
sentence has been clarified by deleting the lead-in clause that only cited criticism of New
York City. The sentence now reads as follows:
EPA began to assume a lead role in February 2002, when the Agency initiated a
multi-agency task force to address concerns about the indoor environment
2. We presented the criticism as background information that is necessary for the reader to
understand the information that follows and to put this information into proper context.
Regarding indoor asbestos contamination, evidence does not support the City's contention
that there is "no evidence to support a claim that any significant number of buildings were
contaminated with asbestos." Appendix K to our report points out that an October 12, 2001
study of two residential buildings - one presumed to have significant WTC dust
contamination and the other not - found that both buildings had significant asbestos
contamination, ranging from 6,277 to 10,620 s/mm2 in one building and from 141 to 379 in
the other building - all of which are above the 70 s/mm2 level. As we also point out, from
September 2001 to September 2002 (when the indoor testing and cleaning program was
implemented), many residents returned and cleaned their own residences, leaving it
unknown as to the level of WTC dust contamination that actually was deposited in their
residences. Further, EPA recent cleaning confirmation study report notes that one to three
cleanings were necessary to achieve the health related clearance levels. We do not believe
changes are needed.
3. We do not agree with removing the cited information. In our opinion, an EPA Regional
Administrator's letter to a United States Congressman is evidence that we can cite in our
report. Further, EPA's Situation Reports represent evidence we can cite as these are
contemporaneous documents, that are completed soon after events are observed. We have
included NYC's position on this issue by adding the following sentence to the paragraph:
New York City officials disagreed with the characterizations of their
statements presented in these documents and told us that they repeatedly
expressed the position that the City welcomed any authorized federal
assistance at that time.
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4. No change is needed as this portion of the draft was removed during the editing process.
5. The City's position has been included in the final report as follows (revised sentences in
italics):
Initially, building owners were held responsible for cleaning up their own
buildings, including interiors and exteriors. According to New York City officials,
the issue of funding the cleanup of privately owned buildings was discussed with
FEMA and EPA; and the initial federal position was that the Stafford Act (the
implementing statute for the FRP) did not provide direct funding to New York
City for this cleanup. New York City officials said that during this discussion they
informed the federal agencies that building owners would be responsible for
funding the cleanup of their buildings and the federal agencies agreed with this
position. Under this arrangement, owners of rental units were responsible for
cleaning apartment walls, ceilings, and floors; common areas, such as hallways
and lobbies; and heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC) systems, when
deemed necessary as explained in guidance provided by New York City. Renters
were responsible for cleaning personal belongings. In resident-owned
condominiums, residents were responsible for cleaning their units, while building
owners were responsible for cleaning common areas and HVAC systems.
6. No change is needed as this phrase was deleted during the editing process.
7. See response to note 3.
8. See response to note 1 where we explain that there were a number of factors that caused
EPA to assume a lead role in responding to indoor environmental concerns. However,
according to the EPA Chief of Staff, who was highly knowledgeable of EPA's reasons for
becoming involved in indoor environmental concerns, EPA's reasons were as stated.
Further, recognizing the importance of this information, we confirmed this and other
information obtained from the Chief of Staff in writing.
9. A site does not have to be officially declared a "hazardous waste site" in order to engage
state/local response. The NCP Part 300.500 contains the state role provisions. Nothing in
this section precludes state/local involvement based on a formal declaration of the site.
CERCLA and the NCP plainly allow states to respond on their own to non-NPL sites, and
to decide whether to become the lead or support agency in Fund-financed sites.
Nonetheless, NYC's suggested footnote has been added to ensure clarity in describing the
response.
10. The cited sentence is based on evidence presented in the report which suggests that persons
cleaning apartments that contained WTC dust may have increased their long-term health
risks if they did not wear appropriate personal protective equipment. In regard to the
"Interim Final WTC Residential Confirmation Cleaning Study," the study report notes that
1 to 3 cleanings were necessary to achieve the health-related clearance levels, with the
number of cleanings related to the extent of dust in the unit. Further, the clearance levels
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were established to correspond to a 1 in 10,000 increased lifetime risk of cancer. As a
matter of comparison, for a Superfund site cleanup the desired cleanup goal is a 1 in
1,000,000 increased lifetime risk of cancer with a minimum goal of 1 in 10,000.
11. See response to note 2.
12. No comment needed.
13. Sugge sted change made.
14. Section clarified by adding the following statement:
New York City officials maintained that EPA had functional notice
of NESHAP related activities through its participation at these
meetings and that it was doubtful that notification would have
changed the manner in which these activities were conducted.
15. The report already points out that asbestos removal activities prior to September 11, 2001,
were of accessible asbestos materials, not all asbestos materials. No change made.
16. The last sentence of the footnote was revised as follows:
They also said that the vehicles did not require decontamination since they were not transporting
hazardous waste as defined by EPA under 40 CFR Part 260-280; and while decontamination
procedures were not required, wash down procedures were mandated.
17. Testimony at EPA Superfund Ombudsman, Congressional, New York State Assembly, and
New York City Council hearings is sufficient evidence to indicate a concern with removal
activities. The OIG draft report presents a balanced discussion of this issue, as the
testimonial evidence was supplemented with the results of ambient air readings in the area
around the barge as well as a consultant's opinion on the impact this may have had on
Stuyvesant High School.
18. Questions about lead contamination at Stuyvesant High School were raised in the news as
well as at EPA Superfund Ombudsman hearings. This information was retained in the final
report.
19. This paragraph was moved to Chapter 2 and revised during the editing process. During this
process the specific statements questioned by New York City were eliminated. Further, the
final report now includes the total number of air samples analyzed by the TEM method.
20. This paragraph was revised to eliminate the reference to a "public health emergency." The
correct reference should be "immediate hazard." We retained the FEMA officials'
statement about New York City's position on the formal indoor cleanup program because
this was the position presented to us during our October 21, 2002 interview with the New
York City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene's Assistant Commissioner for
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Environmental Health. We have also retained reference to the memorandum provided by
the EPA Region 2 Administrator. The questioned paragraph was revised as follows:
The indoor residential cleanup program was administered by EPA and New York
City. FEMA officials told us that they normally do not fund indoor cleanups of
private spaces related to a disaster unless an immediate hazard is declared. FEMA
officials told us that New York City officials indicated a formal cleanup program
was not needed. Therefore, in May 2002, the EPA Region 2 Administrator
provided FEMA with a memorandum that furnished the necessary justification to
authorize funding.
21. With regard to federal agency responsibilities, we agree that worker safety and personal
protective measures are within the jurisdiction of OSHA. However, protecting human
health and safety in an emergency is a shared goal, and one in which EPA actively
supported OSHA. Additionally, EPA was criticized for its efforts in this area and may
again face similar challenges in the future. Therefore, this is a legitimate topic for us to
address in our report.
22. The cited report is a public document, issued by a Federal Agency, therefore it is sufficient
evidence for us to cite. In addition, the report's findings related to safety measures at the
site were corroborated by press accounts, our interviews, and reports from various officials
present at the site. Further, we do not agree with New York City's interpretation of RCRA
regulations. Asbestos, is a hazardous substance under CERCLA and, therefore, the OSHA
definition of a hazardous waste operation as involving hazardous substances is appropriate.
Therefore, we have retained this section in our report.
23. This section was revised to better reflect the cited report's information and to eliminate any
misperception that the author's conclusions are those of our report. The section was
revised as follows:
In contrast to the recovery operation at the WTC site, the January 2002 report
noted that workers conducting WTC debris sorting and inspection at the Fresh
Kills landfill were wearing half-face respirators, hard hats, eye protection, and
Tyvek suits. The author noted that respiratory protection compliance by workers
at Fresh Kills was reported to be approximately 90 percent as opposed to 30-50
percent compliance at the WTC site. The author observed that:
"... debris is pulled by workers from the smoking, twisted
wreckage of the World Trade Centers and then wetted and
hauled to a site where the debris is carefully sorted by
workers wearing more protective clothing, much more
consistently
Moreover, the author noted that workers at the landfill were officially informed
that not wearing respirators would result in disciplinary action. OIG investigators
from our New York office who participated in the recovery operations confirmed
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the report's conclusions about the difference in respiratory use between the WTC
and landfill sites.
We do not agree with characterizing respirator use at Ground Zero as "less than 100%
compliance." We agree that the paragraph should be revised to directly quote the cited
letter and to eliminate the use of the term "decontamination." The paragraph was revised to
read as follows:
As the rescue phase progressed, EPA emergency response officials told us they
were concerned about the lack of respirator use at Ground Zero and outlined these
concerns in a letter to NYCDOH dated October 5, 2001. This letter outlined the
threat of potential exposure of workers to hazardous substances. The letter noted
that EPA ". . has recommended, and continues to recommend, that workers utilize
personal protective equipment and the personal wash stations to prevent the
spread of asbestos and other hazardous substances from the WTC to their homes,
cars, public transportation, food service locations, etc." The letter stated that EPA
had observed very inconsistent compliance with its recommendations, but did not
have the authority to enforce compliance with non-EPA/United States Coast
Guard employees. The letter concluded by recommending that the Incident
Commander adopt and enforce a site-wide Health and Safety Plan. A copy of the
letter is in Appendix P.
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Distribution
Appendix U
EPA Headquarters
Acting Administrator
Acting Assistant Administrator for Solid Waste and Emergency Response
Assistant Administrator for Air and Radiation
Assistant Administrator for Research and Development
Assistant Administrator for Environmental Information
Acting Associate Administrator, Office of Public Affairs
Comptroller (2731 A)
Agency Audit Follow-up Coordinator (2724A)
Audit Follow-up Coordinator, Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response
Audit Follow-up Coordinator, Office of Air and Radiation
Audit Follow-up Coordinator, Office of Research and Development
Audit Follow-up Coordinator, Office of Environmental Information
Audit Follow-up Coordinator, Office of Public Affairs
Associate Administrator for Congressional and Intergovernmental Relations (1301 A)
Director, Office of Regional Operations (1108A)
EPA Regions
Regional Administrators
Regional Audit Follow-up Coordinators
New York City Agencies
City of New York Law Department
EPA Office of Inspector General
Inspector General (2410)
Assistant Inspector General for Program Evaluation
Assistant Inspector General for Human Capital
Assistant Inspector General for Planning, Analysis and Results
Media and Congressional Liaison
Counsel
Science Advisor
Product Line Directors
Editor
Human Resource Center Managers
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